{"id":22319,"date":"2007-10-26T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-10-25T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/yyyyyshnan-vs-k-vaidhyanathan-on-26-october-2007"},"modified":"2017-02-15T07:49:36","modified_gmt":"2017-02-15T02:19:36","slug":"yyyyyshnan-vs-k-vaidhyanathan-on-26-october-2007","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/yyyyyshnan-vs-k-vaidhyanathan-on-26-october-2007","title":{"rendered":"Yyyyyshnan vs K.Vaidhyanathan on 26 October, 2007"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"docsource_main\">Kerala High Court<\/div>\n<div class=\"doc_title\">Yyyyyshnan vs K.Vaidhyanathan on 26 October, 2007<\/div>\n<pre>       \n\n  \n\n  \n\n \n \n  IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM\n\nAS No. 182 of 2001()\n\n\n\n1. YYYYYSHNAN\n                      ...  Petitioner\n\n                        Vs\n\n1. K.VAIDHYANATHAN\n                       ...       Respondent\n\n                For Petitioner  :SRI.S.EASWARAN\n\n                For Respondent  :SRI.R.HARIKRISHNAN\n\nThe Hon'ble MR. Justice P.R.RAMAN\nThe Hon'ble MR. Justice V.K.MOHANAN\n\n Dated :26\/10\/2007\n\n O R D E R\n                P.R.RAMAN &amp; V.K.MOHANAN, JJ.\n             -------------------------------\n                        A.S.NO.182 OF 2001\n            --------------------------------\n               Dated this the 26th day of October, 2007\n\n                              JUDGMENT\n<\/pre>\n<p>Raman, J.\n<\/p>\n<p>       Plaintiffs are the appellants. Suit was one for declaration and<\/p>\n<p>separate possession of the plaint schedule properties. Originally there<\/p>\n<p>were 4 defendants in the suit. During the pendency of the suit the 2nd<\/p>\n<p>defendant Sri K.Mahadevan died and his legal heirs were impleaded as<\/p>\n<p>additional defendants 5 to 7. The suit was dismissed by the trial court,<\/p>\n<p>against which the present appeal is filed.\n<\/p>\n<p>       2. The questions that arise for consideration in this appeal is (i)<\/p>\n<p>whether the plaint schedule properties are co-parcenary properties and<\/p>\n<p>if so, whether the plaintiffs acquired right by birth and hence available<\/p>\n<p>for partition, (ii) whether the right if any of the plaintiffs extinguished<\/p>\n<p>by the release deed ( Ext.A5) executed by the 4th defendant, the father<\/p>\n<p>of the plaintiffs, (III) whether the suit is barred by limitation and (iv)<\/p>\n<p>whether defendants 1 to 3 and 5 to 7 perfected their title by adverse<\/p>\n<p>possession.\n<\/p>\n<p>       3. The material averments as gathered from the plaint and the<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">                                     -2-<\/span><br \/>\nA.S.No.182\/2001<\/p>\n<p>written statement filed by the parties which are relevant for answering the<\/p>\n<p>above questions may be briefly stated as follows:\n<\/p>\n<p>       Plaint A schedule property consists of an extent of 10.08 acres.<\/p>\n<p>Plaint B schedule property consists of an extent of 3.500 cents.<\/p>\n<p>According to the plaintiff, plaint A schedule property originally belonged<\/p>\n<p>to one Sri Krishnayyan, Pazhayadath Puthenmadom, Thodupuzha and he<\/p>\n<p>was in possession and enjoyment of the same. Krishnayyan had 3 sons,<\/p>\n<p>viz., Krishna Iyer, Narayana Iyer and Neelakanda Iyer. Neelakanda Iyer<\/p>\n<p>died long ago surviving him        his widow Smt.Kaveri Ammal and 4<\/p>\n<p>daughters, viz., Parvathi, Lakshmi, Savithri and Thankamma and one son<\/p>\n<p>Hariharan. Krishna Iyer died on 10\/6\/1971 and his wife Parvathy Ammal<\/p>\n<p>died in the year 1976. Krishna Iyer and Parvathy Ammal had four sons,<\/p>\n<p>who are defendants 1 to 4. Plaintiffs are two sons of the 4th defendant.<\/p>\n<p>During the life time of Krishnayyan plaint A schedule properties were<\/p>\n<p>allotted in favour of his eldest son, Krishna Iyer, who is the grandfather<\/p>\n<p>of the plaintiffs, as per document No.912 dated 24\/4\/1120 M.E. of the<\/p>\n<p>Sub Registry, Thodupuzha styled as a partition deed, produced as Ext.A1<\/p>\n<p>in this case. In respect of other properties excluding plaint A schedule<\/p>\n<p>properties Krishnayyan executed a settlement deed as per document<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">                                    -3-<\/span><br \/>\nA.S.No.182\/2001<\/p>\n<p>No.3601 dated 5\/12\/1121 M.E. of Sub Registry, Thoudupuzha produced<\/p>\n<p>as Ext.A2 in this case, settling the properties in favour of his sons;<\/p>\n<p>Krishna Iyer, Narayana Iyer and Neelakanda Iyer. Since Neelakanda Iyer<\/p>\n<p>was no more at the time of such settlement deed, his legal representatives,<\/p>\n<p>his widow Kaveri Ammal and children Lakshmi, Savithri, Thankamma<\/p>\n<p>and Hariharan were included in the said settlement deed.         Parvathy,<\/p>\n<p>daughter of     late Neelakanda Iyer however was excluded from the<\/p>\n<p>settlement deed for the reason that she was married at that time.<\/p>\n<p>      4. Plaint A schedule properties was acquired by Krishna Iyer.<\/p>\n<p>Krishna Iyer died on 10\/6\/1971 leaving his wife Parvathy Ammal and his<\/p>\n<p>children who are defendants 1 to 4. According to the plaintiffs, they are<\/p>\n<p>therefore entitled to 1\/5th share over the plaint schedule properties as per<\/p>\n<p>the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Plaintiffs and their<\/p>\n<p>sister Geetha are the children of the 4th defendant. On the death of<\/p>\n<p>Krishna Iyer, the 4th defendant is thus entitled to 1\/5th share over plaint<\/p>\n<p>A and B schedule properties. The 4th defendant and the plaintiffs form a<\/p>\n<p>co-parcenary and hence entitled to 1\/5th share of the 4th defendant over<\/p>\n<p>the plaint schedule items. Even otherwise the 4th defendant and the<\/p>\n<p>plaintiffs would form a joint family entitled to 1\/5th share over paint A<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">                                      -4-<\/span><br \/>\nA.S.No.182\/2001<\/p>\n<p>and B schedule properties. According to the plaintiffs, they were away<\/p>\n<p>from Thodupuzha for their studies and recently before instituting the suit<\/p>\n<p>when they visited to the ancestral home at Thodupuzha, they noticed the<\/p>\n<p>activities among defendants 1 to 3 for partition of plaint A schedule<\/p>\n<p>properties. The lst defendant is in possession of the plaint schedule items<\/p>\n<p>for and on behalf of the joint family. Defendants 1 to 3 were evasive to<\/p>\n<p>the various enquiries made by the plaintiffs regarding their attempt of<\/p>\n<p>partition among themselves of the plaint schedule items. Hence, they<\/p>\n<p>sent a letter dated 21\/12\/1996 to the lst defendant to inform regarding<\/p>\n<p>their proposal and whether the plaintiffs are allotted any share. To this<\/p>\n<p>the lst defendant replied saying that the schedule properties were owned<\/p>\n<p>and possessed by late N.K.Krishna Iyer absolutely and hence the plaint<\/p>\n<p>schedule items are not joint family properties and the lst defendant is the<\/p>\n<p>Manager of the family. It is stated that the schedule properties belonged<\/p>\n<p>to the defendants and Parvathy Ammal, and during her life time<\/p>\n<p>Paravathy Ammal joined the 4th defendant to execute a release deed as<\/p>\n<p>early as in 1972 and therefore there is nothing to be partitioned. It was for<\/p>\n<p>the first time that the plaintiffs then came to know from the reply of the<\/p>\n<p>release deed said to have been executed by the 4th defendant father along<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">                                       -5-<\/span><br \/>\nA.S.No.182\/2001<\/p>\n<p>with their mother, Parvathy Ammal and hence they made enquiries with<\/p>\n<p>the Sub Registra&#8217;s Office and came across the release deed as also the<\/p>\n<p>partition deed by which defendants 1 to 3 partitioned and allotted among<\/p>\n<p>themselves the plaint schedule properties. Hence they obtained certified<\/p>\n<p>copies of these documents. Document No.325 dated 8\/2\/1972 is the<\/p>\n<p>release deed executed by the 4th defendant along with Parvathy Ammal<\/p>\n<p>in favour of defendants 1 to 3. This document is marked as Ext.A5.<\/p>\n<p>Partition deed No.4588\/96 dated 23\/12\/1996 is marked as Ext.A6 in this<\/p>\n<p>case. It is averred that 1\/5th share of udukkoor rights over plaint A and<\/p>\n<p>B schedule properties of the 4th defendant           and   Parvathy Ammal<\/p>\n<p>purported to have assigned in favour of defendants 1 to 3 as per Ext.A5.<\/p>\n<p>It is the case of the plaintiffs that the release deed No.325 dated 8\/2\/1972<\/p>\n<p>(Ext.A5) and the partition deed No.4588 dated 23\/12\/1996 (Ext.A6) to<\/p>\n<p>the extent they purported to deal with the share of plaint A and B<\/p>\n<p>schedule properties are void abinitio and hence liable to be declared so by<\/p>\n<p>the court. According to them, on the death of Krishna Iyer on 10\/6\/1971<\/p>\n<p>the properties devolved on his legal representatives, the defendant as<\/p>\n<p>well as his widow Parvathy Ammal. The 4th defendant being one of the<\/p>\n<p>sons and heir of Krishna Iyer is entitled to 1\/5th share over the plaint<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">                                     -6-<\/span><br \/>\nA.S.No.182\/2001<\/p>\n<p>schedule items and plaint A schedule property in the hands of Krishna<\/p>\n<p>Iyer is a co-parcenary property being ancestral in nature; obtained by<\/p>\n<p>Krishna Iyer from his father Krishnayyan as per document No.912\/1120<\/p>\n<p>M.E. (Ext.A1). The 1\/5th share to which the 4th defendant was entitled to<\/p>\n<p>on the death of his father Krishna Iyer is also ancestral in his hands.<\/p>\n<p>Therefore, the plaintiffs are entitled to equal share over 1\/5th share of the<\/p>\n<p>4th defendant over the plaint schedule items. Hence, the 4th defendant<\/p>\n<p>could not purport to release or assign the plaintiffs&#8217; right acquired by<\/p>\n<p>birth. According to them, the 4th defendant had only a share over 1\/5th<\/p>\n<p>share obtained by him over the plaint schedule properties on the death of<\/p>\n<p>his father and therefore, except to the extent of his right over the plaint<\/p>\n<p>schedule item, the right that was acquired by the plaintiffs could not have<\/p>\n<p>been validly released in favour of defendants 1 to 3. In other words, the<\/p>\n<p>assignment cannot affect 1\/3rd share each of the plaintiffs over 1\/5th<\/p>\n<p>share obtained by the 4th defendant over the plaint schedule item. To that<\/p>\n<p>extent, the release deed No.325 dated 8\/2\/1972 (Ext.A5) is liable to be<\/p>\n<p>declared void ab initio.      Alternatively it is contended that the 4th<\/p>\n<p>defendant and plaintiffs formed a joint family at the time when Krishna<\/p>\n<p>Iyer died on 10\/6\/1971. The 1\/5th share of the plaint schedule items<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">                                    -7-<\/span><br \/>\nA.S.No.182\/2001<\/p>\n<p>inherited by the 4th defendant on the death of Krishna Iyer on 10\/6\/1971<\/p>\n<p>is the nucleus. Plaintiffs are co-owners of 1\/5th share of 4th defendant<\/p>\n<p>over the plaint schedule item and hence the assignee cannot claim<\/p>\n<p>exclusive right over the plaint schedule item in-exclusion of the other co-<\/p>\n<p>owners. Plaintiffs claim 1\/3rd right each over 1\/5th share of the 4th<\/p>\n<p>defendant over the plaint schedule item.       In the circumstances, they<\/p>\n<p>sought for a decree declaring Ext.A5 (document No.325 dated 8\/2\/1972)<\/p>\n<p>and Ext.A6 (document No.4588 dated 23\/12\/1996) are void ab initio and<\/p>\n<p>not binding on the plaintiffs and for setting aside those documents to the<\/p>\n<p>extent of 1\/3 share of each of the plaintiffs over 1\/5th share of the 4th<\/p>\n<p>defendant over the plaint schedule item. They also claimed for partition<\/p>\n<p>of the plaint schedule item and for separate possession of their share and<\/p>\n<p>for a permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants 1 to 3<\/p>\n<p>from dealing with plaint schedule item.\n<\/p>\n<p>      5. Defendants 1 to 3 contended that by virtue of the release deed<\/p>\n<p>executed by the 4th defendant and his wife they cease to have any right<\/p>\n<p>thereafter and subsequently defendants 1 to 3 have also partitioned the<\/p>\n<p>plaint schedule item as per Ext.A6 partition deed. They also contended<\/p>\n<p>that the plaint schedule item held by Krishna Iyer is self acquired<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">                                     -8-<\/span><br \/>\nA.S.No.182\/2001<\/p>\n<p>property. Though Ext.A1 the nomenclature shown may be partition deed<\/p>\n<p>from the recitals contained therein and from the subsequent settlement in<\/p>\n<p>which reference is made to the earlier deed, it is only a gift deed and the<\/p>\n<p>plaint A schedule items were self acquisition of Krishnayyan and there<\/p>\n<p>was no pre-existing right to be partitioned between Krishnayyan and his<\/p>\n<p>son, Krishna Iyer. Thus both plaint A and B schedule properties were<\/p>\n<p>self acquired properties of Krishnayyan and hence not co-parcenary and<\/p>\n<p>the plaintiff have no right by birth. After the death of Krishna Iyer,<\/p>\n<p>plaintiffs father, the 4th defendant, along with his wife having released<\/p>\n<p>their undivided right in favour of defendants 1 to 3, the plaintiffs should<\/p>\n<p>be non-suited for partition. They also contended that the suit is barred by<\/p>\n<p>limitation. They also contended that the plaint schedule properties were<\/p>\n<p>not ancestral properties and never treated as such. Actually, Krishnayyan<\/p>\n<p>had no means to purchase A schedule properties and it was late Krishna<\/p>\n<p>Iyer, who purchased it in the name of his father besides other properties<\/p>\n<p>in the name of his wife etc. It is not correct to say that the 4th defendants<\/p>\n<p>and the plaintiffs are co-owners of 1\/5th share of the 4th defendant over<\/p>\n<p>the properties. Apart from the huge debts whatever properties obtained<\/p>\n<p>by the 4th defendant from the family were lost, spoiled or wasted by<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">                                    -9-<\/span><br \/>\nA.S.No.182\/2001<\/p>\n<p>himself. Plaintiffs are looking after their parents at Thodupuzha. They<\/p>\n<p>had been coming to Thodupuzha every week and hence it is false to say<\/p>\n<p>that they came to know the entire affairs only recently.<\/p>\n<p>      6. The evidence consists of Exts.A1 to A6 marked on the side of<\/p>\n<p>the plaintiffs, the lst plaintiff gave evidence as PW-1 and the 3rd<\/p>\n<p>defendant gave evidence as DW-1. No documents were marked on the<\/p>\n<p>side of the defendants. Registered copy of the document No.912 dated<\/p>\n<p>24\/4\/1120 M.E. is executed by Krishnayyan, styled as a partition deed<\/p>\n<p>(           ). But from the recitals in this deed it is clear that the<\/p>\n<p>executant had no ancestral properties and that he had acquired properties<\/p>\n<p>by his own efforts and he is in exclusive possession and enjoyment of the<\/p>\n<p>same.\n<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>      &#8221;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>                                                              &#8220;<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">                                     -10-<\/span><br \/>\nA.S.No.182\/2001<\/p>\n<p>      7. It is out of those properties that the properties mentioned therein<\/p>\n<p>were purchased by him as per registered document of the Sub Registry,<\/p>\n<p>Thodupuzha and that the property scheduled therein were gifted in favour<\/p>\n<p>of Krishna Iyer. Thus even going by the recitals in this deed the property<\/p>\n<p>was purchased      by the executant as per registered deed of the Sub<\/p>\n<p>Registry, Thodupuzha. Admittedly, this is the plaint A schedule property.<\/p>\n<p>As a matter of fact, the plaintiffs themselves have described this deed in<\/p>\n<p>the plaint as a gift deed. There is also a declaration that he had no<\/p>\n<p>ancestral property and he had purchased various other items including<\/p>\n<p>this property of which this item is assigned in favour of Krishna Iyer,<\/p>\n<p>one of his sons. Since Krishna Iyer had no pre-existing right and going<\/p>\n<p>by the recitals contained in the deed, this is only a gift deed executed in<\/p>\n<p>favour of Krishna Iyer. Admittedly, the plaint B schedule items were<\/p>\n<p>acquired by Krishna Iyer during his life time. Thus both the plaint A and<\/p>\n<p>B schedule items do not have the characteristic of any ancestral property.<\/p>\n<p>Plaint B schedule property having been acquired by Krishna Iyer and<\/p>\n<p>Plaint A schedule properties obtained by him as per gift deed executed by<\/p>\n<p>his father, Krishnayyan, both plaint A and B schedule items are self<\/p>\n<p>acquisition in the hands of Krishna Iyer. Ext.A2 is a document dated<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">                                    -11-<\/span><br \/>\nA.S.No.182\/2001<\/p>\n<p>5\/12\/1121, which is styled as settlement deed (                         )<\/p>\n<p>executed by Krishnayyan in favour of Krishna Iyer, Narayana Iyer and<\/p>\n<p>Kaveri Ammal, minors Lakshmi, Savithri Thankamma, and Harihara<\/p>\n<p>Iyer.      Krishna Iyer and Narayana Iyer are described as sons of<\/p>\n<p>Krishnayyan, the executant and Kaveri Ammal is described as wife of<\/p>\n<p>deceased Neelakanda Iyer.       The minors are children of deceased<\/p>\n<p>Neelakanda Iyer. According to the executant, during his life time he<\/p>\n<p>decided to settle the properties which were acquired by him. There is a<\/p>\n<p>further declaration that those properties mentioned in the document are<\/p>\n<p>self acquisition and not an exclusive possession and enjoyment of the<\/p>\n<p>same. Vellookkunnu Madom and Purayidom is one such property which<\/p>\n<p>was given by way of gift in favour of Krishna Iyer, his son. Thus what<\/p>\n<p>was assigned under Ext.A1 was also the property acquired by him and in<\/p>\n<p>respect of which a gift deed was executed in favour of Krishna Iyer, one<\/p>\n<p>among the sons and also a beneficiary of Ext.A2. As per this document<\/p>\n<p>various properties described therein were settled. Ext.A5 is the document<\/p>\n<p>No.325 dated 8\/12\/1972 of the Sub Registry, Thodupuzha.              This<\/p>\n<p>document was executed by Senapathy, son of Krishnayyan, and his wife<\/p>\n<p>Parvathy Ammal in favour of Vaidyanatha Iyer, Mahadeva Iyer and<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">                                     -12-<\/span><br \/>\nA.S.No.182\/2001<\/p>\n<p>Harihara Iyer. It is described as released deed (                         ).\n<\/p>\n<p>As per this deed the executants relinquished their right over the properties<\/p>\n<p>scheduled thereunder. As per the recitals contained in the deed, after the<\/p>\n<p>death of Krishna Iyer on 10\/6\/1971 the scheduled properties belonged to<\/p>\n<p>him and after his death, by devolution all of them had equal right over<\/p>\n<p>the properties jointly held by them and whatever right the executant had<\/p>\n<p>over the schedule properties was already relinquished orally in favour of<\/p>\n<p>the executants and they were in exclusive possession of the same and<\/p>\n<p>with a view to acknowledge the same by a written document for<\/p>\n<p>consideration of Rs.20,0000\/- received on different occasions. Ext.A6 is<\/p>\n<p>a document No.4588 dated 23\/12\/1996, which is a partition deed<\/p>\n<p>executed between Vaidyanatha Iyer, Mahadeva Iyer and Harihara Iyer.<\/p>\n<p>       8. According to the learned counsel, Sri Easwaran, appearing on<\/p>\n<p>behalf of the appellants, the property in the hands of their father, the 4th<\/p>\n<p>defendant obtained by him from Krishna Iyer, father of defendants 1 to 4<\/p>\n<p>and grandfather of plaintiffs, is ancestral in nature. Plaintiffs being co-<\/p>\n<p>parcenars are entitled to 1\/3rd right over 1\/5th right acquired by their<\/p>\n<p>father, the 4th defendant. Hence, the release deed (Ext.A5) executed by<\/p>\n<p>their father, the 4th defendant cannot be treated as valid to the extent of<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">                                    -13-<\/span><br \/>\nA.S.No.182\/2001<\/p>\n<p>their share. At best only the share of their father, 4th defendant alone<\/p>\n<p>could have been given valid relinquishment under Ext.A5. Since the 4th<\/p>\n<p>defendant had only a fractional interest in the property, the right, title and<\/p>\n<p>interest of the plaintiffs as co-parcenars in no way are affected by such<\/p>\n<p>release deed. To the extent of their right and interest concerned, Ext.A5 is<\/p>\n<p>ab initio void and even without specifically seeking to set aside the said<\/p>\n<p>document, they can ignore the said document and claim partition. On the<\/p>\n<p>other hand, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents<\/p>\n<p>would contend that the properties were obtained by Krishna Iyer by two<\/p>\n<p>settlement deeds, Exts.A1 and A2. The recitals contained in Exts.A1 and<\/p>\n<p>A2 would abundantly make it clear that those properties were self<\/p>\n<p>acquisition by Krishnayyan, father of Krishna Iyer (grandfather of<\/p>\n<p>plaintiffs) and grandfather of defendants 1 to 4. If so, after the death of<\/p>\n<p>Krishna Iyer in 10\/6\/1971 the properties devolved on defendants 1 to 4 by<\/p>\n<p>way of succession under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and by virtue of<\/p>\n<p>Section 8 of the Hindu Successions Act, the share held by the 4th<\/p>\n<p>defendant is to be treated as self acquisition and by virtue of the release<\/p>\n<p>deed, Ext.A5 executed by the 4th defendant and his wife, defendants 1 to<\/p>\n<p>3 are absolutely entitled to the said property and the plaintiffs would not<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">                                    -14-<\/span><br \/>\nA.S.No.182\/2001<\/p>\n<p>have acquired any right by birth. But according to the learned counsel for<\/p>\n<p>the appellants, if the properties are ancestral properties in the hands of<\/p>\n<p>Krishna Iyer, they have acquired a right by birth and they having been<\/p>\n<p>born long prior to 1956, devolution of their right and title would be<\/p>\n<p>governed by Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act. Therefore the prime<\/p>\n<p>question is as to whether the plaintiffs had acquired any right by birth in<\/p>\n<p>the property held by Krishna Iyer prior to his death on 10\/6\/1971 and<\/p>\n<p>whether the property in the hands of Krishna Iyer is ancestral in nature.<\/p>\n<p>From the recitals contained in Ext.A1 and A2 to which reference has<\/p>\n<p>already been made, it is abundantly clear that Krishna Iyer obtained the<\/p>\n<p>plaint schedule item by two settlement deeds (Exts.A1 and A2) executed<\/p>\n<p>by his father Krishnayyan. Though Ext.A1 is styled as a partition deed,<\/p>\n<p>further recitals contained in the deed would clearly show that it is only a<\/p>\n<p>settlement deed. Krishnayyan, father of Krishna Iyer himself declared<\/p>\n<p>that those properties are self acquisition and not ancestral in his hands<\/p>\n<p>and that Ext.A1, which is a gift deed, is further supported by the recitals<\/p>\n<p>contained in the settlement deed, Ext.A2 also. If so, the properties<\/p>\n<p>obtained by Krishna Iyer can only be treated as self acquisition and not<\/p>\n<p>ancestral in his hands.\n<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">                                     -15-<\/span><br \/>\nA.S.No.182\/2001<\/p>\n<p>      9. In Commissioner of Wealthtax, Kanpur etc. v. Chander Sen<\/p>\n<p>etc. (AIR 1986 SC 1753) the Apex Court had occasion to consider a case<\/p>\n<p>where a partition of joint family business between father and his only son<\/p>\n<p>and the business was continued by the father and the son formed a joint<\/p>\n<p>family with his own sons. The father died later and the question arose as<\/p>\n<p>to whether the amount standing to the credit of the deceased father in the<\/p>\n<p>account of the firm devolved on his son as his individual income. It was<\/p>\n<p>held that such income cannot be included in computing net wealth of<\/p>\n<p>son&#8217;s joint family. The joint family business were partitioned between<\/p>\n<p>father and his only son and it was thereafter that they continued the<\/p>\n<p>business in the name of the partnership firm. The Wealth Tax Authorities<\/p>\n<p>while assessing the wealth tax in respect of the family of the son i.e. the<\/p>\n<p>assessee, included the amount in computing wealth. It was held that the<\/p>\n<p>son inherited the property as an individual and not as karta of his own<\/p>\n<p>family and hence it could no be included in computing the assessee&#8217;s<\/p>\n<p>wealth. It was further held that under the Hindu law the son would<\/p>\n<p>inherit the property of his father as karta of is own family. But the Hindu<\/p>\n<p>Succession Act has modified the rule of succession. The Act lays down<\/p>\n<p>the general rules of succession in the case of males. The first rule is that<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">                                    -16-<\/span><br \/>\nA.S.No.182\/2001<\/p>\n<p>the property of a male Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to<\/p>\n<p>the provisions of Chapter II and Class I of the Schedule provides that if<\/p>\n<p>there is a male heir of Class I then upon the heirs mentioned in Class I of<\/p>\n<p>the Schedule. In interpreting the provisions of Act it is necessary to bear<\/p>\n<p>in mind the preamble to the Hindu Succession Act. The preamble states<\/p>\n<p>that it was an Act to amend and codify the law relating to intestate<\/p>\n<p>succession among Hindus. In view of the Preamble to the Act i.e., that to<\/p>\n<p>modify where necessary and to codify the law, it is not possible when<\/p>\n<p>Schedule indicates heirs in Class I and only includes son and does not<\/p>\n<p>include son&#8217;s son but does include son of a predeceased son, to say that<\/p>\n<p>when son inherits the property in the situation contemplated by Section 8<\/p>\n<p>he takes it as karta of his own undivided family. If a contrary view is<\/p>\n<p>taken it would mean that though the son of a predeceased son and not the<\/p>\n<p>son of a son who is intended to be excluded under Section 8 to inherit, the<\/p>\n<p>latter would by applying the old Hindu Law get a right by birth of the<\/p>\n<p>said property contrary to the scheme outlined in Section 8. Further more<\/p>\n<p>the Act makes it clear by Section 4 that one should look to the Act in case<\/p>\n<p>of doubt and not to the pre-existing Hindu law. It would be difficult to<\/p>\n<p>hold today that the property which devolved on a Hindu under Section 8<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">                                   -17-<\/span><br \/>\nA.S.No.182\/2001<\/p>\n<p>of the Hindu Succession Act would be HUF in his hand vis-a-vis his own<\/p>\n<p>son; that would amount to creating two classes among the heirs<\/p>\n<p>mentioned in Class I, the male heirs in whose hands it will be joint Hindu<\/p>\n<p>Family property and vis-a-vis son and female heirs with respect to whom<\/p>\n<p>no such concept could be applied or contemplated. It may be mentioned<\/p>\n<p>that heirs in Class I of Schedule under Section 8 of the Act included<\/p>\n<p>widow, mother, daughter of predeceased son etc. The express words of<\/p>\n<p>Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act cannot be ignored and must<\/p>\n<p>prevail. The preamble to the Act reiterates that the Act is, inter alia, to<\/p>\n<p>&#8216;amend&#8217; the law. With that background the express language which<\/p>\n<p>excludes son&#8217;s son but included son of a predeceased son cannot be<\/p>\n<p>ignored.\n<\/p>\n<p>      10. <a href=\"\/doc\/1148062\/\">In C.N. Arunachala Mudaliar v. C.A.Muruganatha<\/p>\n<p>Mudaliar and<\/a> another (AIR 1953 SC 495) the Apex Court held that the<\/p>\n<p>Mitakshara father is not only competent to sell his self acquired<\/p>\n<p>immovable property to a stranger without the concurrence of his son, but<\/p>\n<p>he can make a gift of such property to one of his own sons to the<\/p>\n<p>detriment of another and he can make even an unequal distribution<\/p>\n<p>amongst his heirs. It was also held that in view of the settled law that a<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">                                    -18-<\/span><br \/>\nA.S.No.182\/2001<\/p>\n<p>Mitakshara father has absolute right of disposition over his self acquired<\/p>\n<p>property to which no exception can be taken by his male descendants, it is<\/p>\n<p>not possible to hold that such property bequeathed or gifted to a son must<\/p>\n<p>necessarily, and under all circumstances, rank as ancestral property in the<\/p>\n<p>hands of the donee in which his sons would acquire co-ordinate interest.<\/p>\n<p>To find out whether a property is or is not ancestral in the hands of a<\/p>\n<p>particular person, not merely the relationship between the original and the<\/p>\n<p>present holder but the mode of transmission also must be looked to; and<\/p>\n<p>the property can ordinarily be reckoned as ancestral only if the present<\/p>\n<p>holder has got it by virtue of his being a son or descendant of the original<\/p>\n<p>owner. But when the father obtains the grandfather&#8217;s property by way of<\/p>\n<p>gift, he receives it not because he is a son or has any legal right to such<\/p>\n<p>property but because his father chose to bestow a favour on him which<\/p>\n<p>he could have bestowed on any other person as well. The interest which<\/p>\n<p>he takes in such property must depend upon the will of the grantor. There<\/p>\n<p>is no warrant for saying that according to the Mitakshara, an affectionate<\/p>\n<p>gift by the father to the son constitutes &#8216;ipso facto&#8217; ancestral property in<\/p>\n<p>the hands of the donee. In other words, a property gifted or bequeathed<\/p>\n<p>by a father to his son cannot become ancestral property in the hands of<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">                                     -19-<\/span><br \/>\nA.S.No.182\/2001<\/p>\n<p>the donee or legatee simply by reason of the fact that the donee or<\/p>\n<p>legatee got it from his father or ancestor. As the law is accepted and well<\/p>\n<p>settled that a Mitakshara father has complete powers of disposition over<\/p>\n<p>his self-acquired property, it must follow as a necessary consequence that<\/p>\n<p>the father is quite competent to provide expressly, when he makes a gift,<\/p>\n<p>either that the donee would take it exclusively for himself or that the gift<\/p>\n<p>would be for the benefit of his branch of the family. If there are express<\/p>\n<p>provisions to that effect either in the deed of gift or a will, no difficulty is<\/p>\n<p>likely to arise and the interest which the son would take in such property<\/p>\n<p>would depend upon the terms of the grant. If, however, there are no clear<\/p>\n<p>words describing the kind of interest which the donee is to take, the<\/p>\n<p>question would be one of construction and the Court would have to<\/p>\n<p>collect the intention of the donor from the language of the document<\/p>\n<p>taken along with the surrounding circumstances in accordance with the<\/p>\n<p>well-known canons of construction. In paragraph 12 of the judgment it<\/p>\n<p>was held as follows:\n<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>      &#8220;&#8230;&#8230;..According to Mitakshara, the son has a right by<br \/>\n       birth both in his father&#8217;s and grandfather&#8217;s estate, but<br \/>\n       a distinction is made in this respect by Mitakshara<br \/>\n       itself. In the ancestral or grandfather&#8217;s property in the<br \/>\n       hands of the father, while in the self acquired<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">                                      -20-<\/span><br \/>\nA.S.No.182\/2001<\/p>\n<p>       property of the father, his rights are unequal by<br \/>\n       reason of the father having an independent power<br \/>\n       over or predominant interest in the same. The son<br \/>\n       can assert this equal right with the father only when<br \/>\n       the grandfather&#8217;s property has devolved upon his<br \/>\n       father and has become ancestral property in his<br \/>\n       hands. The property of the grandfather can normally<br \/>\n       vest in the father as ancestral if and when the father<br \/>\n       inherits such property on the death of the grandfather<br \/>\n       or receives it, by partition, made by the grandfather<br \/>\n       himself during his life-time. On both these occasions<br \/>\n       the grandfather&#8217;s property comes to the father by<br \/>\n       virtue of the latter&#8217;s legal right as a son or descendant<br \/>\n       of the former and consequently it becomes ancestral<br \/>\n       property in his hands.&#8221;<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>       11. In this case Krishna Iyer having obtained the plaint schedule<\/p>\n<p>items by virtue of the gift deed executed by his father Krishnayyan and<\/p>\n<p>not by virtue of his being the son or descendant of the owner but because<\/p>\n<p>his father bestowed a favour, which he could have bestowed on any other<\/p>\n<p>person as well. So merely because it was obtained by Krishna Iyer from<\/p>\n<p>his father it does not become ancestral in his hands. Thus, Krishna Iyer<\/p>\n<p>had absolute right of dispossession over the property during his life time<\/p>\n<p>which has obtained by him from his father by two gift deeds executed in<\/p>\n<p>his favour.    Thus, defendants 1 to 4 did not acquire any right by birth<\/p>\n<p>over the property held by Krishna Iyer during his life time. It is only after<\/p>\n<p>the death of Krishna Iyer that the properties devolved by succession in<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">                                     -21-<\/span><br \/>\nA.S.No.182\/2001<\/p>\n<p>favour of his heirs included in Clause 1, as per Hindu Succession Act. If<\/p>\n<p>defendants 1 to 4 did not have acquire any right by birth and Krishna Iyer<\/p>\n<p>had absolute right of dispossession during his life time, there is no<\/p>\n<p>question of the plaintiffs acquiring any right by birth in the said property.<\/p>\n<p>       12. <a href=\"\/doc\/15535\/\">In Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar (AIR<\/a> 1987 SC 558) after<\/p>\n<p>referring to the decision in <a href=\"\/doc\/487379\/\">Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Kanpur v.<\/p>\n<p>Chander Sen (AIR<\/a> 1986 SC 1753), it was reiterated that normally<\/p>\n<p>whenever the father gets a property from whatever source from the<\/p>\n<p>grandfather or from any other source, be it separate property or not, his<\/p>\n<p>son should have a share in that and it will become part of the joint Hindu<\/p>\n<p>family of his son and grandson and other members who form joint Hindu<\/p>\n<p>family with him. This position has been affected by Section 8 of the<\/p>\n<p>Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and therefore after the Act, when the son<\/p>\n<p>inherited the property in the situation contemplated by Section 8, he does<\/p>\n<p>not take it as Kar of his own undivided family but takes it in his<\/p>\n<p>individual capacity.\n<\/p>\n<p>       13. <a href=\"\/doc\/420921\/\">In Sheela Devi and others v. Lal Chand and<\/a> another (2006)<\/p>\n<p>8 SCC 581)       the Apex Court       considered the question as to how<\/p>\n<p>devolution of co-parcenary property takes place and considered the<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">                                    -22-<\/span><br \/>\nA.S.No.182\/2001<\/p>\n<p>scope of Sections 6 and 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and the<\/p>\n<p>devolution of co-parcenary property after commencement of 1956 Act. It<\/p>\n<p>was held that the effect of a son having been born prior to commencement<\/p>\n<p>of 1956 Act and as per the Mitakshara law in usage prior to the<\/p>\n<p>commencement of the 1956 Act, once a son was born, he acquired an<\/p>\n<p>interest in the co-parcenary property as an incident of his birth and hence<\/p>\n<p>a son having been born prior to commencement of 1956 Act would retain<\/p>\n<p>his share of the property as a co-parcenar even after the commencement<\/p>\n<p>of the 1956 Act, while the father&#8217;s share shall devolve upon his heirs<\/p>\n<p>according to the provisions of 1956 Act. It was also held that so long as<\/p>\n<p>the property remains in hands of a single person, though it be inherited<\/p>\n<p>co-parcenary property, it would be treated as a separate property. But<\/p>\n<p>once a son is born, the concept of a property being co-parcenary property<\/p>\n<p>in terms of Mitakshara law, is revived. In that case one Tulsi Ram was<\/p>\n<p>the owner of the property. He died in the year 1989 leaving behind five<\/p>\n<p>sons of whom Babu Ram was one. The afore-mentioned five sons of<\/p>\n<p>Tulsi Ram were members of a M itakshara Coparcenary. Upon the death<\/p>\n<p>of Tulsi Ram, Babu Ram inherited 1\/5th share in the property. Babu Ram<\/p>\n<p>died in the year 1989 leaving behind two sons (respondent-plaintiffs) and<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">                                    -23-<\/span><br \/>\nA.S.No.182\/2001<\/p>\n<p>three daughters (appellants). One of the son was was born in the year<\/p>\n<p>1938 and the other in 1956. Although in 1927, Babu Ram had no son and<\/p>\n<p>the property in his hands became a separate property. But, as soon as a<\/p>\n<p>son was born to him the concept of the property being a co-parcenary<\/p>\n<p>property in terms of the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law revived. The<\/p>\n<p>succession had been opened in 1989 on the death of Babu Ram. Section<\/p>\n<p>6(1) of the Hindu Succession Act governs the law relating to succession<\/p>\n<p>on the death of a co-parcener in the event the heirs are only male<\/p>\n<p>descendants. Placing reliance on this decision it was contended that in<\/p>\n<p>this case the plaintiffs, who were born prior to 1956, acquired the right by<\/p>\n<p>birth   in the grandfather&#8217;s property namely the property held by<\/p>\n<p>Krishnayyan, which right according to them, will not be lost by Hindu<\/p>\n<p>Succession Act, 1956. But this contention is raised forgetting the fact<\/p>\n<p>that Krishna Iyer had an absolute right of dispossession over his property<\/p>\n<p>and no right is acquired by his male descendants and as already stated<\/p>\n<p>defendants 1 to 4 have therefore acquired no right by birth and Krishna<\/p>\n<p>Iyer died only in the year 1971 long after the Hindu Succession Act.<\/p>\n<p>Hence succession takes place as per the Hindu Succession Act only.<\/p>\n<p>      14. As per Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, the property of a<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">                                     -24-<\/span><br \/>\nA.S.No.182\/2001<\/p>\n<p>male Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to the provisions of<\/p>\n<p>this Chapter, firstly, upon the heirs, being the relatives specified in class I<\/p>\n<p>of the schedule. Section 6 of the Act only says that when a male Hindu<\/p>\n<p>dies after the commencement of this Act, having at the time of his death<\/p>\n<p>an interest in a Mitakshara co-parcenary property, his interest in the<\/p>\n<p>property shall devolve by surveyorship upon the surviving members of<\/p>\n<p>the co-parcenary and not in accordance with this Act. As per Explanation<\/p>\n<p>1, for the purpose of this section, the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara co-<\/p>\n<p>parcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have<\/p>\n<p>been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place<\/p>\n<p>immediately before his death, irrespective of whether he was entitled to<\/p>\n<p>claim partition or not. But here as already stated, no right is acquired by<\/p>\n<p>the male descendants of Krishna Iyer till his death. So, Section 6 has no<\/p>\n<p>application.\n<\/p>\n<p>       15. The court below held that the suit is barred by limitation as per<\/p>\n<p>Article 109 of the Limitation Act, since the suit was instituted more than<\/p>\n<p>12 years after Ext.A5 and they cannot validly seek to set aside Ext.A5,<\/p>\n<p>after the expiry of the period of 12 years. Ext.A5 being dated 8\/12\/1972<\/p>\n<p>and the suit was filed only on 17\/3\/1997. According to the counsel for<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">                                     -25-<\/span><br \/>\nA.S.No.182\/2001<\/p>\n<p>the appellants, he need not specifically seek to set aside Ext.A5 and<\/p>\n<p>according to him, Ext.A5 is void ab initio and therefore he can ignore the<\/p>\n<p>same and during his argument he submitted that he is not pressing the<\/p>\n<p>relief for setting aside Ext.A5, but still he can validly maintain the prayer<\/p>\n<p>for separate possession.     As per Article 65 of the Limitation Act, for<\/p>\n<p>claiming possession of immovable property or any interest therein based<\/p>\n<p>on title, the period of limitation prescribed is twelve years when the<\/p>\n<p>possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.            But<\/p>\n<p>according to the plaintiffs\/appellants, the possession       can be said to<\/p>\n<p>become adverse to their interest only when there was an attempt to<\/p>\n<p>partition of the property by defendants 1 to 3 and only in 1996 the<\/p>\n<p>partition deed was executed whereas the suit was instituted in 1997 itself.<\/p>\n<p>If the release deed Ext.A5 is a document void ab initio and if defendants<\/p>\n<p>1 to 3 are in possession of the property, lst defendant is the Manager,<\/p>\n<p>whose possession can only be on behalf of all the co-owners. In this<\/p>\n<p>connection he also placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Paru<\/p>\n<p>v. Chiruthai (1985 KLT 563). It was held that since a co-sharer in<\/p>\n<p>possession is a trustee for a co-sharer not in possession, there can be no<\/p>\n<p>question of any adverse possession, by any co-owner in possession. Mere<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">                                     -26-<\/span><br \/>\nA.S.No.182\/2001<\/p>\n<p>non-participation in the profits or non-payment of rent by themselves<\/p>\n<p>cannot amount to ouster.\n<\/p>\n<p>      16. <a href=\"\/doc\/3074\/\">In Karbalai Begum v. Mohd. Sayeed and<\/a> another (AIR 1981<\/p>\n<p>SC 77) the Apex Court while considering Articles 64 and 65 of the<\/p>\n<p>Limitation Act, held that it is well settled that mere non-participation in<\/p>\n<p>the rent and profits of the land of a co-sharer does not amount to an ouster<\/p>\n<p>so as to give title by adverse possession to the other co-sharer in<\/p>\n<p>possession. Indeed even if this fact is admitted, then the legal possession<\/p>\n<p>would be that the co-sharers in possession would become constructive<\/p>\n<p>trustees on behalf of the co-sharer who is not in possession and the right<\/p>\n<p>of such co-sharer would be deemed to be protected by the trustees.<\/p>\n<p>      17. <a href=\"\/doc\/197296101\/\">In Mohd. Mohammad Ali v. Jagadish Kalita and others<\/a><\/p>\n<p>((2004) 1 SCC 271) the Apex Court held that possession of property by a<\/p>\n<p>co-sharer is deemed to be possession on behalf of other co-sharers unless<\/p>\n<p>there is a clear ouster by denying title of the other co-sharers. Mere long<\/p>\n<p>and continuous possession by itself is not enough. Plea of ouster has to<\/p>\n<p>be raised and proved. In a suit for declaration of title to the property,<\/p>\n<p>plaintiff has only to prove his title and not his possession and the<\/p>\n<p>defendant raising plea of adverse possession must prove the same along<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">                                     -27-<\/span><br \/>\nA.S.No.182\/2001<\/p>\n<p>with his animus possidendi.\n<\/p>\n<p>       18. <a href=\"\/doc\/1268605\/\">Sankaran Nair v. Govindan<\/a> (1982 KLT 948) was a suit for<\/p>\n<p>recovery of possession by junior members of tarwad property alienated<\/p>\n<p>without necessity of a tarwad property. The question arose as to whether<\/p>\n<p>it was necessary to set aside the sale. In that context, Articles 60 or 65 of<\/p>\n<p>the Limitation is relevant. It was held that there is no necessity for a<\/p>\n<p>junior member of a tarwad in impuging a transaction by its karanavan to<\/p>\n<p>file a suit to have the transaction set aside. He can ignore the transaction<\/p>\n<p>and recover possession to the property if the acts of the karnavan cannot<\/p>\n<p>be said to be within his powers. A junior member can treat an invalid<\/p>\n<p>alienation of his tarwad property as void, ignore it and sue to recover the<\/p>\n<p>property. There is no need to bring a suit to set aside the alienation and a<\/p>\n<p>junior member bringing a suit for recovery of possession of tarwad<\/p>\n<p>property alienated without consideration or necessity need not seek to set<\/p>\n<p>aside the document and neither Article 59 nor Article 60 of the Limitation<\/p>\n<p>Act can have any application to such a suit for recovery of possession.<\/p>\n<p>The only article of the Limitation Act that is applicable to such a suit is<\/p>\n<p>Article 65 as per which the period of limitation is 12 years from the date<\/p>\n<p>on which possession of the defendant became adverse to the plaintiff.<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">                                    -28-<\/span><br \/>\nA.S.No.182\/2001<\/p>\n<p>      19. In this case if the plaintiffs could establish that they acquired<\/p>\n<p>right by birth in the property held by Krishna Iyer, then necessarily on his<\/p>\n<p>death, the right, title and interest of the plaintiffs cannot be validly<\/p>\n<p>extinguished Ext.A5. Since the 4th defendant will have only a fractional<\/p>\n<p>interest along with the plaintiff and if so execution of the release deed,<\/p>\n<p>Ext.A5, can in no way affect the right, title and interest of the plaintiffs,<\/p>\n<p>their right cannot be transferred without their consent.       In this case<\/p>\n<p>according to the plaintiffs, they have already become majors as on the<\/p>\n<p>date of Ext.A5 release deed. If only the contention of the appellants that<\/p>\n<p>the property held by Krishna Iyer is ancestral in nature is accepted, then it<\/p>\n<p>has to be held that the suit will be governed by Article 65 of the<\/p>\n<p>Limitation Act and hence not barred.\n<\/p>\n<p>      Conclusion:\n<\/p>\n<p>      1) In the result, we hold that the plaintiffs have not succeeded in<\/p>\n<p>establishing that they had acquired any right by birth in the property held<\/p>\n<p>by Krishna Iyer. The contention of the appellants that the property in the<\/p>\n<p>hands of Krishna Iyer is ancestral in nature, is found against.<\/p>\n<p>      2) The 4th defendant and his wife having executed a release deed<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">                                     -29-<\/span><br \/>\nA.S.No.182\/2001<\/p>\n<p>Ext.A5 in favour of defendants 1 to 3 have no further right in the<\/p>\n<p>property. After the death of Krishna Iyer, when the property devolved on<\/p>\n<p>his legal heirs, (defendants 1 to 4 alone), the right, title and interest of the<\/p>\n<p>4th defendant having been released in favour of the co-sharers, the<\/p>\n<p>plaintiffs have no right to seek partition.\n<\/p>\n<p>      3) In the circumstances of the case, it is not be necessary for the<\/p>\n<p>plaintiffs to seek to set aside Ext.A5 and the relevant article that would<\/p>\n<p>apply is Article 65 of the Limitation Act.\n<\/p>\n<p>      4) There is no evidence in this case to hold that the properties held<\/p>\n<p>by defendants 1 to 3 were adverse to the interest of the plaintiffs or that<\/p>\n<p>there is any ouster to the knowledge of the plaintiffs. If they are co-<\/p>\n<p>sharers of the property, the possession if any held by the lst defendant can<\/p>\n<p>only be on behalf of the co-sharers as a trustee. Hence, the suit is not<\/p>\n<p>shown to be barred under the provisions of the Limitation Act.<\/p>\n<p>      5) In view of the finding that the appellants\/plaintiffs had no right<\/p>\n<p>in the plaint schedule property at the time of execution of the released<\/p>\n<p>deed Ext.A5 executed by the 4th defendant in favour of defendants 1 to 3,<\/p>\n<p>it has to be held that plaintiffs have no partible interest in the plaint<\/p>\n<p>schedule item.\n<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">                                  -30-<\/span><br \/>\nA.S.No.182\/2001<\/p>\n<p>      In the result, confirming the decree and judgment passed by the<\/p>\n<p>court below, this appeal is dismissed. Parties shall bear their respective<\/p>\n<p>costs.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p>                                                           P.R.RAMAN,<br \/>\n                                                                Judge.\n<\/p>\n<p>                                                      V.K.MOHANAN,<br \/>\n                                                              Judge.\n<\/p>\n<p>kcv.\n<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">                      -31-<\/span><br \/>\nA.S.No.182\/2001<\/p>\n<p>                    P.R.RAMAN &amp; V.K.MOHANAN,JJ.\n<\/p>\n<p>                   &#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;-\n<\/p>\n<p>                          A.S.NO.182 OF 2001\n<\/p>\n<p>                   &#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;-\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>                                 JUDGMENT<\/p>\n<p>                           26th October, 2007<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Kerala High Court Yyyyyshnan vs K.Vaidhyanathan on 26 October, 2007 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM AS No. 182 of 2001() 1. YYYYYSHNAN &#8230; Petitioner Vs 1. K.VAIDHYANATHAN &#8230; Respondent For Petitioner :SRI.S.EASWARAN For Respondent :SRI.R.HARIKRISHNAN The Hon&#8217;ble MR. Justice P.R.RAMAN The Hon&#8217;ble MR. Justice V.K.MOHANAN Dated :26\/10\/2007 O R D E R [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[8,21],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-22319","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-high-court","category-kerala-high-court"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.3 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Yyyyyshnan vs K.Vaidhyanathan on 26 October, 2007 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court &amp; High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/yyyyyshnan-vs-k-vaidhyanathan-on-26-october-2007\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Yyyyyshnan vs K.Vaidhyanathan on 26 October, 2007 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court &amp; 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