{"id":213839,"date":"1968-02-07T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1968-02-06T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/udai-ram-sharma-and-others-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-others-on-7-february-1968"},"modified":"2018-02-06T14:36:11","modified_gmt":"2018-02-06T09:06:11","slug":"udai-ram-sharma-and-others-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-others-on-7-february-1968","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/udai-ram-sharma-and-others-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-others-on-7-february-1968","title":{"rendered":"Udai Ram Sharma And Others Etc vs Union Of India And Others on 7 February, 1968"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Udai Ram Sharma And Others Etc vs Union Of India And Others on 7 February, 1968<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1968 AIR 1138, \t\t 1968 SCR (3)\t 41<\/div>\n
Author: G Mitter<\/div>\n
Bench: Wanchoo, K.N. (Cj), Bachawat, R.S., Shelat, J.M., Mitter, G.K., Vaidyialingam, C.A.<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nUDAI RAM SHARMA AND OTHERS ETC.\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nUNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT:\n07\/02\/1968\n\nBENCH:\nMITTER, G.K.\nBENCH:\nMITTER, G.K.\nWANCHOO, K.N. (CJ)\nBACHAWAT, R.S.\nSHELAT, J.M.\nVAIDYIALINGAM, C.A.\n\nCITATION:\n 1968 AIR 1138\t\t  1968 SCR  (3)\t 41\n CITATOR INFO :\n RF\t    1973 SC1150\t (2)\n RF\t    1974 SC2077\t (25)\n RF\t    1975 SC1699\t (3)\n RF\t    1975 SC2299\t (46,60)\n\n\nACT:\nLand Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act, 13 of 1967,\nss. 2, 3, 4, 5--Validity of Act--Validation of past  invalid\nreports\t under\ts.  5-A of Land\t Acquisition  Act  1894\t and\ndeclarations  under  s.\t 6  without  removal  of  lacuna  in\nsubstantive law whether an encroachment on judicial power by\nthe  legislature--Amendment  whether violates Arts.  14\t and\n31(2) of Constitution of India 1950.\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\nIn  the\t State of Madhya Pradesh v. V. P. Sharma,<\/a>  [1966]  3\nS.C.R. 557 this Court held that once a declaration under  s.\n6 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 was made the notification\nunder s. 4(1) of the Act was exhausted and there could be no\nsuccessive notifications under s. 6 with respect to land  in\na  locality  specified in one notification  under  s.  4(1).\nRelying\t on  the above judgment the present  writ  petitions\nwere  filed in order to challenge  successive  notifications\nunder s. 6 following a single notification under s. 4(1)  in\nrespect\t of land belonging to them.  Meanwhile in  order  to\nmeet the situation created by the judgment in V. P. Sharma's\ncase the President of India promulgated the Land Acquisition\n(Amendment  and\t Validation)  Ordinance (1  of\t1967).\t The\nOrdinance  was\tlater  followed\t by  the  Land\t Acquisition\n(Amendment and Validation) Act 1967.  Section 2 of this\t Act\npurported  to amend s. 5-A of the principal Act by  allowing\nthe making of more than one report in respect of land  which\nhad  been  notified under s. 4(1).  Section 3  purported  to\namend  s.  6 of the principal Act  by  empowering  different\ndeclarations  to  be made from time to time  in\t respect  of\ndifferent  parcels of land covered by the same\tnotification\nunder  s.  4(1)\t irrespective  of  whether  one\t report\t  or\ndifferent  reports  had been made under s. 5-A\tsub-s.\t(2).\nSection 4 of the Act purported to validate all\tacquisitions\nof  land  made\tor purporting to have been  made  under\t the\nprincipal  Act\tbefore\tthe commencement  of  the  ordinance\nnamely January 10, 1967, notwithstanding that more than\t one\ndeclaration  under  s. 6 had been made in pursuance  of\t the\nsame  notification  under s. 4(1), and\tnotwithstanding\t any\njudgment, decree or order of any court to the contrary.\t The\nAmending  Act  also laid down time limits  for\tdeclarations\nunder s. 6 of the principal Act after the notification under\ns  4(1),  had been issued in respect of\t notifications\tmade\nafter  January 20. 1967 the time limit was three  years;  in\nrespect of notification made before that date the time limit\nwas  to\t be two years after that date.\tProvision  was\talso\nmade for payment of interest on compensation due to  persons\nin  respect of whose land declarations under s. 6  had\tbeen\ndelayed beyond a specified period; no interest was  however,\nto  be paid to those to whom compensation had  already\tbeen\npaid.\nThe petitioners by leave of Court amended their petitions to\nattack the validity of the. aforesaid Validating Act on\t the\nfollowing  main\t grounds : (1) By seeking to  validate\tpast\ntransactions  of a kind which had been declared\t invalid  by\nthis Court without retrospectively changing the\t substantive\nlaw under which the past transactions had been effected\t the\nlegislature was encroaching over the domain of the  judicial\npower\tvested\t by  the  Constitution\tin   the   judiciary\nexclusively; (ii) The Validating Act did not\nL4Sup. C.I.1684\n42\nrevive\tthe  notification  under  s.  4\t which\thad   become\nexhausted  after  the first declaration under s.  6  and  no\nacquisition  following\tthereafter could be made  without  a\nfresh  notification  under s. 4; (iii)\tThe  Validating\t Act\nviolated  Art.\t31(2)  of the Constitution  inasmuch  as  it\npurported   to\t authorise   acquisitions   without    fresh\nnotifications under s. 4 thereby allowing compensation to be\npaid  on  the basis of the said . notification\tunder  s.  4\nwithout\t  allowing  for\t increase  in  the  value  of\tland\nthereafter; (iv) The Validating Act violated Art. 14 of\t the\nConstitution in various ways.\nHELD:  Per  Wanchoo C.J., Bachawat & Mitter,  JJ.-  (i)\t The\nAmerican doctrine of well defined separation of\t legislative\nand  judicial  powers  has no application to  India  and  it\ncannot\tbe  said  that\tan Indian  Statute  which  seeks  to\nvalidate  invalid  actions'  is bad if\tthe  invalidity\t has\nalready been pronounced upon by a court of law.\nA.K.  Gopalan v. State, [1950] S.C.R. 88, referred to.\n(ii) The absence of a provision in the amending Act to\tgive\nretrospective  operation to s. 3 of the Act does not  affect\nthe  validity  of s. 4. It was open to Parliament  to  adopt\neither\tcourse\te.g.  (a)  to  provide\texpressly  for\t the\nretrospective operation of s. 3, or, (b) to lay down that no\nacquisition purporting to have been made and no action taken\nbefore\tthe  Land  Acquisition\t(Amendment  and\t Validation)\nOrdinance,  1967  shall be deemed to be invalid or  even  to\nhave  become invalid because, inter alia, of the  making  of\nmore than one declaration under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition\nAct,  notwithstanding  any judgment decree or order  to\t the\ncontrary.  Parliament was competent to validate such actions\nand  transactions,  its\t power in  that\t behalf\t being\tonly\ncircumscribed  by  appropriate entries in the Lists  of\t the\nSeventh\t Schedule  and the fundamental rights  set-forth  in\nPart III of the Constitution.  Section 4 of the Amending Act\nbeing  within the legislative competence of Parliament,\t the\nprovisions  thereof  are  binding  on  all  courts  of\t law\nnotwithstanding judgments, orders or decrees to the contrary\nrendered or made in the past. [67 C-F]\nCase-law referred to.\n(iii) The impugned Act does not violate Art. 31(2).\nThe  Act  does\tnot in express terms  enact  any  law  which\ndirectly affects compensation payable in respect of property\nacquired nor does it lay down any principles different\tfrom\nthose  which  were already in the Land\tAcquisition  Act  of\n1894.\tAfter the amendment of the Constitution in 1955\t the\nquestion of compensation is not justiciable and it is enough\nif the law provides that a person expropriated must be given\ncompensation  for his property or lays down  the  principles\ntherefor. [67 G-H]\nThe Legislature might well have provided in the Act of\t1894\nthat  it would be open to the appropriate  Government  after\nissuing\t a  notification under s. 4 to\tconsider  objections\nraised\tunder s. 5 with regard to the  different  localities\nfrom  time  to time enabling different reports to  fie\tmade\nunder  s. 5-A with consequent adjustments in s. 6  providing\nfor declarations to be made as and when each report under s.\n5A was considered.  By the validation of action taken  under\ns.  6  more than once in respect of  a\tsingle\tnotification\nunder  s.  4,  the original scheme  of\tacquisition  is\t not\naltered.  The public purpose behind the notification remains\nthe  same.  It is not as if a different public\tpurpose\t and\nacquisition of land for such purpose were being interploated\nby means of the Validating Act.\t Only the shortcoming in the\nAct  as to want to provision to enable more than one  decla-\nration under s. 6 are being removed. [68 D-F]\n43\nThe  date of valuation under the Validation Act is  that  of\nthe  issue of notification under s. 4(1), a principle  which\nhas  held  the field since 1923\t Legislative  competence  to\nacquire\t land under the provisions of the  Land\t Acquisition\nAct cannot be challenged because of constant appreciation of\nland  values  all  over the country  due  to  the  prevalent\nabnormal inflation.  There must be some time lag between the\ncommencement and conclusion of land acquisition\t proceedings\nand  in\t principle there is nothing wrong in  accepting\t the\nsaid commencement as the date of valuation.  Sections 4\t and\n23  of the Land Acquisition Act are protected by Art.  31(5)\n(a) of the Constitution.  Only ss. 5-A and 6 of the Act have\nbeen amended.  The amendment does not alter the principle of\ncompensation fixed by the Act nor contravene Art. 31 of\t the\nConstitution in any way. [69 G-70 B]\nIt  cannot be said of the Validating Act that it was  fixing\nan  arbitrary date for the valuation of the  property  which\nbore  no  relation  to\tthe  acquisition  proceedings.\t The\npopulation  in\tIndian cities especially in the\t capital  is\never-increasing.   The State has to plan the development  of\ncities and it is not possible to take up all schemes in\t all\ndirections at the same time.  The resources of the State may\nnot  be\t sufficient to acquire all the area  required  by  a\nscheme\tat the same time.  Of necessity the area  under\t the\nproposed acquisition would have to be carved into blocks and\nthe  development of one or more blocks at a time could\tonly\nbe  taken  up in consonance with  the  resources  available.\nEven  contiguous  blocks could be  developed  gradually\t and\nsystematically.\t  In view of such factors it cannot be\tsaid\nthat  the principle of fixing compensation on the  basis  of\nthe  price prevailing on the date of the notification  under\ns.  4(1)  of  the Land Acquisition Act was  not\t a  relevant\nprinciple which satisfied the requirements of Art. 31(2).[70\nC-71 H]\nThe  State  of\tWest Bengal v. Mrs.  Bela  Banerjee,<\/a>  [1954]\nS.C.R.\t558,  State  of Madras v.  D.  Namasivaya  Mudaliar,<\/a>\n[1964] 6 S.C.R. 936 and,\nP.V.  Mudaliar\tv. Deputy Collector, [1965]  1\tS.C.R.\t614,\nconsidered.\n(iv) The validating Act was not violative of Art. 14.\nWhenever an Amending Act is passed there is bound to be some\ndifference  in\ttreatment between  transactions\t which\thave\nalready taken place and those which are to take place in the\nfuture.\t  That by itself will not attract the  operation  of\nArt. 14.  Again, even with respect to transactions which may\nbe completed in the future, a reasonable classification will\nnot be struck down. [72 C]\nJalan  Trading\tCo. v. Mazdoor Union,<\/a> [1967]  1\t S.C.R.\t 15,\nrelied on.\nIt  is\tnot  possible to say that  because  the\t Legislature\nthought\t of  improving upon the Act of 1894  by\t prescribing\ncertain\t limits\t of  time  as from  20th  January  1967\t the\ndifference in treatment in cases covered by the notification\nbefore\tthe said date and after the said date  denies  equal\nprotection   of\t laws  because\tthe  transactions  are\t not\nsimilarly  circumstanced.  Some of the notifications  issued\nunder s. 4 must have been made even more than 3 years before\n20th  January,\t1967 and such cases obviously could  not  be\ntreated\t in the same manner 'as notifications  issued  after\nthat  date.   Art.  14 does not\t strike\t at  differentiation\ncaused\tby  the\t enactment of  a  law  between\ttransactions\ngoverned  thereby and those which are not so governed.\t [73\nH-74 B]\nHatisingh Manufacturing Co., Ltd. v. Union of India,<\/a>  [1960]\n3 S.C.R. 528.\nNo  grievance  can  be made because interest  is  denied  to\npersons who\nhave   already\ttaken  the  compensation.   Even  here\t the\nclassification is not unreasonable and cannot be said to  be\nunrelated to the object of the Act.\n[74 E-F]\n44\nPer Shelat and Vaidialingam, JJ. (dissenting)-\nBy  validating the acquisition orders and declarations\tmade\non  the\t basis of an exhausted notification under s.  4\t the\nimpugned  Act saves government from having to issue a  fresh\nnotification  and having to pay compensation  calculated  on\nthe  market value as on the date of such fresh\tnotification\nand  depriving the expropriated owner of the benefit of\t the\nappreciated value in the meantime.  The real object of s.  4\nof the impugned Act is thus to save the State from having to\ncompensate  for\t such  appreciation  under  the\t device\t  of\nvalidating  all\t that  is  done\t under\tan  exhausted  s.  4\nnotification  and  thus in reality fixing an  anterior\tdate\ni.e.  the date of such a dead s. 4 notification\t for  fixing\nthe compensation.  The impugned Act thus suffers from a\t two\nfold  vice : (i) that it purports to  validate\tacquisitions\norders\t and   notifications   without\t resuscicating\t the\nnotification under s. 4 by any legislative provision on\t the\nbasis of which alone the validated acquisitions, orders\t and\ndeclarations  can  properly be sustained and (ii)  that\t its\nprovisions are in derogation of Art. 31(2) as interpreted by\nthis  Court by fixing compensation on the basis of value  on\nthe  date  of  notifications under s.  4  which\t had  become\nexhausted   and\t for  keeping  them  alive  no\t legislative\nprovision  is  to  be  found in the  impugned  Act.   It  is\ntherefore  not\tpossible  to agree with the  view  that\t the\npurpose\t of  s.\t 4  is to fill the  lacuna  pointed  out  in\nSharma's case nor with the view that it raises a question of\nadequacy  of compensation.  The section under the  guise  of\nvalidating   the  acquisitions,\t orders\t and   notifications\ncamouflages  the  real object of  enabling  acquisitions  by\npaying\tcompensation  on  the  basis  of  values  frozen  by\nnotifications\tunder  s  4  which  by\t part\tacquisitions\nthereunder  had lost their efficacy and\t therefore  required\nthe  rest  of  the land to be  notified\t afresh\t and  paying\ncompensation  on the date of such fresh notifications.\t The\nfact  that neither s. 4 nor s. 23 of the principal  Act\t are\naltered does not make any difference. [89 D-H, 85 H]\nSection 4 of the Amending Act must therefore be struck\tdown\nas invalid. [90 A]\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petitions Nos. 114, 216, 223 and
\n252 of 1966 and 85 of 1967.\n<\/p>\n
Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India\t for
\nthe enforcement of fundamental rights.\n<\/p>\n
C.B. Agarwala and K. P. Gupta, for the petitioners (in W.P.s
\nNos. 114, 216 and 252 of 1966 and 85 of 1967.)
\nR.V. S. Mani and K. P. Gupta for the petitioner (in  W.P.
\nNo. 223 of 1966).\n<\/p>\n
Niren  De,  Solicitor-General, B. R. L. lyengar\t and  R.  N.
\nSachthey  for the respondents (in W.Ps. Nos. 114 and 216  of
\n1966).\n<\/p>\n
Niren  De, Solicitor-General, R. H. Dhebar and R.  N.  Sach-
\nthey,  for respondents Nos. 1 to 5 (in W.P. No. 223 of\t1966
\nand the respondents (in W. P. No. 85 of 1967).
\nR.  N. Sachthey, for respondent No. 9 (in W. P. No.  223  of
\n1966).\n<\/p>\n
M.  K.\tRamamurthi,  Vineet Kumar  and\tShyamala  Pappu\t for
\nrespondents Nos. 12(a) to 12(d) (in W.P. No. 223 of 1-966).\n<\/p>\n
45<\/span><\/p>\n
V.  A . Seyid Muhammad and R. H. Dhebar and R. N.  Sachthey,
\nfor respondents Nos.  1 to 5 (in W. P. No. 252 of 1966).
\nP.C. Bhartari, for the intervener (in W.P. No. 114 of 1966).
\nThe Judgment of WANCHOO, C.J., BACHAWAT and MITTER, JJ.\t was
\ndelivered  by MITTER, J.  The dissenting opinion  of  SHELAT
\nand VAIDIALINGAM, JJ. was delivered by SHELAT, J.
\nMitter,\t J. Ms is a group of five Writ Petitions under\tArt.
\n32  of\tthe  Constitution  challenging\tin  four  cases\t the
\nvalidity  of  land  acquisition\t proceedings  started  by  a
\nnotification dated November 13, 1959 under s. 4 of the\tLand
\nAcquisition   Act  and\tdeclarations  contained\t  in   other
\nnotifications dated March 18, 1966 onwards under s. 6 of the
\nsaid  Act  and for other incidental  reliefs  including\t the
\nissue  of  appropriate\twrits  for  the\t purpose.    Various
\npersons.  have\tjoined\tas  petitioners\t in  three  of\t the
\napplications.\tIn  Writ  Petition  No.\t 114  of  1966\t the
\npetitioners  number  61.   They all  own  lands\t in  village
\nMandawali  Fazilpur,  on Patparganj Road  within  the  union
\nterritory  of  Delhi, the notification\tof  the\t declaration
\nunder,\ts.  6 having been made on March 18,  1966.  in\tWrit
\nPetition  No. 216 of 1966 there are 71 petitioners who\talso
\nown lands in the same village.\tTheir complaint is based  on
\nthe  same notification under s. 4 and a\t notification  dated
\nJuly  12, 1966 under s. 6 of the Act.  In Writ Petition\t No.
\n223  of\t 1966 the single petitioner is Pandit Lila  Ram\t who
\nowned  lands  in  villages Masjid  Moth,  Raipur  Khurd\t and
\nShahpur\t Jat  respectively  within the\tunion  territory  of
\nDelhi.\tHis complaint is based on a s. 4 notification  dated
\nSeptember 3, 1957, a notification dated April 15, 1961 under
\ns. 6 of the Act and several awards of Land Acquisition\tCol-
\nlector,\t Delhi\tmade in 1961.  In Writ Petition No.  252  of
\n1966, there are eight petitioners who owned lands in village
\nKotla  at  Patparganj  Road within the\tunion  territory  of
\nDelhi.\t Their grievance is against s. 4 notification  dated
\nNovember  13,  1959 and a notification dated June  14,\t1961
\nunder s. 6 of the Act.\tIn Writ Petition No. 85 of 1967\t the
\nsole petitioner is one Rai Bahadur Sohan Lal who owned\tland
\nin  village  Kilokri on the Delhi-Mathura  Road\t within\t the
\nunion  territory  of Delhi.  His grievance is against  s.  4
\nnotification  dated November 13, 1959, a notification  dated
\nJuly  27,  1961\t under s. 6 of the Act and  an\taward  dated
\nFebruary 16, 1962.\n<\/p>\n
Although there are some distinctive features in some of\t the
\npetitions to be mentioned later, the common attack is  based
\non the judgment of this Court delivered on February 9,\t1966
\nin  State .of Madhya Pradesh v. V. P. Sharma<\/a>(1).  That\tcase
\narose  out of proceedings for acquisition of land in  eleven
\nvillages in Madhya Pradesh for the steel plant at  Rourkela.
\nThere  a notification had been issued under s. 4(1)  of\t the
\nLand- Acquisition Act on May 16,
\n(1) [1966] 3 S.C.R. 557.\n<\/p>\n
46<\/span><\/p>\n
1949  declaring\t that lands in eleven  named  villages\twere
\nlikely to be needed for a, public purpose i.e., the erection
\nof an iron and steel plant.  Thereafter, notifications\twere
\nissued\tunder  s.  6 from time to time\tand  some  lands  in
\nvillage Chhawani were acquired in the year 1956.  In  August
\n1960  a fresh notification under s. 6 of the Act was  issued
\nproposing  to  acquire,\t Ac.  486-17 of\t land  in  the\tsaid
\nvillage.   Some owners of the land in the village  who\twere
\naffected   by  the  notification  filed\t ‘a  writ   petition
\nchallenging the validity of the notification under s. 6. The
\nHigh Court accepted their contention whereupon the State  of
\nMadhya Pradesh came up to this Court in appeal.\t It was held
\nby this Court that ss. 4, 5-A and 6 of the Land\t Acquisition
\nAct  were integrally connected and that\t acquisition  always
\nbegan  with  a\tnotification  under  s.\t 4(1)  followed\t  by
\nconsideration  of all objections thereto under s. 5-A and  a
\ndeclaration  under  s. 6. According to this  Court,  once  a
\ndeclaration  under s. 6 was made the notification  under  s.
\n4(1)  was  exhausted  and  the\tlatter\tsection\t was  not  a
\nreservoir from which the Government might from time to\ttime
\ndraw  out  land\t and make declaration  with  respect  to  it
\nsuccessively.  The ultimate conclusion was that there  could
\nbe  no successive notifications under s. 6 with\t respect  to
\nland  in a locality specified in one notification  under  s.
\n4(1)  and  in  the  result, the\t appeal\t of  the  State\t was
\ndismissed.  The present Writ Petitions were all filed  after
\nthe said judgment of this Court.\n<\/p>\n
The  omnibus notification under s. 4 in four of these  cases
\ndated  November\t 13, 1959 covered an area of  Ac.  34,070-00
\nmarked\tas blocks Nos.\tA to T and X in a map enclosed\twith
\nthe  notification  excepting therefrom\tcertain\t classes  of
\nlands,\tnamely,\t (a) Government land and evacuee  land,\t (b)
\nland already notified either under s. 4 or under s. 6 of the
\nAct  for  any Government scheme, (c) land  already  notified
\neither\tunder  S.  4 or under s. 6 for\thouse  building\t co-
\noperative  societies  mentioned\t in annexure  (iii)  to\t the
\nnotification and the land under graveyards, tombs,  shrine-,
\nand  those  attached  to  religious  institutions  and\twakf
\nproperty, The notification stated that land was required  by
\nthe  Government at the public expense for a public  purpose,
\nnamely, the planned development of Delhi.  As already noted,
\nthere  were several notifications under s. 6 made from\ttime
\nto time, the earliest one in this series of petitions  being
\ndated  June 14, 1961.  It is clear that on the basis of\t the
\njudgment  of  this Court the validity of  the  notifications
\nunder  s. 6 of the Act after the first of the  series  could
\nnot be upheld in A court of law.\n<\/p>\n
On  January  20, 1967 an Ordinance was\tpromulgated  by\t the
\nPresident  of India styled The Land  Acquisition  (Amendment
\nand  Validation) Ordinance (1 of 1967).\t The scheme  of\t the
\nOrdinance  was that the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 was  to
\nhave  effect, subject to the amendments specified in  ss.  3
\nand 4 of the Ordin-\n<\/p>\n
47<\/span><\/p>\n
ance.\tSection\t 3  purported to amend s. 5-A  of  the\tLand
\nAcquisition  Act (hereinafter referred to as  the  principal
\nAct) by enabling different reports to be made in respect  of
\ndifferent  parcels  of\tland  under  s.\t 5-A  of  the\tAct.
\nSimilarly, s. 4 of the Ordinance purported to amend s. 6  of
\nthe  principal Act by enabling different declarations to  be
\nmade  from time to time in respect of different\t parcels  of
\nland covered by the same notification under s. 4. Section  5
\nof  the Ordinance purported to validate all acquisitions  of
\nland  made  or\tpurporting  to\thave  been  made  under\t the
\nprincipal  Act\tbefore the commencement\t of  the  Ordinance,
\nnotwithstanding\t any judgment, decree or order of any  court
\nto the contrary.\n<\/p>\n
On April 12, 1967 Parliament passed an Act (Act 13 of  1967)
\nstyled\tThe  Land  Acquisition (Amendment  and\tShort  Title
\nValidation)  Act, 1967.\t Section 2 of this Act purported  to
\namend  S.  5-A of the principal Act to allow the  making  of
\nmore  than  one\t report in respect of land  which  had\tbeen
\nnotified  under s. 4(1).  Section 3 similarly  purported  to
\namend  s.  6 of the principal Act  by  empowering  different
\ndeclarations  to  be made from time to time  in\t respect  of
\ndifferent  parcels of land covered by the same\tnotification
\nunder  s.  4(1)\t irrespective  of  whether  one\t report\t  or
\ndifferent  reports  had been made under s. 5-A\tsub-s.\t(2).
\nClause\t(ii)  of  s. 3 inserted a new  proviso\tto  s.\t6(1)
\nreading.:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “Provided\t that no declaration in\t respect  of
\n\t      any particular land covered by a\tnotification
\n\t      under  section 4, sub-section  (1),  published
\n\t      after the commencement of the Land Acquisition
\n\t      (Amendment  and Validation)  Ordinance,  1967,
\n\t      shall be made after the expiry of three  years
\n\t      from the date of such publication.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
As  a. good deal of argument turns on the interpretation  of
\ns.  4 of the Amending Act, it is necessary to set  the\tsame
\nout in extenso :\n<\/p>\n
“4. (1) Notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any
\ncourt to the contrary,-\n<\/p>\n
(a)  no acquisition of land made or purporting to have\tbeen
\nmade under the principal Act before the commencement of\t the
\nLand Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967,
\nand no action taken or thing done (including any order made,
\nagreement  entered  into,  or  notification  published)\t  in
\nconnection  With  such\tacquisition shall be  deemed  to  be
\ninvalid or ever to have become invalid merely on the ground-\n<\/p>\n
(i) that one or more Collectors have performed the functions
\nof Collector under the principal Act in respect of the\tland
\ncovered\t by the same notification under sub-section  (1)  of
\nsection 4 of the principal Act;\n<\/p>\n
(ii)that  one  or more reports have been  made\tunder  sub-
\nsection (2) of section 5-A of the principal Act, whe-\n<\/p>\n
48<\/span><\/p>\n
ther  in  respect of the entire land, or  different  parcels
\nthereof, covered by the same notification under\t sub-section
\n(1) of section 4 of the principal Act;\n<\/p>\n
(iii)  that  one or more declarations have been\t made  under
\nsection\t 6  of\tthe principal Act in  respect  of  different
\nparcels of land covered by the same notification under\tsub-
\nsection (1) of section 4 of the principal Act;\n<\/p>\n
(b)  any  acquisition  in  pursuance  of  any\tnotification
\npublished  under sub-section (1) of section 4 of  the  prin-
\ncipal  Act before the commencement of the  Land\t Acquisition
\n(Amendment and Validation) Ordinance 1967, may be made after
\nsuch  commencement  and no such acquisition  and  no  action
\ntaken  or  thing done (including any order  made,  agreement
\nentered\t into or notification published), whether before  or
\nafter such commencement, in connection with such acquisition
\nshall be deemed to be invalid merely on the grounds referred
\nto in clause. (a)   or any of them.\n<\/p>\n
(2)  Notwithstanding  anything\tcontained in clause  (b)  of
\nsub-section  (1),  no  declaration under section  6  of\t the
\nprincipal Act in respect of any land which has been notified
\nbefore\tthe commencement of the Land Acquisition  (Amendment
\nand  Validation) Ordinance, 1967, under sub-section  (1)  of
\nsection\t 4  of the principal Act, shall be  made  after\t the
\nexpiry\tof  two\t years from the\t commencement  of  the\tsaid
\nOrdinance.\n<\/p>\n
(3)Where  acquisition of any particular land covered by\t a
\nnotification  under  sub-section  (1) of section  4  of\t the
\nprincipal Act, published before the commencement of the Land
\nAcquisition  (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967,  is
\nor  has\t been  made in pursuance of  any  declaration  under
\nsection 6 of the principal Act, whether made before or after
\nsuch commencement, and such declaration is or has been\tmade
\nafter the expiry of three years from the date of publication
\nof  such notification, there shall be paid simple  interest,
\ncalculated  at\tthe rate of six per cent per  annum  on\t the
\nmarket value of such land, as determined under section 23 of
\nthe  principal\tAct,  from the date of expiry  of  the\tsaid
\nperiod\tof three years to the date of tender of\t payment  of
\ncompensation awarded by the Collector for the acquisition of
\nsuch land :\n<\/p>\n
Provided  that\tno such interest shall be  payable  for\t any
\nperiod\tduring which the proceedings for the acquisition  of
\nany  land were held up on account of stay or  injunction  by
\norder of a court
\n49<\/span>
\n\t      Provided\tfurther\t that nothing in  this\tsub-
\n\t      section shall apply to the acquisition of\t any
\n\t      land where the amount of compensation has been
\n\t      paid  to\tthe persons  interested\t before\t the
\n\t      commencement of this Act.”\n<\/p>\n
Section 5 of the Amending Act repealed the Land Acquisition,
\n(Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967 and further\tpro-
\nvided that notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any
\naction taken under the principal Act as amended by the\tsaid
\nOrdinance  shall be deemed to have been done or taken  under
\nthe principal Act as amended by,_this Act as it this Act had
\ncome into force on the 20th January, 1967.
\nThe  petitions before us were amended by leave of the  Court
\nso  that  the Validation Act of 1967 could.  be\t challenged.
\nMr. C. B. Agarwala who appeared for the petitioners in\tWrit
\nPetitions  Nos. 114, 216, 252 of 1966 and 85 of 1967  raised
\nthe  following points in support of the petitions : (1)\t The
\nValidation  Act does not revive the notification under s.  4
\nwhich  had  become exhausted. after  the  first\t declaration
\nunder s. 6 and no acquisition could be made without a  fresh
\nnotification  under  s. 4. (2) The Validation  Act  violated
\nArt. 31( 2) of the Constitution inasmuch as it purported  to
\nauthorise acquisitions without fresh notifications under  s.
\n4  thereby allowing compensation to be paid on the basis  of
\nthe dead notification under s. 4. It was argued that once  a
\nnotification under s. 4 was exhausted Government had to make
\na  fresh  one under the said section; as  a  result  thereof
\ncompensation  had  to  be  assessed  on\t a  different  basis
\naltogether.  (3) The Validation Act violated Art. 14 of\t the
\nConstitution in various ways –\n<\/p>\n
(a)  It-  made\tdiscrimination inasmuch\t as  a\tnotification
\nunder-s.  4  made before the commencement of  the  Ordinance
\nhad  to be followed by a declaration under s. 6\t within\t two
\nyears of the said’ date, whereas if a notification under  s.
\n4  was\tmade after 20th January 1967 i.e. the  date  of\t the
\nOrdinance, the declaration under s. 6 could be made within a
\nperiod\tof  three years from the date  of  the\tnotification
\nunder s. 4. The discrimination lay in the fact that  whereas
\na  declaration\tunder s. 6 had to be made in  respect  of  a
\nnotification  under  s. 4 bearing date\tsubsequent  to\t20th
\nJanuary\t 1967  within three years, a much longer  period  of
\ntime  might elapse between a date of declaration under s.  6
\nand  a notification under s. 4 issued prior to the  date  of
\nthe Ordinance.\n<\/p>\n
(b) If a notification under s. 4 was made after the date  of
\nthe  Ordinance, compensation had to be paid on the basis  of
\nsuch notification but if a notification had been made  under
\ns.  4  of  the\tAct  before  the  date\tof  the\t  Ordinance,
\ncompensation would be awarded on the basis, of the exhausted
\nnotification under s. 4 however much time might have elapsed
\nsince the date of the dead notification.\n<\/p>\n
50<\/span><\/p>\n
(c)If compensation had not been paid before the Ordinance,
\ninterest  at 6% had to be paid to the owner of the  land  on
\nthe  ,amount  of compensation fixed, but if  the  owner\t had
\nreceived  compensation before the date of the Ordinance,  he
\nhad  no claim to interest although the acquisition  in\tboth
\ncases flowed from the same notification under s. 4.\n<\/p>\n
(d)  It was open to Government to make a fresh\tnotification
\nunder  s. 4 after the lapse of three years from the date  of
\nthe  Ordinance and such notification might be  issued  after
\nevery period of three years in any case where acquistion was
\nnot  completed.\t  In  such cases, owners of  land  would  be
\nsubstantially benefited by the new notification under s.  4.
\nBut  if a notification had been made before the date of\t the
\nOrdinance, the owner of the land would receive\tcompensation
\nbased on the old notification although a period much  longer
\nthan  three  years  might elapse between  the  date  of\t the
\nnotification  under s. 4 and a declaration under s.  6,\t his
\nonly solatium being interest at 6% p.a. on the amount of the
\ncompensation.  This would result in discrimination  inasmuch
\nas  a  person affected by a s. 4 notification prior  to\t the
\ndate  of  the Ordinance would be treated.  very\t differently
\nfrom  another person whose land was acquired in terms  of  a
\nnotification made after the commencement of the Ordinance.
\nOn the first point, it was argued by Mr. Agarwala that ss. 2
\n:and  3 of the Amending Act had no retrospective  operation,
\nthat   there  was  no  law  which  purported   to   validate
\nretrospectively\t any but the first report made under s.\t 5-A
\nof the principal Act or any but the first declaration issued
\nunder  S. 6 of the Act and consequently there was  no  legal
\nbasis for the validation of such past acts by the  operation
\nof  s.-4 of the Amending Act.  It was therefore argued\tthat
\nthe defect in the principal Act as pointed out by this Court
\nin  V.\tP. Sharma’s case(1) was not removed by s. 4  of\t the
\nAmending  Act.\tIt was urged that Acts seeking\tto  validate
\npast  transactions  can only be effective if  the  amendment
\nintroduced  had\t retrospective operation so as to  cure\t the
\nlacuna ‘in the enactment from a date anterior to that of the
\nimpugned   transactions.   If  the  Amending  Act   had\t  no
\nretrospective\toperation,   it\t could\tnot   protect\tpast
\ntransactions  which would still have to be declared  invalid
\ninasmuch as the notification under S. 4 made on November 13,
\n1959  having  exhausted itself after the  first\t declaration
\nunder  S.  6 was not resusciated by any\t provision  ,of\t the
\nAmending Act.\n<\/p>\n
On the second point, the broad contention urged was that the
\namendment was hit by Art. 31(2) of the Constitution inasmuch
\nas  its\t whole\tpurpose was to\tavoid  payment\tof  enhanced
\ncompensation   which  would  be\t necessitated  if  a   fresh
\nnotification  had to be issued under s. 4. The\tnotification
\ndated November 13, 1959
\n(1) [1966] 3 S.C.R. 557.\n<\/p>\n
51<\/span><\/p>\n
having spent itself, a fresh one in the normal course  would
\nhave to be issued and compensation be paid not on the  basis
\nof valuation on November 13, 1959 but on that prevailing  at
\nleast  8 or 9 years afterwards which would be  substantially
\nhigher.\t It was argued that acquisition on the basis of\t any
\ndeclaration under S. 6 of the Act after the first one  would
\nin  effect be providing for compensation on the basis  of  a
\nnotification  under  s.\t 4  which had  no  relation  to\t the
\nacquisition.   In  other  words, the  date  of\tthe  earlier
\nnotification  under s. 4 must be treated to be an  arbitrary
\ndate divorced, from and completely alien to the\t acquisition
\nsought to be made by a subsequent declaration under S. 6. In
\nsuch  circumstances, the ratio of a number of  decisions  of
\nthis Court starting from that of The State of West Bengal v.
\nMrs. Bela Banerjee<\/a>(1) to a recent judgment in Union of India
\nv.Kamalabai  Harjivandas Parekh and others(2)  would  apply.
\nIt  is\tnot  necessary to examine  all\tthese  decisions  in
\ndetail.\t  The notable decisions to which reference was\tmade
\nat  some  length are P. V. Mudaliar v.\tDy.   Collector(3),,
\nJeejeebhoy v. Asstt.  Collector(4)and State of Madras v.  D.
\nNamasivaya Mudaliar<\/a>(5).\t It was argued that though the\tLand
\nAcquisition  Act  was  saved  by  Art.\t31(5)  (a)  of\t the
\nConstitution,\tany  amendment\tthereto\t after\tthe   coming
\ninto force of the Constitution had to pass the test of\tArt.
\n13  and\t Art.  31(2)  would apply with\tfull  force  to\t any
\namendment of the Land Acquisition Act if as a result thereof
\na  person expropriated was being deprived  of  compensation,
\ni.e.,  the  just equivalent of the property  acquired.\t The
\npoint  sought  to  be  made was\t that  the  notification  of
\nNovember 13, 1959, having exhausted itself, the value of the
\nproperty  at  or  about that date  would  be  illusory\tcom-
\npensation  in  violation  of  Art. 31(2)  in  respect  of  a
\ndeclaration  under  S.\t6 made after the first\tone  of\t the
\nseries.\t  Reference was made to proceedings  for  compulsory
\nacquisition of land in England under the Lands Clauses\tActs
\nunder\twhich  “once  the  undertakers\tor   authority\t are
\nauthorised  to purchase, the next step in the normal  course
\nis  to\tserve  a notice to  treat”-see\tHalsbury’s  Laws  of
\nEngland,   third  edition,  Vol.  10,  page  60,  Art.\t 97.
\nIt is pointed out in Art. 102 of the said book that
\n\t      “The effect of serving a notice to treat is to
\n\t      establish\t  a  relation  analogous   in\tsome
\n\t      respects to that of a purchaser and vendor,  a
\n\t      relation\twhich binds the undertakers to\ttake
\n\t      the land and binds the, land-owner to give  up
\n\t      the  land subject to his being paid  compensa-
\n\t      tion,  but until the price is ascertained\t the
\n\t\t\t    land  remains  the property of  the\t l
\nandowner.\n<\/p>\n
\t      Both parties have the
\n(1) [1954] S.C.R. 558.\n<\/p>\n
(2)  C.A. 1564\/1966 decided on 7-9-1967.\n<\/p>\n
(3)  [1965] 1 S.C.R. 614.\n<\/p>\n
(4)  [1965] 1 S.C.R. 636.\n<\/p>\n
(5)  [1964] 6 S.C.R. 936.\n<\/p>\n
52<\/span><\/p>\n
\t      right  to have the price ascertained  and\t the
\n\t      purchase\tcompleted in manner provided by\t the
\n\t      Lands Clauses Acts.”\n<\/p>\n
It  was said that the English procedure ensured the  payment
\nof  just  equivalent of the property to the person  who\t was
\ndeprived  of it and that issue of a declaration under  s.  6
\nmade  years  after the notification under s. 4 the  date  of
\nwhich alone was to be considered for fixing the value of the
\nproperty,  ignored  the rights of the person to\t the  lawful
\ncompensation  aimed  at by Art. 31(2) of  the  Constitution.
\nReference was made to the judgment of the Judicial Committee
\nof  the\t Privy\tCouncil in Ezra v. Secretary  of  State\t for
\nIndia(1)  where on a reference to the sections of  the\tLand
\nAcquisition Act as they then stood, it was observed :\n<\/p>\n
\t      “that  the  expert official charged  with\t the
\n\t      duty of fixing a value should-be possessed  of
\n\t      all  the\tinformation  in\t the  hands  of\t the
\n\t      department, and should at the same time  avail
\n\t      himself of all that is offered at the enquiry,
\n\t      his  ultimate duty being not to  conclude\t the
\n\t      owner  by his so-called award, but to fix\t the
\n\t      sum,  which in Ms best judgment is  the  value
\n\t      and should be offered.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
On the question of violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution,
\nbesides\t the  general argument already referred to,  it\t was
\nurged  that  in\t Writ Petition No. 85 of 1967  there  was  a
\nfurther point as to discrimination.  The facts laid in\tthis
\npetition  are as follows.  The petitioner was the  owner  of
\nland  measuring Ac. 10-62 in village Kilokri.  He wanted  to
\ndevelop\t the land by establishing a residential\t colony\t and
\nselling\t the  same out in plots.  For this purpose,  he\t had
\nspent  a good deal of money and taken enormous\ttrouble\t and
\ndivided\t the  area  after development  into  78\t residential
\nplots.\tIn 1956 he had submitted a lay out plan of the\tland
\nin question for necessary, sanction to the Delhi Development
\nProvisional Authority.\tOn June 18, 1956 he was informed  by
\nthe Delhi Development Provisional Authority that the,  final
\nlay  out plan had been approved by the said  authority.\t  In
\nSeptember   1957  the  said  authority\tdemanded  from\t the
\npetitioner  a security for Rs. 12,850-25 as a guarantee\t for
\ncarrying  out  the development of the colony  in  accordance
\nwith the approved standards and this sum was duly  deposited
\nby  the\t petitioner.  On September 15, 1958  the  petitioner
\nsubmitted  service plans in respect of his colony and  these
\nwere  duly checked and found to be in order : the  case\t was
\nordered\t to be Placed before the Standing Committee  of\t the
\nMunicipal  Corporation for approval.  By December  24,\t1958
\nthe Standing Committee’referred the case
\nR. 32 Calcutta 605 at 629.\n<\/p>\n
53<\/span><\/p>\n
back  to  the Town Planner for a scrutiny of  the  ownership
\ndocuments.  The question relating to the proof of  ownership
\nwas  settled  on  March\t 19, 1961.   In\t the  meantime,\t the
\nnotification  dated November 13, 1959 had been issued  under
\ns.  4(1)  of  the  Act.\t  The  petitioner  duly\t filed\t his
\nobjections under s. 5-A of the Act.  By a notification dated
\nJuly 1, 1960 published by the Delhi Administration the Chief
\nCommissioner,  Delhi, withdrew the land of 16 colonies\tfrom
\nthe acquisition out of the area covered by the\tnotification
\nof  November 13, 1959 on the ground that their lay out\tplan
\nhad  been sanctioned by the Delhi Municipal Corporation\t and
\nas  per\t general decision of the Standing  Committee,  Delhi
\nMunicipal Corporation, the petitioner was asked by the\tTown
\nPlanner\t by  letter  dated April 16, 1960 to  submit  a\t de-
\nnotification  certificate  to  the  effect  that  the\tland
\ncomprising  the proposed lay out of his colony was  excluded
\nfrom  the purview of the notification issued under s.  4  of
\nthe Act.  On June 14, 1961 the Deputy Housing  Commissioner,
\nDelhi Administration, issued the first notification under s.
\n6 of the Act in respect of 97 bighas and 4 biswas of land in
\nvillage\t Kilokri as required by the Government for a  public
\npurpose\t  at  the  public  expense,  namely,   the   planned
\ndevelopment of Delhi.  The petitioners land was not  covered
\nby  this  notification.\t The  Deputy  Housing  Commissioner,
\nDelhi  Administration,\tpurported  to  issue  another  noti-
\nfication  dated\t 26\/27th July, 1961 under s. 6\tof  the\t Act
\ndeclaring that land specified therein in village Kilokri was
\nrequired to be taken by the Government at public expense for
\na public purpose.  This notification covered the petitioners
\nland in question in village Kilokri.  On January 9, 1962 the
\npetitioner was informed by a letter issued by the office  of
\nthe  Town  Planner, Municipal Corporation, Delhi,  that\t the
\nStanding  Committee  of\t the Municipal\tCorporation  by\t its
\nresolution No. 1190 dated December 18, 1961 had rejected the
\nlay  out plan of the petitioner’s colony.  According to\t the
\npetitioner,  this resolution went to show that his land\t was
\nsought\tto be acquired because it had not  been\t de-notified
\nalong with the land of the other colonies on the ground that
\nthe Standing Committee had rejected the lay out plan of\t his
\ncolony.\t  Thereafter the Land Acquisition Collector,  Delhi,
\nmade an award No. 1276 dated February 16, 1962 with  respect
\nto the petitioner’s said land.\tIn March 1965 the petitioner
\nlearnt\t about\t the  notification  issued  by\t the   Delhi
\nAdministration\ton  July 1, 1960 under s. 48(1) of  the\t Act
\nwithdrawing  the land of the 16 colonies  mentioned  therein
\nfrom  the  acquisition\tout  of\t the  area  covered  by\t the
\nnotification  dated  November 13, 1959 on  the\tground\tthat
\ntheir  lay  out\t plan  had  been  sanctioned  by  the  Delhi
\nMunicipal  Corporation.\t By letter dated March 10, 1965\t the
\npetitioner  asked  the Deputy  Housing\tCommissioner,  Delhi
\nAdministration,\t for  restoration of his land  on  the\tsame
\nbasis because his lay out plan
\n54<\/span>
\nhad  been  sanctioned before the s.  4\tnotification.\tThis
\nrequest was however turned down by letter dated May 14, 1965
\non  the ground that the petitioner’s land had  already\tbeen
\nacquired  and  could  not be  released.\t  According  to\t the
\npetitioner,  there was no basis for treating his land  in  a
\nmanner\tdifferent  from\t that  of  the\t16  colonies.\tThis
\ndifferential treatment has resulted in violation of Art.  14
\nof  the\t Constitution so far as the petitioner’s  colony  is
\nconcerned.\n<\/p>\n
Mr.  Agarwala also tried to make a subsidiary point in\tthis
\nconnection  and urged that acquisition of petitioner’s\tland
\nwas  a\tcolourable  exercise  of the  power  under  the\t Act
\ninasmuch  as the petitioner was out to do the same thing  as
\nwas  sought  to\t be  achieved  by  proceedings\tunder\tLand
\nAcquisition Act, the only difference being that whereas\t the
\nsales  effected\t by  him were  at  reasonable  rates,  those
\nfetched at auction of lands acquired under the Act were\t for
\nmuch higher figures and the State was really making  revenue
\nout of such acquisitions.\n<\/p>\n
Mr.  R. V. S. Mani<\/a> who appeared for the petitioner  in\tWrit
\nPetition  No.  223  of 1966 adopted  the  arguments  of\t Mr.
\nAgarwala  in general but sought to make a special  point  of
\nhis  own.  In substance the additional ground urged  by\t him
\nwas that by the Validating Act the Legislature had sought to
\nencroach  into\tthe  domain  of\t the  Judiciary.   Mr.\tMani
\ncontended  that\t although there was no clear  separation  of
\nlegislative   and  judicial  powers  in\t our   Constitution,
\nnevertheless  the  Constitution\t did  not  confer  unlimited
\npowers\ton the legislature and it was for the  Judiciary  to
\ndeclare\t the limits of the legislative powers  enshrined  in
\nthe Constitution.  To quote Mr. Mani’s words :\n<\/p>\n
\t      “The  Legislature exercises judicial power  if
\n\t      its  legislative\taction\tretroacts  on\tpast
\n\t      controversies  and overrides or  reverses\t the
\n\t      decisions of the Judiciary.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Such  an  act,\targued Mr. Mani, bad to be  struck  down  in
\ncourts of law.\n<\/p>\n
Mr. Mani’s main argument was that inasmuch as ss. 2 and 3 of
\nthe  Amending Act had not been given  retrospective  effect,
\nthe validation sought to be effected by s. 4 with respect to
\nthe  past  transactions\t was of no  avail  as  the  impugned
\nactions, i.e., the subsequent declarations under s. 6 of the
\nAct, had no legal basis.\n<\/p>\n
In our opinion no useful purpose will be served by referring
\nto  the\t clear demarcation between the judicial\t powers\t and
\nlegislative  powers  in America and attempt to\tengraft\t the
\nsaid  principle\t in the working of our\tConstitution.\tThis
\ndevelopment of the
\n55<\/span>
\nlaw, as pointed out in A. K. Gopalan v. State(“) was due  to
\nhistorical reasons.  In that case it was pointed out by Das,
\nJ. (see, at p. 286) that
\n\t      “the Supreme Court of the United States, under
\n\t      the  leadership  of  Chief  Justice  Marshall,
\n\t\t\t    assumed   the   power  to\tdeclare
\nany   law
\n\t      unconstitutional\ton  the ground\tof  its\t not
\n\t      being in “due process of law,” It is thus that
\n\t      the   Supreme   Court  established   its\t own
\n\t      supremacy over the executive and the Congress.
\n\t      In  India\t the position of  the  Judiciary  is
\n\t      somewhere in between the Courts in England and
\n\t      the United States.  While in the main  leaving
\n\t      our  Parliament  and  the\t State\tLegislatures
\n\t      supreme\tin  their   respective\t legislative
\n\t      fields,  our Constitution has, by some of\t the
\n\t      articles,\t put  upon the\tLegislature  certain
\n\t      specified\t      limitations………\t Our
\n\t      Constitution, unlike the English Constitution,
\n\t      recognises  the  Court’s\tsupremacy  over\t the
\n\t      legislative authority, but such supremacy is a
\n\t      very  limited one, for it is confined  to\t the
\n\t      field   where   the   legislative\t  power\t  is
\n\t      circumscribed  by limitations put upon  it  by
\n\t      the   Constitution   itself.    Within\tthis
\n\t      restricted field the Court may, on a  scrutiny
\n\t      of the law made by the Legislature, declare it
\n\t      void  if it is found to have transgressed\t the
\n\t      constitutional limitations.”\n<\/p>\n
It  will not serve any useful purpose to note the  decisions
\nof  this  Court\t where\treference  has\tbeen  made  to\t the
\ndistinction  between, the Indian Constitutional law and\t the
\nAmerican  Constitutional  law  on this\tsubject.   Mr.\tMani
\nsought\tto rely on a statement of the law made by Cooley  in
\nhis  Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., p. 137, as  quoted
\nin  Willoughby’s Constitution of the United  States,  second
\nedition, Vol. 3, at page 1651 that
\n\t      “If   the\t  legislature  would   prescribe   a
\n\t      different rule for the future from that  which
\n\t      the  courts  enforce,  it\t must  be  done\t  by
\n\t      statute,\tand cannot be done by a\t mandate  to
\n\t      the courts which leaves the law unchanged, but
\n\t      seeks  to\t compel the courts to  construe\t and
\n\t      apply  it not according to the  judicial,\t but
\n\t      according to the legislative judgment………
\n\t      If  the  legislature  cannot  thus  indirectly
\n\t      control the action of the courts, by requiring
\n\t      of them a construction of the law according to
\n\t      its  own views, it is very plain it cannot  do
\n\t      so directly, by setting aside their judgments’
\n\t      compelling them to grant new trials,  ordering
\n\t      the discharge of offenders, or directing\twhat
\n\t      particular   steps  shall\t be  taken  in\t the
\n\t      progress of a judicial. inquiry.\n<\/p>\n
(1)  [1950] S.C.R. 88 at 198.\n<\/p>\n
56<\/span><\/p>\n
According to Willoughby,
\n\t      “Retroactive   legislation,  which  does\t not
\n\t      impair  vested  rights,  or  violate   express
\n\t      constitutional  prohibitions,  is\t valid,\t and
\n\t      therefore, particular legal remedies, and,  to
\n\t      a\t certain  extent, rules of evidence  may  be
\n\t\t\t    changed  and,  as changed, made  appli
\ncable  to
\n\t      past  transactions,……\t   But\t substantial
\n\t      rights may not thus be interfered with.”\n<\/p>\n
Willoughby  seeks  to  fortify his  statement  quoting\tfrom
\nCooley again :\n<\/p>\n
\t      “The  legislature does, or may, prescribe\t the
\n\t      rules  under  which  the\tjudicial  power\t  is
\n\t      exercised\t by the courts; and in doing  so  it
\n\t      may  dispense, with any of  those\t formalities
\n\t      which are not essential to the jurisdiction of
\n\t      the  court; and whatever it may dispense\twith
\n\t      by  statute  anterior to the  proceedings,  we
\n\t      believe  it may also dispense with by  statute
\n\t      after the proceedings have been taken, if\t the
\n\t      court  has  failed  to observe  any  of  those
\n\t      formalities.   But it would not  be  competent
\n\t      for  the legislature to authorize a  court  to
\n\t      proceed  and  adjudicate upon  the  rights  of
\n\t      parties, without giving them an opportunity to
\n\t      be heard before it and, for the same reason it
\n\t      would be incompetent for it, by  retrospective
\n\t      legislation,  to\tmake valid  any\t proceedings
\n\t      which  had been had in the courts,  but  which
\n\t      were  void for want of jurisdiction  over\t the
\n\t      parties.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Relying\t on the above Mr. Mani proceeded to argue  that\t the
\nwording\t of s. 4 of the Amending Act was not a\tquestion  of
\nmere form and that it was a decree purporting to operate  as
\nsuch.  According to him unless s. 3 was’ retrospective, s. 4
\nwould  be meaningless and should be struck down.   Mr.\tMani
\nrelied particularly on the decision of the Federal Court  in
\nBasanta\t Chandra Ghose v. King Emperor(1) where it was\theld
\nby  this Court that Ordinance No. III of 1944 did  not\ttake
\naway  the  power of the court to investigate  and  interfere
\nwith  orders of detention or deprive the court of its  power
\nto  pass orders under s. 491 of the Criminal Procedure\tCode
\nand the court was still at liberty to investigate whether an
\norder  purporting  to,\thave been made under r.\t 26  of\t the
\nDefence\t of  India Rules and deemed to be  made\t under\t.the
\nOrdinance  or  a new order purporting to be made  under\t the
\n,Ordinance was in fact validly made, in exactly the same way
\nas immediately before the promulgation of the Ordinance; and
\nif on a consideration the Court came to the conclusion\tthat
\nit was not
\n(1)  [1944] F.C.R. 295.\n<\/p>\n
57<\/span><\/p>\n
validly made on any ground other than the ground that r.  26
\nof  the Defence of India Rules was ultra vires s. 10 of\t the
\nOrdinance  would no more prevent it from so finding than  S.
\n16 of the Defence of India Act did.  We shall deal with\t the
\nargument based on this case later on.\n<\/p>\n
The learned Solicitor General first dealt with the  question
\nas   to\t whether  Parliament  was  competent  to  pass\t the
\nValidating Act and whether s. 4 of the Amending Act could be
\ngiven  effect to unless the legislature\t gave  retrospective
\noperation to section 3. According to the Solicitor  General-
\nand that is undoubtedly the position in law-the\t legislative
\ncompetence of Parliament is only circumscribed by the  scope
\nof  the entries in the appropriate Lists under\tthe  Seventh
\nSchedule and the fundamental rights enshrined in Part III of
\nthe Constitution.  The power of Parliament to make laws\t for
\nthe  whole  or any part of the territory of India  is  dealt
\nwith  by the Constitution in Arts. 245 to 250, 252 and\t253.
\nAcquisition  and requisitioning of property is an  entry  in
\nList III and Parliament is competent to make laws enumerated
\nin  that  list under Art. 246(2) of  the  Constitution.\t  As
\nearly as in the year 1878 it was pointed out by the Judicial
\nCommittee of the Privy Council in The Queen v. Burah(1) that
\nthe  Indian  Legislature  when\tacting\twithin\tthe   limits
\nprescribed  (by\t the Act of the\t Imperial  Parliament  which
\ncreated\t it) had plenary powers of legislation as much,\t and
\nof the same nature as those of Parliament itself and
\n\t      “If what has been done is legislation,  within
\n\t      the  general  scope of the  affirmative  words
\n\t      which  give the power, and if it\tviolates  no
\n\t      express condition or restriction by which that
\n\t      power is limited (in which category would,  of
\n\t      course,  be included any Act of  the  Imperial
\n\t      Parliament at variance with it), it is not for
\n\t      any Court of Justice to inquire further, or to
\n\t      enlarge  constructively those  conditions\t and
\n\t      restrictions.”\n<\/p>\n
In that case the question before the Judicial Committee\t was
\nwhether Act XXII of 1869 of the Indian Legislature which ex-
\ncluded\tthe  jurisdiction of the High Court  within  certain
\nspecified  districts  was not inconsistent with\t the  Indian
\nHigh Courts Act or with the Charter of the High Court and so
\nin  its\t general scope within the legislative power  of\t the
\nGovernor-General  in  Council.\tUnder s. 4 of that  Act\t the
\nterritory   known  as  Garo  Hills  was\t removed  from\t the
\njurisdiction of the Courts of Civil and Criminal  Judicature
\nand from the control of the officers of revenue, constituted
\nby  the regulations. of the Bengal Code and the Acts  passed
\nby any Legislature established in British India as well ,is
\n(1) L.R. 5 I.A. 178 at 194.\n<\/p>\n
L4Sup.\tC.I.\/68-5
\n58<\/span>
\nfrom  the law prescribed for such courts or officers by\t the
\nRegulations  and  Acts\taforesaid.   This  section   further
\nprovided that no Act thereafter passed by the Council of the
\nGovernor-General  for making laws and regulations  shall  be
\ndeemed\tto extend to any part of the said  territory  unless
\nthe same was specially named therein.  Under s. 9 of the Act
\nthe  Lieutenant-Governor was authorised by  notification  in
\nthe  Calcutta Gazette to extend mutatis mutandis all or\t any
\nof the provisions contained in the other sections of the Act
\nto  the Jaintia Hills, the Naga Hills, and such\t portion  of
\nthe  Khasi  Hills as might for the time being form  part  of
\nBritish\t India.\t The Lieutenant-Governor of  Bengal,  acting
\nunder  powers conferred by s. 9, extended the provisions  of
\nAct XXII of 1869 to the territory of Khasi and Jaintia Hills
\nand  excluded  therefrom the jurisdiction of the  courts  of
\ncivil  and criminal judicature.\t The High Court of  Calcutta
\nheld  that  the 9th section was not legislation\t but  was  a
\ndelegation of ‘legislative power.  This was not accepted  by
\nthe Judicial Committee and it was observed (at p. 195) :\n<\/p>\n
\t      “……it is a fallacy to speak of the  powers
\n\t      thus  conferred upon  the\t Lieutenant-Governor
\n\t      (large  as they undoubtedly are) as  if,\twhen
\n\t      they were exercised, the efficacy of the\tacts
\n\t      done  under  them would be due  to  any  other
\n\t      legislative   authority  than  that   of\t the
\n\t      GovernorGeneral\tin  Council.   Their   whole
\n\t      operation is, directly and immediately,  under
\n\t      and  by  virtue  of this Act  (XXII  of  1869)
\n\t      itself.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Reference  was made by counsel to the case of Abeyesekra  v.
\nJayatilake(1).\t The question there arose as to\t whether  an
\nOrder  in  Council of 1928 amending another of\t1923  making
\nprovision  that the action of a common informer\t brought  to
\nrecover\t penalties  under the Order in Council\tof  1923  be
\ndismissed  and\tfurther\t amending the 1923 Order  so  as  to
\nexcept the office held by the respondent from its  operation
\nwas  valid  and\t constituted all effective  defence  to\t the
\naction\talthough  it  was retrospective\t in  operation.\t  In
\nupholding the validity of 1928 Order, it was observed by the
\nJudicial  Committee  that legislators  “have  certainly\t the
\nright to prevent, alter or reverse the consequences of their
\nown decrees.”\n<\/p>\n
The effect and validity of retrospective legislation has had
\nto  be\tconsidered by the Federal Court of  India  and\tthis
\nCourt  on a number of occasions.  In the case of The  United
\nProvinces, V. Atiqa Begum(2) a question arose as to whether,
\nthe  Regularisation  of Remissions Act, 1938 of\t the  United
\nProvinces Legislature
\n(1) [1932] A.C. 261.\n<\/p>\n
(2) [1940] F.C.R. 110.\n<\/p>\n
59<\/span><\/p>\n
was  within  its  competence.  There was an  Act  in  force,
\nnamely,\t the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926 the purpose whereof\t was
\nto  consolidate and amend the law relating  to\tagricultural
\ntenancy\t and certain other matters.  Section 73 of that\t Act
\nprovided  that “when for any cause the Local  Government  or
\nany authority empowered by it, remitted or suspended for any
\nperiod\tthe  whole  or any part of the\trevenue\t payable  in
\nrespect of any land, a Collector might order that the  rents
\nof the tenants should be remitted or suspended to an  amount
\nwhich  shall  bear the same proportion to the whole  of\t the
\namount\tpayable\t in respect of the land as  the\t revenue  of
\nwhich the payment has been so remitted or suspended bears to
\nthe  whole of the revenue payable in respect of such  land.”
\nIn 1931 there was a catastrophic fall in agricultural prices
\nfollowed by threats on the part of tenants to withhold\trent
\non  a large scale.  The Government of the  United  Provinces
\ndevised\t a  scheme for the systematic  reduction  of  rents,
\nvarying\t with the circumstances of the different  districts,
\nfollowed later by consequential adjustments in land revenue.
\nThe  Allahabad High Court had held in Muhammad Abdul  Qaiyum
\nv.  Secretary of State for India(1)that remissions  made  in
\npursuance  of the orders of Government had no legal  effect.
\nIn 1938 the Provincial Legislature passed the Regularisation
\nof  Remissions\tAct which precluded any question as  to\t the
\nvalidity  of  the orders of remission being  raised  in\t the
\ncourts of law.\tThe Allahabad High Court took the view\tthat
\nthe Act was contrary to the provisions of s. 292 of the Gov-
\nernment of India Act, 1935 because it amounted to an attempt
\nto legislate retrospectively.  Section 2 of the Act of\t1938
\nprovided that
\n\t      “notwithstanding anything in the Agra  Tenancy
\n\t      Act,  1926……….. or in any other law\t for
\n\t      the  time being in force where rent  has\tbeen
\n\t      remitted\ton account of any fall in the  price
\n\t      of  agricultural\tproduce\t which\ttook   place
\n\t      before the commencement of this Act, under the
\n\t      order  of\t the Provincial\t Government  or\t any
\n\t      authority empowered by it in that behalf, such
\n\t      order,  whether  passed before  or  after\t the
\n\t      commencement of this Act, shall not be  called
\n\t      in question in any civil or revenue court.”
\nReferring to the case of Queen v. Burah(2) Gwyer, C.J., said
\nthat  there  was  nothing  in s.  292  which  suggested\t any
\nintention  on  the  part of Parliament to  impose  a  fetter
\nagainst retrospective legislation.  According to the learned
\nChief  Justice, the impugned Act was an Act with respect  to
\n“remission  of rents” although it might also be an act\twith
\nrespect to something else, that is to say, the validation of
\ndoubtful executive orders.  The learned Chief Justice said :
\n(1) I.L.R. 1938 Allahabad , 114.\n<\/p>\n
(2) L.R.I.A. 178.\n<\/p>\n
60<\/span><\/p>\n
\t      “It  is  true that  “Validation  of  executive
\n\t      orders”  or any entry even remotely  analogous
\n\t      to  it is not to be found in any of the  three
\n\t      Lists;  but  I am clear that  legislation\t for
\n\t      that  purpose must necessarily be regarded  as
\n\t      subsidiary  or  ancillary\t to  the  power\t  of
\n\t      legislating  on  the  particular\tsubjects  in
\n\t      respect of which the executive orders may have
\n\t      been issued.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
His  Lordship further opined that powers of the\t court\twere
\nnot  affected merely because certain executive\torders\twere
\nnot allowed to be questioned in any court.
\nIn  Piare Dusadh & others v. The Kink Emperor(1) one of\t the
\nquestions  raised  was\twhether it  was\t competent  for\t the
\nLegislature  by retrospective legislation to make valid\t any
\nproceedings which had been had in the courts but which\twere
\nvoid  for  want of jurisdiction over the parties.   In\tthis
\ncase  the  facts were as follows.  The appellants  had\tbeen
\nconvicted  by courts functioning under the Special  Criminal
\nCourts\tOrdinance (Ordinance No. 11 of 1942).  On 4th  June,
\n1943,  the  Federal Court held that the\t courts\t constituted
\nunder  that  Ordinance\thad  not  been\tduty  invested\twith
\njurisdiction,  in  view\t of the\t nature\t of  the  provisions
\ncontained  in ss. 5, 10 and 16 of that Ordinance.  The\tnext
\nday, the Governor-General made and promulgated another Ordi-
\nnance  (Ordinance No- XIX of 1943) whereby Ordinance No.  11
\nof  1942  was repealed and certain provisions were  made  in
\nrespect\t of sentences which had been passed by\tthe  special
\ncourts\tand  in respect of cases which were  pending  before
\nthem  on  that\tdate.\tBy sub-s. (2) of s.  3\tof  the\t new
\nOrdinance,  a  right of appeal against sentences  which\t had
\nalready\t been  passed by the special courts  was  given\t and
\nappeals were accordingly preferred to the High Court in some
\ncases.\t In certain other cases applications for a  writ  in
\nthe  nature  of habeas corpus were made.  In  both  sets  of
\ncases,\tit was contended on behalf of the accused  that\t the
\nnew  Ordinance\tdid not, and in any event  could  not,\tgive
\nvalidity  on  the  sentences which had been  passed  by\t the
\nspecial courts, and it was claimed that the sentences should
\nbe  treated  as\t void or set aside.  Section 4\tof  the\t new
\nOrdinance provided that
\n\t      “Where the trial of any case pending before  a
\n\t      court constituted under the said Ordinance has
\n\t      not   concluded\tbefore\tthe  date   of\t the
\n\t      commencement    of   this\t   Ordinance,\t the
\n\t      proceedings of such court in the case shall be
\n\t      void  and\t the  case shall  be  deemed  to  be
\n\t      transferred”\n<\/p>\n
to  the\t ordinary criminal courts for enquiry  or  trial  in
\naccordance  with the Code of Criminal Procedure.  Section  3
\nof the Ordinance provided as follows
\n(1)  [1944] F.C.R. 61.\n<\/p>\n
61<\/span><\/p>\n
.lm15
\n“(a)Any\t sentence  passed  by a\t Special  Judge,  a  Special
\nMagistrate  or a Summary Court in exercise  of\tjurisdiction
\nconferred  or purporting to have been conferred by or  under
\nthe  said  Ordinance shall have effect, and subject  to\t the
\nsucceeding provisions of this section shall continue to have
\neffect, as if the trial at which it was passed had been held
\nin accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 by a
\nSessions Judge, an Assistant Sessions Judge or a Magistrate,
\nof  the\t first\tclass  respectively,  exercising   competent
\njurisdiction under the said Code.\n<\/p>\n
(2)Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law,\t any
\nsuch  sentence as is referred to in sub-section\t (1)  shall,
\nwhether\t or  not the proceedings in which the  sentence\t was
\npassed\twere  submitted\t for review  under  section  8,\t and
\nwhether\t or  not the sentence was the subject of  an  appeal
\nunder  Section 13 or Section 19, of the said  Ordinance,  be
\nsubject to such rights of appeal as would have accrued,\t and
\nto  such powers of revision as would have  been\t exercisable
\nunder  the said Code if the sentence had at a trial so\theld
\nbeen  passed  on  the  date  of\t the  commencement  of\tthis
\nOrdinance.\n<\/p>\n
(3)Where any such sentence as aforesaid has been altered  in
\nthe course of review or on appeal under the said  Ordinance,
\nthe  sentence  as so altered shall for the purpose  of\tthis
\nsection\t be  deemed to have been passed by the\tCourt  which
\npassed the original sentence.”\n<\/p>\n
Learned counsel for the accused conceded that the  principle
\nof validation by subsequent legislation was quite applicable
\nto  judicial  as to ministerial proceedings but\t relying  on
\nCooley’s  Constitutional  Limitations, 8th ed., p.  205\t and
\nalso pp. 773-776, they contended–\n<\/p>\n
(a)that while such legislation might seek to aid and support
\njudicial  proceedings, the legislature could not  under\t the
\nguise  of  legislation\tbe permitted  to  exercise  judicial
\npower, and\n<\/p>\n
(b)  that  it  was  not\t competent  to\tthe  legislature  by
\nretrospectivelegislation  to  make valid  any  proceedings
\nwhich had been held inthe courts, but which were void for
\nwant of jurisdiction over the parties.\n<\/p>\n
Spens, C. J., observed (see at p. 100):\n<\/p>\n
 “As  a\t general proposition, it may be true enough  to\t say
\nthat the legislative function belongs to the legisla-\n<\/p>\n
62<\/span><\/p>\n
\t      ture   and  the  judicial\t function   to\t the
\n\t      judiciary. , Such differentiation of functions
\n\t      and distribution of powers are in a sense part
\n\t      of the Indian law as of the American law.\t But
\n\t      an  examination  of the  American\t authorities
\n\t      will show that the development of the  results
\n\t      of  this\tdistribution  in  America  has\tbeen
\n\t      influenced  not merely by the simple  fact  of
\n\t      distribution   of\t  functions,  but   by\t the
\n\t      assumption that the Constitution was  intended
\n\t      to  reproduce the provision that\thad  already
\n\t      existed  in  many of the\tState  Constitutions
\n\t      positively  forbidding the  legislature  from,
\n\t      exercising judicial powers . . . . One  result
\n\t      of the application of this rule in the  United
\n\t      States  has  been to  hold  that\t“legislative
\n\t      action  cannot be made to retroact  upon\tpast
\n\t      controversies  and to reverse decisions  which
\n\t      the courts in the exercise of their  undoubted
\n\t      authority have made.” The reason given is that
\n\t      “this  would  not\t only  be  the\texercise  of
\n\t      judicial\tpower, but it would be its  exercise
\n\t      in the most objectionable and offensive  form,
\n\t      since the legislature would in effect sit as a
\n\t      court of review to which parties might  appeal
\n\t      when  dissatisfied  with\tthe  ruling  of\t the
\n\t      courts………\tIn  India,   however’,\t the
\n\t      legislature  has more than once  enacted\tlaws
\n\t      providing that suits which had been  dismissed
\n\t      on  a  particular\t view of  the  law  must  be
\n\t      restored and retried.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
The  learned Chief Justice referred to the Australian  case,
\nFederal\t Commissioner of Taxation v. Munro(1) where a  Board
\nof Appeal constituted under an Act of 1922 had given certain
\ndecisions in appeals in income-tax matters.  The law  courts
\ndeclared  that\tthe Australian Parliament had  no  power  to
\ninvest\tthis Board of Appeal with judicial power.   A  later
\nAct established what was described as a Board of Review\t and
\nassigned to it functions which were held to be different  in
\ncharacter from those assigned to the former Board of Appeal.
\nThis Act however went on to provide that decisions which had
\nalready\t been pronounced by the Board of Appeal\t “should  be
\ndeemed\tto be and at all times to have been decisions  of  a
\nBoard of Review given in pursuance of the provisions of\t the
\nlater  Act.”  This  later  Act\twas  challenged\t as  vesting
\njudicial  power in the Board of Review, but this  contention
\nwas  overruled.\t  Reference may be made to the\tjudgment  of
\nStarke, J. quoted by Spens, C.J. that
\n\t      “Parliament    simply   takes    up    certain
\n\t      determinations  which  exist in  fact,  though
\n\t      made  without  authority, and  prescribes\t not
\n\t      that they shall be acts done by a Board
\n(1) 38 Com.  L. R. 153.\n<\/p>\n
63<\/span><\/p>\n
\t      of  Review, but that they shall be treated  as
\n\t      they would be treated if they were- such acts.
\n\t      The sections, no doubt, apply  retrospectively
\n\t      but they do not constitute an exercise of\t the
\n\t      judicial power on the part of the Parliament.”
\nThe learned Chief Justice observed that this aptly described
\nwhat  had happened in the case before the Federal Court\t and
\nanswered  the  argument that it was an\timpossible  feat  to
\nconvert\t what  was not a trial under the  Code\tof  Criminal
\nProcedure into a trial under the Code:\n<\/p>\n
According  to the learned Chief Justice, the  real  question
\nwas, whether the Ordinance was covered by any of the entries
\nin  the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution Act.   “It\t was
\nnot contended said the Chief Justice “that the mere  absence
\nof a specific provision about validating laws” was by itself
\nof  much significance.” As observed by this Court  in  Atiqa
\nBegum’s\t case(1), “the power of validation must be taken  to
\nbe  ancillary  or subsidiary to the power to deal  with\t the
\nparticular subjects specified in the Lists.”
\nThere is nothing in Basanta Chandra Ghose’s case ( 2 ) which
\ndetracts  from\tthe propositions of law laid down  in  Atiqa
\nBegum’s\t case(1)  or  Piare  Dusadh’s  case(3).\t  In  Basant
\nChandra Ghose’s case(2) Cl. (2) of s. 10 provided :\n<\/p>\n
\t      “If  at  the commencement\t of  this  Ordinance
\n\t      there  is pending in any Court any  proceeding
\n\t      by  which\t the  validity of  an  order  having
\n\t      effect  by  virtue of section 6 as if  it\t had
\n\t      been  made under this Ordinance is  called  in
\n\t      question,\t   that\t  proceeding\tis    hereby
\n\t      discharged.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      Spens,  C.J. said with regard to\tthis  clause
\n\t      that
\n\t      “here  there  has\t been  no  investigation  or
\n\t      decision by any Tribunal which the legislating
\n\t      authority\t can be deemed to have given  effect
\n\t      to.   It is a direct disposal of cases by\t the
\n\t      legislature itself.” (see at p. 309).\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
It  was\t pointed  out  that  the  nature  of  the  provision
\nconsidered   in\t Piare\tDusadh’s  case(3)  was\t essentially
\ndifferent from cl. (2) of s.  10 of the impugned Ordinance.
\nThe  question has engaged the attention of this Court  in  a
\nnumber of cases and we may refer to the case of West  Ramnad
\nElectric  Distribution Co. Ltd. v. State of Madras<\/a>   (4)  by
\nway of
\n(1) [1940] F.C.R. 110.\t\t (2) [1944] F.C.R. 295
\n(3) [1944] F.C.R. 61.\t\t (4) [1963] 2 S.C.R.747
\n64<\/span>
\nillustration.\tIn  that case, the  Madras  Legislature\t had
\npassed\tan  Act\t (43 of 1949) on January 24,  1950  for\t the
\nacquisition  of\t undertakings supplying electricity  in\t the
\nProvince of Madras.  In pursuance of S. 4(1) of the Act\t the
\nState  of Madras passed an order on May 17,  1951  declaring
\nthat the appellant undertaking shall vest in the  respondent
\nfrom  September\t 21, 1951.  The Chief  Electrical  Inspector
\ntook  over possession of the appellant and all\tits  records
\netc.   The State paid to the appellant Rs. 8,34,000 and\t odd
\nas  compensation.   According to the  appellant,  about\t Rs.
\n1,00,000 still remained to be paid.  Some of the  electrical
\nundertakings in Madras which had’ been taken over filed writ
\npetitions in the High Court which upheld the validity of the
\nimpugned Act in so far as it related to the licencees  other
\nthan   municipalities.\t In  Rajahmundry   Electric   Supply
\nCorporation  Ltd. v. The State of Madras(1) this  Court\t had
\nheld  that the impugned Act of 1949 was ultra vires  on\t the
\nground that it went beyond the legislative competence of the
\nMadras Legislature inasmuch as there was no entry in any  of
\nthe three Lists of the Seventh Schedule of the Government of
\nIndia  Act, 1935 relating to compulsory acquisition  of\t any
\ncommercial or industrial undertaking.  After the decision in
\nthis  case, the Madras Legislature passed Act XXIX  of\t1954
\nwhich  received the assent of the President on 9th  October,
\n1954.\tThis  Act incorporated the main\t provisions  of\t the
\nearlier Act and purported to validate action taken under the
\nearlier\t Act.\tThe  appellant then filed  a  writ  petition
\nalleging  that to the extent to which the Act  purported  to
\nvalidate  acts\tdone under the earlier Act of  1949  it\t was
\nultra  vires.  It was further urged that the three bases  of
\ncompensation as laid down by the Act were inconsistent\twith
\nthe requirement of Art. 31 of the Constitution.\t Section  24
\nof the Act ran as follows
\n\t      “Orders  made, decisions or directions  given,
\n\t      notifications  issued, proceedings  taken\t and
\n\t      acts  or\tthings\tdone, in  relation  to\tany-\n<\/p>\n
\t      undertaking  taken  over, if they\t would\thave
\n\t      been  validly  made, given, issued,  taken  or
\n\t      done,   had  the\tMadras\tElectricity   Supply
\n\t      Undertakings  (Acquisition) Act, 1949  (Madras
\n\t      Act  XLIII  of   1949),  and  the\t rules\tmade
\n\t      thereunder been in force on the date on  which
\n\t      the  said\t orders,  decisions  or\t directions,
\n\t      notifications,  proceedings, acts\t or  things,
\n\t      were  made, given, issued, taken or  done\t are
\n\t      hereby  declared\tto have been  validly  made,
\n\t      given, issued, taken or done, as the case\t may
\n\t      be,  except  to the extent to which  the\tsaid
\n\t      orders, decisions, directions,  notifications,
\n\t      proceedings,  acts or things are repugnant  to
\n\t      the provisions of this Act.”\n<\/p>\n
(1) [1954] S.C.R. 779.\n<\/p>\n
65<\/span><\/p>\n
\t      It was held by this Court that this was
\n\t      “a  saving  and validating  provision  and  it
\n\t      clearly  intends\tto  validate  actions  taken
\n\t      under  the relevant provisions of the  earlier
\n\t      Act  which  was invalid from the\tstart.\t The
\n\t      fact  that  s.  24  does\tnot  use  the  usual
\n\t      phraseology  that\t the  notifications   issued
\n\t      under the earlier Act shall be deemed to\thave
\n\t      been issued under the Act, does not alter\t the
\n\t      position\tthat the second part of the  section
\n\t      has and is intended to have the same effect.”
\nThe  contention that the impugned  notification\t contravened
\nArt. 31(1) because of want of existence of an-antecedent law
\ndepriving  the citizen of his property was turned down\twith
\nthe observation
\n\t      “In  our opinion, this argument is  not  well-
\n\t      founded.\t If  the  Act  is  retrospective  in
\n\t      operation\t and s. 24 has been enacted for\t the
\n\t      purpose of retrospectively validating  actions
\n\t      taken under the provisions of the earlier Act,
\n\t      it  must\tfollow\tby  the\t very  retrospective
\n\t      operation\t of the relevant provisions that  at
\n\t      the  time when the impugned  notification\t was
\n\t      issued,  these provisions were  in  existence.
\n\t      That  is the plain and obvious effect  of\t the
\n\t      retrospective operation of the statute.”
\nReference  was made to the cast of the United  Provinces  v.
\nMst. Atiqa Begum(1), Piare Dusadh v. The King Emperor(2) and
\nalso  to  the  decision in Union of  India  v.\tMadan  Gopal
\nKabra<\/a>(3) and it was finally said (at p. 766)
\n\t      “……there is no doubt about the  competence
\n\t      of the Legislature to enact a law and make  it
\n\t      retrospective in operation in regard to topics
\n\t      included within the relevant Schedules of\t the
\n\t      Constitution.”\n<\/p>\n
Reference  may\talso be made to the case of  Rai  Ramkrishna
\nv.The State of Bihar(4).\n<\/p>\n
All these decisions lay down that the power to legislate for
\nvalidating  actions  taken  under  statute  which  were\t not
\nsufficiently comprehensive for the purpose is only ancillary
\nor  subsidiary\tto  legislate  on  any\tsubject\t within\t the
\ncompetence  of\tthe  legislature and  such  Validating\tActs
\ncannot\tbe  struck down merely because courts  of  law\thave
\ndeclared  actions  taken earlier to be invalid for  want  of
\njurisdiction. Nor is there any reason to hold that in  order
\nto validate action without legislative support the  Validat-
\ning  Act  must enact provisions to cure the defect  for\t the
\nfuture
\n(1) [1940] F.C.R. 110.\t\t(2) [1944] F.C.R. 61.
\n(3) [1954] S.C.R. 541 at 544.\t(4) [1964] 1 S.C.R. 897.\n<\/p>\n
66<\/span><\/p>\n
and  also  provide that all actions taken  or  notifications
\nissued must be deemed to have been taken or issued under the
\nnew provisions so as to give them full retrospective effect.
\nNo  doubt legislatures often resort to such practice but  it
\nis not absolutely necessary that they should do so so as  to
\ngive  full scope and effect to the Validating Acts.  By\t way
\nof illustration reference may be made to the following Acts.
\n(1)   The   Professions\t Tax   Limitation   (Amendment\t and
\nValidation) ‘Act, 1949 where s. 3(i) provided that
\n\t       “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary  in
\n\t      any other law for the time being in force,-\n<\/p>\n
\t      (i)  no  tax  on\tcircumstances  and  property
\n\t      imposed  before the commencement of  this\t Act
\n\t      under  clause  (ix)  of  sub-section  (1)\t  of
\n\t      section\t128   of   the\t United\t   Provinces
\n\t      Municipalities  Act, 1916, or, clause  (b)  of
\n\t      section  108 of the United Provinces  District
\n\t      Boards  Act, 1922, shall be deemed to  be,  or
\n\t      ever to have been invalid merely on the ground
\n\t      that the tax imposed exceeded the limit of Rs.
\n\t      50\/- per annum prescribed by the said Act, and
\n\t      the validity of the imposition of any such tax
\n\t      shall not be called in question in any Court;”
\n(2)The Hindu Marriages (Validation of Proceedings) Act, 1960
\n(Act 19 of 1960) was passed to obviate the short comings  in
\nthe Hindu Marriage Act pointed out by the Punjab High  Court
\nin  Janak  Dulari  v. Narain Das (A.I.R.  1959\tPunjab\t50).
\nThere  the High Court held that the court of  an  additional
\nJudge  cannot  be  regarded as a principal  court  of  civil
\njurisdiction  within the meaning of the Hindu  Marriage\t Act
\nand  that a District Judge to whom a petition under the\t Act
\nis  presented cannot transfer it to an additional Judge\t for
\ntrial.\tThe object of the Validation Act was to validate all
\nproceedings  taken and decrees and orders passed by  any  of
\nthe Courts specified in cl. (2) exercising or purporting  to
\nexercise jurisdiction under the Hindu Marriage Act.  Section
\n2(1) ran as follows :-\n<\/p>\n
\t      “All proceedings taken and decrees and  orders
\n\t      passed before the commencement of this Act  by
\n\t      any  of the Courts referred to in\t sub-section
\n\t      (2)  exercising  or  purporting  to   exercise
\n\t      jurisdiction  under  the Hindu  Marriage\tAct,
\n\t      1955  shall,  notwithstanding  any   judgment,
\n\t      decree or order of any court, be deemed to  be
\n\t      as  good\tand  valid in law as  if  the  court
\n\t      exercising  or  purporting to,  exercise\tsuch
\n\t      jurisdiction had been a district court  within
\n\t      the meaning of the said Act.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
The courts referred to in sub-section (1) are : the court of
\nan additional Judge, additional district Judge, etc.
\n67<\/span>
\nIn  our opinion the contentions raised about the  invalidity
\nof the Amending Act on the ground that s. 3 thereof was\t not
\nmade expressly retrospective or that it encroached upon\t the
\ndomain\tof  the\t judiciary by seeking  to  nullify  judicial
\ndecisions  cannot  be sustained.  The American\tdoctrine  of
\nwell-defined  separation of legislative and judicial  powers
\nhas  no application to India and it cannot be said  that  an
\nIndian\tStatute which seeks to validate invalid\t actions  is
\nbad if the invalidity has already been pronounced upon by  a
\ncourt of law.\n<\/p>\n
In  view  of the decisions of the  Judicial  Committee,\t the
\nFederal\t Court and this Court referred to above, it must  be
\nheld that the absence of a provision in the Amending Act  to
\ngive  retrospective  operation to s. 3 of the Act  does\t not
\naffect\tthe validity of s. 4 as contended for.\tIt was\topen
\nto  Parliament to adopt either course, e.g. (a)\t to  provide
\nexpressly  for the retrospective operation of s. 3, or,\t (b)
\nto lay down that no acquisition purporting to have been made
\nand  no action taken before the Land Acquisition  (Amendment
\nand  Validation)  Ordinance,  1967 shall  be  deemed  to  be
\ninvalid or ever to have become invalid because inter alia of
\nthe making of more than one report under s. 5-A or more than
\none declaration under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, not-
\nwithstanding any judgment, decree or order to the  contrary.
\nParliament  was\t competent  to\tvalidate  such\tactions\t and
\ntransactions,\tits  power  in.\t that  behalf\tbeing\tonly
\ncircumscribed by the appropriate entries in the Lists of the
\nSeventh Schedule and the fundamental rights setforth in Part
\nIII  of the Constitution.  As shown above, there  have\tbeen
\ninstances  where the latter course had been adopted  by\t the
\nIndian Parliament in the past.\n<\/p>\n
Section\t 4 of the Amending Act being within the\t legislative
\ncompetence of Parliament, the provisions thereof are binding
\non  all courts of law notwithstanding judgments,  orders  or
\ndecrees to the contrary rendered or made in the past.
\nWe find ourselves unable to accept the contention about\t the
\nviolation  of  Art. 31(2) of the Amending Act.\t It  is\t not
\nsuggested  that the Validating Act in express words  enacts.
\nany  law  which\t directly affects  compensation\t payable  in
\nrespect of the property acquired or lays down any principles
\ndifferent  from\t those\twhich  were  already  in  the\tLand
\nAcquisition  Act  of  1894.   After  the  amendment  of\t the
\nConstitution   in   1955  the  question\t  of   adequacy\t  of
\ncompensation is not justiciable and it is enough if the\t law
\nprovides   that\t  a  person  expropriated  must\t  be   given
\ncompensation  for his property or lays down  the  principles
\nfor  the determination thereof.\t There is not a\t word  about
\n“compensation”\tin s. 4 of the Validating  Act.\t  Indirectly
\nhowever, it would affect a person’s right to  compensation,,
\ninasmuch  as  but for the Validating  Act  the\tnotification
\nunder s. 4 issued on 13th November 1959 could
\n68<\/span>
\nnot  be resorted to for the purpose of making more than\t one
\ndeclaration under s. 6 of the Act.  Schemes of the magnitude
\nof  the\t plan  for  the development  of\t Delhi\tor  for\t the
\nestablishment of an iron and steel plant did not have to  be
\nconsidered  in pre-Constitution days.  The Land\t Acquisition
\nAct   of  1894\tcontained  sufficient  measures\t  to   allow
\nacquisition  of small parcels of property for the  different
\nschemes\t of  the  extent  and  magnitude  which\t had  to  be
\nconsidered  in the past.  Even then, the law with regard  to
\ncompensation did not remain static from the days of the\t Act
\nof 1870 to 1923.  In the Act of 1894 the date of declaration
\nunder Is. 6 was made to take the place of the date in s.  24
\nof the Act of 1870.  Under the Act of 1870 the market  value
\nof  the\t land at the time of awarding compensation  was\t the
\ncriterion.  The date for the assessment of compensation\t was
\nfurther\t shifted to the date of the notification under S.  4
\nonly in 1923.\n<\/p>\n
The  Legilature might well have provided in the Act of\t1894
\nthat  it would be open to the appropriate  government  after
\nissuing\t a  notification under S. 4 to\tconsider  objections
\nraised\tunder S. 5 with regard to different localities\tfrom
\ntime to time enabling different reports to be made under  S.
\n5-A  with  consequent  adjustments in  S.  6  providing\t for
\ndeclarations to be made as and when each report under s. 5-A
\nwas considered.\t By the validation of actions taken under S.
\n6  more than once in respect of a single notification  under
\ns.  4,\tthe original scheme of acquisition is  not  altered.
\nThe  public  purpose  behind the  notification\tunder  s.  4
\nremains\t the  same.   It is not as  if\ta  different  public
\npurpose and acquisition of land for such purpose were  being
\ninterpolated by means of the Validating Act.  The  principle
\nof compensation remains the same under the Validating Act as
\nit   did  under\t the  principal\t Act  of  1894.\t  Only\t the
\nshortcomings  in the Act as to want of provision  to  enable
\nmore than one declaration under S. 6 are being removed.\t  In
\nour  opinion,  the Validating Act does not fall\t within\t the
\nmischief  pointed  out by this Court  in  various  decisions
\nstarting  from the State of West Bengal v. Mrs. Bela  Baner-<\/a>
\njee(1) :\n<\/p>\n
Entry  42  in List III of the Seventh  Schedule\t before\t its
\namendment read
\n\t      “Principles on which compensation for property
\n\t      acquired or requisitioned for the purposes  of
\n\t      the  Union  or  of a State or  for  any  other
\n\t      public  purpose is to be determined,  and\t the
\n\t      forms   and   the\t  manner   in\twhich\tsuch
\n\t      compensation is to be given.”\n<\/p>\n
In  Mrs. Bela Banerjee’s case(1) s. 8 of the  impugned\tWest
\nBengal Land Development and Planning Act 1948 provided\tthat
\nthe com-\n<\/p>\n
(1)  [1954] S.C.R. 558.\n<\/p>\n
69<\/span><\/p>\n
pensation  to be awarded for acquisition of land was not  to
\nexceed the market value thereof on December 31, 1946.\tThis
\nprovision was held to be arbitrary by this Court inasmuch as
\nit  fixed  the ceiling on compensation by reference  to\t the
\nmarket\tvalue  of the land on the  above-mentioned  date  no
\nmatter\twhen  and how long afterwards the  acquisition\ttook
\nplace.\t Similarly in dismissing the appeal of the State  in
\nState  of  Madras v. D. Namasivaya Mudaliar<\/a>  (1)  where\t the
\nMadras Act XI of 1953 provided that compensation was payable
\non the basis of the valuation of the land on April 28,\t1947
\ntogether with some improvements made thereon up to the\tdate
\nof  notification under s. 4(1) of the Land  Acquisition\t Act
\nbecause\t of  the  discovery of the presence  of\t lignite  in
\ncertain taluks in 1947 and the announcement by Government by
\na  press note that it proposed to undertake  legislation  to
\ncompel\tpersons\t purchasing such lands after a\tdate  to  be
\nprescribed in 1947, it was held that “a law which authorises
\nacquisition  of land not for its true, value, but for  value
\nfrozen\ton  some date anterior to the  acquisition,  on\t the
\nassumption  that  all appreciation in its value\t since\tthat
\ndate is attributable to purposes for which the State may use
\nthe  land  at  some  time in future,  must  be\tregarded  as
\ninfringing  the\t fundamental right” and “there was  no\ttrue
\nrelation  between  the acquisition of the land….  and\t the
\nfixation of compensation based on their value on the  market
\nrate  prevailing  on  April  28,  1947.”  Referring  to\t the
\nprovision  in  the Land Acquisition Act\t for  assessment  of
\ncompensation  on the basis of the market value of  the\tland
\nnot  on\t the  date on which the interest of  the  owner\t was
\nextinguished  under  section  16  but to  the  date  of\t the
\nnotification under s. 4(1) it was observed that “any princi-
\nple  for determination of compensation denying to the  owner
\nall increments in value between a fixed date and the date of
\nissue of the notifications under s. 4(1) must prima facie be
\nregarded  as denying to him the true equivalent of the\tland
\nwhich is expropriated.\n<\/p>\n
In our opinion, the Amending Act cannot be said to lay\tdown
\nany principle which suffers from the vice of the Act  struck
\ndown in the above decisions.  The date of valuation is\tthat
\nof the issue of notification under s. 4(1)-a principle which
\nhas  held  the\tfield  since 1923.   It\t is  true  that\t the
\nunderlying  principle  of  the\tAct of\t1894  was  that\t all
\nincrements  due\t to the setting on foot of  the\t acquisition
\nproceedings  were  to  be ignored whereas due  to  the\tever
\nspiralling  of\tall prices all over India  land\t values\t are
\nmounting up all the time in all the States, specially  round
\nabout  big cities-an occurrence quite unconnected  with\t the
\nissue of a notification under s. 4(1)-but it cannot be\tsaid
\nthat  because owners of land are to be deprived of  all\t the
\nincrements due to the latter phenomenon it must be held that
\nthere  is a Violation of Art. 31(2). Legislative  competence
\nto acquire land under the provisions of
\n(1)  [1964] 6 S.C.R. 936.\n<\/p>\n
70<\/span><\/p>\n
the  Land  Acquisition Act cannot be challenged\t because  of
\nconstant  appreciation of land values all over\tthe  country
\ndue to the prevalent abnormal inflation.  There must be some
\ntime   lag  between  the  start\t and  conclusion   of\tland
\nacquisition  proceedings and in principle there\t is  nothing
\nwrong in accepting the said start as the date for valuation.
\nSections 4 and 23 of the Land Acquisition Act are  protected
\nby  Art. 31(5) (a) of the Constitution.. Only  sections\t 5-A
\nand  6 of the Act have been amended.  The amendments do\t not
\nalter  the  principle of compensation fixed by the  Act\t nor
\ncontravene Art. 31 of the Constitution in any way.
\nThe Amending Act does not really derogate from the principle
\nthat  the  valuation on the date of  issue  of\tnotification
\naffords\t the criterion for determining compensation  of\t all
\nlands  to  be  acquired.   It  only  keeps  alive  the\tsaid
\nnotification for sustaining more than one declaration  under
\ns.  6 to meet the exigencies of the situation where  it\t was
\nnot possible to make one comprehensive declaration under  s.
\n6  and where the State has been obliged to validate  actions
\nwhich  could not be supported under the principal  Act.\t  It
\ncannot\tbe said of the Validating Act that it was fixing  an
\narbitrary date for the valuation of the property which\tbore
\nno  relation  to the acquisition proceedings.  At  the\tsame
\ntime  when  the notification under s. 4 was issued  on\t13th
\nNovember  1959, the State had considered that a\t very  large
\narea round about Delhi-would have to be acquired so that the
\ndevelopment  of the city could proceed in an orderly  manner
\nstep  by step not only ‘Lo meet the immediate needs  of\t the
\nthen.  population of the city but with an eye to  the  ever-
\nincreasing demands of the exploding population in all cities
\nin  India  and\tspecially in its capital.   It\twas  before,
\nNovember   1959\t that  the  State  had\tto   consider\tthe,
\nacquisition  of\t a large tract of land for the\tpurposes  of
\ndevelopment  of\t Delhi but it was not possible\tto  take  up
\nsimultaneously all schemes for the future development of the
\ncity.\tIt was also not practically possible to take up\t all
\nschemes\t in all directions at the same time.  The  resources
\nof  the State were not adequate to take up the\tschemes\t for
\nimprovement  of the city by the acquisition of an area\tlike
\nAc.  34,000,00, at the same time keeping in, mind  not\tonly
\nthe  need of land for housing purposes but also\t for,  other
\npurposes  like\teducation, industry and manufacture  not  to
\nspeak  of amenities for recreation, entertainment  etc.\t  Of
\nnecessity,,  the area under the proposed  acquisition  would
\nhave to be carved into blocks and the development of one  or
\nmore  blocks at a time could only be taken up in  consonance
\nwith the resources available.  Even contiguous blocks  could
\nbe developed gradually and systematically.  If a  particular
\narea, say block ‘A’ was meant to provide lands for  building
\nhouses\tfor  residential purposes only\ta  block  contiguous
\nthereto,  say  block ‘B’ might be set apart  for  industrial
\npurposes.  There may be nothing common between
\n71<\/span>
\nBlock\tA  and\tBlock  B  to  require\ttheir\tsimultaneous
\ndevelopment  .although both the Blocks would form part of  a
\ncomposite whole–to serve the needs of a growing city.\t Can
\nit be said that acquisition of lands for Block A and Block B
\nmust be made simultaneously and is the law to be struck down
\nbecause it enables a declaration under s. 6 with respect  to
\nBlock B to be made some time after a similar declaration  in
\nrespect of Block A ? In such a case, it would be incongruous
\nto  award  compensation for lands acquired in Block B  on  a
\nbasis  different  from that in respect of lands in  Block  A
\ncovered\t by an earlier declaration under s. 6. The scope  of
\nArt. 31(2) as amended was considered by this Court in P.  V.
\nMudaliar v. Deputy Collector(1).  It was there, pointed\t out
\nthat after the amendment “what is excluded from the  courts’
\njurisdiction  is that the said law cannot be  questioned  on
\nthe  ground, that the compensation provided by that  law  is
\nnot adequate;” and “if a law lays down principles which\t are
\nnot relevant to the property acquired or to the value of the
\nproperty at or about the time it is acquired, it may be said
\nthat  they are not principles contemplated by Art. 31(2)  of
\nthe Constitution.” In that case it was also observed by this
\nCourt that “in the context of continuous rise in land prices
\nfrom  year to year depending upon abnormal circumstances  it
\ncannot\tbe said that fixation of average price of over\tfive
\nyears  is not a principle for ascertaining the price of\t the
\nland  in or about the date of acquisition.” The decision  is
\nalso  an authority for the proposition that the omission  of
\none  of\t the  elements that should properly  be\t taken\tinto
\naccount\t in  fixing  the compensation might  result  in\t the
\ninadequacy  of compensation but such omission in itself\t did
\nnot  constitute fraud on power. it is also to be noted\tthat
\nin this case this Court upheld the Land Acquisition  (Madras
\nAmendment) Act, 1961 although the said Act substituted a new
\nclause\tfor  the  first clause in s. 23 ( 1 )  of  the\tLand
\nAcquisition  Act.  The substituted clause provided for\tpay-
\nment of compensation on the basis of the market value of the
\nland  at  the date of the publication  of  the\tnotification
\nunder s. 4(1) or an amount equal to the average market value
\nof  the.  land during the five years  immediately  preceding
\nsuch  date, whichever was less.\t It is significant that\t the
\nAct  which was a postFourth Constitution Amendment Act,\t was
\nupheld\talthough by its own terms and independently  of\t the
\nLand Acquisition Act it provided for payment of compensation
\non the basis of the market value of the land at the date  of
\nthe  publication of the notification under s. 4(1).  It\t may
\ntherefore be inferred that in upholding the Land Acquisition
\n(Madras\t Amendment)  Act, 1961, this Court was of  the\tview
\nthat  the principle of fixing compensation on the  basis  of
\nthe  price prevailing on the date of the notification  under
\ns.   4(1)  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act  was\t a  relevant
\nprinciple.  In
\n(1) [1965] 1 S.C.R. 614.\n<\/p>\n
72<\/span><\/p>\n
the  result the court turned down the contention  about\t the
\nviolation. of Art. 31(2) because of the modification of some
\nof the principles for assessing compensation laid down in s.
\n23 of the Act.\n<\/p>\n
In the present case, there has been no variation of the\t law
\nformulated  in s. 23 of the Act.  As such, in  our  opinion,
\nthere has been no violation of Art. 31(2) merely because the
\nactions\t already  taken have been sought to  be\t ‘validated.
\nNor  are we satisfied that there has been any colourable  or
\nfraudulent exercise of legislative power.
\nWith  regard to the question as to discrimination  violative
\nof Art. 14, it goes without saying that whenever an Amending
\nAct  is\t passed,  there is bound to be\tsome  difference  in
\ntreatment  between  transactions which\thave  already  taken
\nplace and those which are to take place in the future.\tThat
\nby itself will not attract the operation of Art. 14.  Again,
\neven with respect to transactions which may be completed  in
\nthe  future, a reasonable classification will not be  struck
\ndown  as  was  held by this Court in Jalan  Trading  Co.  v.
\nMazdoor Union<\/a>(1).\n<\/p>\n
\t      “If   the\t classification\t is   not   patently
\n\t      arbitrary,   the\tCourt  will  not   rule\t  it
\n\t      discriminatory  merely  because  it   involves
\n\t      hardship or inequality of burden.\t With a view
\n\t      to secure a particular object a scheme may  be
\n\t      selected by the Legislature wisdom whereof may
\n\t      be open to debate; it may even be demonstrated
\n\t      that  the\t scheme\t is  not  the  best  in\t the
\n\t      circumstances   and   the\t  choice   of\t the
\n\t      Legislature may be shown to be erroneous,\t but
\n\t      unless the enactment fails to satisfy the dual
\n\t      test   of\t intelligible\tclassification\t and
\n\t      rationality of the relation with the object of
\n\t      the  law, it will not be subject\tto  judicial
\n\t      interference  under  Art. 14.   Invalidity  of
\n\t      legislation  is  not  established\t by   merely
\n\t      finding faults with the scheme adopted by\t the
\n\t      Legislature  to achieve the purpose it has  in
\n\t      view.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Before\tscrutinising the provisions of the Amending Act,  we
\nmust examine the objects of the Act., They may be summed  up
\nas follows :-\n<\/p>\n
(a) To amend the Act for the future by empowering the making
\nof more than one declaration under s. 6.\n<\/p>\n
(b) To validate completed acquisitions on the basis of\tmore
\nthan one declaration under that section.\n<\/p>\n
(c)  To authorise more than one declaration under  the\tsaid
\nsection\t in  cases  where there is already  in\texistence  a
\nnotification under s. 4.\n<\/p>\n
(1)[1967] 1 S.C.R. 15 at 36.\n<\/p>\n
73<\/span><\/p>\n
(d)To prescribe a time limit for future acquisitions as also
\npending proceedings not yet completed; and\n<\/p>\n
(e) To provide additional compensation by way of interest in
\nall  cases where acquisition has not yet been completed\t and
\nwhere  a  declaration under s. 6 is issued more\t than  three
\nyears after the notification under s. 4.\n<\/p>\n
There  is  nothing arbitrary or irrational  about  the\tsaid
\nobjects. It    is  well known that in some cases  there\t has
\nbeen unusual delay in\t the issue of declaration under s. 6
\nafter a notification under s. 4.  The Amending Act  puts  an
\nend to this harsh treatment by providing that in respect  of
\nnotifications  under  s.  4  made before  the  date  of\t the
\nOrdinance  i.e. 20th January 1967, a declaration under s’  6
\nmust  be made within two years after that date.\t If  such  a
\ndeclaration  is\t not  made,  then it will  not\tbe  open  to
\nGovernment to make use of the old s. 4 notification and\t the
\nState  would be obliged to issue a fresh notification  under
\ns.  4.\tThe  Act  also\tlimits\tthe  time  within  which   a
\ndeclaration under s. 6 may be made when a notification under
\ns.  4  is issued after 20th January, 1967.  This  period  is
\nlimited\t to three years there having been no time  limit  in
\nthe  past.   We\t are not impressed by the  argument  that  a
\nperson whose land may be covered by a notification under  s.
\n4  issued more than one year before 20th January 1967  would
\nseemingly  be treated differently from a person\t whose\tland
\ncomes  under  the notification under s. 4 after\t that  date.
\nThe  Legislature  has sought to improve\t upon  the  existing
\nprovisions  of\tthe  Land Acquisition Act and  there  is  no
\ndiscriminatory\ttreatment  which should be  struck  down  as
\nviolative of Art. 14.  The Legislature in its wisdom thought
\nthat  some  time limit should be fixed in respect  of  s.  4
\nnotifications  issued before 20th January, 1967 and  that  a
\ntime limit should also be fixed for acquisition where such a
\nnotification  is  issued after that date.  No fault  can  be
\nfound  with  the Legislature because it has provided  for  a
\nperiod\tof  two\t years in one case and three  years  in\t the
\nother.\tAs was pointed out in Jalan Trading Co. v.  Mazdoors
\nUnion(1).\n<\/p>\n
\t      “Equal protection of the laws is denied if  in
\n\t      achieving a certain object persons, objects or
\n\t      transactions   similarly\t circumstanced\t are
\n\t      differently   treated  by\t law   no   rational
\n\t      relation\tto the object sought to be  achieved
\n\t      by the law.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
It  is\tnot  possible to say that  because  the\t legislature
\nthought\t of  improving upon the Act of 1894  by\t prescribing
\ncertain\t limits\t of  time  as from  20th  January  1967\t the
\ndifference  in\ttreatment in cases covered  by\tnotification
\nbefore\tthe said date and after the said date  denies  equal
\nprotection   of\t laws  because\tthe  transactions  are\t not
\nsimilarly circumstanced.  Some of the notifications
\n(1) [1967] 1 S.C.R. 15.\n<\/p>\n
LA Sup.\t C.I.\/68-6
\n74<\/span>
\nissued under s. 4 must have been made even more than 3 years
\nbefore 20th January 1967 and such cases obviously could\t not
\nbe  treated  in\t the same  manner  as  notifications  issued
\nafter,that   date.    Art.   14\t does  not   strike   at   a
\ndifferentiation\t caused\t by the enactment of a\tlaw  between
\ntransactions  governed\tthereby and those which are  not  so
\ngoverned.   As\twas pointed out by this Court  in  Hatisingh
\nManufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Union of India<\/a>(1).\n<\/p>\n
\t      “When  Parliament\t enacts\t a  law\t imposing  a
\n\t      liability as flowing from certain transactions
\n\t      prospectively,\tit   evidently\t  makes\t   a
\n\t      distinction  between those transactions  which
\n\t      are covered by the Act and those which are not
\n\t      covered\tby  the\t Act,  because\t they\twere
\n\t      completed before the date on which the Act was
\n\t      enacted.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
With  respect,\tthe dictum can also be\tapplied\t as  between
\ncases where the transaction was in the course of  completion
\nand  those which had to be started after a particular  date.
\nOn  the\t whole\tthe  Amending  Act  seeks  to  improve\t the
\nlegislation which covered the field of acquisition of  land.
\nThe Legislature might have made more liberal provisions\t for
\nimprovement  but it is not for this court to strike  down  a
\npiece of legislation because the improvement falls short  of
\nthe expectation of the litigants.\n<\/p>\n
With  regard  to the provision for payment of  interest,  in
\naddition   to\tcompensation  or  by   way   of\t  additional
\ncompensation  no grievance can be made in that\tinterest  is
\nnot  allowed  in  respect of transactions  which  have\tbeen
\nalready\t completed and compensation taken.  The\t Legislature
\nfelt  that because there has been unreasonable delay in\t the
\npayment of compensation, interest should be, allowable where
\nthe period of three years has already expired or may  expire
\nbetween\t the  date  of s. 4 notification  and  the  date  of
\ndeclaration  under  s. 6. No grievance can be  made  because
\ninterest  is  denied to persons who have already  taken\t the
\ncompensation.\t Even  here  the  classification   is\t‘not
\nunreasonable  and  cannot  be said to be  unrelated  to\t the
\nobject of the Act.\n<\/p>\n
As regards violation of Art.14, in the case of Sohan Lal who
\nfiled  Writ  Petition No. 85 of 1967 the  learned  solicitor
\ndrew  our  attention to a few facts which  are\tnot  clearly
\nbrought\t out  in  the affidavit in opposition  and  will  be
\nreferred  to presently.\t Here the attack is on an  executive
\nact,  namely,  the differential treatment meted\t out  to  16
\ncolonies whose lands were covered by the notification  dated
\n13th November, 1959 but in respect of which  de-notification
\norders were issued subsequently.  It would appear that\tsome
\nof  the\t letters which were received by Sohan  Lal  did\t not
\nbring  out the full facts and the policy underlying the\t ap-
\nparent\tdiscrimination in this case.  It is pointed  out  in
\nparagraph 36 of the affidavit in opposition:
\n(1)  [1960] 3 S.C.R. 528 at 543.\n<\/p>\n
75<\/span><\/p>\n
\t      “After   the   issue   of\t  the\tnotification
\n\t      No.F.15(111)\/59LSG  dated 13-11-1959,  it\t was
\n\t      decided by the Government that the colonies in
\n\t      respect of which the layout and service  plans
\n\t      had   been   sanction  before  the   date\t  of
\n\t      notification viz., 13-11-1959, may be released
\n\t      from the purview of  acquisition………..The
\n\t      petitioner’s colony known as Kanwal Park could
\n\t      not   be\t released  from\t  the\tpurview\t  of
\n\t      acquisition  because  in\tits  case  only\t the
\n\t      layout  plans had been sanctioned and not\t the
\n\t      service plans.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
This  policy is corroborated by the records of the Land\t and
\nHousing\t Department,  Delhi Administration which  were\tmade
\navailable to us at the hearing.\t It appears from that record
\nthat  after the notification of 13th November  1959  private
\nowners of land who wanted to lay out colonies and had  taken
\nsteps  in  respect thereof by making  some  arrangement\t and
\nspent  money–threon had approached the\t Administration\t for
\nrelease of their lands from the notification and a  proposal
\nfor de-notification of the colonies was considered at a high
\nlevel.\t It  appears that a meeting ‘was held on  29th\tJune
\n1960 at which were present a number of persons including the
\nChief Secretary, Vice Chairman, Delhi Development Authority,
\nEngineer-Member,  Architect,  Town  Planning   Organisation,
\nDeputy Commissioner, Delhi Municipal Corporation, Architects
\nof  Delhi  Municipal  Corporation,  Secretary,\tLocal\tSelf
\nGovernment and Under Secretary to the State Government.\t The
\nrecords\t show  that  the case of each  notified\t colony\t was
\nconsidered  separately and it was felt that cases  in  which
\nthe  layout and service plans had been finally\tapproved  in
\nall   respects\t before\t 13th  November,  1959\t should\t  be
\nrecommended for de-notification.  On 1st of July, 1960,\t the
\nCommission, Delhi Municipal Corporation went into the matter
\nand recommended that
\n\t      “All  those colonies in respect of which\tboth
\n\t\t\t    lay-out  plans  and\t service  plans\t h
\nad   been
\n\t      approved by the Delhi Development\t Provisional
\n\t      Authority the Delhi Development, Authority  or
\n\t      the  Delhi  Municipal Corporation may  be\t de-
\n\t      notified irrespective of whether security\t was
\n\t      demanded or not and whether the time limit for
\n\t      completion  of development was imposed or\t not
\n\t      and irrespective of whether security has\tbeen
\n\t      paid or not and’ whether development has\tbeen
\n\t      completed or not.”\n<\/p>\n
According to this recommendation, 16 colonies named therein’
\nfell  in this category.\t Sohan Lal’s colony was not  one  of
\nthose sixteen.\n<\/p>\n
It is unfortunate that the petitioner who submitted the\t lay
\nout plan of the colony as early as June 18, 1956 had not the
\nservice\t plan  approved before 13th November, 1959.   It  is
\nclear from
\n76<\/span>
\nthe  annexures to the petition that the details of the\tlay-
\nout of the colony were submitted on 30th August, 1956.\t The
\npetitioner submitted service plans on 15th September,  1959.
\nThere was nothing wrong with the plans intrinsically  except
\nthat  there were more than one small pocket of\tland  within
\nthe  colony  to which the petitioner could  not\t prove\this,
\nownership  statisfactorily.  Mr. Agarwala appearing for\t the
\npetitioner  submitted that the only difficulty was  that  in
\nrespect\t of  the small pockets they were owned\tnot  by\t the
\npetitioner  alone  but in co-ownership with others  and\t the
\npetitioner subsequently excluded these pockets from the pur-
\nview  of his lay-out plan: but this was done only  on  March
\n19,  1961, The petitioner’s subsequent efforts to  have\t his
\ncolony\tdenotified  were  of no avail  even  though  he\t had
\nexcluded  these\t pockets on 20th January,  1960.   On  these
\nfacts,\twe cannot hold that the petitioner was subjected  to
\nany  discrimination.   There  was a policy  behind  the\t de-
\nnotification  and it has not been suggested that the  policy
\nwas   vitiated\tby  any\t malafides  on\tthe  part   of\t the
\nauthorities.\n<\/p>\n
All the points urged by the petitioners, therefore, fail and
\nthe petitions will stand dismissed.  There Will be no  order
\nas to costs.\n<\/p>\n
Shelat\tJ.-The facts in these five writ petitions have\tbeen
\nsufficiently set out by our learned brother Mitter J.in\t his
\njudgment  and therefore need not be repeated  here.   Though
\nthey  differ in some particulars, the contentions raised  by
\nCounsel for the petitioners are common except the additional
\ncontentions raised by Mr. Mani in Writ Petition 223 of\t1966
\nand by Mr. Agarwala in Writ Petition 85 of 1967.
\nThese writ petition arise as a result of and challenge inter
\nalia  the  validity  of\t the  following\t notifications.\t  No
\nNovember  13, 1959 the Chief Commissioner, Delhi,  issued  a
\nnotification under sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act 1,  of
\n1894 (hereafter referred to as the Principal Act)  notifying
\nthat land measuring 34070 acres marked in blocks A to T\t and
\nX  in the map enclosed there with was required by the  Delhi
\nAdministration\tfor  the planned development of\t Delhi.\t  In
\npursuance  of  that notification, the  Delhi  Administration
\nissued sec. 6 notification dated June 14, 1961 in respect of
\nthe  land situate in village Kilkori measuring 97 bighas  14
\nbiswas\tonly  from  out\t of the\t said  notified\t area.\t The
\nnotification  directed the Collector to take order  for\t its
\nacquisition under s. 7 of the Act.  The Collector thereafter
\nmade his award on August 31, 1961 in respect of the said  97
\nbighas\tof  land  at  Rs. 2500 a  bigha,  the  total  amount
\nincluding  the\tsolatium  awarded  being  Rs.\t2,80,887.50.
\nNothing thereafter was done till March 18; 1966 when another
\nnotification under sec. 6 was issued in
\n77<\/span>
\nrespect\t of  1752.2  bighas of land  situated  in  Mandawali
\nFazilpur, Khuraj Khas and Shakarpur Khas.
\nOn February 9, 1966 this Court delivered its judgment in  M.
\nP. State v. V. P. Sharma (1) where facts were similar to the
\nfacts  in the present cases and where the land was  required
\nfor the erection of a steel plant in public sector.  In that
\ncase  the notification under sec. 4 covering land in  eleven
\nvillages  was  issued  in May 1949.  This  was\tfollowed  by
\nseveral\t notifications under sec. 6, the last of them  being
\nin. 1960.  After examining the provisions of secs. 4, 5A and
\n6 of the Act, this Court declared as follows :-\n<\/p>\n
\t      “At  the\tstage  of sec. 4, the  land  is\t not
\n\t      particularised   but  only  the  locality\t  is
\n\t      mentioned;  at the stage of s. 6 the  land  in
\n\t      the locality is. particularised and thereafter
\n\t      the  notification under s. 4(1) having  served
\n\t      its purpose exhausts itself.  The sequence  of
\n\t      events from a notification of the intention to
\n\t      acquire  under s. 4 to the  declaration  under
\n\t      sec.  6, leads to the conclusion that  once  a
\n\t      declaration  under  s. 6\tparticularising\t the
\n\t      area    is   issued,   the   remaining\tnon-
\n\t      particularised area in the notification  under
\n\t      s.  4(1) stands automatically  released.\t The
\n\t      intention\t of  the legislature  was  that\t one
\n\t      notification under s. 4(1) should be  followed
\n\t      by survey under. s. 4(2), objections under s..
\n\t      5A  heard,  and  thereafter,  one\t declaration
\n\t      under  sec.  6  issued.\tIf  the\t  Government
\n\t      requires more land in that locality, there  is
\n\t      nothing  to  prevent it from  issuing  another
\n\t      notification  under s. 4(1) making  a  further
\n\t      survey  if necessary, hearing  objections\t and
\n\t      then  making another declaration under  s.  6,
\n\t      whereas there is likely to be prejudice to the
\n\t      owner  of\t the land if there  is\tgreat  delay
\n\t      between the notifications under s. 4(1) and s.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      6.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
One of the contentions urged in that case was that where the
\nland  is  required for a small project and the area  is\t not
\nlarge  the government may be able to make up its  mind\tonce
\nfor all what land it needs but where, land is required for a
\nlarge project requiring a large area of land, government may
\nnot  be able to make up its mind at once.   This  contention
\nwas  rejected on the ground that even if it be so  there  is
\nnothing\t to  prevent  the government  from  issuing  another
\nnotification  under sec. 4 followed by a notification  under
\nsec.  6,  that the government’s power to acquire land  in  a
\nparticular   locality  is  not\texhausted  by  issuing\t one
\nnotification  under  sec. 4(1) followed\t by  a\tnotification
\nunder  s.6  and\t that it can proceed to do  so\tby  a  fresh
\nnotification  under  Section 4(1) and  a  fresh\t declaration
\nunder sec. 6 and that such a procedure would be fair to\t all
\nconcerned.\n<\/p>\n
(1) [1966] 3 S.C.R. 557.\n<\/p>\n
78<\/span><\/p>\n
Sarkar\tJ. who delivered a separate judgment  also  repelled
\nthe contention by observing that he could not
\n\t       “imagine\t  a   government  which\t  has\tvast
\n\t      resources\t not being able to make\t a  complete
\n\t      plan  of\tits project, at a time.\t  Indeed,  I
\n\t      think,  when a plan is made it is\t a  complete
\n\t      plan.   I\t should\t suppose  that\tbefore\t the
\n\t      government  starts acquisition proceedings  by
\n\t      the  issue of a notification under sec.  4  it
\n\t      has  made\t its plan for  otherwise  it  cannot
\n\t      state  in the notification, as it has  to\t do,
\n\t      that the land is likely to be needed.  Even if
\n\t      it  had not then completed its plan  it  would
\n\t      have  enough  time  before  the  making  of  a
\n\t      declaration under section 6 to do so.  I think
\n\t      therefore\t  that\t the   difficulty   of\t the
\n\t      government,  even\t if there is one,  does\t not
\n\t      lead   to\t  the  conclusion   that   the\t Act
\n\t      contemplates  the making of a number  of\tdec-
\n\t      larations under sec. 6.”\n<\/p>\n
In the view taken Sharma’s case(1) sec. 6 notification dated
\nMarch 18, 1966 was invalid as sec. 4 notification dated Nov-
\nember  13,  1959  on  which it\twas  founded  ceased  to  be
\nefficacious  and became exhausted after sec. 6\tnotification
\ndated June 14, 1961 wag issued and the rest of the land\t not
\ncovered by it became as a result released from\tacquisition.
\nDepending  on the declaration of law made in  this  decision
\nthe petitioners filed these writ petition in April 1966\t and
\nthereafter.\n<\/p>\n
Realising that if the view taken in Sharma’s case(1) were to
\nstand  the  government would have to issue a  fresh  sec.  4
\nnotification and would have to pay compensation on the basis
\nof  the\t market value of the land on the date  of  such\t new
\nnotification instead of on November 13, 1959, the government
\npromulgated  an Ordinance dated January 20, 1967 called\t the
\nLand  Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance 1  of
\n1967.  It is not necessary to set out the provisions of\t the
\nOrdinance  as  it has been substituted by  Land\t Acquisition
\n(Amendment  and\t Validation)  Act,  13\tof  1967  (hereafter
\nreferred to as the Amendment Act) passed on April 12,  1967.
\nThere  can be no manner of doubt that the Ordinance and\t the
\nAmendment  Act\twere enacted with the object of\t setting  at
\nnaught the decision in Sharma’s case(1).
\nSection\t 2  of the Amendment Act substituted  the  following
\nwords in sec. 5A (2), viz.,
\n\t      “Submit  the  case  for  the  decision  of  an
\n\t      appropriate   government\ttogether  with\t the
\n\t      record  of the proceedings held by him  and  a
\n\t      report  containing his recommendations on\t the
\n\t      objections.” by the following words viz.,
\n(1) [1663] S.C.R. 557.\n<\/p>\n
79<\/span><\/p>\n
\t      “either  make a report in respect of the\tland
\n\t      which has been notified under sec. 4  sub-sec.
\n\t      (1)  or make different reports in\t respect  of
\n\t      different parcels of such land.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Section\t 3 added the following words in sec. 6(1) after\t the
\nwords ‘certify its orders’, viz.,
\n\t      “and  different declaration may be  made\tfrom
\n\t      time  to time in respect of different  parcels
\n\t      of  any land covered by the same\tnotification
\n\t      under  sec.  4 sub-sec.  (1)  irrespective  of
\n\t      whether one report or different reports has or
\n\t      have been made (wherever required) under\tsec.
\n\t      5A sub-section (2).”\n<\/p>\n
Section 3 also substituted the existing proviso to sec. 6(1)
\nby the following :-\n<\/p>\n
\t      ”\t provided that no declaration in respect  of
\n\t      any particular land covered by a\tnotification
\n\t      under   sec.   4(1)   published\tafter\t the
\n\t      commencement  of\tthe  said  ordinance  (after
\n\t      20-1-1967)  shall be made after the expiry  of
\n\t      three   years   from   the   date\t  of\tsuch
\n\t      publication.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Sec.  4(1) of the Amendment Act is a  validating  provision.
\nBy clause (a) it provides that no acquisition purporting  to
\nhave been made before the commencement of the said Ordinance
\n(i.e.,\tbefore\t20-1-67) and no action taken or\t thing\tdone
\nincluding any notification published in connection with such
\nacquisition  shall be deemed to be invalid or ever  to\thave
\nbecome invalid on the ground that\n<\/p>\n
\t      (i)one  or more collectors  have\tperformed
\n\t      the  functions of collector in respect of\t the
\n\t      entire land covered by s. 4 notification.\n<\/p>\n
\t      (ii)  one or more reports have been made under
\n\t      s.5A(2) whether in respect of the entire\tland
\n\t      or  different parcels thereof covered  by\t the
\n\t      same notification, and\n<\/p>\n
\t      (iii) that more than one declaration are\tmade
\n\t      under sec . 6 in respect of different  parcels
\n\t      of land covered by the same notification under
\n\t      sec. 4(1).\n<\/p>\n
Clause\t(b)  of sec. 4(1) provides that any  acquisition  in
\npursuance ,of a sec. 4 notification published before 20-1-67
\nmay  be made after that date and no such acquisition and  no
\naction taken or thing done including any order, agreement or
\nnotification made or published whether before or after 20-1-
\n67 in connection with such acquisition shall be deemed to be
\ninvalid merely on the said grounds mentioned in clause (a).
\nSub-sec. (2) of, sec. 4. provides that no declaration  under
\nsec.  6 shall be made in respect of land covered by  sec.  4
\nnotification  published before 20-1-67 after the  expiry  of
\ntwo years from that
\n80<\/span>
\ndate,  that is, 20-1-69.  Sec. 4(3) provides for payment  of
\ninterest in the circumstances set out therein.
\nThe  result of the Amendment Act clearly is that an area  of
\nland  notified under sec. 4(1) can be acquired piecemeal  at
\nany time the only restriction being that under sec. 3 in the
\ncase  of  land covered by a sec.  4  notification  published
\nafter  20-1-67, sec. 6 notification can be issued  within  3
\nyears  from the date of such notification and in respect  of
\nland  notified\tunder sec. 4(.1) before 20-1-67\t within\t two
\nyears\tafter  20-1-67.\t  The  direct  consequence  of\t the
\nAmendment  Act is that the unitary character of\t acquisition
\nby a single inquiry, a single report,’ a single\t declaration
\nand  a\tsingle award under the Principal Act  is  done\taway
\nwith.  The government can freeze an area by issuing a sec. 4
\nnotification  and can, subject to the limitations in sec.  3
\nand sec. 4 (2) of the Amendment Act, go on acquiring parcels
\nof  such  area at its convenience irrespective of  the\ttime
\nwhen  it makes up its mind to acquire and pay,\tcompensation
\non  the\t basis\tof  the\t ‘Value\t at  the  date\tof  sec.   4
\nnotification.  In the case of land notified under sec.\t4(1)
\nafter  20-1-67 the owner is deprived of appreciation-in\t the
\nvalue of his land during three years by reason of limitation
\nprescribed in sec. 3 but in the case of land notified before
\n20-1-67\t such  deprivation’ can be for an  uncertain  period
\nfrom  the date of sec. 4 notification up to two\t years\tfrom
\n20-1-67\t i.e.,\tup  to\t20-1-69\t depending  upon  when\t its
\nacquisition  is made.  As has happened in the instant  cases
\nthe entire area of 34070 acres was frozen for the purpose of
\ncomputation of compensation as from Nov. 13, 1959 portons of
\nthat  area were acquired as late as 1966 and  the  remaining
\narea can still be acquired until 20-1 769, each owner  being
\nthus  deprived\tof  the appreciation in value  of  his\tland
\ndepending  upon\t when  during  all  this  long\tperiod\t the
\ngovernment  decides  to acquire it.  Thus, if  the  land  is
\nnotified  in  1959  and is acquired in\t1960,  the  loss  of
\nappreciation in value is only of one year.  But the owner of
\nanother\t plot  even  if\t it is\tcontiguous  to\tit,  if\t the
\ngovernment decides to acquire it in 1969, would be  deprived
\nof  the\t appreciation in value which has taken\tplace  right
\nfrom  1959  to\t1969.  The entire area is  in  the  meantime
\nfrozen\tboth for the purpose of compensation and as  pointed
\nout in Sharma’s. Case(1) from its full beneficial enjoyment,
\nthe owner not knowing until government chooses to make\tsec.
\n6 declaration Whether it will ultimately be acquired or not.
\nUnder  the  Principal Act as construed in  Sharma’s  Case(1)
\nonce  a sec. 6 notification is issued sec.,  4\tnotification
\nwould  become exhausted and the land not declared as  needed
\nthereunder   would   be\t relieved  from\t  acquisition.\t  If
\ngovernment then desires to acquire any land in addition\t to.
\nthe one so declared it would have to be notified a fresh and
\nthe government would be obliged to pay compen-
\n(1)[1966] 3 S.C.R. 557.\n<\/p>\n
81<\/span><\/p>\n
sation\tat  the market rate prevailing on  such\t date.\t The
\npractical  effect  of the Amendment Act is that\t by  keeping
\nalive sec. 4 notification and by declaring the\tdeclarations
\nmade  after  the first declaration  valid,  the\t legislature
\ndated back the basis of compensation which would have  been,
\nput for this validation, the rate prevailing at the date  of
\nsec.  4\t notification howsoever\t belatedcessary.   The\treal
\npurpose\t of enacting sec.4 is thus to enable  government  to
\nfreeze an unlimited area by first notifying it under sec.  4
\nand  then to acquire bit by bit and pay compensation at\t the
\nrate  prevailing  at  the  date\t of  sec.  4   notification-
\nhowsoever  belatedly  it may choose to\tacquire\t such  bits,
\nprovided  it  does  so\tbefore 20-1-69\twhere  the  land  is
\nnotified before 20-1-67 and before the expiry of three years
\nwhere  s.  4 notification is issued after 20-1-67  and\tthus
\navoid compensating the appreciation in value in the meantime
\nto  which the owner would have been entitled to.  Though  in
\nform the Amendment Act purports to validate acquisitions in-
\ncluding\t orders\t and declarations made\ttherefor,  the\treal
\npurpose\t of enacting the Amendment Act is to,  avoid  having
\notherwise  to  compensate for the appreciation in  the\tland
\nvalue  during the intervening period.  It is a\twell-settled
\nprinciple  that\t in determining the constitutionality  of  a
\nprovision impugned, on the ground of its being. an  invasion
\non  a  fundamental right the court must weigh not  its\tform
\nwhich may apparently look innocuous but its real effect\t and
\nimpact on such fundamental right. (cf.\tRe Kerala  Education
\nBill(1); Gajapati Deo v. State of Orissa (2)
\nIt  will be seen that. secs. 2 and 3 which enable  piecemeal
\nand  multiple  inquiries  and  reports\tof  a  Collector  or
\nCollectors under s, 5A. diverse declarations, and awards  in
\nrespect\t of  different ‘Parcels of land covered\t by  sec.  4
\nnotification  are prospective.\tIt is only sec. 4  which  is
\nmade  retrospective.   But it merely seeks  to\tnullify\t the
\ndecision in Sharma’s Case(3) and purports to keep alive sec.
\n4  notifications  which\t would\thave  otherwise\t lost  their
\nefficacy  and  validates acquisitions including\t orders\t and
\nsee. 6 declarations purported to have been made on the basis
\nof such sec. 4 notifications.  Section 4, however, does\t not
\ncontain\t any  provision retrospectively amending sec.  4  or
\nsec.  5A  or sec. 6 and merely seeks to\t revitalise  sec.  4
\nnotifications already exhausted.  The section does not\talso
\nprovide that an acquisition or an order or declaration under
\nsec. 6 made on the basis of such exhausted notification will
\nbe deemed to have been made or issued under secs. 2 and 3 of
\nthe  Amendment Act and as if the Amendment Act was in  force
\nat that date as, is usually done in such validating Acts.  A
\nnotification  under sec. 4 having exhausted itself  after  a
\ndeclaration  under sec. 6 in respect of a part of  the\tland
\ncovered\t by it and the rest of the land being relieved\tfrom
\nacquisition,
\n(1) [1959] S.C.R. 995.\t    (2) [1953] S.C.R. 357.
\n(3) [1966] 3 S.C.R. 557.\n<\/p>\n
82<\/span><\/p>\n
there would be prima facie no basis for a sec. 6 declaration
\nor  acquisition unless such notification is  retrospectively
\nvalidated  by  a  supporting  amendment of  sec.  4  of\t the
\nPrincipal  Act or by making secs. 2 and 3 of  the  Amendment
\nAct retrospective. and by a fiction deeming it to have\tbeen
\nmade under such amending provision.\n<\/p>\n
Counsel\t for  the petitioners raised the  following  conten-
\ntions:–\n<\/p>\n
(1) that Act 13 of 1967 does not revive sec. 4\tnotification
\ndated  November\t 13, 1959 which became exhausted  after\t the
\nfirst  sec. 6 declaration in 1961 was made and therefore  no
\nacquisition in respect of the rest of the land could be made
\nwithout\t a  fresh sec. 4 notification.\tThe  contention\t was
\nthat   secs.  2\t and  3\t being\tprospective  they  did\t not
\nresuscitate  the  sec.\t4  notification\t though\t  subsequent
\nacquisitions including orders and declarations under sec.  6
\nare  validated and that such validation has no\tefficacy  as
\nthere would be no basis by way of a sec. 4 notification\t for
\nsuch acquisition or order or declaration.
\n(2) that Act 13 of 1967 is in derogation of the requirements
\nof  Art.  31(2)\t as it\tpurports  to  authorise\t acquisition
\nwithout\t a  fresh  sec.\t 4  notification  thereby   allowing
\ncompensation to be paid on the basis of an exhausted sec.  4
\nnotification and on the value of the land prevailing on\t the
\ndate of such exhausted notification.\n<\/p>\n
(3)  that  the Amendment Act is in violation of Art.  14  in
\nthat\n<\/p>\n
(a)  where a sec. 4 notification is made  before  20-1-1967,
\nsec. 6 declaration can be made within 2 years from the\tsaid
\ndate,  i.e.,  on or before 20-1-69.  But where the  land  is
\nnotified  after 20-1-67 sec. 6 declaration would have to  be
\nmade within 3 years from the date of such notification.\t  In
\nthe former case a much longer period is provided for a\tsec.
\n6 declaration than in the latter case;\n<\/p>\n
(b)  where  a  sec. 4 notification  is\tmade  after  20-1-67
\ncompensation  would  be fixed on the basis of the  value  on
\nthat date but where a sec. 4 notification is made before 20-
\n1-67 compensation would be on the basis of the value on\t the
\ndate  of the exhausted notification howsoever long a  period
\nhas elapsed since such notification;\n<\/p>\n
(c)if compensation has not been paid before 20-1-67 interest
\nhas to be paid on the compensation amount, but if  compensa-
\ntion  has  been paid before 20-1-67 no interest\t is  payable
\nthough\tacquisition in both the cases springs from the\tsame
\nsec. 4 notification;\n<\/p>\n
83<\/span><\/p>\n
(d)in the case of sec. 4 notification issued after 20-1-67
\nif Sec. 6 declaration is not made within three years a fresh
\nsec. 4notification is necessary and compensation would be on
\nthe   basis  of\t the  value  on\t the  date  of\tsuch   fresh
\nnotification but where a s. 4 notification is issued  before
\n20-1-67\t there is no defined period and sec.  6\t declaration
\ncan  be\t made  until  20-1-69.\t Therefore  the\t owner\tgets
\ncompensation  on the value at the date of s. 4\tnotification
\nhowsoever  long\t the  intervening period may  be.  A  person
\naffected by see. 4 notification issued after 20-1-67 is thus
\ndifferently  treated than the one who is affected by such  a
\nnotification issued’ before 20-1-67. In Writ Petition No. 85
\nof 1967 an additional point was raised, viz., that though 16
\ncolonies in village Kilkori were denotified under s. 48, the
\nland  of  the  petitioner though, situate  within  the\tsame
\nnotified area was not denotified thus.wrongly discriminating
\nhim.  In  Writ Petition No. 223 of 1966,Mr.  Mani  contended
\nthat the Amendment Act merely seeks to reverse the  decision
\nof  this  Court,  that the Act is not a\t legislative  but  a
\njudicial  act  and  that though\t the  Constitution  has\t not
\nbrought\t about separation of powers nonetheless it does\t not
\nconfer unlimited powers on the legislature to encroach\tupon
\nthe judicial power. In other words, the legislature seeks to
\ncontrol\t  the  courts’function\tby  requiring  of   them   a
\nconstruction of law according to its views. The\t legislative
\naction cannot be made to retroact upon past transactions and
\ncontroversies  and  reverse decisions which  the  courts  in
\nexercise  of their undoubted authority have made,.for,\tthat
\nwould  mean not only exercise of a judicial function but  in
\neffect\tto  sit\t as  a court of review\tto  which  the\tpast
\ntransactions and controversies are referred to. The question
\nas  formulated\tby  him is whether a  statute  which  simply
\nvalidates  acts\t and orders pronounced upon by\ta  court  as
\ninvalid is sustainable without a retrospective law providing
\nthat such acts and orders are deemed to have been made under
\nthe  validating\t Act and as, if such validating Act  was  in
\nexistence at the date of such acts and orders.
\nOn  the question whether the Amendment Act is in  derogation
\nof  the\t requirements of Art. 31(2), the contention  of\t the
\nSolicitor-General was that it is not the law contemplated by
\nArt.31(2) as it merely amends ss. 5A and 6 of the  Principal
\nAct and does not touch either s. 4 or s. 23 which deal\twith
\ncompensation,.that it amends only the procedural  provisions
\nand  that  sec.\t 4  thereof  merely  validates\tacquisitions
\nincluding  orders and notifications purported to  have\tbeen
\nmade or passed to get over the difficulty create by Sharma’s
\nCase(1).The   impugned\tAct  does  not\tfrankly\t deal\twith
\ncompensation.But  as already stated it is not the form of  a
\nstatute under
\n(1)  [19661 3 S.C.R. 557.\n<\/p>\n
84<\/span><\/p>\n
challenge  which matters but its substance, and\t the  direct
\nimpact\tit has on the constitutional  requirements.   Though
\nsees.  2  and  3 amend ss. 5A and 6  of\t the  Principal\t Act
\nenabling  multiple  inquiries, reports and  declarations  in
\nrespect\t of different parcels of land notified under  S.  4,
\nthe  validating provisions of s. 4 have a direct, impact  on
\nthe question of compensation payable under the Act.  Where a
\nsec. 4 notification has been issued at any time before 20-1-
\n67,  as has happened in the instant cases, a large area\t can
\nbe  notified  under  sec. 4, say, in 1959, and\tyet  sec.  6
\ndeclarations  can be made by reason of s. 4 of the  impugned
\nAct  at\t different  times and as late  as  1969.   Yet,\t the
\ncompensation  would be on the value in 1959 irrespective  of
\nthe fact that such value has appreciated in the meantime due
\nto the general spiralling of prices and not as a consequence
\nof  its\t having been notified under sec. 4. It\tis  manifest
\nthat  but  for\tthe validating provisions of  S.  4  of\t the
\nAmendment  Act government would have had either\t to  proceed
\nwith the acquisition of the whole of the notified land or to
\nproceed\t with  part  of\t it and\t thus  exhaust\tthe  sec.  4
\nnotification   and  release  the  rest\tof   the   land-from
\nacquisition.  If further land-is subsequently needed a fresh
\nnotification  under  s.\t 4  would  have-been-necessary\t and
\ncompensation would have to be paid on the basis of the value
\non  that  date.\t  The impugned\tAct  enables  government  to
\nacquire\t the  land  once  it is notified  under\t sec.  4  in
\ndifferent parcels and if the notification is of a date prior
\nto 20-1-67 pay the same compensation depriving the owner  of
\nthe  appreciation  of value during the\tintervening  period.
\nSuch  appreciation would have had to be compensated for\t but
\nfor sec. 4 of the impugned Act-.  Each parcel of land in  an
\narea  notified\tunder  sec.  4\twould  thus  be\t dealt\twith
\ndifferently  depending\ton  at\twhat point  of\ttime  it  is
\nacquired.   A  piece of land would fetch compensation  at  X
\namount even though its market value has doubled by the\ttime
\nsec. 6 declaration in respect of it is made.  Another  piece
\nof the very same land would be awarded the same compensation
\neven  if  the appreciation “in its value is  four-fold\tonly
\nbecause government can now acquire it at a subsequent  date.
\nThe deprivation of the appreciated value to different owners
\nor  to the same owner if both the parcels of land belong  to
\nthe  same would vary depending upon when government  chooses
\nto  acquire each of such parcels.  Therefore, from the\tmere
\nfact that the impugned Act does not amend sec. 4 or sec.  23
\nit is not possible to say that it is not an Act dealing with
\nor  affecting compensation.  Besides, by amending  sees.  5A
\nand  6 and validating acquisitions, orders and\tdeclarations
\nthe  Amendment\tAct brings about changes  of  a\t fundamental
\ncharacter in the Act by converting the unitary character  of
\nan  acquisition into a diversified one, in that\t instead  of
\none  inquiry  and  one\treport by  the\tsame  officer,.\t one
\ndeclaration  under sec. 6 and one award, it permits  several
\ninquiries and several reports by different officers, several
\ndeclarations and even
\n85<\/span>
\nseveral\t awards\t thus  altering the very  structure  of\t the
\nPrincipal  Act.\t  It  is thus impossible  to  say  that\t the
\nimpugned  Act is not the law of acquisition contemplated  by
\nArt. 31(2).,
\nIt  was, however, contended that even so, (1)  the  impugned
\nAct  does not alter the principle in s. 23 of the  Act\tthat
\ncompensation is to be fixed on the basis of market value  at
\nthe  date  of  s.  4 notification  and\tthat  such  mode  of
\ncompensation is based on a long standing principle that\t the
\nowner  is not entitled to any increase in value as a  result
\nof the land having, been notified; and (2) that the basis of
\ncompensation  emerging from the Amendment Act has a  bearing
\non  the\t adequacy  of compensation and hence  the  court  is
\nbarred\tunder  the  amended  Art.  31(2)  from\tmaking\t any
\nscrutiny.\n<\/p>\n
The  principle\ton which compensation is to  be\t ascertained
\nhas.,  undergone changes from time to time.  In the  Act  of
\n1870, s. 24 provided that it should be fixed on the basis of
\nthe  value  at the time of paying  compensation.   That\t was
\nchanged\t in  the Act of 1894 under which the date  of  s.  6
\nnotification  was  made,.the crucial date  for\tascertaining
\ncompensation.\tThis  was changed in 1923  when\t the  market
\nvalue on the date of s. 4 notification was made the  measure
\nof compensation.  This was done as s. 5A was then introduced
\nfor  the  first\t time  in the Act.  It\twas  felt  that\t the
\ninsertion  of  s. 5A would create, a time. gap\tbetween\t the
\nnotification  under  s. 4 and the actual  acquisition.\t The
\ndate  of s. 4 notification was accepted as the crucial\tdate
\non  the\t principle that in calculating compensation  it\t was
\nfair  to exclude appreciation due, to the land\thaving\tbeen
\nnotified  for  a  scheme  for which ‘it\t was  sought  to  be
\nacquired.   The,  principle on which appreciation  in  value
\nafter the issuance of s. 4 notification was. excluded is  no
\nlonger valid or in accord with the present day realities for
\nit is a notorious fact that prices of properties have,\tbeen
\ncontinuously rising for reasons into which it is neither ne-
\ncessary\t nor  relevant to go into. The\tprinciple  excluding
\nappreciation as a result of s. 4 notification has been there
\nfor a long time.  But the argument that s. 23 is not altered
\nby the Amendment Act does not lead us any further, for,\t the
\ninquiry\t is  what is the impact of the impugned Act  on\t the
\nquestion of compensation payable to the expropriated owner.-
\nIf  the\t impugned  Act had not\tnullified  the\tdecision  in
\nSharma’s  Case(1) and had not ruled that s.  4\tnotification
\nwould  not become exhausted, fresh notification under  s.  4
\nWould  have become necessary and higher\t compensation  would
\nhave  become payable than now.\tThe fact that neither  s.  4
\nnor s. 23 is altered therefore does not make any difference.
\n(1)  [1966] 3 S.C.R. 557.\n<\/p>\n
86<\/span><\/p>\n
The  impugned Act being a legislation after the 4th  Consti-
\ntution amendment of 1955 the question as to the adequacy  of
\ncompensation is no longer amenable to judicial scrutiny\t but
\nthe  amendment\tof Art. 31(2) in 1955 has not  affected\t the
\nconstitutional\t requirement   that  no\t property   can\t  be
\ncompulsorily  acquired\texcept\tunder a\t law  providing\t for
\ncompensation  or  which\t provides  principles  fixing\tsuch
\ncompensation.  As to what the term “compensation” in Art. 31
\nmeans  has been the subject-matter of several  decisions  of
\nthis  Court  and the term has as a result  acquired  a\twell
\nsettled\t  interpretation.    In\t Bela\tBanerjee’s   Case(1)
\nPatanjali  Sastri  C.J.\t in repelling  the  contention\tthat
\ncompensation  ‘in Entry 42 of List III could not  mean\tfull
\ncash  equivalent laid stress on the distinction between\t the
\nword  “compensation’ in Art. 31 and the said Entry  and\t the
\nwords  “the acquisition of property on just terms” in s.  51
\n(XXXI)\tof  the Australian Constitution Act  and  held\tthat
\ncompensation meant just equivalent and the principles  which
\nshould govern the determination of compensation amount to be
\ngiven  to  the expropriated owner must ensure that  what  is
\ndetermined must be such compensation, i.e., just equivalent.
\nIn striking down the proviso to s. 8 of the West Bengal Land
\nDevelopment  and Planning Act, XXI of 1948 he observed\tthat
\nthe fixing of an anterior date which has no relation to\t the
\nvalue  of  the land when it is acquired, may be\t many  years
\nlater,\tcannot but be regarded as arbitrary.   Similarly  in
\nNamasivaya  Mudaliar’s Case (2) this Court  held,  following
\nBela   Banerjee’s   Case(1),   that   any   principle\t for
\ndetermination\tof  compensation  denying  the\t owner\t all
\nincrements in’ value between a fixed date and the date of s.
\n4 notification must be regarded as denying to the owner\t the
\ntrue equivalent of the land which is ,expropriated and\tthat
\nit is for the State to show that fixation of compensation on
\nthe  market  value on an anterior date does  not  constitute
\nviolation  of the constitutional guarantee.   This  decision
\nwas  in respect of a law before the 1955 amendment  and\t the
\ncourt  expressed no opinion on the question whether  it\t was
\npossible by enacting legislation after the 1955 amendment to
\nprovide that compensation may be fixed on the basis of value
\nprevailing  on a certain anterior date. (cf.  Jeejeebhai  v.
\nAssist.\t Collector(3).\n<\/p>\n
It was thus well settled before the amendment of Art.  31(2)
\nin  1955 that there could not be a valid acquisition  unless
\nthe  law authorising it provided. compensation,\t i.e.,\tjust
\nequivalent  or\tprinciples fixing such\tcompensation,  i.e.,
\njust  equivalent  of  what the owner is\t deprived  of.,\t The
\nquestion  as  to the impact of the 1955\t amendment  of\tArt.
\n31(2) on this principle arose in
\n(1) [1954] S.C.R. 558. at p. 563-64.\n<\/p>\n
(3) [1965] 1 S.C.R. 636.\n<\/p>\n
(2) [1964] 6 S.C.R. 936.\n<\/p>\n
87<\/span><\/p>\n
P. Vajravelu Mudaliar v. Deputy Collector<\/a>(1).  This decision
\nlaid down the following propositions :-\n<\/p>\n
(i) whether the principles laid down in an impugned Act take
\ninto  account all the elements to make up the true value  of
\nthe property and exclude matters which are to be included is
\na justiciable issue;\n<\/p>\n
(ii) that the law fixing compensation or laying down princi-
\nples  governing\t its fixation cannot be\t questioned  on\t the
\nground of inadequacy;\n<\/p>\n
(iii)that the connotation of “compensation” and the question
\nof  justiciability are distinct concepts and should be\tkept
\napart  while  considering  the\tvalidity  of  the   impugned
\nprovision;\n<\/p>\n
(iv)  that the fact that the amended Article uses  the\tsame
\nwords,\tviz.,  “compensation” and “principles”\t-shows\tthat
\nParliament  used  them\tin  the sense  in  which  they\twere
\nconstrued by this Court, and\n<\/p>\n
(v) that the legislature must provide for a just  equivalent
\nor  lay down principles fixing such just equivalent  and  if
\nthat is done, such a law cannot be questioned on the  ground
\nof inadequacy of compensation.\n<\/p>\n
As to how and in what manner the question of adequacy  would
\narise  was illustrated by giving various examples.   Article
\n31(2)  as amended means therefore that if the  impugned\t Act
\neither\tfixes just equivalent as compensation or  lays\tdown
\nprinciples  for\t fixing such just equivalent  it  cannot  be
\nimpeached on the ground that such compensation is inadequate
\nor  that  when working out those  principles  the  resultant
\ncompensation is inadequate.  But this does not mean that the
\namendment  permitted  the  legislature,\t to  fix  inadequate
\ncompensation  or to lay down principles fixing\tcompensation
\nwhich  is not just equivalent.\tSuch a theory attributes  an
\nintention  to  the legislature to enact a law in  terms\t of.
\ncontradiction,\t for,  compensation  which,  is\t  not\tjust
\nequivalent  is no compensation as interpreted by this  Court
\nand  understood when Art. 31(2) was amended and\t giving\t any
\nsuch  meaning to that Article would be contrary to the\twell
\nsettled principle of construction that where the legislature
\nuses  in  an Act a legal term which  has  received  judicial
\ninterpretation\tit  must be assumed that it is used  in\t the
\nsense in which it has been judicially interpreted unless  a’
\ncontrary intention appears.  At p. 629 of the report it\t has
\nclearly been laid down that
\n\t      “If  the legislature though ex facie  purports
\n\t      to  provide for compensation or indicates\t the
\n\t      principles  for ascertaining the same  but  in
\n\t      effect and substance takes
\n(1)  [1965] 1 S.C.R. 614.\n<\/p>\n
88<\/span><\/p>\n
\t      away  a property without\tpaying\tcompensation
\n\t      for  it, it will be exercising power which  it
\n\t      does not possess.\t If the legislature makes  a
\n\t      law for acquiring a property by ,providing for
\n\t      an illusory compensation or by indicating\t the
\n\t      principles  for ascertaining the\tcompensation
\n\t      which  do not relate to the property  acquired
\n\t      or to the value of such property at or  within
\n\t      a\t  reasonable  proximity\t Of  the   date\t  of
\n\t      acquisition or the principles are so  designed
\n\t      and so arbitrary that they do not provide\t for
\n\t      compensation  at all one can easily hold\tthat
\n\t      the  legislature made the law in fraud of\t its
\n\t      powers.”\n<\/p>\n
Following  this\t decision this Court held in  the  Union  of
\nIndia  v. Metal Corporation of India<\/a>(1) that the  principles
\nlaid  down in the impugned Act were not in accord with\tArt.
\n31(2) and that an acquisition law “to justify itself has  to
\nprovide for the payment of a just equivalent to the property
\nacquired or lay down principles which are not arbitrary\t but
\nwhich  are relevant to the fixation of compensation.  It  is
\nonly  when the principles stand this test that the  adequacy
\nof  the\t resultant compensation falls outside  the  judicial
\nscrutiny under the second limb of Art. 31(2).”
\nIt  is true that in Vajravelu’s Case(2) it was held that  in
\nthe context of the continuous rise in land prices,  fixation
\nof  an average price over 5 years amounted to  ascertaining-
\nthe  price of the land in or about the date  of\t acquisition
\nand  that  omission  of one of\tthe  elements  which  should
\nproperly  be  taken  into account  for\tfixing\tcompensation
\nthough\tresulting  in inadequacy of compensation  would\t not
\nconstitute fraud on power.  But there is no analogy  between
\nthe  provisions\t of the impugned Act in that case  and’\t the
\ninstant\t cases.\t  Though  that\tAct  varied  the  method  of
\nascertainment  of  compensation\t provided by s.\t 23  of\t the
\nPrincipal  Act it provided for taking the average of  prices
\nprevailing  during  the\t 5 years in or\tabout  the  date  of
\nacquisition.  By striking the average of prices during those
\n5 years the Act actually took into account the\tappreciation
\nin  value during the 5 years preceding the  acquisition\t for
\nfixing the compensation.  The position in the instant  cases
\nis  quite different.  The impugned Act does not provide\t for
\nany  such average price as was done in Vajravelu’s  Case.(2)
\nThough\ts. 4 apparently validates’ acquisitions, orders\t and
\nnotifications made on the basis of s. 4 notification  issued
\nbefore\t20-1-67, in effect and substance it seeks  to  treat
\nsuch  a notification under s. 4 which had lost its  efficacy
\nand  had  become exhausted where s. 6 declaration  has\tbeen
\nmade
\n(1) [1967] 1 S.C.R. 255,
\n(2) [1965] 1 S.C.R. 614.\n<\/p>\n
89<\/span><\/p>\n
for a part of the land covered by such s. 4 notification  as
\nstill  outstanding.  This is sought to be done\twithout\t any
\nlegislative  provision in the impugned Act revitalising\t the
\nnotification which had become dead and inefficacious.\tSuch
\na thing could not be done by merely validating acquisitions,
\norders\t and  declarations  without  revitalising  by\tsome
\nprovision  the\tnotifications under s. 4  which\t had  become
\nexhausted  and on which such acquisitions  including  orders
\nand  declarations  are\tfounded.   Nor\tcould  it   validate
\ninquiries and reports under s. 5A and declarations under  s.
\n6,  all\t of which are made on the basis\t of  a\tnotification
\nwhich was no longer alive except by retrospectively amending
\ns.  4  and declaring such s. 4 notification as\thaving\tbeen
\nmade under such amended s. 4. Not having so done, the direct
\nresult of the validating provisions of s. 4 of the  impugned
\nAct is to fix compensation on the basis of the market  value
\nexisting  on  the  date\t of  s.\t 4  notification  which\t had
\nexhausted  itself.  By validating the  acquisitions,  orders
\nand  declarations  made on the basis of\t such  an  exhausted
\nnotification  the impugned Act saves government from  having
\nto  issue  a  fresh  s. 4 notification\tand  having  to\t pay
\ncompensation  calculated on the market value as on the\tdate
\nof  such fresh notification and depriving  the\texpropriated
\nowner the benefit of the appreciated value in the  meantime.
\nThe real object of s. 4 of the impugned Act is thus to\tsave
\nthe  State from having to compensate for  such\tappreciation
\nunder  the  device of validating all that is done  under  an
\nexhausted  s. 4 notification and thus in reality  fixing  an
\nanterior   date,  i.e.,\t the  date  of\tsuch  a\t  dead\t s.4
\nnotification for fixing the compensation.  We apprehend that
\ns.   4\tof the impugned Act suffers from a two-told  vice  :\n<\/p>\n
(i)  that it purports to validate acquisitions,\t orders\t and
\nnotifications  without resuscitating the notification  under
\ns.  4  by any legislative provision on the  basis  of  which
\nalone  the validated acquisitions, orders  and\tdeclarations
\ncan properly be sustained and (2) that its provisions are in
\nderogation  of\tArt. 31(2) as interpreted by this  Court  by
\nfixing\tcompensation  on the basis of value on the  date  of
\nnotifications under s. 4 which had become exhausted and\t for
\nkeeping\t them alive no legislative provision is to be  found
\nin the impugned Act.  It is therefore not possible to  agree
\nwith  the  view that the purpose of s. 4 is to fill  in\t the
\nlacuna\tpointed\t out in Sharma’s Case(1) nor with  the\tview
\nthat it raises a question of adequacy of compensation.\t The
\nsection\t under\tthe guise of  validating  the  acquisitions,
\norders\tand  notifications camouflages the  real  object  of
\nenabling acquisitions by paying compensation on the basis of
\nvalues\tfrozen\tby notifications under s. 4  which  by\tpart
\nacquisitions   thereunder  had\tlost  their   efficacy\t and
\ntherefore  required  the  Test of the land  to\tbe  notified
\nafresh\tand  paying compensation on the date of\t such  fresh
\nnotifications.\n<\/p>\n
(1) [1966] 3 S.C.R. 557.\n<\/p>\n
L4Sup.C.I\/68-7
\n90<\/span>
\nIn  this  view,\t it is not necessary to go  into  the  other
\nquestions  raised  by the petitioners and  we  refrain\tfrom
\nexpressing  any opinion on them.  We would declare s.  4  as
\ninvalid and allow the petitions with costs.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t   ORDER
\nIn accordance with the opinion of the majority the petitions
\nare dismissed.\tNo order as to costs.\n<\/p>\n
G.C.\n<\/p>\n
91<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Udai Ram Sharma And Others Etc vs Union Of India And Others on 7 February, 1968 Equivalent citations: 1968 AIR 1138, 1968 SCR (3) 41 Author: G Mitter Bench: Wanchoo, K.N. (Cj), Bachawat, R.S., Shelat, J.M., Mitter, G.K., Vaidyialingam, C.A. PETITIONER: UDAI RAM SHARMA AND OTHERS ETC. Vs. RESPONDENT: UNION OF […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-213839","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nUdai Ram Sharma And Others Etc vs Union Of India And Others on 7 February, 1968 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/udai-ram-sharma-and-others-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-others-on-7-february-1968\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Udai Ram Sharma And Others Etc vs Union Of India And Others on 7 February, 1968 - 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