{"id":22145,"date":"2009-12-02T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2009-12-01T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/dr-v-k-vijayalekshmi-amma-vs-bindu-v-on-2-december-2009"},"modified":"2015-08-01T16:08:42","modified_gmt":"2015-08-01T10:38:42","slug":"dr-v-k-vijayalekshmi-amma-vs-bindu-v-on-2-december-2009","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/dr-v-k-vijayalekshmi-amma-vs-bindu-v-on-2-december-2009","title":{"rendered":"Dr. V.K.Vijayalekshmi Amma vs Bindu V. on 2 December, 2009"},"content":{"rendered":"
Kerala High Court<\/div>\n
Dr. V.K.Vijayalekshmi Amma vs Bindu V. on 2 December, 2009<\/div>\n
       \n\n  \n\n  \n\n \n \n  IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM\n\nCrl.MC.No. 2225 of 2009()\n\n\n1. DR. V.K.VIJAYALEKSHMI AMMA, AGED 70 YRS,\n                      ...  Petitioner\n\n                        Vs\n\n\n\n1. BINDU V., AGED 34 YEARS,\n                       ...       Respondent\n\n2. ARJUN RAJAGOPAL, AGED 8 YEARS,\n\n3. STATE OF KERALA, REPRESENTED BY\n\n                For Petitioner  :SRI.C.HARIKUMAR\n\n                For Respondent  :PUBLIC PROSECUTOR\n\nThe Hon'ble MR. Justice M.SASIDHARAN NAMBIAR\n\n Dated :02\/12\/2009\n\n O R D E R\n              M.SASIDHARAN NAMBIAR,J.\n            ===========================\n            CRL.M.C.No. 2225      OF 2009\n            ===========================\n\n     Dated this the 2nd day of December,2009\n\n                        ORDER\n<\/pre>\n
    Second respondent in M.C.36\/2009 on the file of<\/p>\n
Judicial    First     Class    Magistrate    Court-II,<\/p>\n
Thiruvananthapuram,  a petition filed under section 12<\/p>\n
of   Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act,<\/p>\n
2005, (hereinafter referred to as the Act,) is the<\/p>\n
petitioner. Respondents 1 and 2 are the petitioners<\/p>\n
before the Magistrate.   This petition is filed under<\/p>\n
section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash<\/p>\n
the proceedings as against her contending that the<\/p>\n
allegations in Annexure A complaint do not disclose or<\/p>\n
prove any domestic violence as defined under section 3<\/p>\n
of the Act, and first respondent has no right over the<\/p>\n
property of the petitioner and it is not a shared<\/p>\n
household.   It is contended that petitioner being a<\/p>\n
female person is not    a respondent as defined under<\/p>\n
section 2(q) of the     Act and therefore proceedings<\/p>\n
under  the  Act  as  against   the petitioner  is  not<\/p>\n
maintainable and is to be quashed.\n<\/p>\n
    2.   Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner<\/p>\n
Crl.M.C.2225\/2009               2<\/span><\/p>\n
was heard.\n<\/p>\n
      3.      The argument of the learned counsel is that<\/p>\n
respondent as defined under section 2(q) of the Act can<\/p>\n
only be a male person and not a female and therefore the<\/p>\n
proceedings initiated by the learned Magistrate on Annexure<\/p>\n
A1 complaint as against the petitioner is not sustainable<\/p>\n
and is    an abuse of process of the court and hence it is to<\/p>\n
be quashed.      It is also argued that the house involved in<\/p>\n
the petition is the exclusive property of the petitioner<\/p>\n
and is not a shared household of respondents 1 and 2 and on<\/p>\n
that    ground     also  the  petition is  not  maintainable.<\/p>\n
Relying on the decision of      Madhya Pradesh High Court in<\/p>\n
Ajay Kant v. Smt.Alka Sharma (2008(Crl.L.J.) 264), learned<\/p>\n
counsel argued that a female person could be proceeded<\/p>\n
against under the Act only on a complaint for    violation of<\/p>\n
an order under section 18 or 23 and        proceedings under<\/p>\n
section 12 of the Act        cannot be continued before the<\/p>\n
learned Magistrate against the petitioner.     Relying on the<\/p>\n
decisions of this court in Surendran v. State of Kerala<\/a><\/p>\n
(2009(3) KLT 967) and     the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in<\/p>\n
Mohammad      Maqeenuddin  Ahmed   v.  State   of   A.P,(2007<\/p>\n
Crl.L.J.3361)     it   was  argued  that  High  Court     has<\/p>\n
jurisdiction to quash a petition filed under section 12 of<\/p>\n
Crl.M.C.2225\/2009               3<\/span><\/p>\n
the    Act       pending  before  the   Magistrate and  when<\/p>\n
continuation of the proceedings as against the petitioner<\/p>\n
is an abuse of process of the court, it is to be quashed.<\/p>\n
      4. The questions to be decided in the petition are:-<\/p>\n
          1.   Whether a female person could be<\/p>\n
          a respondent, in a petition filed<\/p>\n
          under section 12 of the Act.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
          2.   Whether the powers under section<\/p>\n
          482 of Code of Criminal Procedure is<\/p>\n
          to be invoked, to quash a petition<\/p>\n
          filed under section 12 of the Act,<\/p>\n
          on the ground of abuse of process of<\/p>\n
          the court or on the ground that<\/p>\n
          petitioner before the Magistrate is<\/p>\n
          not    an    aggrieved   person    or<\/p>\n
          respondent is not a respondent as<\/p>\n
          defined   under   the  Act   or   the<\/p>\n
          disputed   house  is  not  a   shared<\/p>\n
          household,   as  provided  under  the<\/p>\n
          Act.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      5.     Clause (a) of Section 2 defines “an aggrieved<\/p>\n
person as “means any woman who is, or has been, in a<\/p>\n
domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges<\/p>\n
Crl.M.C.2225\/2009               4<\/span><\/p>\n
to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by<\/p>\n
the respondent.”       As is clear from the definition, an<\/p>\n
aggrieved person provided       under the Act can only be a<\/p>\n
woman.    Respondent is defined under clause (q) of Section 2<\/p>\n
as follows:-\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
                 “respondent” means  any  adult  male<\/p>\n
                 person who is,or has been, in a<\/p>\n
                 domestic   relationship   with   the<\/p>\n
                 aggrieved person and against whom<\/p>\n
                 the aggrieved person has sought any<\/p>\n
                 relief under this Act.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                 Provided that an aggrieved wife or<\/p>\n
                 female living in a relationship in<\/p>\n
                 the nature of a marriage may also<\/p>\n
                 file a complaint against a relative<\/p>\n
                 of the husband or the male partner.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
If there is no proviso to clause (q), it could be contended<\/p>\n
that a respondent could only be a male person and a female<\/p>\n
person cannot be the     respondent.  But under the proviso an<\/p>\n
aggrieved wife or a female living in a relationship in the<\/p>\n
nature of marriage can file a complaint against a relative<\/p>\n
of the husband. But it is not provided that such a<\/p>\n
Crl.M.C.2225\/2009               5<\/span><\/p>\n
complaint could be filed only against a male relative of<\/p>\n
the husband. Instead it is against a relative of the<\/p>\n
husband or the male partner.        The legislatures in their<\/p>\n
wisdom used “a male person” in the main definition of the<\/p>\n
respondent and     purposely did not use “a male relative” and<\/p>\n
instead used only a relative.      The proviso makes it clear<\/p>\n
that    an    aggrieved    wife  or  a  female  living  in   a<\/p>\n
relationship in the nature of marriage may also file a<\/p>\n
complaint against a relative of the husband or the male<\/p>\n
partner. The proviso       consciously avoided using “a male<\/p>\n
relative” and instead used only a “relative”of the husband<\/p>\n
or male partner.          A relative could be both male and<\/p>\n
female. Hence      a female relative is not excluded by the<\/p>\n
proviso.     If that be so,  contention that a female relative<\/p>\n
of the husband cannot be a respondent, as defined under<\/p>\n
section 2(q) of       the Act cannot be accepted.   There are<\/p>\n
sufficient indications in the Act      to strengthen the said<\/p>\n
conclusion.\n<\/p>\n
      6. Section 19 provides for residence orders.         Sub<\/p>\n
section (1) of Section 19 reads:-\n<\/p>\n
             “19.Residence Orders:-(1) While<\/p>\n
             disposing  of  an   application<\/p>\n
             under   sub  section   (1)   of<\/p>\n
Crl.M.C.2225\/2009               6<\/span><\/p>\n
             Section  12,   the   Magistrate<\/p>\n
             may, on being satisfied that<\/p>\n
             domestic  violence  has   taken<\/p>\n
             place, pass a residence order-<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
<\/blockquote>\n
             (a) restraining the respondent<\/p>\n
             from dispossessing or in any<\/p>\n
             other  manner  disturbing   the<\/p>\n
             possession  of  the   aggrieved<\/p>\n
             person    from    the    shared<\/p>\n
             household, whether or not the<\/p>\n
             respondent  has   a  legal   or<\/p>\n
             equitable   interest   in   the<\/p>\n
             shared household’<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
             (b) directing the respondent to<\/p>\n
             remove himself from the shared<\/p>\n
             household;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
             (c) restraining the respondent<\/p>\n
             or any of his relatives from<\/p>\n
             entering any portion of the<\/p>\n
             shared household in which the<\/p>\n
             aggrieved person resides;<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
             (d) restraining the respondent<\/p>\n
             from alienating or disposing<\/p>\n
             off the shared household or<\/p>\n
Crl.M.C.2225\/2009               7<\/span><\/p>\n
             encumbering the same.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
             (e) restraining the respondent<\/p>\n
             from renouncing his rights in<\/p>\n
             the  shared  household   except<\/p>\n
             with   the    leave   of    the<\/p>\n
             Magistrate; or<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
             (f) directing the respondent to<\/p>\n
             secure same level of alternate<\/p>\n
             accommodation      for      the<\/p>\n
             aggrieved person as enjoyed by<\/p>\n
             her in the shared household or<\/p>\n
             to pay rent for the same, if<\/p>\n
             the circumstances so require;<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
             Provided that no order under<\/p>\n
             clause  (b)  shall  be   passed<\/p>\n
             against any person who is a<\/p>\n
             woman.(underline supplied)<\/p>\n
The proviso makes it absolutely clear that the prohibition<\/p>\n
is only against passing an     order under clause (b) against<\/p>\n
a person who is a woman.     That means except in the case of<\/p>\n
clause (b), orders could be passed as against the woman<\/p>\n
also. Otherwise there is no necessity to specifically<\/p>\n
provide by a proviso that no order under clause (b)<\/p>\n
passed    against   a  woman.     If  a  woman  cannot be   a<\/p>\n
Crl.M.C.2225\/2009               8<\/span><\/p>\n
respondent,when no order      could be passed against such a<\/p>\n
person, there is no need to provide such a proviso as even<\/p>\n
otherwise in any     event an order cannot be passed against a<\/p>\n
woman who is not the      respondent.   Moreover in that case<\/p>\n
there is no rational for providing that no order could be<\/p>\n
passed under clause (b) alone, thereby enabling to pass<\/p>\n
orders under the other clauses of Section 19. Clause (b)<\/p>\n
provides for passing a residence order, directing the<\/p>\n
respondent to remove himself from the shared household.     In<\/p>\n
view of proviso,       Magistrate cannot direct a woman, to<\/p>\n
remove herself from the shared household.       Under section<\/p>\n
19, residence orders could be passed as against a woman<\/p>\n
also in respect of clause (a) and (c) to (f).           It is<\/p>\n
therefore clear that under clause (a) Magistrate can pass<\/p>\n
an order restraining the respondent from dispossessing or<\/p>\n
in any other manner disturbing     possession of the aggrieved<\/p>\n
person from the shared household, whether or not the<\/p>\n
respondent has a legal or equitable interest in the shared<\/p>\n
household.     Similarly under clause (c) an order restraining<\/p>\n
the respondent or any of his relative from entering any<\/p>\n
portion of the shared household in which the aggrieved<\/p>\n
person resides could be passed. There also it is not<\/p>\n
restricted as against the male relative alone. Under clause<\/p>\n
(d) an order restraining the respondent from alienating or<\/p>\n
Crl.M.C.2225\/2009               9<\/span><\/p>\n
disposing off the shared household or encumbering the same<\/p>\n
could be passed.      Under clause (e)    respondent could be<\/p>\n
restrained     from  renouncing  his  rights  in  the   shared<\/p>\n
household, except with the leave of the Magistrate.      Under<\/p>\n
Clause (f) the respondent could be directed to secure same<\/p>\n
level of alternate accommodation for the aggrieved person,<\/p>\n
as enjoyed by her in the shared household, or to pay rent<\/p>\n
for the same if the circumstances so required.         In all<\/p>\n
these cases such a restraining        order could be passed<\/p>\n
against the woman also as is clear by the proviso to<\/p>\n
Section 19(1) as those clauses are not included in the<\/p>\n
proviso.     If such an order can be  passed against a woman,<\/p>\n
as it is permissible under the Act, that woman against whom<\/p>\n
such an order is to be passed should necessarily be a<\/p>\n
respondent in the petition before the Magistrate.     If that<\/p>\n
be so, it can never be said that a female person cannot be<\/p>\n
a respondent under the Act.\n<\/p>\n
      7.     A learned single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High<\/p>\n
Court has taken a different view in Ajay Kant v. Smt.Alka<\/p>\n
Sharma (2008 Crl.L.J.264)     for the reason that proviso to<\/p>\n
clause (q)       of Section 2 enables an aggrieved wife or<\/p>\n
female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage<\/p>\n
to file a complaint against a relative of the husband      and<\/p>\n
Crl.M.C.2225\/2009            10<\/span><\/p>\n
as    ‘complaint’ is not defined in the Act and Section 12<\/p>\n
provides     for  filing only an  application  and  not   a<\/p>\n
complaint, the definition of “complaint” in clause (d) of<\/p>\n
Section 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is to be<\/p>\n
followed and if so the complaint contemplated under the<\/p>\n
proviso to Section 2(q) could only be in        respect of<\/p>\n
offences provided under section 31(1) and 33 of the Act. It<\/p>\n
was therefore held that   scope of the respondent cannot be<\/p>\n
widened to include a female.\n<\/p>\n
      8.It is to be born in mind that sub section (1) of<\/p>\n
Section 31 only provides that  a breach of protection order<\/p>\n
or of an interim protection order, by the respondent shall<\/p>\n
be an offence under the Act and shall be punishable with<\/p>\n
the sentence provided therein. Section 32 provides for<\/p>\n
cognizance and proof of the offence.  Under sub section (1)<\/p>\n
notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal<\/p>\n
Procedure, the offence under sub section (1)of Section 31<\/p>\n
shall be cognizable and non-bailable.    Under sub section<\/p>\n
(2) of Section 32, upon the sole testimony of the aggrieved<\/p>\n
person, the court may conclude that an offence under<\/p>\n
section 31(1) has been committed by the accused.      Under<\/p>\n
sub section (1) of Section 31 it is only the breach of a<\/p>\n
protection order under section 18 or an interim protection<\/p>\n
Crl.M.C.2225\/2009               11<\/span><\/p>\n
order under section 23 which      is made  punishable.    As is<\/p>\n
clear from       sub section   (1) of Section 31, such breach<\/p>\n
shall    be   by   the  “respondent”.   Therefore   unless  the<\/p>\n
“respondent” could be     a female person, an offence cannot be<\/p>\n
committed by breach of such an order by a female person.<\/p>\n
If that be so, the complaint provided under proviso to<\/p>\n
Clause    (q)    of  Section  2,  cannot  be  a   complaint  as<\/p>\n
interpreted by the learned Judge, as it is an impossibility<\/p>\n
because if a female person cannot be a respondent as<\/p>\n
defined under section 2(q), no protection order under<\/p>\n
section 18 or interim protection order under section 23<\/p>\n
could be passed against the      female person and in that case<\/p>\n
the proviso enabling       filing of a complaint against the<\/p>\n
female relative of the husband would be         reduntant.   If<\/p>\n
that be so, it could only be taken that the complaint<\/p>\n
provided in the proviso to clause (q)of Section 2       is the<\/p>\n
application filed under section 12, though inadvertently an<\/p>\n
application is referred in the Section        as complaint.   A<\/p>\n
learned single Judge of this Court in Remadevi v. State of<\/p>\n
Kerala<\/a> (2008(4) KLT 106) has taken an identical view that<\/p>\n
respondent as defined under section 2(q) could also be a<\/p>\n
female person.       It cannot be said that   proceedings under<\/p>\n
section 12 cannot be initiated against a female person.<\/p>\n
Crl.M.C.2225\/2009              12<\/span><\/p>\n
      9.     The next question is whether the extra ordinary<\/p>\n
jurisdiction of this court under section 482 of Code of<\/p>\n
Criminal Procedure is to be invoked to quash a petition<\/p>\n
filed by a person claiming to be an aggrieved person<\/p>\n
against a respondent, for the reliefs provided under the<\/p>\n
Act.\n<\/p>\n
      10. Undoubtedly the High Court possess inherent powers<\/p>\n
under section 482 of the Code.     These inherent powers are<\/p>\n
meant    to    act ex-debito  justitiae  to do     real and<\/p>\n
substantial justice for the administration of justice or to<\/p>\n
prevent abuse of process of court.     Inherent powers under<\/p>\n
section 482 can be exercised either (1) to give effect to<\/p>\n
an order under the Code or (2) to prevent abuse of process<\/p>\n
of court and (3) to otherwise secure the ends of justice.<\/p>\n
Apex Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal<\/a> (1992 supp.(1)<\/p>\n
SCC 335) enunciated the principles relating to the exercise<\/p>\n
of the extra ordinary power under Article 226 of the<\/p>\n
Constitution of India or the inherent powers under section<\/p>\n
482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as follows:-<\/p>\n
          “(1) Where the allegations made<\/p>\n
          in the first information report<\/p>\n
          or the complaint, even if they<\/p>\n
          are taken at their face value and<\/p>\n
Crl.M.C.2225\/2009               13<\/span><\/p>\n
          accepted in their entirety do not<\/p>\n
          prima    facie    constitute   any<\/p>\n
          offence   or   make  out   a  case<\/p>\n
          against the accused.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n          (2) Where the allegations in the<\/p>\n
          first    information  report   and<\/p>\n
          other     materials,    if    any,<\/p>\n
          accompanying   the   FIR   do not<\/p>\n
          disclose   a  cognizable  offence,<\/p>\n
          justifying   an  investigation  by<\/p>\n
          police officers under section 156<\/p>\n
          (1) of the Code except under an<\/p>\n
          order of a Magistrate within the<\/p>\n
          purview of Section 155(2) of the<\/p>\n
          Code.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          (3)    Where  the   uncontroverted<\/p>\n
          allegations made in the FIR or<\/p>\n
          complaint    and    the   evidence<\/p>\n
          collected in support of the same<\/p>\n
          do not disclose the commission of<\/p>\n
          any offence and make out a case<\/p>\n
          against the accused.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          (4) Where the allegations in the<\/p>\n
          FIR    do    not    constitute  a<\/p>\n
Crl.M.C.2225\/2009               14<\/span><\/p>\n
          cognizable offence but constitute<\/p>\n
          only a non-cognizable offence, no<\/p>\n
          investigation is permitted by a<\/p>\n
          police officer without an order<\/p>\n
          of a Magistrate as contemplated<\/p>\n
          under Section 155(2) of the Code.<\/p>\n
          (5) Where the allegations made in<\/p>\n
          the    FIR or   complaint are   so<\/p>\n
          absurd and inherently improbably<\/p>\n
          on the basis of which no prudent<\/p>\n
          person   can  ever  reach  a  just<\/p>\n
          conclusion     that    there    is<\/p>\n
          sufficient ground for proceeding<\/p>\n
          against the accused.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          (6) Where there is an express<\/p>\n
          legal bar engrafted in any of the<\/p>\n
          provisions of the Code or the Act<\/p>\n
          concerned (under which a criminal<\/p>\n
          proceeding is instituted) to the<\/p>\n
          institution   and  continuance  of<\/p>\n
          the    proceedings  and\/or   where<\/p>\n
          there is a specific provision in<\/p>\n
          the Code or the Act concerned,<\/p>\n
          providing efficacious redress for<\/p>\n
Crl.M.C.2225\/2009              15<\/span><\/p>\n
          the grievance of the aggrieved<\/p>\n
          party. (underline supplied)<\/p>\n
          (7) Where a criminal proceeding<\/p>\n
          is manifestly attended with mala<\/p>\n
          fide and\/or where the proceeding<\/p>\n
          is maliciously instituted with an<\/p>\n
          ulterior    motive for   wreaking<\/p>\n
          vengeance on the accused and with<\/p>\n
          a   view  to  spite  him  due  to<\/p>\n
          private and personal grudge.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
The content of the inherent power under section 482 of the<\/p>\n
Code of Criminal Procedure were examined and laid down in<\/p>\n
Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra<\/a> (1977) 4 SCC 551 as<\/p>\n
follows:-\n<\/p>\n
          “(1) that the power is not to be<\/p>\n
          resorted    to  if  there  is  a<\/p>\n
          specific provision in the code<\/p>\n
          for the redress of the grievance<\/p>\n
          of the aggrieved party;<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n          (2) that it should be exercised<\/p>\n
          very sparingly to prevent abuse<\/p>\n
          of    process  of any  court  or<\/p>\n
          otherwise to secure the ends of<\/p>\n
Crl.M.C.2225\/2009              16<\/span><\/p>\n
          justice;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          (3)    that it   should  not   be<\/p>\n
          exercised as against the express<\/p>\n
          bar    of law engrafted   in  any<\/p>\n
          other provision of the Code.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
In R.P.Kapur v. State of Punjab (AIR<\/a> 1960 SC 866) Apex<\/p>\n
Court summarised some categories of cases where inherent<\/p>\n
powers are to be exercised to quash the proceedings as<\/p>\n
follows:-\n<\/p>\n
           “(i) where it manifestly appears<\/p>\n
           that   there is   a  legal   bar<\/p>\n
           against   the   institution   or<\/p>\n
           continuance of the proceedings;<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
           (ii) where the allegations in<\/p>\n
           the first information report or<\/p>\n
           complaint taken at their face<\/p>\n
           value   and accepted  in   their<\/p>\n
           entirety do not constitute the<\/p>\n
           offence alleged;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
           (iii)   where  the   allegations<\/p>\n
           constitute   an   offence,   but<\/p>\n
           there   is  no  legal   evidence<\/p>\n
           adduced or the evidence adduced<\/p>\n
Crl.M.C.2225\/2009              17<\/span><\/p>\n
           clearly or manifestly fails to<\/p>\n
           prove the charge.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
The question whether the extra ordinary inherent powers<\/p>\n
under section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure is to be<\/p>\n
exercised by the court to quash a proceeding initiated<\/p>\n
under the Protection of Women from Domestic violence Act,<\/p>\n
2005 is to be considered in the background of the settled<\/p>\n
legal position. For a better appreciation of the relevant<\/p>\n
aspects, it is necessary to bear in mind the object and<\/p>\n
purpose of the Act. The Act      was enacted to provide for<\/p>\n
more effective protection of rights of woman guaranteed<\/p>\n
under the Constitution, who are victims of violence of any<\/p>\n
kind occurring within the family and      incidental thereto.<\/p>\n
Relevant portion of the Statement of Objects and reasons of<\/p>\n
the Act reads:-\n<\/p>\n
         “It    is therefore proposed   to<\/p>\n
          enact a law keeping in view the<\/p>\n
          rights guaranteed under Articles<\/p>\n
          14,15 and 21 of the Constitution<\/p>\n
          to provide for a remedy under<\/p>\n
          the civil law which is intended<\/p>\n
          to protect the woman from being<\/p>\n
          victims of domestic violence and<\/p>\n
Crl.M.C.2225\/2009              18<\/span><\/p>\n
          to   prevent the  occurrence  of<\/p>\n
          domestic    violence   in    the<\/p>\n
          society.”(underline supplied).\n<\/p>\n
      11. It is     clear that the Act was enacted to provide<\/p>\n
“a remedy under civil law” to protect the woman from being<\/p>\n
victims of domestic violence and to prevent occurrence of<\/p>\n
domestic violence in the society.\n<\/p>\n
      12. The definition in clause (a) of Section 2 shows<\/p>\n
that an “aggrieved person” could only be a woman who is , or<\/p>\n
has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent<\/p>\n
and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of<\/p>\n
domestic violence by the respondent. Chapter IV provides<\/p>\n
the procedure for obtaining orders of reliefs under the<\/p>\n
Act.     Under sub section (1) of Section 12, an aggrieved<\/p>\n
person or a Protection Officer or any other person on<\/p>\n
behalf of the aggrieved person may present an application<\/p>\n
before the Magistrate seeking one or more reliefs under the<\/p>\n
Act.    Under sub section (2), the reliefs sought for under<\/p>\n
sub section (1) may include a relief for issuance of an<\/p>\n
order for payment of compensation or damages, without<\/p>\n
prejudice to the right of such person to institute a suit<\/p>\n
for compensation or damages for the injuries caused by the<\/p>\n
acts of domestic violence committed by the respondent.<\/p>\n
Crl.M.C.2225\/2009             19<\/span><\/p>\n
Under sub section (3) every such application shall be in<\/p>\n
such form and contain such particulars as may be prescribed<\/p>\n
or as nearly as possible thereto. Prescribed     is defined<\/p>\n
under clause (m) of Section 2, means prescribed by rules<\/p>\n
made under the said     Act.  Sub section (5) of Section 12<\/p>\n
provides that Magistrate shall endeavour to dispose of<\/p>\n
every application made under sub section (1) within a<\/p>\n
period of sixty days from the date of its first hearing.<\/p>\n
Section 16 provides that if the Magistrate considers that<\/p>\n
the circumstances of the case so warrant, and if either<\/p>\n
party to the proceedings so desires, he may conduct the<\/p>\n
proceedings under the Act in camera.    Section 17 provides<\/p>\n
for the right of an aggrieved person   to reside in a shared<\/p>\n
household.        Under sub  section  (1)  of  Section  17,<\/p>\n
notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the<\/p>\n
time being in force, every woman in a domestic relationship<\/p>\n
shall have the right to reside in the shared household,<\/p>\n
whether or not she has any right, title or beneficial<\/p>\n
interest in the same.     Shared household is defined under<\/p>\n
clause (s) of Section 2.    Under sub section (2) of Section<\/p>\n
17, the aggrieved person shall not be evicted or excluded<\/p>\n
from the shared household or any part of it by the<\/p>\n
respondent,      except in  accordance with  the   procedure<\/p>\n
established by law.      Section 18 provides for protection<\/p>\n
Crl.M.C.2225\/2009              20<\/span><\/p>\n
orders.     Under section 18, the Magistrate may after giving<\/p>\n
the aggrieved person and the respondent an opportunity of<\/p>\n
being    heard   and on  being  prima  facie  satisfied that<\/p>\n
domestic violence has taken place or is likely to take<\/p>\n
place, pass a protection order in favour of the aggrieved<\/p>\n
person and prohibit the respondent from committing any acts<\/p>\n
as provided under clause (a) to clause (g).       Section 19<\/p>\n
provides for Residence orders.    Under sub section (1) while<\/p>\n
disposing of an application under sub section (1) of<\/p>\n
Section 12 and on being satisfied that domestic violence<\/p>\n
has taken place, Magistrate may pass a residence order<\/p>\n
restraining the respondent from dispossessing or in any<\/p>\n
other manner disturbing the possession of the aggrieved<\/p>\n
person from the shared household, whether or not the<\/p>\n
respondent has a legal or equitable interest in the shared<\/p>\n
household or directing the respondent to remove himself<\/p>\n
from the shared household or restraining the respondent or<\/p>\n
any of his relatives from entering any portion of the<\/p>\n
shared household in which the aggrieved person resides or<\/p>\n
restraining the respondent from alienating or disposing off<\/p>\n
the shared household or encumbering the same or restraining<\/p>\n
the respondent from renouncing his rights in the shared<\/p>\n
household except with the leave of the Magistrate or<\/p>\n
directing the respondent to secure same level of alternate<\/p>\n
Crl.M.C.2225\/2009               21<\/span><\/p>\n
accommodation for the aggrieved person as enjoyed by her in<\/p>\n
the shared household or to pay rent for the same if the<\/p>\n
circumstances so require.      Proviso makes it clear that no<\/p>\n
order shall be passed against any person who is a woman<\/p>\n
under clause (b) directing the respondent to remove herself<\/p>\n
from the shared household.       Sub section (2) enables the<\/p>\n
Magistrate to impose any additional condition or pass any<\/p>\n
other     direction which may deem reasonably   necessary to<\/p>\n
protect or to provide for the safety of the aggrieved<\/p>\n
person or any child of such aggrieved person.     Sub section<\/p>\n
(3) enables the Magistrate to require from the respondent<\/p>\n
to execute, a bond with or without sureties, for preventing<\/p>\n
commission of domestic violence.     Sub section (4) makes it<\/p>\n
clear that an order under sub section (3) shall be deemed<\/p>\n
to be an order under Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal<\/p>\n
Procedure and shall be dealt with accordingly making       it<\/p>\n
clear that       other orders are not to be treated as orders<\/p>\n
passed under the Code of Criminal Procedure as essentially<\/p>\n
they are      orders in respect of the civil liability.   Sub<\/p>\n
section (5) provides that while passing an order under sub<\/p>\n
section (1) or sub section (2) or sub section (3),      court<\/p>\n
may also pass an order directing the officer-in-charge of<\/p>\n
the nearest police station, to give protection to the<\/p>\n
aggrieved person or to assist her or the person making an<\/p>\n
Crl.M.C.2225\/2009               22<\/span><\/p>\n
application on her behalf in the implementation of the<\/p>\n
order.    Sub section (6) enables the Magistrate while making<\/p>\n
an order under sub section (1) to impose on the respondent<\/p>\n
obligations, relating to the discharge of rent or other<\/p>\n
payments having regard to the financial needs and resources<\/p>\n
of the parties.      Sub section (7) provides that Magistrate<\/p>\n
may direct the officer-in-charge of the police station in<\/p>\n
whose jurisdiction the Magistrate has been approached to<\/p>\n
assist in the implementation of the protection order.<\/p>\n
Under sub section (8) Magistrate may direct the respondent<\/p>\n
to return to the possession of the aggrieved person, her<\/p>\n
stridhan or any other property or valuable security, to<\/p>\n
which she is entitled to.          Section   20 provides for<\/p>\n
monetary reliefs.      Under sub section (1) while disposing<\/p>\n
the application under sub section (1) of Section 12,<\/p>\n
Magistrate may direct the respondent to pay monetary relief<\/p>\n
to meet the expenses incurred and losses suffered by the<\/p>\n
aggrieved person or her        child as a result of domestic<\/p>\n
violence.      Sub section (2)makes it clear that the monetary<\/p>\n
relief granted under sub section (1) shall be adequate,<\/p>\n
fair and reasonable and consistent with the standard of<\/p>\n
living to which the aggrieved person is accustomed.        Sub<\/p>\n
section (6) provides that on the failure of the respondent<\/p>\n
to make payment in terms of the order under sub section<\/p>\n
Crl.M.C.2225\/2009              23<\/span><\/p>\n
(1), Magistrate may direct the employer or a debtor of the<\/p>\n
respondent to directly pay to the aggrieved person or to<\/p>\n
deposit in       court a portion of the wages or salaries or<\/p>\n
debt due to or accrued to the credit of the respondent and<\/p>\n
that amount may be adjusted towards the monetary relief<\/p>\n
payable by the respondent.         Section 21 provides that<\/p>\n
notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the<\/p>\n
time being in force, Magistrate may, at any stage of<\/p>\n
hearing of the application for protection order or for any<\/p>\n
other relief under the Act, grant temporary custody of any<\/p>\n
child or children to the aggrieved person or the person<\/p>\n
making an application on her behalf and specify,          the<\/p>\n
arrangements for visit of such child or children by the<\/p>\n
respondent.      Section 22 provides for compensation orders.<\/p>\n
Under the said section in addition to other reliefs as may<\/p>\n
be granted, Magistrate may on an application being made by<\/p>\n
the    aggrieved    person,  pass  an  order  directing   the<\/p>\n
respondent to pay compensation and damages for the injuries<\/p>\n
including mental torture and emotional distress caused by<\/p>\n
the respondent, by acts of domestic violence.      Section 23<\/p>\n
provides the power to grant interim and ex parte orders.<\/p>\n
Section 25 provides for duration and alteration of the<\/p>\n
orders.      Under sub section (1) a protection order made<\/p>\n
under section 18 shall be in force till the aggrieved<\/p>\n
Crl.M.C.2225\/2009               24<\/span><\/p>\n
person applies for discharge.       Under sub section (2), on<\/p>\n
receipt of an application from the aggrieved person or the<\/p>\n
respondent       if satisfied that there is a change in the<\/p>\n
circumstances      requiring   alteration,   modification   or<\/p>\n
revocation or any order made under the Act, for reasons to<\/p>\n
be recorded in writing       he may pass such order as he may<\/p>\n
deem appropriate.      Section 26 provides for relief in other<\/p>\n
suits and legal proceedings.       Under sub section (1) any<\/p>\n
relief available under section 18 to 22 may also be sought<\/p>\n
in any legal proceeding, before a civil court, family court<\/p>\n
or a criminal court, affecting aggrieved person and the<\/p>\n
respondent, whether such proceeding was initiated before or<\/p>\n
after the commencement of the Act.           Sub section (2)<\/p>\n
provides that any relief referred to in sub section (1) may<\/p>\n
be sought for, in addition to and along with any other<\/p>\n
relief that the aggrieved person may seek in such suit or<\/p>\n
legal proceeding before a civil or criminal court.         Sub<\/p>\n
section (3) mandates that in case any relief has been<\/p>\n
granted     in   favour   of  the  aggrieved  person  in  any<\/p>\n
proceedings other than a proceeding under the Act, she<\/p>\n
shall be bound to inform the Magistrate of the grant of<\/p>\n
such relief.\n<\/p>\n
      13. Section 28 provides the procedure. It reads:-<\/p>\n
\n         “28.    Procedure:-(1) Save   as<\/p>\n
Crl.M.C.2225\/2009             25<\/span><\/p>\n
         otherwise   provided  in   this<\/p>\n
         Act,    all proceedings  under<\/p>\n
         sections 12,18,19,20,21,22 and<\/p>\n
         23 and offences under section<\/p>\n
         31 shall be governed by the<\/p>\n
         provisions  of   the  Code  of<\/p>\n
         Criminal Procedure,1973 (2 of<\/p>\n
         1974).\n<\/p>\n
         (2) Nothing in sub section (1)<\/p>\n
         shall prevent the court from<\/p>\n
         laying down its own procedure<\/p>\n
         for disposal of an application<\/p>\n
         under section 12 or under sub<\/p>\n
         section (2) of Section 23.”\n<\/p>\n
Therefore under sub section (1) all        proceedings under<\/p>\n
section 12, 18 to 23 and offences under section 31 shall be<\/p>\n
governed by the provisions of    Code of Criminal Procedure,<\/p>\n
1973.    Sub section (2) provides that nothing in sub section<\/p>\n
(1) shall prevent the court from laying down its own<\/p>\n
procedure for disposal of an application under section 12<\/p>\n
or under sub section (2) of Section 23 of the Act.    Section<\/p>\n
29 provides for an appeal against the order,    by either the<\/p>\n
aggrieved person or by the respondent within thirty days<\/p>\n
Crl.M.C.2225\/2009             26<\/span><\/p>\n
from the date of passing of the order.\n<\/p>\n
      14. Section 31 and 33 are    the only penal provisions<\/p>\n
in the Act. Section 31 reads:-\n<\/p>\n
           “31.Penalty   for   breach    of<\/p>\n
           protection order by respondent-\n<\/p>\n
           (1)   A  breach  of   protection<\/p>\n
           order,   or   of   an    interim<\/p>\n
           protection   order,    by    the<\/p>\n
           respondent shall be an offence<\/p>\n
           under  this  Act  and  shall  be<\/p>\n
           punishable with imprisonment of<\/p>\n
           either description for a term<\/p>\n
           which may extend to one year, or<\/p>\n
           with fine which may extend to<\/p>\n
           twenty thousand rupees, or with<\/p>\n
           both.\n<\/p>\n
           (2)   The  offence   under   sub<\/p>\n
           section(1)  shall  as   far   as<\/p>\n
           practicable  be  tried  by   the<\/p>\n
           Magistrate who had passed the<\/p>\n
           order, the breach of which has<\/p>\n
           been alleged to have been caused<\/p>\n
           by the accused.\n<\/p>\n
           (3) While framing charges under<\/p>\n
Crl.M.C.2225\/2009              27<\/span><\/p>\n
           sub section (1), the Magistrates<\/p>\n
           may   also frame  charges  under<\/p>\n
           section 498A of the Indian Penal<\/p>\n
           Code (45 of 1860) or any other<\/p>\n
           provision of that Code or the<\/p>\n
           Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28<\/p>\n
           of 1961), as the case may be, if<\/p>\n
           the     facts    disclose    the<\/p>\n
           commission of an offence under<\/p>\n
           those provisions.”\n<\/p>\n
      15.    Section  32  provides    cognizance  and   proof.<\/p>\n
Under sub section (1) notwithstanding anything contained in<\/p>\n
the Code of Criminal Procedure, the offence under sub<\/p>\n
section (1) of Section 31, shall be cognizable and non-<\/p>\n
bailable.        Under sub section (2) the court may on the<\/p>\n
sole testimony of the aggrieved person conclude that an<\/p>\n
offence under sub section (1) of Section 31, has been<\/p>\n
committed by the accused.     Only if the respondent, against<\/p>\n
whom a protection order or interim protection order        is<\/p>\n
passed, commits     breach of that order, an offence under the<\/p>\n
Act is attracted.     Under sub section (2), the said offence,<\/p>\n
as far as practicable, shall be tried by the Magistrate who<\/p>\n
had passed the order the breach of which has been alleged<\/p>\n
Crl.M.C.2225\/2009              28<\/span><\/p>\n
to have been caused by the accused.    Under sub section (3)<\/p>\n
while framing charge for the offence under sub section (1),<\/p>\n
Magistrate may also frame charge under section 498A of<\/p>\n
Indian Penal Code or any other provisions of the Indian<\/p>\n
Penal Code or Dowry Prohibition Act, if the facts disclose<\/p>\n
the commission of such an offence.       Section 33 provides<\/p>\n
that    if   any  Protection  Officer fails  or  refuses   to<\/p>\n
discharges his duties as directed by the Magistrate in the<\/p>\n
protection order, without any sufficient cause, he shall be<\/p>\n
punished with imprisonment as provided therein.         Under<\/p>\n
section 34 Magistrate is not competent to take cognizance<\/p>\n
of such an offence unless a complaint is filed with the<\/p>\n
previous sanction of the State Government or an officer<\/p>\n
authorised by it in this behalf.     Section 35 provides for<\/p>\n
protection,       taken in  good  faith,  to  the  Protection<\/p>\n
Officer.      Section 36 provides that  the Act shall be in<\/p>\n
addition to, and not      in derogation of the provisions of<\/p>\n
any other law for the time being in force.<\/p>\n
      16.     It is thus clear that though under sub section<\/p>\n
(1)    of    Section  28,  all  proceedings  under   sections<\/p>\n
12,18,19,20,21,22 and 23 of the Act and offence under<\/p>\n
section 31, shall be governed by the provisions of Code of<\/p>\n
Criminal Procedure, the    penal provisions under the Act are<\/p>\n
under sub section (1) of Section 31 and Section 33 of the<\/p>\n
Crl.M.C.2225\/2009               29<\/span><\/p>\n
Act.     When under section 34, cognizance of offence under<\/p>\n
section 33 could only be taken by the Magistrate on a<\/p>\n
complaint filed with the previous sanction of the State<\/p>\n
Government or an officer authorised by it on that behalf.<\/p>\n
Under sub section (1) of Section 32, an offence under sub<\/p>\n
section (1) of Section 31 is      cognizable  and no complaint<\/p>\n
is necessary for the Magistrate to take cognizance of that<\/p>\n
offence.\n<\/p>\n
      17. In     an application filed under section 12 claiming<\/p>\n
reliefs either under section 18,19, 20, 21 or 22,          the<\/p>\n
Magistrate can pass an interim order under section 18 to<\/p>\n
23. All these reliefs are in respect of the civil liability<\/p>\n
and not the criminal liability.      If that be so,  it is not<\/p>\n
for this court under section 482 of the Code of Criminal<\/p>\n
Procedure,      to quash the proceedings invoking    the extra<\/p>\n
ordinary inherent powers provided under the Code, as such<\/p>\n
order is      necessary neither   to give effect to any order<\/p>\n
under the Code nor to       prevent  abuse of the   process of<\/p>\n
any   court nor to     secure the ends of justice.  An offence<\/p>\n
under sub section (1) of Section 31, or an offence under<\/p>\n
section 33 taken cognizance by the Magistrate or an order<\/p>\n
passed    by    the  Magistrate  directing the   respondent to<\/p>\n
execute a bond as provided under sub section 3 of Section<\/p>\n
19, which by the mandate under sub section 5 that such<\/p>\n
Crl.M.C.2225\/2009               30<\/span><\/p>\n
order is to be treated as an order under Chapter VIII of<\/p>\n
Code of Criminal Procedure, stand        on different footing.<\/p>\n
They are truly criminal proceedings.      Except in respect of<\/p>\n
such proceedings      it is not for the High Court to exercise<\/p>\n
the   extraordinary     inherent  jurisdiction  to  quash   the<\/p>\n
proceedings pending before the Magistrate.<\/p>\n
      18.    A   person  to  whom  notice  was  issued  by  the<\/p>\n
Magistrate in a petition filed under section 12 of the Act<\/p>\n
can appear before the Magistrate and contend that the<\/p>\n
proceedings is not maintainable either on the ground that<\/p>\n
the person who filed the application is not an aggrieved<\/p>\n
person as defined under section 2(a) or the application is<\/p>\n
not filed for an aggrieved person.      He is also entitled to<\/p>\n
contend that he is not a respondent, as defined under<\/p>\n
section 2(q) of the Act.       He is also entitled to contend<\/p>\n
that there is no domestic violence as defined under section<\/p>\n
2(g) or the reliefs sought for are not the reliefs provided<\/p>\n
under the Act. In all such cases,      it is not for this court<\/p>\n
to consider the       question, when it  could legitimately be<\/p>\n
raised and decided before the Magistrate. So long as the<\/p>\n
respondent is not an accused in a         proceeding initiated<\/p>\n
under the Act and      pending before the Magistrate and he is<\/p>\n
not   obliged     to  apply   for  bail  in  respect  of   such<\/p>\n
proceedings       and    even his personal presence is not<\/p>\n
Crl.M.C.2225\/2009              31<\/span><\/p>\n
mandatory     for  hearing  and  disposing  a  petition  under<\/p>\n
section 12, it is not for this court to consider the<\/p>\n
question whether the petitioner before the Magistrate is an<\/p>\n
aggrieved person as defined under section 2(a) or the<\/p>\n
respondent is a respondent as defined under clause (q) of<\/p>\n
Section 2 or the household is a shared household as defined<\/p>\n
under    clause   (s)  or   whether  there  is  any   domestic<\/p>\n
relationship between the parties or whether       the reliefs<\/p>\n
sought for in the petition could be granted.        These are<\/p>\n
matters which are to be considered by the Magistrate,<\/p>\n
before granting       relief in the     petition filed under<\/p>\n
section 12, either under section 18 or 19 or 20 or 21 or 22<\/p>\n
or 23.\n<\/p>\n
      19.    Learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  petitioner<\/p>\n
pointed out that in various decisions of this court and the<\/p>\n
other High Courts and       Apex Court, proceedings initiated<\/p>\n
under section 12 of the Act were quashed invoking the<\/p>\n
powers under section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure and<\/p>\n
in such circumstance, it cannot be held that inherent<\/p>\n
powers under section     482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure<\/p>\n
is not to be exercised.     In   none of those decisions, the<\/p>\n
question was addressed as stated above and in fact in none<\/p>\n
of   those    decisions,      question  whether  the  inherent<\/p>\n
jurisdiction     under  section  482   of  Code  of   Criminal<\/p>\n
Crl.M.C.2225\/2009              32<\/span><\/p>\n
Procedure is to be invoked to quash a proceeding     initiated<\/p>\n
under the Act which is enacted to     provide  a remedy under<\/p>\n
the civil law was not considered.      In such circumstances,<\/p>\n
for the reason that proceeding under the Act was quashed<\/p>\n
invoking the powers under section 482 of the Code of<\/p>\n
Criminal Procedure it cannot be said that the powers under<\/p>\n
section 482 is to be invoked in all cases. I am of the firm<\/p>\n
view that      a party against whom proceedings were initiated<\/p>\n
by the Magistrate under section 12, on a petition filed<\/p>\n
under section 12(1) of the Act seeking relief under section<\/p>\n
18 to 23, has adequate remedy before the Magistrate,    it is<\/p>\n
not for the High Court to exercise the extraordinary<\/p>\n
inherent powers and quash the proceedings.        Section 482<\/p>\n
is to      be invoked in appropriate cases either to give<\/p>\n
effect to any order passed under the Act or to prevent<\/p>\n
abuse of process of any court or to secure the ends of<\/p>\n
justice, when cognizance was taken by the Magistrate for an<\/p>\n
offence under sub section (1) of Section 31 or Section 33<\/p>\n
of the Act.      In all other cases, the affected party could<\/p>\n
raise the question and seek an order from the Magistrate<\/p>\n
including the       maintainability of the proceedings and if<\/p>\n
an   order is passed against him, he is at liberty to    file<\/p>\n
an appeal as provided under section 29 of the Act.    If that<\/p>\n
be so, it is not for this court to invoke the extraordinary<\/p>\n
Crl.M.C.2225\/2009            33<\/span><\/p>\n
jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code of Criminal<\/p>\n
Procedure, to quash a proceeding initiated under section 12<\/p>\n
(1) of the Act.\n<\/p>\n
      The petition is dismissed.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
                                    M.SASIDHARAN NAMBIAR
\n                                              JUDGE
\ntpl\/-\n<\/p>\n
M.SASIDHARAN NAMBIAR, J.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
     ———————\n<\/p>\n
    Crl.M.C.NO.2225 \/09\n<\/p>\n
     ———————\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
          ORDER<\/p>\n
    2ND DECEMBER,2009<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Kerala High Court Dr. V.K.Vijayalekshmi Amma vs Bindu V. on 2 December, 2009 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM Crl.MC.No. 2225 of 2009() 1. DR. V.K.VIJAYALEKSHMI AMMA, AGED 70 YRS, … Petitioner Vs 1. BINDU V., AGED 34 YEARS, … Respondent 2. ARJUN RAJAGOPAL, AGED 8 YEARS, 3. STATE OF KERALA, REPRESENTED BY […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[8,21],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-22145","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-high-court","category-kerala-high-court"],"yoast_head":"\nDr. V.K.Vijayalekshmi Amma vs Bindu V. on 2 December, 2009 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/dr-v-k-vijayalekshmi-amma-vs-bindu-v-on-2-december-2009\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Dr. V.K.Vijayalekshmi Amma vs Bindu V. on 2 December, 2009 - 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