{"id":221527,"date":"2002-12-17T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2002-12-16T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/s-amarjit-singh-kalra-dead-by-vs-pramod-gupta-dead-by-l-rs-ors-on-17-december-2002"},"modified":"2016-02-06T04:05:26","modified_gmt":"2016-02-05T22:35:26","slug":"s-amarjit-singh-kalra-dead-by-vs-pramod-gupta-dead-by-l-rs-ors-on-17-december-2002","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/s-amarjit-singh-kalra-dead-by-vs-pramod-gupta-dead-by-l-rs-ors-on-17-december-2002","title":{"rendered":"S.Amarjit Singh Kalra (Dead) By … vs Pramod Gupta (Dead) By L.Rs. & Ors on 17 December, 2002"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
S.Amarjit Singh Kalra (Dead) By … vs Pramod Gupta (Dead) By L.Rs. & Ors on 17 December, 2002<\/div>\n
Author: D Raju<\/div>\n
Bench: G.B.Pattanaik Cji, M.B.Shah, Doraiswamy Raju, S.N.Variava, D.M.Dharmadhikari<\/div>\n
           CASE NO.:\nAppeal (civil)  1027-1028 of 1992\n\nPETITIONER:\nS.Amarjit Singh Kalra (dead) by L.Rs. & Ors.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nPramod Gupta (dead) by L.Rs. & Ors.\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT: 17\/12\/2002\n\nBENCH:\nG.B.PATTANAIK CJI & M.B.SHAH & DORAISWAMY RAJU & S.N.VARIAVA & D.M.DHARMADHIKARI\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
JUDGMENT<\/p>\n
WITH Appeal (civil)  1029-1030 of 1992
\nAppeal (civil)  8465-8466 of 2002<\/p>\n
Judgement Delivered By:\n<\/p>\n
DORAISWAMY RAJU, J.\n<\/p>\n
D. RAJU, J.\n<\/p>\n
\tSpecial leave granted in S.L.P. [C) Nos.11914-11915 of 1991.\n<\/p>\n
\tOn 14.8.2002, this Court allowed the applications filed in
\n\tC.A.Nos.1029-1030 of 1992 and Civil Appeals arising out of S.L.P.
\n\t(C) Nos.11914-11915 of 1991 for substitution and condonation of
\n\tdelay in filing the applications for substitution in respect of
\n\tsome of the respondents, who died during the pendency of these
\n\tappeals.  In the light of the above, all other applications filed
\nfor substitution and condonation of delay of one or the other parties in
\nthe above matters by the respective counsel for the appellants are also
\nallowed. After the hearing was completed and orders have been reserved, it
\nappears that the heirs of one Late Sultan Singh alias Ishwar Singh claiming
\nto be interested in the compensation but admittedly was not a party (the
\nlate Sultan Singh himself) either before the Reference Court or the High
\nCourt, have filed applications to be impleaded as necessary parties.
\nSince, the predecessor-in-interest of the applicants was himself not a part
\nat any stage of the proceedings before the Courts below, we see no
\njustification to entertain their claim for coming on record at this stage
\nof the proceedings.  These unnumbered applications filed by Col. Mohinder
\nSingh Malik and three others are, therefore, rejected.\t Having regard to
\nthe orders passed already, and the fact that the necessary legal
\nrepresentatives of all parties, who died during the pendency of the matters
\nin this Court, have come on record, the benefit of the same will enure to
\nthe appellants in C.A.Nos.1027-1028 of 1992.  The fact that the
\napplications filed therein, earlier were not pressed and disposed of as
\nsuch, will not come in the way of those appeals also being heard on merits
\nand disposed of in accordance with law,along with the other appeals.\n<\/p>\n
\tAn extent of about 5500 bighas of land described as `gain mumkin
\n\tPahar’ (uncultivable mountainous area) situated at Masudpur Village
\n\twithin the Union Territory of Delhi was acquired by the Government
\n\tfor planned development of Delhi. Notifications were issued  (1) on
\n\t24.10.1961 for acquisition of 720 bighas and 4 biswas out of 4307
\n\tbighas and 18 biswas under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act,
\n\t1894 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’).  It may be stated
\nat this stage itself that an extent of 390 bighas of land notified on
\n24.10.1961 and acquired by passing the award in Award No.1944 does not form
\nthe subject matter of these proceedings.  Declarations under Section 6 of
\nthe Act were issued on 6.8.1966.  In the course of the Award enquiry claims
\nwere filed before the Land Acquisition Collector by three categories of
\nclaimants as hereunder: –\n<\/p>\n
(i)\tClaims by the Union of India and Gaon Sabha that the lands acquired
\nstood vested with the Gaon Sabha they being `waste land’ under
\nSection 7 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954.\tThis claim proceeded
\non the basis that not only it was `waste land’ but also the Bhumidari
\nCertificate issued in favour of Smt. Gulab Sundari was invalid and
\nnonest in law.\n<\/p>\n
(ii)\tThe other class of claims were from the Proprietors\/Co-owners, on
\nthe basis that the acquired land was not `land’ as defined under Section
\n3(13) of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, since they were being used for
\nnon-agricultural purposes and therefore, they neither could be said to
\nbe `waste land’ nor could be held to have vested in the Gaon Sabha,
\nfor either of them to claim any title to the lands in question and,
\ntherefore, they continued to be proprietors of the soil and as such
\nentitled to the compensation for themselves; and\n<\/p>\n
(iii)\tYet another claim was from Smt. Gulab Sundari and her transferees
\nof portions of the rights over the land on the ground that she was the
\nBhumidar of the land measuring about 4307 bighas and 18 biswas and
\nthose lands were part of her Bhumidari holding out which she also
\nclaimed to have transferred rights in an extent of 3500 bighas of
\nundivided holding in favour of the other private respondents\/claimants.\n<\/p>\n
     By another Notification dated 23.1.1965 under Section 4 of the Act, an
\nextent of 3224 bighas and 24 biswas out of the total extent of 4307 bighas
\nand 18 biswas was notified for acquisition, followed by the issue of a
\nDeclaration under Section 6.  In respect of these acquired lands also, the
\nabove three categories of claims came to be made.  It may also be stated
\nthat  the individual claims made by persons other than the Union of India
\nand Gaon Sabha were in respect of specified shares, though over the total
\nextent involved.\n<\/p>\n
\t   Award No.2040 dated 1.12.1967 came to be passed in respect of
\n\t   lands covered by the Notification dated 24.10.1961 measuring
\n\t   about 720 bighas and 4 biswas.  Since competing claims, though
\n\t   in respect of only their respective shares were made by them to
\n\t   the exclusion of others as far as their shares are concerned,
\n\t   the Land Acquisition Collector while awarding a compensation of
\n\t   Rs.5,79,932.10, made a reference under Sections 30 and
\n31(2) of the Act for apportionment of the same to the Court of District
\nJudge. Likewise, in respect of lands acquired under Notification dated
\n23.1.1965 measuring about 3224 bighas and 2 biswas, Award No.2225 dated
\n26.3.1969 came to be passed for a sum of Rs.22,27,867.69 and a similar
\nreference under Sections 30 and 31(2) also came to be made, having regard
\nto the disputed nature of competing claims.  Smt. Gulab Sundari, claiming
\nexclusive Bhumidar rights in respect of the entire area, moved applications
\nunder Order 1 Rule 10, CPC, for getting impleaded to the proceedings o the
\nplea that she had not sold any part of her rights to any one, that she had
\nbeen defrauded to sign those documents, which are not valid or binding on
\nher and she alone was entitled to the entire compensation as Bhumidar to
\nthe exclusion of all including those who sought to assert claims as Vendees
\nfrom her.  The Gaon Sabha of the Village also filed applications claiming
\nthe entire compensation on the ground that the land as per the entries in
\nthe Jamabandi vested in the Gaon Sabha as per the provisions of Delhi Land
\nReforms Act.  All such claims, made by different class and category of
\nclaimants, came to be combined and consolidated and taken up for
\nconsideration.   The learned Additional District Judge (Shri P.L. Sinlga),
\nwho tried the references together, on a consideration of the materials
\nplaced on record, held as follows: –\n<\/p>\n
(a)\tThe lands in question were `land’ within the meaning of Section
\n3(13) of the Land Reforms Act;\n<\/p>\n
(b)\tThe Bhumidari Certificate\/Declaration granted in favour of Smt.
\nGulab Sundari was valid, legal and within jurisdiction and the
\ntransfers made by her in favour of some of the other respondents
\nare also valid;\n<\/p>\n
(c)\tThe Owners\/Proprietors were legally barred from challenging or
\ndisputing the Bhumidari Certificate issued in favour of Smt. Gulab
\nSundari;\n<\/p>\n
(d)\tSince the Proprietors were not `Khudkhast’ of the land in question,
\ntheir proprietary\/ownership rights stood abolished under the Land
\nReforms Act;\n<\/p>\n
(e)\tThat the Bhumidari Certificate issued in favour of Smt. Gulab
\nSundari stood immune from challenge in view of Section 4 of the
\nDelhi Land Reforms (Amendment) Act  I of 1996, which Act
\nhaving also been placed in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution
\nof India;\n<\/p>\n
(f)\tThe rights and claims made by the Proprietors were also barred by
\nlimitation;\n<\/p>\n
(g)\tThe lands were not `waste land’ and, therefore, did not vest in
\nthem
\nas claimed by the Union of India and the Gaon Sabha and,
\ntherefore, they have no rights or interest in the lands in question;
\nand<\/p>\n
(h)\tThe claims of Union of India and Gaon Sabha are also barred by
\nres judicata.  Consequently, the compensation was awarded to the
\nBhumidar and the transferees from Bhumidar, to the exclusion of
\nthe Proprietors, Gaon Sabha and the Union of India.\n<\/p>\n
Thereupon, about 63 Proprietors joined together and filed RFA No. 309 of
\n1980 (arising out of the reference made in respect of Award No.2040) and
\nRFA No.310 of 1980 (arising out of reference in respect of Award No.2225)
\nbefore the Delhi High Court.   Another set of 10 Proprietors seem to have
\nfiled RFA No.356 of 1980 (in respect of claims arising out of Award
\nNo.2040) and RFA No.357 of 1980 (in respect of claims arising out of Award
\nNo.2225) before the Delhi High Court.\tThe Gaon Sabha and Union of India
\nseem to have filed RFA No.340 of 1980 and RFA No.341 of 1980, likewise.\tIt
\nis stated that about 37 Proprietors, who filed claims before the Reference
\nCourt, did not pursue their claims by filing any appeals before the High
\nCourt and these persons were not parties to the proceedings before the High
\nCourt in any other capacity also.  It appears that during the pendency of
\nthese appeals, about 5 appellants in RFA No.309 of 1980 and RFA No.310 of
\n1980 died on different dates and there was no attempt to take any steps
\nwithin time for bringing on record the legal representatives of those five
\ndeceased appellants either at the instance of the remaining appellants or
\nthe legal heirs of the deceased appellants. On 8.12.1986, the respondents
\nherein seem to have filed applications in RFA Nos.309 of 1980 and 310 of
\n1980 seeking for the dismissal of those appeals, as having been abated due
\nto failure in bringing on record the legal representatives of the five
\ndeceased appellants and also further seeking for the dismissal
\nof RFA Nos.356 of 1980 and 357 of 1980 on the ground that they are not
\nproperly constituted and incompetent for the reason that the connected
\nappeals RFA Nos.309 and 310 of 1980 having abated, the other appeals
\ninvolving common questions of fact and law cannot be proceeded with,
\nresulting into any conflicting, inconsistent or contradictory decrees.\tAt
\nthat stage, on or about 2.3.1987 applications seem to have been filed by
\nthe heirs of the deceased parties themselves for bringing them on record as
\nthe legal representatives of the deceased appellants.\n<\/p>\n
The three sets of appeals, numbering about six in all, were taken up for
\nfinal hearing, as also those applications along with the appeals.  The
\napplications for condonation of the delay in seeking to set aside the
\nabatement were rejected, and it is claimed that even the counsel for the
\nappellants conceded that there was no sufficient cause for the same.  The
\nplea on behalf of the appellants before the High Court that the appeals
\nmerely partially abated qua the deceased appellants only and not in toto
\ndid not meet acceptance with the Court.\t On the view that in such
\ncircumstances the appeals were incompetent and not validly constituted the
\nentirety of the appeals RFA Nos.309 and 310 of 1980 were held
\nto abate in toto and rejected the same.\t  Since common and same questions
\nwere raised in the other appeals, RFA Nos.356 and 357 of 1980 were also
\ndismissed, likewise.  The appeals filed by the Gaon Sabha and Union of
\nIndia were dismissed on the ground that they were barred by res judicata.
\nHence, the above appeals.\n<\/p>\n
One of the respondents by name Bhim Singh had died on 8.10.1988, even
\nwhen the appeals were pending before the High Court.  One Ahsan Ullah
\nanother respondent\/co-bhumidar was also said to have died even during the
\npendency of the Reference proceedings.\tSmt. Gulab Sundari, one of the
\nrespondents, died on 12.5.1995; another respondent-K.K. Kochar died on
\n12.10.1992 and one Mohanlal also died during the pendency of these
\nproceedings.  As noticed supra, applications for bringing on their legal
\nrepresentatives and connected applications were already allowed.\n<\/p>\n
A brief reference to the history of the lands and the role of the parties
\nconcerned with them would be necessary to highlight the nature of the
\nclaims and the need for an effective and objective consideration and
\ndetermination of the same on merits, in accordance with law.  The lands in
\nquestion, in which the various Proprietors in the village held distinct,
\nseparate and independent shares, were leased out on 15.11.1939 by the
\nProprietors under a Registered Lease Deed in favour of Delhi Pottery Works
\nfor a period of twenty years for exploiting minerals.  The lands were said
\nto be otherwise not fit or capable of any cultivation.  The said lessees
\nseem to have sublet the same on 23.5.1942 in favour of a partnership firm
\nof Kota in Rajasthan, known as “Dewan Bahadur Seth Kesari Singh Budh
\nSingh”, for the remaining period of seventeen years from 18.4.1942 to
\n17.4.1959.\t On 10.5.1951, one Smt. Gulab Sundari claimed to have
\nbeen inducted as the third partner in the sub-lessee firm and thereafter on
\n17.10.1951, an alleged dissolution of the partnership was said to have
\ntaken place as evidenced by a supplementary deed of dissolution said to
\nhave been executed on 27.8.1953 (unregistered) allotting the rights of the
\npartnership firm under the Mining sub-lease dated 23.5.1942, to Smt. Gulab
\nSundari. Claiming to have secured a Bhumidari Certificate under the Land
\nReforms Act, she seems to have filed a Civil Suit No.174 of 1959 seeking
\nfor cancellation of the proceedings vesting the lands in the Gaon Sabha, on
\nthe basis that she continued to be Bhumidar.  The said suit seems to have
\nbeen decreed on 12.12.1966 and the appeals preferred by the Gaon Sabha and
\nthe Union of India were also said to have been dismissed, though the
\nquestion as to whether the proceedings in which she claimed to have been
\naccorded Bhumidar rights is illegal or legal was actually left open
\nundecided and as irrelevant for the said litigation. Taking
\nadvantage of the above alone, the said Gulab Sundari seems to have got
\nimpleaded as a claimant in the proceedings before the Reference Court, for
\napportionment of the compensation awarded, among herself and her alienees.
\nShe also seems to have initially questioned the alienations made by her as
\nbeing vitiated due to undue influence and fraud alleged to have been
\npractised on her. But, subsequently on 27.7.1969, such alienees and Mrs.
\nGulab Sundari appear to have entered into a compromise and the same was
\nalso said to have been filed before the Reference Court on 31.7.1969,
\nresulting in those persons also making their claims before the Court.\tOn
\n17.10.1969, Gulab Sundari seems to have filed a fresh claim statement
\nclaiming 3\/16th share of the compensation leaving the remaining 13\/16th
\nshare in favour of those sixteen persons.\n<\/p>\n
It may be stated that the Additional District Judge, Delhi, decided the
\nreferences on 20.5.1980 and the appeals before the High Court were filed
\nagainst the said decision.  During the pendency of the appeals before the
\nHigh Court, the following appellants in RFA Nos.309 and 310 of 1980 were
\nsaid to have died, as noticed below: –\n<\/p>\n
S.No.\tName of the appellant & rank\t\t\tdate of death\n<\/p>\n
\t1.Shri Mukhtiar Singh (A. No.19)\t\t24.06.1982\n<\/p>\n
\t2.Shri Chandgi Ram (A. No.31)\t\t\t01.04.1981\n<\/p>\n
\t3.Shri Amichand (A. No.55)\t\t\t21.02.1984\n<\/p>\n
\t4.Shri Chhelu (A. No.56)\t\t\t28.04.1983\n<\/p>\n
\t5.Shri Balbir (A. No.57)\t\t\t14.11.1985<\/p>\n
Applications for impleading their legal representatives were said to have
\nbeenfiled on 2.3.1987.  These applications were rejected as belated and
\nthat no sufficient cause has been shown for condonation of the delay.  The
\nplea of partial abatement, if at all, of appeals qua only those deceased
\nappellants was not accepted by the High Court and on the view that the
\ndecree was joint based upon common right and interest, the appeals were
\nrejected in toto, as noticed supra.\n<\/p>\n
\tThe proceedings, since had their origin under the Land Acquisition
\n\tAct, 1894, it is appropriate to notice the nature and purport of
\n\tthe same for a better appreciation of the nature of cause of
\n\taction.\tAfter a firm decision has been taken to acquire the land by
\n\tissuing a Declaration under Section 6 of the Act, the Land
\n\tAcquisition Collector, empowered for the purpose, proceed to
\n\tconduct an enquiry to pass an Award as to (i) the true area of the
\n\tland covered by the Award; (ii) the total compensation to be
\n\tallowed for the land and (iii) the apportionment of that
\n\tcompensation among all the persons interested in the land, whether
\n\tthey have appeared before him or not.  This Award, in law, is
\n\tconsidered to be a mere offer made by the Government to the
\n\tclaimants whose property is acquired.  If the same is accepted
\n\twithout protest, the right to compensation will not survive any
\n\tlonger, but if it is not accepted or accepted under protest and a
\nreference is sought under Section 18, the right to receive compensation
\nsurvive and kept live for being prosecuted before the Civil Court, to which
\na reference will be made, when sought in terms of Section 18.   Against the
\nAward that may be passed by the Reference Court, the parties thereto can
\npursue their remedies for determination of a proper amount of compensation
\nbefore the High Court and this Court, as well.  So much, about the
\ndetermination of the compensation. Where several persons are interested in
\nthe compensation and if such persons agree in the apportionment of the
\ncompensation, the apportionment will be specified in the Award itself by
\nthe Land Acquisition Collector and the same shall be conclusive evidence of
\nthe correctness of the apportionment.\t But, when the amount of
\ncompensation has been settled under Section 11, if any dispute arise
\nas to the apportionment of the same or any part thereof or as to the
\npersons to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, Section 30
\nenvisages the Collector to refer such dispute to the decision of the Court.
\nSection 31 stipulates that on making an Award under Section 11, the
\nCollector shall tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to the
\npersons interested entitled thereto according to the Award, unless
\nprevented by one or the other of the contingencies envisaged therein, viz.,
\nif they shall not consent to receive it, or if there be no person competent
\nto alienate the land, or if there be any dispute as to the title to receive
\nthe compensation or as to the apportionment of it, the Collector is
\nobligated to deposit the amount of the compensation in the Court to
\nwhich a reference under Section 18 would normally be submitted.\t Thus,
\nbefore further proceeding to take possession, if not already taken as
\nenvisaged under Section 17, the Collector has to pay or deposit the amount
\nawarded, in the manner noticed above, and the parties then will be at
\nliberty to litigate in the ordinary way to determine what their rights and
\ntitle to the property and the compensation may be.\n<\/p>\n
\tTherefore, it becomes necessary for the Reference Court dealing
\n\twith a reference made to it under Sections 30 and 31(2) and the
\n\tAppellate Court dealing with appeals arising out of such decision
\n\trendered by the Reference Court, to decide as to who among the
\n\tclaimants, or whether anyone of them at all are entitled to receive
\n\tthe compensation or any portion of it and if so, in what proportion
\n\tor that any other than those already before the Court is entitled
\n\tto the same.  So far as the cases on hand are concerned, having
\n\tregard to the ramification of the Land Reforms Act on the legality,
\n\tpropriety and the tenability of the various claims, it becomes
\n\tobligatory to consider each of such claims distinctly.  The
\n\trejection of any one cannot by itself be a justification for
\n\tsustaining the claim of the other and if none of the private
\n\tclaimants are found to be legally entitled to the same, the
\n\tGovernment or for that matter the Local Authority concerned may
\n\teven be the residual beneficiary, entitled to it. The
\n\tconsideration, therefore, cannot be confined to the claimants
\n\tbefore Court but the Court is obliged to find out who really would
\n\tbe entitled to the same, whether a party before it or not.
\n\tThe Reference Court does not seem to have been alive to its onerous
\n\tresponsibilities in these cases and the High Court having rejected
\n\tthe appeals as having abated had no occasion to advert to the
\n\tquestion as to whether the adjudication by the Reference Court was
\n\tin keeping with the requirements of its obligations and the
\n\tultimate decision was in conformity with law.  This aspect is
\n\tnoticed only to highlight the serious nature of the various issues
\n\tinvolved but omitted to be properly and effectively decided and not
\n\tto express any opinion on any such claims or questions.\n<\/p>\n
Dr. K.S. Sidhu, learned senior counsel appearing for some of the
\nappellants, vehemently contended that the High Court ought not to have
\ndismissed the appeals in toto merely because about five of the appellants
\ndied  and the belated attempt to bring on record their legal
\nrepresentatives did not fructify and even in the absence of those legal
\nrepresentatives the claims of the other 58 surviving appellants in RFA Nos.
\n309 and 310 of 1980 ought to have been dealt with and disposed of in
\naccordance with law on merits, since each one of them were seeking relief
\non the basis of his own independent cause of action, grievance, right to
\nclaim relief arising out of his distinct and  specified share in the lands
\nacquired under the Act, as recorded in the Jamabandi. Reliance has been
\nplaced upon the decision of this court reported in Harihar Prasad Singh &
\nothers vs. Balmiki Prasad Singh & others<\/a> [1975(2) SCR 932], and the
\ndecisions on which the respondents sought to place strong reliance
\nwere sought to be distinguished on the basis of the nature of claims
\ninvolved in those cases.  Argued the learned counsel further that merely
\nbecause the Reference Court before whom separate claims, individually were
\nmade in respect of their own distinct and independent shares, has chosen t
\no combine and consolidate all such claims for consideration in common does
\nnot have the effect of rendering the decree passed therein to be “one and
\nindivisible” and that therefore grave injustice has been meted out to the
\nappellants in dismissing the appeals in entirety without adjudicating on
\nthe merits of the respective claims due to the abatement caused in respect
\nof the five appellants who died and whose legal representatives could not
\nbe brought on record, in time.\tFor the same reasons, according to the
\nlearned counsel, the death of some of the parties to the proceedings during
\nthe pendency of the appeals in this court would not attract the application
\nof the principle justifying dismissal of the appeals in toto even in
\nrespect of others.\n<\/p>\n
Sarvashri P.P. Juneja and Saharya while adopting generally the
\nsubmissions of the senior counsel on behalf of the other appellants, also
\ncontended that the provisions of Order 22 strike a discordant note with the
\nspecific mandate contained in Section 11(1)(iii) and Section 30\/31 of the
\nLand Acquisition Act, 1894 which obligates an adjudication on the right as
\nwell as the proportion in which the compensation is to be awarded according
\nto his share or entitlement to a person interested, whether or not such
\nperson appeared before the authority concerned, and therefore, the
\nrejection of the appeals and that too in toto, cannot be justified in law.
\nAll the learned counsel, appearing for all the appellants have highlighted
\nthe merits of the case and the necessity to determine the claims on merits
\nin the teeth of the alleged nebulous and insufficient basis of the claim of
\nthe so called Bhumidar and her transferees, particularly when according to
\nthe appellants there was no effective adjudication of the same and
\nmore so when in the earlier proceedings such an issue was specifically left
\nopen. We do not propose to advert to them in greater details, in as much as
\nthe High Court has not gone into them and, if at all, the judgment of the
\nHigh Court calls for interference, the matters have to be relegated back to
\nthe High Court for deciding the same on merits.\n<\/p>\n
Sarvashri K. Parasaran, Senior Advocate, supported and supplemented
\nby T.R. Andhyarujina, K. Ramamoorthy, L.R. Gupta, were heard on behalf of
\nthe respondents, claiming the entire compensation as Bhumidar’s.   While
\njustifying the conclusions arrived at by the High Court, it was strenuously
\ncontended that the disputes centred around one lump sum of compensation to
\nbe shared and divided among the sharers, in respect of an undivided and
\ncommon land, that the competing claims were at the instance of one class on
\nthe basis that they are Proprietors and the other on the basis that they
\nare entitled to Bhumidari rights and consequently, having regard to the
\nunity of possession of the land and the fact that the litigation is on the
\nsame nature of title, the decree passed would be a joint and indivisible
\none, either way and to which the principle laid down in The State of Punjab
\nvs. Nathu Ram<\/a> (1962 (2) SCR 636), subsequently followed and applied in
\nseveral other cases, squarely applied and no exception could be
\ntaken to the judgment rendered by the High Court.  It was also urged that
\nonce the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, applied the other
\nthings inevitably followed and the doctrine of representation also did not
\napply to the case on hand.  Even dehors the question of abatement under
\nOrder 22 Rules 3 & 9, the appeals, according to the respondents, were
\nrightly rejected as not duly and properly constituted, failing which there
\nwas every possibility of any such decision on merits resulting in
\ncontradictory decrees in the same cause or subject matter.\n<\/p>\n
On behalf of the respondents, it was also pointed out that the serious
\nlapses and absence of sufficient cause, as conceded by the counsel for the
\nappellants before the High Court itself, for the delay in bringing on
\nrecord the legal representatives of the deceased 5 appellants of the same
\nvillage, despite the knowledge of their death, justified their rejection
\nand no challenge could be made of it, at this stage.  It was also urged
\nthat even these appeals before this Court also have abated on account of
\nthe death of Smt. Gulab Sundari (R-27), Shri K.K. Kochar (R-12) and Bhim
\nSingh (R-23), since the applications to bring on record their legal
\nrepresentatives were dismissed as “not having been pressed” by the order
\ndated 22.11.2001 passed by the Constitution Bench. The applications now
\nmoved for revival of those applications are said to be of no merit and that
\nthe bar under Order 23 Rule 1(4) and Order 22 Rule 9(1) CPC read with
\nSection 141 CPC was also attracted besides the bar of limitation.
\nReliance has been placed in this regard on the decisions reported in Saguja
\nTransport Service vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, M.P. Gwarlior &
\nOrs.<\/a> [1987(1) SCC 5] and Renen Roy vs. Prakash Mitra<\/a> [1998(9) SCC 689].\n<\/p>\n
Strong reliance has also been placed on the decision of the Constitution
\nBench of this Court reported in Ram Sarup vs. Munshi & Ors.<\/a> [1964(3) SCR
\n858], in support of the stand that where a decree is a joint one and a part
\nof the decree has become final by reason of abatement the entire appeal
\nmust be held to be abated.  The further plea on behalf of the respondents
\nwas the impleadment of the legal representatives in the other batch of
\nappeals cannot be of any assistance to deem their impleadment in the cases
\nwhere no steps have been taken or where steps have been attempted but not
\nresulted in any actual order to so implead them and that the appellants
\ncannot approbate and reprobate to take different or opposite stands.
\nThe abatement being automatic takes effect ipso facto and no separate order
\nwas required therefor,according tothe respondents.  The orders passed in
\nI.A. No.29-30\/1988 on 22.3.1999,deleting respondent Nos.5 to 7, 18, 22\n<\/p>\n
(vii) and 26 were said to render these appeals defective on account of non-
\njoinder\/absence of the necessary parties.The non-filing of appeals by 37
\nProprietors out of 110, or non-joinder of those parties to the proceedings,
\nwas also claimed to render the appeals by only the others, incompetent and
\nnot properly or validly constituted and reliance was also sought to be
\nplaced in this regard on the decision reported in Kanakrathanammal vs. V.S.
\nLoganctha Muddier & another [1964(6) SCR 1] and Jahar Roy (dead through
\nLRs) & another vs. Premji Bhimji Mansata &another [1978(1) SCR 770] and for
\nthat very reason these appeals are alsosaid to be incompetent and liable to
\nbe dismissed.A reference to the case law on which strong reliance was
\nplaced by either side becomes essential, before adverting to the relevance
\nand applicability or otherwise of the principles laid down therein to the
\npoints arising for consideration in these appeals.\t The earliest of
\nthe series, which came to be noticed, followed and distinguished in several
\nsubsequent decisions is the one in Nathu Ram’s case (supra).  The relevant
\nfacts necessary to appreciate the principle laid down therein are, that the
\nPunjab Government acquired on lease certain parcels of land belonging to
\nLabhu Ram and Nathu Ram for military purposes under the Defence of India
\nAct, 1939.\tThe brothers refused to accept the compensation offered and
\napplied for reference to an Arbitrator who passed an award ordering the
\npayment of an amount higher than what was offered by the collector and
\nfurther directed the payment of certain amount on account of Income Tax
\nwhich would be paid on the compensation received.  An appeal was filed by
\nthe State Government before the High Court and during the pendency
\nof the appeal, Labhu Ram, one of the respondents, died.  The High Court,
\nwhile holding the appeal to have abated as against Labhu Ram, further held
\nits effect to be the dismissal of the appeal against Nathu Ram also.  The
\ncross- objections also were dismissed.  On a certificate being granted, the
\nmatter came up on appeal before this Court.  This court while adverting to
\n0rder 22 Rule 4, CPC, observed that the code does not provide for the
\nabatement of the appeal against the other respondents, though courts at
\ntimes have held that in certain circumstances, the appeals against the co-
\nrespondents would also abate, as a result of the abatement of the appeal
\nagainst the deceased respondent. Indicating that it would be incorrect to
\nstate that the appeal abated in such circumstances, this court observed
\nthat the appeal in certain circumstances even against the respondent other
\nthan the deceased, would be rendered not possible to be proceeded with
\nfurther and therefore the court would refuse to deal with the
\nappeal further and dismiss it.\tThis Court, proceeding further observed as
\nfollows:\n<\/p>\n
“The question whether a Court can deal with such
\nmatters or not, will depend on the facts of each case
\nand therefore no exhaustive statement can be made
\nabout the circumstances when this is possible or is
\nnot possible.  It may, however, be stated that
\nordinarily the considerations which weigh with the
\ncourt in deciding upon this question are whether the
\nappeal between the appellants and the respondents
\nother than the deceased can be said to be properly
\nconstituted or can be said to have all the necessary
\nparties for the decision of the controversy before the
\nCourt.\tThe test to determine this has been described
\nin diverse forms.  Courts will not proceed with an
\nappeal (a) when the success of the appeal may lead
\nto the Court’s coming to a decision which be in
\nconflict with the decision between the appellant and
\nthe deceased respondent and therefore which would
\nlead to the Court’s passing a decree which will be
\ncontradictory to the decree which had become final
\nwith respect to the same subject matter between the
\nappellant and the deceased respondent; (b) when the
\nappellant could not have brought the action for the
\nnecessary relief against those respondents alone who
\nare still before the Court and (c) when the decree
\nagainst the surviving respondents, if the appeal
\nsucceeds, be ineffective, that is to say, it could not be
\nsuccessfully executed.\n<\/p>\n
There has been no divergence between the courts
\nabout the court’s proceeding with the appeal between
\nthe respondents other than the deceased respondent,
\nwhen the decree in appeal was not a joint decree in
\nfavour of all the respondents.\tThe abatement of the
\nappeal against the deceased respondent, in such a
\ncase, would make the decree in his favour alone final,
\nand this can, in no circumstances, have a
\nrepercussion, on the decision of the controversy
\nbetween the appellant and the other decree-holders
\nor on the execution of the ultimate decree between
\nthem.\t\t\t\t\t  (Emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
The difficulty arises always when there is a joint
\ndecree.\t Here again, the consensus of opinion is that
\nif the decree is joint and indivisible, the appeal against
\nthe other respondents also will not be proceeded with
\nand will have to be dismissed as a result of the
\nabatement of the appeal against the deceased
\nrespondent.  Different views exist in the case of joint
\ndecrees in favour of respondents whose rights in the
\nsubject matter of the decree are specified.  One view
\nis that in such cases, the abatement of the appeal
\nagainst the deceased respondent will have the result
\nof making the decree affecting his specific interest to
\nbe final and that the decree against the other
\nrespondents can be suitably dealt with by the
\nappellate court.  We do not consider this view correct.
\nThe specification of shares or of interest of the
\ndeceased respondent does not affect the nature of
\nthe decree and the capacity of the joint decree holder
\nto execute the entire decree or to resist the attempt of
\nthe other party to interfere with the joint right decreed
\nin his favour.\tThe abatement of an appeal means not
\nonly that the decree between the appellant and the
\ndeceased respondent has become final, but also, as a
\nnecessary corollary, that the appellate Court cannot,
\nin any way, modify that decree directly or indirectly.
\nThe reason is plain.  It is that in the absence of the
\nlegal representatives of the deceased respondents,
\nthe appellate court cannot determine anything
\nbetween the appellant and the legal representatives,
\nwhich may affect the rights of the legal
\nrepresentatives under the decree.  It is immaterial that
\nthe modification which the court will do is one to which
\nexception can or cannot be taken.”\n<\/p>\n
This Court, noticed the peculiar facts in that case to come to the
\nconclusion that the decree was joint in nature, in favour of both brothers
\nand that in the absence of one of the joint decree-holders due to his death
\nand omission to bring on record the legal representatives, the State cannot
\nget rid ofthe joint decree and therefore the State appeal against Nathu Ram
\nalone cannot be proceeded with.\t The salient features noticed therein which
\nweighed with this Court are that the lease of the land was joint, the claim
\nwas joint, based on the allegation that the land belonged to them jointly,
\nthat the award and joint decree was on that basis and since a claim put
\nforward by the State before the Arbitrator itself that the joint
\napplication should be treated as separate applications and
\nseparate awards should be passed relating to their respective shares was
\nrejected by the Arbitrator who in his discretion decided and passed a joint
\nAward and the frame of the appeal, with particular reference to the nature
\nof the decree challenged.  In rejecting the plea of the State that the
\nlegal representative of Labhu Ram would be entitled to be paid separately
\nthe share of Labhu Ram only, this Court held that such calculations were
\nforeign to the appeal which only concerned with the correct amount of
\ncompensation payable with respect to the land taken over, as awarded by the
\nArbitrator-the exercise being one and the same, and that there cannot be
\ndifferent assessments of the amount of compensation for the same parcel of
\nland and, therefore, the said question cannot be decided merely on the
\nbasis of separate shares.\n<\/p>\n
\tIt is not necessary to consider individually all the decisions
\n\trendered by Benches of two and three learned judges, brought to our
\n\tnotice, wherein uniformly this Court has held  (a) In case of
\n\t“Joint and indivisible decree”, “Joint and inseverable or
\n\tinseparable decree”, the abatement of proceedings in relation
\nto one or more of the appellant(s) or respondent(s) on account of omission
\nor lapse and failure to bring on record his or their legal representatives
\nin time would prove fatal to the entire appeal and require to be dismissed
\nin toto, as otherwise inconsistent or contradictory decrees would result
\nand proper reliefs could not be granted, conflicting with the one which had
\nalready become final with respect to the same subject matter vis–vis the
\nothers; (b) the question as to whether the Court can deal with an appeal
\nafter it abates against one or the other would depend upon the facts of
\neach case and no exhaustive statement or analysis could be made about all
\nsuch circumstances wherein it would or would not be possible to proceed
\nwith the appeal, despite abatement, partially;\n<\/p>\n
(c) existence of a joint right as distinguished from tenancy in common
\nalone is not the criteria but the joint character of the decree, dehors the
\nrelationship of the parties inter se and the frame of the appeal, will take
\ncolour from the nature of the decree challenged; (d) where the dispute
\nbetween two groups of parties centred around claims or based on grounds
\ncommon relating to the respective groups litigating as distinct groups or
\nbodies\tthe issue involved for consideration in such class of cases would
\nbe one and indivisible; and (e) when the issues involved in more than one
\nappeals dealt with as group or batch ofappeals, which are common and
\nidentical in all such cases, abatement of one or the other of the connected
\nappeals due to the death of one or more of the parties and failure to bring
\non record the legal representatives of the deceased parties, would result
\nin the abatement of all appeals.\n<\/p>\n
\tStrong reliance has been placed for the respondents on the decision
\n\tof aConstitution Bench of this Court reported in Ram Swarup vs.
\n\tMunshi & Ors.<\/a> [1963(3) SCR 858].  That was a case wherein the owner
\n\tof certain agricultural lands in Punjab sold the same to one of the
\n\trespondents on 12.12.1957 and the son of the vendor claiming to be
\n\tentitled to a right of pre-emption instituted a suit against the
\n\tpurchaser relying upon Section 15(a) of the Punjab Pre-emption
\nAct,1913.  The suit came to be decreed by the trial court and affirmed by
\nthe First Appellate Court as well as the High Court.  The matter was
\npursued on appeal before this Court by the appellants who were five in
\nnumber falling in two groups, the 1st and 2nd appellants, who are brothers,
\nand appellants Nos. 3, 4 & 5, the other.During the pendency of the said
\nappeal the 1st appellant died on 18.5.1960 leaving a widow, four daughters
\nand a son, as his heirs.  No application was made to bring on record those
\nlegal representatives but the appellant preferred to proceed with the
\nappeal on behalf of the remaining four appellants.  The respondents raised
\na plea to dismiss the appeal, in entirety, as incompetent without the legal
\nrepresentatives of the 1st appellant on record.  This was met by the
\ncounsel for the appellants, contending that since the interest of the
\ndeceased was distinct and separate from that of the others whatever
\nmight be the position as to the share of the deceased and partial abatement
\ndue to his death, the same would not affect the continuance of the appeal
\nby the surviving appellants as regards their share in the property.  In
\nrejecting the plea on behalf of the surviving appellants, this Court held
\nas hereunder:\n<\/p>\n
“An English translation of the deed of sale has now
\nbeen produced before us and a perusal of it indicates
\nthat the submission made on behalf of the appellants
\nis not sustainable.  The consideration for the sale is a
\nsum of Rs.22,750\/- and the conveyance recites that
\nMehar Singh and the second appellant had paid one
\nhalf amounting to Rs.11,375\/- while the other three
\nappellants had paid the other half.  It is therefore not a
\ncase of a sale of any separated item of property in
\nfavour of the deceased-appellant but of one entire set
\nof properties to be enjoyed by two sets of vendees in
\nequal shares.  It is clear law that there can be no
\npartial pre-emption because pre-emption is the
\nsubstitution of the pre-emptor in place of the vendee
\nand if the decree in favour of the pre-emptor in
\nrespect of the share of the deceased Mehar Singh
\nhas become final it is manifest that there would be
\ntwo conflicting decrees if the appeal should be
\nallowed and a decree for pre-emption insofar as
\nappellants 2 to 5 are concerned is interfered with.
\nWhere a decree is a joint one and a part of the decree
\nhas become final by reason of abatement, the entire
\nappeal must be held to be abated.  It is not necessary
\nto cite authority for so obvious a position but we might
\nrefer to the decision of this court in Jhanda Singh v.
\nGurmukh Singh (deceased)1.  The result is that the
\nappeal fails as having abated and is dismissed with
\ncosts.”\t\t\t\t\t\t  (Emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
\tThe right sought to be asserted in this case was considered to be
\n\tsingle and joint, though on behalf of more than one. The appellants
\n\trelied heavily upon the decision reported in Harihar Prasad Singh &
\n\tOthers vs. Balmiki Prasad Singh and Others<\/a> [1975(2) SCR 932]
\n\trendered by a Bench of three learned Judges.  The suit therein came
\n\tto be filed by the plaintiffs claiming to succeed to the estate of
\n\tone R, a Bhumihar Brahmin on the basis of a special custom of the
\n\tfamily to which te parties belonged, though under the ordinary
\n\tHindu Law they would not be entitled to succeed to the estate of R
\n\tbeing related to him in distant degree.  The custom was sought to
\n\tbe substantiated by proving 52 instances of its observance. The
\n\ttrial court decreed the suit holding the custom to be in force on
\n\tthe proof of 49 such instances.\t The defendants filed three appeals
\n\tgetting themselves divided into three groups.  One of the
\n\trespondents in one of the three appeals, who was not arrayed as a
\n\trespondent in the other appeals, died and his legal representatives
\n\twere not brought on record.  The High Court differed and reversed
\n\tthe decree on the view that none of the instances claimed were
\nproved. The matter was taken before this Court on appeal by filing three
\nappeals. The objection taken on behalf of the respondents was that the High
\nCourt should have dismissed the appeal on account of the fact that though
\nwhen plaintiff No.29 died in 1953 his wife and son were substituted in his
\nplace on 12.8.53, when the said widow died on 1.11.67, leaving behind a son
\n(already a party) and a daughter, the counsel sought for striking of the
\nname of the deceased since her son was already on record and there was no
\nneed to bring any other legal representatives and the appeal can be
\nproceeded with on that basis without impleading the daughter.  When the
\nrespondents made an application stating that the appeal abated in the
\nabsence of all legal representatives of the deceased, an application came
\nto be filed to implead the daughter also, but the same was rejected as
\nbelated and that the effect of the said order will be considered at the
\ntime of final hearing of the appeals.\t Finally, the other appeals
\nwere held not to abate merely because the Trial Court decree was one.  This
\nCourt, while dealing with such a situation, held as follows:\n<\/p>\n
“The important point to note about this litigation is that
\neach of the reversioners is entitled to his own specific
\nshare.\tHe could have sued for his own share and got
\na decree for his share.\t That is why five title suits
\nNos.53 and 61 of 1934 and 20, 29 and 41 of 1935
\nwere filed in respect of the same estate.  In the
\npresent case also the suit in the first instance was
\nfiled by the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs for their 1\/12th share.
\nThereafter many of the other reversioners who were
\noriginally added as defendants were transposed as
\nplaintiffs.  Though the decree of the Trial Court was
\none, three appeals Nos.326, 332 and 333 of 1948
\nwere filed by three sets of parties.  Therefore, if one of
\nthe plaintiffs dies and his legal representatives are not
\nbrought on record the suit or the appeal might abate
\nas far as he is concerned but not as regards the other
\nplaintiffs or the appellants.  Furthermore, the principle
\nthat applies to this case is whether the estate of the
\ndeceased appellant or respondent is represented.
\nThis is not a case where no legal representative of
\nManmohini was on record.\n<\/p>\n
…\n<\/p>\n
As we have already pointed out, in this case each one
\nof the plaintiffs could have filed a suit for his share of
\nRamdhan Singh’s estate.\t The fact that all the
\nreversioners joined together as plaintiffs and filed one
\nsuit does not mean that if for one reason or other the
\nsuit of one of them fails or abates the suit of the
\nothers fails or abates.\t The decree is in substance the
\ncombination of several decrees in favour of several
\nplaintiffs.  If in an appeal against the decree one of
\nthe plaintiffs is not added as a respondent, it only
\nmeans that the decree in his favour cannot be set
\naside or modified even if the appeal succeeds against
\nother plaintiffs in respect of their interest.\tThere
\nwould in that case be no conflict between the decrees
\nas the decree is a combination of many decrees.\t In
\nother words the result of the failure to add Nirsu
\nPrasad Singh as a respondent in F.A. 332 and F.A.\n<\/p>\n
333 would be that the decree granted in his favour by
\nthe Subordinate Judge would stand but not the
\ndecrees granted in favour of the other plaintiffs.  They
\ncan be reversed in those appeals.  There was no
\nsuch difficulty in F.A. 326 and in that appeal the
\ndecree granted in favour of Nirshu Prasad Prasad
\nSingh as well as in favour of other plaintiffs could
\nhave been reversed.  This is not a case where a party
\nwho is aggrieved by a decree fails to file an appeal
\nwithin the time allowed by law and should not,
\ntherefore, be granted relief under O.41, R.33.”\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t   (Emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
\tIn Indian Oxygen Ltd. Vs. Ram Adhar Singh & Others : C.A.
\nNo.1444\/1966 dated 24.9.1968, a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court
\nhad also an occasion to deal with the relevant principles relating to
\nabatement of proceedings.  That was a case wherein five workmen employed as
\nwatch and ward staff of the appellant-company raised a dispute that though
\nthey were entitled to be provided with the staff quarters located inside
\nthe factory premises, since the company imposed an unreasonable condition
\nthat the quarters would be only for the personal use of the workers and
\nthat even their families would not be permitted to reside with them
\ntherein, the company is liable to pay Rs.15\/- per month towards quarter
\nallowance, inasmuch as none of them could live in the quarters.  The matter
\nwas referred to the Industrial Tribunal and the claim was allowed by the
\nTribunal with a direction to pay Rs.10\/- per month as quarter allowance.
\nAggrieved, an appeal was filed before this Court by obtaining special
\nleave.\tPending appeal in this Court, the 1st respondent died but the
\ncompany failed to bring his heirs and legal representatives on record and,
\ntherefore, the appeal abated against the 1st respondent.  The respondents
\ncontended that the appeal having abated as against the deceased 1st
\nrespondent, the appeal against the other surviving respondents must also be
\nheld to have abated, and dismissed as such.  Reliance was placed in support
\nof the said claim on the decision in Nathu Ram’s case (supra) and Krishan
\nSingh & Others Vs. Nidhan Singh & Others : CA No.563 of 1962 dated
\n14.12.64.   While rejecting the said claim, it was observed as hereunder:
\n “Though it may, with some stretch of language, be contended that the
\n alleged right under which allowance was claimed was a right common to the
\nworkmen engaged in Watch & Ward department, the statement of claim filed on
\nbehalf of the five workmen itself claimed allowance as from the date of
\nappointment of each of them which would not necessarily be the same.  The
\nclaim also was for a separate allowance for each of them and not for an
\namount jointly claimed by them all.  It would seem that in the light of
\nsuch a separate claim for each of the five workmen the dispute referred to
\nthe Tribunal was worded as follows:\n<\/p>\n
“Should the employers be required to
\npay House Allowance to the workmen,
\nnamed in the Annexure?\tIf so, from
\nwhich date and with what other details?”\n<\/p>\n
The words “from which date and with what other
\ndetails” were used because the date from which
\nallowance was claimed and would be payable, if the
\naward went against the company, would be the
\nrespective date of appointment of each of them.\t The
\nclaimants were the five workmen named in the
\nannexure to the reference i.e. the workmen then
\nemployed in the Watch & Ward department and not
\nthose who in future would be appointed by the
\ncompany.  It is thus clear that the claim was a
\nseparate one by each of the five workmen and not a
\njoint claim in respect of a joint right.  The award of the
\nTribunal also is not for one amount jointly claimed or
\njointly payable.  The operative part of the award is in
\nthe following words:\n<\/p>\n
“I, therefore, award that a sum of
\nRs.10\/- per mensem shall be allowed by
\nway of House Rent Allowance to the
\nmembers of Watch and Ward where the
\nworker is not supplied a residential
\nquarter to stay in it along with his
\nfamily.”\n<\/p>\n
The appeal filed by the company is thus not against
\nan award which was joint and indivisible as in the two
\ndecisions relied on by counsel, but was one in favour
\nof each of the five workmen named in the annexure to
\nthe Reference.\tThe allowance payable by the
\ncompany under the award was not to all of them but
\nto the workmen to whom the company refused to
\nprovide with one of the said four quarters with
\npermission to live with his family.  No allowance,
\ntherefore, would be payable under the award to the
\nworkmen to whom the company gave the quarters
\nwith permission to live with their families.  It may be
\nthat the workmen, Ram Adhar Singh, having died
\npending this appeal and his legal representatives not
\nhaving been brought on record, the appeal against
\nhim would abate and the award to the extent of the
\nallowance payable to him would become final, and,
\ntherefore, even if the company were to succeed in this
\nappeal, the amount paid by the company to him or to
\nlegal representatives after his death cannot be
\nclaimed back by the company.  But so far as the other
\nrespondents are concerned, the award being for a
\ndistinct amount payable to each of them, there is, in
\nour view, no question of abatement of the appeal
\nagainst them on the ground that the appeal against
\nthe said Ram Adhar Singh has abated.  This is not,
\ntherefore, one of those cases where by reason of the
\ndecree being a joint and indivisible decree, the Court
\nwould have to pass inconsistent orders under the
\nsame decree, one in favour of the deceased
\nrespondent and the other against the surviving
\nrespondents.  The contention of Mr. Goyal, therefore,
\nmust be rejected.”\t\t\t  (Emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
\tWe have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel
\n\ton either side.  The consideration by the High Court seems to be
\n\ttoo superficial on the basis of certain abstract principles without
\n\tparticular reference to the nature and character of the
\n\tproceedings, the nature of claims and rights of parties, the
\nstatutory obligations cast on the courts dealing with a reference under
\nSection 30\/31originating from an Award under Section 11 of the Act and the
\nsource as well as origin of rights of the claimants.  The Land Acquisition
\nCollector empowered under the Act to pass the Award was not only obliged
\nto, among other things, determine the total compensation to be allowed for
\nthe land but also apportion the said compensation among all the persons
\ninterested in the land depending upon their respective interests
\nproportionately, whether they have appeared or not before him.  If any
\ndispute arises as to the apportionment of the compensation or any part
\nthereof or as to the persons to whom the same or any part thereof is
\npayable, the Land Acquisition Collector is obliged to refer such dispute to
\nthe decision of the Court.  If the amount could not be disbursedat his
\nlevel due to any one or the other reasons set out in Section 31, the amount
\nhas to be deposited in the Court to which normally a reference would be
\nsubmitted. The claim of each one was in respect of his distinct, definite
\nand separate share and their respective rights are not inter-dependant but
\nindependent.  Among themselves there is no conflicting or overlapping
\ninterest and the grant of relief to one has no adverse impact on the
\nother(s).   The mere fact that there was no division by metes and bounds on
\nstate of ground is no reason to treat it to be a joint right-indivisible in
\nnature to be asserted or vindicated only by all of them joining together in
\nthe same proceedings, in one capacity or the other. As a matter of fact
\nseparate claims seem to have been filed by them before the Reference Court
\nin respect of their own respective share.  Even if they have engaged a
\ncommon counsel or even if they have filed one claim in respect of their
\nspecified separate share, it could not have the effect of altering
\nthe nature of their claim or the character of their right so as to make it
\nan indivisible joint right. Though the Reference Court has decided all such
\nclaims together, having regard to the similarity or identical nature of
\nissues arising for consideration of the claims, in substance and reality
\nthe proceedings must be considered in law to be of multifarious claims
\ndisposed of in a consolidated manner resulting in as many number of Awards
\nof the Reference Court as there were claimants before it. There was no
\ncommunity of interest between them and that each one of them in
\nvindicating their individual rights was not obliged to implead the other
\nclaimants of their shares in one common action\/proceeding and the
\norders\/judgment though passed in a consolidated manner, in law, amounts to
\nas many orders or judgments as there were claimants and, by no reason, it
\ncan be branded to be a joint and inseverable one.  Similarity of the claims
\ncannot be a justification in law to treat them as a single and indivisible
\nclaim, for any or all purposes and such a thing cannot be legitimately done
\nwithout sacrificing the substance to the form. The claim on behalf of the
\nrespondents that the compensation awarded is of a lump sum, though shares
\nare divided, is belied by the scheme underlying Sections 11, 18, 30 and 31
\nof the Act, and cannot be countenanced as of any merit.\tAgainst the Award
\nof the Reference Court in this case, it was possible and permissible in law
\nfor everyone of the appellants to file an appeal of his own separately in
\nrespect of his share without any need or obligation to implead every
\nother of the claimants like him, as party respondent or as co-appellant,
\nbecause there is no conflicting interest or claims amongst them, inter se.
\nAs such, the alleged and apprehended fear about possible inconsistent or
\nconflicting decrees resulting therefrom if the appeals are proceeded with
\nand disposed of on merits has no basis in law nor well founded on the facts
\nand circumstances of these cases.Even if the appellants succeed on merits,
\ndehors the fate of the deceased appellants, the decree passed cannot either
\nsaid to become ineffective or rendered incapable of successful execution.
\nTo surmise even then a contradictory decree coming into existence, is
\nneither logic nor reason or acceptable by Courts of Law.  Otherwise, it
\nwould amount to applying the principle of vicarious liability to penalize
\nsomeone for no fault of his and denial of ones own right for the mere
\ndefault or refusal of the other(s) to join or contest likewise before the
\nCourt.  The fact that at a given point of time all of them joined in one
\nproceedings because one Court in the hierarchy has chosen to club or
\ncombine all their individual and separate claims for purpose of
\nconsideration on account of the similarity of the nature of their claims or
\nthat for the sake of convenience they joined together for asserting their
\nrespective, distinct and independent claims or rights is no ground to
\ndestroy their individual right to seek remedies in respect of their
\nrespective claims.In cases of the nature, there is every possibility of one
\nor the other among them subsequently reconciling themselves to their fate
\nand settle with their opponents or become averse to pursue the legal battle
\nforever so many reasons, as in the case on hand due to disinterestedness,
\nindifference or lethargy and, therefore, the attitude, approach
\nand resolve of one or the other should not become a disabling or
\ndisqualifying factor for others to vindicate their own individual rights
\nwithout getting eclipsed or marred by the action or inaction of the others.
\nConsequently, the fact that about 37 out of the total number of interested
\npersons, like the appellants, were not parties before the High Court or
\nthis Court, does not, in any manner,affect or deprive the appellants to
\nhave their claims, duly and properly considered and adjudicated in
\naccordance with law, on merits.Laws of procedure are meant to regulate
\neffectively, assist and aid the object of doing substantial and real
\njustice and not to foreclose even an adjudication on merits of substantial
\nrights of citizen under personal,property and other laws.  Procedure has
\nalways been viewed as the handmaid of justice and not meant to hamper the
\ncause of justice or sanctify miscarriage of justice.  A careful reading of
\nthe provisions contained in Order 22 of CPC as well as the subsequent
\namendments thereto would lend credit and support to the view that
\nthey were devised to ensure their continuation and culmination into an
\neffective adjudication and not to retard the further progress of the
\nproceedings and thereby non-suit the others similarly placed as long as
\ntheir distinct and independent rights to property or any claim remain in
\ntact and not lost forever due to the death of one or the other in the
\nproceedings.  The provisions contained in Order 22 are not to be construed
\nas a rigid matter of principle but must ever be viewed as a flexible tool
\nof convenience in the administration of justice.  The fact that the Khata
\nwas said to be joint is of no relevance, as long as each one of them had
\ntheir own independent, distinct and separate shares in the property as
\nfound separately indicated in Jamabandhi itself of the shares of each
\nof them distinctly.   We are also of the view that the High Court should
\nhave, on the very perception it had on the question of abatement, allowed
\nthe applications for impleadment even dehors the cause for the delay in
\nfiling the applications keeping in view the serious manner it would
\notherwise jeopardize an effective adjudication on merits, the rights of
\nother remaining appellants for no fault of them.  Interests of justice
\nwould have been better served had the High Court adopted a positive and
\nconstructive approach than merely scuttle the whole process to foreclose an
\nadjudication of the claims of others on merits. The rejection by the High
\nCourt of the applications to set aside abatement, condonation and brining
\non record the legal representatives does not appear, on the peculiar nature
\nof the case, to be a just or reasonable exercise of the Court’s power or in
\nconformity with the avowed object of Court to do real, effective and
\nsubstantial justice.  Viewed in the light of the fact that each one of the
\nappellants had an independent and distinct right of his own not inter-
\ndependant upon the one or the other of the appellants, the dismissal of the
\nappeals by the High Court in their entirety does not constitute a sound,
\nreasonable or just and proper exercise of its powers.\t Even if it has to
\nbe viewed that they had a common interest, then the interests of justice
\nwould require the remaining other appellants being allowed to pursue the
\nappeals for the benefit of those others, who are not before the Court also
\nand not stultify the proceedings as a whole and non-suit the others, as
\nwell.  The principles laid down or the ratio of the decision in Ram Sarup’s
\ncase(supra) will not apply to the case on hand.  As indicated earlier, the
\nreal decision in a given case would ultimately depend very much on the
\nfacts of that particular case, the nature of the right sought to be
\nasserted and relief sought.\tThe suit was filed in that case by some
\nfour persons asserting a right of pre- emption claiming that they are the
\nnearest collaterals of the Vendor and heirs according to rule of
\nsuccession.  The sale was found to be of one entire set of properties to be
\nenjoyed by two sets of Vendees in equal shares.\t Since the position of law
\nwas held to be clear that there can be no partial pre-emption and that pre-
\nemption is the substitution of the pre-emptor in place of the Vendee, the
\nCourt felt that two conflicting decrees were bound to result, if the appeal
\nhas to be allowed in favour of the other remaining appellants, in the teeth
\nof the abatement of the appeal as against the deceased appellants and the
\ndecree in respect of him having become final.\tIt is for this reason that
\nthe decree in that case was held to be a joint one and, therefore, when a
\npart of it has become final by reason of abatement, the entire appeal was
\nheld to have abated, relying upon the decision in Jhanda Singh Vs. Gurmukh
\nSingh & Ors. (supra).  The Constitution Bench, which rendered the decision
\nin Ram Sarup’s case (supra), was neither concerned with any reconciliation
\nof conflicting views on the point nor declare the correct position of
\nlaw on this aspect, for the simple reason that the matter was before the
\nConstitution Bench only on the question of constitutional validity of
\nSection 15 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, and that the appeal
\n(C.A.No.214\/1961) was dismissed as having abated in view of the earlier
\nunreported decision dated 10.4.2002 in C.A. No.344\/1956 (Jhanda Singh’s
\ncase) rendered by a Bench of three learned Judges, without any further
\nreference either to the other decisions striking a different note or
\nundertaking any exercise, of the nature now before us in the light of a
\nspecific reference made therefor.\n<\/p>\n
\tThis Court in Jhanda Singh’s case (supra) was dealing with a matter
\nwherein one of the two sons of one Ramditta, by name Gurdas, was taken in
\nadoption by one Mihan, the paternal uncle of his father.  The other son
\nLabhu died possessed of agricultural land of an extent of 56 kanals and 6
\nmarlas, leaving behind his widow, who also died in 1945.  The two grandsons
\nof  another paternal uncle of Ramditta (Jiwa and Gurmukh Singh) filed a
\nsuit against Gurdas before the Sub-Court for a declaration that they were
\nin proprietary possession of an half share in the said land and in the
\nalternative for possession of the same stating that since Gurdas was
\nadopted by Mihan, he ceased to have any interest in the properties of his
\nbrother Labhu, in the capacity as brother, and, therefore, the plaintiffs
\nalso are entitled to an half share with Gurdas.\tGurdas pleaded that
\nhis adoption was only as an appointed heir under the customary law
\naccording to which he does not lose his rights to succeed in the natural
\nfamily.  The suit was decreed by the Trial Court and the First Appellate
\nCourt also dismissed the appeal against the same.  In the appeal before the
\nHigh Court, the plea on behalf of Gurdas was upheld and the suit was
\ndismissed.  But in further appeal under LPA, the Division Bench agreed with
\nthe judgments of the Courts below and reversed the decision of the Single
\nJudge of the High Court.  Then the matter was pursued before this Court.
\nThe appeal before the High Court itself was filed by the three sons of
\nurdas since he died after the decision of the First Appellate Court.
\nAfter the appeal was disposed of by the Division Bench in the High
\nCourt, the first plaintiff seems to have died and in the appeal before this
\nCourt the second plaintiff and three sons of deceased first plaintiff were
\nrespondents. Pending appeal, second plaintiff\/respondent died and an
\napplication was made to bring to the notice of the Court that the heirs of
\nsecond plaintiff are only the sons of first plaintiff and that they are
\nalready on record. It appears that there were daughters of the first
\nplaintiff also to be brought on record, besides sisters’ sons and
\ndaughters.The application thereafter filed was dismissed by declining
\nto condone the delay in filing it.\t An application for review of the
\nsaid order was also dismissed for default.\tBut, the Review Petition,
\nthough was restored, was dismissed on the ground that there was no ground
\nfor review.  Another application filed for the purpose of bringing on
\nrecord the legal representatives though was listed along with the appeal,
\nthe said application was also dismissed. To a preliminary objection that
\nsince the decree under challenge was a joint one in favour of the
\nplaintiffs, the entire appeal has abated even in respect of other
\nrespondents, the appellants claimed that since the plaintiffs and the heirs
\nwere tenants in common having separate and distinct shares in the property,
\nthere is no impediment for the appeal being proceeded with against others.
\nSince as a result of the dismissal of the applications, the appeal abated
\nagainst the 2nd plaintiff\/respondent, the impact of the same on the rest of
\nthe appeal came up for consideration by this Court.
\n\tThe decision in Jhanda Singh’s case (supra), though of a Bench of
\n\tthree learned Judges, dealt with the question in the light of the
\n\tdecision in Nathu Ram’s case (supra) and applied the ratio therein
\n\tto the said case and in the process observed that “a perusal of the
\n\tjudgment does not disclose that the decision was based upon the
\n\texistence of a joint right as distinguished from tenancy in common.
\n\tThe emphasis was more on the joint decree passed than on the
\n\trelationship of the respondents inter se” and ultimately came to
\n\tthe conclusion that “Indeed, this Court definitely held that
\n\tevenspecification of shares does not affect the nature of the
\n\tdecree.”  On that view of the matter, the Bench specifically
\n\tdeclined to consider in detail the other line of decisions placed
\nbefore them.  In Nathu Ram’s case (supra), the original claim as projected
\nbefore the Arbitrator itself was found to be a joint one in respect of the
\nland acquired, apparently the same being a claim for merely an enhanced
\ncompensation,unlike the present case before us where the further claim
\nbefore the Land Acquisition Collector as well as the Reference Court were
\nas to the separate and independent shares of each of their own.  This is
\nclear from the observation in Nathu Ram’s case (supra) that, “Their claim
\nwas a joint claim based on the allegation that the land belonged to them
\njointly.  The Award and the joint decree are on this basis and the
\nAppellate Court cannot decide on the basis of the separate shares”.  The
\nassumption in Jhanda Singh’s case (supra) as though this Court in Nathu
\nRam’s case, as a matter of general principle held that specification of
\nshares does not affect the nature of the decree, cannot be considered to be
\nthe correct position emerging on a proper appreciation of the decision in
\nNathu Ram’s case (supra). It was, at any rate, observed in this decision
\nalso that the nature and extent of abatement in a given case and the
\ndecision to be taken thereon will depend upon the facts of each case and,
\ntherefore, no exhaustive statement can be made either way and that the
\ndecision will ultimately depend upon the fact whether the decree obtained
\nwas a joint decree or a separate one.  This question, in our considered
\nview, cannot and should not also be decided merely on the format of the
\ndecree under challenge or it being one or the manner in which it was dealt
\nwith before or by the Court, which passed it. It may usefully be noticed at
\nthis stage that the decision in Harihar Prasad’s case (supra) wherein the
\nprinciples have been considered elaborately in the light of the overall
\ndistinguishing features from an aspect very relevant for the purpose of the
\ncases before us, specifically adverted to the decision in Ram Swarup’s case
\n(supra) of the Constitution Bench as also the unreported decisions in
\nJhingan Singh’s case (supra) and Kishan Singh’s case (supra) and
\ndistinguished them with observations as hereunder:-
\n“We do not think that the decision relied upon by the
\nappellants in Jhinghan Singh & Anr. etc. v.\n<\/p>\n
Singheshwar Singh & Ors. etc. (C.A. Nos.114-122 of
\n1958 decided on 20.4.1965) helps the appellants.  In
\nthat case Singheshwar Singh was one of the
\nappellants in C.A. Nos.114 and 115 and respondent
\nin the other appeals.  Kaushal Kishore Prasad Singh
\nwas one of the appellants in C.A.Nos.116 and 117
\nand a respondent in the other appeals.\tBoth of them
\ndied and the pending appeals abated against them.\n<\/p>\n
The contesting respondents took the preliminary
\nobjection that all the appeals had become defective
\nfor non-joinder of the legal representatives of
\nSingheshwar Singh and Kaushal Kishore Prasad
\nSingh and this objection was accepted.\tThe decision
\nproceeded on the basis that the plaints in the several
\nsuits raised a dispute between a body of landholders
\nclaiming Khas possession of the lands and a number
\nof persons claiming to be occupancy tenants thereof,
\nthat in substance, the plaintiffs asked for an
\nadjudication that the lands were bakasht and the first
\nparty defendants were not occupancy tenants and to
\nsuch suits all the landholders were necessary parties.
\nIt was therefore held that as in the appeals before this
\nCourt the landholders claimed the same relief, which
\nthey sought in the trial court and in those appeals also
\nSingheshwar Singh and Kaushal Kishore Prasad
\nSingh, were necessary parties, in the absence of their
\nlegal representatives the appeals were not
\nmaintainable.  It would be seen that the two
\nappellants whose legal representatives were not
\nadded as parties were parties in all the four suits and
\nin all the four appeals and the question was a
\ncommon question to which all the landholders were
\nnecessary parties.  As we have explained earlier that
\nis not the position here.\n<\/p>\n
\tThe decision in Kishan Singh & Ors. v. Nidhan
\nSingh & Ors. (C.A.No.563 of 1962 decided on 14-12-\n<\/p>\n
1964) and the statement of law laid down by this
\nCourt therein in the following terms :\n<\/p>\n
“Mr. Bishan Narain points out that in
\nsubstance, the present suit is between the
\nlandholders on the one hand and those
\nwho claimed to be occupancy tenants on
\nthe other.  It is true that the plaint alleges
\nthat the occupancy rights were
\nextinguished on the death of the last
\noccupancy tenant Narain Singh, but that
\nhas been denied by the appellants, and in
\nfact, round this dispute the whole
\ncontroversy centers in the present suit.\n<\/p>\n
There is no doubt that the allegations
\nmade in the plaint clearly show that the
\ndispute is between the landholders and
\nthe person who claim to be occupancy
\ntenants and so, it is plain that in such a
\ndispute the whole interest of the
\nlandholders and the whole interest of the
\ntenants must be adequately represented.\n<\/p>\n
The tenancy rights, which the appellants
\nclaim, are no doubt based on the
\npresumption under Section 5(2) of the
\nTenancy Act.  But the relationship in
\nrespect of which the said presumption
\nwould arise is a relationship of landlord
\nand tenant, and this relationship in the
\nvery nature of things is one and
\nindivisible.  Therefore, when a claim is
\nmade to evict the persons who allege that
\nthey are tenants the whole of the
\nlandlord’s interest must be before the
\nCourt.”\n<\/p>\n
was cited with approval in Jhinghan Singh & Anr. etc.
\nv. Singheshwar Singh & Ors. etc. (supra).  It does not,
\ntherefore, stand on any different footing.”\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t\t\t     (Emphasis
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t     supplied)<\/p>\n
The question, therefore, as to when a proceeding before the Court
\nbecomes or rendered impossible or possible to be proceeded with, after it
\nhad partially abated on account of the death of one or the other party on
\neither side has been always considered to depend upon the fact as to
\nwhether the decree obtained is a joint decree or a severable one and that
\nin case of a joint and inseverable decree if the appeal abated against one
\nor the other, the same cannot be proceeded with further for or against the
\nremaining parties as well.\tIf otherwise, the decree is a joint and
\nseveral or separable one, being in substance and reality a combination of
\nmany decrees, there can be no impediment for the proceedings being
\nproceeded with among or against those remaining parties other than the
\ndeceased.   As observed in Nathu Ram’s case (supra) itself, the code does
\nnot itself provide for the abatement of the appeal against the other
\nrespondents even where, as against one such it has abated but it is only
\nthe Courts which have held that in certain circumstances the appeal also
\nwould abate against a co-respondent as a result of abatement against the
\ndeceased respondent.  The same would be the position of an appeal vis–vis
\nthe appellants, as in the other cases.  Order 22 Rule 4 also was considered
\nnot to provide for abatement of the appeal(s) against the co-respondents of
\nthe deceased respondent and it was specifically observed therein that to
\nsay that the appeals against them also abated in certain circumstances is
\nnot a correct statement.  It was held that the appeals against such other
\nrespondents cannot be proceeded against and, therefore, had to be
\ndismissed, in certain circumstances.\n<\/p>\n
But, in our view also, as to what those circumstances are to be, cannot be
\nexhaustively enumerated and no hard and fast rule for invariable
\napplication can be devised.  With the march and progress of law, the new
\nhorizons explored and modalities discerned and the fact that the procedural
\nlaws must be liberally construed to really serve as handmaid, make it
\nworkable and advance the ends of justice, technical objections which tend
\nto be stumbling blocks to defeat and deny substantial and effective justice
\nshould be strictly viewed for being discouraged, except where the mandate
\nof law, inevitably necessitates it. Consequently, having regard to the
\nnature of the proceedings under the Act and the purpose of reference
\nproceedings and the appeal therefrom, the Courts should adopt a liberal
\napproach in the matter of condonation of the delay as well as the
\nconsiderations which should weigh in adjudging nature of the decree,
\ni.e., whether it is joint and inseverable or joint and severable or
\nseparable. The fact that the Reference Court has chosen to pass a decree
\njointly in the matters before us is and should be no ground by itself to
\nconstrue the decree to be joint and inseparable.  At times, as in the cases
\non hand, the Court for its convenience might have combined the claims for
\njoint consideration on account of similar nature of the issues in all such
\ncases and for that reason the parties should not be penalized, for no fault
\nof them.  Actus cuirae neminem gravabit (an act of Court shall prejudice no
\none) is the maxim of law, which comes into play in such situations.  Number
\nof people, more for the sake of convenience, may be counselled to join
\ntogether to ventilate, all their separate but similar nature of claims and
\nthis also should not result in the claims of all such others being rejected
\nmerely because one or the other of such claims by one or more of the
\nparties abated on account of death and consequent omission to bring on
\nrecord the legal heirs of the deceased party.\tAt times one or the other
\nparties on either side in a litigation involving several claims or more
\nthan one, pertaining to their individual rights may settle among themselves
\nthe dispute to the extent of their share or proportion of rights are
\nconcerned and may drop out of contest, bringing even the proceedings to a
\nconclusion so far as they are concerned.  If all such move is allowed to
\nboomerang adversely on the rights of the remaining parties even to contest
\nand have their claims adjudicated on merits, it would be a travesty of
\nadministration of justice itself. The area of differences in the catena of
\ndecisions brought to our notice is not so much with reference to the
\nprinciples to be applied to different nature of decrees but only as to
\nwhich of the decree(s) falls, when or under what circumstances under one or
\nthe other of the classification, i.e., joint and inseverable or joint and
\nseverable or separable.  This aspect seems to have been adjudged in
\ndifferent cases depending upon the nature\/source of rights, the
\ncause of action, the manner they were asserted by the parties themselves
\nand the contradictory nature of decrees impossible of execution, likely to
\nresult when considered differently.\t It is for this reason any
\nstandardised formula was avoided and matter left for the consideration of
\nCourts, on the peculiar nature of the cases coming for determinatio.
\nHaving regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances noticed by us that
\nthe claimants appellants have each their own distinct, separate and
\nindependent rights, the principles enumerated in Harihar Prasad’s case
\n(supra) and Indian Oxygen Ltd. case (supra) squarely apply with all force.
\nThe appeals even dehors the claims of the deceased and others who have not
\nchosen to approach the High Court or this Court, were neither rendered
\nincapable of consideration nor impossible of according any relief or could
\nbe held difficult to enforce the decree that may be passed, in favour of
\nthe remaining appellants without suffering the vice of inconsistency.
\nEven if it is likely to result in two different sets of judgments of
\nvarying content, purport or reason, as long as the enforcement of the
\ndecrees passed therein are not rendered impossible due to mutual
\ncontradiction in terms of self-destructive nature,there is
\nno justification whatsoever to assume them to be inconsistent or
\ncontradictory decrees, at all.  The mere fact that in a set of similar or
\nidentical nature of cases two different nature or type of decrees was
\nnecessitated is no reason to treat them to be inconsistent or contradictory
\ndecrees, so long as both can be executed and enforced without either of
\nthem being destructive of the other. Contradictory or inconsistent decrees,
\nconsequently, could be held to have resulted only in a given case when the
\nrelief granted in one cannot be enforced\/realized without denying the
\nrelief in the other or totally nullifying or setting at naught the relief
\ngranted in the other, and in no other class of cases.
\nEven assuming that the decree appealed against or challenged before the
\nHigher forum is joint and several but deal with the rights of more than one
\nrecognized in law to belong to each one of them on their own and unrelated
\nto the others, and the proceedings abate in respect of one or more of
\neither of the parties, the Courts are not disabled in any manner to proceed
\nwith the proceedings so far as the remaining parties and part of the appeal
\nis concerned. As and when it is found necessary to interfere with the
\njudgment and decree challenged before it, the Court can always declare the
\nlegal position in general and restrict the ultimate relief to be granted,
\nby confining it to those before the Court only rather than denying the
\nrelief to one and all on account of a procedure lapse or action or inaction
\nof one or the other of the parties before it. The only exception to this
\ncourse of action should be where the relief granted and the decree
\nultimately passed would become totally unenforceable and mutually
\nself- destructive and unworkable vis–vis the other part, which had become
\nfinal. As far as possible Courts must always aim to preserve and protect
\nthe rights of parties and extend help to enforce them rather than deny
\nrelief and thereby render the rights themselves otiose, `ubi jus ibi
\nremedium’ (where there is a right, there is a remedy) being a basic
\nprinciple of jurisprudence.  Such a course would be more conducive and
\nbetter conform to a fair, reasonable and proper administration of justice.
\nIn the light of the above discussion, we hold:-\n<\/p>\n
(1)\tWherever the plaintiffs or appellants or petitioners are found to
\nhave distinct, separate and independent rights of their own and
\nfor purpose of convenience or otherwise, joined together in a
\nsingle litigation to vindicate their rights, the decree passed by
\nthe Court thereon is to be viewed in substance as the
\ncombination of several decrees in favour of one or the other
\nparties and not as a joint and inseverable decree.  The same
\nwould be the position in the case of defendants or respondents
\nhaving similar rights contesting the claims against them.\n<\/p>\n
(2)\tWhenever different and distinct claims of more than one are
\nsought to be vindicated in one single proceedings, as the one
\nnow before us, under the Land Acquisition Act or in similar
\nnature of proceedings and\/or claims in assertion of individual
\nrights of parties are clubbed, consolidated and dealt with
\ntogether by the Courts concerned and a single judgment or
\ndecree has been passed, it should be treated as a mere
\ncombination of several decrees in favour of or against one or
\nmore of the parties and not as joint and inseparable decrees.\n<\/p>\n
(3)\tThe mere fact that the claims or rights asserted or sought to be
\nvindicated by more than one are similar or identical in nature or
\nby joining together of more than one of such claimants of a
\nparticular nature, by itself would not be sufficient in law to treat
\nthem as joint claims, so as to render the judgment or decree
\npassed thereon a joint and inseverable one.\n<\/p>\n
(4)\tThe question as to whether in a given case the decree is joint
\nand inseverable or joint and severable or separable has to be
\ndecided, for the purposes of abatement or dismissal of the
\nentire appeal as not being properly and duly constituted or
\nrendered incompetent for being further proceeded with, requires
\nto be determined only with reference to the fact as to whether
\nthe judgment\/decree passed in the proceedings vis–vis the
\nremaining parties would suffer the vice of contradictory or
\ninconsistent decrees.  For that reason, a decree can be said to
\nbe contradictory or inconsistent with another decree only when
\nthe two decrees are incapable of enforcement or would be
\nmutually self-destructive and that the enforcement of one would
\nnegate or render impossible the enforcement of the other.\n<\/p>\n
 The Award\/decrees, which were the subject-matter of challenge
\nbefore the High Court, in these cases, viewed in the light of the above
\nconclusions, would not render them to be a joint and inseparable decree
\nbut in substance a mere combination of several decrees depending upon
\nthe number of claimants before the Court and, therefore, joint and several
\nor separable vis–vis the individuals or their claims concerned.
\nConsequently, even the abatement of the appeal in the High Court in
\nrespect of one or other of the appellants cannot by itself result in the
\nabatement of the appeal in its entirety or render it liable to be dismissed
\nas
\nnot duly or properly constituted or not possible to be proceeded with.\tThe
\nconclusions to the contrary arrived at by the High Court and liable to be
\nand are hereby set aside.  That apart, since we have also arrived at a
\nconclusion that the rejection of the applications by the High Court was
\nerroneous, the orders passed by the High Court in this regard also are set
\naside and the legal representatives of the deceased appellants before the
\nHigh Court are directed to be brought on record in the appeals before the
\nHigh Court.\n<\/p>\n
For all the reasons stated above, we are unable to approve the
\ndecision or the manner of disposal given by the High Court in these cases,
\nwhich resulted in grave injustice to the remaining appellants in denying
\nthem of their right to have an adjudication of their claims on merits.\tThe
\nHigh Court ought to have condoned the delay as prayed for, keeping in
\nview the pendency of the main appeals on its file, adopting a liberal and
\nreasonable approach, which would have facilitated an effective
\nadjudication of the rights of parties on either side, avoiding summary
\nrejection of the appeals in entirety.  The judgment and decrees passed by
\nthe High Court in all these appeals are set aside and appeals are remitted
\nto the High Court to be restored to their original files for being disposed
\nof
\nafresh on merits of the claims of both parties and in accordance with law.
\nThese appeals are allowed on the above terms, with no order as to costs.\n<\/p>\n
 The observations, if any, made in this judgment about the respective
\n claims of parties are merely for the sake of indicating the serious and
\n disputed nature claims between the parties necessitating an effective
\n adjudication on merits and not to be construed as any expression of
\n opinion on any such claims which the High Court shall be at liberty to
\n deal with and dispose of on their own merits, after hearing both parties,
\n in accordance with law.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India S.Amarjit Singh Kalra (Dead) By … vs Pramod Gupta (Dead) By L.Rs. & Ors on 17 December, 2002 Author: D Raju Bench: G.B.Pattanaik Cji, M.B.Shah, Doraiswamy Raju, S.N.Variava, D.M.Dharmadhikari CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 1027-1028 of 1992 PETITIONER: S.Amarjit Singh Kalra (dead) by L.Rs. & Ors. RESPONDENT: Pramod Gupta (dead) by L.Rs. […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-221527","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nS.Amarjit Singh Kalra (Dead) By ... vs Pramod Gupta (Dead) By L.Rs. & Ors on 17 December, 2002 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/s-amarjit-singh-kalra-dead-by-vs-pramod-gupta-dead-by-l-rs-ors-on-17-december-2002\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"S.Amarjit Singh Kalra (Dead) By ... vs Pramod Gupta (Dead) By L.Rs. & Ors on 17 December, 2002 - 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