{"id":221880,"date":"1983-04-20T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1983-04-19T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-bihar-vs-radha-krishna-singh-ors-on-20-april-1983"},"modified":"2016-01-26T16:16:46","modified_gmt":"2016-01-26T10:46:46","slug":"state-of-bihar-vs-radha-krishna-singh-ors-on-20-april-1983","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-bihar-vs-radha-krishna-singh-ors-on-20-april-1983","title":{"rendered":"State Of Bihar vs Radha Krishna Singh & Ors on 20 April, 1983"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
State Of Bihar vs Radha Krishna Singh & Ors on 20 April, 1983<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1983 AIR 684, \t\t 1983 SCR (2) 808<\/div>\n
Author: S M Fazalali<\/div>\n
Bench: Fazalali, Syed Murtaza<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nSTATE OF BIHAR\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nRADHA KRISHNA SINGH & ORS.\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT20\/04\/1983\n\nBENCH:\nFAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA\nBENCH:\nFAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA\nVARADARAJAN, A. (J)\nERADI, V. BALAKRISHNA (J)\n\nCITATION:\n 1983 AIR  684\t\t  1983 SCR  (2) 808\n 1983 SCC  (3) 118\t  1983 SCALE  (1)789\n\n\nACT:\n     Genealogies considerations\t to be\tkept in\t view  while\nconsidering.\n     Evidence Act, 1872-Enties in public records-Prepared by\na public  officer  in  discharge  of  his  official  duties-\nProbative value\t of-Sections 13,  40, 41, 42 and 43-Recitale\nin judgments  not inter\t partes-Section 32-Doctrine  of post\nlitem motam-Appreciation  of oral  evidence in the matter of\nproof of  pedigree-Hearsay evidence  section 60-Statement of\nperson deposing a fact known from a different source-How far\ncan be\trelied on Escheat-State not entering apperance-Plea-\nIf  can\t  be  accepted\twithout\t public\t notice\t to  persons\ninterested.\n     Interpretation-Dictionaries-How far can be used.\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\n     Maharaja  Harindra\t  Kishore  Singh   was\tthe   direct\ndescendant of Debi Singh who was the son of Bansidhar Singh.\nMaharaja  Harindra  Kishore  Singh  died  issueless  leaving\nbehind vast  properties in  the states\tof Uttar Pradesh and\nBihar. The original plaintiff, Bhagwati Prasad Singh was the\ndirect descendant of Ramruch Singh but his relationship with\nBansidhar Singh\t had not  been established.  The plaintiffs-\nrespondents basing their title as the nearest revisioners of\nMaharaja Harindra  Kishore  Singh  claimed  that  they\twere\nentitled to immediate possession of the properties after the\ndeath of the widows of the Maharaja.\n     The Trial\tCourt held  that the plaintiffs had not been\nable to\t prove any  linkage or\tconnection  between  Ramruch\nSingh and  Bansidhar Singh.  But the  majority of  the\tHigh\nCourt held  that all  the links\t were clearly  proved by the\nplaintiffs and\tthat it had been found to their satisfaction\nthat Ramruch was the son of Bansidhar. It also held that Ex.\nJ which\t was an entry made by a Public Officer in a register\nin the\tdischarge of  his  official  duties  squarely  falls\nwithin the  four corners  of section  35 of the Evidence Act\nand, is\t therefore, admissible\tin evidence.  The appellants\nhowever, claimed that it was not admissible in evidence.\n^\n     HELD: In  a hotly\tcontested point, there is a tendency\non the\tpart of\t an interested person or a party in order to\ngrab, establish\t or prove  an  alleged\tclaim,\tto  concoct,\nfabricate or  procure false genealogy to suit their ends. In\nrelying on  the genealogy  put forward,\t courts\t must  guard\nthemselves against falling into the trap laid by a series of\ndocuments or  a labyrinth  of seemingly\t old genealogies  to\nsupport their rival claims. [820 H, 821 A]\n809\n     The principles governing such cases are:\n     (i) Genealogies admitted or proved to be old and relied\non in  previous cases  are doubtless  relevant and  in\tsome\ncases may  even be conclusive of the facts proved, but there\nare several considerations which must be kept in mind viz.:\n     (a)  Source of the genealogy and its dependability.\n     (b)   Admissibility of the genealogy under the Evidence\n\t  Act.\n     (c)  A proper  use in  decisions or  judgments on which\n\t  reliance is placed.\n     (d) Age of genealogies.\n     (e)  Litigations  where   such  genealogies  have\tbeen\n\t  accepted or rejected. [821 B-E]\n     (2) On  the question  of  admissibility  the  following\ntests must be adopted:\n     (a)  The genealogies  of the  families  concerned\tmust\n\t  fall within  the four-corners of s. 32(5) or s. 13\n\t  of the Evidence Act.\n     (b)  They must not be hit by the doctrine of post litem\n\t  motam.\n     (c)  The genealogies  or the claims cannot be proved by\n\t  recitals, depositions\t or facts  narrated  in\t the\n\t  judgment which  have been held by a long course of\n\t  decisions to be inadmissible.\n     (d)  Where genealogy  is proved  by oral  evidence, the\n\t  said evidence\t must clearly  show special means of\n\t  knowledge disclosing\tthe exact  source, time\t and\n\t  the circumstances  under which  the  knowledge  is\n\t  acquired,   and   this   must\t  be   clearly\t and\n\t  conclusively proved. [821 B-H]\n     The  majority  view  that;\t Ex.  J.  is  admissible  is\ncorrect.  Section  35  of  the\tEvidence  Act  requires\t the\nfollowing conditions  to be  fulfilled before a document can\nbe admissible under this section:\n     (1)  the document\tmust be in the nature of an entry in\n\t  any public  or other\tofficial book,\tregister  or\n\t  record,\n     (2)  it must state a fact in issue or a relevant fact,\n     (3)  the entry  must be made by a public servant in the\n\t  discharge of his official duties or in performance\n\t  of his  duties specially enjoyed by the law of the\n\t  country in  which the\t relevant entry is kept.[829\n\t  H, 830 A-B]\n810\n     A perusal\tof Ex.\tJ. clearly shows that it is a report\nmade by\t an officer  of the  Government in  discharge of his\nofficial  duties.   It\twas  written  by  a  serishtadar,  a\nGovernment officer,  on the direction of a high governmental\nauthority. Ex.\tJ. being  an entry  in a  Register made by a\npublic officer\tin the\tdischarge of  his  duties,  squarely\nfalls within  the four corners of s. 35 of the Evidence Act.\nIt is  clear that the officer was entrusted with the task of\nascertaining the  possession of\t various landlords  for\t the\npurpose of  taking suitable steps in the matter. It mentions\na number  of persons through whom the plaintiffs claim their\ntitle and,  therefore, it  relates to  a relevant  fact. The\nquestion as to whether the relevant fact is proved or not is\nquite a\t different matter  which has  nothing to do with the\nadmissibility of  the document\tbut which assumes importance\nonly when  the court  considers the  probative\tvalue  of  a\nparticular document.  In short, all the essential conditions\nof section 35 are fully complied with. [830 C-E]\n     Admissibility of  a  document  is\tone  thing  and\t its\nprobative value, quite another: a document may be admissible\nand yet\t may not  carry any  conviction and  weight  or\t its\nprobative value may be nil. [832 A]\n     In the  instant case  Ex. J.  has\tno  probative  value\nbecause it  does not  disclose the  source  from  which\t the\nSheristadar collected  his facts nor does it show whether he\nconsulted either contemporary or previous records or entries\ntherein to  satisfy himself  regarding\tthe  correctness  of\nvarious statements  pertaining to the genealogy of landlords\nwho were  in possession of the lands. Although he has stated\nthat he\t had taken  these facts from an account book, he had\nnot given  any description or the nature of the account book\nand its contents. The fact of the matter, therefore, is that\nthere  was   no\t proper\t verification  by  the\tSherishtadar\nregarding the  facts stated  in the  Report from any source.\nTherefore, it  is difficult  to place  any reliance  on\t the\ndocument even  though it may be admissible in evidence. [832\nC-G]\n\t  P.C. Purushothama  Reddiar v.\t S. Perumal<\/a> [1972] 2\n     SCR 646, applied.\n\t  Ghulam Rasul\tKhan v. Secretary of State for India\n     in Council 52 I.A. 201, distinguished.\n\t  Guar Shyam  Pratap Singh  v. Collector  of  Etawah\n     A.I.R. 1946  PC 103;  Meer Usd-oollah v. Mussumat Beeby\n     Imaman, widow  of Shah Khadim Hossain, 1 M.I.A. 19 held\n     inapplicable.\n     A\treport\t based\ton   hearsay  evidence\t or  on\t the\ninformation  given   by\t an   illiterate  person  cannot  be\nadmissible even\t under section\t35 of the Evidence Act. [837\nG]\n\t  Brij Mohan Singh v. Priya Brat Narain Singh<\/a> [1965]\n     3 SCR 861, followed.\n     In the  instant case  the Sherishtdar  had to depend on\nsome unknown  persons who were not mentioned in it to gather\nhis facts and so even if it is\n811\nadmissible its\tprobative value would be almost zero. Ex. J.\nwas admissible\tbecause its  author is\tno longer  alive. It\ncontains information  which is\tbased on  what he  may\thave\nheard from  third parties and therefore much value cannot be\nattached to such a report. [838 C, 839 B]\n     Brain v.  Preece Lord,  152 English Reports 1017; Mario\nMangini Sturla\t& Ors.\tv. Filippo  Tomasso Mattia  Freccia,\nAugustus Keppel\t Stevenson &  Ors., 1880 A.C. 623; Mercer v.\nDenne [1905] 2 Ch. 538, referred to.\n     Briefly stated  the law  relating to  the admissibility\nand probative value of the Ex. J is:\n     (i)   The exhibit\tis clearly admissible under s. 35 of\n\t  the Evidence\tAct, and  the finding  of  the\tHigh\n\t  Court on this point is correct;\n     (ii) The Sheristadar, started writing Ex. J in the year\n\t  1810 and completed it in 1813:\n     (iii) It  mentions names of some persons who, according\n\t  to the  plaintiffs, were  their ancestors,  but on\n\t  carefully analysing  the document  it is  not very\n\t  clear as  to how  Ramruch Singh was connected with\n\t  Bansidhar Singh or Debi Singh.\n     (iv) Its  probative value is insignificant and is of no\n\t  assistance in proving the plaint genealogy.\n     (v)     It\t was  a\t part  of  the\trecord\tof  Mirzapur\n\t  Collectorate and was summoned therefrom.\n     (vi) A  bare perusal  of the  exhibit  shows  that\t the\n\t  Sherishtadar was  directed to embark on an enquiry\n\t  regarding  the   persons  who\t  were\t in   actual\n\t  possession of\t lands at  the relevant\t time and it\n\t  was not  a part  of his  duty\t to  embark  on\t any\n\t  enquiry regarding the title of the persons holding\n\t  the lands,  nor did  he  attempt  to\tdo  so.\t The\n\t  heading af  Ex. J itself shows that it is a report\n\t  regarding the\t possession of\tTaluqa Majhwa.\t[841\n\t  A-F]\n     Even if  the exhibit  is taken  into consideration,  it\nwill prove  not the  title of the plaintiffs-respondents but\nonly the  possession of\t lands held by some of their alleged\nancestors. In  other words,  the documents  will not  be any\nevidence of  title in  the suit\t out of\t which\tthe  present\nappeals arise  which are  mainly concerned with the question\nof title and not with the question of possession. This apart\nthe scheme  followed and  the modus  operandi adopted by the\nplaintiffs are\tbased on  an incorrect translation and wrong\ninterpretation of  the meaning\tof actual  words in Persian.\n[841 G-H]\n     Judgments of  courts are  admissible in  evidence under\nthe provisions\tof sections 40, 41 & 42 of the Evidence Act.\nSection 43 provides that those\n812\njudgments which\t do not\t fall within  the  four\t corners  of\nsections 40  to 42  are inadmissible unless the existence of\nsuch judgment,\torder or decree is itself a fact in issue or\na relevant  fact under\tsome other  provisions\tof  Evidence\nAct. Some  Courts   have  used\t section  13  to  prove\t the\nadmissibility of  a judgment  as coming under the provisions\nof section  43. But  where there  is  a\t specific  provision\ncovering the  admissibility of a document it i, not open to.\nthe Court to call into aid other general provisions in order\nto make\t a particular document admissible In other words, if\na judgment is not admissible as not falling within the ambit\nof sections  40 to  42 it  must\t fulfil\t the  conditions  of\nsection 43; otherwise it cannot be relevant under section 13\nof the\tevidence Act.  The words  \"other provisions  of this\nAct\" cannot  cover section  13 because this section does not\ndeal with judgments at all. [860 H, 861 A, 861 C-D]\n     A judgment\t in rem,  like judgments  passed in probate,\ninsolvency,  matrimonial   or  guardianship  proceedings  is\nadmissible in  all cases  whether such\tjudgments are  inter\npartes or  not.\t In  the  instant  case,  however,  all\t the\ndocuments consisting of judgments filed are not judgments in\nl em, and there fore, the question of their admissibility on\nthat basis  does not  arise. The judgments filed as Exhibits\nin this\t case are judgments in personam, and therefore, they\ndo not\tfulfil the conditions mentioned in section 41 of the\nEvidence Act. [861 E-F]\n\t  John Cockrane v. Hrrosoondurri Debia & Ors, 6\n     M.I.A. 494;  Jogendro Deb\tRoy Kut v. Funindro Deb\n     Roy Kut  14 M.I.A.\t 367; Gujju Lall v. Fatteh Lall\n     ILR 6  Cal. 171;  Maharaja Sir  Kesho Prasad Singh\n     Bahadur v.\t Bahuria Mt.  Bhagjogna Kuer & Ors. AIR\n     1937 PC 69, referred to.\n\t  Gadadhar Chowdhury  and Ors. v. Sarat Chandra\n     Chakravarty and  Ors 44  CWN 935,\tSeethapati  Rao\n     Dora v.  Venkanna Dora  & Ors  ILR\t 45  Mad,  332;\n     approved.\n     It is also well settled that statements or declarations\nbefore persons\tof competent knowledge made ante litem motam\nare receivable\tto prove  ancient  rights  of  a  public  or\ngeneral nature. [865 H]\n     The admissibility\tof such\t declarations  is,  however,\nconsiderably weakened  if it  pertains not  to public rights\nbut to\tpurely private\trights. It  is equally\twell settled\nthat declarations  or statements made post litem motam would\nnot be\tadmissible because  in cases or proceedings taken or\ndeclarations made  ante litem motam, the element of bias and\nconcoction is eliminated. Before, however, the statements of\nthe nature  mentioned above  can be admissible as being ante\nlitem  motam  they  must  not  only  be\t before\t the  actual\nexistence of any controversy, but should be made even before\nthe commencement of legal proceedings. [866 C-E]\n     This position  however cannot  hold good  of statements\nmade post litem motam which would be clearly inadmissible in\nevidence. The  reason for this rule seems to be that after a\ndispute\t has  begun  or\t a  legal  proceeding  is  about  to\ncommence, the  possibility of bias, concoction or putting up\nfalse pleas cannot be ruled out. [866 G-H]\n813\n\t  Kalka Prasad\tand Ors.  v. Mathura Prasad ILR\n     30 All. 510, Hari Bakh v. Babu Lal & Anr. AIR 1924\n     PC 126; Dolgobinda Paricha v. Nimai Charan Misra &\n     Ors.<\/a> [1959] Supp. 2 SCR 814; and Ralidindi Venkata\n     Subbaraju &  Ors v.  Chintalpati Snbbaraju\t & Ors.\n     [1969] 2 SCR 292, referred to.\n     (i)   A judgment  in rem  e.g, judgments or orders\n\t  passed  in  admirally,  probate  proceedings,\n\t  etc, would  always be admissible irrespective\n\t  of whether they are inter partes or not;\n     (ii) judgment in personam not inter partes are not\n\t  at all  admissible in evidence except for the\n\t  three purposes mentioned above.\n     (iii) on  a parity\t of  aforesaid\treasoning,  the\n\t  recitals In a judgment like findings given in\n\t  appreciation of evidence made or arguments or\n\t  genealogies referred to in the judgment would\n\t  be wholly  in\t admissible  in\t a  case  where\n\t  neither the  plaintiffs  nor\tthe  defendants\n\t  were parties.\n     (iv)  The\tprobative  value  of  documents\t which,\n\t  however ancient  they may be, do not disclose\n\t  sources of  their  information  or  have  not\n\t  achieved sufficient  notoriety.  is  precious\n\t  little.\n     (v)    Statements,\t declarations  or  depositions,\n\t  etc., would  not be  admissible if  they  are\n\t  post litem motam. [869 A-F]\n     In the  instant case,  a detailed\texamination  of\t the\ndocuments shows\t that the  plaintiffs as  pointed out by the\ndiscenting judge  have not  proved that\t they are in any way\ndirectly connected  with Ramruch  Singh, Bansidhar  Singh or\nDebi Singh.  The majority  on the  other hand  seems to have\nbeen greatly influenced by the age of the documents or their\nnature rather than their contents, relevancy and weight. The\nmajority also  did not\tfocus attention\t on the\t most  vital\nquestion whether  or not  the plaintiffs  have\tproved\tthat\nGajraj Singh,  the ancertor of the plaintiff, was in any way\nconnected with\tRamruch\t Singh,\t Devi  Singh  and  Bansidhar\nSingh. [869 G-H, 870 A-B]\n     In considering the oral evidence regarding a pedigree a\npurely mathematical  approach cannot be made because where a\nlong line  of descent  has to  be proved  spreading  over  a\ncentury, it  is' obvious that the witnesses who are examined\nto depose  to the  genealogy would  have to  depend on their\nspecial means  of knowledge  which may\thave  come  to\tthem\nthrough their  ancestors but,  at the  same time,  there  is\ngreat risk  and a  serious danger involved in relying solely\non the\tevidence of  witness given  from pure memory because\nthe witness  who are  interested normally have a tendency to\ndraw more from their imagination or turn and twist the facts\nwhich they  may have  heard from their ancestors in order to\nhelp the parties for whom they are deposing. The court, must\ntherefore safeguard  that the  evidence of  such witness may\nnot be\taccepted as  it is based purely on imagination or an\nimaginary or  illusory source  of  information\trather\tthan\nspecial means  of knowledge  as required  by law.  The\toral\ntestimony or  the witness  on this  matter is  bound  to  be\nhearsay\n814\nand their  evidence is\tadmissible as  an exception  to\t the\ngeneral rule  where hearsay evidence is not admissible. [888\nE-H, 889 A]\n     In the  appreciation of evidence of such witnesses, the\nprinciples to be borne in mind are:\n     (1)   The relationship  or the  connection however\n\t  close it  may be,  which the witness bears to\n\t  the persons  whose pedigree  is sought  to be\n\t  deposed by him.\n     (2)  The nature and character of the special means\n\t  of knowledge\tthrough which  the witness  has\n\t  come to know about the pedigree.\n     (3)     The  interested   nature  of  the\twitness\n\t  concerned.\n     (4)   The precaution  which must  be taken to rule\n\t  out any  false statement  made by the witness\n\t  post litem  motam or one which is derived not\n\t  by means of special knowledge but purely from\n\t  his imagination, and\n     (5)     The  evidence   of\t the  witness  must  be\n\t  substantially corroborated as far as time and\n\t  memory admit. [889 [B-E]\n\t  Bahadur Singh & Ors. v. Mohan Singh & Ors. 29\n     I.A.  Pershad   Chowdhry  &  Ors.\tv.  Rani  Radha\n     Chowdharain &  Ors. 31  I.A. 160;\tAbdul Ghafur  &\n     Ors. v.  Hussain Bibi  & Ors.  58 I.A.  188;  Mewa\n     Singh &  Ors. v.  Basant Singh & Ors. AIR 1918 P.C\n     49; Bhojraj  v. Sita  Ram &  Ors. AIR  1936 PC 66,\n     referred to.\nEscheat:\n     When  a  claim  for  escheat  is  put  forward  by\t the\nGovernment, the\t onus lies heavily on the appellant to prove\nthe absence  of any  heir of  the respondent anywhere in the\nworld. Normally,  the court frowns on the estate being taken\nby escheat  unless the\tessential conditions for escheat are\nfully and  completely satisfied. Further, before the plea of\nescheat can  be entertained,  there must  be a public notice\ngiven by  the Government  so that  if there  is any claimant\nanywhere in the country, or for that matter in the world, he\nmay come  forward to  contest the  claim of  the State. [919\nE-F]\n     In the  instant case,  the States\tof Bihar  and  Uttar\nPradesh merely\tsatisfied themselves  by appearing to oppose\nthe claims  of the  plaintiffs\trespondents.  Even  if\tthey\nsucceeded in  showing  that  the  plaintiffs  were  not\t the\nnearest reversioners  of the  late  Maharaja,  it  does\t not\nfollow as  a logical  corollary\t that  the  failure  of\t the\nplaintiffs claim  would lead  to the  irresistible inference\nthat there  is no  other heir  who could  at any  time\tcome\nforward to claim the properties. [919 F-G]\n     Dictionaries can  always be  referred to  in  order  to\nascertain not  only the\t meaning of  a\tword  but  also\t the\ngeneral use of it. [842 F]\n815\n     Coca-Cola Company\tof Canada Ltd. v. Pepsi-Cola Company\nof Canada Ltd., AIR 1942 PC 40 referred to.\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
     CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION :  Civil Appeal Nos. 494-
\n496 of 1975.\n<\/p>\n
     From the  Judgment and  Decree dated the 15th December,
\n1982 of\t the Patna  High Court in First Appeal Nos. 85, 86 &
\n87 of 1966 respectively.\n<\/p>\n
     Dr. L.M. Singhvi, S.C. Mishra, U.P. Singh, S.N. Jha and
\nL.K Pandey for the Appellant.\n<\/p>\n
     V.M.  Tarkunde,   U.R.Lalit,  D.N.\t  Goburdhan  and  D.
\nGoburdhan for Respondents Nos. S 22.\n<\/p>\n
     Dr. Y.S.  Chitale and  Mrs. Sobha Dikshit for the State
\nof U.P.\n<\/p>\n
     S.K Verma for the Intervener.\n<\/p>\n
     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
\n     FAZAL ALI,\t J. These  appeals are\tdirected  against  a
\njudgment of  the Special  Bench of  the Patna  High Court by
\nwhich the  High\t Court\tdecreed\t title\tsuit  No.5\/61  after
\nreversing the  Judgment of  the trial court. It appears that
\nafter  the   death  of\t Maharaja  Harendra   Kishore  Singh
\n(hereinafter  referred\t to  as\t the  ‘Maharaja’)  who\tdied
\nissueless on the 26th of March 1893, a serious dispute arose
\nabout the  impartible  estate  left  by\t him.  The  Maharaja
\nclaimed to  be a  direct descendant  of Raja  Hirday  Narain
\nSingh who  was the admitted owner of the properties. Several
\npersons came forward with rival claims of being the heirs to
\nthe properties\tleft by\t the  Maharaja\twhich  consisted  of
\nimmovable and  moveable properties,  such as  lands, houses,
\njewellery, etc.\t As a  result of  the hot contest by each of
\nthe claimants, one suit was filed at Varanasi being T.S. No.
\n3\/55. That  suit was  filed by one Ram Bux Singh who claimed
\nto be  the nearest  reversioner of  the late  Maharaja. That
\nsuit, however, appears to have died its natural death during
\nthe preliminary stages and was ultimately withdrawn on April
\n9, 1956, leaving only three claimants in the field.\n<\/p>\n
     Another suit was filed on 16th August 1955 in the Court
\nof  Sub-Judge,\tPatna  which  was  registered  as  T.S.\t No.
\n44\/1955. The
\n816<\/span>
\nclaimant in this suit was one Suresh Nandan Singh of Sheohar
\nwho had\t put in\t his claim before the Board of Revenue which
\nhad taken over the management of the entrie properties after
\nthe death of the widows of the Maharaja.\n<\/p>\n
     The third\tsuit being  T.S. No.  25\/58 was filed by two
\nsets of\t plaintiffs who\t had  entered  into  some  agreement
\ninter-se. That\tsuit was  filed in  the Court  of Sub-Judge,
\nPatna on  April 11,  1958. In  that suit, the main claim was
\nput forward  by Raja Jugal Kishore Singh who claimed to have
\nsucceeded to the gaddi of the Bettiah Raj in the capacity of
\nputri ka  putra of  Raja Dhrub\tand on the extinction of the
\nline of\t Raja Delip Singh by reason of the death of Maharaja
\nHarendra Kishore Singh, the right devolved on the plaintiff,
\nAmbika Prasad Singh.\n<\/p>\n
     The fourth\t suit was  filed on  March 12,\t1959 in\t the
\ncourt of  Sub-Judge, Chhapra  which was later transferred to
\nthe court of Sub-Judge, Patna and renumbered as T.S. 5\/1961.
\nIn this\t suit also,  there were\t two sets  of plaintiffs-one
\nconsisting of  plaintiffs who  had entered into a champartus
\nagreement with\tthe other  set of  plaintiffs. In this suit,
\nthe principal  plaintiffs, Shri\t Radha Krishan Singh, one of
\nthe  sons   of\tBhagwati,  Prasad  Singh,  claimed  to\thave
\nsucceeded to  the estate of the late Maharaja as his nearest
\nreversioner
\n     We might  mention here  that the main contest before us
\nhas  been   between  the   plaintiff,  Radha  Krishan  Singh
\n(hereinafter referred  to as  the ‘plaintiff’) and the State
\nof Bihar, supported by the State of Uttar Pradesh. So far as
\nthe other  two suits were concerned they were dismissed both
\nby the\ttrial court and the High Court but the suit filed by
\nRadha Krishan  Singh (T.S.  5\/1961) was\t decreed by the High
\nCourt with  a majority\tof 2:1 Mr. Justice G.N. Prasad, with
\nwhom Mr. Justice A.N. Mukherji agreed, reversed the judgment
\nof the\tSubordinate Judge  and derceed\tthe  suit  of  Radha
\nKrishan Singh  and rejected the claim of the State of Bihar.
\nMr. Justice  M.M. Prasad, however, took a different view and
\nagreed with  the trial\tcourt holding  that the\t suit of the
\nplaintiff was  rightly\tdismissed.  He\taccordingly  have  a
\ndissenting judgment dismissing the usit plaintiff.\n<\/p>\n
     It is not necessary for us to embark on the history and
\nother circumstances  of the case because Justice G.N. Prasad
\nhas dexterously\t detailed the facts and circumstances of the
\nentire case  and has candidly narrated the historical events
\nleading to  the various\t crucial stages\t through  which\t the
\nlitigation regarding the disputed properties
\n817<\/span>
\nhad passed.  We, therefore, need not repeat what has already
\nbeen fully  discussed by  the High  Court. Suffice it to say
\nthat the eventful story of the present litigation opens with
\nthe death  of Maharaja\tHarendra Kishorc  Singh which took a
\nmore serious  turn when\t his two  widows, Maharani Sheoratan
\nKuer died  on March  24, 1896  and Maharani  Janki Kuer\t was
\ndeclared incompetent  to manage\t the estate,  as a result of
\nwhich the  management of the entire estate was taken over by
\nthe Court  of Wards.  As the  properties  in  question\twere
\nsituated in  both the  States of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh the
\nCourts of  Wards of  Bihar and Uttar Pradesh jonitly carried
\non the\tmanagement of  the properties.\tMaharani Janki\tKuer
\nresided at  Allahabad and  died childless  on  November\t 27,
\n1954.\n<\/p>\n
     After her\tunfortunate death or even before, interested
\npersons started\t casting their\tcovetous and avaricious eyes
\non the\thuge  properties  left\tby  the\t late  Maharaja\t and
\nlitigation started  by putting forward rival and conflicting
\nclaims thus  making strenuous  efforts to  “turn chance into
\ngood fortune”.\tThe last  and inevitable  step of  the drama
\nlong in\t process  reached  its\tclimax\twith  the  death  of
\nMaharani Janki Kuer when as many as four suits, as mentioned
\nabove, were  filed claiming  the properties of the Maharaja,
\nsome as reversioners and some as putri ka putra, etc.
\n     We would  like to make it clear that the three appeals,
\ni.e., civil  appeal Nos. 494 to 496 of 1975, have been filed
\nby the\tState of  Bihar arraying  the plaintiffs  and  other
\nclaimants as  the respondents  in each\tof the\tappeals. The
\npivotal dispute\t centres round\tappeal No.  494 between\t the
\nState of  Bihar, supported  by the State of Uttar Pradesh on
\none side  and the  plaintiff, Radha  Krishan Singh  and\t his
\nchamparters on the other.\n<\/p>\n
     We,  therefore,  intend  to  discuss  and\tanalyse\t the
\nevidence-oral and  documentary-only so far as the parties in
\nappeal No. 494 are concerned.\n<\/p>\n
     Before  dealing   with  the   oral,   documentary\t and
\ncircumstantial evidence it may be necessary to refer briefly
\nto the background of the case which has doubtless been fully
\ndiscussed by  the  courts  below.  Some\t of  the  historical
\naspects,  however,   have  to  be  reiterated  in  order  to
\nunderstand the view which we take in this case.\n<\/p>\n
     Coming to the history of the Bettiah Raj, we have to go
\nback to\t the 17th  century. The\t undisputed position is that
\nBettiah Raj
\n818<\/span>
\nwas an\timpartible estate having properties in the States of
\nBihar and Uttar Pradesh. The Raj was established by one Raja
\nUgra Sen  as far  back as the middle of 17th century and was
\ncommonly known\tas  the\t Riyasat  of  Sirkar  of  Champaran,
\nconsisting of  four parganas,  viz,. Majhwa,  Simrown, Babra
\nand Maihsi. Raja Ugra Sen was succeeded by Raja Dalip Singh,
\nRaja Gaj  Singh and  ultimately by  Raja Dhrub\tSingh in the
\nyear 1715.  Raja Dhrub\tSingh died  in the year 1762 without
\nleaving any  male issue,  but leaving a daughter named Benga
\nBabui who  had\tmarried\t one  Raghunath\t Singh,\t a  Bhumihar
\nBrahmin of  Gautam gotra.  On the death of Raja Dhrub Singh,
\nhis daughter’s\tson, Raja  Jugal Kishore  Singh entered into
\npossession  of\t the  estate  of  Bettiah  Raj\tand  was  in
\npossession thereof  at the  time when the East India Company
\nassumed the  Government of  the province.  The Company could
\nnot tolerate any resistance from the Rulers and a battle was
\nfought in  the course  of which Raja Jugal Kishore Singh was
\ndriven into  the neighbouring  State of\t Bundelkhand in 1766
\nand the\t entire estate\tof Bettiah Raj was seized and placed
\nunder the  management of the officers of the Company. During
\nthe absence  of Raja  Jugal Kishore  Singh, Sri Kishen Singh
\nand Abdhoot  Singh who\twere the  sons of  Prithi Singh\t and
\nSatrajit Singh\trespectively and  were younger\tbrothers  of
\nRaja Dalip  Singh, enjoyed the confidence of the Company and
\nwere placed  incharge of the Bettiah Raj. How ever, in 1771,
\nthe Company  reinstated Raja  Jugal Kishore  Singh obviously
\nbecause he probably tendered his apologies and made a solemn
\npromise to  be loyal  to the  Company, as  a result of which
\nnegotiations started  between the  Government and Raja Jugal
\nKishore\t Singh\t regarding  the\t  estate  in   question\t and
\nultimately he  was allotted  the  Zamindari  of\t Majwha\t and
\nSimrown which  formed part  of the  Bettiah Raj\t estate\t and
\nBabra and  Maihsi were\tleft in\t the possession of Srikishen
\nSingh and Abdhoot Singh. The East India Company had formally
\nannounced this\tarrangement by\ta decision  dated  July\t 24,
\n1771. Soon  thereafter, there  was some dispute between Raja
\nJugal Kishore Singh and the Company, as a result of which he
\nwas again  dispossessed by  the Company\t as he failed to pay
\nthe Government revenue. Thus, the entire Sirkar of Champaran
\npassed into the possession of the Government and was held by
\nsmall farmers  on temporary  settlements. Raja Jugal Kishore
\nSingh  received\t  an  allowance\t for  maintenance  and\tdied
\nsometime in  the year  1783, leaving a son named Bir Kishore
\nSingh who  was succeeded  by his  eldest son, Maharaja Anand
\nKishore Singh  in 1790. Upon his death, leaving no issue, he
\nwas succeeded by his younger brother, Maharaja Nawal Kishore
\nSingh who  was succeeded by his eldest son, Rajendra Kishore
\nSingh who was
\n819<\/span>
\nultimately succeeded  by Maharaja  Harendra  Kishore  Singh,
\nwhose estate is the subject matter of this suit.\n<\/p>\n
     On 22nd September, 1790, Lord Cornwallis recommended to
\nthe Board  of Revenue  that estate  of\tMajhwa\tand  Simrown
\nshould be restored ro Raja Jugal Kishore Singh but as he had
\ndied by\t this, time,  the Company directed that the heirs of
\nRaja Jugal  Kishore Singh, Srikishen Singh and Abdhoot Singh
\nbe restored  the possession  of their  respective Districts.
\nBir Kishore  Singh,  was  not  at  all\tsatisfied  with\t the
\ndecision of  the Board,\t mentioned above, because he claimed
\nthe entire  province (Sirkar  of Champaran) but in obedience
\nto the\torder of the Governor-General, he took possession of
\nthe parganas of Majhwa and Simrown.\n<\/p>\n
     Thereafter, a  long-term litigation started between Bir
\nKishore Singh  and the\theirs of Raja Jugal Kishore Singh in
\nrespect of  Majhwa and\tSimrown and  ultimately\t suits\twere
\nfiled which  were followed  by Memorial\t to  the  Lieutenant
\nGovernor. It  appears that whereas in the earlier suit, Raja
\nDeoki Nandan Singh’s predecessor had pleaded that Raja Jugal
\nKishore Singh  was the\tson of\tRaja Dhrub  Singh’s duaghter
\nand, therefore,\t not a\tmember of  the family  of Raja Dhrub
\nSingh, Bir Kishore Singh had pleaded that Raja Jugal Kishore
\nSingh having  been adopted  by Raja Dhrub Singh had become a
\nmember of  his family.\tIt was\tpleaded in the Memorial that
\nRaja Jugal  Kishore Singh, who belonged to the Gautam gotra,
\nhad been,  adopted by  Raja Dhrub  Singh who belonged to the
\nKashyap gotra, and had been appointed as his successor.\n<\/p>\n
     To cut  the matter short, it may be stated that a spate
\nof litigation  followed putting\t forward rival claims to the
\nestate left  by Raja  Dhrub Singh. It may, however, be noted
\nthat in none of the suits instituted in 1895, 1896 and 1905,
\nthe question  as to  whether Raja  Jugal Kishore  Singh\t had
\nbecome a member of the family of Raja Dhrub Singh, by virtue
\nof his\tadoption as  putri ka  putra, was  decided despite a
\nplea having  been raised  in all  those\t suits.\t As  already
\nmentioned, out\tof the\tfour suits  that were  filed, one of
\nthem was  withdrawn. In\t the present  appeals, we  are\tonly
\nconcerned with\ttwo rival  claims put forward to the Bettiah
\nRaj on\tthe death of Maharaja Harendra Kishore Singh and his
\ntwo widows.  In suit  No. 25\/1958, the claimants were Ambika
\nPrasad Singh  and others  claiming the\testate on  the basis
\nthat as\t Raja Jugal  Kishore Singh succeeded to the gaddi of
\nSirkar as the adopted son and successor to Raja
\n820<\/span>
\nDhrub Singh  and not  as his  daughter’s son,  Ambika Prasad
\nbeing nearest among the reversioners was entitled to succeed
\nto the\testate after  the death\t of the\t widows. The suit of
\nAmbika Prasad Singh was dismissed by the trial court as also
\nby the special Bench of the High Court and some appeals were
\nbrought to  this Court\tby certificate.\t The  said  appeals,
\nbeing civil  appeal Nos.  114-119 of  1976, in\tShyam Sunder
\nPrasad Singh  & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors.(1) came up for
\nhearing before\ta Bench consisting of P.N. Bhagwati, A.P.Sen
\nand E.S. Venkataramiah, JJ. This Court dismissed the appeals
\nand rejected  the claim\t of Ambika Prasad Singh holding that
\nas Raja Jugal & Kishore Singh could not in law be considered
\nas putri ka putra his claim to the estate left by Raja Dhrub
\nas being the nearest reversioner, cannot succeed.\n<\/p>\n
     The claim of Radha Krishan Singh and others in suit No.
\n5 of  1961 was left to be decided by another Bench and it is
\nthese appeals  that have  now  been  placed  before  us\t for
\nhearing.\n<\/p>\n
     However, it  is not  necessary for\t us to make a deeper
\nprobe into  the early  history of Bettiah Raj because in the
\ninstant case  the relevant  genealogy  for  the\t purpose  of
\nascertaining the  ancestors of\tthe parties starts from Raja
\nHirday Narain  Singh  and  his\tdescendants  who  have\tbeen
\nreferred to  in Ex.  J, a  report of  the serishtedar, which
\nappears to be the sheet-anchor of the plaintiffs’ case.\n<\/p>\n
     Ex. Q-2,  a genealogy  filed by  the plaintiffs clearly
\nshows that  Thakur Hirday  Narain Singh, who was the Raja of
\nBettiah after  the death of his father, Thakur Hansraj Singh
\nhad five  sons. One  of his sons was Bansidhar Singh who was
\nalleged to  be the  ancestor of\t the  plaintiffs.  Bansidhar
\nSingh had only one son named Debi Singh.\n<\/p>\n
     After a  brief narration of the facts, mentioned above,
\nbefore going  to the  oral, documentary\t and  circumstantial
\nevidence, it  may be necessary to state the well established
\nprinciples in  the light  of which  we have  to\t decide\t the
\nconflicting claims  of the  parties.  It  appears  that\t the
\nplaint genealogy  is the  very fabric  and foundation of the
\nedifice on  which is built the plaintiff’s case. This is the
\nstarting point\tof the\tcase of the plaintiff which has been
\nhotly contested by the appellant.\n<\/p>\n
     In such cases, as there is a tendency on the part of an
\ninterested person  or a party in order to grab, establish or
\nprove an  alleged claim,  to concoct,  fabricate or  procure
\nfalse genealogy to suit their ends,
\n821<\/span>
\nthe courts  in relying\ton the\tgenealogy put  forward\tmust
\nguard themselves  against falling  into the  trap laid\tby a
\nseries\tof   documents\tor  a  labyrinth  of  seemingly\t old
\ngenealogies to support their rival claims.\n<\/p>\n
     The principles  governing such  cases may be summarized
\nthus:\n<\/p>\n
     (1)   Genealogies admitted\t or proved  to\tbe  old\t and
\nrelied on  in previous\tcases are  doubtless relevant and in
\nsome cases  may even  be conclusive  of the facts proved but
\nthere are  several considerations which must be kept in mind
\nby  the\t  courts  before   accepting  or   relying  on\t the
\ngenealogies:\n<\/p>\n
     (a)      Source   of   the\t  genealogy   and   its\n\t  dependability.\n<\/pre>\n
     (b)   Admissibility of  the  genealogy  under  the
\n\t  Evidence Act\n<\/p>\n
     (c)   A proper  use of  the  said\tgenealogies  in
\n\t  decisions or\tjudgments on  which reliance is
\n\t  placed.\n<\/p>\n
     (d)  Age of genealogies.\n<\/p>\n
     (e)   Litigations where such genealogies have been
\n\t  accepted or rejected.\n<\/p>\n
     (2)     On\t the   question\t of  admissibility  the
\n\t  following tests must be adopted:\n<\/p>\n
     (a)   The genealogies  of the  families  concerned
\n\t  must fall  within the\t four-corners of  s. 32
\n\t  (5) or s. 13 of the Evidence Act.\n<\/p>\n
      (b)  They must not be hit by the doctrine of post
\n\t  litem motam.\n<\/p>\n
     (c)  The genealogies or the claim cannot be proved
\n\t  by recitals, depositions or facts narrated in
\n\t  the judgment\twhich have  been held by a long
\n\t  course of decisions to be inadmissible.\n<\/p>\n
     (d)   Where genealogy  is proved by oral evidence,
\n\t  the said  evidence must  clearly show special
\n\t  means\t of   knowledge\t disclosing  the  exact
\n\t  source,  time\t and  the  circumstances  under
\n\t  which the  knowledge is  acquired,  and  this
\n\t  must be clearly and conclusively proved,
\n822<\/span>
\n     We shall  now proceed  to scan and analyse the evidence
\nin the light of the principles adumbrated above referring to
\nthe important  authorities on  the questions  arising out of
\nthe  evidence,\toral  and  documentary,\t Although  both\t the
\nparties have cited a very large number of decisions we would
\nnot like  to load  or  crowd  this  judgment  with  all\t the
\nauthorities cited before us and would confine ourselves only
\nto the\timportant and relevant authorities of this Court and
\nthose of  the Privy  Council  and  we  shall  refer  to\t the
\njudgments of  the High Court only if there is no decision of
\nthe Privy Council or of this Court directly in point.\n<\/p>\n
     To recapitulate, the plaintiffs-respondents based their
\ntitle as  being the nearest reversioners of the Maharaja and
\nclaimed to  be entitled\t to immediate  possession after\t the
\ndeath  of  the\twidows\tof  the\t Maharaja.  The\t plaintiffs’
\ntherefore, claimed  to be  the direct  descendants of Gajraj
\nSingh and  Ramruch Singh  which was  the branch of Bansidhar
\nSingh’s\t son   which  remained\tin  Baraini  and  after\t the
\nextinction of  the line of the Maharaja, the properties were
\nto revert to the descendants of Gajraj Singh. The attempt of
\nthe plaintiffs\thas been to show to the Court that they were
\ndirect descendants  of Gajraj  Singh  who  was\tthe  son  of
\nRamruch, Ramruch being the son of Bansidhar Singh.\n<\/p>\n
     Thus, for the purpose of this case, Bansidhar Singh may
\nbe taken  to be admittedly the ancestor of Maharaja Harendra
\nKishore Singh.\tThe only  point of  dispute and\t the pivotal
\ncontroversy centres  round the question as to whether or not
\nthe plaintiffs\thave proved  their case\t that they were also
\nthe direct descendants of Bansidhar Singh so as to claim the
\nproperties in  dispute on  the death of the Mahraja. Both on
\nthe question  of genealogy and other matters, a mass of oral
\nand documentary\t evidence consisting  of documents, reports,
\njudgments, plaints,  entries in\t registers, etc.,  have been
\nproduced and will be considered at the relevant stage.\n<\/p>\n
     The defence of the appellant is of a negative character
\ninasmuch as the defendants-appellants have denied the claims
\nmade by\t the plaintiffs-respondents  and but  them to strict
\nproof of their case. The defendants, however, have been fair
\nenough to  concede that Bhagwati Prasad Singh, father of the
\nplaintiff has  been proved  to be  a  direct  descendant  of
\nGajraj Singh  but have\tflatly denied  that  Ramruch  Singh,
\nfather of  Gajraj Singh\t had any connection either with Debi
\nSingh or  Bansidhar Singh.  In other  words, the plaintiffs’
\ngenealogy,
\n823<\/span>
\nso far\tas they\t are concerned,\t has been  accepted  by\t the
\nappellants, upto  the stage  of Ramruch\t Singh.\t The  courts
\nbelow also  on a  consideration of  the oral and documentary
\nevidence have  endorsed the  stand taken  by the  defendants
\nthat Bhagwati  Prasad Singh has been proved to be the direct
\ndescendant of Gajraj Singh being 7th in that line.\n<\/p>\n
     It is well settled that when a case of a party is based
\non a  genealogy consisting  of links, it is incumbent on the
\nparty to  prove every  link thereof  and even if one link is
\nfound to  be missing  then in  the eye\tof law the genealogy
\ncannot be  said to  have been  fully proved.  In the instant
\ncase,  although\t  the  plaintiffs  have\t produced  oral\t and
\ndocumentary evidence  to show  that Ramruch  Singh and\tDebi
\nSingh were  brothers being  the sons of Bansidhar Singh this
\nposition was not accepted by the trial court as also by M.M.
\nPrasad,\t J.   who  dissented   from  the  other\t two  Judges
\nconstituting the Special Bench who had taken a contrary view
\nand had held that the plaintiffs had fully proved the entire
\ngenealogy set-up  in the  plaint. This, therefore, makes our
\ntask easier  because we\t need  not  discuss  in\t detail\t the
\nevidence  and  documents  to  show  the\t connection  of\t the
\nplaintiffs upto the stage of Gajraj Singh though we may have
\nto refer  to the  evidence for\tthe purpose  of deciding the
\nmain issue, viz., whether or not Gajraj Singh was the son of
\nRamruch Singh  and Ramruch Singh a brother of Debi Singh and
\nson of Bansidhar Singh.\n<\/p>\n
     Before going  into\t the  evidence,\t we  would  like  to
\nextract the  findings of the courts below on the question of
\ntitle. The  trial court had clearly held that the plaintiffs
\nhad not been able to prove any linkage or connection between
\nRamruch and  Bansidhar but  the majority judgment consisting
\nof G.N. Prasad and Mukherji, JJ. disagreed with this finding
\nand held  that all  the links  were clearly  proved  by\t the
\nplaintiffs and it has been proved to their satisfaction that
\nRamruch Singh  was the son of Bansidhar Singh. On this point
\nthe finding of the majority may be extracted thus
\n\t  “I have  considered the  oral and documentary
\n     evidence adduced  by the  parties on  the point of
\n     genealogy and  in my  opinion, it\thas  been  well
\n     established by  the evidence  adduced in this case
\n     on behalf of the plaintiffs of Title Suit No. 5 of
\n     1961 that Bansidhar Singh was a common ancestor of
\n     Maharaja Harendra Kishore Singh and Bhagwati
\n824<\/span>
\n     Prasad Singh (father of plaintiffs 1 to 8 of Title
\n     Suit No.  5 of  1961).” (Vol.  VII), p.  247, para\n<\/p>\n
     109)
\n     M.M. Prasad,  J. however,\tdissented from\tthe  majorty
\njudgment and  agreed with the view taken by the trial court.
\nIn this connection, his finding may be quoted thus:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “A  discussion   of  the  entire  documentary
\n     evidence on the point of genealogy thus shows that
\n     there is  no document  which can  be safely relied
\n     upon for  the purpose  of proving the two links in
\n     the genealogy  of the  present  appellants.  viz.,
\n     that (1)  Bansidhar was  the father of Ramruch and
\n     (2) Ramruch the father of Gajraj.<\/p>\n
\n\t\t\t\t\t(P-491 para 457)\n     ...\t\t   ...\t\t\t     ...\n<\/pre>\n
\t  In conclusion,  therefore, I\tfind that there
\n     is not  a single document which can be relied upon
\n     to prove  the two\tdisputed  links,  namely,  that
\n     Gajraj was\t the son of Ramruch and Ramruch the son
\n     of Bansidhar.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n\t\t\t\t\t(P. 506 para 480)\n     ...\t\t      ...\t\t      ...\n<\/pre>\n
\t  Turning to  the oral\tevidence which\tI  have
\n     discussed above  I find that there is not a single
\n     witness who  can be relied upon for the purpose of
\n     proving the aforesaid two links. (P. 506 para 480)
\n     …\t\t      …\t\t       …<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  Therefore, I\tfind  that  the\t two  links  in
\n     respect of\t which there is no reliable documentary
\n     evidence have  also not  been proved  by the  oral
\n     evidence  on   the\t point\t those\ttwo  links  are
\n     Bansidhar being  the father of Debi and Aini being
\n     the father\t of Raghunath.\tThe consequence thereof
\n     is that the plaintiffs of Title Suit 5 have failed
\n     to\t prove\tthat  Bansidhar\t was  the  ancestor  of
\n     Maharaja Harendra\tKishore. I  have  already  held
\n     that they have also failed to prove that Bansidhar
\n     was their\tancestor, having  failed to  prove that
\n     Bansidhar was  the father\tof Ramruch  and Ramruch
\n     the father of Gajraj. In the result, I hold that
\n825<\/span>
\n     the plaintiffs  of Title  Suit 5  have  failed  to
\n     prove the\tgenealogy set  up by them and thus they
\n     have failed  to prove  that they  are the\tnearest
\n     heirs of  Maharaja Harendra  Kishore”. (Vol. VIII,
\n     p. 533, para 533)
\n     There  is,\t however,  one\tcommon\tfactor\tbetween\t the
\nmajority and  the dissenting  judgments and  it is  that the
\nplaintiffs  have   proved  beyond   reasonable\tdoubt  their
\nconnection with\t Gajraj Singh.\tThis, therefore, has reduced
\nthe controversy\t to the\t bare minimum  and has shortened the
\narena of  the dispute  that we\tare called upon to consider.
\nEven so,  this short controversy itself is a stupendous task
\nto determine  and we  will have to approach this aspect with
\ngreat care  and\t caution,  deliberation\t and  circumspection
\nbecause two learned Judges of Patna High Court had negatived
\nthe plea of the defence and accepted that of the plaintiffs.\n<\/p>\n
     In order  to understand  the various shades and aspects
\nof the\tcase  and  its\thistorical  background,\t it  may  be
\nnecessary to  extract the  plaint genealogy even at the risk
\nof repetition.\tIn fact,  the plaintiffs  themselves did not
\nappend any genealogy to their plaint but G.N. Prased, J. has
\nconstructed a  genealogy,  based  on  the  recitals  in\t the
\nplaint, for  the purpose  of convenience which is reproduced
\nhere (reproduced on pages 826-27).\n<\/p>\n
     The  position  that  emerges  from\t a  perusal  of\t the
\npleadings of  the parties is that so far as the left side is
\nconcerned, the\tplaintiffs have\t not  proved  their  linkage
\neither with  Debi Singh or Bansidhar Singh or Ramruch Singh.
\nThe late  Maharaja (Harendra  Kishore Singh)  was  a  direct
\ndescendant of Debi Singh who appears on the Left Side of the
\ngenealogy whereas  the original\t plaintiffs Bhagwati  Prasad
\nSingh was  the direct  descendant of Ramruch Singh appearing
\non the Right Side of the genealogy while all other links are
\nadmitted the  dispute  centres\tround  Ramruch\tSingh  being
\nrelated to  Bansidhar Singh in any way either as a father of
\nGajraj Singh  or as  a brother of Debi Singh. Apart from the
\nmajority judgment, even M.M. Prasad, J., as indicated above,
\nhas found  that the  plaintiffs have  proved that  they were
\ndirect descendants of Ramruch Singh. In this connection, the
\nfinding of M.M. Prasad, J. may be quoted thus:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “So far  as the genealogy of these plaintiffs
\n     is concerned,  their claim to the effect that they
\n     are descended  from Gajraj is not disputed in this
\n     case. Learned counsel
\n826<\/span>
\nLEFT SIDE
\n|
\nBansidhar Singh
\n|
\nDebi Singh
\n|
\nAini Singh
\n   _____________________________________________________
\n   |\t\t\t      |\t\t\t  |
\nRaghunath Singh =\t  Pahalwan Singh =   Basant Singh
\nBenga Babui (daughter\t   Basant Kuer\t     (Childless)
\nof Raja Dhruva Singh,
\n     17\/15\/1762\t\t   Tilak Singh =
\n\t  |\t\t   Soman Kuer
\nRaja Jugal Kishore Singh\t |
\n(D. 1784)\t\t      _______________________
\n     |\t\t\t      |\t\t\t    |
\nRaja Bir Kishore Singh\t   Balbhadra Singh   Sangam Kuer
\n     (1790-1816)\t     = Jaimed Kuer   (Daughter)
\n\t  |\t\t     (D. 1887)\t    (died childless)\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     ———————\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     |\t\t\t |\nAnand Kishore\t    Naval Kishore\n(D. 1838)\t    (D. 1855)\n\t\t\t |\n\t  ---------------------------\n\t  |\t\t\t     |\n     Rajendra Kishore\t      Mahendra Kishore\n     (D. 26th March 1883)     (childless)\n\t  |\n     Harendra Kishore\n     (D. 26th March 1893)\n     =widow -\n     1.\t  Maharani Sheortan Kuer\n\t  (D. 24th March 1896)\n     2.\t  Maharani Janaki Kuer\n\t  (D. 27th November 1954)\n827<\/span>\nRIGHT SIDE\n|\nBansidhar Singh\n|\nRam Ruch alias Ram Rup\n|\n<\/pre>\n
  —————————————————\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
  |\t\t    |\t\t   |\t\t  |\nFarman\t       Har Kuer\t      Bhup Narain    Avadhut Singh\n   |\t\t   |\t      (childless)\nDeo Narain     -----------------------------------\n   |\t       |\t      |\t\t\t|\n   |\t  Sheo Balak\t Prithvi\t     Mohan Singh\n   |\t       |\t (childless)\t\t  |\n   |\t  Chotku\t\t\t     Pratap Narain\n   |\t  (childless)\t\t\t\t  |\n--------------------\t\t\t     Sheogulam\n  |\t\t   |\t\t\t\t  |\nBhoala Singh   Deep Narain\t\t     Jagdamba Prasad\n  |\t\t   |\t\t\t\t  |\nNand Kumar\t\t\t\t     Jagat Bahadur\n(childless)\t   |\t\t\t     = Amol Kuer\n\t\t   |\t\t\t\t  |\n--------------------------------------\t     Nand Prasad\n     |\t\t |\t   |\t     |\t     (Adopted)\nBansgopal  Hari Kishore\t  Ram\t  Sankata\t  |\n     |\t  (childless)\t Kumar\t  Prasad       Ram Chandra\n     |\t\t      (childless) (childless)\t(Living)\n-----------------------\n     |\t\t      |\nBhagwati Prasad\t    Ilaka\nSingh (D. 29th\t    (childless)\nJune, 1957)\n     |\n<\/pre>\n
———————————————————-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
  |\t  |\t  |\t |\t   |\t |\t|\t|\nRadha\t Sri\t Ram\t Sheo\t Ashta\tMaina  Ram    Bhagi-\nKrishna\t Krishna Krishna Krishna Bhuja\t       Kesari rathi\n(plain-\t\t = Shail\ntiff)\t\t Kumari\n  |\t\t    |\n---------------\t    ------------------\n |\t      |\t    |\t\t     |\nVidya\t  Malti\t    Parvati\t   Meera Devi\nSagar\t  Devi\t    (Daughter)\t   (Daughter)\n(Son)\t  (Daughter)\n828<\/span>\n<\/pre>\n
     appearing for  the plaintiffs  of Title Suit 25 as
\n     also the State of Bihar have clearly stated before
\n     us that  they do not dispute their genealogy up to
\n     that point. The finding of the learned Subordinate
\n     Judge is  also to the effect that they have proved
\n     their genealogy  up to  that point. The point does
\n     not, therefore. need a detailed consideration.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     …\t\t    …\t\t\t  …<\/p>\n
\t  378. The other documents, however, prove that
\n     Bhagwati, the  father of  these appellants,  was a
\n     descendant of Gajraj-” (Vol. VIII, pp. 442 & 444)
\n     Thus, the dispute which we have to resolve in this case
\nis whether  the plaintiffs  have been able to prove any link
\nbetween Ramruch and Gajraj Singh on the one hand and Ramruch
\nand Bansidhar  on the other. The plaintiffs can succeed only
\nif they\t prove both these links by showing that Gajraj Singh
\nwas son\t of Ramruch  Singh and\tRamruch was son of Bansidhar
\nSingh.\n<\/p>\n
     We\t would\t first\texamine\t the  principal\t documentary
\nevidence relied\t upon by the plaintiffs to prove their case.
\nThe genuineness\t of some  documents has not been disputed by
\nthe appellants, but according to them these documents do not
\nassist the case of the plaintiffs. There are other documents
\nwhose genuineness  and admissibility  have  been  questioned
\nbefore us by Dr. L.M. Singhvi, appearing for the appellants.\n<\/p>\n
     To start  with, the  main fabric and the cornerstone of
\nthe documents  produced by  the plaintiffs appears to be Ex.
\nJ.,  an\t  ancient  document   of  the\tyear  181   O  whose
\nadmissibility was  seriously disputed  by the appellants but
\nall the\t courts have  found this  document to be admissible.
\nApart from  the majority  judgment, even M.M. Prasad, J. has
\nclearly held  that Ex.\tJ. being an entry in a Register made
\nby a  public officer in the discharge of his duties squarely
\nfalls within  the four\tcorners of s. 35 of the Evidence Act
\nand is, therefore, doubtless admissible. In this connection,
\nthe learned Judge observed thus:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “There can  thus be  no doubt\t that it  is  a
\n     report of a public officer in the due discharge of
\n     his public and office duties. There can thus be no
\n     doubt that\t it is\tadmissible under  section 35 of
\n     the Evidence Act.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
829<\/span><\/p>\n
     Certain inferences\t drawn by  M.M. Prasad,\t J.  do\t not
\nappear to us to be correct because they are not borne out by
\nthe recitals  in Ex.  J. and  are really  based on  a  wrong
\ninterpretation\tof   certain  expressions  used\t in  Persian
\nlanguage. These\t observations appear  at  page\t483  of\t his
\njudgment (Vol.\tVIII) where  the learned Judge says that the
\ndocument shows\tthat Gajraj Singh was one of the descendants
\nof Hirday  Narain Singh and that Debi Singh and Gajraj Singh
\nbelonged to  the, same\tfamily. This anomaly appears to have
\ncrept in  because the  said document  (Ex. J)  is in Persian
\nlanguage and  on  a  very  close  reading  of  the  recitals
\npertaining to  these two  facts, the inferences drawn by the
\nlearned\t Judge\tdo  not\t appear\t to  be\t correct.  We  shall
\nelaborate this point further when we deal with the merits of
\nthe document.  We agree\t with the unanimous view of the High
\nCourt that  Ex. J  is admissible.  In fact, the said Exhibit
\nitself would  show that\t it was\t written by a serishtadar, a
\nGovernment  officer,   on  the\tdirection  of  a  very\thigh
\ngovernmental authority\twho had asked him to make a detailed
\nenquiry regarding  the possession  of various  Zamindars and
\nsubmit a  Report to the Government about possession. We are,
\ntherefore, of  the opinion  that all the conditions of s. 35
\nof the\tEvidence Act  are fully complied with and fulfilled,
\nand it\tis difficult  to  accept  the  conclusion  that\t the
\ndocument is  not admissible  either under s. 35 or under any
\nother provision\t of the\t Evidence Act.\tIt  is\ta  different
\nmatter that  even though  a document  may be  admissible  in
\nevidence its  probative value may be almost zero and this is
\nthe main  aspect of  the case  which we propose to highlight
\nwhen we deal with the legal value of this document.\n<\/p>\n
     Before, however,  making any  comment on  the probative
\nvalue of  the document\tin question  it will be necessary to
\nperuse and  analyse its\t important contents  and their legal
\neffect on  the case  put forward  by the  parties. We  might
\nmention here that the appellants before us have not accepted
\nthe stand  taken by  the High  Court that  this document  is
\nadmissible in  evidence but  have argued at some length that
\nit  is\ttotally\t inadmissible.\tDr.  Singhvi  was  not\tvery
\nvehement in  persuading us  to hold  that  the\tdocument  is
\ninadmissible but  Mr. Misra,  appearing for  one set  of the
\nappellants,  forcefully\t  contended  that  the\tdocument  is
\ninadmissible. In  view of the arguments addressed before us,
\nit  may\t  be  necessary\t  to  consider\t the   question\t  of
\nadmissibility also.\n<\/p>\n
     In our  opinion, Ex.  J. squarely falls within the four
\ncorners of  s. 35  of the  Evidence Act\t which requires\t the
\nfollowing conditions  to be  fulfilled before a document can
\nbe admissible under this section.\n<\/p>\n
830<\/span><\/p>\n
     (1)   the document\t must be  in the  nature of  an
\n\t  entry in  any public\tor other official book,
\n\t  register or record,
\n     (2)   it must  state a fact in issue or a relevant
\n\t  fact,
\n     (3)  the entry must be made by a public servant in
\n\t  the discharge\t of his\t official duties  or in
\n\t  performance of his duties especially enjoined
\n\t  by the  law  of  the\tcountry\t in  which  the
\n\t  relevant entry is kept.\n<\/p>\n
     A perusal\tof Ex.\tJ clearly  shows that it is a Report
\nmade by an officer of the Government in the due discharge of
\nhis official  duties because  the recitals  of the  document
\nshow that he was entrusted with the task of and enjoined the
\nduty of ascertaining the possession of various landlords for
\nthe purpose  of taking\tsuitable steps\tin the matter. It is
\nbeyond dispute\tin this\t case that  the\t said  Exhibit\tdoes
\nmention a  number of  persons through  whom  the  plaintiffs
\nclaim their  title and\ttherefore, it  relates to a relevant
\nfact. The question as to whether the relevant fact is proved
\nor not\tis quite  a different matter which has nothing to do
\nwith the  admissibility of  the document  but which  assumes
\nimportance only\t when we consider the probative value – of a
\nparticular document. The fact that the Report was called for
\nfrom the Mirzapur Collectorate has been amply proved both by
\noral and  documentary  evidence.  Thus,\t all  the  aforesaid
\nconditions of s. 35 are fully complied with in this case.\n<\/p>\n
     Mr. Misra, however, raised two formidable objections to
\nthe admissibility  of this  document. In the first place, he
\nsubmitted that\tthere is  no reliable  evidence to show that
\nDurga Prasad,  the author of Ex. J. was a Government officer
\nat all\tbecause the  possibility  of  his  being  a  private
\nrevenue agent  of a  Zamindar, who  also maintains  kutcheri
\n(private office)  where papers\trelating to  realisation  or
\nrent  and  revenue  are\t kept,\tcannot\tbe  ruled  out.\t The
\ndesignation of Durga Prasad therefore, does not conclusively
\nprove that  he was  a Government  officer. Secondly,  it was
\ncontended that\teven if\t Ex. J\tcontains a  seal,  there  is
\nnothing to  show that  it was  not a  private seal.  In\t our
\nopinion, the contentions raised by Mr. Misra are without any
\nsubstance and  cannot be accepted. Reading the document (Ex.
\nJ) as a whole and taking into consideration the occasion for
\nthe entrustment\t of the\t task to  Durga Prasad, its recitals
\nand the\t fact that  it\twas  kept  in  a  purely  Government
\ndepartment, viz.,  the Mirzapur\t Collectroate from  where it
\nwas  produced\tbefore\tthe   trial   court,   clearly\t and
\nconclusively prove  that the  report was made by an official
\nserishtadar
\n831<\/span>
\nappointed by  a very  high governmental\t authority. Even the
\nopening lines  of the  Exhibit clearly\tindicate that  Durga
\nPrasad was  a Government  servant, perhaps  in\tthe  Revenue
\nDepartment, and\t was asked  to submit  a report for official
\npurposes. It  is also  established that\t Durga Prasad made a
\nroving enquiry\tand ultimately\tsubmitted his  Report in the
\nyear 1813.  Of course,\tit is true that there is no evidence
\nto show\t as to\twhat happened  to this\tReport, but  that is
\nbeside\tthe   point  so\t  far  as   the\t relevancy   or\t the
\nadmissibility of  this document\t is concerned.\tIn fact,  we
\nshall show  that although Exhibit J is admissible yet it has
\nno  probative\tvalue  at   all\t for  the  reasons  and\t the
\ncircumstance that  we shall  discuss hereafter. Furthermore,
\nall the three Judges of the High Court have unanimously held
\nthat Ex.  J. is admissible in evidence whatever be its legal
\nvalue.\n<\/p>\n
     In P.C.  Purushothama Reddiar  v. S.  Perumal,<\/a> (1) this
\nCourt while  considering the effect of s. 35 of the Evidence
\nAct observed as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
\t  “It was  lastly contended  that the  evidence
\n     afforded by  the police  reports is  not relevant.
\n     This again\t is untenable  contention.  Reports  in
\n     question were  made by government officials in the
\n     discharge of their official duties. Those officers
\n     had been  deputed by  their superiors to cover the
\n     meetings in  question-.. …  The first part of s.
\n     35 of  the Evidence  Act says that an entry in any
\n     public record  stating a fact in issue or relevant
\n     fact and made by a public servant in the discharge
\n     of his  official duty  is relevant evidence. Quite
\n     clearly the  reports  in  question\t were  made  by
\n     public servants  in discharge  of\ttheir  official
\n     duty.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     In view  of the  clear decision of this Court, referred
\nto above, it is not necessary for us to multiply authorities
\non this point.\n<\/p>\n
     The admissibility\tor Ex.\tJ or its genuineness is only
\none side  of the  picture and,\tin our\topinion, it does not
\nthrow much light on the controversial issues involved in the
\nappeal; We  may not  be understood, while holding that Ex. J
\nis admissible,\tto mean that all its recitals are correct or
\nthat it\t has very  great probative  value merely  because It
\nhappens to be an ancient document. Admissibility of a
\n832<\/span>
\ndocument is one thing and its probative value quite another-
\nthese two  aspects cannot  be combined.\t A document  may  be
\nadmissible and\tyet may\t not carry any conviction and weight
\nor its\tprobative value\t may be\t nil. Before  going  to\t the
\ncontents of  Ex. J  which have\tbeen fully  discussed by the
\nHigh Court,  we would first like to comment on the probative
\nvalue of this document.\n<\/p>\n
     In adjudicating  on this important aspect of the matter
\nit may be necessary to mention a few facts and circumstances
\nwhich go  to show  that Ex. J has no probative value at all.
\nTo begin with, a perusal of the Report (Ex. J) shows that it
\ndoes not  at all disclose the source from which Durga Prasad
\ncollected his  facts or\t gathered  the\tmaterials  disclosed
\ntherein. There\tis also\t nothing to  show that the author of
\nthe Report consulted either contemporary or previous records
\nor entries therein in order to satisfy himself regarding the
\ncorrectness of\tvarious statements  made pertaining  to\t the
\ngenealogy of  landlords who were in possession of the lands,
\nas stated  in the  said Report. It is true that at one place
\nthe author  has stated that he had taken these facts from an
\naccount book  (Tumar) but  he  has  not\t at  all  given\t any
\ndescription or detalis or even the kind or the nature of the
\naccount book  and its  contents. Furthermore,  there  is  no
\nevidence to  indicate as  to what  happened after the author
\nhad submitted  his Report  to the  Government and whether or
\nnot any\t follow up  action was\ttaken on  the basis  of\t his
\nReport or  it was  just filed  and kept\t on the record Lying
\nlifeless and mute.\n<\/p>\n
     The fact  of the  matter is that no proper verification
\nwas made  by Durga  Prasad regarding the facts stated in his
\nReport from  any source\t and that  it did not form part of a
\nrevenue entry  or record  which was  ever referred to by any
\nExecutive, Judicial or statutory authority subsequent to the
\nfiling of this Report. In other words, the position seems to
\nbe that\t the fate of the Report, after it was submitted, was
\nshrouded in  mystery and  Report became\t a  forgotten  story
\nunheard unwept\tand unsung  until the  present suit  by\t the
\nplaintiff was  filed. In  these circumstances, therefore, it
\nis difficult  for us  to place\tany reliance on the document
\n(Ex. J) even though it may be admissible in evidence.\n<\/p>\n
     Mr. Tarkunde,  appearing for  the respondents,  however
\nrelied on  several authorities in support of his argument to
\nshow that  the\tauthenticity  of  this\tdocument  cannot  be
\nquestioned. In\tthe first  place, reliance  was placed\ton a
\ndecision of the Privy Council in Ghulam
\n833<\/span>
\nRasul Khan  v. Secretary  of State  for India in Council,(1)
\nparticularly on the following observations:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “In such a case as the present, statements in
\n     public documents are receivable to prove the facts
\n     stated on\tthe general grounds that they were made
\n     by the  authorized agents\tof the\tpublic\tin  the
\n     course of official duty and respecting facts which
\n     were of public interest or required to be recorded
\n     for the  benefit of the community. Taylor’s Law of
\n     Evidence, 10th  ed., s.  1591. In\tmany cases,  in
\n     deed, in nearly all cases, after lapse of years it
\n     would be  impossible to  give  evidence  that  the
\n     statements, contained  in such  documents were  in
\n     fact true,\t and it is for this reason that such an
\n     exception\tis   made  to\tthe  rule   of\thearsay
\n     evidence,”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     The observations  extracted above\tno doubt  presumably
\nsupport the  contention\t of  Mr.  Tarkunde  but\t even  these
\nobservations have  to be  read in  the light  of the special
\nfacts of  that particular  case. In  that  case,  there\t was
\nevidence of  a clear Government revenue record maintained in
\ndue course  since 1852 showing that the term ‘Khayyat Mohal’
\ndid not\t denote a  tribe but  merely a profession. Secondly,
\nthe revenue  record of\tMauza Shahna  clearly mentioned\t the
\nentire pedigree\t of the\t family which was found by the trial
\ncourt to  have been  proved. The  question at  issue in that
\ncase was  whether Mohals  were of  Rajput origin  and it was
\nconclusively proved  by the  lower courts  that Mohals\twere
\ndoubtless Rajput  or had  a Rajput  origin. The entry relied
\nupon in\t that case was based on the extracts from settlement
\nrecords of the District from 1852 and corrobortated by later
\nentries up  to 1882.  The Privy Council took special note of
\nthe fact  that evidence\t of the\t character taken from public
\nrecords for a series of years since 1852 could not be easily
\nbrushed aside.\tIn this connection, their Lordships observed
\nas follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “Their Lordships cannot share the view of the
\n     appellate Court  that evidence  of this character,
\n     taken from\t public records\t for a\tseries of years
\n     since 1852\t and recorded  in accordance  with  the
\n     requirements of the law, can in a pedigree case be
\n     disregarded.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
834<\/span><\/p>\n
     Thus, it  is absolutely  clear to\tus that the facts of
\nthat   case    are   essentially   different   and   clearly
\ndistinguishable from  the nature  of the document that Ex. J
\nis Ex.\tJ cannot  be regarded  as an entry of the type which
\nwas the\t subject matter of Ghulam Rasul Khan’s case (supra).
\nThere is  absolutely no corroboration of the facts mentioned
\nin Ex.\tJ either  by later entries or by any other document.
\nThere are  a number of other facts mentioned in the judgment
\nof the\tPrivy Council (supra) which completely distinguishes
\nthat case from Ex. J in the present case. At least this much
\nis clear,  as already  indicated, that\tin the Privy Council
\ncase there  was positive evidence to show that the entry was
\nacted  upon  for  several  years  and  that  by\t process  of
\nelimination the caste of the appellants as Mohal Rajputs was
\nestablished. But  in the instant case there is absolutely no
\nevidence to  corroborate  the  recitals\t in  Ex.  J  by\t any
\ncontemporary  or   subsequent  Government   record.  In\t our
\nopinion, therefore,  the decision relied upon by the counsel
\nfor respondents is of no assistance.\n<\/p>\n
     Reliance was  also placed on the decision in Kuar Shyam
\nPratap Singh  v. Collector  of Etawah  (1) where  the  Privy
\nCouncil made the following observations:-\n<\/p>\n
\t  “This\t document   therefore  is  an  official
\n     document  prepared\t  by  a\t  public  authority  in
\n     pursuance of  a statutory\tduty,  and  it\tis  not
\n     disputed  that   it  is   evidence,   though   not
\n     conclusive evidence of the fact stated therein….
\n     No cross-examination of the two witnesses from the
\n     Court of  Wards who  were called  was directed  to
\n     ascertain the  sources on\twhich the  pedigree was
\n     founded.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     In our  opinion, this  decision far from supporting the
\ncase of\t the respondents completely belies the importance or
\nprobative value of a document like Ex. J. To begin with, the
\ndocument relied\t upon by  the Privy  Council was  a pedigree
\nwhich was  produced in\tcourts by an officer of the Court of
\nWards. Secondly.  the High Court had found that the Court of
\nWards Manual  was prepared under the U.P. Court of Wards Act
\nwhich had  made a  provision for an Estate Notebook for each
\nestate in  the Court  of Wards which had to be maintained in
\ntriplicate form, one copy being kept in the District office,
\none in\tthe Divisional\toffice and  one in the office of the
\nCourt of Wards. The object of the Notebook was to pro-\n<\/p>\n
835<\/span><\/p>\n
vide a\tseparate and succinct note of every estate under the
\nmanagement of the Court of Wards. It is, therefore, manifest
\nthat the  document concerned in that case was maintained not
\nmerely by  an officer  but under  a statute  which  required
\ncertain conditions  to be fulfilled. Furthermore, sufficient
\nnotoriety and publicity was given to this document because a
\ncopy of\t the record  was kept  in the  District office which
\ncould be  inspected by\tany member  of the  public. Tn the B
\ninstance case,\thowever,  we  find  that  after\t Ex.  J\t was
\nsubmitted it faded into oblivion and on one ever heard of it
\nuntil it  was produced for the first time in the trial court
\nfrom the  Mirzapur Collectorate.  Another important  feature
\nwas that the Privy Council had found that the Court of Wards
\nitself had  held an  enquiry and  being a  statutory body it
\nmust be\t presumed to  have done\t its duty to the best of its
\nability. Fourthly,  although two  witnesses were examined to
\nprove the  documents from  the Court of Wards, they were not
\ncross-examined at  all. In  the instant\t case, a person from
\nMirzapur Collectorate  merely produced\tthe document  but he
\nhad no knowledge about its contents or about its being acted
\nupon. In these circumstances, Ex. J cannot be equated in any
\nrespect with  Ex. which was the document under consideration
\nby the\tPrivy Council  in Kuar\tShyam  Pratap  Singh’s\tcase
\n(supra),
\n     We would  like to\tmention here that even if a document
\nmay be\tadmissible or  an ancient  one, it  cannot carry the
\nsame weight  or probative  value  as  a\t document  which  is
\nprepared either\t under a  statute, ordinance or an Act which
\nrequires certain  conditions to\t be fulfilled.\tThis was the
\ncase in\t both Ghulam  Rasul Kltan’s  and Kuar  Shyam  Pratap
\nSingh’s cases (supra).\n<\/p>\n
     The case  of Meer\tUsd-oollah v. Mussumat Beeby Imaman,
\nWidow of  Shah Khadim Hossain (1) appears to us to be a cler
\nillustration of\t a document  which while being an entry in a
\npublic record  is of  great probative  value and carries the
\nutmost weight.\tIn this\t case, the  Registers concerned were
\nprobably  under\t  Bengal  Regulations\tand   the   act\t  of
\nregistration in\t the Registers was made after a proclamation
\namounting to  a public,\t open  and  notorious  assertion  of
\ntitle. Such  a document\t was held by the Privy Council to bn
\nof  very  great\t importance,  and  in  this  connection\t the
\nfollowing observations were made:\n<\/p>\n
836<\/span><\/p>\n
\t  “This fact is most important, not because the
\n     registers themselves  are at  all of the nature of
\n     conclusive evidence of title, (for the Regulations
\n     provide against  that) but\t because  this\tact  of
\n     registration after\t a proclamation\t amounts  to  a
\n     public, open  and notorious  assertion of title on
\n     the  one  side,  and  the\tomission  to  register,
\n     unexplained by  proof of  the ill\thealth\tof  the
\n     claimant, or  absence in  a  distant  country,  or
\n     ignorance, afford an equally strong presumption of
\n     the non-existence\tof any\ttitle  on  the\tother.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t\t       (Emphasis supplied)
\n     This is  a clear  and  ‘important\tillustration  of  an
\nadmissible document  which  commands  great  confidence\t and
\nwhose\tprobative   value   is\t almost\t  irrebuttable\t and
\nimpregnable.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     In the  case  of  (Raja  Muttu  Ramalinga\tSetupati  v.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Perianayagum Pillai  (1) the  Privy Council was dealing with
\nreports made  by Collectors  acting under  Regulation VII of
\n1817 of\t the Madras  Presidency and  it was  held  that\t the
\nReport of  the Collectors  may\tnot  be\t of  great  judicial
\nauthority so far as the opinions expressed on private rights
\nof the\tparties but being the reports made under a statutory
\nRegulation  they   were\t entitled   to\tbe  of\tconsiderable
\nimportance. The\t reason why the Privy Council attached great
\ncredence to these reports was that the report, when referred
\nto the\tCollector were based on the depositions taken by him
\n(Collector) and other documents on the basis of which he had
\ngiven his report. Furthermore, the Board of Revenue accepted
\nthe Report  of the collector and made a minute approving the
\nsame and  observing that  there was  no question of doubting
\nthe validity  of the  Report. In  this connection, the Privy
\nCouncil observed thus: (1)
\n\t  “This new  dispute was  referred to  the then
\n     collector, Mr.  Wroughton. His  report upon  it is
\n     dated the\t7th of\tJanuary, l 834. It appears that
\n     he\t examined   the\t  depositions\tsent   to   the
\n     collectorate in  1815, and other documents, and he
\n     records the  facts\t which,\t in  his  opinion,  are
\n     adverse to\t the claims  made in  the part\tof  the
\n     zemindar. He  also reported  to in\t favour of  the
\n     title  of\t the  Pandaram\tVenkatachellum\tto  the
\n     office.\n<\/p>\n
837<\/span><\/p>\n
     “But being\t the reports  of public officers made in the
\n     course of duty, and under statutory authority, they are
\n     entitled to  great consideration  so far as they supply
\n     information  of  official\tproceedings  and  historical
\n     facts, and\t also in  so far  as they  are\trelevant  to
\n     explain the conduct and acts of the parties in relation
\n     to them,  and the proceedings of the Government founded
\n     upon them.”\n<\/p>\n
     With due  respect to  the Privy Council, we fully agree
\nwith the  view taken  by their\tLordships and  the test laid
\ndown by\t them. The  document Ex.  J in the instant case does
\nnot contain  any of  the qaulities  or attributes which were
\npresent in  the Report\tof the Collectors relied upon by the
\nPrivy Council.\tAs indicated  above, while the Collector had
\nmade a\tthorough enquiry, based on the evidence of witnesses
\nand other documents and had recorded his clear opinion which
\nwas accepted  by the  Board of\tRevenue, in the instant case
\nEx. J  is a  God forsaken  document which  does\t not  reveal
\neither the  source on  the basis of which the materials were
\ncollected nor  does it\tindicate that  the author  of Report
\nrecorded any  statements or  looked into  other documents to
\nbase the  truth\t of  the  genealogy  or\t the  possession  of
\nlandlords referred to in his report.\n<\/p>\n
     Finally, Ex.J,  unlike the\t document in the case before
\nthe Privy  Council was\tnot a  Report  under  any  statutory
\nauthority  but\t was  merely   a  report  submitted  on\t the
\nadministrative orders  of a high Government official. In our
\nopinion, therefore, where a report is given by a responsible
\nofficer,  which\t is  based  on\tevidence  of  witnesses\t and
\ndocuments and  has a  statutory flavour\t in that it is given
\nnot merely  by\tan  administrative  officer  but  under\t the
\nauthority of  a statute, its probative value would indeed be
\nvery high so as to be etitled to great weight.\n<\/p>\n
     On a  parity of  reasoning mentioned  above, this Court
\nhad held  that a  Report based on hearsay evidence or on the
\ninformation  given   by\t an   illiterate  person  cannot  be
\nadmissible even\t under s.  35 of  the Evidence\tAct. In Brij
\nMohan Singh  v. Priya Brat Narain Singh & Ors.<\/a>(1) this Court
\nobserved as follows.\n<\/p>\n
\t  “The entry therein showing the birth of a son
\n     to Sarjoo Singh on October 15, 1935 can however be
\n     of no
\n838<\/span>
\n     assistance to  the appellant  unless this entry is
\n     admissible in  evidence under the Evidence Act. If
\n     this entry\t had been made by the Chowkidar himself
\n     this entry would have been relevant under S. 35 of
\n     the  Evidence   Act.  Admittedly,\t however,   the
\n     Chowkidar himself did not make it.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      *\t\t\t     *\t\t\t       *
\n     The reason\t why an\t entry made by a public servant
\n     in a  public or  other official book, register, or
\n     record stating  a fact in issue or a relevant fact
\n     has been  made relevant  is  that\twhen  a\t public
\n     servant makes  it himself\tin the discharge of his
\n     official duty,  the probability of its being truly
\n     and correctly  recorded is\t high. That probability
\n     is reduced\t to a  minimum when  the public servant
\n     himself  is   illiterate  and  has\t to  depend  on
\n     somebody else to make the entry.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     In the instant case also, Durga Prasad had to depend on
\nsome unknown  persons, who  were not  even mentioned  in the
\ndocument, to  gather his facts and, therefore, even if it is
\nadmissible its probative value will be almost zero.\n<\/p>\n
     Mr. Tarkunde  then relied on the following observations
\nmade by\t Rupert Cross  in his  book ‘Evidence’\t(1967: Third
\nEdition) at page 408:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “Entries  by\ta  solicitor’s\tclerk  may,  of
\n     course, be received under exception to the hearsay
\n     rule which\t is now\t being considered on account of
\n     the duty owed to his employer, and, in some cases,
\n     the duty  to record  may have  been  owed\tby  the
\n     solicitor to  his\tclient\tWhen  speaking\tof  the
\n     reception of declartions in the course of duty Sir
\n     Robert Philimore said;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  “Entries in  a document  made by  a  deceased
\n     person can\t only be  admitted where  it is clearly
\n     shown that\t the entires  relate to\t an act or acts
\n     done by  the deceased  person  and\t not  by  third
\n     parties.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     These observations,  however,  have  to  be  read\twith
\nreference to  the context.  Cross while making the aforesaid
\nobservations
\n839<\/span>
\nemphasised that\t Sir Robert Phillimore had said that entries
\nin a document made by a deceased person can only be admitted
\nwhere it is clearly shown that they relate to an act or acts
\ndone by the deceased person and not by third parties.\n<\/p>\n
     Thus, in  the instant case, though Ex. J was admissible
\nbecause\t its   author  is   no\tlonger\t alive\tit  contains
\ninformation which  is obviously\t based on  what he  may have
\nheard from  third parties  and hence  much value  cannot  be
\nattached to such a report.\n<\/p>\n
     In\t Brain\tv.  Preece  Lord(1)  C.B  Abinger  made\t the
\nfollowing observations:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “The case of the attorney, in Deo v. Turford,
\n     stands on\tprecisely the  same grounds  as that of
\n     Price v. Lord Torrington. There it was proved that
\n     the notices  were written,\t and that  the attorney
\n     had gone  out, and\t indorsed the duplicate when he
\n     came back,\t and that  it was  his practice\t so  to
\n     indorse it\t when he  had served  the original, and
\n     that was  rightly held  to be proof of the service
\n     of the  pnotice. There  is also  another case viz,
\n     that of  the notary (Poole v. Dicas, supra), where
\n     similar entries  were held\t evidence; but a notary
\n     is a  public officer,  and is sworn to do his duty
\n     as a  notary, and in foreign countries the acts of
\n     a notary  are like\t the acts  of a court, although
\n     that is not so here.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     On the other hand, commenting on the probative value of
\ndocuments like\tEx. J, it was held in Maria Mangini Sturla &
\nOrs. v.\t Filippo Tomasso  Mattia  Freccia,  Augustus  Keppel
\nStevenson & Ors (2) where Lord Blackburn observed thus:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “I think  an entry in the books of a manor is
\n     public in\tthe sense  that\t it  concerns  all  the
\n     people interested in the manor… But it must be a
\n     public document,  and it  must be made by a public
\n     officer. I\t understand a  public document there to
\n     mean a  documnent that  is made for the purpose of
\n     the public\t making use  of it,  and being\table to
\n     refer to it.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
840<\/span><\/p>\n
     Same view\twas taken  in a\t later decision in Mercer v.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Denne(1) where the following observations were made:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “There is  nothing to\t show that  any of them
\n     was  made\tcontemporaneously  with\t the  doing  or
\n     effecting of  a transaction  which it was the duty
\n     of the  deceased person  to record.  There\t is  no
\n     evidence of  what his  instructions were or of the
\n     relation of  those instructions  to  the  document
\n     tendered in  evidence, or\tof the\tsource\tof  the
\n     knowledge or  information on which the contents of
\n     the report or estimate were based …..
\n\t  These reports\t in no\tway resemble the field-
\n     book entries  made by  a deceased surveyor for the
\n     purpose of a survey on which he was professionally
\n     employed, which  this Court  held to be admissible
\n     in Mellor v. Walmesley(2).”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     Although we  cannot hold that Ex. J in the present case
\nis inadmissible\t in view  of the express provisions of s. 35
\nof the\tEvidence Act,  yet the\tobservations  of  the  Privy
\nCouncil extracted  above would\tdirectly and  aptly apply to
\nthe probative value or the weight to be attached to Ex. J in
\nthe absence  of any disclosure by the author of the document
\nregarding the  source or the materials on the basis of which
\nhe had\tmentioned the facts in his report. Assuming that the
\ncase, extracted above, had taken an extreme view in that the
\nrepot was  not\tadmissible  at\tall  because  of  the  legal
\nposition in  England, the  hard fact  remains that so far as
\nthe probative  value of\t a  document  is  concerned,  it  is
\nreduced to  the\t minimum  where\t there\tis  no\tevidence  to
\ndisclose the  nature of the instructions given to the author
\nof the\tdoucment tendered  in  evidence\t or  the  source  or
\nknowledge or  information on which the report is based. This
\nis a serious legal infirmity from which Ex. J suffers and on
\nthat ground  alone it  cannot be regarded as a reliable or a
\ndependable document.\n<\/p>\n
     In view  of the  reasons  given  above,  we  reach\t the
\nfollowing conclusions  regarding the  law  relating  to\t the
\nadmissibility and probative value of Ex. J:-\n<\/p>\n
841<\/span><\/p>\n
     (1)   That Ex. J is clearly admissible under s. 35
\n\t  of the  Evidence Act\tand we\tagree with  the
\n\t  finding of the High Court on this point,
\n     (2)   It appears  that Durga  Prasad, serishtadar,
\n\t  started writing  Ex. J  in the  year 1810 and
\n\t  completed the same in 1813.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (3)  That Ex. J mentions names of some persons who
\n\t  according  to\t  the  plaintiffs   were  their
\n\t  ancestors  but  on  carefully\t analysing  the
\n\t  document, it\tis not\tvery clear  as\tto  how
\n\t  Ramruch Singh\t was connected\twith  Bansidhar
\n\t  Singh or Debi Singh.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (4)    That  the  probative  value\t of  Ex.  J  is
\n\t  absolutely  insignificant   and  is\tof   no
\n\t  assistance  to   us  in  proving  the\t plaint
\n\t  genealogy.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (5)   That Ex.  J was  a part  of\tthe  record  of
\n\t  Mirzapur  Collectorate   and\t was   summoned
\n\t  therefrom.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (6)   It would appear from a bare perusal of Ex. J
\n\t  that Durga  Prasad was  directed to embark on
\n\t  an enquiry  regarding the persons who were in
\n\t  actual possession  of lands  at the  relevant
\n\t  time and  it was  not a  part of  his duty to
\n\t  embark on  any enquiry regarding the title of
\n\t  the persons  holding the  lands, nor\tdid  he
\n\t  attempt to  do so.  The heading of the Report
\n\t  (Ex. J  ) itself  shown that\tit is  a report
\n\t  regarding the possession of Taluqa Majhwa.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     Even if  Ex. J  is taken  into consideration,  it\twill
\nprove not  the title  of the plaintiffs-respondents but only
\nthe possession\tof lands  held\tby  some  of  their  alleged
\nancestors. In  other words,  the document  will not  be\t any
\nevidence of  title in  the suit\t out of\t which\tthe  present
\nappeals arise  which are  mainly concerned with the question
\nof title and not with the question of possession.\n<\/p>\n
     We now come to a detailed discussion of the contents of
\nEx. J to show the extent of its relevancy or importance. The
\noriginal Exhibit  is in\t Persian language  and had been kept
\nseparately in  a basta.\t During the course of hearing of the
\nappeal, the
\n842<\/span>
\nsaid Exhibit  was got  retranslated and\t the said translated
\nEnglish version\t appears at pages 25-33 in Volume VII of the
\npaperbook. The\tdocument in  Rom In script is to be found at
\npages 120-123  in Volume  V which,  in our  opinion  is\t the
\ncorrect reproduction  of the  original Exhibit\twith  slight
\ndiscrepancies here and there.\n<\/p>\n
     As the  counsel for  the parties  have not been able to
\nagree regarding\t the meaning  and purport  of  some  of\t the
\nexpressions used  by Durga  Prasad in  the said\t Exhibit, we
\ndecided to  make a  detailed study  of the original document
\nside by\t side with  the translated  version. Fortunately, as
\none of\tus (Fazal  Ali, J.)  happens to\t possess  sufficient
\nknowledge of  Persian language,\t we found  no difficulty  in
\ndeciphering the\t correctness of the disputed meanings of the
\nexpressions used  in the Exhibit. Even so, we have consulted
\nthe most  reliable  Persian-English  Dictionary\t (Steingass-
\n1947-3rd Impression)  and  other  standard  dictionaries  to
\narrive at  the correct\timport of  the meanings of the terms
\nand expressions used in the document.\n<\/p>\n
     In the  case of  Coca-Cola Company\t of Canada  Ltd.  v.
\nPepsi-Cola Company  of Canada  Ltd.(1) It  was clearly\theld
\nthat Dictionaries  can always  be referred  to in  order  to
\nascertain not  only the\t meaning of  a\tword  but  also\t the
\ngeneral use  of it.  In\t this  connection,  their  Lordships
\nobserved as follows .\n<\/p>\n
\t  “While questions  may sometimes  arise as  to
\n     the extent\t to which  a Court may inform itself by
\n     reference\tto   dictionaries  there   can,\t  their
\n     Lordships think, be no doubt that dictionaries may
\n     properly be  referred to  in order\t to . ascertain
\n     not only  the meaning  of a word, but also the use
\n     to which  the thing  (if it be a thing) denoted by
\n     the word is commonly put.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     This is  what we  have tried  to achieve in addition to
\nthe knowledge of Persian language that one of us possesses.\n<\/p>\n
     To begin  with, the  document clearly recites as to who
\nhad ordered Durga Prasad to make the necessary inquiries and
\nthis fact  assumes some\t importance because there has been a
\nserious controversy  between the parties as to whether Durga
\nPrasad was  entrusted with  the task  of the  inquiry  by  a
\nprivate landlord  or by a high Government official. The High
\nCourt on a perusal of the
\n843<\/span>
\nOpening\t portion   of  the  document  clearly  came  to\t the
\nconclusion that\t the terms  used in  the opening portion and
\nthe manner  in which  he has addressed the person to whom he
\nwas directed  to submit\t the Report  shows that he must have
\nbeen a\thigh officer  of the  Government  though  the  exact
\ndesignation of the said officer is not disclosed in the said
\nExhibit. On  perusing the  original as\talso the  translated
\nversion, we  find ourselves in agreement with the view taken
\nby the\tHigh Court.  The actual\t wolds used by Durga Prasad,
\nwhen translated in English, are as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “Beneficent Master,  generous, kind and Judge
\n     of the time, May your prosperity be ever lasting.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t\t (p. 25, Vol. VII of the Paperbook)
\n     We have  perused the original words in Persian and find
\nthat they  have been  correctly\t translated  in\t English  as
\nabove. In  these circumstances,\t we overrule  the. Objection
\ntaken by  the appellants  regarding  the  document  being  a
\nprivate\t one   or  the\t Report\t being\tmade  by  a  private
\nserishtadar.\n<\/p>\n
     After addressing  the official,  the document begins by
\nusing the word “Huzoor” and on the basis of this word it was
\ncontended that this shows that it must have been a very high
\nofficial who  had ordered the inquiry. Nothing much turns on
\nthe use\t of the\t word ‘Huzoor’\twhich  is  only\t a  term  of
\ncourtesy used  to address  either elders or high dignitaries
\nbut the crucial word is ‘Huzur-e-wala’. The word ‘wala’ with
\nHuzur qualifies\t the nature of the official mentioned in the
\nopening part of the document, viz., beneficent master, i.e.,
\nthe high officer aforesaid.\n<\/p>\n
     Having determined\tthe opening  part of  the Report  we
\nwill now proceed to the main points mentioned therein:\n<\/p>\n
     (1)   It is  mentioned that  the order of the high
\n\t  official was received by Durga Prasad on 26th
\n\t  October 1810\tdirecting the  humble author of
\n\t  the Report  to peruse\t the documents\tkept in
\n\t  the serishtadar’s  office and give a detailed
\n\t  account as  to who in the past, in which year
\n\t  and  in   what  manner  the  predecessors  of
\n\t  Pahalwan Singh  were\tin  possession\tof  the
\n\t  aforesaid Taluka  (by aforesaid  Taluka Mauza
\n\t  Majhwa is  clearly intended  as would\t appear
\n\t  from the earlier
\n844<\/span>
\n\t  part of  the document.)  The word used in the
\n\t  Roman script\tare “buzurgan  Pahalwan Singh”.
\n\t  There was a serious controversy regarding the
\n\t  actual  meaning   of\tthe   word  ‘Buzurgan’.
\n\t  According to\tthe plaintiffs respondents, the
\n\t  word\t‘Buzurgan’   means  ancestors  whereas,
\n\t  according to\tthe appellant,\tit means elders
\n\t  of the  family of  Pahalwan Singh.  In  other
\n\t  words, according to the appellant, what Durga
\n\t  Prasad was required to do was to find out not
\n\t  that the  ancestors of Pahalwan Singh were in
\n\t  possession but  the elders of Pahalwan Singh,
\n\t  which is  a much  wider term. In our opinion,
\n\t  the interpretation  put by  the appellants on
\n\t  the word ‘Buzurgan’ appears to be correct. To
\n\t  begin with, the word ‘buzurgan’ does not mean
\n\t  predecessors in the strict sense of the term.
\n\t  The concept  of ‘buzurgan’ in Persian or Urdu
\n\t  language  is\tto  denote  merely  an\telderly
\n\t  person.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     In\t Steingass’s   Persian-English\t Dictionary   (Third
\nImpression: 1947) at page 183, the. word ‘Buzurg’ is defined
\namong  others\tas  grandee,   adult  and  elder.  The\tword
\n‘Buzurgan’  is\tmerely\ta  plural  of  Buzurg.\tIn  Forbes’s
\nHindustani-English  Dictionary\t (1848)\t ‘Buzurg’  has\tbeen
\ndefined as  an elder (p. 77). Similarly, ‘buzurgan’ has been
\ndefined as elder (p. 89). Therefore in the instant case, the
\nactual connotation  of the term ‘buzurgan’ with reference to
\nthe context would mean not only predecessors or ancestors of
\nPahalwan Singh but also the elders of Pahalwan Singh who may
\nor may\tnot be\tdirectly related to him though they may form
\neither near  or distant\t relatives being  elder to  Pahalwan
\nSingh. The High Court seems to have proceeded on the footing
\nthat the word ‘buzurgan’ really means ancestors only and one
\nof the\ttasks entrusted\t to Durga Prasad was to find out the
\nnames of  the  ancestors  of  Panalwan\tSingh  who  were  in
\npossession of  the taluka.  In view of the actual meaning of
\nthe word  ‘buzurgan’ as\t explained above, which is supported
\nby the\tdictionary meaning,  we are unable to agree with the
\nconnotation of\tthe word  ‘buzurgan suggested by the counsel
\nfor  the   respondents\tand   we  also\tdo  not\t accept\t the
\ntranslation of\tthe. word  ‘buzurgan’ in the Roman Script as
\n‘predecessors’ only.\n<\/p>\n
     There  is\t another  circumstantial   evidence  in\t the
\ndocument itself which fully supports the view taken by us. A
\nlittle later,  Durga Prasad  while describing  the heirs  of
\nGautam tribe has used the word
\n845<\/span>
\n‘warsha’ (to  be correctly  written as ‘worasa’) which means
\ndescendants or\theirs (vide  p. 134  of Forbes’s Hindustani-
\nEnglish dictionary  & p. 1449 of Steingass’s dictionary & p.
\n141 of\tWollaston’s  English  Persian  dictionary)  …\t The
\ntranslation of the word ‘ancestor’ in Persian would be Moris
\nor Jad\tor Bapdada  (father &  grandfather) vide Wollaston’s
\ndictionary at  p. 12 and Forbes’s dictionary at p. 10 and if
\nhighest ancestor  is intended,\tit  will  be  translated  as
\nMoris-e-ala’. Durga  Prasad who\t was fully  conversant\twith
\nPersian language  has deliberately not used the word ‘Moris,
\nor ‘Moris-e-ala’  or ‘Jadd’ while referring to the elders of
\nPahalwan  Singh,   which  is  unmistakably  clear  from\t the
\nlanguage and  the style\t used by  him, but has used the word
\n‘Buzurgan’ which  is of\t a  much  wider\t import\t and  merely
\nsuggests that  he was directed to find out the possession of
\nthe elders  of Pahalwan\t Singh whether\tbeloning to the same
\nfamily or  not. If  the intention of the author was to refer
\nto the direct ancestors of Pahalwan Singh he would have used
\nthe term  ‘Morisane Pahalwan  Singh’ (ancestors\t of Pahalwan
\nSingh) which he has deliberately not done.\n<\/p>\n
     We are  fortified in our view by the dictionary meaning
\nof the\twords ‘Moris’ and ‘Moroos’. The meaning or Moroos is
\ndescribed  by\tSteingass  at\tpage  1343  as\t‘hereditary,
\npossessed by  paternal succession’.  The word  ‘Moris’ is  a
\nroot of Moroos which means hereditary possession and conveys
\nthe  sense  of\ta  direct  ancestor.  Similarly,  the  other
\nexpressions have  been defined\tby different dictionaries as
\nshown below: –\n<\/p>\n
     Minjumla =\t Among all;  from among\t (p. 1323, Steingass
\n\t       dictionary)
\n     Minjumla = Upon the whole (p 510, Forbes’ dictionary)
\n     Aulad = Descendant (p. 121, Steingass Dictionary)
\n     Descendant =  Aulad (p.  72, Forbes’ Dictionary-English
\n\t\t    Part)
\n     It follows\t as a logical corollary that the translation
\nof the\tword ‘Buzurgan’ as ‘Predecessor’ in the Roman Script
\nof Ex. J is not quite accurate.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     Having sorted  out the problem of the word Buzurgan’ we
\nnow proceed  to consider  the meaning  of the  words used by
\nDurga Prasad  in the  introductory part\t of his\t Report. The
\ndocument (Ex.  J) proceeds  to mention\twhile addressing the
\nhigh official  that the\t zamindari of  taluka Majhwa Pargana
\nKaswar was previously in the possession
\n846<\/span>
\nof the\tdescendants Gautam tribe and further emphasised that
\nthe descendants\t of Gautam tribe were in possession there of
\nby inheritance\taccording to  the shares of their respective
\nfamily members.\t The  translation  of  these  English  words
\nthough substantially  correct require some amplification. In
\nthe first  place, Durga\t Prasad has  used the word ‘Aulad-e-
\nGautam’. Auld  means ‘heirs  or direct descendants’. This is
\nfollowed by  the word  ‘Biradari’. The actual sense which he
\nwanted to  convey was  that the\t lands in  the Mauza were in
\npossession of  the  descendants\t of  Gautam  tribe  and\t his
\nbiradari. Biradari  was sought\tto  be\tinterpreted  by\t the
\nrespondents as\tmeaning the  members of the family of Gautam
\ntribe. This,  however, is  wholly incorrect.  The concept of
\nBaradari in  Persian is\t much wider  than a  mere family. In
\nSteingass’s  Dictionary\t  (supra)  at\tpage  167  the\tword
\n‘biradari’ is defined thus:\n<\/p>\n
     “biradari\t–   Brotherhood,  the\tfraternal  relation;
\nrelationship;-”\n<\/p>\n
     In Muhammed  Mustafa Khan’s  Urdu-Hindi dictionary, the
\nword ‘biradari’ has been defined thus:\n<\/p>\n
     “Baradari-one  tribe,   man  belonging  to\t one  tribe,
\nbrother hood”\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t      (P. 422: 1959 edition)
\n     ‘Baradari – Relationship, Brotherhood
\n\t       (Forbes Hindustani-English Dictionary, p. 71)
\n     It denotes\t only brotherhood which does not mean merely
\nmembers of  the family of a particular person but the entire
\nbrother hood  or caste\tor tribe  in a\tbroader and  general
\nsense of  a group  of persons  of which\t some may or may not
\nconstitute one\tfamily. Thus,  from  the  use  of  the\tword
\n‘baradari’ it  cannot be  argued with  any show offence that
\nMauza  Majhwa\twas  in\t  possession  only   of\t the  direct
\ndescendants and members of the family of Gautam tribe. Durga
\nPrasad has  taken care\tto use\tdifferent terms\t to indicate
\ndifferent relationships.  Somewhere he\thas  used  the\tword
\n‘aulad’ where  he wanted  to indicate  direct descendants or
\nheirs; at other place he has used ‘buzurgan’ where he wanted
\nto indicate only the elders who may or may not be related to
\nthe  person  concerned;\t sometimes  he\thas  used  the\tword
\n‘biradari’ to  indicate not  only the  family but the entire
\nbrotherhood or members of the caste or tribe.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
847<\/span><\/p>\n
     In the  last lines of first paragraph of the Report the
\nfollowing words are used
\n\t  “ba beradari\tHirdeynarain  Singh  dar  qabza
\n     mosamiyan Debi  Singh wo  Barisal Singh  wo Ramhit
\n     Singh wo  Gajraj Sahi zamindaran boods.” (The last
\n     word should be ‘bood’ and not ‘boods’
\n     From this,\t the respondents as also the High Court seem
\nto infer  that Debi  Singh, Barisal  Singh, Ramhit Singh and
\nGajraj Sahi  were the  direct  descendants  of\tHirdaynarain
\nSingh or  the members  of his  family. This inference is not
\nbrone out  by the  aforesaid words used by Durga Prasad. The
\nwords only indicate the undoubted possession of Hirdaynarain
\nSingh, and the persons who were in possession along with him
\nwere the  four persons\tmentioned above who belonged only to
\nthe brotherhood\t of Hirday Narain Singh. The question of all
\nof them being direct descendants or relations does not arise
\non the\tinterpretation of the words used by Durga Prasad, as
\nindicated above,  He has  further stated  that he had learnt
\nthe aforesaid  facts from  the\taccount\t papers\t of  Pargana
\nKaswar.\n<\/p>\n
     We might  mention that even M.M. Prasad, J. was carried
\naway by\t the language used by Durga Prasad, viz., the use of
\nthe word ‘biradari’ to indicate that Hirday Narian Singh and
\nfour others  belonged to  the same  family which was neither
\nhis intention  nor the\tmeaning of the sentence used by him.
\nTo this extent, therefore, we do not agree with M.M. Prasad,
\nJ. It  may be  important to  remember this fact because much
\nhas been made of the sentence “Debi Singh and aforesaid four
\npersons” to  contend that  the four persons, viz Debi Singh,
\nBarisal Singh,\tRamhit\tSingh  and  Gajraj  Sahi,  were\t the
\ndescendants of\tHirday Narain  Singh or\t Debi Singh which is
\nalso a\tfallacious conclusion  reached by the High Court and
\nnot warranted by the words used in the documetlt (Ex.J.).\n<\/p>\n
     The word  ‘minjoomle’ merely  means – among all or from
\namong them-it  does not\t mean ‘including’.  The words in the
\nlast portion  of second\t paragraph of  the Report  “Pahalwan
\nSingh ham  az auladey  Debi Singh  minjoomle  chehar  kashan
\nmazkuran asht. Faqat.” – do not indicate that Pahalwan Singh
\nalongwith his  descendants, viz.,  Debi Singh Barisal Singh,
\nRamhit Singh  and Gajraj  Sahi were  in possession. The word
\n‘descendant’ qualifies\tonly Ramhit  Singh and not the other
\nthree persons as a logical consequence of the statement
\n848<\/span>
\nmade in the first paragraph, extracted above, indicating the
\nbaradari of Hirday Narain Singh.\n<\/p>\n
     The document  then proceeds  to  give  details  of\t the
\nsettlements made  with various\tpersons,  and  the  relevant
\nportion recites thus in Roman Script at page 121, Vol. VII:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “Khalispur 1 Mauza asli
\n\t  Bawaqt bandobast Patta zamindari banam Audhan
\n     Singh Ke  az  aulad  Hirday  Narain  Singh\t mazkur
\n     ashtshuda bood ……..\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     The English translation runs thus:
\n     “Khalispur 1 M Asli
\n     At the  time of settlement the Zamindari Patta was
\n     executed in  favour of Audhan Singh, who is one of
\n     the   descendants\t  of   Hirday\tNarain\t Singh,
\n     aforesaid.. ”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t\t\t\t   (Vol. VII, p. 27)
\n     We may  pause here to indicate an important point which
\narises out  of the  aforesaid recitals. Durga Prasad has not
\nused the  word ‘brotherhood’  or ‘Buzurgan’ while describing
\nAudhan Singh but has clearly stated that he was a descendant
\nof Hirday  Narain Singh.  If it was true that Barisal Singh,
\nDebi Singh  and Gajraj Singh were also direct descendants of
\nHirday Narain  Singh, he  would have  undoubtedly  mentioned
\ntheir names also.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     In the  Next column, Durga Prasad goes on narrating the
\nhistory and  mentions that  at the  time of  settlement, the
\nzamindari patta\t was executed  in favour of Gurdat Singh who
\nwas one\t of the\t descendants of\t Debi Singh.  Here also,  he
\nclearly indicates  the relationship of Gurdat Singh as being
\na descendant  of Debi  Singh. What is most important is that
\nin the\tplaint genealogy  there is  absolutely no  reference
\neither to  Audhan Singh\t or to Gurdat Singh while describing
\nthe heirs  of Hirday Narain Singh. In fact, no person by the
\nname of\t Gurdat Singh  is mentioned as an heir of Debi Singh
\nin the plaint genealogy.\n<\/p>\n
     On the next page it was mentioned that Babu Deep Narain
\nSingh purchased\t the village  at  an  auction  held  by\t the
\nGovernment for payment of arrears of Government revenue Deep
\nNarain Singh
\n849<\/span>
\nobtained  the  zamindari  sanad\t from  the  huzoor  (a\thigh
\nofficial of the Government) and patta was executed in favour
\nof Ram\tBaksh Singh, who is one of the descendants of Hirday
\nNarain Singh  and is  alive. It\t may be\t noted that even Ram
\nBaksh Singh  is not  at all  mentioned in  the genealogy  of
\nHirday Narain  Singh nor is he mentioned in the earlier part
\nof Ex.\tJ as  being either  a member  of  the  family  or  a
\ndescendant of Hirday Narain Singh.\n<\/p>\n
     It has,  therefore, been  established beyond any shadow
\nof doubt  that Barisal\tSingh, Debi  Singh and\tGajraj Singh
\nwere not  the direct  descendants of  Hirday  Narain  Singh.
\nOtherwise Durga\t Prasad would  have mentioned  these persons
\nalso as heirs or direct descendants of Hirday Naram Singh as
\nhe has done in the case of Audhan Singh, Ram Baksh Singh and
\nRamhit Singh.  Furthermore, at page 28 on the left hand side
\nof  the\t  document  (English   translation)  it\t is  clearly
\nmentioned that\tzamindari patta\t was executed  in favour  of
\nBhagat Singh,  Golami  Singh,  Harjan  Singh  who  were\t the
\ndescendants of\tHirday Narain  Singh. Thus, it is clear from
\nthe scheme  followed by Durga Prasad that whenever he wanted
\nto convey  a particular\t person or  persons to\tbe heirs  or
\ndirect descendants of an ancestor he would expressly say so.
\nOn a  plain reading  of this  part of  the Report,  it would
\nappear that  the descendants  of Hirday\t Narain\t Singh\twere
\nBhagat Singh,  Golami Singh,  Audhan Singh, Ram Baksh Singh,
\nRahmit Singh  and Harjan Singh. The other persons, viz, Debi
\nSingh, Barisal\tSingh and Gajraj Sahi (or Gajraj Singh) have
\nnot been mentioned as descendants of Hirday Narain Singh and
\nthis, therefore,  completely  demolishes  the  case  of\t the
\nplaintiffs-respondents on  this aspect\tof  the\t matter\t and
\nthrows serious\tdoubt on  their genealogy. Furthermore, this
\ncircumstance supports  our interpretation  that in the first
\npart of\t the Report the words used “among the aforesaid four
\npersons”; connote that only Ramhit Singh and not others were
\ndescendants of\tHirday Narain  Singh; they may have belonged
\nto same brotherhood
\n     In the  right-hand column of Ex. J at page 28, vol. VII
\nof the\tEnglish translation,  it is  clearly mentioned\tthat
\nPahalwan Singh is one of the descendants of Debi Singh. This
\nstatement corroborates\tthe plaintiffs’\t case to this extent
\nthat Pahalwan Singh was one of the descendants of Debi Singh
\nand shows  that a  part of the plaintiffs genealogy relating
\nto Debi Singh is correct.\n<\/p>\n
     Referring to Baraini, Semri and Ramchandrapur villages,
\nit is  mentioned that  zamindari patta\twas given  to  Mohan
\nSingh who was
\n850<\/span>
\na descendant  of Gajraj\t Sahi. It may be noted that here the
\nword used  is ‘aulad’  which means son, or grandson being in
\nthe nature of a direct descendant. This entry throws a flood
\nof light  on the actual position occupied by Gajraj Sahi and
\nthere is  absolutely no\t reference nor anything to show that
\nGajraj Sahi was in any way directly related to Debi Singh or
\nHirday Narain  Singh. There  is also no reference to Ramruch
\nSingh. As  the plaintiffs claim to be the direct descendants
\nof Gajraj  Singh,  this\t circumstance  completely  falsifies
\ntheir case  that Gajraj\t Singh or  Ramruch singh were in any
\nway connected  with Debi  Singh or the descendants of Hirday
\nNarain Singh.\n<\/p>\n
     Next item\trelates to  villages  Badapur,\tKanak  Sarai
\nwhere it  is mentioned\tthat  Hardarshan  Singh\t who  was  a
\ndescendant of  Ramhit Singh  has been given the patta and is
\nin possession. As regards village Gadoi it is mentioned that
\nat the time of settlement zamindari patta was given to Nanku
\nSingh and  Jitoo Singh who were descendants of Hirday Narain
\nSingh. Nanku  Singh died  and thereafter  Deep Narain Singh,
\nson of Nanku Singh, got the patta in his own name in respect
\nof halfshare.\n<\/p>\n
     The  next\titem  narrates\tthat  at  the  time  of\t the
\nsettlement, the\t zamindari patta  was executed\tin favour of
\nGurdat Singh,  who was one of the descendants of Debi Singh,
\nand he\tpaid rent  without obtaining  any fresh patta. It is
\nfurther\t mentioned  that  in  respect  of  village  Sabesar,
\nzamindari  patta  was  given  to  Ramhit  Singh,  descendant
\n(aulad) of  Hirday Narain  Singh and on his death, the patta
\nwas given to Nanku Singh.\n<\/p>\n
     It is  not necessary for US to wade through the details
\nof the\tsettlement made\t by various  zamindars pertaining to
\ndifferent villages  in the  Sirkar of Champaran, except some
\nentries to which we would refer hereafter.\n<\/p>\n
     As regards\t Jalalpur which was in Taluka of Madan Gopal
\nand Kiswar  Das Thathar, the zamindari patta was executed in
\nfavour of  Farman Singh\t and after his death Zalim Singh and
\nRamhit Singh,  sons of\tFarman Singh,  obtained the patta in
\ntheir names and were in possession thereof. Here also, there
\nis no  reference either\t to Gajraj  Sahi or  Gajraj Singh as
\nbeing relations\t of Debi  Singh nor  is the  name of Ramruch
\nSingh mentioned at all. Again, in respect of Chak Lohani and
\nKalyanpur it  is mentioned  that Gurdat Singh was one of the
\ndescendants  of\t Debi  Singh  and  Hardarshan  Singh  was  a
\ndescendant of Ramhit Singh.\n<\/p>\n
851<\/span><\/p>\n
     As regards\t Taluka Thathra and other villages they were
\nsold to Raja Balwant Singh and one Gajraj Singh paid rent to
\nthe sirkar on behalf of Raja Balwant Singh. The parentage of
\nGajraj Singh  or his  relationship either with Hirday Narain
\nSingh or  Debi Singh  is not indicated at all. Therefore, it
\nappears that Gajraj Singh must be someone who had nothing to
\ndo with the family of Debi Singh.\n<\/p>\n
     These are\tall the facts that can be collected from the
\ndocument (Ex. J). Summing up, therefore, the contents of the
\nReport, the position emerges as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
     (1)   the zamindari  patta of various villages had
\n\t  been given  to Hirday\t Narain Singh  and  his
\n\t  descendants,
\n     (2)   Neither Debi\t Singh, nor  Gajraj Singh,  nor
\n\t  Bansidhar Singh  have been mentioned as being
\n\t  a direct descendants of Hirday Narain Singh,
\n     (3)     Pahalwan  Singh   is  no  doubt  a\t direct
\n\t  descendant of\t Debi Singh  but that  does not
\n\t  solve the problem: the descendants of Pahlwan
\n\t  Singh were later on given various pattas,
\n     (4)   the Report (Ex. J) is purely confined to the
\n\t  question  of\t possession  of\t various  patta
\n\t  holders and  there is\t not a\tsingle word  to
\n\t  indicate the\ttitle of  any  of  these  patta
\n\t  holders.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t       As already  indicated, Durga  Prasad was
\n\t  not called  upon  to\tembark\ton  an\tenquiry
\n\t  regarding  the   question   of   title   and,
\n\t  therefore, his Report is concerned solely and
\n\t  mainly with  the question  of possession  and
\n\t  not  in   any\t manner\t with  that  of\t title.
\n\t  However, if  any observations\t have been made
\n\t  by him  incidentally on the question of title
\n\t  (though as far as we have seen the Report, no
\n\t  such observation has been made) they would be
\n\t  of no\t consequence what  soever to  prove the
\n\t  title of the parties.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (5)   As regards the facts contained in the Report
\n\t  though Durga\tPrasad says  that he  got  them
\n\t  from Tumar, i.e., an account-book, he has not
\n\t  given any particulars of the account-kook nor
\n\t  has he appended
\n852<\/span>
\n\t  any relevant portion of the account-book with
\n\t  the Report nor has he mentioned as to who was
\n\t  the author  of the account books and when and
\n\t  under what  circumstances the\t account  books
\n\t  were prepared.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     In\t these\t circumstances,\t therefore   we\t  are\tkept
\ncompletely in  the dark\t as  to\t what  those  account  books
\ncontained and  whether or  not the  facts mentioned  in them
\nwere properly  checked and verified. Even the fact as to who
\nwas the\t accountant or\tin whose  custody  the\taccount-book
\nremained, is  conspicuously absent  from the Report of Durga
\nPrasad. These  are additional circumstances which completely
\nreduce the probative value of Ex. J.\n<\/p>\n
     Mr. Tarkunde  made an attempt to convince us that Ex. J
\nis not\tonly admissible but is substantially corroborated by
\nthe oral and documentary evidence. It is true that a part of
\nthe plaintiffs’\t genealogy which  is  not  disputed  by\t the
\nappellants, receives  some corroboration from Ex. J but that
\ntakes us  no where.  Our attention has not been drawn to any
\nfact  mentioned\t  in  the  Report  which  shows\t the  direct
\nrelationship or connection between Debi Singh, Ramruch Singh
\nand Gajraj  Singh and unless this is done the corroboration,
\nif any,\t is of\tno use\tat all.\t However, we shall deal with
\nthis argument for whatever it is worth.\n<\/p>\n
     In the  first place,  it was  contended that  the\toral
\nevidence of  DWs 13,  21, 33,  34 and  35  corroborates\t the
\nentries made  in Ex.  J. We  propose at\t this stage to refer
\nbriefly to the oral evidence only in so far as it is alleged
\nto corroborate\tEx. J  and we  shall deal with the main oral
\nevidence after\twe have\t completed  the\t discussion  of\t the
\ndocumentary evidence.\n<\/p>\n
     It\t was  contended\t by  Mr.  Tarkunde,  which  is\talso
\nreiterated in  the Summary of arguments supplied to us, that
\nthe defence  witnesses referred to above support some of the
\nstatements made\t in Ex. J. It was argued that while the said
\nExhibit mentions Barisal Singh and Ramhit Singh as among the
\nfour zamindars\twho were in possession of Taluka Majhwa, the
\noral evidence  shows that  Barisal  Singh  was\tson  of\t Ram
\nFaquira who was one of the sons of Bansidhar Singh and whose
\nline became  extinct with  the\tdeath  of  his\tthree  sons,
\nincluding Barisal.  In the  first place,  this\targument  is
\nbased on  a wrong  interpretation of the terms used in Ex. J
\nin respect  of Barisal\tSingh who  has not been mentioned as
\nbeing a\t direct descendant  of Hirday  Narain Singh.  It  is
\npossible that Barisal Singh may have been
\n853<\/span>
\ndistantly related  to or  formed a member of the brotherhood
\nof Hirday  Narain Singh\t but the  document does\t not at\t all
\nindicate that  he was  a direct\t descendant of Hirday Narain
\nSingh.\n<\/p>\n
     Coming now to the oral evidence on this point, reliance
\nwas placed on the statement of DW 33 Bhairo Prasad who is 85
\nto 86  years old  and is a resident of Mirzapur. At page 436
\nof volume,  I, the  witness states  that Ram Fakir had three
\nsons Barisal,  Ram Singh  and Ratan  Singh and\tthat all the
\nthree sons  of Fakir  Singh died  issuless. As\tregards\t the
\ngenealogy, he  states that  he came to know of the genealogy
\nof Bansidhar Singh and his descendants from Nand Kumar Singh
\nand Jugal  Bahadur Singh and from his own grandfather. There
\nis, however,  nothing to  show as  to what  special means of
\nknowledge regarding  the genealogy  he possessed.  Secondly,
\nthe witness  has nowhere  said that Barisal Singh and others
\nwere directly  related to  Hirday Narain  Singh because that
\nseems to  be the main link and the pivotal base of the claim
\nof the\tplaintiff. This witness was born in 1879 whereas the
\nReport is  of the  year 1810. It is obvious, therefore, that
\nthe memory  of Durga  Prasad would  be much  fresher and  he
\nwould have  better knowledge  than this witness to prove the
\nplaintiffs’ genealogy  and  particularly  the  name  of\t the
\nelders of  Pahalwan Singh  about whom  he had  to submit his
\nReport.\n<\/p>\n
     Furthermore, we  are unable  to see how the evidence of
\nthis witness  supports the plaintiffs which merely says that
\nRam Fakir  had three  sons, viz.,  Barisal,  Ram  Singh\t and
\nRattan Singh.  He does not say anywhere in his evidence that
\neither Ram  Fakir or his sons were in any way connected with
\nHirday Narain Singh. At another place, the witness says that
\nBansidhar Singh\t had three  sons, viz.,\t Ramruch Singh,\t Ram
\nFakir and  Debi Singh and Gajraj Singh was Debi Singh’s son.
\nIn the\tReport (Ex.  J) there  is  absolutely  no  reference
\neither to  Bansidhar Singh  or to Ram Fakir Singh or Ramruch
\nSingh. The  only person\t who is\t mentioned in  the Report is
\nDebi Singh  who is  said to  be descendant  of Hirday Narain
\nSingh. There  is also no reference to Bansidhar Singh in the
\nentire Report.\tThus, the  starting point  of the  genealogy
\ngiven by  him is  after the Report (Ex. J) was submitted. We
\nare, therefore,\t unable to  see how  the  evidence  of\tthis
\nwitness in any way corroborates Ex. J.\n<\/p>\n
     Reliance was  then placed\ton the\tevidence of  DW\t 34,
\nNagendra Kumar. At page 446 of Voume I. This witness is aged
\n60 years  and claims  to belong\t to Gautam  gotra. He states
\nthat the ancestor
\n854<\/span>
\nof the\tmembers of his family was Babu Hansraj Singh who had
\ntwo sons,  Hari Narain\tSingh and  Hirday Narain Singh. Hari
\nNarain had a son Sah Makund and he claims to be a descendant
\nof Makund  separated by\t several degrees  below. He  further
\nstates that  Bansidhar Singh  was the  son of  Hirday Narain
\nSingh. If the facts spoken by him are correct then we should
\nhave expected a clear mention of the name of his ancestor in
\nEx. J.\tOn the other hand, though Durga Prasad was expressly
\nentrusted the  task of finding out the details of the elders
\nof Pahalwan Singh yet he does not mention that Hirday Narain
\nSingh was  son of  Hansraj  Singh.  In\tfact,  there  is  no
\nreference to  Hansraj Singh  at all.  He further  goes on to
\nstate that Bansidhar Singh had three sons, namely, Ram Fakir
\nSingh, Ramruch\tSingh and  Debi Singh.\tThis  is  completely
\ncontradicted by\t the statements\t made in  Ex. J as discussed
\nabove. In the whole Report, there is absolutely no reference
\neither\tto   Ramruch  Singh  or\t Bansidhar  Singh  as  being
\nconnected with\tHirday\tNarain\tSingh.\tFor  these  reasons,
\ntherefore, we  are unable  to agree with the argument of the
\nplaintiffs’ counsel that Ex. J is corroborated in any way by
\nthe evidence of this witness.\n<\/p>\n
     Reliance was then placed on the evidence of DW 35, Debi
\nSingh who claims to be a resident of mauza Majhwa and states
\nthat his  ancestors were residents of Majhwa and that Bikram
\nSah was\t ten degrees  above him.  According to\this evidence
\nBikram Sah and Bansidhar Singh were full brothers being sons
\nof Hirday  Narain Singh\t who was  son of  Hansraj Singh. His
\nevidence is  completely falsified  by the statements made in
\nthe Report  where there\t is no\treference either  to Hansraj
\nSingh or to Bansidhar Singh. We have shown from the contents
\nof Ex.\tJ that\tDurga Prasad bas clearly mentioned the names
\nof the sons of direct descendants of Hirday Narain Singh. If
\nBansidhar Singh\t and Bikram  Sah were  really sons of Hirday
\nNarain Singh,  he could\t not have missed this important fact
\nwhich was  very pertinent for the purpose of his Report. The
\nwitness then goes on to state that Bansidhar Singh had three
\nsons, viz.,  Debi Singh,  Ramruch Singh and Ram Fakir. While
\nthere is  clear reference  to Debi  Singh in Ex. J, there is
\nabsolutely no  reference to  Ramruch  Singh  or\t Ram  Fakir.
\nTherefore, far\tfrom corroborating  the contents of Ex. J he
\npositively contradicts\tthe same. Further comments regarding
\nthis witness would be made when we discuss the oral evidence
\nof the parties. At present it is sufficient to show that the
\narguments  of\tthe  respondents   counsel  that  Ex.  J  is
\ncorroborated by\t the evidence  of this\twitness\t are  wholly
\nuntenable.\n<\/p>\n
855<\/span><\/p>\n
     Reliance was  then placed\ton the\tevidence of  DW\t 36,
\nMahadeo Singh  who seems to be an interested witness because
\naccording  to  his  evidence  his  ancestors  and  those  of
\nBhagwati Prasad\t Singh, father of the plaintiff, had been on
\nvisiting, dining  and inviting terms with the family of Babu
\nBhagwati Prasad\t Singh right from the time of his ancestors.
\nHe states  that Bhagwati  Prasad Singh\tand Harendra Kishore
\nSingh were  descendants from  a common ancestor who was Babu
\nBansidhar Singh.  Bansidhar Singh  had three  sons, Ramruch,
\nExam Fakir  Singh and Debi Singh, and Gajraj Singh was a son
\nof  Ram\t  Fakir\t Singh.\t His  evidence\tex  facie  does\t not
\ncorroborate the\t Report (Ex.  J). As in the case of previous
\nwitnesses, so  here also  we do\t not find  any reference  to
\neither Bansidhar Singh or Ramruch Singh. It is impossible to
\nbelieve that if Ramruch Singh or Gajraj Singh were connected
\nwith the  family of  Hirday Narain Singh this fact would not
\nbe mentioned  in the  Report. Furthermore, neither Bansidhar
\nSingh nor  the fact  that Debi\tSingh was a son of Bansidhar
\nSingh has  been mentioned  in the Report, and this important
\nevent could  not have  been missed  by Durga  Prasad in\t his
\ndetailed  and\tcopious\t Report.  WE  shall  deal  with\t the
\nintrinsic merits  later but  what we have said is sufficient
\nto demonstrate\tthat like  other witnesses, i e., DWs 33, 34
\nand 35\tthis witness also does not corroborate the Report of
\nDurga Prasad.  There is\t one important fact in the statement
\nof this\t witness which is that he says that Ramhit Singh was
\na son  of Madho\t Singh who  was one  of the  sons of  Hirday
\nNarain Singh.  This is, however, clearly contradicted by the
\nReport of  Durga Prasad which mentions that Ramhit Singh was
\nthe son\t of Hirday Narain Singh and not of Madho Singh whose
\nname has  not been  mentioned at  all. This  fact  far\tfrom
\ncorroborating the  Report (Ex.\tJ) directly  contradicts the
\nsaid Report (Ex J).\n<\/p>\n
     As regards\t the documentary  evidence which  is said to
\ncorroborate Ex.\t J, we\tmight observe  at this stage that if
\nthe probative  value of\t Ex. J\tis zero,  it can  hardly  be
\ncorroborated by\t any other  document which  will have  to be
\njudged and examined on its own merits.\n<\/p>\n
     Reference was  made to  Ex. L which is a petition given
\nby Raja Udit Narain Singh of Banaras seeking verification of
\nhis rights  from all  the zamindars,  lambardars  and  other
\nrevenue officials  as  also  the  respectable  residents  of
\nTaluka Majhwa,\tPargana Kaswar,\t Sirkar of  Banaras  to\t the
\neffect that  that the  entire taluka was the khas ancestoral
\nzamindari interest of Babu Pahalwan Singh, owned and
\n856<\/span>
\npossessed by  him generation after generation. This document
\nis dated  March 14,  1818, about  5 years  after Ex.  J\t was
\nsubmitted by  Durga  Prasad.  Apart  from  the\tquestion  of
\nadmissibility of  this document, it merely gives the history
\nof the\tZamindari of  Raja of  Banaras and also mentions the
\nfact that  this Zamindari was purchased by the father of the
\napplicant for  a sum  of Rs. 59, 864. 11 annas. In the first
\nplace, the  only purpose  for which  support is sought to be
\nmustered by  the plaintiffs  is that there is a reference to
\nPahalwan Singh\tas being  a descendant of Udit Narain Singh.
\nAs Durga  Prasad was  asked to\tfind out  the  name  of\t the
\nancestors of  Pahalwan\tSingh,\tthis  document\tis  said  to
\ncorroborate this statement made in Ex. J. It is, however not
\nvery clear  as to  what was  the occasion  for sending\tthis
\npetition and  what was the eventual fate which it met. It is
\nmerely a  statement of\tUdit Narain  Singh, and the document
\ndoes not  show that it is based on his personal knowledge or
\nthat the  petitioner acquired  knowledge from his ancestors.
\nHowever, as  it is  not disputed  that\tPahalwan  Singh\t was
\nundoubtedly an\tancestor of  the late  Manaraja and his name
\nfinds place in the plaintiffs’ genealogy, nothing turns upon
\nthis statement\tbecause the  defendant does  not dispute the
\ngenealogy not  only up to Pahalwan Singh but even higher. As
\ndiscussed above,  the main link is to be established between
\nGajraj Singh,  Ramruch Singh  and Debi Singh. On this point,
\nthis document  throws no  light\t at  all  and  is  therefore
\nvalueless. Nobody  ever disputed that Pahalwan Singh was not
\na grandson of Debi Singh. Even otherwise, the document Ex. L
\nis of doubtful admissibility,
\n     It was  further contended\tthat this  document supports
\nthe statement in Ex J that Debi Singh, Barisal Singh, Ramhit
\nSingh and  Gajraj Singh were family members of Hirday Narain
\nSingh. This argument however, is utterly misconceived and is
\nbased on a wrong interpretation of Ex. J which nowhere shows
\nthat Debi  Singh, Barisal  Singh, Ramhit  Singh\t and  Gajraj
\nSingh were  family members  of Hirday Narain Singh. All that
\nit says\t is that  they belonged\t to the\t brotherhood of Debi
\nSingh. In fact, as we have shown, the names mentioned in Ex.
\nJ regarding  the parentage of Barisal Singh and Ramhit Singh
\nand Debi  Singh are  quite different  from the\tcase of\t the
\nplaintiffs. Furthermore,  assuming that\t the aforesaid\tfour
\npersons ere  members of\t the family  of Hirday Narain Singh,
\nEx. J  does not\t show in  what manner Ramruch and Debi Singh
\nwere related  or that  Gajraj Singh  was a  son\t of  Ramruch
\nSingh.\n<\/p>\n
857<\/span><\/p>\n
     Reliance was  then placed\ton Ex. DD (38)-vol. IV, page
\n251- which  is a  judgment delivered  on April 25, 1801 in a
\nsuit  between\tDeo  Narain  Singh  and\t Mohan\tSingh,\twho,
\naccording to  the plaintiffs, were grandsons of Gajraj Singh
\nin respect  of zamindari  of village  Baraini. Reliance\t was
\nplaced on  the mention\tof  the\t fact  in  Ex.\tJ  that\t the
\nsettlement of  village Baraini\twas made  in favour of Mohan
\nSingh who  was a  descendant of\t Gajraj Siugh or Gajraj Sahi
\nAssuming that this statement is correct, it does not advance
\nthe case  of the  plaintiffs any  further because Ex. J does
\nnot at all show that Gajraj Singh was a son of Ramruch Singh
\nand a grandson of Bansidhar Singh or a nephew of Debi Singh.\n<\/p>\n
     Reference was then made to Ex. (I)-Vol.III, page 72 Ex.
\nat page\t 105 in\t the same volume, and Ex.DD (44) at page 107
\nin Vol.\t IV, as\t being instances of various grants made from
\ntime to time by Debi Singh in taluka Majhwa. These documents
\nmerely corroborate  the statement  in Ex.  J that Debi Singh
\nwas one\t of the\t zamindars in  possession of  taluka Majhwa.
\nThis fact  is also  undisputed and  1 corroboration,  or  no
\ncorroboration the  appellants have not challenged either the
\nauthenticity of\t this statement\t or the fact that Debi Singh
\nwas a zamindar of taluka Majhwa.\n<\/p>\n
     Ex. NN  (6)-Vol. V, page 215- consists of extracts from
\nthe Banaras Gazeteer. This Gazeteer merely speeks of Barisal
\nSingh as  being one  of the  persons who  ware killed in the
\nbattle of  Marui in  or about  the  year  1719.\t It  is\t not
\ndisputed that  Barisal Singh  was  undoubtedly\tone  of\t the
\nzamindars of  the village  and was  in possession of village
\nMajhwa\tbut  this  fact\t alone\tcannot\tprove  any  link  or
\nconnection  between  the  plaintiffs  and  Gajraj  Singh  or
\nbetween Gajraj Singh and Debi Singh.\n<\/p>\n
     Ex. TT (Vol. IV, page 238) is another document which is
\nrelied on for corroborating Ex. J. This document merely says
\nthat zamindari\tpatta of  village Jalalpur  in taluka Majhwa
\nwas executed  in favour\t of Farman Singh and after his death
\nhis sons  Zalim\t Singh\tand  Ramhit  Singh  obtained  patta.
\nAssuming that  the statement  made above is correct, it only
\ntakes us to Farman Singh who is said to be the son of Gajraj
\nSingh. We  have already\t indicated above  that so far as the
\nplaintiffs’ genealogy  is concerned,  the link\tupto  Gajraj
\nSingh on the right side and upto Debi Singh on the left side
\nis clearly proved but that does not substantiate the case of
\nthe plaintiffs\tunless they  further prove that Gajraj Singh
\nwas son of Ramruch Singh and
\n858<\/span>
\na nephew  of Debi  Singh. If this link is missing, the claim
\nof the plaintiffs must fail.\n<\/p>\n
     Similarly, Exhibits  GGG-3,  GGG-4,  GGG-5,  GGG-6\t and
\nGGG-8 at  pages 187,  192, 209,\t 188 and  208 (in volume lV)
\nrespectively are  documents in\tthe nature or mortgage deeds
\nexecuted  by  the  heirs  of  Gajraj  Singh  in\t respect  of
\nZamindari interest  in village Baraini. These documents also
\nare  hardly   relevant\tfor   the  purpose  of\tproving\t the
\nplaintiff’s genealogy  or to  show that\t he was the next and
\nnearest reversioner of the late Maharaja.\n<\/p>\n
     Similarly, Ex.  WW (Vol.  IV, page 185) proves that the
\nzamindari patta in respect of village Baraini was granted to
\nMohan Singh,  a fact  mentioned in Ex. J which is not at all
\nrelevant for  our purpose  in determining the correctness of
\nthe plaintiff’s genealogy.\n<\/p>\n
     Ex. SS  (Vol. IV,\tpage 376) is a Report. Of Salik Ram,
\nSerishtadar Sadar  (Deputy  Collector)\tin  respect  of\t the
\nsettlement of village Baraini and subsequent transactions in
\nrespect of  the zamindari  of that  village.  This  document
\nrefers to  the settlement  of the village in favour of Mohan
\nSingh in  1197 Fasli and records subsequent transfers. Mohan
\nSingh’s name  is also  mentioned in Ex. J and to this extent
\nit corroborates\t the Exhibit but this corroboration is of no
\nuse because  there is  no dispute  that Mohan  Singh  was  a
\ngrandson of Gajraj Singh.\n<\/p>\n
     Thus, all\tthe documents  referred to  above and relied
\nupon by\t the plaintiffs-respondents  for corroborating Ex. J
\nare  practically   of  no  value  in  determining  the\treal
\ncontroversy in\tissue. The  plaintiffs seem to have got hold
\nof several  old documents  wherever they could find the same
\nand wherever they found the names of the descendants of Debi
\nSingh or  Gajraj Singh,\t without laying\t their pands  on any
\ndocument  which\t may  show  that  Debi\tSingh,\twas  son  of
\nBansidhar Singh\t and own  brother of  Ramruch Singh who also
\nwas another son of Debi Singh, and that Gajraj Singh was son
\nof Ramruch  Singh. In  fact, the last of the ancestors shown
\nin the\tplaint genealogy  is Bansidhar Singh whose name also
\ndoes not  find any  mention in\tEx, J.\tBut, for purposes of
\nthis case we may assume that Bansidhar Singh was the highest
\nancestor-of the\t late Maharaja and hence unless it is proved
\nthat Bansidhar\tSingh had  two sons-Debi  Singh and  Ramruch
\nSingh-and Ramruch’s  son was  Gajraj  Singh,  the  genealogy
\nrelied upon  by the  plaintiff cannot  be said\tto have been
\nproved. It is not
\n859<\/span>
\nnecessary for  us to  make any\tfurther\t comments  on  these
\ndocuments because  they do  not show anything beyond what we
\nhave said.\n<\/p>\n
     The explanation  which is\tsought to  be given  by\t the
\nrespondents for\t the absence of names of Bansidhar Singh and
\nRamruch Singh  is that\tsince Durga  Prasad was\t writing the
\nreport in  the year  1810, by  which time both Bansidhar and
\nRamruch had  already died,  there could\t be no\tquestion  of
\ntheir names  finding a place in the Report. This argument in
\nour opinion,  is wholly\t untenable. We\thave already pointed
\nout that the main task with which Durga Prasad was entrusted
\nwas to\tfind out  the ancestors\t of Pahalwan  Singh  and  if
\nBansidhar and  Ramruch were really the ancestors of Pahalwan
\nSingh, their  names could  not have escaped the attention of
\nDurga Prasad  particularly when\t the name  of Hirday  Narain
\nSingh, who  is higher  than Bansidhar Singh, is mentioned in
\nthe Report  conspicuously. Secondly, in view of the scope of
\nthe enquiry  embarked upon  by Durga  Prasad, he had to find
\nout the\t ancestors from the records and he says very clearly
\nin his\tReport that  his information was based on records in
\nthe Serista,  particularly  the\t Tumar\t(account  book).  If
\nBansidhar and  Ramruch had  in fact  been directly connected
\nwith Debi  Singh or  Pahalwan Singh,  there is no reason why
\nDurga Prasad  should not  have mentioned  their names  as  .
\nbeing ancestors\t of Pahalwan Singh who appeared to be only 2
\nto 3  degrees remote  from  them.  In  these  circumstances,
\ntherefore, the absence of the names of the aforesaid persons
\nin Ex.\tJ is,  in our  opinion a  conclusive circumstance to
\nshow that  there  was  no  relationship\t between  Bansidhar,
\nRamruch and  Pahalwan  Singh.  This  conclusion\t is  further
\nfortified by  the fact\tthat even  Gajraj  Sahi\t (or  Gajraj
\nSingh) who  was the  only son  of Ramruch  and a grandson of
\nBansidhar, finds  specific mention  in the Report. For these
\nreasons, we  reject the\t explanation given by the respondent
\non this point.\n<\/p>\n
     In view of our analysis of the document, we need not go
\ninto their admissibility though it is extremely doubtful how
\nthe statements\tmade by\t various persons  without disclosing
\ntheir means of knowledge can be said to be admissible.\n<\/p>\n
     It appears to us that what the plaintiff’s seem to have
\ndone in\t this case  is that taking advantage of the recitals
\nin Ex.\tJ and  of certain  names  of  persons  who  were  in
\npossession of  Mauza Majhwa  and village  Baraini, they took
\nEx. J  as the  base fore  relying  on  some  statements\t and
\nobservations made by Durga Prasad out of context
\n860<\/span>
\nand tried to connect Gajraj Singh with Bansidhar Singh by an
\ningenious process  of joining  tits  and  bits,\t pieces\t and
\npatches here  and there\t so  as\t to  reconstruct  an  exotic
\ngenealogy  by\tinserting  willy-nilly\t Gajraj\t Singh\t and
\nBansidhar Singh\t as being  their ancestors.  The methodology
\nadopted by  them has achieved precious little and is nothing
\nbut a futile and an acrimonious exercise.\n<\/p>\n
     We have  already shown that the scheme followed and the
\nmodus operandi\tadopted by  the plaintiffs  are based  on an
\nincorrect  translation\t and  wrong  interpretation  of\t the
\nmeaning of  actual words in Persian with the result that the
\nentire scheme  followed by  them instead of effectuating the
\ngoal sought  to be achieved by them, has rendered their case
\ntotally abortive.  With these  findings and  observations we
\nclose  the   chapter  so  far  as  Ex.\tJ  and\tits  alleged
\ncorroboration by documentary and oral evidence is concerned.\n<\/p>\n
     We now  pass on to the next limb of the argument of the
\nplaintiffs-respondents, viz.,  that there  are unimpeachable
\ndocuments  which   throw  a  flood  of\tlight  on  the\tcase
\npropounded by them in their plaint. In this connection, they
\nhave relied on private documents, public documents, recitals
\nin judgments, judgments inter parties as also judgment which
\nare not\t inter parties\tsale deeds, mortgage deeds and other
\ndocuments of  a simlar\tnature which  we proceed  to discuss
\nhere after  but before doing so we would like to expound the
\nlegal position of the admissibility of most of the documents
\nwhich have  been filed by the plaintiffs in support of their
\ncase. For  this purpose,  the documents\t may  be  classified
\nunder three heads-\n<\/p>\n
     (1) documents which are per se inadmissible,
\n     (2) recitals in judgments not inter patties, and
\n     (3) documents or judgments post litem motam.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     In order  to put  the record  straight we would briefly
\ndiscuss the the case law on the subject and refer to some of
\nthe important  authorities of  this Court  and those  of the
\nPrivy Council  or some of the High Courts which appear to us
\nto be very relevant.\n<\/p>\n
     Taking  the   first  head,\t it  is\t well  settled\tthat
\njudgments of  courts are  admissible in\t evidence under\t the
\nprovisions of  sections 40,  41 and  42 of the Evidence Act.
\nSection 43  which is  extracted below, clearly provides that
\nthose judgments which do not fall within the
\n861<\/span>
\nfour corners  of sections  40 to  42 are inadmissible unless
\nthe existence  of such judgment, order or decree is itself a
\nfact in\t issue or a relvant fact under some other provisions
\nof the Evidence Act:-\n<\/p>\n
\t  “43.\tJudgments,   etc.,  other   than  those
\n     mentioned in  sections 40\tto 42,\twhen  relevant-
\n     Judgments, orders\tor decrees,  other  than  those
\n     mentioned\tin   sections  40,   41\t and   42,  are
\n     irrelevant, unless the existence of such judgment?
\n     order or decree is a fact in issue, or is relevant
\n     under some other provision of this Act.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     Some  Courts   have  used\t section  13  to  prove\t the
\nadmissibility of  a judgment  as coming under the provisions
\nof s. 43, referred to above. We are, however, of the opinion
\nthat where  there  is  a  specific  provision  covering\t the
\nadmissibility of  a document, it is not open to the court to
\ncall into  aid other  general provisions  in order to make a
\nparticular  document   admissible.  In\torder  words,  if  a
\njudgment is  not admissible  as not falling within the ambit
\nof sections 40 to 42, it must fulfil the conditions of s. 43
\notherwise it  cannot be relevant under s. 13 of the Evidence
\nAct. The  words “other\tprovisions of this Act” cannot cover
\ns. 13  because this  section does not deal with judgments at
\nall
\n     It is  also well  settled that  a judgment\t in rem like
\njudgments passed  in  probate,\tinsolvency,  matrimonial  or
\nguardianship or\t other similar proceedings, is admissible in
\nall cases  whether such\t judgments are inter parties or not.
\nIn the\tinstant case,  however, all the documents consisting
\nof judgments  filed are\t not judgments in rem and therefore,
\nthe question  of their\tadmissibility on that basis does not
\narise, As mentioned earlier, the judgments filed as Exhibits
\nin  the\t  instant  case,   are\tjudgments  in  personam\t and
\ntherefore, they do not fulfil the conditions mentioned in s.
\n41 of the Evidence Act.\n<\/p>\n
     It is  now settled law that judgments not inter parties
\nare inadmissible in evidence barring exceptional cases which
\nwe  shall   point  out\t hereafter.  In\t Johan\tCockrane  v.
\nHurrosoondurri Debia  & Ors.,(1)  Lord Justice\tBruce  while
\ndealing with  the question  of admissibility  of a  judgment
\nobserved as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “With regard\tto the\tjudgment of the Supreme
\n     Court, it\tis plain,  that considering the parties
\n     to the suit in which
\n862<\/span>
\n     that judgment was given, it is not evidence in the
\n     present case..  We must  recollect,  however,  not
\n     only that\tthat suit  had a  different object from
\n     the present,  independently of  the difference  of
\n     parties, but that the evidence here is beyond, and
\n     is different  from,  that\twhich  was  before  the
\n     Supreme Court upon the occasion of delivering that
\n     judgment.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     It is  true that  in  the\tabove-mentioned\t case  their
\nLordships felt that in some cases a decision proceeding from
\na Tribunal  must be  given due defference but cases like the
\none which  was being  dealt  with  by  their  Lordships\t the
\njudgment was not admissible.\n<\/p>\n
     In Jogendro Deb Roy Kut v. Funindro Deb Roy Kut(1)
\nthe following observeations were made:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “If such  a suit,  as\t the  first  suit,  was
\n     brought here  and tried  according to  the law  of
\n     this Country  there could\tnot be\ta pretence  for
\n     saying, that  the judgment\t in it\twas any,  thing
\n     like judgment in rem or that it could bind any but
\n     the parties  to the  suit.. It  is sufficient  for
\n     their Lordships  to say, that the judgment pleaded
\n     in this  case in  bar cannot  be treated as one of
\n     that nature  upon any  principles, whether derived
\n     from the  English Law or from the Law and practice
\n     of India, which can be applied to it.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     In the  case of  Gujju Lall  v. Fatteh  Lall(2) a\tFull
\nBench exhaustively  considered the  ambit and scope of ss 40
\nto 43 of the Evidence Act and observed thus:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “On the  other hand,\twhen in\t a law prepared
\n     for such  a purpose, and under such circumstances,
\n     we find  a group  of several  sections prefaced by
\n     the title\t“Judgments of  Courts of  Justice  when
\n     relevant,” that  seems to\tbe a  good  reason  for
\n     thinking  that,  as  far  as  the\tAct  goes,  the
\n     relevancy of  any particular  judgment  is\t to  be
\n     allowed or\t disallowed  with  reference  to  those
\n     sections.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     …\t\t   …\t\t       …\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  I have  had the  opportunity of  reading  the
\n     judgment  which  the  Chief  Justice  proposes  to
\n     deliver, as well the
\n863<\/span>
\n     observations of  my brother  Pontifex, in\tboth of
\n     which I  generally concur,\t and  for  the\treasons
\n     there stated,  and\t those\twhich  I  have\tshortly
\n     given, I consider the evidence inadmissible.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
And Garth, C. J. made the following observations:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “It is  obvious  that,  if  the  construction
\n     which the\trespondent’s counsel  would put upon s.
\n     13 is  right, there  would be no necessity for ss.
\n     40, 41,  and 42 at all. Those sections would then.
\n     Only tend\tto mislead, because the judgments which
\n     are  made\tadmissible  under  them\t would\tall  be
\n     equally admissible\t as “transaction”  under s. 13,
\n     and not  only those,  but an  infinite variety  of
\n     other  judgments\twhich  had  never  before  been
\n     admissible either\tin this\t country or in England.
\n     And it  is difficult to conceive why, under s. 42,
\n     judgments though  not  between  the  same\tparties
\n     should be\tdeclared admissible  so\t long  as  they
\n     related to\t matters of  a public  nature, if those
\n     very  same\t  judgment  had\t  already   been   made
\n     admissible under  s. 13,  whether they  related to
\n     matters of a public nature or not.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     …\t\t …\t\t       …\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  I am,\t therefore, of\tthe  opinion  that  the
\n     former judgment  was not admissible in the present
\n     suit.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t\t\t\t     (Emphasis ours)
\n     In\t Gadadhar   Chowdhury  &   Ors.\t v.   Sarat  Chandra
\nChakravarty & Ors.(1) it was held that findings in judgments
\nnot inter  parties are\tnot admissible\tin evidence. In this
\nconnection a  Division Bench  of  the  Calcutta\t High  Court
\nobserved as follows:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  “Though  the\t recitals  and\tfindings  in  a
\n     judgment not  inter parties  are not admissible in
\n     evidence, such  a judgment\t and decree are, in our
\n     opinion, admissible  Lo  prove  the  fact\tthat  a
\n     decree was\t made in a suit between certain parties
\n     and for  finding out  for what  lands the suit had
\n     been decreed.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     This, in  our opinion,  is the  correct legal  position
\nregarding the admissibility of judgments not inter parties,
\n864<\/span>
\n     In Maharaja  Sir Kesho  Prasad Singh Bahadur v. Bahuria
\nMt. Bhagjogna  Kuer &  Ors.(1) the  Privy Council  made\t the
\nfollowing observations:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  “Whether based  upon sound  general principle
\n     or merely supported by reasons of convenience, the
\n     rule that\tso far\tas regards  the\t truth\tof  the
\n     matter  decided   a  judgment  is\tnot  admissible
\n     evidence against one who is a stranger to the suit
\n     has long  been  accepted  as  a  general  rule  in
\n     English law.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     Their Lordships  find themselves  in agreement with the
\nobservation of Ross, J:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  ‘The judgment is not inter parties, nor is it
\n     a judgment\t in rem, nor does it relate to a matter
\n     of a  public nature. The existence of the judgment
\n     is not  a fact  in issue;\tand if the existence of
\n     the  judgment   is\t relevant  under  some\tof  the
\n     provisions of  the Evidence Act it is difficult to
\n     see what inference can be drawn from its use under
\n     these sections.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  Serious consequences\tmight ensue  as regards
\n     titles to land in India if it were recognised that
\n     a judgment\t against  a  third  party  altered  the
\n     burden of\tproof as  between rival\t claimants, and
\n     much ‘indirect laying’ might be expected to follow
\n     therefrom.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t\t\t    (Emphasis supplied)
\n     This principle  was reiterated in the case of Coca-Cola
\nCo. of\tCanada Ltd.  (already referred to on the question of
\nrelevancy of  dictionary while\tdealing with  Ex.  J)  where
\ntheir Lordships in most categorical terms expressed the view
\nthat no\t judgment which\t was not inter parties or the one to
\nwhich neither  the plaintiff  nor the defendant were parties
\ncould be  used in  evidence for any purpose. It appears that
\nin the case referred to above the President of the Exchequer
\nCourt had  relied on  facts found  in the  judgment  of\t the
\nChancellor  and\t  drawn\t support  from\tthe  uncontradicated
\nevidence  given\t  by  the   Chancellor.\t The  Privy  Council
\ndiprected this\tpractice of  relying on judgments which were
\nnot inter  parties in  the sense  that a  judgment in  which
\nneither the plaintiff nor the defendant were parties, and in
\nthis connection Lord Russell observed thus:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
865<\/span><\/p>\n
\t  “The\tlearned\t  President  relied   on   this
\n     judgment”\tas   very  formidable  support\tto  the
\n     plaintiff’s contention that …there is likelihood
\n     of confusion”;  but in their Lordships’ opinion he
\n     was not  entitled to  refer  to  or  rely\tupon  a
\n     Judgment given in proceedings to which neither the
\n     plaintiff\tnor  the  defendant  was  a  party,  as
\n     proving the facts stated therein.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t\t\t    (Emphasis supplied)
\n     We entirely  agree with  the observations\tmade by\t the
\nPrivy Council  which flow  from a  correct interpretation of
\nsections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     Same view\twas taken by a full Bench of the Madras High
\nCourt in Seethapti Rao Dora v. Venkanna Dora & Ors(1). where
\nKumaraswami Sastri, J. Observed thus:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “I am\t of opinion  that  section  35\thas  no
\n     application to  judgments, and  a\tjudgment  which
\n     would not be admissible under sections 40 to 43 of
\n     the Evidence  Act would not become relevant merely
\n     because it\t contains a  a statement  as to\t a fact
\n     which is  in issue\t or relevant  in a suit between
\n     persons who  are not  parties or privies. Sections
\n     40 to  44\tof  the\t Evidence  Act\tdeal  with  the
\n     relevancy of judgments in Courts of justice.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     The cumulative  effect of\tthe decisions cited above on
\nthis point clearly is that under the Evidence Act a judgment
\nwhich is  not inter  parties  is  inadmissible\tin  evidence
\nexcept for  the limited\t purpose of  proving as\t to who\t the
\nparties\t were  and  what  was  the  decree  passed  and\t the
\nproperties which  were the  subject matter  of the  suit. In
\nthese circumstances,  therefore,  it  is  not  open  to\t the
\nplaintiffs respondents\tto derive  any support\tfrom some of
\nthe judgments  which they  have filed  in order\t to  support
\ntheir title and relationship in which neither the plaintiffs
\nnor the\t defendants were  parties. Indeed,  if the judgments
\nare used  for the  limited purpose  mentioned above, they do
\nnot take us anywhere so as to prove the plaintiffs case.\n<\/p>\n
     It is also well settled that statements or declarations
\nbefore persons\tof competent knowledge made ante litem motam
\nare receivable\tto prove  ancient  rights  of  a  public  or
\ngeneral nature vide
\n866<\/span>
\nHalsbury’s Laws\t of England  (Vol. IS:\t3rd Edition, p. 308)
\nwhere the following statement is to be found: ‘
\n\t  “Declarations\t  by\tdeceased   persons   of
\n     competent knowledge,  made ante  litem motam,  are
\n     receivable to  prove ancient rights of a public or
\n     general nature.  The admission  of declarations as
\n     to those rights is allowed partly on the ground of
\n     necessity, since  without\tsuch  evidence\tancient
\n     rights could  rarely be established; and partly on
\n     the ground\t that the  public nature  of the rights
\n     minimises the risks of mis-statement.”\n<\/p>\n
     The admissibility\tof such\t declarations  is,  however,
\nconsiderably weakened  if it  pertains not  to public rights
\nbut to\tpurely private\trights. It  is equally\twell settled
\nthat declarations  or statements made post litem motam would
\nnot be\tadmissible because  in cases or proceedings taken or
\ndeclarations made  ante litem motam, the element of bias and
\nconcoction is eliminated. Before, however, the statements of
\nthe nature  mentioned above  can be admissible as being ante
\nlitem  motam  they  must  be  not  only\t before\t the  actual
\nexistence of  any controversy  but they\t should be made even
\nbefore\tthe  commencement  of  legal  proceedings.  In\tthis
\nconnection, in\tpara 562  at page  308 of Halsbury’s Laws of
\nEngland (supra) the following statement is made:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “To obviate  bias, the declarations must have
\n     been made ante litem motam, which means not merely
\n     before the\t commencement of legal proceedings, but
\n     before  even   the\t  existence   of   any\t actual
\n     controversy, concerning  the subject matter of the
\n     declarations. So  strictly\t has  this  requirement
\n     been enforced  that the  fact that\t such a dispute
\n     was unknown  to the declarant, or was fraudulently
\n     begun  with   a   view   to   shutting   out   his
\n     declarations, has been held immaterial.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     This position  however cannot  hold good  of statements
\nmade post  Item motam which would be clearly inadmissible in
\nevidence. The  reason for this rule seems to be that after a
\ndispute has begun or a legal proceeding is about to commence
\nthe possibility\t of bias,  concoction or  putting  up  false
\npleas cannot  be ruled out. This rule of English law has now
\nbeen crystallised  as one of the essential principles of the
\nEvidence Act  on the  question of admissibility of judgments
\nor documents. M.M. Prassd, J, has dealt with this
\n867<\/span>
\naspect of  the matter  fully and  we entirely agree with the
\nopinion expressed  by him  on this  point In  fact,  section
\n32(5) of  the Evidence\tAct itself  fully  incorporates\t the
\ndoctrine of  post litem\t motam the relevant portion of which
\nmay be extracted thus:\n<\/p>\n
     “32. Cases\t in which statement of relevant fact by
\n\t  person who  is dead or cannot be found, etc.,
\n\t  is relevant
\n     (5)   …. the  person making  the\t statement  had
\n\t  special means\t of  knowledge,\t and  when  the
\n\t  statement was\t made before  the  question  in
\n\t  dispute was raised.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     In Kalka  Prasad & Ors. v. Mathura Prasad (1) the Privy
\nCouncil refused\t to accept  a pedigree which was of the year
\n1892 because  the controversy  had originated  in  the\tyear
\n1891, that  is to say, a year before the pedigree was filed.
\nIn this\t connection, commenting on the genealogy relied upon
\nby the plaintiff their Lordships observed as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “Taking them\tin the\treverse order, the last
\n     is\t inadmissible,\thaving\tbeen  made  post  litem
\n     motam.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     …\t\t  …\t\t\t    …\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  In order  to make  the statement inadmissible
\n     on\t this\tground,\t the  same  thing  must\t be  in
\n     controversy before\t and  after  the  statement  is
\n     made.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     In Hari  Baksh v.\tBabu Lal  & Anr.(2)  their Lordships
\nobserved as follows.\n<\/p>\n
\t  “It appears  to their\t Lordships  that  these
\n     statements\t of   Bishan  Dayal  who  was  then  an
\n     interested party  in the  disputes\t and  was  then
\n     taking a  position adverse to Hari Baksh cannot be
\n     regarded  as   evidence  in   this\t suit  and  are
\n     inadmissible.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     It appears\t in that  case one  Bishan Dayal who was the
\ndefendant in  a suit  for partition  which  was\t brought  on
\nAugust 7,  1908 made a Will on the 26th November, 1908, that
\nis to  say, about  two and  a half months after the suit was
\nfiled. The statement of Bishan
\n868<\/span>
\nDayal in the suit of 1908 was sought to be relied on but the
\nPrivy Council  held the statement to be inadmissible because
\nhe had\talready become\tan interested  party and  the  case,
\ntherefore, had been hit by the doctrine of post litem motam.\n<\/p>\n
     In Dolgobinda  Paricha v.\tNimai Charan Misra & Ors.<\/a>(1)
\nthis  Court   held  that   the\tstatement  in  question\t was
\nadmissible because  it\twas  made  before  the\tquestion  in
\ndispute had  arisen. In other words, this Court held that in
\nthe facts  and circumstances  of that case the statement and
\nthe pedigree  relied upon were made ante litem motam and not
\npost litem  motam, for\tif the latter had been the case, the
\ndocument  would\t  have\tbecome\t inadmissible  and  in\tthis
\nconnection the Court observed thus:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “That being  the position,  the statements as
\n     to pedigree  contained in\tEx. I  were made before
\n     the precise  question in  dispute in  the\tpresent
\n     litigation had arisen.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     In Kalidindi  Venkata Subbaraju  & Ors. v. Chintalapati
\nSupparaju &  Ors<\/a>(2). while  construing the provisions of cl.
\n(5) of\ts. 32  of the  Evidence Act  this Court\t observe  as
\nfollows:-\n<\/p>\n
\t  “Both sub-ss.\t 5 and 6 of s. 32, as aforesaid
\n     declare  that   in\t order\tto  be\tadmissible  the
\n     statement relied  on must be made ante litem motam
\n     by\t persons   who\tare   dead,  i.e.,  before  the
\n     commencement of  any controversy  actual or  legal
\n     upon the same point.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     Relying on\t an earlier  case of  the Privy Council this
\nCourt further observed thus:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “In Kalka  Prasad  v.\t Mathtlra  Prasad(3)  a
\n     dispute arose in 1896 on the death of one Parbati.
\n     In 1898  in a  suit brought  by one  Sheo Sahai  a
\n     pedigree was  filed. After\t this,\tthe  suit  from
\n     which the\tappeal went up to the Privy Council was
\n     instituted in  1901. It  was held\tthere that  the
\n     pedigree filed  in 1898  was not admissible having
\n     been made post litem motam.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
869<\/span><\/p>\n
     Thus,  summarising\t  the  ratio   of  the\t authorities
\nmentioned  above,   the\t position   that  emerges   and\t the
\nprinciples that\t are deducible\tfrom the aforesaid decisions
\nare as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
     (1)   A judgment in rem e. g., judgments or orders
\n\t  passed  in  admiralty,  probate  proceedings,
\n\t  etc., would always be admissible irrespective
\n\t  of whether they are inter parties or not,
\n     (2)   judgments in\t personam not inter parties are
\n\t  not at  all admissible in evidence except for
\n\t  the three purposes mentioned above.
\n     (3)   on a\t parity\t of  aforesaid\treasoning,  the
\n\t  recitals in a judgment like findings given in
\n\t  appreciation of evidence made or arguments or
\n\t  genealogies referred to in the judgment would
\n\t  be  wholly   inadmissible  in\t a  case  where
\n\t  neither the  plaintiff nor the defendant were
\n\t  parties.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (4)   The\tprobative  value  of  documents\t which,
\n\t  however ancient  they may be, do not disclose
\n\t  sources of  their  information  or  have  not
\n\t  achieved  sufficient\tnotoriety  is  precious
\n\t  little.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (5)    Statements,\t declarotions  or  depositions,
\n\t  etc., would  not be  admissible if  they  are
\n\t  post litem motam.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     We\t would\tnow  discuss  the  evidence  both  oral\t and
\ndocumentary in\tthe light of the principles laid down by the
\naforesaid decisions. By way of introduction. it may be noted
\nthat in\t the present  case the\tonus lies  squarely  on\t the
\nplaintiff Radha\t Kirshan Singh\tto prove his case by showing
\nthat he\t was the  next reversioner  of the late Maharaja and
\nthat every  link in  the genealogical  tree which he has set
\nout in\tthe plaint  was proved. Only after he has discharged
\nhis  burden  by\t proving  the  aforesaid  facts,  could\t the
\ndefendents be  called upon to rebut their case. On a careful
\nscrutiny of  the evidence  it seems  that what the plaintiff
\nhas done  is to\t file any  and every  document,\t deposition,
\nstatement, declaration,\t etc., where  there is any genealogy
\nwhich connects\thim with  either the  Maharaja of Banaras or
\nhis gotias without making any attempt to prove the main link
\non which rests the entire fabric of his case. The result has
\nbeen that  the plaintiffs  have\t landed\t themselves  into  a
\nlabyrinth of delusion and,
\n870<\/span>
\ndarkness from which it is difficult for them to come out and
\nthe case  made out  by them  has been reduced to smithereens
\nand smoulders  and despite  all their  snaring and  snarling
\nthey have  miserably failed to prove the pivotal point viz.,
\nthe link between Ramruch Singh, Gajraj Singh, Debi Singh and
\nBansidhar Singh.\n<\/p>\n
     With these\t introductory  remarks\twe  now\t proceed  to
\ndiscuss the  evidence led  by the  Plaintiffs on  the points
\nindicated above.\n<\/p>\n
     In considering  the documentary evidence we shall begin
\nwith the  documents Exhibits  P\/2, V., DD\/30 and DD\/31 which
\nare closely  connected documents.  It would  appear from the
\nplaintiffs,  genealogical   tree,  which  for  the  sake  of
\nconvenience has been put at one place in Volume VIII at page
\n131 and\t which has  been extracted earlier in this judgment,
\nthat Balbhadra\tSingh was  grandson of\tPahalwan  Singh\t and
\nSangam Kuer  was his  sister who died issuless. Bhola Singh,
\non the\tright hand  side of  the genealogy,  was grandson of
\nFarman Singh and son of Deo Narain. It is therefore, obvious
\nthat after  the death  of Jaimed Kuer, Bhola Singh could not
\nbe her\tnext reversioner,  who\twould  be  Harendra  Kishore
\nSingh. Thus,  the title\t conveyed by Bhola Singh to Maharaja
\nof Banaras  under a sale which was the subject matter of Ex.
\nDD\/30 was  a bag of wind and is the surest proof of the fact
\nthat  the   transaction\t in   question\twas  merely  a\tsham
\ntransaction. The  contents of the Sale Deed, Ex. V also show
\nthat  it  was  without\tconsideration  because\tit  contains
\nextraordinary terms  and recitals which will be discussed by
\nus hereafter  and which were seriously commented upon by the
\njudgment Ex. DD\/30 rendered by the trial court in that suit.\n<\/p>\n
     Coming now\t to the\t Sale Deed (Ex. V) at pages 33-34 in
\nVolume III,  it appears\t that the property sought to be sold
\nactually belonged  to Mst.  Jaimed Kuer who died in 1881. In
\nthe Sale  Deed Bhola  Singh claimed (in our opinion falsely)
\nthat he\t was the  legal heir  of Jaimed\t Kuer whereas as the
\ntrue legal heir was the late Maharaja. According to the Sale
\nDeed the  properties in\t question were sold to Prabhu Narain
\nSingh of  Kashi (Banaras)  for a  sum of  Rs. 25,000. In the
\nsale deed,  Bhola Singh had clearly described himself as the
\nsole heir  of Mst.  Jaimed Kuer,  which was admittedly false
\nbecause even  according to  the\t plaintiffs’  genealogy\t the
\nnearest\t heir,\tas  we\thave  already  indicated,  would  be
\nHarendra  Kishore  Singh  and  not  Bhola  Singh.  Secondly,
\nanother extraordinary  feature of  the Sale Deed is that out
\nof the consideration money of Rs. 25,000 a sum of
\n871<\/span>
\nRs. 12,500 that is to say, half the amount, only was paid to
\nthe vendee.  Furthermore, a  set off  of Rs. 9979\/10\/8 (nine
\nthousand nine  hundred seventy\tnine and  annas ten and pies
\neight) was given to the vendee in respect of the rehan money
\npayable to  him which  was said to have been taken by Jaimed
\nKuer from  the Maharaja of Banaras. Another sum of Rs. 5,000
\nwas left  in deposit  with the\tvendee in  order to meet the
\nexpenses  for\trecovering  the\t properties  which  were  in
\npossession  of\t other\t persons.   The\t  balance   of\t the
\nconsideration of Rs. 10,022.5.4 (ten thousand twenty two and
\nannas S\t and pies  four) was  received by  the vendor, Bhola
\nSingh, in  cash out  of which  Rs.  2020-S-4  (two  thousand
\ntwenty and  annas  S  and  pies\t four)\twere  spent  on\t the
\nexecution of  the sale\tdeed and Rs. 8,000 was again left in
\ndeposit with  the  vendee  for\this  satisfaction  till\t the
\ndocument was  executed. As  Bhola Singh\t himself  was  fully
\naware that  he had no title to the properties at the time of
\nthe  sale,   he\t on  the  one  hand,  deposited\t the  entire
\nconsideration money, excepting a very small amount, with the
\nvendee and,  on the  other hand,  made no secret of the fact
\nthat these  amounts were  to be\t spent by the vendee to meet
\nthe expenses  of litigaton  arising out\t of  the  defect  of
\ntitle. Thus,  on a perusal of the recitals of the sale deed,
\nit would  appear that  out of  a consideration amount of Rs.
\n25,000 a  paltry sum  of Rs.  1700 was\ttaken by Bhola Singh
\nwhich shows  the very peculiar and pretentious nature of the
\ntransaction. In other words, Bhola Singh sold the properties
\nfor a  song knowing full well that he had no interest in the
\nproperties.  Although\tthe  sale  was\tin  respect  of\t the
\nproperties of  Mauza Majhwa, District Mirzapur, yet the sale
\nDeed was  registered in\t Banaras town  and in  order to give
\njurisdiction to the Sub Registrar of Banaras a miserable mud
\nbuilt house  covered with  earthen tiles  was given  to\t the
\nMaharaja Prabhu\t Narain Singh.\tMost of the witnesses to the
\nsale deed  hailed from\tMirzapur. The  properties which were
\nmortgaged to  Mahadev were  sold to  the Maharaja of Banaras
\nunder this  document. Most of the witnesses to the sale deed
\nwere from  Mauza Baraini  or Majhwa  and there\twas only one
\nwitness from Banaras. The transaction, therefore, manifestly
\nshows that  since all  the properties  sold were in District
\nMirzapur, just\tto make a show of sale in respect of Banaras
\nproperty also,\tthe mud house was included in the sale deed.
\nThus, the  main purpose\t for which  this document  has\tbeen
\nrelied upon by the plaintiffs-respondents is that it gives a
\ngenealogy which,  according to them, supports that they were
\nthe descendants\t of Bansidhar  Singh. The  said genealogy is
\nreproduced below:<\/p>\n
\n872<\/span>\nBabu Bansidhar Singh\nFirst wife\t\t      Second wife\nBabu Ramruch Singh, died      Babu Debi Singh, died\nBabu Gajraj Singh, died\t      Babu Aini Singh, died\nBabu Farman Singh, died\t      Babu Pahalwan Singh, died\nBabu Deonarain Singh, died    Babu Tilak Singh, died\nBabu Bhola Singh alive\t      Babu Balbhaddar Singh\n\t\t\t      Thakurain Jaimed Kuer,\n\t\t\t      deceased, wife of Babu\n\t\t\t      Balbhaddar Singh,\n\t\t\t      deceased\n<\/pre>\n
     The contention of Mr. Tarkunde, was that this genealogy
\nwas filed  at a\t time when  there was no dispute between the
\nparties and  it fully  supports the  plaintiffs’ case  as it
\nshows that Bhola Singh on one side is a direct descendant of
\nGajraj\tSingh,\t Ramruch  Singh\t and  Bansidhar\t Singh,\t and
\nThakurain Jaimed Kuer was a direct descendant of Debi Singh,
\nson of\tBansidhar Singh. It is impossible to infer that this
\ngenealogy is correct and connects all the necessary links in
\norder to  prove the  plaintiffs’ case  as put forward in the
\nplaint. For  instance, Deep  Narain Singh,  elder brother of
\nBhola Singh has not been mentioned at all in this genealogy.
\nSimilarly, Pratap  Narain Singh\t who was a great-grandson of
\nGajraj Singh  has not  been mentioned in this genealogy, and
\nalso the  name of  Raghunath Singh who was son of Aini Singh
\nis also\t not mentioned\ttherein. Moreover, no legal value or
\nsignificance can be attached to the genealogy when the terms
\nand recitals of the document have been found to be false and
\nthe court in which the suit based on the sale deed was filed
\nwas clearly of the opinion that the entire transaction was a
\nsham one.  Thus, there\tcan be\tno guarantee of the truth of
\nthe statements\tmade by\t Bhola Singh  or even  the genealogy
\ngiven by  him in that sale deed. Therefore, the genealogy is
\nincorrect, inaccurate  and incomplete  and no reliance could
\nbe placed  on this  document for  the purpose of proving the
\nplaintiffs’ genealogical  tree. The trial court had rejected
\nthis document  (Ex. V)\tand go\thad one\t of the Judges (M.M.
\nPrasad, J.) in the High Court and, in our opinion. rightly.\n<\/p>\n
     Lastly, regarding\tthis document,\tit may\tbe mentioned
\nthat soon  after the  execution of  the sale  deed the\tlate
\nMaharaja had  already been substituted as the heir of Jaimed
\nKuer as\t proved by  the documents  Ex.\tU\/3  and  DD\/43\t and
\nultimately Narendra  Kishore Singh  was held to be the legal
\nheir of\t Jaimed Kuer  by the  Allahabad High  Court  by\t its
\njudgement dated 13.4.88 (Ex. DD\/43). In these
\n873<\/span>
\ncircumstances, since  the question  of succession had opened
\nbetween the parties the document Ex. V would also but hit by
\nthe doctrine  of post  litem motam  and,  therefore,  it  is
\ninadmissible in evidence under s. 35 of the Evidence Act and
\nhence has to be excluded from consideration.\n<\/p>\n
     Coming now\t to Ex.\t DD\/30 (Vol.  IV, page 116) which is
\nthe judgment given in respect of the Sale Deed (Ex. V) which
\nwe have\t discussed above,  the trial  court after a full and
\ncomplete consideration\tof the contents of the document held
\nthat Bhola  Singh had no right to execute the sale deed, and
\nthat the  plaintiff did\t not purchase  any legal  right. The
\ncourt  also   held  that   Bhola  Singh\t was  not  the\tnext
\nreversioner of\tMst. Jaimed  Kuer and that the consideration
\nwas also  illusory. In other words, the trial court rejected
\nthe case of the plaintiff in toto in that suit.\n<\/p>\n
     Reliance was sought to be placed by the counsel for the
\nplaintiff on  some recitals  in the  judgment regarding\t the
\ngenealogy  and\tthe  statement\tof  some  of  the  witnesses
\nexamined before\t the Court.  However this  question need not
\ndetain us  any further because we have already held from the
\nreported decisions  of this Court as also those of the Privy
\nCouncil\t that  a  recital  of  facts  or  evidence  or\teven
\ngenealogy  in\tjudgments  not\tinter  parties\tare  totally
\ninadmissible in\t evidence. The judgment Ex. DD\/30, was not a
\njudgment  inter\t  parties  and\t therefore  any\t recital  or
\nstatement made\ttherein would not be admissible to prove the
\nplaintiff’s case.  The argument\t of Mr.\t Tarkunde  that\t Ex.
\nDD\/30 speaks  for the whole of the genealogical table of the
\nfamily as  being correct,  is not an accurate description of
\nthe genealogy  because the  judgment also  mentions the fact
\nthat  the  genealogy  was  disputed.  Even  so,\t taking\t the
\njudgment ex  facie it  would appear that Ex. DD\/30 bases its
\nconclusion that\t Bhola Singh  was a  descendant of Bansidhar
\nSingh solely  on the  deposition of  Har Nandan Singh but as
\nthe deposition\tof this witness was not even produced in the
\npresent case,  any statement made with respect do Har Nandan
\nSingh would  be completely  inadmissible and cannot be taken
\ninto consideration  for any purpose whatsoever. Furthermore,
\nit has\tnot been  shown that Har Nandan Singh was in any way
\nrelated to the family of Bhola Singh or to the late Maharaja
\nso that\t he may\t have any  special means of knowledge and on
\nthis account  also his\tstatement is  hit by s. 32(5) of the
\nEvidence Act. Again Har Nandan Singh’s evidence in the suit,
\nwhich was  decided by Ex. DD\/20, clearly shows that Bansidar
\nSingh had a son known as Ramhit Singh whose
\n874<\/span>
\ndescendants had appeared as witnesses but Ramhit Singh finds
\nno  mention  at\t all  in  the  plaint  genealogy.  In  these
\ncircumstances,\ttherefore,   we\t are  unable  to  place\t any
\nreliance on the judgment Ex. DD\/30.\n<\/p>\n
     Coming now\t to the\t appeal judgment. Ex. DD\/31, (Volume
\nIV, page  121) the  appellate court  affirmed the finding of
\nthe trial  court and  found  that  Bhola  Singh\t was  not  a
\nreversioner of\tJaimed Kuer  and, therefore, had no title to
\nsell the properties to the late Maharaja The appellate court
\nfurther found  that the\t whole tenor  of the sale deed shows
\nthat  the   Maharaja  of  Banaras  purchased  a\t litigation.
\nReliance was  placed by\t Mr. Tarkunde  on  certain  recitals
\npertaining to  genealogy but even though the Judge held that
\nthe late  Maharaja was\ta descendant  of Raghunath Singh yet
\nthere is  no mention  of Raghunath  Singh in  the  genealogy
\ngiven in that suit. Moreover, the genealogy given in Ex. P-2
\nis  totally   inconsistent  with   and\tdifferent  from\t the
\ngenealogy propounded  by the  plaintiffs. A  number of names
\nand heirs  of the  two lines  of Bansidhar Singh, that is to
\nsay, Debi  Singh and  Ramruch Singh  have not  at  all\tbeen
\nmentioned in  this genealogy.  The name\t of Raghunath Singh,
\none of the sons of Aini Singh, in Suit No. 130 of 1856 filed
\nby Suman  Kuer in  respect of a pond known as Hansraj Pokhra
\nin  Majwa   village  is\t conspicuous  by  its  absence.\t The
\nexplanation given  by the  counsel for\tthe respondents\t was
\nthat it\t was not necessary to give the name of all the heirs
\nof Bansidhar  Singh or\tfor that matter of Debi Singh, hence
\nthese omissions\t in the\t genealogy. We\tare, however, not at
\nall impressed  with this  explanation because  some  of\t the
\nnames not mentioned in the genealogy in Ex. P-2 are supposed
\nto be based as links in order to prove the plaintiff’s right
\nto be  the next\t reversioner of the late Maharaja whose name
\nalso does  not find a place in this genealogy although he is
\nsupposed to be a direct descendant of Debi Singh.\n<\/p>\n
     Before closing the discussion of the documents referred
\nto above,  viz.,  Exhibits,  V,\t DD\/30\tand  DD\/31,  it\t may
\nnecessary to notice the arguments which were advanced by Mr.
\nTarkunde with  some amount  of vehemence.  As regards Ex. V,
\nthe sale-deed executed by Bhola in favour of Maharaja Prabhu
\nNarain of  Banaras, it\twas contended that even though Bhola
\nmay not\t have been the actual reversioner of Jaimed Kuer yet
\nas the\tlate Maharaja  was not\tinterested in the properties
\ncovered by  Ex. V he did not raise any objection although he
\nknew about  the execution  of the  said sale deed. Hence, it
\ncould be  safely presumed  that Bhola was the defacto though
\nnot de jure reversioner of Jaimed Kuer because he
\n875<\/span>
\nwas next  in the  line after  the late Maharaja. In order to
\nbuttress this  argument reliance  was placed  by counsel for
\nthe respondents\t on some  observations of Mukherji, J. to be
\nfound in  volume VIII,\tpara 69, page 219. With due respect,
\nthe observations  made by  the learned\tJudge were  based on
\npure  speculation  and\twere  not  supported  by  any  legal
\nevidence. There is no evidence to show that the Maharaja was
\naware of  the sale  deed nor  was there any evidence to show
\nthat the  late Maharaja\t did not want to take the properties
\nof Jaimed Kuer by inheritance. The only reason given for the
\naforesaid  knowledge   of   the\t  Maharaja   regarding\t the
\ntransaction was that he was a close relation of the Maharaja
\nof Banaras and therefore it must be presumed that he must be
\nin the know of the aforesaid transaction. In support of this
\nargument, our  attention was  drawn to some documents of the
\nyear 1885  viz., Exhibits  F-4, 5,  7 and  8 to show that in
\n1885 Jaimed  Kuer had  made an\toffer to  Maharaja  Harendra
\nKishore Singh  that she\t would like to surrender or sell out
\nher entire properties to him. The Maharaja, however, refused
\nto take the properties, either by surrender or by sale. From
\nthis conduct it was sought to be inferred by the counsel for
\nthe respondents\t that the Maharaja was not at all interested
\nin the\tproperties of  Jaimed Kuer.  In our  opinion,  these
\narguments are  based on\t surmises and  conjectures  and\t are
\nwithout any  legal basis.  The mere  fact that\tthe Maharaja
\nspuerned the  offer  of\t Jaimed\t Kuer  of  surrendering\t her
\nproperties to  him would not show that he was not interested
\nin the\tproperties because  he knew full well that after her
\ndeath the  properties were  bound to come to him as the next
\nreversioner and\t he would  have an  absolute interest in the
\nsame. It  is quite  possible that the offer of surrender may
\nhave hurt  the vanity  and self-respect of the Maharaja as a
\nresult of  which he  spurned the offer. At any rate, instead
\nof wandering  amiss hither  and thither\t into the  realm  of
\nimagination and\t speculation like  Alice in  Wonderland, the
\nfact is\t that  the  Maharaja  did  get\tthe  properties\t and
\nresisted all  claims against  the same\tas would appear from
\nthe documents  Exhibits U\/3  and DD\/43 by which the Maharaja
\nwas substituted\t as the heir of Jaimed Kuer on her death and
\nwas held  to be a legal heir by the judgment dated 13.4.1888
\nof the\tAllahabad High\tCourt (Ex. DD\/43). The said judgment
\nshows that  the Maharaja  accepted the position of his being
\nthe legal  representative and  heir of\tJaimed\tKuer.  This,
\ntherefore, clearly  negatives  the  contention\tadvanced  on
\nbehalf of  the respondents  that the  Maharaja was extremely
\nreluctant to take the properties of Jaimed Kuer. The conduct
\nof the\tMaharaja in  unconditionally accepting the ownership
\nand the inheritance of the
\n876<\/span>
\nproperties of  Jaimed Kuer  far\t outweighs  the\t speculative
\nargument of  Mr. Tarkunde  that the  the Maharaja was either
\nnot interested\tor had\tsome reservations  or was in any way
\nreluctant to  take the\tproperties of  Jaimed Kuer after her
\ndeath. If  there  was  any  reluctance\tat  all\t before\t the
\nproperties could  legally come to the Maharaja, it was fully
\njustified and  in  keeping  with  the  self-respect  of\t the
\nMaharaja as  indicated above. Indeed, if there was any truth
\nin the\tfacts adumbrated by the counsel for the respondents,
\nthe Maharaja  could very well have refused to be substituted
\nas an  heir or\tto take\t the properties of Jaimed Kuer. This
\ncircumstantial\t evidence   speaks   volumes   against\t the
\nspeculative plea  of the  respondents that  the Maharaja was
\nnot at\tall interested\tin the properties of Jaimed Kuer. It
\nwas further  explained by  Mr. Tarkunde\t that the Maharaja’s
\nreluctance in  taking the  properties  was  because  of\t the
\nfamily history\tof Bettiah  Raj ever  since the time of Raja
\nBir Kishore  Singh and\tthe Maharaja did not want to get rid
\nof his\tJethria caste  and wanted to stick to the claim that
\nJugal Kishore  Singh got  the Bettiah  Raj  because  of\t his
\nadoption by  Raja Dhrub\t Singh, a fact which we have already
\nnarrated in  tile earlier  part of the judgment. This again,
\nis another  conjectual process\tof reasoning  adopted by the
\nlearned counsel for the respondents.\n<\/p>\n
     In fact,  the main thrust of the respondents to rely on
\nEx.V. and  the two  judgments was  inspired by the fact that
\nsomehow or  the other the genealogy mentioned therein should
\nbe proved  to be  correct and  admissible. This is, however,
\nnot legally possible because the recitals of these documents
\nhave been  held to  be inadmissible  in evidence.  Moreover,
\neven at\t the risk of repetition, we might say that it is too
\nmuch to\t justify a  rejected, dejected,\t sham  and  spurious
\ntransaction as\tbeing valid on a fictitious supposition that
\nBhola the  executant was  a sort  of an\t illusory  de  facto
\nthough not a de jure reversioner and that too half a century
\nafter the  judgment of\tthe trial  court and  the  appellate
\ncourt Exs.  DD\/30-31) had  rejected this  document as  being
\nsham and  collusive which  had become final and irrevocable.
\nAnd all\t this futile  and amorphous exercise only to rely on
\nthe  genealogy\t given\tin   Exs.  V   and  P-2\t which\tboth
\ninadmissible and incorrect.\n<\/p>\n
     Dr. Singhvi,  appearing  for  the\tappellants,  rightly
\npointed out  that the entire edifice of the arguments of the
\nrespondents is\tbased on  a pack of cards which must collaps
\nthe moment  the court makes a through probe into the various
\nconstituents or\t bricks which  from the\t foundation  of\t the
\nedifice. The  learned counsel  also pointed out that even in
\nthe judgment (Ex. DD\/30)
\n877<\/span>
\nit has\tnot been  said that  the  genealogy  was  wholly  or
\nundisputedly correct  but the  exact expression used is “the
\nwhole genealogical  table of  the family which is disputed”.
\nSince the  genealogy was  not admitted by the parties to the
\nsale  deed,  it\t carries  no  value  particularly  when\t the
\njudgment  was\tnot  inter   parties.  For   these  reasons,
\ntherefore, the\targuments of  Mr. Tarkunde  must necessarily
\nfail.\n<\/p>\n
     Finally, all the three documents, Exhibits V, DD\/30 and
\nDD\/31 are  hit by  the doctrine\t of  post  litem  motam.  We
\ntherefore, agree  with the  conclusions arrived\t at by\tM.M.
\nPrasad, J.  On this point. As regards Ex. P-2 which was only
\na plaint  in the  suit which  was the  subject matter of Ex.
\nDD\/30, whatever\t is true of DD\/30 equally applies to Ex. P-2
\n(Vol. IV page 245).\n<\/p>\n
     Ex. 0\/3  (Vol. 3, page 85) is a written statement filed
\nin title suit No. 55 of 1893 (the suit which was the subject
\nmatter of Ex. DD\/30 and DD\/31) in which Mahadev Prasad Singh
\ndenied all the allegations made by Bhola Singh and expressly
\nstated that  Bhola Singh was not an heir of Jaimed Kuer, and
\nthat the  sale deed  and ekrarnama executed in favour of the
\nplaintiff was  without consideration and are not vaild. This
\ndocument, therefore,  far  from\t supporting  the  plaintiffs
\nnegatives their case and is of no assistance to us.\n<\/p>\n
     We would  next deal  with Ex. Q-2 (Vol. V, page 239) on
\nwhich great  reliance has  been placed\tby counsel  for\t the
\nrespondents. This  document appears  to be a genealogy which
\nis said\t to have  been produced on behalf of the defendants,
\nRamratan Singh and Harkhan Singh. This document is primarily
\nused as the sheet-anchor of the plaintiffs’ case in order to
\nprove their  genealogy. Unfortunately, however, the history,
\nthe manner  and the  circumstances under which this document
\nhas taken  several different  forms  throws  a\tconsiderable
\ndoubt on  the genuineness  or authenticity of this document.
\nOne version  of Ex.  Q-2 is  to be found in Vol. IV at pages
\n437-440 and  another in Vol. V at page 239 and a third which
\nwas sent to this Court by the Deputy Registrar of Patna High
\nCourt who  claimed that\t it was\t taken out  of a  bundle  of
\nmiscellaneous\tpapers\t  lying\t  with\t the   summons\t and
\nvakalatnamas.  The   Deputy  Registrar\t claims\t that\tthis
\ndocuments (Ex.\tQ-2) is\t the one which was before the Judges
\nof the\tHigh Court  and was  considered by  them, but  which
\nseems to  have been  relied upon by the majority judgment of
\nG.N. Prasad  and Mukherjee,  JJ and rejected by the minority
\njudgment of  M.M.Prasad, J.  Unfortunately, however,  we are
\nnot in\ta position  to determine as to which of the versions
\nof Ex. Q\/2 was actually considered by the
\n878<\/span>
\ncourt. According to the appellants, Ex. Q\/2 is not a genuine
\ndocument, which seems to have been introduced in the records
\nof the present suit allegedly by the present plaintiffs.\n<\/p>\n
     To being  with, Ex.  Q\/2 was brought to the trial court
\nby the Head clerk of the Civil and Sessions Judge, Mirzapur.
\nThe original  document was  also called\t for and  the  stand
\ntaken by  the appellant\t was that the document was of a very
\nsuspicious nature.  At any rate, since the original document
\nwas marked  in evidence, M.M.Prasad, J. had rightly observed
\nthat the  points urged\tby the appellants about the document
\nbeing suspicious  do not  survive. It  appears that the Head
\nclerk who  was examined\t as DW-6  stated that  the certified
\ncopy was  marked as Ex. Q\/2 although the earlier entry shows
\nthat the original itself was marked as Ex. Q\/2. DW-6 further
\nadmitted that  there was a table of contents attached to the
\nrecords which  he had brought but the number of suit was not
\nmentioned in  the aforesaid  table. He further admitted that
\nhe was\tunable to  decipher item  No.  5  in  the  table  of
\ncontents and, therefore, could not say whether any genealogy
\nwas mentioned  as being\t a part\t of the\t aforesaid  list  of
\ndocuments.\n<\/p>\n
     Lastly, the  learned Judge\t pointed out that DW-6 could
\nnot vouch-safe\tthat the  document was a part of the records
\nof Title  suit No. 130 of 1856. Indeed, if this document had
\nbeen filed  in the  said suit since a number of documents of
\nthat time  had been produced in the present suit there could
\nnot have  been any  difficulty for  the plaintiffs  to\thave
\nobtained a  copy of the order-sheet or the list of documents
\nto dispel  any\tdoubt  regarding  the  authenticity  of\t the
\noriginal document (Ex. Q\/2).\n<\/p>\n
     M.M. Prasad,  J. relies  on another  circumstance\tthat
\nthere is  no mention  of either the name of the court or the
\nnumber of the suit or the names of the parties, nor any seal
\nof the\tcourt which  could have identified or connected this
\ndocument with  the aforesaid suit. The document merely bears
\nthe date 15.8.1856. It appears from Ex. DD\/39, a judgment in
\nsuit No.  13()\/1856, that Ramadhin was not the vakil for the
\ndefendants. There  are other circumstances which were relied
\nupon by\t the learned Judge in order to doubt the veracity of
\nthis document.\tAfter considering  a number of circumstances
\nwhich it  is not  necessary for\t us to detail in the present
\ncase, the learned Judge observed as follows.\n<\/p>\n
\t  “It is, therefore, impossible to believe that
\n     those  endorsements   had\tbeen  existing\tin  the
\n     genealogy at the
\n879<\/span>
\n     time of  the filing  of the  document if at all in
\n     the suit.\tThere cannot  be the  slightest\t doubt,
\n     even assuming  that the document had been filed in
\n     the aforesaid  suit, that\tit  has\t been  tampered
\n     with.   Somebody\tinterested   in\t  showing   the
\n     relationship between  Bansidhar and Bettiah family
\n     must have\tdone it\t without considering that other
\n     documents would belie it.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     ...\t\t ...\t\t      ...\n\t  It cannot  be said  that the\tfact  that  the\n     defendant's    lawyer    filed    the    genealogy\n<\/pre>\n
     conclusively shows\t that the  statements contained
\n     therein had been made by one of the two defendants
\n     or both.  The genealogy  could have  as well  been
\n     prepared on the instruction of anybody else making
\n     pairvi  in\t  the  suit   or  behalf   of  the  two
\n     defendants. It  is not  signed by\teither\tof  the
\n     defendants. The  authorship of  this  genealogical
\n     table cannot,  therefore, be  said\t to  have  been
\n     proved. This  is another  difficulty in the way of
\n     its admissibility.”\t      (Vol . VIII pp. S
\n     15, S 17)
\n     Apart from the aforesaid circumstance the learned Judge
\nhas relied  on the  following circumstances  to hold against
\nthe genuineness of the contents of this document:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (1)   Although it was a genealogy which formed the
\n\t  cornerstone of  the case  of the  parties  no
\n\t  Exhibit mark\thas been  put on  the  document
\n\t  which\t one   usually\tfinds\tin  a  document
\n\t  accepted in any suit.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (2)   All the  important documents\t filed\tin  the
\n\t  aforesaid  suit   have  been\t enumerated  or
\n\t  mentioned in\tthe judgment  (Ex.  DD\/39)  but
\n\t  there is  no\tmention\t of  this  genealogical
\n\t  table.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (3)  There is no reliable evidence in this case to
\n\t  show\t that\tHarkhan\t  and\tRamratan   were
\n\t  descendants of  one  Bikram  Sahi  or\t Bikram
\n\t  Singh who was shown as a brother of Bansidhar
\n\t  Singh. There\tare lot\t of other discrepancies
\n\t  pointed out by M.M. Prasad, J. which have not
\n\t  been\tadequately   rebutted  either\tby  the
\n\t  majority judgment  or by  the counsel for the
\n\t  respondents,
\n880<\/span>
\n     We now  come to  the most serious problem regarding the
\ncontents of  Ex. Q\/2.  It is  also worth  noting  that\teach
\nversion of  Ex.\t Q\/2  is  distinctly  different\t and  it  is
\ndifficult to  ascertain and  choose as to which of the three
\nversions is  correct. Another  circumstantial evidence which
\nthrows serious\tdoubt on  the genuineness of the document is
\nas to  what had\t happened to  the  document  which  was\t got
\ntranslated by the High Court, as observed by M M. Prasad, J.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
in his\tjudgment. The  letter of the Deputy Registrar of the
\nPatna High  Court seems\t to suggest  that the  third version
\nwhich he  suddenly found  in the bundle of papers containing
\nsummons and  vakalatnamas was the real one. It is not at all
\nunderstandable how an important document like Ex. Q\/2, which
\nwas the subject matter of a very serious controversy between
\nthe parties  in the  High Court,  could find  a place in the
\nmiscellaneous paper  which do not contain important Exhibits
\nor documents  but are  meant only  for purposes\t cf  keeping
\nformal papers  like summons,  vakalatnamas, etc.  We find it
\ndifficult to believe the explanation of the Deputy Registrar
\nof the\tPatna High Court that he suddenly found the real Ex.
\nQ\/2 in\ta bundle  of papers  and then despatched the same to
\nthis Court.  But the  fact is  that this  document  was\t not
\ndespatched at  the time\t when the  records were sent to this
\nCourt though the other two versions had been sent.\n<\/p>\n
     It would  appear from  Ex. DD\/39  (Vol. IV p. 108) that
\nSoman Kuer  and Jaimed\tKuer were  related to  the last male
\nholder of  the Bettiah\tRaj and\t were the  plaintiffs of the
\nsuit where  as Ramratan\t and  others  were  the\t defendants.
\nRamratan has  not been proved to be related to the family of
\nthe late Maharaja or to that of the plaintiff. His name also
\nwas  not   mentioned  by  the  plaintiffs  in  the  pedigree
\npropounded by  them in\tthe present  suit As Ramratan had no
\nconnection either with Bansidhar Singh or Ramruch Singh, the
\ngenealogical  table  filed  by\this  pleader  would  not  be
\nadmissible in evidence.\n<\/p>\n
     Realising these  defacts, Mr. Tarkunde submited that he
\nwould prefer  to rely  on Ex. Q\/2 as brought out at page 239
\nin Volume  V of\t the Paperbook in the present suit though he
\ndid not\t give any particular reason of justification for the
\nsame. Assuming\tthat Ex.  Q\/2 printed  in Volume  V  is\t the
\ncorrect version,  there are a number of errors and omissions
\nin the\taforesaid genealogy.  It would\tappear\tthat  Thakur
\nHirday\tNarain\t Singh\thad  five  sons\t viz.,\tAmar  Singh,
\nBansidhar Singh,  Rudra Sahi,  Chhatra Sahi and Bikram Sahi.
\nThe name of Hirday Narain Singh finds clear mention in Ex. J
\nwhere Durga  Prasad mentioned  the names  of  his  sons\t but
\nneither Bansidhar,
\n881<\/span>
\nnor Amar  Singh, nor Rudra Sahi, nor Chhatra Sahi find place
\namong  the  names  of  the  sons  of  Hirday  Narain  Singh.
\nSecondly, there\t is no\tmention of  Ramruch Singh  as  being
\nconnected in  any way  with either  Bansidhar or  Debi Singh
\nwhich completely  falsifies the\t plaint genealogy,  and\t the
\nfundamental link  which may  connect the plaintiffs with the
\nlate Maharaja  is absolutely  wanting and  even the  name of
\nGajraj\tSingh  does  not  find\ta  place  anywhere  in\tthis
\ngenealogy.\n<\/p>\n
     There   are   a   number\tof   other   omissions\t and
\ncontradictions but  it is  sufficient for  us to  state that
\nsince the  main links are not connected this genealogy is of
\nno assistance  to  the\tplaintiffs.  Apart  from  that\tthis
\ngenealogy is  not a  public document but is a purely private
\ndocument and  it has  not been shown as to who prepared this
\ngenealogy, in  what manner,  at what  time  and\t under\twhat
\ncircumstances. No  person having  special means of knowledge
\nof the\tvarious heirs  mentioned in  this document  has been
\nexamined  in  these  circumstances  and\t for  the  foregoing
\nreasons\t we   are  unable  to  place  any  reliance  on\t the
\nmysterious and murky document which Ex. Q-2 is.\n<\/p>\n
     Exhibit Q-5  is another  genealogical table of the late
\nMaharaja which shows that he was a direct descendant of Debi
\nSingh. A  portion of  this document  is, however,  torn\t and
\nhence we  cannot make  out as  to who the ancestor of Farman
\nSingh was,  nor is  there any reference to Ramruch or Gajraj
\nSingh. At  any rate,  both the\tmajority  and  the  minority
\njudgments of  the High Court as also of the trial court have
\nrejected this  document as  being a  purely spurious one. In
\nthis connection, Mukherji, J. speaking for the majority, has
\nclearly\t found\tthat  this  document  is  in  admissible  in
\nevidence because  it is\t alleged to  have  been\t written  by
\nShital who  had no  special means  of knowledge\t about\tthis
\nfamily.\t The   learned\tJudge\talso  found   a\t number\t  of
\ninconsistencies and  contradictions in the evidence of Avadh
\nBehari, DW\/32,\twho purported  to prove Ex Q-5. M.M. Prasad,
\nJ. had also taken great pains to show that this document was
\nper se\tnot genuine  as the paper on which it was written is
\nold but\t the writing  thereon is  fresh. He  also found that
\nthis document  was somehow  planted or introduced in a basta
\nin which  the papers  of the  Bettiah Raj case were kept. He
\nfully agreed  with Mukherji,  J. that  DW\/32 was an entirely
\nunrealiable witness who purported to prove the signatures of
\nShital on  Ex. Q-5.  For these\treasons, therefore,  without
\ntravelling further into the domain of
\n882<\/span>
\nspeculation and\t surmises we  reject both  these  documents,
\nExhibits Q-2  and Q-5, as being totally irrelevant and of no
\nconsequence.\n<\/p>\n
     The defects  pointed out  in the  genealogies  and\t the
\nabsence of  vital links\t therein were  explained away by Mr.
\nTarkunde on  the ground\t that since  it was not necessary in
\nthe case  of some  of the  genealogies filed  to mention the
\nentire line  of ancestors  or other connected relations, the
\nincompleteness\tof   the  genealogies\twould  not  put\t the
\nplaintiffs out\tof court  or affect  the correctness  of the
\ngenealogies.  We   are,\t however,   unable  to\taccept\tthis
\nexplanation  which,   apart  from   being   fallacious,\t  is
\nambivalent  and\t  enigmatic,  for  the\tvery  purpose  of  a
\ngenealogy is  to connect  all the  important  and  essential
\nlinks and  if falls  short  of\tdoing  so  then\t it  becomes
\ndestitute of  any legal\t effect and  has to  be discarded in
\ntoto.\n<\/p>\n
     Reliance was also placed on Ex. P-S (Vol. IV, page 407)
\nwhich is a plaint filed in suit No. 108 of 1909 in the court
\nof Sub\tJudge, Mirzapur, by Bhagwati Prasad Singh, father of
\none of\tthe plaintiffs, This document has been filed for the
\npurpose of  adding force and weight to the genealogical tree
\nfiled and relied upon by the plaintiffs in this case. In the
\nfirst place,  Mr. Tarkunde  did not  place much\t reliance on
\nthis document; secondly the plaint being in a suit not inter
\nparties, the  recitals therein are inadmissible in evidence;
\nthirdly, this  pedigree, even  if correct,  stops at  Gajraj
\nSingh  who  is\tshown  to  be  the  final  ancestor  of\t the
\nplaintifis. This  fact is  not disputed\t by  the  appellants
\nbecause, as  already pointed  out, the\tessential dispute is
\nregarding the  parentage and  ancestry of  Gajraj Singh, and
\nthis document throws no light on this vital question.\n<\/p>\n
     Reliance was  placed on Ex. KK\/1 (Vol. VII P. 2) before
\nthe trial court but Mr. Tarkunde appearing for the plaintiff
\nhas merely  referred to\t this document\twithout\t asking\t the
\ncourt to  place implicit reliance on it and, in our opinion,
\nrightly, because this document is wholly irrelevant to prove
\nthe  controversy  in.  dispute\tand  merely  relates  to  an
\nEkrarnama executed  by Rajendra\t Kishore Singh\tnominating a
\nCommittee for  the purpose of managing the properties of his
\nson, Chiranjiv\tRajkumar Harendra  Kishore Singh  (the\tlate
\nMabaraja) until\t he attained majority. This merely shows the
\nconnection of  Maharaja of  Banaras and the late Maharaja of
\nBettiah. Therefore, this document is not relevant at all and
\nit may\ttherefore, be  ruled out  of consideration so far as
\nthe present dispute about genealogy is concerned.\n<\/p>\n
883<\/span><\/p>\n
     Exhibits K\t and K-l  have been rejected not only by the
\nmajority judgment  but also  by the  trial court.  In  these
\ncircumstances it  is not  necessary for us to consider these
\ndocuments in  any detail.  We would,  however, just  make  a
\npassing reference  to these  documents to  show that they do
\nnot support  the case  of the  plaintiffs.  These  documents
\ndon’t bear any seal or signature, nor is it possible to find
\nout when,  how and  under what circumstances these documents
\ncame into existence. Ex facie, they are not public documents
\nand are\t not admissible\t in evidence  under  s.\t 35  of\t the
\nEvidence Act.  Mukherji, J.,  speaking for the majority, has
\nclearly held  that these  documents are\t a  inadmissible  in
\nevidence and observed thus:-\n<\/p>\n
\t  “These  documents,   Exts.  K\t and  K-l,  are
\n     alleged to\t be public  and official  documents and
\n     according to the plaintiffs of Title Suit No. S of
\n     1961 they\tare in\tthe  nature  of\t appendices  or
\n     annexures to a report. Ex. J which is stated to be
\n     a public document. In our opinion, it has not been
\n     proved that  these documents Exts-K and K-1 are in
\n     any way  connected with Ext. J. These documents do
\n     not bear  any seal\t or any\t signature  and\t it  is
\n     difficult to  say as  to when these documents came
\n     into existence.  Under these  circumstances, I  do
\n     not accept\t the contention\t urged on behalf of the
\n     plaintiffs of  Title Suit No. S of 1961 that these
\n     documents are  dublic  documents  These  documents
\n     cannot be\tsaid to be admissible in evidence under
\n     section 35\t of the\t Evidence Act.”\t (Vol.-VII,  P.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     207)
\n     Similarly, M.M.  Prasad, J.  while commenting  on these
\ntwo documents  and pointing  out their infirmities concluded
\nthus:\n<\/p>\n
\t  In  the   absence  of\t  any  evidence\t either
\n     intrinsic or  extrinsic to\t that effect, it is not
\n     known whether it is a public or official document.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     In\t consideration\tof  all\t these\tfacts  the  two
\n     documents are  neither admissible under section 35
\n     of the Evidence Act nor have any evidentiary value
\n     whatsoever\t even\tif  they   were\t held\tto   be
\n     admissible.” (Vol. VIII, P. 489)
\n     These documents are supposed to be appendices to Ex. J,
\nthe report  of Durga  Prasad, and  have given  some  details
\nregarding the  relationship  of\t Pahalwan  Singh  with\tsome
\npersons mentioned  in these  documents. But there is nothing
\nto show that these documents were either appendices or parts
\nof Ex. J nor have they been referred to at
\n884<\/span>
\nany place  either expressly  or by  necessary implication in
\nthe report Ex. J. Furthermore, he has clearly stated that he
\nhad looked  into ‘Tumar’  i. e. account books for collecting
\nsome of\t the necessary materials. These documents are not in
\nthe nature  of account books at all. In these circumstances,
\ntherefore, all\tthe courts  rightly rejected these documents
\nboth as being inadmissible and unworthy of credence.\n<\/p>\n
     Ex. P-7  (Vol. V,\tP. 148)\t is also a certified copy of
\nthe plaint  in suit  No. 139  of 1895  in the  court of\t Sub
\nJudge, Mirzapur.  It would appear that this plaint was filed
\non 26th\t July 1895,  that is  to say,  after  the  death  of
\nMaharani Sheoratan  Kuer, senior widow of the late Maharaja.
\nThe plaintiff  in that\tcase was  Ram Nandan  Singh. In\t the
\nfirst place,  this document  is hit  by the doctrine of post
\nlitem motam  because the  dispute to  the succession  of the
\nlate Maharaja  (Harendra Kishore  Singh) had  already stated
\nwith his  death in the year l 893 and the suit was filed two
\nyears thereafter, and it is therefore, irrelevant. Secondly,
\nthe plaint  filed in  the suit\tnot being inter parties, its
\nrecitals are  in admissible  in evidence. The only claim put
\nforward was that as the Bettiah Raj estate was an impartible
\nestate, the widows ef the late Maharaja could not succeed to
\nhis properties\teven  as  limited  owners.  Nothing  of\t any
\nsignificance turns upon the contents of this document and it
\nwas rightly not relied upon by M.M. Prasad, J.\n<\/p>\n
     Ex. G.  II (Vol. III, P. 31) merely shows that the late
\nMaharaja had  made a  gift of  a portion  of land in Pargana
\nMajhwa,\t District   Champaran  for   making   a\t  road\t for
\nconstructing a\trailway line in Bettiah but we are unable to
\nfind any  relevancy of\tthis document  to the  facts of\t the
\npresent case.\n<\/p>\n
     Ex. G. II\/ 1 (Vol. III, P. 32) is another deed executed
\nby the\tlate Maharaja  making a gift of a land for a similar
\npurpose. This  document also appears to be wholly irrelevant
\nand does not prove anything of consequence.\n<\/p>\n
     Ex. H-II (Vol. III, P. 163) is a genealogy filed by the
\nplaintiff of  title suit  No. 34  of 1905  after the present
\ndispute had already arisen. Apart from the fact that in this
\ngenealogy a number of important names are missing, the names
\nof Gajraj  Singh, Ramruch  Singh, Debi\tSingh  or  Bansidhar
\nSingh are  not at  all mentioned  but the  highest  ancestor
\nmentioned is Raja Ugra Sen Singh. This genealogy, therefore,
\napart from being hit by the doctrine of post
\n885<\/span>
\nlitem motam  does not  appear to be of any assistance to the
\nplaintiffs   and   must,   therefore,\tbe   excluded\tfrom
\nconsideration.\n<\/p>\n
     Ex. R (2) (Vol. III, page 95) is merely a will executed
\nby Maharaja  Nawal Kishore  Singh  in  favour  of  his\tson,
\nRajendra Kishore  Singh. There\tdoes not  appear to  be\t any
\nnexus between  this document  and the case of the plaintiffs
\nas put\tforward in  the present suit. This document is also,
\ntherefore, wholly irrelevant for the purpose of deciding the
\nquestion at issue.\n<\/p>\n
     Ex. Q-3  (Vol. IV,\t page 423)  is a  genealogical table
\nfiled in  title suit  No. 254  of 1868\tand it describes the
\nheirs of  Raja Gaj  Singh and  appears to have been filed in
\norder to  prove the  relationship of the Sheohar family with
\nMaharaja Rajendra  Kisoore Singh  who was  the father of the
\nLate Maharaja.\tThis also  does not  throw any\tlight on the
\nrelationship of\t Gajraj Singh  with Ramruch Singh, Bansidhar
\nSingh and Debi Singh and is, therefore, of no consequence.\n<\/p>\n
     Other documents  like Exhibits NN\/8 (Vol V, p. 219) and
\nB\/3 (Vol.  III, p.205)\thave been  filed merely\t to show the
\ngenealogy of the late Maharaja and to prove that Bhola Singh
\nwas the\t next reversioner of Janki Kuer. The fact that Bhola
\nSingh was not the next reversioner of Janki Kuer at the time
\nwhen  he  made\tthe  sale  deed\t has  been  demonstrated  by
\njudgments Exhibits DD\/30 and DD\/31. It is a different matter
\nthat he\t may have  become the  next  reversioner  some\ttime
\nafterwards. These  documents also  show that  Pahalwan Singh
\nand Raghunath  Singh were brothers, yet Raghunath Singh does
\nnot find  a place  in the  various genealogies\tfiled by the
\nplaintiffs, as\talready shown.\tThese were  mearly filed  to
\nshow that  Raghunath  Singh  was  a  gotia  of\tMaharaja  of
\nBettiah. This fact is also proved by DW-36 but that does not
\nhelp us at all.\n<\/p>\n
     There are a series of documents filed by the plaintiffs
\nto prove that Bhola Singh was an ancestor of Bhagwati Prasad
\nSingh. Even  if these documents are proved, they merely take
\nus up to Bhola Singh and some of them even upto Gajraj Singh
\nbut that  linkage is  not sufficient  to determine the vital
\nissue in  this case,  viz.,  as\t to  how  Gajraj  Singh\t was
\nconnected with\tRamruch,  Deci\tSingh  and  Banisidhar.\t For
\ninstance, Exhibits GGG\/13, 14 and 16 are recitals in several
\ndocuments in  the nature  of Rehan deeds, mortgage deeds and
\nplaint in  suits for  declaration as  also  Exhibits  DD\/33,
\nDDD\/4 & 5, GGG\/8 which at the most prove that the plaintiffs
\nwere direct descendants of Gajraj Singh, and we shall assume
\nfor the purpose of this case, as
\n886<\/span>
\nthe High  Court has  done, the fact that the plaintiffs were
\ndirect descendants  of Gajraj  Singh has  been amply  proved
\nboth by\t oral and  documentary evidence.  This fact  is also
\nproved by  another set\tof documents, viz., Exhibits; GGG\/3,
\n4, 5  and 8,  WW\/l, 3 & 4, DD\/40 & 38, XX\/20, WW\/2, YY\/4 and
\nP\/4. All these documents by and large prove the relationship
\nof the\tplaintiffs with\t Bhola Singh and his ancestors right
\nup to Gajraj Singh but they completely fall short of proving
\nthe vital “links.”\n<\/p>\n
     Ex. H  merely shows  that some  time in  the year 1829,
\nafter the  death of  Pahalwan Singh  the name  of  Balbhadra
\nSingh was substituted. This fact, as we have already pointed
\nout, is\t not disputed. This document also does not throw any
\nlight on  the crucial  question regarding  the link  between
\nGajraj Singh,  Debi Singh  and Ramruch Singh and takes us no
\nwhere.\n<\/p>\n
     Similar is\t the case with Ex. M (Vol. III, p. 66) which
\nis a deed of conditional sale executed by Pahalwan Singh and
\ntakes us  at the  most up  to Debi  Singh and shows that the
\nlate maharaja  was a  direct descendant\t of Debi  Singh. The
\nquestion still\tremains as  to what  the  direct  connection
\nbetween Gajraj\tSingh and  Ramruch Singh.  Nor does it prove
\nthe connection\tof Gajraj  Singh either\t with Debi  Singh or
\nBansidhar Singh.  In other words, no light is thrown by this
\ndocument on the question that, (even if it be conceded as it
\nmust be)  the plaintiffs  were direct  descendants of Gajraj
\nSingh or  to the  question of  parentage of Gajraj Singh and
\nhis connection\twith Ramruch Singh, Debi Singh and Bansidhar
\nSingh and unless this is done, the document does not take us
\nanywhere.\n<\/p>\n
     Similarly, Ex. DD\/44 is a Rubakar which shows that Debi
\nSingh was  son of  Bansidhar Singh  and\t this  fact  is\t not
\ndisputed though\t the vital  link  between  Debi\t Singh,\t and
\nGajraj Singh  has  not\tbeen  shown.  In  other\t words,\t the
\nplaintiffs, in\torder to succeed, must prove that he was the
\nown nephew of Debi Singh, being the son of Debi Singh’s full
\nbrother Ramruch Singh. This link has not been established by
\nany of\tthese documents.  Taking these documents, therefore,
\nex facie  they do  not appear to be of any assistance to the
\nplaintiffs’ case.\n<\/p>\n
     Exhibits Q-l  and T-68 are also documents falling under
\nthis class  relating to\t the proof  of relationship  between
\nBhagwati Prasad,  Bhola\t Singh\tand  Gajraj  Singh  but\t the
\nevidence stops there and there alone.\n<\/p>\n
     Exhibits F\/1 and are various remarks made by Debi Singh
\nabout lands  in Taluka\tMajhwa which  proved that Debi Singh
\nwas
\n887<\/span>
\none of\tthe zamindars  in possession  of Taluka\t Majhwa,  as
\nmentioned in Ex. J. These facts, however, cannot be disputed
\nbecause Debi  Singh who\t was the  son of Bansidhar Singh and
\nwhose final ancestor was Hirday Narain Singh was undoubtedly
\nin possession of Majhwa lands. But this does not improve the
\ncase of\t the plaintiffs unless the direct connection between
\nDebi Singh, Ramruch and Gajraj Singh is proved.\n<\/p>\n
     Ex. NN\/6  consists of extracts from the Banrag Gazetter
\nwhich shows  that Barisal  Singh of  Majhwa was\t one of\t the
\npersons who  was killed\t in the\t battle of  Marui which took
\nplace near  about the year 1719. This fact is also mentioned
\nin Ex-J\t but that  does not  mean that\tthe plaintiffs\thave
\nproved their case by virtue of these documents.\n<\/p>\n
     The other\tdocuments have\talready been discussed by us
\nwhile referring\t to the\t documents said\t to have corrobrated
\nEx. J.\n<\/p>\n
     This is  all the  documentary evidence  produced by the
\nplaintiffs in  support of  their case.\tAfter a detailed and
\nmicroscopic  consideration   of\t these\t documents  we\tfind
\nourselves in complete agreement with the dissenting judgment
\nof M.M.\t Prasad, J. that the plaintiffs have not proved that
\nthey were  in any way directly connected with Ramruch Singh,
\nBansidhar Singh\t or Debi  Singh. With  due  respect  to\t the
\nJudges constituting  the majority,  we\tare  constrained  to
\nremark that  they did  not fully  consider the factual legal
\nand relevant  aspects of the documents produced nor did they
\nconsider what  on an  ultimate analysis could be the correct
\nconclusion reached  on a  fuller and  proper application  of
\nmind having regard to the vital issues involved in the case.
\nThe Majority  Judges seem to have been greatly influenced by
\nthe age\t of the documents or their nature rather than by the
\ncontents, relevancy  and weight. The plaintiffs seem to have
\nby a  process of various combinations and permutations tried
\nto present a very plausible case which at first sight seemed
\nto be extremely attractive and appealing but on a very close
\nanalysis of  the evidence  produced  by\t the  plaintiffs  we
\ncannot think  of any  other conclusion\tthat could  be drawn
\nexcept the  one drawn by M.M. Prasad, J. It is no doubt true
\nthat the judgments of Mukherji and G.N. Prasad, JJ show that
\nthey have  taken great\tpains in  applying their mind to the
\ndocuments  before   them  but,\t unfortunately,\t either\t the
\ncomprehensive aspects both of facts and law placed before us
\nwere not  argued before\t them or  with due respect they were
\ncarried away  by the  apparent importance  of the  documents
\nwithout making\ta deeper  probe\t or  a\tscientific  approach
\nregarding the same.\n<\/p>\n
888<\/span><\/p>\n
     With due  deference to  the  learned  Judges  we  might
\nreiterate at  the risk\tof  repetition\tthat  they  did\t not
\nconcentrate  their  pointed  attention\tat  the\t most  vital
\nquestion, viz.,\t as to\twhether or  not the  plaintiffs\t had
\nproved that  Gajraj Singh,  who was undoubtedly the ancestor
\nof the\tplaintiffs, was\t in any\t way connected\twith Ramruch
\nSingh,\t Debi\tSingh\tand   Bansidhar\t  Singh.   We\thave
\ndemonstratively shown  that-from the  documents filed by the
\nplaintiffs, the\t fundamental missing  link  between  Ramruch
\nSingh, Devi  Singh, Gajraj Singh and Bansidhar Singh has not
\nbeen proved  and we  are sure  that if\tthe majority  Judges
\nwould have  laid greater stress and attention on this aspect
\nof the\tcase, in  all probability  they might  have found  a
\nlarge measure  of agreement  with the  judgment rendered  by
\nM.M. Prasad, J.\n<\/p>\n
     This now  brings us to the finale of the highly complex
\nand extremely complicated historical case in which we had to
\ntravel and  traverse through  diverse fact and figures, data
\nand  documents\t spreading  over  a  period  of\t almost\t two
\ncenturies. The last chapter consists of the oral evidence of
\nthe pedigree  propounded by the plaintiffs and we shall deal
\nwith the  same for  whatever it\t is worth  after a  complete
\nconsideration of  the opinions expressed in the majority and
\nthe minority judgments of the High Court.\n<\/p>\n
     Before,  however,\t opening  this\tchapter\t it  may  be
\nnecessary to  restate the norms and the principles governing
\nthe proof  of a\t pedigree by  oral evidence  in the light of
\nwhich the  said evidence would have to be examined by us. It
\nis true\t that in  considering the  oral evidence regarding a
\npedigree a  purely  mathematical  approach  cannot  be\tmade
\nbecause where  a long  line of\tdescent\t has  to  be  proved
\nspreading over\ta century,  it is obvious that the witnesses
\nwho are\t examined to  depose to\t the genealogy would have to
\ndepend on  their special  means of  knowledge which may have
\ncome to\t them through their ancestors but, at the same time,
\nthere is  a great  risk and  a serious\tdanger . involved in
\nrelying solely\ton the evidence of witnesses given from pure
\nmemory because\tthe witnesses  who are\tinterested  normally
\nhave a\ttendency to draw more from their imagination or turn
\nand twist  the facts  which they  may have  heard from their
\nancestors in  order to\thelp the  parties for  whom they are
\ndeposing. The  court must,  there fore\tsafeguard  that\t the
\nevidence of  such witnesses  may not be accepted as is based
\npurely on  imagination or an imaginary or illusory source of
\ninformation rather  than special  means of  knowledge as  is
\nrequired by law. The oral testimony of the witnesses on this
\nmatter bound  to be hearsay and their evidence is admissible
\nas an exception
\n889<\/span>
\nto  the\t  general  rule\t  where\t hearsay   evidence  is\t not
\nadmissible. This is culled out from the law contained in cl.
\n(5) of\ts. 32 of the Evidence Act which must be construed to
\nthe letter and to the spirit in which it was passed.\n<\/p>\n
     In order  to appreciate the evidence of such witnesses,
\nthe following principles should be kept in mind:\n<\/p>\n
     (1)   The relationship  or the  connection however
\n\t  close it  may be,  which the witness bears to
\n\t  the persons  whose pedigree  is sought  to be
\n\t  deposed by him.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (2)  The nature and character of the special means
\n\t  of knowledge\tthrough which  the witness  has
\n\t  come to know about the pedigree.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (3)     The  interested   nature  of  the\twitness
\n\t  concerned.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (4)   The precaution  which must  be taken to rule
\n\t  out any  false statement  made by the witness
\n\t  post litem  motam or one which is derived not
\n\t  by means of special knowledge but purely from
\n\t  his imagination, and
\n     (5)     The  evidence   of\t the  witness  must  be
\n\t  substantially corroborated as far as time and
\n\t  memory admit.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     These are\tthe broad  outlines on the basis of which in
\ncases whose  facts start  from very  olden times  such\toral
\ntestimony has to be judged and evaluated.\n<\/p>\n
     In the  case of  Bahadur Singh  & Ors  v.\tMohan  Singh
\nOrs.(1) the  Privy  Council  cautioned\tthe  courts  against
\naccepting statements which may be inadmissible under cl. (5)
\nof s.32\t of the\t Evidence Act  and which have been made post
\nlitem motam.  This aspect  of the matter has been dealt with
\nwhile dealing  with the\t doctrine of  post litem  motam.  We
\nmight mention  that in\tthis particular case the evidence of
\nalmost all the witnesses is post litem motam.\n<\/p>\n
     In\t Debi\tPershad\t Chowdhry   &  Ors.  v.\t Rani  Radha
\nChowdhrain &  Ors.(2) the  law on  the subject was very well
\nexpounded and  clearly\tdefined\t and  while  describing\t the
\nnature of  dependable evidence\tin  such  cases,  the  Privy
\nCouncil made the following observations:\n<\/p>\n
890<\/span><\/p>\n
\t  “It cannot  be doubted  that, in its quality,
\n     this  is\tadmissible   evidence.\t The   singular
\n     criticism of  the High Court is that it comes from
\n     relatives’ of  the appellant,  but it is difficult
\n     to see where else such evidence could be found, or
\n     that in  the mouth\t of strangers it would have any
\n     value at  all. Each  of the persons who has spoken
\n     to\t this\tpedigree  has\tbeen  carefully\t cross-
\n     examined, and  each  proves  circumstances,  apart
\n     from the pedigree, which support his knowledge and
\n     credit. This is not the case of a pedigree learned
\n     by rote,  but it circumstantially corroborated, as
\n     far as time and memory admit.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t\t\t\t      (Emphasisours)
\n     In Abdul  Ghafur &\t Ors v.\t Hussain Bibi  & Ors.(1) the
\nPrivy Council  briefly summed  up the  law in this regard in
\nthe following words:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  “It has  been established  for a  long  while
\n     that in  questions of pedigree, I suppose upon the
\n     ground that  they were  matters relating to a time
\n     long past,\t and that  it was  really necessary  to
\n     relax the\tstrict rules  of evidence there for the
\n     purpose of\t doing justice-but for whatever reason,
\n     the statements  of deceased  members of the family
\n     made ante\tlitem motam,  before there wag anything
\n     to throw  doubt upon  them, are  evidence to prove
\n     pedigree. And  such statements by deceased members
\n     of the  family may\t be proved  not only by showing
\n     that they\tactually made  the statements,\tbut  by
\n     showing that  they acted upon them, or assented to
\n     them, or  did anything  that amounted  to\tshowing
\n     that they recognised them.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t  (Sturla v. Freccia-(1880) S A.C. 623)
\n\t  “The rule  of evidence  thus enunicated is in
\n     accord with  the terms  of s.  32, sub-s. 6 of the
\n     Indian Evidence  Act, 1812, which is applicable to
\n     the present case.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     In Mewa  Singh &  Ors. v.\tBasant Singh  & Ors.(2)\t the
\nPrivy  Council\tmade  very  apt\t and  valuable\tobservations
\nregarding the manner in which a pedigree could be proved and
\npointed out  that in  order to\tsucceed, the plaintiffs must
\nbring  themselves   within  fourteen  degrees  and  in\tthis
\nconnection obverved thus:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
891<\/span><\/p>\n
\t  “The oldest names in a pedigree are naturally
\n     the first\tto  be\tlearnt\tand  the  first\t to  be
\n     learned, and the names of the earliest generations
\n     may well  survive in their proper order long after
\n     all trustworthy  memory of\t their lives has passed
\n     away.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     …\t\t   …\t\t\t    …\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  Those who  claim to be the reversionary heirs
\n     must bring\t themselves within the necessary number
\n     of pedigree  viz., fourteen.  They must  show that
\n     they are both next heirs and near enough.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     To the  same effect  is another  decision of  the Privy
\nCouncil in  Bhojraj v.\tSita Ram  & Ors.(1)  We have already
\npointed out  that in  the aforesaid  cases,  the  principles
\nenunciated by  us are  wholly consistent with what the Privy
\nCouncil says  and we  fully endorse  the same. None of these
\ncases  lays  down  that\t the  courts  should  suspend  their
\nobjective appraisal  of the veracity or dependability of the
\nwitnesses in  pedigree cases,  nor have\t the decisions given
\nany concrete  formula of  universal application for adducing
\noral evidence which may pass the judicial scrutiny.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     Mr. Tarkunde relied particularly on the observations of
\nthe Privy  Council in  Debi Pereshed Chowdhry’s case (supra)
\nextracted above\t to show  the approach\tto be  made  by\t the
\ncourt. The ratio of that case is in no way inconsistent with
\nwhat we\t have said  above. The\tPrivy Council did not accept
\nthe view  of the High Court because in their own opinion the
\nHigh Court  had rejected  the oral  testimony  only  on\t the
\nground that  the witnesses  were relations of the appellant.
\nThat was obviously wrong.\n<\/p>\n
     Similarly, other  cases on\t which reliance\t was placed,
\nwhich have already been discused above, do not lay down that
\nwherever witnesses  speak of  old  genealogy  it  should  be
\naccepted as  a gospel  truth. The  evidence of the witnesses
\nmust  be  scanned  very\t thoroughly  and  according  to\t the
\nstandards laid down by the Privy Council and this Court.\n<\/p>\n
     Apart from\t the aforesaid\tauthorities, there  are some
\nfamous\ttext   books  which  also  have\t laid  down  certain
\nprinciples for the appraisement of pedigree evidence. Taylor
\non ‘Treatise on Evidence’ has
\n892<\/span>
\npointed out in para 648 at page 414 that the declarations by
\nthe deceased  relatives deposed\t to by\tinterested claimants
\nrarely deserve\tmuch weight  because these  declarations are
\nmade by\t the relations\tfor the first time after the contest
\nof claim has arisen. In accepting this kind of evidence, the
\ncourt  runs   the  risk\t of  being  deceived  by  deliberate
\nfalsehood. The author further goes on to state thus:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “Little reliance can be placed on accuracy of
\n     his  testimony,   for  men,  without  deliberately
\n     intending to falsify facts, are extremely prone to
\n     believe what  they wish,  what they  believe  with
\n     what they have heard and to ascribe to memory what
\n     is merely the result of imagination.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     Similar view  was expressed  in Lovat  Peerage(1)\tcase
\nwhich is an example of how hearsay evidence can sometimes be
\nfraught with  serious consequences.  In this  case,  it\t was
\nemphasised that\t the time  occasion and\t manner of acquiring
\nknowledge of  pedigree to  prove the statement of a deceased
\nrelation is crucial to the test of veracity and an imaginary
\nstory related by the witness may ultimately turn out to be a
\nmere gossip.  It was  pointed out by Lord Watson at page 783
\nof  the\t Report\t that  in  taking  the\tdepositions  of\t old
\nwitnesses, the court must take into consideration that there
\nmay have  been an erroneous impression in the minds of those
\nwho proved the claimant’s case.\n<\/p>\n
     Wigmore on\t ‘Evidence’ in Volume V at pages 296 and 297
\nhas expressed  more or\tless the  same views and observes as
\nfollows:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “Accordingly the  only sound rule for the use
\n     of individual  declarations is  that the declarant
\n     himself must be shown to be unavailable.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     …\t\t …\t\t\t    …\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  The circumstantial indication of trustworthi-
\n     ness has  been found  in the  probability that the
\n     ‘natural effusions’  (to use  Lord Eldon’s\t of ten
\n     quoted phrase)  of those  who talk bias or passion
\n     exists are fairly trustworthy, and should be given
\n     weight by\tjudges and  juries, as\tthey are in the
\n     ordinary affairs of life.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
893<\/span><\/p>\n
     It has  also been\tpointed out  by the  author that the
\ndeclarations which  have been  made before  any\t controversy
\narises must  be given  greater weight.\tThis aspect has also
\nbeen emphasised\t in one\t of the Privy Council cases referred
\nto above.\n<\/p>\n
     The majority  judges  and\tthe  dissenting\t Judge\thave
\nvitally differed  in the  appreciation of  the oral evidence
\nbut in\tthe case of some witnesses all the three Judges have
\nrefused to rely on the evidence of the said witnesses, which
\nhas to\tbe ruled  out at  the  very  outset.  The  witnesses
\nexamined by the plaintiffs have been labelled as DWs because
\nat one\ttime the  plaintiffs were  defendants  in  the\tsuit
\nbrought\t by   other  defendants-claimants   but\t  when\t the
\nplaintiffs  themselves\tfiled  the  present  suit  laying  a
\nformidable claim  as being the next reversioners of the late
\nMaharaja, their\t witnesses continued  to be labelled Defence
\nWitnesses  though   they  were\t really\t witnesses  for\t the
\nplaintiffs. The\t trial court  ought to have put some mark in
\norder to  differentiate the  witnesses of the plaintiffs and
\nthe defendants\tbut unfortunately  that has  not been  done.
\nHowever, there is no dispute on the aforesaid description of
\nthe witnesses;\tso  this  matter  need\tnot  detain  us\t any
\nfurther.\n<\/p>\n
     To begin  with, before dealing with the evidence of the
\nplaintiffs’ witnesses  on the  point of\t genealogy we  would
\nlike to\t preface our  discussion with the description of the
\nimperfections and  infirmities of  human memory\t which alone
\nwould determine the dependability of the evidence.\n<\/p>\n
     Indeed, as\t a mortal man is not infalliable so is human
\nmemory. It records facts and events seen with some amount of
\nprecision and  accuracy, but  with the\tlapse or distance of
\ntime, unless  the facts\t or events  are noted or recorded in
\nwriting, the  facts or\tevents\tfade,  sequences  get  lost,
\nconsistency gives  way to  inconsistency, realities yield to
\nimagination,  coherence\t slowly\t disappears,  memory  starts
\nbecoming  blurred,   confusion\tbecomes\t  worse\t confounded,
\nrememberance is substituted by forgetfulness resulting in an
\nerosion of  facts  recorded  by\t the  memory  earlier.\tThis
\nequally applies to facts merely heard by one from some other
\nperson. Thus, if a person having only heard certain facts or
\nevents repeats\tthem after  a long  time  with\tmathematical
\nprecision  or\tadroit\taccuracy,   it\tis   unnatural\t and
\nunbelievable and  smacks of concoction and fabrication being
\nagainst normal human conduct, unless he repeats some special
\nor strikingly  unusual incidant\t of life which one can never
\nforget or  where a  person is  reminded of  some conspicuous
\nfact on the happening of a
\n894<\/span>
\nparticular contingency\twhich lights  up the  past  such  as
\nmarriage, death,  divorce, accident disappointment, failure,
\nwars, famine,  earthquake, pestilence, (personally affecting
\nthe subject  and the  like) etc.,  and revives the memory in
\nrespect of the aforesaid incidents. Of course, if the person
\nhappens to  be an inimitable genius or an intellectual giant
\npossessing a  very sharp and shocking memory, the matter may
\nbe different.  But, such  persons are not born every day. To
\nsay, in this case, that all the witness one after the other,
\nwere geniuses  is  to  tell  the  impossible.  Weakness\t and
\nuncertainty of\thuman memory  is the  rule. The witnesses of
\nthe plaintiffs examined in this case are normal human beings
\nsuffering from\tthe usual  defects and drawbacks of a common
\nman.\n<\/p>\n
     Describing the  vagaries of  human memory, Ugo Betti so
\naptly and correctly observes:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “Memories are\t like stones, time and distance
\n\t  erode them like acid.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n\t\t\t (p.  395,   The  International\n\t\t\t Theasaurus   of    Quotations:\n\t\t\t Rhoda Thomas Tripp)\n<\/pre>\n
     In the  same strain,  Sir Richard Burton in his article
\n‘Sind Revisited’  expresses his thoughtful experience in the
\nfollowing words:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  “How strange are the tricks of memory, which,
\n     often hazy\t as a  dream about  the most  important
\n     events of\ta man’s\t life, religiously preserve the
\n     merest trifles.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n\t\t\t (p.  395,   The  International\n\t\t\t Theasaurus   of    Quotations.\n\t\t\t Rhoda Thomas Tripp)\n<\/pre>\n
     Similarly, Baltasar  Gracian in  ‘The  Art\t of  Worldly
\nWisdom’ very aptly puts the frailties of human memory thus:
\n\t  “The things we remember best are those better
\n     forgotten.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     We shall  now endeavour  to approach  and\tanalyse\t the
\nevidence  of  plaintiffs  witnesses  in\t the  light  of\t the
\nprinciples enunciated above.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
895<\/span><\/p>\n
     The oral  evidence led by the plaintiffs group consists
\nof the\ttestimony of  DWs 13,  21, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36 and to
\nsome extent  PW 40. Some of these witnesses were examined on
\ncommission which  will be  made clear  when we deal with the
\nevidence of individual witnesses.\n<\/p>\n
     To start  with, so\t far as\t the evidence of DW-32 Awadh
\nBihari Lall.  (Vol. I.\tp. 41  l ) is concerned, it has been
\nrejected both  by the majority and the minority judgments in
\nthe High  Court as  also by  the trial\tcourt. Mukherji,  J.
\nspeaking for  the  majority  after  carefully  scanning\t the
\nevidence of DW-32, observed as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
\t  ‘I have  already adverted  to above about the
\n     statement made  by DW-32  in the  Court below  and
\n     since he  appears to  be an  omnibus  witness  and
\n     there are lots of inconsistencies in his evidence,
\n     it will  not be  proper for  this Court  to  place
\n     reliance on his statement.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t\t\t   (Vol. VIII, P. 241)
\n     Similarly,\t M.M   Prasad,\tJ.,  who  had  rendered\t the
\ndissenting judgment  rejected the  statement of this witness
\nin the following words:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  “Ultimately, the Witness has admitted that he
\n     was a  classmate of  Bhagwati  Prasad  Singh,  the
\n     father  of\t  these\t 1  plaintiffs.\t That  explains
\n     everything\t the   witness\trepresents   a\ttypical
\n     partisan witness  who can\tgo out\tof the\tway  to
\n     support one  party\t and  expose  himself  even  to
\n     ridicule for the sake of such support. In my view,
\n     no reliance can be placed at all on his evidence.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     The trial\tcourt also did not place any reliance on the
\nevidence of  this witness. In these circumstances, it is not
\nnecessary for us to deal with the evidence of DW-32, nor was
\nany reliance  placed by\t the counsel  for the respondents on
\nhis evidence.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     The evidence  of DW-33,  Bhairo Prasad (Vol. I, p. 433)
\nwas rejected  by M.M.  Prasad, J.  though  accepted  by\t the
\nmajority but,  in our  opinion, wrongly. Before dealing with
\nthe evidence of this witness we might clarify that the trial
\ncourt had  numbered two\t witnesses as  DW-33,  viz.,  Bhairo
\nPrasad, who was the main witness in trial suit No. 5\/61, and
\nKamla Prasad  Singh (Vol.  I, p.  299) who  was a witness in
\ntrial suit No. 25\/58. The trial court as also the High Court
\nrejected the  evidence of  Kamla Prasad Singh, with which we
\nare not concerned at all. We are mainly concerned with
\n896<\/span>
\nDW-33, Bhairo  Prasad who  was\texamined  on  the  point  of
\ngenealogy in suit No. 5\/1961 and it is his evidence which we
\nhave to consider while dealing with the present case.\n<\/p>\n
     It is true that both the trial court and the dissenting
\njudge in  the High  Court rejected  the evidence  of  Bhairo
\nPrasad but  Mukherji, J. speaking for the majority came to a
\ndifferent conclusion  and held that Bhairo Prasad was not an
\ninterested witness  and there  was no  reason to discard his
\nevidence.  With\t  due  respect,\t  after\t going\tthrough\t his
\nevidence, we  find ourselves  unable to agree with Mukherji,
\nJ. and for the reasons given hereafter we are satisfied that
\nno reliance can be placed on the evidence of this witness.\n<\/p>\n
     To begin  with, we\t might state  that he  is one of the
\nwitnesses who  is almost  an octogenarian. While the witness
\ngave his age as 85-86 years, the Commissioner before whom he
\nwas examined  estimated his  age at 75 years, which seems to
\nhave been  accepted by\tMukherji, J. Although this is a very
\nminor discrepancy,  Mukherji, J.  seems to  have  overlooked
\nthat there  is a  tendency on  the part\t of the villagers to
\nsupport a  case of  this kind by overstating their age so as
\nto introduce  an element  of personal  knowledge in order to
\nprove old  genealogies. On  the\t other\thand,  the  Pleader-
\nCommissioner, who  recorded the\t evidence being a lawyer and
\nan educated  person, would  be in  a much better position to
\nestimate the  correct age  of the  witness. However, nothing
\nmuch turns  on this discrepancy and we shall presume that in
\nview of the very old age of the witness, his evidence merits
\nserious consideration.\tThere is  no doubt that this witness
\nwas closely  connected with  the family\t of Bhagwati  Prasad
\nSingh, father of the Plaintiff Radha Kirshan Singh as he has
\nadmitted to  have scribed  many documents  on behalf  of the
\nfamily of  Bhagwati Prasad  Singh. Mukherji,  J. also  found
\nthat the witness was intimately connected with the family of
\nBhagwati Prasad Singh as this witness and his ancestors have
\nscribed numerous  documents for\t different  members  of\t the
\nfamily and  on this ground the learned Judge thought that he
\nwould be  a more  competent  witness  to  depose  about\t the
\ngenealogy than any other witness. Assuming what Mukherji, J.
\nsays is\t correct, the  fact remains  that  being  intimately
\nconnected with\tthe family  of the  plaintiffs\tthe  witness
\ncannot be  said to  be an  independent one and he was deeply
\ninterested in  the success  of their  case. Therefore, while
\nthis may  not be  a sole  ground for rejecting his testimony
\nhis evidence  has to  be taken\twith great  care and caution
\nparticularly when he is Dot deposing as an eye-witness
\n897<\/span>
\nbut as\ta witness  to the  genealogy which he may have heard
\nfrom his  ancestors. The  approach made\t by Mukherji, J., in
\nappreciating his evidence does not appear to be correct. The
\nlearned Judge  has referred  to several documents which have
\nnothing to  do\twith  the  genealogy  in  question.  On\t the
\nquestion of  genealogy, which  was the\tvital question to be
\ndetermined, the learned Judge has not examined the intrinsic
\nevidence of  this witness  on merits.  We would,  therefore,
\nexamine his  evidence on the question of genealogy which was
\nthe only point to prove which he was examined.\n<\/p>\n
     After narrating  the genealogy  of the plaintiffs right
\nfrom Bansidhar\tSingh he  states that  he came\tto know\t the
\ngenealogy from Nand Kumar Singh, Jagat Bahadur Singh as also
\nfrom his  grandfather, Kamta Prasad Bhagwati Prasad, Mahadeo
\nSingh. According  to this evidence all the persons concerned
\nfrom whom  he had  learnt the  genealogy, excepting  Mahadeo
\nSingh, were  dead. So  far as  his information\tderived from
\nMahadeo Singh  is concerned,  it  will\tbe  inadmissible  as
\nhearsay because, according to him Mahadeo Singh is alive. At
\npage 439,  para 51  of his  evidence,  he  states  that\t the
\nnarration of  the genealogy  by the persons mentioned by him
\ntook place  in Chait  1894 (Hindi  Samvat year)-he  did\t not
\nremember the  corresponding Fasli  year- that is to say when
\nhe was\t15 years  old, if  his estimate\t of his\t own age  is
\ncorrect. If  we accept\tthe estimate of the Commissioner who
\nrecorded his  evidence, then  he was  only about  5 years in
\nwhich case it is impossible to believe that he would be in a
\nposition to  remember such a long drawn genealogy after such
\na long time when he heard the same as a boy of only 5 or 15,
\nas the\tcase may  be. This  aspect of  the metter  has\tbeen
\ncompletely overlooked  by Mukheriji,  J. Assuming,  however,
\nthat he\t was 85 years and therefore 15 years of age when the
\nnarrating  incident   took  place,  he\tdoes  not  give\t any
\nparticular  occasion  on  which\t so  many  persons  went  on
\nnarrating the  genealogy to  him. He admits that he does not
\nremember the  exact date  when the  narration took place nor
\ndid he\tmake any note on any paper but was speaking entirely
\nfrom his  memory. He  further admits  that all\tthe  persons
\nmentioned by  him narrated  the genealogy at one sitting and
\nyet he\tis unable  to give the special occasion on which the
\nnarration was done. So far as his grandfather was concerned,
\nhe says\t that the  genealogy was narrated by his grandfather
\nin 1895.  Though he  does not remember the month, nor did he
\nmake a\tnote of\t it on\tany paper,  it is  curious  that  he
\nremembers the  exact time  of narration\t which, according to
\nhim, was  7. 00\t p.m. Another  pertinent statement  which he
\nmade and  which completely  falsifies his  evidence  may  be
\nextracted thus;\n<\/p>\n
898<\/span><\/p>\n
\t  “The family members of Nand Kumar Singh, were
\n     weeping  over   the  death\t of  Maharaja  Harendra
\n     Kishore  Singh  and  told\tthe  said  fact\t to  my
\n     grandfather who in reply narrated the genealogy of
\n     Babu Bansidhar’s family of Manjhwa”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     According to  this statement  it is clear that both the
\nfamily members\tof Nand\t Kumar\tSingh  and  his\t grandfather
\nnarrated the  genealogy of Bansidhar’s family when they were
\nweeping over  the  death  of  the  late\t Maharaja  (Harendra
\nKishore Singh)\tand the\t weeping took  place at the house of
\nThakur Nandkumar  Singh. It  is common\tground that the late
\nMaharaja died  in  the\tyear  1893  while  the\tincident  or
\nnarration took\tplace in  1895. It is absurd to believe that
\nthe weeping of the family members would take place two years
\nafter the  death of  the Maharaja.  Similarly, when  he\t was
\nfurther cross-examined\tabout the  time and  the  manner  in
\nwhich he  acquired the knowledge of the genealogy, he made a
\nnumber of inconsistent statements: sometimes he said that he
\nacquired knowledge  of genealogy from Nandkumar Singh but he
\ndid not reduce it in writing. In answer to another question,
\nhe admits  that the  entire genealogy was narrated to him at
\none stretch  but he  did not  learn the the same at once but
\nfrom time  to time.  He could  not say how far he learnt the
\ngenealogy when\tit was narrated to him and then said that he
\nlearnt the same on hearing it repeatedly.\n<\/p>\n
     Indeed, of\t this  is  the\tprimordial  and\t rudimentary
\nreflex\tof   his  memory,  then\t it  is\t strongest  possible
\ncircumstance to\t discredit his\ttestimony and it leads to an
\nirresistible inference\tthat the story of repeated narration
\nof the\tplaintiffs’ genealogy  is nothing but a pure figment
\nof  his\t  imagination  concocted  to  help  and\t oblige\t his
\nrelation, friend,  philosopher and  guide  (Bhagwati  Prasad
\nSingh). Again  he makes a very strange statement which fully
\nbelies the  false story\t of the\t narration. He gays that the
\nlate Maharaja  died in\tChait 1894 A.D. whereas the Maharaja
\ndied on 26th March 1893, a year before. This  is   the\tbest
\ntest and  proof of  his weak  or frail\tmemory. A person who
\ncould not  remember the\t date of  the  death  of  his  close
\nrelation, the  late Maharaja  who furnished the occasion for
\nthe narration  of the  genealogy by various relations of the
\nfamily, is  not expected  to remember the genealogy narrated
\nto him\tlong before  the death\tof the\tlate Maharaja.\tThis
\ncircumstance, therefore,  completely destroys  his  evidence
\nregarding the  proof of genealogy. From a general reading of
\nhis evidence on the point of genealogy we are
\n899<\/span>
\nconvinced that\the has\tbeen set  up to repeat parrot like a
\nconcocted story\t to prove a genealogy. which, in fact, never
\nappeared to  have been narrated to him. His evidence on this
\npoint, therefore,  is not  free from  suspicion and  we\t are
\nunable to place any reliance on the same. We are constrained
\nto observe  that in  spite of  these serious infirmities and
\nmanfest\t defects,  Mukherji,  J.  Overlooked  the  aforesaid
\ninfirmities in\tbelieving the  evidence of  this witness. On
\nthe other  hand, M.M.  Prasad, J.  the dessenting  Judge has
\nmade a\tcorrect approach to his evidence and has pointed out
\na number  of defects  and infirmities  which show  that\t his
\nevidence is  absolutely ridiculous.  For instance, ia cross-
\nexamination, the  witness was  put  questions  to  test\t his
\nmemory and  he denied  knowledge of  the families of his own
\nnear relations\twhose names he could not give. How can it be
\nbelieved that if he could not even remember the names of his
\nown  near   relations,\the   would  remember  the  names  in
\ngenealogies running  into 12 degrees. He also laid stress on
\nthe facts  referred to\tabove, and  little did\tthe  witness
\nrelies that  although the  late Maharaja  died in  1893, the
\nweeping took place in 1895, i. e. two years after his death,
\nwhich is  impossible to\t believe. The learned Judge observes
\nthat there could be no better proof of a witness being hired
\nand tutored  to say  a thing than the aforesaid discrepancy.
\nNone of\t the important circumstances relating to testing the
\nmemory of this witness relied on by the dissenting Judge has
\nbeen considered by Mukherji, J. For these reasons, therefore
\nwe entirely  agree with\t the conclusion\t of  the  dissenting
\nJudge that  it is  impossible to  place any  reliance on the
\nevidence of this witness.\n<\/p>\n
     Narbadeshwar Dutt Sharma, PW 40 (Vol. I, p.l58) who was
\nessentially a  witness for  the plaintiffs of title suit No.
\n44 of  1955 has incidentally deposed to the genealogy of the
\nplaintiffs-respondents. His  evidence was  considered by the
\nmajority  and\trejected  on  the  ground  that\t he  had  no
\nconnection with\t the family of Bansidhar Singh and as he did
\nnot hear  the name  of Farman  Singh or Gajraj Singh, he was
\nnot competent  to prove\t the plaintiffs’  genealogy. In this
\nconnection, Mukherji, J observed thus:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “This witness was also an unsummoned witness.
\n     He cannot\teven tell  the name  of the  father  of
\n     Bhagwati Prasad  Singh. He\t did not  even hear the
\n     name of  Farman Singh  or Gajraj  Singh of village
\n     Baraini. In  this circumstance,  this witness does
\n     not appear\t to be a competent witness on the point
\n     of genealogy.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t\t (Vol. VIII, p. 247, para 108)
\n900<\/span>
\n     Thus it  is not  necessary for  us to  make any further
\nprobe into  the intrinsic  merits of  the evidence  of PW-40
\nwhich stands rejected.\n<\/p>\n
     The other\twitnesses who  are relevant  on the point of
\ngenealogy are DWs 13, 21, 32, 34, 35 and 36 (the evidence of
\nDWs 32\thaving been  rejected by  all the Judges of the High
\nCourt). Mr.  Tarkunde mainly relied on the evidence of these
\nfive witnesses\tand submitted in the course of his arguments
\nthat if he. was not able to persuade the Court to accept the
\nevidence of these witnesses, then the plaintiffs-respondents
\nwould not  succeed on  the basis of the oral evidence led by
\nhim.\n<\/p>\n
     We how  propose  to  deal\twith  the  evidence  of\t the
\naforesaid witnesses  individually. We will, however, take up
\nthe evidence  of DW-13, Radha Krishna Singh (Vol. I, p. 335)
\nat the\tend because  he\t is  one  of  the  main\t plaintiffs-
\nrespondents and therefore a highly interested witness, which
\nmay by\titself be no ground to distrust his testimony but is
\nundoubtedly a  circumstance to\tscan his  evidence with some
\namount of caution.\n<\/p>\n
     This brings  us to\t the evidence  of DW-21,  Bhuneshwar
\nPrasad Singh,  (Vol. I,\t p. 385). To begin with, the witness
\ngives his  age as only 38 years hence, it would be necessary
\nto scrutinise the sources of his information with great care
\nand caution  before his\t statment  can\tbe  admissible.\t The
\nwitness states\tthat Bansidhar\tSingh had  three sons, viz.,
\nRamruch Singh,\tRam Fakir  and Debi  Singh and Gajraj Singh,
\nthe alleged  ancestor of the plaintiff, was a son of Ramruch
\nSingh. It  is pertinent to not that Ram Fakir Singh, who was
\nanother\t son  of  Bansidhar  Singh,  is\t not  shown  in\t the
\nplaintiffs’ genealogy  at all.\tThis lacuna was sought to be
\nexplained by Mr. Tarkunde on the ground that Ram Fakir Singh
\nhad already died and therefore, his name is not mentioned in
\nthe genealogy. As the genealogy mentions a number of person,
\nwho had\t died childless, in the list of his ancestors, there
\nis no  reason why Ram Fakir Singh’s name, who was actually a
\nbrother\t of   Debi  Singh,   should  not  be  shown  in\t the
\nplaintiffs: genealogy.\tWe are,\t therefore unable  to accept
\nthe some  what unconvincing  reasons given  by Mr.  Tarkunde
\nregarding the  absence of the name of Ram Fakir Singh in the
\nplaintiffs’ genealogy.\tThis omission  is  rather  important
\nbecause it  would throw\t a flood  of light on the sources of
\ninformation of\tthe witness  and his  competency  to  depose
\nabout the genealogy.\n<\/p>\n
     The witness  further claims that one of the brothers of
\nBansidhar Singh\t was his  ancestor and goes an to state that
\nHirday Narain
\n901<\/span>
\nSingh, who  according to  the plaintiff,  was the  father of
\nBansidhar Singh was son of Hansraj Singh. The witness claims
\nhis ancestory  from Madho  Singh, who  was one\tof the seven
\nsons of\t Hirday Narain\tSingh. It may be noted that there is
\nabsolutely no  mention of  either Hansraj  Singh  or  Hirday
\nNarain Singh  or Madho\tSingh or  any  of  the\tbrothers  of
\nBansidhar Singh\t or even  of Ramhit  Singh  or\tany  of\t his
\ndescendants in\tthe plaint  genealogy. It would be pertinent
\nto note in this context that the descendants of Ramhit Singh
\nhad appeared  as witnesses  in suit  No. 55 of 1983. and had
\ndeclared that  Ramruch Singh  was not  the son\tof Bansidhar
\nSingh. In  these circumstances,\t this witness  cannot now be
\nheard to  say that  Ramruch Singh  was the  son of Bansidhar
\nSingh and  not of Mangal Sah. The witness admits that he has
\nnot seen  and written  genealogy in  respect of which he had
\ndeposed in  the court.\tHe appears  to be  closely connected
\nwith Gauri  Babu who  is the Pairvikar of the plaintiffs and
\nadmits in  his evidence\t that Gauri  Babu had gone to him in
\nvillage\t Baraini  two-three  years  before  his\t deposition;
\nthereby he  indirectly admits  that he\twas  brought  to  D,
\ndepose in  the court at the instance of Gauri Babu. Although
\nthe witness  has denied\t that he was staying at the house of
\nGauri Babu  for about a month and was being tutored, reading
\nwithin the  lines of his testimony it does appear that Gauri
\nBabu had  no doubt  brought the\t witness  to  Patna  and  he
\n(Gauri) being  a Pairvikar of the plaintiffs, as admitted by
\nthe witness, must have brought him for a certain purpose.\n<\/p>\n
     Coming now\t to the\t intrinsic merits of his evidence we
\nwould first  trace the\tsource of knowledge of this witness.
\nTo begin  with, he  states that\t his  father  told  him\t the
\ngenealogy about 50 times but he does not remember as to when
\nthe genealogy  was told\t to him\t last time.  He admits\tthat
\nthere was  no special  occasion for  his father to have told
\nhim the\t genealogy. He\talso admits  that he  had no written
\ngenealogy. This\t statement is  obviously  incorrect  because
\nnormally a genealogy is recited on certain festive occasions
\nlike marriage,\tshradh, etc.,  and  not\t just  by  the\tway.
\nFurther, it  is difficult to believe that even if his father
\nhad narrated  the genealogy  he would  do it  as many  as 50
\ntimes without  any rhyme  or reason.  The witness goes on to
\nstate that  his father had told him as many as 1000 names of
\nBhumihar  Brahmins   living  in\t villages  Majhwa,  Garauli,
\nBaraini and lot of other villages. He further states that he
\nwas also  told the  names of  gotias only  who lived  in the
\naforesaid villages. The entire tenor of his evidence
\n902<\/span>
\nshows that  the source\tof his\tknowledge, which is from his
\nfather,\t appears   to  be   a  tainted\t one  and  has\tbeen
\nmanufactured for  the purpose  of  this\t case.\tThe  witness
\nfurther admits\tthat he had not seen any papers showing Raja
\nJugal Kishore Singh as the son of the daughter of Raja Dhrub
\nSingh. He  pretends to\tknow that  Bhagwati Prasad Singh was
\nthe nearest  legal heir of the late Maharaja but he does not
\ndisclose the  source of\t his information. Furthermore, while
\ndeposing about the relationship with the Maharaja of Banaras
\nhe says\t that he  has  not  seen  any  papers  showing\tthat
\nMaharaja of Banaras belonged to Dionwar sub-sect. He further
\nsays that  he heard  this fact\tfrom his  father when he was
\nonly 10-12 years old.\n<\/p>\n
     The clear\tand categorical\t statement of  DW-33, Bhairo
\nPrasad, shows  that none  of the  descendants  or  Bansidhar
\nSingh had  settled in  village\tBaraini\t and  that  Bhagwati
\nPrasad\tSingh\tof  village   Baraini  had  no\tgenealogical
\nconnection with Majhwa. Thus, DW-21 is sadly contradicted by
\nthe evidence of DW-33. Furthermore, according to DW-21, Babu
\nDebi Singh had five sons but this is completely falsified by
\nthe plaintiffs’\t genealogy as also the case made out by them
\nand sought to be proved by other witnesses.\n<\/p>\n
     It was further contended by Mr. Tarkunde that according
\nto DW-21,  he was  a descendant of Hirday Narain Singh or of
\nMadho Singh and therefore he would be, second in the line of
\nclaim to  the reversionary interest of the late Maharaja and
\nas  such  he  is  not  likely  to  depose  against  his\t own
\ninterests. The\twitness is  a young  man and we have already
\nshown that  the source\tof his\tinformation about the plaint
\ngenealogy is not believable. The manner in which the witness
\nwas brought  from his  village to  Patna by the Pairvikar of
\nthe plaintiff  and  the\t incorrect  statement  made  by\t him
\nregarding the  genealogy clearly  show that  whatever he may
\nprofess he  does not  seem to  be in  any way connected with
\nHirday Narain  Singh. In  fact, DW-21 himself admits that he
\nhad no concern or interest in Bettiah Raj. He further admits
\nin para\t 18 of\this evidence  that he came to know about the
\ncase from  the plaintiff,  Radha Krishan  Singh, and that he
\ndid not\t know the  claim of  the respective  parties.  While
\ndeposing regarding the genealogy he could not tell the order
\nof death  of any of his ancestors nor could he tell in which
\nperiod Hansraj\tand Hirday  Narain Singh  existed. He admits
\nthat when  his father  repeated the  names of  his ancestors
\nfifty times  he was  only 16  years old.  It is difficult to
\nbelieve that  a casual\trecitation of  the names fifty times
\nwould be  remembered by\t him after  a lapse  of more than 20
\nyears. M. M. Prasad, J. has given very cogent and
\n903<\/span>
\nconvincing reasons  for disbelieving  the evidence  of\tthis
\nwitness. The  learned Judge  has pointed out, apart from the
\nfacts mentioned, above, that the witness has not come across
\nany written  genealogy even of his own family, what to speak
\nof  the\t family\t of  the  plaintiff.  Finally,\tthe  witness
\nadmitted that  he is a cousin of Kamla Singh, DW-33. If this
\nwas so,\t then the  genealogies given  by Kamla Singh and the
\nwitness should\thave tallied  but it  would appear  from the
\nevidence of  DW-33 that\t he gave  a genealogy different from
\nthe  one  given\t by  this  witness.  Having  regard  to\t the
\ncircumstances and  the statements  made by  this witness, we
\nfind it impossible to place any reliance on the testimony of
\nthis witness.  We therefore  agree with the opinion of M. M.
\nPrasad, J.  that the  evidence of this witness is not worthy
\nof credence.\n<\/p>\n
     Nagendra Kumar,  DW-34 (Vol. I, p. 445) sought to prove
\nthe genealogy of the family. The witness was 60 years old at
\nthe time  of his deposition and was a resident of Majhwa. He
\nclaimed to  be a  descendant of Hansraj Singh, the father of
\nHari Narain  Singh and\tHirday Narain  Singh, as the witness
\nsays. According\t to the witness, Hari Narain Singh had a son
\nnamed Sah  Makund and  the witness  claims to  be  from\t the
\nbranch of  Sah Makund.\tComing to  the genealogy,  he states
\nthat Hirday  Narain Singh  had a son, named Bansidhar Singh,
\nand than  Bansidhar Singh  had three  sons, viz., Ram Fakir,
\nRamruch and  Devi Singh.  We have  already pointed  out that
\nalthough the  name of Hirday Narain Singh finds place in Ex.
\nJ yet  there is\t absolutely no reference to Bansidhar Singh.
\nWe shall  presently show that there is an important document
\nEx. B\/32  (vol. llI, p. 42) where Ramruch Singh has not been
\nmentioned as  the son  of Bansidhar Singh but instead Gajraj
\nSingh has been mentioned as the son of Bansidhar Singh. This
\ndocument is  rather important because it is a certified copy
\nof a  deposition of  one Bhupraj,  who was  a witness as far
\nback as\t 1909 in  the earlier  suit. The  statement of\tthis
\nwitness that  Bansidhar\t Singh\thad  three  sons,  including
\nRamruch Singh,\tis therefore  clearly  contradicted  by\t Ex.
\nB\/32, a\t document which\t came into existence long before the
\nplaintiff’s suit  of 1961  entered the\tarena of the present
\ncase. Moreover,\t in 1909,  the memory  of Bhupraj would have
\nbeen much fresher than that of this witness.\n<\/p>\n
     In order  to test\tthe veracity  of this witness on the
\ntouchstone of  the principles  enunciated by  this Court and
\nthe Privy  Council we  would refer  to\tthe  source  of\t his
\nknowledge.  Admittedly,\t  ‘the\twitness\t  had  no   personal
\nknowledge about the genealogy of the family of the
\n904<\/span>
\nplaintiffs. He\thowever represented  in his evidence that he
\nhad learnt  the genealogy  from his  grand uncle Hari Sharan
\nSingh and  Bhagwati Prasad  Singh,  father  of\tone  of\t the
\nplaintiffs, both  of whom  are now  dead. He  further admits
\nthat his  grand-uncle, Hari  Sharan Singh,  died in or about
\nthe year  1936. This means that at the time when the witness
\nwas told  about the family genealogy of the plaintiffs By he
\nwas only  14-15 years  and was\tstudying in  class VI  of  a
\nmiddle school.\tHe then\t goes on  to state  that at the time
\nwhen the  genealogy was\t narrated, 5-6 persons of his family
\nwere present  but he  does not even remember the name of any
\nof them. It is rather strange that he does not even remember
\nthe names of the persons in whose persence the genealogy was
\nnarrated by  his grand-uncle and yet he traces the genealogy
\nof the\tfamily\ttold  to  him  about  45  years\t back.\tThis
\nimportant circumstance\tshows that  his memory is very weak,
\nin which  case it is well-high impossible to believe that he
\nwould remember\tthe genealogy  narrated to  him by his grand
\nuncle though  he could\tnot give the names of the persons in
\nwhose presence\tthe genealogy  was narrated  to him. He does
\nnot appear  to have  made any  note of\tthe genealogy on any
\npaper when  his grand  uncle repeated  the same,  nor has he
\nmentioned any particular occasion on which the genealogy was
\nnarrated to  him which\tmay have enabled him to remember the
\nsame. The  graphic details  about the  relationship of\tHari
\nNarain Singh  right up\tto Harendra  Kishore Singh could not
\nhave been  given by  him in these circumstances. It appears,
\ntherefore, as  rightly contended  by the appellant. that he,
\nbeing  a   highly  interested  witness,\t has  concocted\t all
\nconversations, chances and coincidences when his grand uncle
\ntold him  the genealogy.  Moreover, human  memory, faint and
\nvulnerable as  it is  not likely  to reflect  facts of 40-50
\nyears back  unless there  is something\tin the\tshape  of  a
\nparticular document,  mode, occasion or something to remined
\nhim. At the time when the genealogy was narrated to him, the
\nwitness was  only a boy 14-15 years and he would not have at
\nthat time cared to make any particular note of the genealogy
\nas he would be least interested in the same at that time. He
\nfurther admits\tthat his  grand uncle  narrated to  him\t the
\ngenealogy from his memory and not from any note, nor was the
\nsaid genealogy written on any place of paper.\n<\/p>\n
     The witness  admitted that\t he could remember only some
\nportion of  the genealogy  then and there and not the whole.
\nHe clearly  admits in  his deposition  that  he\t learnt\t the
\ngenealogy from\tBhagawati Prasad  Singh in the winter season
\nafter the death Maharani
\n905<\/span>
\nJanki Kuer,  that is  to say  after the\t present dispute had
\nalready started\t and in\t these circumstances his evidence is
\ninadmissible under  s. 35  of the Evidence Act on a point of
\nlaw, viz.,  being hit  by the  doctrine of post litem motam.
\nAgain, he  embarks on  a flight\t of fancy  and\tgoes  on  to
\nnarrate facts  which  he  could\t never\thave  known  without
\nreading some authentic historical book. He relates the facts
\nof the battle of Marui which took place as far back as 1719.\n<\/p>\n
     Finally, he  attributes five sons to Debi Singh whereas
\nin the plaint it is stated that Debi Singh had only one son,
\nviz.,  Aini   Sihgh.  Thus,   far  from\t  corroborating\t the
\ngenealogy,   his   evidence   positively   contradicts\t the
\nplaintiff’s genealogy.\tHe has\talso made a number of errors
\nin describing  the genealogy  which does  not tally with the
\nplaintiff’s genealogy.\tIn our opinion, the evidence of this
\nwitness appears\t to be\tgot up\tand  does  not\tinspire\t any
\nconfidence. This is demonstrated by the fact that he admitts
\nthat the  plaintiff Radha Krishan Singh had told him to give
\nevidence in  the case  and yet\the says\t that he  had  never
\nnrrated the  genealogy to  Radha Krishan  Singh. Indeed,  if
\nthis was  so, it  is not  understandable why  Radha  Krishan
\nSingh would have asked him to depose in his favour.\n<\/p>\n
     To crown it all, DW-34 admits that there is no document
\neither to  show that  he was originally a resident of Majhwa
\nor that\t Hansraj Singh was a common ancestor of this witness
\nand Bhagwati  Prasad Singh.  Mukherji, J.  who delivered the
\nmajority judgment,  has dealt  with  the  evidence  of\tthis
\nwitness rather\tsummarily without  alluding or\treferring to
\nthe important  facts,  infirmities,  flaws  and\t defacts  as
\ndiscussed above\t which makes  the evidence  of this  witness
\nboth faulty  and imperfect.  All these\tcircumstances  taken
\ntogether render him an unreliable witness.\n<\/p>\n
     The next  evidence that falls for consideration is that
\nof Debi\t Singh, DW-35  (Vol. 1, p. 453) who belongs to Mauza
\nMajhwa. It  is curious\tthat he\t claims his  descent through
\nHarkhan Singh  who was disclaimed and disowned by Soman Kuer
\nand Jaimed  Kuer in the plaint filed by them in suit No. 130
\nof 1856\t relating to Hansraj Talab (Pokhar), which falsifies
\nthe  evidence\tof  this  witness  at  the  very  inception.
\nAccording to  the witness, there were some cases relating to
\nHansraj Talab  between Harkhan\tSingh and  Ramratan Singh on
\nthe one\t side and  Soman Kuer  and Jaimed Kuer on the other.
\nThe witness  claims to belong to the family of Rarnratan and
\nHarkhan who are descendants of Bikram Sah. He admits that
\n906<\/span>
\nHarkhan Singh  was in the service of Bettiah Raj and also of
\nSoman Kuer  and Jaimed\tKuer and after the dispute resulting
\nfrom the  suit, Harkhan’s  services were  terminated. In the
\nsaid plaint  Jaimed Kuer  and Soman  Kuer vehemently  denied
\nhaving any  relationship either\t with  Harkhan\tor  Ramratan
\nSingh. It  seems to us that he has claimed Harkhan Singh and
\nBikram Sah  as his  ancestors in  order to make his evidence
\nadmissible so as to trace the source of his information from
\nthe aforesaid  two persons  who are  now  dead.\t The  plaint
\ngenealogy does\tnot mention  the name  of Harkhan  Singh and
\nBikram Sah  as having  any connection  with Jaimed  Kuer  or
\nSoman Kuer.  According to  the plaintiff’s  own case  Jaimed
\nKuer was  the wife of Balbhadra Singh whereas Soman Kuer was
\nthe wife of Tilak Singh, son of Pahalwan Singh. According to
\nhis evidence,  he learnt  the genealogy\t of the\t family from
\nJadunandan  Singh,   Vasisht  Singh,   Bhupraj\tUpadhya\t and
\nBhagwati Prasad\t Singh. All  these persons  are dead  and he
\nseems to  have traced  the  source  of\this  information  to
\ndeceased persons  in order  to make  his evidence admissible
\nunder sub-s.  (5) of  s. 32 or the Evidence Ast. The witness
\ngoes on\t to state  that Jadunandan Singh was his grand uncle
\nand one of the descendants of Bikram Sah. In order to give a
\ntouch of truth and a cover of legal admissibility he gives a
\ntwist and  turn by  asserting that  Bhupraj Upadhya  was the
\nPurohit of  his family and wants us to believe that since he
\nhad heard  the plaintiff’s genealogy from the Purohit, there
\ncould  be  no  doubt  about  the  correctness  of  the\tsaid
\ngenealogy.\n<\/p>\n
     As usual  with the other witnesses, this witness states
\nthat Jadunandan\t Singh gave  out  the  family  genealogy  of
\nBansidhar Singh\t and Bikram  Sah when he was aged only 15-16
\nyears. He further asserts that Dalthumbhan, Prayag Singh and
\nParsidh Singh were also present and none else. None of these
\nwitnesses have\tbeen produced  to support  the testimony  of
\nthis witness.  It is  also not known whether these witnesses
\nare dead  or alive. He then states that at the time when the
\ngenealogy was narrated to him he could remember only 10 or 5
\nnames but  he could  not name those 10 or 5 names exactly. A
\nperson who  is not  able to  remember the names disclosed to
\nhim about  40-46 years\tago could  not possibly remember the
\nnames of  all the ancestors of Jadunandan Singh after such a
\nlong lapse of Time. This part of his evidence is against the
\nbalance of  probabilities and  fails to consider infirmities
\nand infalibility  of human memory. He admits that he did not
\nmake any  note of  the genealogy  of Bikram Sah or Bansidhar
\nSingh but heard the same from
\n907<\/span>
\n     Bhagwati Prasad  Singh. He\t further stated\t that before
\nhearing the  genealogy from  Bhagwati Prasad  Singh  he\t had
\noccasion to  narrate the same to his son, Sarju Prasad. This
\npart of\t his evidence is wholly unintelligible because if he
\nhimself had  not heard\tthe genealogy  from Bhagwati  Prasad
\nSingh, how could he narrate it to Sarju Prasad
\n     In order  to further test his memory he was asked a few
\nquestions and  he admitted that he did not remember the year
\nof his own marriage although he was married at the age of 18
\nyears. He further admitted that he did not remember the year
\nwhen his  mother died. It is not understandable how he could
\nremember the  genealogy narrated  to him  long before  if he
\ncould not  remember the facts which were directly within his
\npersonal knowledge, viz., either the year of his marriage or
\nof the\tdeath of  his mother.  Another person  from whom the
\nwitness is  said to have acquired knowledge of the genealogy
\nis, according  to him, Vashist Singh. He admits that he does
\nnot remember the time, year or even the occasion for hearing
\nthe genealogy  from Vashist  Singh nor\tdoes he remember how
\nmany other  persons were present when Vashist Singh narrated
\nthe genealogy.\n<\/p>\n
     Doubtless, this  witness is  highly interested  being a
\nclose relation\tand friend  of Bhagwati Prasad Singh (father
\nof the plaintiffs. Though that circumstance alone may not be
\nsufficient to discard his evidence, yet it is a factor to be
\nreckoned with  and shows  that the testimony of this witness
\nis tainted. As the stakes in the present case are very high,
\nhis evidence  has to  be viewed with great care and caution.
\nWe have\t already adverted  to his  previous statement in the
\nevidence where\the has\tsaid that  he did  not remember more
\nthen 10\t or 5  names in\t the genealogy\tnarrated to  him  by
\nJadunandan Singh  yet he  claims that Vashist Singh gave out
\nexactly the  same genealogy  as given  by  Jadunandan  Singh
\nwhich in  fact consisted  of the  entire family of Bansidhar
\nSingh up  to  12  degrees  and\t8  degrees  commencing\tfrom
\nBansidhar Singh\t to Bhagwati  Prasad Singh. Thus, this clear
\ninconsistency in his statement completely belies the fact of
\nnarration of the genealogy by Vashist Singh.\n<\/p>\n
     Another circumstance  to falsify  his evidence  on\t the
\npoint of  genealogy is\tthat one of the persons from whom he
\nclaims to  have learnt\tthe genealogy  is  Bhupraj  Upadhya,
\nPriest of  the late  plaintiff, Bhagwati  Prasad Singh.\t The
\nwitness says that Bhupraj narrated
\n908<\/span>
\nthe genealogy  but he could not say whether it was 50 times,
\n100 times,  20 times,  10 times or only 5 times, nor does he
\nrecollect the  time when  the genealogy\t was repeated on the
\nsecond or  the third  occasion. So  far as Bhupraj Upadhya’s
\nknowledge is  concerned, it  has been clearly proved in this
\ncase that  he could  not at  all be  aware  of\tthe  correct
\ngenealogy of  the family  of the late Maharaja. In the title
\nsuit of\t .1908 filed  by the late plaintiff (Bhaawati Prasad
\nSingh), Bhupraj\t deposed as a witness and the certified copy
\nof his\tevidence is  Ex. B\/32.\tA perusal  of his deposition
\nwould  show   that  Bhupraj  had  himself  given  a  written
\ngenealogy on  the most\tvital point  by saying\tthat  Gajraj
\nSingh was  the son  of Bansidhar  Singh,  thereby  giving  a
\ncomplete go-by\tto the\tcase of\t the present plaintiffs that
\nGajraj Singh  was son  of Ramruch  Singh. In  fact,  in\t his
\nstatement  Bhupraj   omitted  the   existence\tof   Ramruch
\naltogether. Indeed,  if this  was so, how could this witness
\n(Debi Singh)  have learnt  the\tgenealogy  from\t Bhupraj  in
\nrespect of  a point  of which  Bhupraj himself appears to be
\ntotally\t ignorant.   This  is\ta  very\t  strong   intrinsic
\ncircumstance to\t discard  the  testimony  of  this  witness.
\nFurthermore, while  the witness attempts to give a very long
\nand complicated genealogy which would show that he possesses
\nan excellent  and shocking memory yet he admits that he does
\nnot remember  the date\tof the\tdeath of  his own father and
\nmother or  even of  his own  marriage. It  is impossible  to
\nbelieve that  a person\twho had such a short and week memory
\nso much so that who could not remember even important events
\nof which  he had  personal knowledge,  would remember a long
\nand complicated\t genealogy running into more than a century.
\nThus,  the   hurly-burly,  skinny  and\tscrawny\t process  of
\nrepeating the  huge crowd of names of so-called ancestors of
\nthe plaintiffs\tsaid to\t have been  narrated to him has been
\nproved to be unreliable on his own evidence, with the result
\nthat he has made confusion worse confounded. This shows that
\nhe was out to support his plaintiffs’ case without any sense
\nof responsibility or regard for truth.\n<\/p>\n
     As regards\t the fact  that he  heard the genealogy from
\nBhagwati Prasad\t Singh in  1934 at  the Shradh\tceremony  of
\nJanki Kuer,  this is  inadmissible in  evidence\t being\tpost
\nlitam motam  because of\t the death of Janki Kuer the dispute
\nhad already  arisen and\t the question as to who would be the
\nnearest reversioner had come out in the open.\n<\/p>\n
     Having    regard,\t  therefore,\tto    the    glaring
\ninconsistencies and  discrepancies  in\this  statement,\t the
\nshortcomings of his memory
\n909<\/span>
\nwhich has  been\t demonstratively  shown\t by  his  subsequent
\nstatements as  referred to above, it seems that his evidence
\nregarding the  narration of the genealogy by various persons
\nis nothing  but a  cock and  bull story.  For these reasons,
\ntherefore, we are not a-t all inclined to place any reliance
\non his\tevidence. We  might mention  here that\tthe  various
\ndiscrepancies, circumstances  and infirmities pointed out by
\nus in  his evidence  discussed above  have not\tbeen noticed
\nmuch less  explained by\t the majority  judgment delivered by
\nMukherji, J.\n<\/p>\n
     This is  sufficient to  vitiate the appreciation of the
\nevidence of the aforesaid witness by Mukherji, J.\n<\/p>\n
     This  brings   us\tnow  to\t the  last  witness  of\t the
\nplaintiffs, who\t is plaintiff  No. 1  himself,\ti  e.  Radha
\nKrishan Singh,\tDW-13. It  is manifest that being the son of
\nBhagwati Prasad Singh and the main plaintiff, he is the most
\ninterested person  and is bound to support his case on which
\ndepends the  fate  of  this  litigation\t so  far  as  he  is
\nconcerned. His\tevidence  also,\t therefore,  as\t a  rule  of
\nprudence has  to be  examined with  great care\tand  caution
\nbecause he  is interested  in making statements which may go
\nto support  his case.  Even so,\t his evidence  shows that he
\nknows very  little about  the conduct of the case as it does
\nnot support  the genealogical  tree set\t forth in the plaint
\nitself. In  his statement,  he mentions that Bansidhar Singh
\nhad three  sons, viz.  Ramruch Singh,  Accho Singh and Fakir
\nSingh and  expressly states  that Debi\tSingh was not one of
\nhis  three   sons,  which  knocks  the\tbottom\tout  of\t the
\nplaintiffs’ entire  case. Further,  his\t evidence  does\t not
\nestablish any Link between Debi Singh and Aini Singh even in
\nhis examination-in-chief,  as a result of which he is forced
\nto make a substantial change in his version at a later stage
\nafter several days realising that he had committed a serious
\nblunder\t which\tmight  discredit  his  case  altogether.  To
\nillustrate our\tpoint,\twe  might  extract  a  part  of\t his
\nevidence regarding  his ancestor,  Bansidhar Singh  where he
\nsays, “Bansidhar  Singh\t had  three  sons,  namely,  Ramruch
\nSingh, Accho Singh and Fakir Singh”. It is pertinent to note
\nthat he\t does not  name Gajraj\tSingh at  all. Realising his
\nmistake he  adds that  Gajraj Singh  was the  son of Ramruch
\nSingh. It  is obvious  that before  coming to  the court, he
\nmust have been fully prepared with at least his own family’s
\ngenealogy on  the basis of which he wished to succeed hl the
\nsuit filed  by him  and yet  the omission of Gajraj Singh at
\nthe first  flush seems\tto indicate  the poor  state of\t his
\nknowledge.\n<\/p>\n
     Disclosing\t his  knowledge\t about\tthe  genealogy,\t the
\nwitness states\tthat he\t had learnt  the genealogy  from his
\nfather, Bhagawati
\n910<\/span>
\nPrasad\tSingh\tand  one  Bishwanath  Singh  Balwaria  About
\nBishwanath Singh  he says  that he  had heard  the genealogy
\nwhen he\t was only  12 years  old.  He  makes  a\t very  stark
\nadmission which\t shows the  state of  his memory. He says in
\nparagraph 26  of his evidence that he could not say the year
\nof his\tbirth and  that of  his brother\t according to  Hindi
\nSamvat and  Fasli Year.\t In order  to conceal  his  lack  of
\nknowledge he  makes out\t a case\t that his  horoscope as also
\nthat of\t his brother,  Sri Kishan  were lost.  He  later  on
\nchanged his  statement immediately  by saying  that he could
\nnot say\t if the\t horoscope of  his other  two brothers\twere
\nstill in  his house or they were also lost. In order to test
\nhis memory,  some vital\t questions were asked and he replied
\nthus:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “My father at times used to tell me about the
\n     different sub-sects  of Bhumihar  Brahmins. When I
\n     was aged 17 or 18 years, my father told me for the
\n     first  time   about  the  different  sub-sects  of
\n     Bhumihars and  this  he  had  told\t me  about  one
\n     hundred times.  He never tested me if I remembered
\n     the different sub-sects which he had told me.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t\t      (Vol. I, p. 343: para SO)
\n     When questioned  expressly regarding the genealogy, the
\nwitness makes the following pertinent statement:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  “One of  those papers was a written genealogy
\n     which would  show that  the  persons  named  above
\n     belong to\this family  as stated  by me. About two
\n     years ago that I saw the above genealogy. I cannot
\n     say who  is the writer of that genealogy. I cannot
\n     say if the name of the writer is mentioned in that
\n     genealogy which  is from the time of Hansraj up to
\n     the time of Adity Singh and . his brother. Harkhan
\n     Singh in  the line\t of Bikram  Singh and  upto the
\n     time of  Ram Rupan\t Singh in  the line  of Chhatan
\n     Singh. I do not remember if in their genealogy the
\n     last  member   in\tthe  line  of  Rudra  Singh  is
\n     mentioned. In  that genealogy the name of Musammat
\n     Jai (?)  Raj Kuar\tand Raghuanth Singh in the line
\n     of Devi  Singh one\t of the sons of Bansidhar Singh
\n     are  mentioned.   There  is   no  mention\tof  the
\n     descendants of Ram Ruch Singh in that genealogy as
\n     they had  gone away to Baraini. In that genealogy,
\n     there is no mention of the brothers of
\n911<\/span>
\n     Bansidhar Singh or their descendants or the descendants
\n     of Bansidhar Singh who had left village Majhawa.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<\/blockquote>\n
\t\t\t\t   (Vol. 1, p. 349, para 79)
\n     This shows\t his complete  lack of\tknowledge of his own
\nfamily’s genealogy  which conclusively\tproves the fact that
\nhe has\tbeen asked to depose parrot like just to support his
\ncase. To  begin with,  he says that one of the papers he had
\nseen was  a written  genealogy in which the persons named in
\nan earlier  part of  the statement were mentioned. He admits
\nthat he saw that genealogy about two years back but he could
\nnot say\t who was the writer of that genealogy and whether or
\nnot his\t name was  mentioned in\t that genealogy.  He has not
\ncared to  produce that\tparticular genealogy or to prove the
\nsame along  with the  number of genealogical tables filed by
\nthe plaintiffs.\t Further, in  the genealogy which he appears
\nto have\t seen, according  to him, the names of Mst. Raj Kuer
\nand Raghunath Singh in the line of Debi Singh are mentioned.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
A reference  to the plaint genealogy will show that the name
\nof Mst.\t Raj Kuer is not mentioned at all. He further admits
\nthat there  is no  mention at  all  of\tthe  descendants  of
\nRamruch Singh  which is\t the most  vital factor to determine
\nthe truth  of the  plaintiffs’ case.  Ramruch Singh  is\t not
\nproved to  be the father of Gajraj Singh, and therefore, the
\nsuit must necessarily fail. The witness who is the plaintiff
\nhimself is unable to explain this serious lacuna and gives a
\nmost feeble  and unconvincing  explanation that the omission
\nwas due\t to the\t fact that  Ramruch Singh  had gone  away to
\nBaraini. A number of other heirs in the plaint genealogy are
\nmentioned who  also had\t gone to Baraini and, therefore, the
\nexplanation given  by  him  is\tto  be\tstated\tonly  to  be
\nrejected. He  further admits  that in  the  said  genealogy,
\nthere is  no mention  of the  brothers of Bansidhar or their
\ndescendants. This, therefore. completely disproves his case.\n<\/p>\n
     The witness  further goes\ton to  state that he had not
\nasked Gauri Babu, one of the plaintiffs in this case who was
\nalso the  Pairvikar, about  the papers filed by him, nor did
\nGauri Babu  tell him  what papers  had been filed. He admits
\nthat Gauri Babu went to the lawyers to explain the papers to
\nthem and  he has  all along  been present in court since the
\ncases were taken up for hearing. In this view of the matter,
\nhis statement  is most\tunnatural and improbable and even if
\nbelieved it does not prove the vital missing links.\n<\/p>\n
912<\/span><\/p>\n
     M.M. Prasad,  J. rightly  inferred from  the  aforesaid
\nstatements A  made by  the witness  that he had not produced
\nthe most important document, viz., the genealogy about which
\nhe had\tstated in  his evidence mentioned above. The counsel
\nfor the\t respondents, however,\tsubmitted that\tthe  learned
\nJudge was  wrong because  the  genealogy  mentioned  by\t the
\nwitness in  paragraph 79  of his  deposition was  really the
\ngenealogy (Ex.\tQ-2).  We  are\tunable\tto  agree  with\t the
\ncontention advanced  by\t the  counsel  for  the\t respondents
\nbecause in  the first  place. DW-13 has not at all mentioned
\nthat the  genealogy which  he had  seen was produced in this
\ncase. Secondly, the genealogy (Ex. Q-2) was not at all shown
\nto him\tby  the\t counsel  for  the  plaintiff  in  order  to
\nelucidate the  fact that it was the genealogy referred to in
\nhis evidence  in para 79 extracted above. Indeed, if Ex. Q-2
\nwas really  the genealogy  referred to\tby the\twitness,  as
\ncontended for  the respondents,\t then the  first thing which
\nshould have  been done by the plaintiffs’ counsel would have
\nbeen to\t put  Ex.  Q-2\tto  the\t witness  at  once.  It\t is,
\ntherefore, clear that M. M. Prasad, J. was correct in making
\nadverse comments  regarding this part of the evidence of DW-\n<\/p>\n
13.
\n     It was  further argued  before us\tby Mr. Tarkunde that
\nthere was  another mistake  committed in the appreciation of
\nthe evidence  of DW-13\tand that  was the fact that much was
\nmade of\t the statement\tof the witness that while naming the
\nsons of Bansidhar Singh Accho Singh was mentioned instead of
\nDevi Singh.  This is an unmistakably clear statement made by
\nthe witness  and there\tis no  question of  there being\t any
\nlapse on  this part  of the  case. It  is a different matter
\nthat the  witness may have realised the omission of the name
\nof Devi\t Singh later  but truth\t comes out first. Apart from
\nthis, the  learned dissenting  Judge has  given a  number of
\nreasons for disbelieving DW-13. The learned Judge has relied
\non the\tomission on  the part  of the  witness to  give\t the
\ngenealogy of  the Babus\t of Sheohar,  Madhuban and Sirsa. It
\nwas further  pointed out  by the  learned Judge\t that  DW-13
\nstated that  his source\t of information of the genealogy was
\nhis father  but it  is doubtful\t if his father himself would
\nhave known  the genealogy  of all the branches if, according
\nto the\tstatement of  the witness,  he was living in Baraini
\nsince long  and would  therefore have  lost contact with all
\nhis  relations.\t  In  this  connection,\t the  learned  Judge
\nobserved thus:\t“Could his  father himself  have  known\t the
\ngenealogy from\tBansidhar down\tto himself, the genealogy of
\nRaja
\n913<\/span>
\n     Dhruba and\t the members of his family and the genealogy
\n     of the ancestors and descendants of Raja Jugal Kishores
\n     Circumstances do  not show that he could have known all
\n     these. Thus  simply because this witness states to have
\n     learnt it\tfrom his  father, it  cannot  be  taken\t for
\n     granted that  his father  must have known all these and
\n     had communicated  to him  the entire genealogy of these
\n     branches.”\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t (Vol. VIJI, p. 492)
\n     In these circumstances, we entirely agree with the view
\ntaken by  M. M. Prasad, J. that no reliance can be placed on
\nthe evidence of this witness, DW-13.\n<\/p>\n
     The last  witness whose  evidence was  not relied on by
\nMr. Tarkunde is Mahadeo Singh, DW-36 (Vol. I, p. 462) but as
\nthe witness  is an  octogenarian we may just as well briefly
\ndeal with  his evidence.  To begin with, the witness gives a
\ncomplete genealogy  of Bhagwati\t Prasad Singh  and the\tlate
\nMaharaja right\tfrom Bansidhar\tSingh up  to the plaintiff’s
\nfather Bhagwati\t Prasad Singh  and tries  to connect the two
\nfamilies as  having  a\tcommon\tancestor,  Bansidhar  Singh.
\nMukherji,  J.\thas  held   that  the  witness\twas  closely
\nassociated with\t the family of Bhagwati Prasad Singh and the
\nlate Maharaja  and being  an old  man he must be presumed to
\nhave special means of knowledge. The learned Judge, however,
\ndoes not  appear to  have considered the intrinsic merits of
\nthe evidence  of this  witness. In  the first  place,  DW-36
\nadmits in  his cross-examination  that he  could not say how
\nBansgopal Singh,  who is  a descendant in the line of Gajraj
\nSingh, was  related to\tRaghunath Singh\t in the line of Devi
\nSingh. He  further admits  that he  has forgotten about this
\nrelationship. This  is an important circumstance to negative
\nthe fact  that he  had any special means of knowledge of the
\nancestors of  the family  of the late Maharaja. This crucial
\nomission seems\tto have\t been brushed aside by Mukherji, J.,
\nwithout\t realising  the\t importance  of\t the  aforementioned
\nomission. On  the other\t hand, M.  M. Prasad,  J. has  fully
\ndiscussed the  evidence of  this witness  and found that the
\nwitness is  an unreliable one. In order to prove his special
\nmeans of  knowledge of\tthe  genealogy\tof  the\t plaintiff’s
\nfamily he  claims that\the was\ta  close  neighbour  of\t the
\nplaintiff’s and\t was on\t visiting, dining and inviting terms
\nwith their family. H
\n     He also  states that  he and  his ancestors were in the
\nservice of  Bettiah Raj,  more\tparticularly,  Hanuman,\t his
\ngrand-father, Salik.\n<\/p>\n
914<\/span><\/p>\n
Singh,\this   great-grand-father  and  Baijnath\t Singh,\t his
\ngreatgreat-grandfather. There  is, however,  no evidence  to
\nshow that  Baijnath, Salik or Hanuman were in the service of
\nBettiah Raj,  nor has  any document been produced in support
\nof this\t statement. There  is also no document to prove that
\nhe was a personal attendant of the late Maharaja, as claimed
\nby him;\t although he  claims to\t be a personal attendant for
\nthree years, it is rather strange and curious that he cannot
\ngive the  age of  the Maharaja\tat the time of his death nor
\nthe time  of the  marriage of  the Maharaja with Janki Kuer.
\nThis is\t rather important because it is the admitted case of
\nthe parties that Maharaja Harendra Kishore Singh died within
\na month of his marriage with Janki Kuer. He goes on to state
\nthat he\t learnt the genealogy from the late Maharaja and his
\nuncle Ram  Kumar Singh,\t Bhagwati  Prasad  Singh  and  Bhola
\nSingh. He first stated that Bhola was the son of Deep Narain
\nbut immediately\t changed his  statement and  said that Bhola
\nSingh was the son of Deo Narain.\n<\/p>\n
     Some questions  were put  to him  in order\t to test his
\nmemory and  he made  a very specific statement to the effect
\nthat he\t does not  know his  own genealogy except up to five
\ndegrees, that  is to  say, up  to Baijnath Singh. He further
\nadmitted that  he does\tnot know  the genealogy\t even of his
\nclose relations,  not even  the names  of fathers of some of
\nhis close  relations, nor  even of  his own  maternal  grand
\nuncle. Indeed,\tif the witness was not in a position to know
\nthe genealogy  of his own family how could he be expected to
\nremember the  genealogy of the late Maharaja whom he is said
\nto have merely served.\n<\/p>\n
     Further, in  order to  test the  truth of the genealogy
\ngiven by  him he was asked to repeat the twenty names of any
\ngenealogy which\t he remembered\tbut the\t witness  failed  to
\nrespond and  took refuge  under the plea that as he was very
\nold his\t memory had  faded though  he used to remember facts
\nonly up\t to the age of twenty years. It is rather surprising
\nthat although  he claims  that his memory has not failed him
\nin respect of all the names that he learnt at the age of 16-
\n17 years  yet it  completely failed  at the time when he was
\ngiving evidence.\n<\/p>\n
     Similarly,\t when\tasked  as  to  when  his  ancestor’s
\nconnection with\t the ancestors\tof Bhagwati  Prasad Singh on
\ninviting terms\tbegan the  witness answered  ‘Bansidhar\t and
\nBaijnath’. This\t was a\tpositively false  statement  because
\nBaijnath being his ancestor in the 6th
\n915<\/span>
\ndegree could not have been a contemporary of Bansidhar Singh
\nwho lived  long before\tBaijnath and  therefore there  is no
\nquestion of  A Bansidhar  Singh or  Baijnath Singh  being on
\ninviting terms.\n<\/p>\n
     None of  these circumstances or admissions made by this
\nwitness were  noticed or  considered by Mukherji, J. In view
\nof these  confused and\tconflicting statements\twe  find  it
\ndifficult to place any reliance on the evidence of DW-36 and
\nwe agree  with M.M.  Prasad, J.\t that the  witness  was\t not
\nworthy of credence.\n<\/p>\n
     It was  to meet  and save\tsuch or\t similar  situations
\nresulting from the shortcomings and frailties of the failing
\nand fading  human memory that Sir George Rankin, in the case
\nof Rokkam  Lakshmi Reddi  & Anr.  v. Rokkam  Venkata Reddi &
\nOrs.<\/a>(1) like a sage counsel sounded a note of caution in the
\nfollowing prophetic and classic words:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “It cannot  rightly be  left to  time or chance or
\n     cross examination\tto disclose  whether a statement has
\n     any basis which could give it value or admissibility.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     To sum  up, the ingenious and imaginative, fanciful and
\nfoggy, nasty  and nebulous  narration of  genealagies by the
\nplaintiffs witnesses  one  after  the  other  looks  like  a
\n‘sleeping beauty’  or Cinderella’s  Dream or as Shakespeares
\nMacbeth would  say “A  tale told  by an idiot, full of sound
\nand fury, signifying nothing.”\n<\/p>\n
     Thus, on  a complete  and careful\tconsideration of the
\noral evidence  also the\t plaintiffs have miserably failed to
\nprove the  two important  links, viz., that Gajraj Singh was
\nthe son of Ramruch Singh, and that Ramruch Singh was the son
\nof Bansidhar Singh and brother of Debi Singh.\n<\/p>\n
     Before closing  our comments  on the  oral evidence, we
\nmight say  a few  words about  the  methodology\t adopted  by
\nMukherji, J.  speaking for the majority, in appreciating and
\nanalysing the evidence of the witnesses of the plaintiffs:\n<\/p>\n
     (1)   The manner  in which\t Mukherji, J.  seems to have
\n\t  approached the evidence does not appear to be
\n916<\/span>
\n\t  correct or scientific. On the other hand, he has A
\n\t  dealt\t with\tthe  evidence\tof  the\t plaintiffs’
\n\t  witnesses in\ta very casual and cursory manner, as
\n\t  pointed out  by us,  and has completely overlooked
\n\t  striking facts  and circumstances which render the
\n\t  evidence of the witnesses unworthy of credence.
\n     (2)  No attempt was made by the learned Judge to adhere
\n\t  to  the  rules  of  evidence\tregarding  proof  of
\n\t  genealogy which  we have  discussed above, nor was
\n\t  any  importance   attached  to  the  most  notable
\n\t  feature of  the  evidence  of\t witnesses  for\t the
\n\t  plaintiffs that  while  testing  their  memory  in
\n\t  order to  find out  if they  could really remember
\n\t  the names narrated to them, they completely failed
\n\t  to  pass   the  usual\t  tests\t laid  down  by\t the
\n\t  authorities, as  indicated by\t us, both before and
\n\t  after, while\tdealing with  the evidence  of these
\n\t  witnesses.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (3)   The learned\tJudge  appears\tto  have  taken\t the
\n\t  evidence of  the plaintiffs’ witnesses for granted
\n\t  and accepted\tthe same to be true ex facie without
\n\t  making  a   thorough\tprobe\tinto  the   apparent
\n\t  inconsistencies and glaring infirmities from which
\n\t  the evidence of these witnesses suffers.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     We are  therefore, unable\tto uphold  the view taken by
\nthe majority judgment in respect of the oral evidence on the
\npoint of genealogy.\n<\/p>\n
     A similar\tapproach seems\tto have\t been  made  by\t the
\nmajority judgment so far as the documents are concerned, the
\nreliance was  placed by\t the majority  judgment on  a  large
\nnumber\tof   documents\t which\t were\teither\t irrelevant,
\ninadmissible or\t of no\tassistance to  the  plaintiffs.\t For
\ninstance, Mukerji,  J. relied  on Exhibits  DD-30 and  31 to
\nprove the genealogy mentioned therein, little realising that
\nin the\tfirst place  the recitals  in the judgments were not
\nadmissible as  the judgments  were not inter parties and the
\ngenealogy given\t therein was also a part of the recitals and
\ntherefore, could  not be made y use of in law. We have fully
\ndiscussed both\tthe legal  and the  factual position  of the
\ndocuments relied  on by the plaintiffs and have demonstrated
\nthat the said documents ought not have beenrelie
\n917<\/span>
\nOn the majority judgment. It is not necessary to burden this
\njudgment by repeating what we have already said. A
\n     In fact,  it seems to us that the majority judgment was
\ngreatly impressed  by the  fact that  as the  plaintiffs had
\nproved their  case of genealogy right up to Gajraj Singh and
\nthereafter seem\t to have  presumed without  any\t cogent\t and
\nreliable evidence  that Gajraj Singh must have been a direct
\ndescendant of  Bansidhar Singh even if there was no reliable
\nevidence to  prove this\t fact. On  the other hand, there was
\npositive evidence  to show  that Gajraj\t Singh was  not\t the
\ngrandson of  Bansidhar Singh  from the circumstances and the
\ndocuments in  which the\t name of  Ramruch Singh as being the
\nfather of Gajraj Singh was completely omitted as pointed out
\nby as above. C
\n     On\t a   close  and\t careful,  detailed  and  exhaustive
\ndiscussion  of\t the  oral  and\t documentary  evidence,\t the
\ninescapable conclusions\t and  the  firm\t findings  which  we
\narrive at are us follows:\n<\/p>\n
     (1)  That the plaintiff has no doubt proved that he was
\n\t  a direct descendent of Gajraj Singh but that is of
\n\t  no assistance\t to him\t so long  as it is not shown
\n\t  that the  missing links-the relationship of Gajraj
\n\t  Singh with  Ramruch Singh,  and Ramruch Singh with
\n\t  Bansidhar Singh, and that Bandsidhar Singh was one
\n\t  of the  sons of  Hirday  Narain  Singh  have\tbeen
\n\t  established.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (2)   That the  plaintiff has miserably failed to prove
\n\t  that Gajraj  Singh was  in any  way connected with
\n\t  Bansidhar Singh, or that Ramruch Singh was the son
\n\t  of Bansidhar Singh and brother of Debi Singh.
\n     (3)   That Ex.  J. was admissible in evidence though of
\n\t  no assistance to the plaintiffs.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (4)     That  the\tdocuments,  transactions  judgments,
\n\t  rebkars,   plaints,\twritten\t  statements,\tetc.
\n\t  produced by  plaintiffs are either inadmissible or
\n\t  irrelevant.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (5)   That the  oral evidence on the point of genealogy
\n\t  is utterly unrealiable and unworthy of credence. H
\n     (6)  That neither the documentary nor the oral evidence
\n\t  adduced by  the plaintiffs  is sufficient to prove
\n\t  their
\n918<\/span>
\n\t  case and  hence  the\tplaintiffs  have  failed  to
\n\t  discharge A  the initial onus which lay on them to
\n\t  prove their case.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (7)   That the majority judgment is wrong in law and on
\n\t  facts and  has  arrived  at  factually  wrong\t and
\n\t  legally  incorrect   conclusions  and,  therefore,
\n\t  cannot be upheld.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (8)   That we  entirely agree with the judgment of M.M.
\n\t  Prasad, J.  so far  as  the  plaintiffs’  case  is
\n\t  concerned.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (9)   The plaintiffs  have not proved that they are the
\n\t  next and  the nearest\t reversioners  of  the\tlate
\n\t  Maharaja (Harendra Kishore Singh).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     We must  confess however  that to discover and sift the
\ntruth from  a huge mass of materials relevant or irrelevant,
\nancient and  archaic, varied  and diverse, heterogeneous and
\nsundry, has  not been  a bed of roses but indeed a Herculean
\ntask. With  due deference to the majority Judges we dare say
\nthat despite  their strenuous and perhaps genuine efforts to
\nreach  legally\t correct  conclusions  on  important  issues
\ninvolved in  the case,\tin the\tultimate analysis  they have
\nonly been  able to  do poetic  rather than legal justice. We
\nhave, therefore,  taken great  care to\trely only  on  those
\ndocuments. Or  evidence which  appeared to us to be reliable
\nand dependable:\t thus eliminating  any chance of mistake. No
\nmortal person  whether he  be a\t Judge or  a Jurist can ever
\nclaim to  be infallible\t and all  that is  required is to do
\njustice\t on  the  materials  and  records  uninfluenced\t and
\nundaunted by  any extraneous  circumstances. This is what we
\nhave endeavoured  to do in the present case which may be one
\nof the\tmany cases before us but doubtless a prestigious one
\nfor the parties involved in the appeal.\n<\/p>\n
     It may  be stated\tas a sort of a postscript that great
\nreliance was placed by the respondents on the admission made
\nby the State of Bihar in its application for leave to appeal
\nto this\t Court which  is to  the effect\t that  there  is  no
\ndispute regarding  the links  from Bansidhar  Singh to\tDebi
\nSingh, Aini Singh, Pahalwan Singh, Tilak Singh and Balbhadra
\nSingh. We  have earlier\t mentioned quite  8 few\t times\tthat
\nthough these  links arc proved but they are of no use to the
\nplaintiffs unless  the links  between  Ramruch\tSingh,\tDebi
\nSingh
\n919<\/span>
\nand Bansidhar  Singh are  proved. We have already shown that
\nthe  plaintiffs\t  have\tmiserably   failed  to\tprove  these
\nimportant links.  In A\tother words,  the left-hand  side of
\nplaintiffs genealogy starting from Debi Singh up to the late
\nMaharaja has  undoubtedly been\tproved but  that  by  itself
\ncannot show  that the plaintiffs are the next or the nearest
\nreversioners of the late Maharaja.\n<\/p>\n
     In view  of the  findings given  by us, the plaintiffs’
\nsuits have to be dismissed.\n<\/p>\n
     Before closing the colourful chapter of this historical
\ncase we\t would now  like t  o deal with the last point which
\nremains to  be\tconsidered  and\t that  is  the\tquestion  of
\nEscheat. So  far as  this question is concerned, M.M Prasad,
\nJ. has\trightly pointed\t out that  as the State of Bihar did
\nnot enter  the arena  as a plaintiff to claim the properties
\nby pleading  that the  late Maharaja had left no heir at all
\nand, hence,  the properties  should vest  in  the  State  of
\nBihar, it  would be  difficult to  hold that  merely in\t the
\nevent of  the failure of the plaintiffs’ case the properties
\nwould vest in the State of Bihar.\n<\/p>\n
     It is  well settled that when a claim of escheat is put
\nforward by  the Government  the onus  lies  heavily  on\t the
\nappellant to prove the absence of any heir of the respondent
\nanywhere in  the world.\t Normally, the\tcourt frowns  on the
\nestate\tbeing\ttaken  by   escheat  unless   the  essential
\nconditions for\tesheat are  fully and  completely satisfied.
\nFurther, before\t the plea  of escheat  can  be\tentertained,
\nthere must  be a  public notice\t given by  the Government so
\nthat if there is any claimant anywhere in the country or for
\nthat matter in the world, he may come forward to contest the
\nclaim of the State. In the instant case, the States of Bihar
\nand Uttar  Pradesh merely  satisfied themselves by appearing
\nto oppose  the claims of the plaintiffs-respondents. Even if
\nthey succeed  in showing  that the  plantiffs were  not\t the
\nnearest reversioners of late Maharaja, it does not follow as
\na logical  corollary that  the failure\tof  the\t plaintiffs’
\nclaim would lead to the irresistible inference that there is
\nno other  heir who  could at  any time come forward to claim
\nthe properties.\n<\/p>\n
     The trial\tcourt was  wrong in  accepting the  case  of
\nescheat\t put  forward  by  the\tappellants  without  at\t all
\nconsidering  the   well-known\trules\tand   considerations
\ngoverning the vesting of properties in the state by escheat.
\nM.M. Prasad,  J. has  explained the  position very cleary in
\nhis judgment and has concluded thus:\n<\/p>\n
920<\/span><\/p>\n
\t  “In view,  however, of what I have held that the A
\n     finding or declaration of the property having vested in
\n     the State\tof Bihar  itself cannot\t be  sustained,\t the
\n     question of making a declaration in favour of the State
\n     of Uttar Pradesh regarding the property in suit in that
\n     State does not arise.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t\t\t\t (Vol. VIII, p. 535)
\n     We entirely  agree with  the opinion  expressed by\t the
\nlearned Judge  on this\tquestion. However,  we would like to
\nleave this  question open without deciding it one way or the
\nother because  for the\tpurpose of deciding the appeal it is
\nnot at\tall necessary  to go  into the\tquestion of  escheat
\nwhich may  have to be determined when the State of Bihar and
\nUttar Pradesh  come forward  to claim  escheat in a properly
\nconstituted action. The plea taken by both the States on the
\nquestion of escheat is therefore left undecided.\n<\/p>\n
     It is  obvious that  the majority judgment expressed no
\nopinion on  the question  of escheat  in view of its finding
\nthat the plaintiffs’ suit had to be decreed.\n<\/p>\n
     We might further state that as the properties are under
\nthe management\tof the\tCourt of wards of the State of Bihar
\nand Uttar  Pradesh, the\t status quo will be maintained until
\nany of\tthe State  is able to prove its plea of escheat in a
\nproperly constituted action.\n<\/p>\n
     The  result  is  that  the\t appeals  are  allowed,\t the
\ndissenting judgment  of M.M.  Prasad, J. is affirmed and the
\nplaintiffs’ suit is dismissed with costs throughout.\n<\/p>\n
P.B.R.\t\t\t\t\t Appeals allowed and\n\t\t\t\t Plaintiff's suit dismissed.\n921<\/span>\n\n\n\n<\/pre>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India State Of Bihar vs Radha Krishna Singh & Ors on 20 April, 1983 Equivalent citations: 1983 AIR 684, 1983 SCR (2) 808 Author: S M Fazalali Bench: Fazalali, Syed Murtaza PETITIONER: STATE OF BIHAR Vs. RESPONDENT: RADHA KRISHNA SINGH & ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT20\/04\/1983 BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-221880","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nState Of Bihar vs Radha Krishna Singh & Ors on 20 April, 1983 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-bihar-vs-radha-krishna-singh-ors-on-20-april-1983\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"State Of Bihar vs Radha Krishna Singh & Ors on 20 April, 1983 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-bihar-vs-radha-krishna-singh-ors-on-20-april-1983\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"1983-04-19T18:30:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2016-01-26T10:46:46+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@legaliadmin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@Legal_india\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"222 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-bihar-vs-radha-krishna-singh-ors-on-20-april-1983#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-bihar-vs-radha-krishna-singh-ors-on-20-april-1983\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\"},\"headline\":\"State Of Bihar vs Radha Krishna Singh & Ors on 20 April, 1983\",\"datePublished\":\"1983-04-19T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2016-01-26T10:46:46+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-bihar-vs-radha-krishna-singh-ors-on-20-april-1983\"},\"wordCount\":41273,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization\"},\"articleSection\":[\"Supreme Court of India\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-bihar-vs-radha-krishna-singh-ors-on-20-april-1983#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-bihar-vs-radha-krishna-singh-ors-on-20-april-1983\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-bihar-vs-radha-krishna-singh-ors-on-20-april-1983\",\"name\":\"State Of Bihar vs Radha Krishna Singh & Ors on 20 April, 1983 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"1983-04-19T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2016-01-26T10:46:46+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-bihar-vs-radha-krishna-singh-ors-on-20-april-1983#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-bihar-vs-radha-krishna-singh-ors-on-20-april-1983\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-bihar-vs-radha-krishna-singh-ors-on-20-april-1983#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"State Of Bihar vs Radha Krishna Singh & Ors on 20 April, 1983\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/\",\"name\":\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"description\":\"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization\"},\"alternateName\":\"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"alternateName\":\"Legal India\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"width\":512,\"height\":512,\"caption\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/\",\"https:\/\/x.com\/Legal_india\"]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\",\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Legal India Admin\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\",\"https:\/\/x.com\/legaliadmin\"],\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/author\/legal-india-admin\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"State Of Bihar vs Radha Krishna Singh & Ors on 20 April, 1983 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-bihar-vs-radha-krishna-singh-ors-on-20-april-1983","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"State Of Bihar vs Radha Krishna Singh & Ors on 20 April, 1983 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","og_url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-bihar-vs-radha-krishna-singh-ors-on-20-april-1983","og_site_name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","article_published_time":"1983-04-19T18:30:00+00:00","article_modified_time":"2016-01-26T10:46:46+00:00","og_image":[{"width":512,"height":512,"url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Legal India Admin","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@legaliadmin","twitter_site":"@Legal_india","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Legal India Admin","Est. reading time":"222 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-bihar-vs-radha-krishna-singh-ors-on-20-april-1983#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-bihar-vs-radha-krishna-singh-ors-on-20-april-1983"},"author":{"name":"Legal India Admin","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea"},"headline":"State Of Bihar vs Radha Krishna Singh & Ors on 20 April, 1983","datePublished":"1983-04-19T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2016-01-26T10:46:46+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-bihar-vs-radha-krishna-singh-ors-on-20-april-1983"},"wordCount":41273,"commentCount":0,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"articleSection":["Supreme Court of India"],"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-bihar-vs-radha-krishna-singh-ors-on-20-april-1983#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-bihar-vs-radha-krishna-singh-ors-on-20-april-1983","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-bihar-vs-radha-krishna-singh-ors-on-20-april-1983","name":"State Of Bihar vs Radha Krishna Singh & Ors on 20 April, 1983 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website"},"datePublished":"1983-04-19T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2016-01-26T10:46:46+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-bihar-vs-radha-krishna-singh-ors-on-20-april-1983#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-bihar-vs-radha-krishna-singh-ors-on-20-april-1983"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-bihar-vs-radha-krishna-singh-ors-on-20-april-1983#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"State Of Bihar vs Radha Krishna Singh & Ors on 20 April, 1983"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","description":"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"alternateName":"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization","name":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","alternateName":"Legal India","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","width":512,"height":512,"caption":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","https:\/\/x.com\/Legal_india"]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea","name":"Legal India Admin","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Legal India Admin"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com","https:\/\/x.com\/legaliadmin"],"url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/author\/legal-india-admin"}]}},"modified_by":null,"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/221880","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=221880"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/221880\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=221880"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=221880"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=221880"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}