{"id":223655,"date":"2008-10-08T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2008-10-07T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/mumbai-400-022-vs-the-state-of-maharashtra-on-8-october-2008"},"modified":"2016-12-30T09:59:52","modified_gmt":"2016-12-30T04:29:52","slug":"mumbai-400-022-vs-the-state-of-maharashtra-on-8-october-2008","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/mumbai-400-022-vs-the-state-of-maharashtra-on-8-october-2008","title":{"rendered":"Mumbai 400 022 vs The State Of Maharashtra on 8 October, 2008"},"content":{"rendered":"
Bombay High Court<\/div>\n
Mumbai 400 022 vs The State Of Maharashtra on 8 October, 2008<\/div>\n
Bench: S.J. Vazifdar, A.A. Sayed<\/div>\n
                                    1\n\n           IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY\n\n\n\n\n                                                                             \n                 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION\n\n\n\n\n                                                     \n            CRIMINAL MISC. APPLICATION NO. 271 OF 2007\n                                IN\n                  WRIT PETITION NO. 982 OF 2007\n\n\n\n\n                                                    \n                           ALONG WITH\n               CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 219 OF 2007\n                                IN\n                  WRIT PETITION NO. 982 OF 2007\n\n\n\n\n                                       \n                               AND\n                  WRIT PETITION NO. 2031 OF 2007\n                           \n    CRIMINAL MISC. APPLICATION NO. 271 OF 2007\n                          \n                       IN\n    WRIT PETITION NO. 982 OF 2007\n            \n\n\n    Sandeep Rammilan Shukla                      )\n         \n\n\n\n    an Indian inhabitant of Mumbai               )\n    Aged about 28 years, Occupation : Business   )\n    residing at 197\/7, Kamal Kunj, Kingcircle    )\n    CHSL Ltd., R.G. Shukla Marg, Sion East             )\n\n\n\n\n\n    Mumbai 400 022                               ).. PETITIONER\n\n               VERSUS\n\n    1)    The State of Maharashtra               )\n\n\n\n\n\n          through the Secretary                  )\n          Home Department, Mantralaya            )\n          Mumbai.                                )\n\n\n\n\n                                                     ::: Downloaded on - 09\/06\/2013 13:57:16 :::\n                                      2\n\n    2)   The Director                              )\n         Anti Corruption Bureau For Greater        )\n\n\n\n\n                                                                               \n         Mumbai having office on the first floor   )\n         of Madhu Industrial Estate, Pandurang     )\n\n\n\n\n                                                       \n         Budhkar Marg, Lower Parel                 )\n         Mumbai 400 013.                           )\n\n    3)   The Commissioner of Police                )\n\n\n\n\n                                                      \n         Police Headquarters, Crawford Market      )\n         Mumbai 400 002                            )\n\n    4)   The Senior Inspector of Anti Extortion    )\n\n\n\n\n                                          \n         Cell, Crime Branch, Mumbai.                         )\n\n    5)\n                           \n         The Senior Inspector of Police            )\n         Nagpada Police Station, Nagpada           )\n                          \n         Mumbai 400 009                            )\n\n    6)   Dhananjay Kamlakar                        )\n         Deputy Commissioner of Police             )\n           \n\n         Crime Branch, Mumbai                                )\n        \n\n\n\n    7)   Anil Mahabole                             )\n         Police Inspector through DCP              )\n         Crime Branch, Office of the               )\n         Commissioner of Police, Mumbai.           )\n\n\n\n\n\n    8)   Rajendra Nikam                            )\n         Sub-Inspector of Police                             )\n         through DCP, Crime Branch                 )\n\n\n\n\n\n         Office of the Commissioner of Police      )\n         Mumbai.                                   )\n\n    9)   The Director                              )\n         Central Bureau of Investigation           )\n\n\n\n\n                                                       ::: Downloaded on - 09\/06\/2013 13:57:16 :::\n                                      3\n\n          CGO Complex, Lodhi Road, New Delhi ).. RESPONDENTS\n                  WITH\n\n\n\n\n                                                                                \n    CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 219 OF 2007\n\n\n\n\n                                                        \n                  IN \n    WRIT PETITION NO.982 OF 2007\n\n    Chandresh Chimanlal Shah                        )\n\n\n\n\n                                                       \n    Aged about 40 years, Occupation Business        )\n    Residing at 304, Pleasant Park Society          )\n    65, Peddar Road, Mumbai 400 026                           ).. APPLICANT\n\n\n\n\n                                        \n               VERSUS\n\n    1) \n                            \n          Sandeep Rammilan Shukla\n          an Indian inhabitant of Mumbai\n                                                    )\n                                                    )\n          aged about 28 years, Occupation           )\n                           \n          Business, residing at 197\/7, Kamal Kunj   )\n          King Circle CHS Ltd., R.G Shukla Marg     )\n          Sion (East), Mumbai 400 022               )\n            \n\n\n    2)    The State of Maharashtra                  )\n         \n\n\n\n          through the Secretary                     )\n          Home Department, Mantralaya               )\n          Mumbai 400 032                            ).. RESPONDENTS\n\n\n\n\n\n                     WITH\n\n    WRIT PETITION NO. 2031 OF 2007\n\n\n\n\n\n    Smt. Vimal Appaso Lohar                         )\n    Age 36 years, Occupation : Household            )\n    R\/o Mankapur, Tal. Chikkodi          )\n    District Belgaum                                ).. PETITIONER\n\n\n\n\n                                                        ::: Downloaded on - 09\/06\/2013 13:57:16 :::\n                                           4\n\n                 VERSUS\n\n\n\n\n                                                                              \n    1)      Chief Secretary of Home Ministry      )\n            of State of Maharashtra               )\n\n\n\n\n                                                      \n            Mantralaya, Mumbai.                   )\n\n    2)      Inspector General of Police           )\n            of State of Maharashtra               )\n\n\n\n\n                                                     \n            Mumbai.                               )\n\n    3)      District Superintendent of Police     )\n            Kolhapur, Bavada Road Kolhapur        )\n\n\n\n\n                                             \n            District : Kolhapur.                  )\n\n    4)\n                              \n            Asst. Police Inspector              )\n            Kurundwad Police Station, Kurundwad )\n                             \n            Tal. Shirol, Dist. Kolhapur.        ).. RESPONDENTS\n              \n\n    Mr S M A Kazami, Senior Council, Mr Zuber Ahmad and\n    Mr B P Pandey for the Petitioner in W.P. No.982 of 2007.\n           \n\n\n\n    Mr S R Borulkar, Public Procecutor a\/w Mr A R Patil,\n    Additional Public Prosecutor, for the State.\n\n\n\n\n\n    Mr Kiran C Shirguppe for the Petitioner in W.P. No.2031 of 2007.\n\n\n\n\n\n                       CORAM : SWATANTER KUMAR,  C.J.  AND\n                                  S.J. VAZIFDAR & A.A. SAYED, JJ\n\n                  \n                JUDGMENT   RESERVED     ON      :  10TH\n\n\n\n\n                                                      ::: Downloaded on - 09\/06\/2013 13:57:16 :::\n                                              5\n\n    SEPTEMBER2008 \n              JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON      :  8TH OCTOBER 2008\n\n\n\n\n                                                                                      \n    JUDGMENT (Per Swatanter Kumar, C.J.)\n<\/pre>\n
    Introduction<\/p>\n
                  Marcus Tullius Cicero, a great orator and Roman Attorney<\/p>\n
    said, “The solidity of a State is very largely bound up with its judicial<\/p>\n
    decisions”.   The stability of State governance is relatable to the status<\/p>\n
    of public law and order in the State. Protection to person and property<\/p>\n
    of State subjects is the primary obligation of the State and this is the<\/p>\n
    great significance of administration of criminal justice delivery system.\n<\/p>\n
    Criminal jurisprudence governing the law of crime primarily has two<\/p>\n
    concepts like any other legal jurisprudence :\n<\/p>\n
           (i)    Substantive criminal law; and <\/p>\n
           (ii)   Procedural criminal law.\n<\/p>\n
    Provisions   of   substantive   criminal   law   which   are   primarily   penal   in<\/p>\n
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\n                                                6<\/span><\/p>\n
    nature are subjected to rule of strict interpretation, while those relating<\/p>\n
    to   procedural   law   are   guided   by   rules   of   plain   and   liberal<\/p>\n
    interpretation.  The Court, in the present cases, is concerned with the<\/p>\n
    application of rules of interpretation to the procedural law particularly<\/p>\n
    relating to the field of investigation as well as the effect of crime and<\/p>\n
    its registration upon the social fabric of the State.  Needless to notice<\/p>\n
    that registration of First Information Report, inquiry, investigation and<\/p>\n
    adjudication   process   of   offences   are   the   main   attributes   of<\/p>\n
    administration of criminal justice delivery system.\n<\/p>\n
    2.            The   law   relating   to   criminal   procedure   applicable   to   all<\/p>\n
    criminal proceedings in India except the State of Jammu & Kashmir<\/p>\n
    and Nagaland is specified in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973<\/p>\n
    (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”) which was amended from time<\/p>\n
    to time and extensive amendments were introduced by the Amending<\/p>\n
    Act of 1995.  The object of the Code is to ensure that an accused gets<\/p>\n
    a   full   and   fair   trial   along   with   certain   well   established   and   well<\/p>\n
    understood lines that accord with our notions of natural justice and<\/p>\n
                                                                ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 13:57:16 :::<\/span>
\n                                               7<\/span><\/p>\n
    there   is   completely   expeditious   but   fair   investigation.     The   basic<\/p>\n
    importance of criminal procedure has to be kept in mind as it is the<\/p>\n
    procedure that spells out much of the difference between the rule of<\/p>\n
    law   and   rule   by   whim   and   caprice.     The   criminal   procedure   is<\/p>\n
    supplemental   to   the   substantive   criminal   law.     Its   failure   would<\/p>\n
    seriously   affect   the   substantive   criminal   law   which   in   turn   would<\/p>\n
    considerably   affect   the   protection   that   it   gives   to   the   society.\n<\/p>\n
    Therefore, it has been rightly said that too much investigating delay<\/p>\n
    and uncertainty in applying the law of criminal procedure would render<\/p>\n
    the best penal law useless and oppressive.\n<\/p>\n
    3.           Every   criminal   trial   is   initiated   by   registration   of   “First<\/p>\n
    Information   Report”  (for   short   “FIR”).     This   puts   the   mechanism   of<\/p>\n
    criminal   investigation   into   motion   and   is   the   first   step   for<\/p>\n
    commencement   of   legal   process   in   accordance   with   law.     It   is<\/p>\n
    expressed that to keep the weal balanced must be the prime duty of<\/p>\n
    the judiciary.  In interpreting and applying a penal statute, it has to be<\/p>\n
    borne in mind that respect for human rights of the accused is not the<\/p>\n
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\n                                                  8<\/span><\/p>\n
    only value at stake.  The purpose of criminal law is to permit everyone<\/p>\n
    to go about their daily lives without fear of harm to person or property.\n<\/p>\n
    And  it   is in  the   interest   of  every  one  that  serious  crime  should  be<\/p>\n
    effectively investigated and prosecuted. There must be fairness on all<\/p>\n
    sides.       In   criminal   cases,   this   requires   the   Court   to   consider<\/p>\n
    triangulation of interest i.e. the accused, the victim – his or her family<\/p>\n
    and the public.     Besides all this, the paramount duty and the very<\/p>\n
    foundation   of   criminal   investigation   and   justice   delivery   system   is<\/p>\n
    fairness in the entire process and to ensure that there is no denial of<\/p>\n
    justice   to   any   of   the   stated   parties.     Importantly,   it   is   the   fairness<\/p>\n
    during investigation or trial that achieve the ends of criminal justice.\n<\/p>\n
    Particularly,   the   procedural   law   thus   needs   to   be   examined   and<\/p>\n
    interpreted with the object of ensuring fairness even in the process of<\/p>\n
    investigation.  Whatever be the standards of legal conscience but they<\/p>\n
    ultimately   should   be   founded   on   law.    Conscientia   legalise   lege<\/p>\n
    foundatur.\n<\/p>\n
    4.             Academicians   even   in   the   international   field   have<\/p>\n
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\n                                               9<\/span><\/p>\n
    emphasized  the   need  to   understand   the   portion   of   the   impact   that<\/p>\n
    crime exerts on a society. Our approach primarily should be focused<\/p>\n
    exclusively in economic and social consequences of crime.  Very little<\/p>\n
    is   stated   to   have   been   done   in   trying   to   assess   other   type   of<\/p>\n
    consequences.     Even   the   social   structure   of   a   community   may   be<\/p>\n
    challenged wherever the incidents of crime are high. True it is that<\/p>\n
    crime itself is a consequence of social degradation which necessarily<\/p>\n
    implies that even a smallest act in the process of investigation or trial<\/p>\n
    of criminal offences can leave an impact of wide magnitude not only<\/p>\n
    on the social fabric but even on the criminal justice delivery system.\n<\/p>\n
    (Ref.:  Unweaving   the   Social   Fabric  –   https:\/\/repositories.cdlib.org\/<\/p>\n
    vsmex\/ prajm\/paras.)<\/p>\n
    Order of Reference<\/p>\n
    5.            The   reasons   in   support   of   the   judgment   is   the   soul   of<\/p>\n
    judicial decision.  The Division Bench of this court, while dealing with<\/p>\n
    the Writ  Petition No.982 of  2007  (Sandeep  Rammilan Shukla v.  The<\/p>\n
                                                               ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 13:57:16 :::<\/span>
\n                                               10<\/span><\/p>\n
    State   of   Maharashtra   &   Ors.),   noticed   that   the   view   taken   by   the<\/p>\n
    Division Bench of this Court in the case of Shyamsunder R. Agarwal v.\n<\/p>\n
    State of Maharashtra & Ors.,  2008 ALL MR (Cri) 114,     was not in<\/p>\n
    conformity with the “ratio decidendi”  of the judgment of the Supreme<\/p>\n
    Court in Parkash Singh Badal & Anr.  v. State of Punjab & Ors., (2007)1<\/p>\n
    SCC   1,   and   thus   being   unable   to   accept   the   view   of   the   Division<\/p>\n
    Bench  in  that  case,  recommended to  constitute  a  Larger Bench to<\/p>\n
    consider the question as to whether the officer in charge of a Police<\/p>\n
    Station has to register an FIR as required under Section 154(1) of the<\/p>\n
    Code   of   Criminal   Procedure   or   he   has   any   authority   to   conduct   a<\/p>\n
    preliminary inquiry pre-registration.     It will be useful to refer to the<\/p>\n
    Order of Reference dated 2nd May, 2008, which reads as under: –\n<\/p>\n
               “P.C.:-<\/p>\n
               The question raised in these petitions is whether the
\n               police   officer   is   bound   to   register   a   case   when   an
\n               information   is   given   to   him   about   commission   of
\n               cognisable offence.  There are various judgments of<\/p>\n
               the Supreme Court, the latest being Prakash Singh
\n               Badal   &   Anr.   vs.   State   of   Punjab   &   Ors.   [2007(1)
\n               SCC(1).     There   are   other   judgments   which   have
\n               been noted by the Supreme Court in this judgment.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
               There   are   other   judgments   of   other   High   Courts,<\/p>\n
                                                                ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 13:57:16 :::<\/span>
\n                                    11<\/span><\/p>\n
     which   have   also   been   brought   to   our   notice.     We
\n     prima-facie feel that the view of the Supreme Court is<\/p>\n
     that in terms of Section 154(1) Cr.P. C., the police
\n     officer is bound to register a case when he receives<\/p>\n
     information of a cognizable offence. At the stage of
\n     receiving the information of cognizable offence, the
\n     police   officer   is   not   supposed   to   inquire   about   the
\n     correctness or otherwise of such information.   That<\/p>\n
     stage would only come after the case is registered.
\n     However, there is judgment of Division Bench of this
\n     Court   in   Writ   Petition   No.2297   of   2006.     In   this
\n     judgment this question was considered directly and<\/p>\n
     the  Division   Bench   while   drawing   conclusions   after
\n     an elaborate discussion laid down as under:-\n<\/p>\n
               (a) Where   an   information   relating   to<\/p>\n
               the commission of a cognizable offence
\n               is received by an officer in charge of a
\n               police station, he has to register a FIR
\n               as   required   by   section   154(1)   of   the<\/p>\n
               Code.     If   the   information   discloses   a
\n               cognizable   offence,   FIR   must   be<\/p>\n
               registered.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
               (b) If   the   information   received   does
\n               not   disclose   a   cognizable   offence   but<\/p>\n
               indicates   the   necessity   for   further
\n               inquiry,   preliminary   inquiry   may   be
\n               conducted   to   ascertain   whether
\n               cognizable offence is disclosed or not.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     While drawing  conclusion at sub-paragraph (a) and\n<\/p>\n
     (b) of paragraph 57 in the light of the judgment of the
\n     Supreme   Court   referred   to   above,   we   feel   that   it
\n     would be appropriate if the matter is re-considered by<\/p>\n
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\n                                            12<\/span><\/p>\n
              a Full Bench of this High Court.  Therefore, we refer
\n              to the Full Bench the question whether in the light of<\/p>\n
              the judgment of the Supreme Court a police officer is
\n              bound to register a case when an information is given<\/p>\n
              to   him   with   regard   to   commission   of   a   cognizable
\n              offence, irrespective of any qualifications, as created
\n              in paragraph 57(b) of the judgment of this court in the
\n              case   of   Shayamsunder   R.   Agarwal   vs.   State   of<\/p>\n
              Maharashtra in Writ Petition No. 2297 of 206 dated
\n              9th March, 2007. Papers be placed before the learned
\n              Chief Justice for appropriate orders.\n<\/p>\n
                                         Sd\/-<\/p>\n
\n                                  (Bilal Nazki, J)\n                                 ig      Sd\/-\n                                  A.P. Bhangale, J)\"\n                               \n<\/pre>\n
    6.           In   furtherance   to   this   Order   of   Reference,   the   matters<\/p>\n
    have   been   placed   before   this   Bench   for   answering   the   referred<\/p>\n
    question of law.\n<\/p>\n
    Facts of the case<\/p>\n
    7.           It will be useful to refer to the basic facts giving rise to the<\/p>\n
    Order of Reference in Writ Petition No.982 of 2007.  The Petitioners<\/p>\n
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\n                                               13<\/span><\/p>\n
    have   prayed   that   the   investigations   of   C.R.   No.144   of   2007   of<\/p>\n
    Nagpada   Police   Station,   Mumbai,   and   C.R.   No.24   of   2007   be<\/p>\n
    transferred  to the Director  of  Central  Bureau of  Investigation.    The<\/p>\n
    Petitioner  claims  that  he  was  in  the process  of developing  a Slum<\/p>\n
    Rehabilitation   Scheme   under   the   Development   Control   Regulations<\/p>\n
    33(10) and during this process, he was approached by one Shri Vinod<\/p>\n
    Avlani, through one mediator Shri Chandresh Shah and showed his<\/p>\n
    interest for taking over the project of slum rehabilitation on behalf of<\/p>\n
    Ravi Group of Companies.  The parties accordingly negotiated and a<\/p>\n
    draft   agreement   was   drawn.     A   joint   venture   agreement   was   thus<\/p>\n
    arrived at, whereby the Petitioner’s firm would have a joint venture<\/p>\n
    agreement with Ravi Group of Companies represented by Shri Vinod<\/p>\n
    Avlani, who was to pay to the Petitioner a sum of Rs.2 crores, out of<\/p>\n
    which   Rs.1   crore   was   to   be   paid   at   the   time   of   signing   of   the<\/p>\n
    agreement.    In the month of October, 2006, the Petitioner was given<\/p>\n
    an advance of Rs.30 lakhs and the balance of Rs.70 lakhs was to be<\/p>\n
    given just before the signing of the said agreement.   The amount of<\/p>\n
    Rs.30  lakhs  was  accepted  as an  earnest money  by the  Petitioner.\n<\/p>\n
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\n                                             14<\/span><\/p>\n
    Shri Avlani did not act in accordance with the understanding between<\/p>\n
    the parties and they started misguiding and provoking the members of<\/p>\n
    the Slum Society whose co-operation was critical for the success of<\/p>\n
    the project.   The sum of Rs.70 lakhs was not given to the petitioner<\/p>\n
    and   Shri   Avlani   wanted   to   go   back   on   his   promise   and   with   an<\/p>\n
    intention to get back the earnest money, he lodged a complaint with<\/p>\n
    the Crime Branch Unit for recovery of the said earnest money which<\/p>\n
    the Petitioner had forfeited for the reason of detrimental behaviour of<\/p>\n
    Shri   Chandresh   Shah   and   of   Shri   Avlani   over   the   said   slum<\/p>\n
    rehabilitation   project.       The   Crime   Branch   Unit,   according   to   the<\/p>\n
    Petitioner, did not register an FIR.  However, in doing so, the Police<\/p>\n
    Inspector Shri Anil Mahabole and Sub-Inspector Shri Rajaram Nikam<\/p>\n
    started threatening the Petitioner and his uncle that they should pay<\/p>\n
    Rs.10 lakhs as bribe to them and also they should return the said sum<\/p>\n
    of   Rs.30   lakhs,   which   was   forfeited   by   the   petitioner,   to   the<\/p>\n
    complainant.       The   Petitioner   and   his   uncle   were     continuously<\/p>\n
    harassed   and   the   Petitioner,   therefore,   made   a   complaint   to   the<\/p>\n
    Maharashtra State Anti Corruption Bureau which was   lodged as an<\/p>\n
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\n                                               15<\/span><\/p>\n
    FIR in the matter.  The Anti Corruption  Bureau intensively verified the<\/p>\n
    complaint   and   made   phone   tapping   recording   several   telephone<\/p>\n
    conversations.     It was also stated in the complaint  that Chandresh<\/p>\n
    Shah had purchased two expensive Nokia N-Series mobile phones by<\/p>\n
    swapping his credit card and one of which was given to PI Mahabole<\/p>\n
    and  another  to  the  Deputy  Commissioner of  Police   Shri  Kamlakar.\n<\/p>\n
    Shri Chandresh Shah was trapped red-handed by the Anti Corruption<\/p>\n
    Bureau while accepting the bribe of Rs. 1.5 lakhs and was arrested<\/p>\n
    and the mobile phones were seized.   The ACB did not seize mobile<\/p>\n
    phone of DCP Shri Kamalakar.  In order to get out the ACB, the anti-\n<\/p>\n
    extortion cell of crime branch registered counter FIR aginst Petitioner<\/p>\n
    and his uncle alleging a case of extortion.\n<\/p>\n
    8.            According   to   the   Petitioners,   no   case   was   made   out<\/p>\n
    against   them   as   they   had   not   done   any   extortion   and   in   fact   had<\/p>\n
    retained the earnest money.  Krishnamilan, who had taken bold steps<\/p>\n
    for exposing the officers of Crime Branch, after  his bail application<\/p>\n
    was   rejected   was   arrested   along   with   the   Petitioner   and   taken   to<\/p>\n
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\n                                                16<\/span><\/p>\n
    judicial custody.  As he was arrested on the basis of FIR registered by<\/p>\n
    the two officers against whom the complaint was made by the uncle<\/p>\n
    of the Petitioner in the matter, he was being investigated by the Crime<\/p>\n
    Branch.   According to the Petitioner, no case was made out against<\/p>\n
    the   uncle   of   the   Petitioner   and   the   Petitioner   as   they   had   never<\/p>\n
    demanded any extortion money from the complainant, however, they<\/p>\n
    had   only   retained   the   earnest   money.       It   is   the   contention   of   the<\/p>\n
    Petitioner that FIR was registered after four months whereas it should<\/p>\n
    have been registered at once.  Thus, according to them, the FIR itself<\/p>\n
    could not have been registered and in any case the investigation of<\/p>\n
    both the cases i.e. one with the Crime Branch and another with the<\/p>\n
    Police   Station   of   Nagpada,  Mumbai,   should be  investigated  by  the<\/p>\n
    Central Bureau of Investigation.\n<\/p>\n
    9.            While   in   Writ   Petition   No.2031   of   2007   filed   by   the<\/p>\n
    Petitioner,   Smt.   Vimal   Appaso   Lohar,   it   is   averred   that   on   20th<\/p>\n
    January, 2006 her husband Appaso Dattu Lohar was arrested upon<\/p>\n
    registration of an F.I. R. being Criminal Case No.3 of 2006 dated 20th<\/p>\n
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\n                                             17<\/span><\/p>\n
    January, 2006 on the allegation that he committed theft of Hercules<\/p>\n
    Bicycle   and   the   offence   was   registered   under   Section   379   of   the<\/p>\n
    Indian   Penal   Code.     After   his   arrest,   he   was   taken   to   Kurundwad<\/p>\n
    Police   Station   and   thereafter   was   produced   before   the   J.M.   F.C.\n<\/p>\n
    Kurundwad on 21st January, 2006 who granted police custody remand<\/p>\n
    of three days.   Unfortunately on 23rd  January, 2006, Appaso Lohar<\/p>\n
    died in  police  lock-up due to  torture. This  was  not informed to  the<\/p>\n
    Petitioner and it was after the news flashed in the TV Channels and<\/p>\n
    the newspapers of Kolhapur District, that the Petitioner, wife of the<\/p>\n
    Appaso Lohar, came to know about the death of her husband.   She<\/p>\n
    being   uneducated  and   poor  woman   could   not   take   effective   steps.\n<\/p>\n
    Thereafter, even certain people raised voice against this act of the<\/p>\n
    police.     No   FIR   was   registered   regarding     custodial   death   of   her<\/p>\n
    husband.  Even the dead body of her husband was not handed over<\/p>\n
    to her for funeral.   Petitioner stated that her husband was the only<\/p>\n
    bread winner of their family.  An inquiry was sought to be conducted<\/p>\n
    and she was served a notice informing her that she should remain<\/p>\n
    present on 24th February, 2006 for the purpose of inquiry of the said<\/p>\n
                                                             ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 13:57:17 :::<\/span>
\n                                              18<\/span><\/p>\n
    custodial   death,   but   the   same   has   not   been   taken   to   its   logical<\/p>\n
    conclusion   and   even   an   FIR  for   the   custodial   death   has   not   been<\/p>\n
    registered.   Thus, the Petitioner prays that an appropriate case be<\/p>\n
    registered and investigation thereof be handed over to the CBI and<\/p>\n
    the Respondents be also directed to pay reasonable compensation.\n<\/p>\n
    The Law : Relevant provisions of Criminal Procedure Code<\/p>\n
    10.<\/p>\n
                  In  Laxminarayan Vishwanath Arya vs State of Mahrashtra<\/p>\n
    and others, 2007 (5) Mh. L. J. 7, Full Bench of this Court observed<\/p>\n
    that legislative scheme behind the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973<\/p>\n
    discerningly deciphers distinction of jurisdiction and fields covered by<\/p>\n
    the police or investigating agency on the one hand and the powers of<\/p>\n
    the Court while conducting inquiry or trial.   The legislative object of<\/p>\n
    distribution   of   power   without   transgression   on   the   limitation   of   the<\/p>\n
    other has received judicial approval.   With the development of law,<\/p>\n
    under the criminal jurisprudence, there is clear judicial dichotomy of<\/p>\n
    investigative   and   judicial   power.     They   operate   in   different   fields<\/p>\n
    without   conflict   and   scope   of   overlapping   unless   the   provisions   of<\/p>\n
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\n                                                19<\/span><\/p>\n
    Code or judicial dictum have provided to the contrary.  The emphasis<\/p>\n
    of the Full Bench in the case of  Laxminarayan  (supra) had been on<\/p>\n
    Chapter   XII   and  Chapter  XIII   to   XV   which   obviously  includes   even<\/p>\n
    Section 154 of the Code.\n<\/p>\n
    11.          It   will be useful to refer to the provisions of Section 154,<\/p>\n
    with   the   interpretation   of   which   we   are   concerned   in   the   present<\/p>\n
    Reference. Section 154 reads as under :-\n<\/p>\n
               “154.   Information in cognizable cases  –   (1) Every
\n               information relating to the commission of a cognizable
\n               offence,   if   given   orally   to   an   officer   in   charge   of   a
\n               police   station,   shall   be   reduced   to   writing   by   him   or<\/p>\n
               under his direction, and be read over to the informant,
\n               and every such information, whether given in writing or<\/p>\n
               reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the
\n               person   giving   it,   and   the   substance   thereof   shall   be
\n               entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such
\n               form  as the  State  Government  may prescribe  in  this<\/p>\n
               behalf.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                       (2)    A copy of the information as recorded under<\/p>\n
               sub-section (1) shall be given forthwith, free of cost, to
\n               the informant.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                          (3)         Any person aggrieved by a refusal on the
\n               part of an officer in charge of a police station to record<\/p>\n
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\n                                              20<\/span><\/p>\n
              the information referred to in sub-section (1) may send
\n              the  substance  of  such   information,   in   writing  and  by<\/p>\n
              post, to the Superintendent of Police concerned who, if
\n              satisfied   that   such   information   discloses   the<\/p>\n
              commission   of   a   cognizable   offence,   shall   either
\n              investigate the case himself or direct an investigation
\n              to be made by any police officer subordinate to him, in
\n              the   manner   provided   by   this   Code,   and   such   officer<\/p>\n
              shall have all the powers of an officer in charge of the
\n              police station in relation to that offence.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    12.         It   is   a   settled   rule   of   interpretation   of   statute   that   the<\/p>\n
    Courts should always tilt in favour of rule of plain construction unless<\/p>\n
    the   legislative   intent\/object   and   language   unambiguously   support<\/p>\n
    another construction.   On the plain reading of Section 154, following<\/p>\n
    ingredients emerge :-\n<\/p>\n
             (a) Every   information   relating   to   commission   of   a<\/p>\n
                   cognizable offence shall be reduced to writing by<\/p>\n
                   the police officer or under his direction and read<\/p>\n
                   over to the informant.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
             (b) Such   information   can   be   given   in   writing   or<\/p>\n
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\n                                  21<\/span><\/p>\n
         reduced   to   writing   by  the   officer   concerned  and<\/p>\n
         also shall be signed by the informant.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (c) The substance whereof shall be entered in a book<\/p>\n
         to   be   kept   by   such   officer   as   the   State<\/p>\n
         Government may prescribe in this behalf.\n<\/p>\n
     (d) The scheme of registration of FIR under Section<\/p>\n
         154 further requires in terms of Section 154(2) the<\/p>\n
         copy   of   information   so   recorded   shall   be   given<\/p>\n
         forthwith free of cost to the informant.\n<\/p>\n
     (e) Section   154   (3)   provides   a   remedy   to   an<\/p>\n
         aggrieved person in case of refusal on the part of<\/p>\n
         the officer in charge of the police station to record<\/p>\n
         the   information   by   making   a   complaint   to   the<\/p>\n
         Superintendent of Police, who if satisfied by such<\/p>\n
         information,   having   disclosed   a   commission   of<\/p>\n
         cognizable   offence,   shall   either   investigate   the<\/p>\n
         case himself or direct an investigation to be made<\/p>\n
                                                  ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 13:57:17 :::<\/span>
\n                                            22<\/span><\/p>\n
                   by any police officer subordinate to him.\n<\/p>\n
    Thus, the provisions of Section 154 are self contained.  They impose<\/p>\n
    a duty upon the police officer in charge of a police station to register<\/p>\n
    information   of   commission   of   a   cognizable   offence   and   supply   the<\/p>\n
    copy thereof to the complainant. In the event of default, the remedy is<\/p>\n
    also stipulated.   From the essential features of Section 154(1), it is<\/p>\n
    apparent that a police officer has to register information relating to a<\/p>\n
    commission of a cognizable offence.\n<\/p>\n
    13.          Section  2(c) defines “cognizable  offence”.   It  means an<\/p>\n
    offence for which, and “cognizable case” means a case in which a<\/p>\n
    police officer may, in accordance with the First Schedule or under any<\/p>\n
    other law for the time being in force, arrest without warrant.\n<\/p>\n
    14.          The   expression   “investigation”   has   to   be   clearly<\/p>\n
    understood   in   distinction   to   “inquiry”.       They   are   defined   under<\/p>\n
    Sections 2(h) and 2(g) respectively.  All proceedings under the Code<\/p>\n
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\n                                                23<\/span><\/p>\n
    for   collection   of   evidence   conducted   by   a   police   officer   is   an<\/p>\n
    investigation,   while   inquiry   means   every   inquiry   other   than   a   trial<\/p>\n
    conducted under the Code by a Magistrate or Court.   Thus, inquiry<\/p>\n
    falls   in   the   domain   of   Court,   while   investigation   and   all   its   facets<\/p>\n
    exclusively come under the domain of the investigating agency.  It is<\/p>\n
    also apparent that expression “inquiry”  per se  has not been defined,<\/p>\n
    but it only shows what it includes or embraces.   The term “inquiry”\n<\/p>\n
    has been given a wide import.\n<\/p>\n
    15.            The Supreme Court in the case of  Real Value Appliances<\/p>\n
    Limited vs Canara Bank and others, (1998) 5 SCC 554, explained the<\/p>\n
    term “inquiry’
\n                  as :\n<\/p>\n
               “According  to  the  New   Standard  Dictionary,   the   word
\n               “inquiry”   includes   “investigation”   into   facts,   causes,
\n               effects and relations generally; “to inquire”, according
\n               to   the   same   dictionary   means   “to   exert   oneself   to<\/p>\n
               discovery   something”.    Chambers   20th  Century
\n               Dictionary  lays down that the meaning of the term “to
\n               inquire”  is   “to   ask,   to   seek”  and   the   meaning   of   the
\n               term   “inquiry”   is   given   as   “search   for   knowledge;
\n               investigation; a question.”\n<\/p>\n
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\n                                               24<\/span><\/p>\n
    16.           In   contrast   to   this,   the   Supreme   Court;   in   the   case   of<\/p>\n
    Directorate of Enforcement vs Deepak Mahajan and<\/a> another, AIR 1994<\/p>\n
    SC 1775, explained the word “investigation” as under :-\n<\/p>\n
               “An `investigation’    means search for material and facts
\n               in order to find out whether or not an offence has been<\/p>\n
               committed.   The   expression   `investigation’ has   been
\n               defined in Section 2(h) of Criminal Procedure Code.  It<\/p>\n
               is an inclusive definition. No doubt it will not strictly fall
\n               under the definition of `investigation’ in so far as the<\/p>\n
               inclusive   part   is   concerned.   But   then   it   being   an
\n               inclusive   definition   the   ordinary   connotation   of   the
\n               expression `investigation’      cannot be overlooked.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    17.           The   investigation   of   a   cognizable   offence   in   contra-\n<\/p>\n
    distinction   to   a   non-cognizable   offence   is   without   the   leave   of   the<\/p>\n
    Court. The book in which such information is to be recorded is the<\/p>\n
    one which has been prescribed by the Government for that purpose.\n<\/p>\n
    In terms of Section 2(m), “Notification” means the one published in<\/p>\n
    the Official Gazette and “offence” under Section 2(n) means any act<\/p>\n
    or omission made punishable by law.   FIR is to be recorded by an<\/p>\n
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\n                                                25<\/span><\/p>\n
    officer   in   charge  of   a   police   station   which   in   terms   of   section  2(o)<\/p>\n
    includes, “when the officer in charge of the police station is absent<\/p>\n
    from   the   station-house   or   unable   from   illness   or   other   cause   to<\/p>\n
    perform his duties, the police officer present at the station-house who<\/p>\n
    is next in rank to such officer and is above the rank of constable or,<\/p>\n
    when  the  State   Government  so   directs,  any other  police   officer  so<\/p>\n
    present”.\n<\/p>\n
    18.           The powers of the investigating officer are of very wide<\/p>\n
    magnitude.  Once an FIR has been registered in terms of Section 154<\/p>\n
    of the Code, the police officer without an order from the Magistrate<\/p>\n
    and without a warrant may arrest a person who has been concerned<\/p>\n
    in   any   cognizable   offence   and   for   various   other   reasons   stated   in<\/p>\n
    Section 41.  Section 157 of the Code also lays down that if from the<\/p>\n
    information received by an officer in charge of a police station has<\/p>\n
    reason   to   suspect   the   commission   of   an   offence   which   he   is<\/p>\n
    empowered   under   Section   156   to   investigation,   he   shall   send<\/p>\n
    forthwith a report of the same to the Magistrate empowered to take<\/p>\n
                                                                  ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 13:57:17 :::<\/span>
\n                                               26<\/span><\/p>\n
    cognizance   of   such   an   offence   and   shall   proceed   to   investigate<\/p>\n
    himself or through his subordinate officer and to take measures for<\/p>\n
    discovery and arrest of the offender.   Proviso (b) to Section 157(1)<\/p>\n
    authorizes a police officer in charge of a police station that if there is<\/p>\n
    no sufficient grounds for entering into an investigation, he shall not<\/p>\n
    investigate  the case.    Thus,    this  provision gives  some element  of<\/p>\n
    discretion   to   a   police   officer   to   investigate   or   not   depending   upon<\/p>\n
    reasons to suspect commission or no sufficient ground for entering<\/p>\n
    into investigation of an alleged offence. In other case, he is expected<\/p>\n
    to proceed to file a report before the Court of competent jurisdiction<\/p>\n
    as per the requirements of Section 173(2) of the Code. The Supreme<\/p>\n
    Court in the case of Union of India and another vs W. N. Chadha, AIR<\/p>\n
    1993 SC 1082, dealing with the various terms appearing in Section<\/p>\n
    173(1), held as under :-\n<\/p>\n
               “89. Applying the above principle, it may be held that
\n               when   the   investigating   officer   is   not   deciding   any
\n               matter except collecting the materials for ascertaining
\n               whether a prima facie case is made out or not and a
\n               full enquiry in case of filing a report under S. 173(2)<\/p>\n
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\n                                   27<\/span><\/p>\n
     follows in a trial before the Court or Tribunal pursuant
\n     to the filing of the report, it cannot be said that at that<\/p>\n
     stage   rule of  audi alteram  partem  superimposes an
\n     obligation to issue a prior notice and hear the accused<\/p>\n
     which  the  statute does not expressly recognise.  The
\n     question is not whether audi alteram partem is implicit,
\n     but where the occasion for its attraction exists at all.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     90. Under the scheme of Chap. XII of the Code of<\/p>\n
     Criminal Procedure, there are various provisions under
\n     which no prior notice or opportunity of being heard is
\n     conferred as a matter of course to an accused person
\n     while the proceeding is in the stage of an investigation<\/p>\n
     by a police officer.\n<\/p>\n
     91. In State of Haryana v Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1)
\n     SCC 335 at 359 : (AIR 1992 SC 604 AT p. 616), this<\/p>\n
     Court to which both of us (Ratnavel Pandian and K.
\n     Jayachandra   Reddy,   JJ.)   were   parties   after   making
\n     reference   to   the   decision   of   the   Privy   Council   in
\n     Emperor   v   Khwaja   Naziar   Ahmad,   AIR   1947   PC   18<\/p>\n
     and the decision of this Court in State of Bihar v J.A.
\n     C. Saldanha, 1967 (3) SCR 668 has pointed out that<\/p>\n
     “…the field of investigation of any cognizable offence is
\n     exclusively   within   the   domain   of   the   investigating
\n     agencies  over  which   the  Courts  cannot  have  control
\n     and   have   no   power   to   stifle   or   impinge   upon   the<\/p>\n
     proceedings   in   the   investigation   so   long   as   the
\n     investigation   proceeds   in   compliance   with   the
\n     provisions relating to investigation ……”\n<\/p>\n
     170. It may not be out of place to state, in this context,
\n     that   there   are   certain   provisions   in   the   Criminal
\n     Procedure   Code   which   authorise   a   police   officer   to
\n     register a case  and investigate  the matter if  there is
\n     any reason to suspect the commission of an offence or<\/p>\n
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\n                                               28<\/span><\/p>\n
               reasonable   suspicion   of   commission   of   any   offence.
\n               Section 157(1) requires an officer in charge of a police<\/p>\n
               station   who   `from   information   received   or   otherwise’
\n               has reason to suspect the commission of an offence –\n<\/p>\n
               that   is   a   cognizable   offence,   he   can   investigate   the
\n               matter   under   S.   156.     The   expression   “reason   to
\n               suspect” as occurring in S. 157(1) is not qualified as in
\n               S. 41(a) and (g) of the Code, wherein the expression<\/p>\n
               “reasonable   suspicion”  is   used.     Therefore,   what   S.
\n               157(1) requires is that the police officer should have
\n               `reason to suspect’ with regard to the commission of
\n               an offence. See Bhajan Lal (AIR 1992 SC 604).”\n<\/p>\n
    19.           The   legislative   scheme   that   is   demonstrated   under<\/p>\n
    different   provisions   of   the   Code   is   to   ensure   fair,   transparent   and<\/p>\n
    expeditious investigation and control in relation to crime.  It has been<\/p>\n
    more than often said that by inquiry, investigation or trial before the<\/p>\n
    Court all concerned are expected to provide expeditious conclusion of<\/p>\n
    such proceedings.  The provisions of Section 129 of the Code and in<\/p>\n
    fact the entire Chapter X provides of maintenance of law and order by<\/p>\n
    the State and its agencies.     The entire emphasis is on maintaining<\/p>\n
    social harmony and provide due protection to the person and property<\/p>\n
    and ensure protection of liberty contemplated under Article 21 of the<\/p>\n
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\n                                              29<\/span><\/p>\n
    Constitution of India.\n<\/p>\n
    20.           Besides the applicability of the concept of proper law and<\/p>\n
    order   and   fair   investigation,   the   scheme   of   the   Code   of   Criminal<\/p>\n
    Procedure   imposes   duties   and   obligations   upon   the   Investigating<\/p>\n
    Officer   as   well   as   the   Courts   while   vesting   them   with   element   of<\/p>\n
    discretion and wide powers of investigation.   In terms of Section 156,<\/p>\n
    the Investigating Officer has a right to investigate cognizable offence<\/p>\n
    without intervention and\/or order of the Court and his investigations<\/p>\n
    on   technical   default   are   even   protected   as   per   the   provisions   of<\/p>\n
    Section 156(2) of the Code.  Liberty and right to life of an individual is<\/p>\n
    required   to   be   protected   as   guaranteed   under   Article   21   of   the<\/p>\n
    Constitution of India  and this takes in its sweep not only the interest<\/p>\n
    of society at large but the rights available to a victim and an accused<\/p>\n
    as well.\n<\/p>\n
    Basic Principles of Interpretation<\/p>\n
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\n                                               30<\/span><\/p>\n
    21.           The principle of interpretation of statute more particularly<\/p>\n
    in a criminal case would depend on its own facts and a close similarity<\/p>\n
    between one case and another is not enough to warrant like treatment<\/p>\n
    because a significant difference may alter the entire aspect.     In the<\/p>\n
    case of Parasa Raja Manikyala Rao. v. State of A.P., AIR<\/a> 2004 SC 132,<\/p>\n
    the Supreme Court said:\n<\/p>\n
               “…..   In   deciding   such   cases,   one   should   avoid   the
\n               temptation to decide cases ( as said by Cordozo) by<\/p>\n
               matching the colour of one case against the colour of
\n               another.  To decide therefore on which side of the line<\/p>\n
               a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is
\n               not at all decisive.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    22.           It   is  well  settled  principle   and  has  been  reiterated  from<\/p>\n
    time to time that the intention of the Legislature must be found by<\/p>\n
    reading the Statute as a whole.   Every clause of Statute should be<\/p>\n
    construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act,<\/p>\n
    so   as,   as   far   as   possible,   to   make   a   consistent   enactment   of   the<\/p>\n
    whole Statute.     As already noticed, penal statute is liable of strict<\/p>\n
    construction and the procedural law,  would be interpreted on  plain<\/p>\n
    reading   and   it   may   not   be   even   necessary   to   refer   to   dictionary<\/p>\n
                                                                ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 13:57:17 :::<\/span>
\n                                             31<\/span><\/p>\n
    meaning   to   find   out   the   general   sense   in   which   that   word   is<\/p>\n
    understood in common parlance.     It will be more so when a plain<\/p>\n
    reading of the provision brings out what was intended.   Statement of<\/p>\n
    Object   and   Reasons   is   permissible   for   understanding   the<\/p>\n
    background,   the   antecedent   of   state   of   affairs   to   know   what   the<\/p>\n
    Legislature   intended   and   what   the   law   sought   to   be   remedied.\n<\/p>\n
    However,   the   doctrine   of   “Contemporanea   exposit   to   est   optima   et<\/p>\n
    fortissimm” is hardly of any help in interpreting a provision of an on-\n<\/p>\n
    going statute like the Criminal Procedure Code.                (See:  Ratanlal &<\/p>\n
    Dhirajlal   on   the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure,   Wadhwa   Publication,<\/p>\n
    Nagpur.) <\/p>\n
    23.          “When the meaning of the word is plain, it is not the duty<\/p>\n
    of the Courts to busy themselves with supposed intentions,” said Lord<\/p>\n
    Atkin speaking for the Privy Council.     It may not be necessary to<\/p>\n
    dwell   on   the   advantage   or   disadvantage   of   applying   the   plain<\/p>\n
    meaning but   in certain situations,   the purpose of the law, what it<\/p>\n
    intended to avoid would certainly be a relevant consideration.     The<\/p>\n
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\n                                                32<\/span><\/p>\n
    rule of hardship may not be of a great relevance either way when the<\/p>\n
    language of the law is unambiguous   and certain.   This has to be<\/p>\n
    normally   examined   in   the   light   of   the   fact   that   to   conduct   a   fair<\/p>\n
    investigation as well as to prove the charges is  ever burdened on the<\/p>\n
    prosecution and the burden does not shift upon the accused under<\/p>\n
    the   Criminal   Jurisprudence.     In  Raghunath   Rai   Bareja   vs   Punjab<\/p>\n
    National Bank,<\/a> (2007) 2 SCC 230, the Supreme Court stated that the<\/p>\n
    departure from the literal rule should be done only in very rare cases<\/p>\n
    and   ordinarily   there   should   be   judicial   restraint   in   this   connection.\n<\/p>\n
    The Supreme Court further said that to adhere as closely as possible<\/p>\n
    to the literal meaning of the words used,   is a cardinal rule.     Even<\/p>\n
    where two rules for construction are possible, the aspect which could<\/p>\n
    be examined under the purposive construction   and mischief rule is<\/p>\n
    that,   what   shall   be   the   law     before   making   of   the   Act,   what   was<\/p>\n
    mischief or defect for which the law did not provide and what is the<\/p>\n
    remedy which that the Act provides must be examined.\n<\/p>\n
    24.           The   distinction   between   the   mandatory   and   directory<\/p>\n
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\n                                                33<\/span><\/p>\n
    provisions is a well accepted norm of interpretation.  The general rule<\/p>\n
    of interpretation would require the word to be given its own meaning<\/p>\n
    and the word `shall’
\n                        would be read as “must” unless it was essential<\/p>\n
    to   read   it   as   “may”   to   achieve   the   ends   of   legislative   intent   and<\/p>\n
    understand the language of the provisions.   It is difficult to lay down<\/p>\n
    any   universal   rule   but   wherever   the   word   `shall’  is   used   in   a<\/p>\n
    substantive statute it normally would indicate mandatory intent of the<\/p>\n
    legislature.  Crawford on Statutory Construction said as under:-\n<\/p>\n
               “The question as to whether a statute is mandatory or
\n               directory   depends   upon   the   intent   of   the   Legislature<\/p>\n
               and   not   upon   the   language   in   which   the   intent   is
\n               clothed.  The meaning and intention of the Legislature<\/p>\n
               must govern, and these are to be ascertained not only
\n               from   the   phraseology   of   the   provision,   but   also   by
\n               considering   its   nature,   its   design,   and   the
\n               consequences   which   would   follow   from   construing   it<\/p>\n
               the one way or the other.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    25.           Thus the word `shall’
\n                                       would normally be mandatory while<\/p>\n
    the word `may’
\n                  would be directory. Consequences of non compliance<\/p>\n
    would   also  be  a  relevant   consideration.     The  word  `shall’ raises  a<\/p>\n
                                                                 ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 13:57:18 :::<\/span>
\n                                                34<\/span><\/p>\n
    presumption that the particular provision is imperative but this prima<\/p>\n
    facie   inference   may   be   rebutted   by   other   considerations   such   as<\/p>\n
    object  and   scope  of  the   enactment  and   the   consequences  flowing<\/p>\n
    from such construction.   Where a statute imposes a public duty and<\/p>\n
    lays down the manner in which and the time within which the duty<\/p>\n
    shall be performed, injustice or inconvenience resulting from a rigid<\/p>\n
    adherence to the statutory prescriptions may not be a relevant factor<\/p>\n
    in   holding   such   prescription   only   directory.       Dealing   with   the<\/p>\n
    provisions relating to criminal law, its purpose is to be borne in mind<\/p>\n
    for its proper interpretation.  It is said that the purpose of criminal law<\/p>\n
    is to permit everyone to go about their daily lives without fear or harm<\/p>\n
    to person or property and it is in the interest of everyone that serious<\/p>\n
    crime should be effectively investigated and prosecuted.  There must<\/p>\n
    be fairness to all sides.  In a criminal case this requires the court to<\/p>\n
    consider   triangulation   of   interests.     It   takes   into   consideration   the<\/p>\n
    position   of   the   accused,   the   victim   and   his   or   her   family,   and   the<\/p>\n
                                 Reference (No.3 of 1999), (2001) 1 All ER
\n    public.   [Attorney General’s<\/p>\n
    577,   p.584   (HL.).  Reference   :  Justice   G.P.   Singh   on   Principles   of<\/p>\n
                                                                  ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 13:57:18 :::<\/span>
\n                                              35<\/span><\/p>\n
    Statutory Interpretation, 11th Edition 2008).\n<\/p>\n
    26.           The basic purpose of interpretation of statute is further to<\/p>\n
    aid   and   apply   in   determining   either   the   general   object   of   the<\/p>\n
    legislation, or the meaning of its language in any particular provision.\n<\/p>\n
    It   is   obvious   that   the   intention   which   appears   to   be   most   in<\/p>\n
    accordance with the convenience, reason, justice and legal principles<\/p>\n
    should, in all cases of doubtful interpretation, be presumed to be the<\/p>\n
    true one.   The intention to produce an unreasonable result is not to<\/p>\n
    be imputed to a statute.     On the other hand, it is not impermissible<\/p>\n
    but rather is acceptable to adopt more reasonable construction and<\/p>\n
    avoid   anomalous   or   unreasonable   construction.   A   sense   of   the<\/p>\n
    possible injustice of an interpretation ought not to induce judges to do<\/p>\n
    violence to well settled rules of construction, but it may properly lead<\/p>\n
    to   the   selection   of   one   rather   than   the   other   of   two   reasonable<\/p>\n
    interpretations.  In former times the statute imposing criminal or other<\/p>\n
    penalties   were   required   to   be   construed   narrowly   in   favour   of   the<\/p>\n
    person proceeded  against and were more rigorously applied.    The<\/p>\n
                                                              ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 13:57:18 :::<\/span>
\n                                              36<\/span><\/p>\n
    Courts were to see whether there appeared any reasonable doubt or<\/p>\n
    ambiguity in construing the relevant provisions.   Right from the case<\/p>\n
    of R. vs Jones, ex p. Daunton, 1963(1) WLR 270, the basic principles<\/p>\n
    are   stated   that   the   statute   dealing   with   the   jurisdiction   and   the<\/p>\n
    procedure are, if they relate to infliction of penalties strictly construed;\n<\/p>\n
    compliance with the procedure will be stringently exacted from those<\/p>\n
    proceeding against the person liable to be penalized and if there is<\/p>\n
    any ambiguity  or  doubt  it   will, as usual,  be resolved in his  favour.\n<\/p>\n
    These principles have been applied with approval by different courts<\/p>\n
    even in India.   Enactments relating to procedure in courts are usually<\/p>\n
    construed as imperative.     A kind of duty is imposed on court or a<\/p>\n
    public officer when no general inconvenience or injustice is caused<\/p>\n
    from  different   construction.     A   provision   of   statute   may  impose   an<\/p>\n
    absolute or qualified duty upon a public officer which itself may be a<\/p>\n
    relevant consideration while understanding the provision itself. (See<\/p>\n
    Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes, Twelfth Edition by P. St. J.\n<\/p>\n
    Langan).\n<\/p>\n
                                                              ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 13:57:18 :::<\/span>
\n                                               37<\/span><\/p>\n
    Reverting back to Criminal Procedure Code<\/p>\n
    27.           In   the   light   of   above   enunciated   principles,   now   let   us<\/p>\n
    revert back to the language of Section 154 and the other provision<\/p>\n
    which would have a bearing on its true construction.   The provisions<\/p>\n
    of Section 154 use a clear language and hardly leave any scope for<\/p>\n
    doubt.     The   moment   information   relating   to   the   commission   of<\/p>\n
    cognizable offence is given to the officer in charge of a Police Station,<\/p>\n
    he “shall reduce the same in writing or cause it to be written under his<\/p>\n
    direction and  shall be signed  by the person giving  information  and<\/p>\n
    entered   in   such   book   which   may   be   prescribed   by   the   State<\/p>\n
    Government in that behalf.”     Thus, this provision casts an absolute<\/p>\n
    obligation upon an officer in charge of a Police Station that wherever<\/p>\n
    information about cognizable offence is brought to his notice, he shall<\/p>\n
    follow the procedure prescribed under Section 154(1).    In the event<\/p>\n
    of default, Section 154(3) provides a remedy to the aggrieved party.\n<\/p>\n
    In  other  words,   the  Legislature  did  contemplate  the  possibility  of  a<\/p>\n
    refusal   to   record   information   of   a   cognizable   offence   by   officer   in<\/p>\n
                                                                ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 13:57:18 :::<\/span>
\n                                              38<\/span><\/p>\n
    charge of a Police Station, and therefore, found a need of spelling out<\/p>\n
    a remedy under Section 154(3).\n<\/p>\n
    28.           A   cognizable   offence   by   its   very   definition   would   be   a<\/p>\n
    serious offence and in fact, an assault on the freedom and liberty of<\/p>\n
    another   individual   as   protected   under   the   basic   rule   of   law.     A<\/p>\n
    cognizable offence would be one where the Investigating Officer can<\/p>\n
    arrest without warrant.  Section 41 specifies when, without order from<\/p>\n
    the Magistrate and without warrant, a person could be arrested who is<\/p>\n
    concerned   in   any   cognizable   offence.       Section   157   is   another<\/p>\n
    important provision, which throws some light on the matters in issue.\n<\/p>\n
    Section   157   of   course   is  preceded   by  Sections   154   to   156  but   its<\/p>\n
    language   does   not   indicate   that   the   procedure   of   investigation<\/p>\n
    indicated in it can be followed only after registration of a case.\n<\/p>\n
    29.           In the case of  Emperor vs Khwaja Nazir,  AIR<\/a> (32) 1945<\/p>\n
    Privy Council 18, it is held that receipt and recording of FIR is not a<\/p>\n
    condition precedent to criminal investigation and police have statutory<\/p>\n
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\n                                               39<\/span><\/p>\n
    right under Section 154 to investigate.   Section 157 requires that if<\/p>\n
    from the information received which may even refer to Section 154 or<\/p>\n
    otherwise,   an   officer   in   charge   of   a   Police   Station   has   reason   to<\/p>\n
    suspect   commission   of   an   offence   which   he   is   empowered   under<\/p>\n
    Section 156 to  investigate after sending  report to  Magistrate  would<\/p>\n
    proceed   to   investigate   personally   or   appoint   his   subordinate   to<\/p>\n
    investigate.  Here the expression `reason to suspect the commission<\/p>\n
    of an offence’  indicates arriving at some kind of satisfaction on the<\/p>\n
    part of the Investigating Officer in regard to commission of an offence,<\/p>\n
    which he is empowered to investigate in terms of Section 156 i.e. a<\/p>\n
    cognizable   offence.       Proviso   (b)   to   Section   157(1)   further   grants<\/p>\n
    some  kind  of  leverage  to   the  Investigating Officer  that  he  may  not<\/p>\n
    enter upon the investigation where there is `no sufficient ground for<\/p>\n
    investigation’.                       Besides submitting the report, he is under<\/p>\n
    obligation   to   notify   the   informant   as   well.     The   report   is   to   be<\/p>\n
    submitted   in   terms   of   Section   158   where   the   Magistrate   can   even<\/p>\n
    direct investigation in terms of powers conferred upon the Magistrate<\/p>\n
    under Section 159. This provision gives some element of discretion to<\/p>\n
                                                                ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 13:57:18 :::<\/span>
\n                                            40<\/span><\/p>\n
    the   Investigating   Officer,   which   he   could   exercise   as   per   the<\/p>\n
    prescribed procedure, in accordance with the law and to have fair play<\/p>\n
    into the investigation.   Abuse of this discretion can lead to a drastic<\/p>\n
    consequences on the entire criminal law.\n<\/p>\n
    30.          The   opening   words   of   Section   157   are   also   of   some<\/p>\n
    significance.  The expression `If” used in “If’
\n                                                   from information received<\/p>\n
    or otherwise, an officer in charge of a police station has reason to<\/p>\n
    suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered under<\/p>\n
    Section 156 to investigate”, is considered it suggests that the power to<\/p>\n
    investigate under Section 157 is dependent upon some satisfaction as<\/p>\n
    indicated  the  word  `if’.    The  expression `if’    has  to be  given  some<\/p>\n
    meaning and reference in the language of Section. This expression<\/p>\n
    will have to be examined in light of the language of Section 154(1) of<\/p>\n
    the Code.\n<\/p>\n
    31           In   the   scheme   of   the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure,   the<\/p>\n
    provisions   of   Section   154   is   a   significant   provision   and   has<\/p>\n
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\n                                              41<\/span><\/p>\n
    considerable impact on administration of criminal justice as well as<\/p>\n
    have substantial effect on the society.    The question, which requires<\/p>\n
    serious consideration, is whether any kind of discretion is available to<\/p>\n
    the officer in charge of a Police Station in terms of Section 154 or he<\/p>\n
    is left with no choice whatever as per the circumstances of the case.\n<\/p>\n
    The   advantages   and   disadvantages   per   se   may   not   be   a   relevant<\/p>\n
    consideration   in   interpretation   of   provisions  of   criminal   law  but   this<\/p>\n
    exemption in the light of object of the statute and provision and its<\/p>\n
    purpose  can  be of  definite  help  in  such  situation.    Experience  has<\/p>\n
    shown and  even  it   is  not  disputed  at  the  bar  during  the  course  of<\/p>\n
    arguments that the abuse of this power either way is not only possible<\/p>\n
    but has actually been seen in practice.   Fear of manipulation  per se<\/p>\n
    cannot be  the basis for enactment  of  a law  and  for that matter  its<\/p>\n
    interpretation. The Court essentially must believe that all the things<\/p>\n
    would be done fairly and as required under the law unless contrary is<\/p>\n
    shown.    Sometimes,   cases   relating   to   cognizable   offence   are<\/p>\n
    registered even if they are patently false, absurd and the credibility<\/p>\n
    and reliability of which is prima facie questionable. They are filed just<\/p>\n
                                                               ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 13:57:18 :::<\/span>
\n                                               42<\/span><\/p>\n
    to   harass   the   party   complained   against   at   the   behest   of   some<\/p>\n
    influential persons.   On the other hand, a genuine complainant who is<\/p>\n
    the real victim of commission of a cognizable offence committed by<\/p>\n
    another is neither attended to nor heard at various police stations and<\/p>\n
    the officer in charge of a Police Station refuses to record any entry of<\/p>\n
    such information, thus leading to consequences which result in not<\/p>\n
    bringing the influential people to the command of law.\n<\/p>\n
    32.           The word `shall’ appearing in Section 154 has to be given<\/p>\n
    its plain and simple meaning as its plain interpretation is neither hit by<\/p>\n
    any   rule   of   great   hardship,   inconvenience   or   ambiguity.   The<\/p>\n
    expression   `shall’   therefore   is   a   mandatory   provision   and   in   no<\/p>\n
    uncertain terms places an absolute duty upon the officer in charge of<\/p>\n
    a Police Station to record information of a cognizable offence in the<\/p>\n
    appropriate book\/books.     No doubt, the words `shall’ and `may’ are<\/p>\n
    interchangeable but in the present case, mandatory interpretation of<\/p>\n
    the word `shall’ can hardly be avoided.  Corollary to the question that<\/p>\n
    follows   is   whether   this   absolute   duty   arising   from   the   word   `shall’<\/p>\n
                                                                ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 13:57:18 :::<\/span>
\n                                              43<\/span><\/p>\n
    specifically or by definite implication puts an absolute prohibition on<\/p>\n
    the police officer in charge of a Police  Station  to do any other act<\/p>\n
    ancillary thereto or otherwise under the Scheme of the Act.\n<\/p>\n
    33.           The   provisions   of   Section   154   are   capable   of   being<\/p>\n
    interpreted   and   given   a   meaning   on   its   plain   interpretation   without<\/p>\n
    harming either doctrine of fair investigation, avoiding adverse effect<\/p>\n
    on the society and ensuring expeditious commencement and disposal<\/p>\n
    of   the   trials   without   exposing   the   complainant   to   the   possible<\/p>\n
    disadvantage for non registration of his complaint.   Once the matter<\/p>\n
    falls   within   the   realm   of   investigation,   it   is   controlled   by   the<\/p>\n
    Investigating   Agency,   normally,   without   interference   of   the   Court.\n<\/p>\n
    The only condition precedent to put the machinery of investigation in<\/p>\n
    motion is  information  of   a  cognizable offence   and\/or  registration  of<\/p>\n
    offence alleged to have been committed which is cognizible.     The<\/p>\n
    investigation includes all proceedings under the Code for collection of<\/p>\n
    evidence conducted by a police officer.  There is no specific provision<\/p>\n
    or   legislative   command   where   pre-investigative   inquiry   is   either<\/p>\n
                                                              ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 13:57:18 :::<\/span>
\n                                             44<\/span><\/p>\n
    specifically permitted or prohibited.   There appears to be nothing in<\/p>\n
    the language of Section 154 of the Code, which debars recourse to<\/p>\n
    pre-registration inquiry howsoever formal it might be, that necessarily<\/p>\n
    may not mean that it specifically permit such an inquiry.  This aspect<\/p>\n
    of the matter, we shall revert back for a detail discussion after noticing<\/p>\n
    the judgments on the subject.\n<\/p>\n
    34.<\/p>\n
                 Lex nil Frustra  jubet – Law commands nothing vainly. As<\/p>\n
    we have discussed above, it is settled rule of construction that every<\/p>\n
    expression   of   word   appearing   in   the   Section   should   be   given   its<\/p>\n
    meaning as legislature uses no word without purpose.\n<\/p>\n
    35.          Section 154 is a provision which deals with the procedure<\/p>\n
    to be adopted and the jurisdiction of a police officer in charge of a<\/p>\n
    police station regarding investigation.  The provisions of Section 154<\/p>\n
    are invocable only when the information is with regard to a cognizable<\/p>\n
    offence.     The   section   imposes   an   absolute   duty   but   with   the<\/p>\n
    qualifications in relation to the commission of a cognizable offence.\n<\/p>\n
                                                             ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 13:57:18 :::<\/span>
\n                                                45<\/span><\/p>\n
    Thus, would it not be required of an investigating officer to ascertain<\/p>\n
    that the information relates to commission of a cognizable offence, as<\/p>\n
    if   the   offence   is   non   cognizable,     the   officer   concerned   has   no<\/p>\n
    jurisdiction   to   take   any   further   steps   in   regard   to   the   investigation<\/p>\n
    without the leave of the Court in accordance with the provisions of<\/p>\n
    Section 155(2) of the Act.\n<\/p>\n
    36. <\/p>\n
                  The consequences of registration of a cognizable offence<\/p>\n
    are apparently of serious nature and they have the effect of one way<\/p>\n
    or the other affecting the freedom of the suspect.  It essentially should<\/p>\n
    be presumed that the Legislature intended to suppress the mischief of<\/p>\n
    abuse of power by the officer in charge of a Police Station in relation<\/p>\n
    to   the   registration   and\/or   non-registration   of   an   FIR   relating   to   a<\/p>\n
    cognizable offence.   The Court has to keep in mind that all the acts<\/p>\n
    are expected to be done fairly and in accordance with the law.  It may<\/p>\n
    not be advisable for the Court to travel into the supposedly “if” and “if<\/p>\n
    not” which are likely to arise from the abuse of power.    No provision<\/p>\n
    can be  made which will apply to all situation. Each situation has to be<\/p>\n
                                                                 ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 13:57:18 :::<\/span>
\n                                                  46<\/span><\/p>\n
    dealt with as and when it arises and that too in accordance with the<\/p>\n
    law.       Section   154   itself   requires   that   the   information   given   and<\/p>\n
    recorded is to be read over to the informant and then it has to be<\/p>\n
    signed by that person giving it and substance thereof is to be entered<\/p>\n
    in   the   relevant   book.     Thus,   on   receipt   of   information   relating   to<\/p>\n
    commission of a cognizable offence, an entry of the substance of the<\/p>\n
    information received should be reduced in writing and be entered into<\/p>\n
    a book.   These acts are to be done by the investigating officer with<\/p>\n
    complete sense of responsibility and he should ensure that no delay<\/p>\n
    occurs in registration of such information and should take necessary<\/p>\n
    steps in accordance with the law. The provisions of the Code relevant<\/p>\n
    in   this   regard   uses   the   word   `forthwith’   i.e.   the   police   officer   is   to<\/p>\n
    inform   the   Magistrate   of   the   competent   jurisdiction   as   well   as   the<\/p>\n
    informant   of   his   decision   to   conduct   investigation   and\/or   not   to<\/p>\n
    conduct an investigation `forthwith’
\n                                       .\n<\/p>\n
    Object of FIR <\/p>\n
                                                                    ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 13:57:18 :::<\/span>
\n                                                47<\/span><\/p>\n
    37.           The   registration   of   information   received   in   a   prescribed<\/p>\n
    book  and  in  the form of  a First Information Report  is the foremost<\/p>\n
    document which marks commencement of investigation of a criminal<\/p>\n
    offence.   In the offence relating to special statutes there could be a<\/p>\n
    preliminary   investigation   while   in   other   kinds   of   offences,   the<\/p>\n
    Investigating  Officer may enter  upon  regular  investigation  upon  the<\/p>\n
    registration of a case. What stepes are to be taken in an investigation<\/p>\n
    were   precisely   stated   by   the   Supreme   Court   in   the   case   of  H.N.\n<\/p>\n
    Risbud   vs   State   of   Delhi,  AIR   1955   SC   196  which   decision   has<\/p>\n
    remained unaltered  till date.\n<\/p>\n
    38.           Another important facet of this discussion is, what is the<\/p>\n
    object of recording the FIR.   The principle object of the FIR from the<\/p>\n
    point of view of the informant is to set the criminal law in motion and<\/p>\n
    from   the   point   of   view   of   the   investigation   authorities   is   to   obtain<\/p>\n
    information about the alleged criminal activity so as to be able to take<\/p>\n
    suitable steps for tracing and bringing to book the guilty party.   The<\/p>\n
                                                                  ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 13:57:18 :::<\/span>
\n                                              48<\/span><\/p>\n
    FIR   does   not   constitute   the   substantive   evidence   though   its<\/p>\n
    importance   as   conveying   the   earliest   information   regarding   the<\/p>\n
    occurence cannot be doubted.     FIR can, however,   be used as a<\/p>\n
    previous statement for the purpose of either corroborating its maker<\/p>\n
    under Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act, or for contradicting him<\/p>\n
    under Section 145 of that Act as held by the Supreme Court in the<\/p>\n
    case of Shaikh Hasib alias Tabarak vs The State of Bihar, (1972) 4 SCC<\/p>\n
    773.        Strictly  speaking,  recording  of  the  FIR is  not  the  condition<\/p>\n
    precedent to set a criminal investigation in motion but it’
\n                                                              s recording is<\/p>\n
    considered   to   be   useful   if   recorded   within   time   and   without   undue<\/p>\n
    delay.\n<\/p>\n
    39.           In  the  case  of  Ravi Kumar v.  State  of Punjab,  (2005) 9<\/p>\n
    SCC   315,  the   Supreme   Court   said   that   the   FIR   is   a   report   giving<\/p>\n
    information of the commission of a cognizable crime which may be<\/p>\n
    made by the complainant or by any other person knowing about the<\/p>\n
    commission of such an offence.  It is intended to set the criminal law<\/p>\n
                                                               ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 13:57:18 :::<\/span>
\n                                               49<\/span><\/p>\n
    in motion.  It is not necessary to give each and every minute details of<\/p>\n
    the   incident   in   FIR.     Its   object   is   to   obtain   earliest   information<\/p>\n
    regarding the circumstances in which the crime was committed.   This<\/p>\n
    anyway puts some light on the purpose  and significance of recording<\/p>\n
    an   information   which   an   informant   comes   to   give   to   the   officer   in<\/p>\n
    charge of a Police Station in terms of Section 154 of the Code.       If<\/p>\n
    certain rights of the complainant are violated, it results in constituting<\/p>\n
    a cognizable offence and thus makes it obligatory for the investigating<\/p>\n
    agency to act in accordance with the law. Every cognizable offence<\/p>\n
    essentially   has   certain   ingredients.       An   information   must   disclose<\/p>\n
    such ingredients.\n<\/p>\n
    Discussion on Precedents relied upon by the parties <\/p>\n
    40.           It will be desirable to discuss the respective dicta of law<\/p>\n
    stated with reference to facts and circumstances of the case in order<\/p>\n
    to consider to what extent the judgments cited by the learned Counsel<\/p>\n
                                                                ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 13:57:18 :::<\/span>
\n                                              50<\/span><\/p>\n
    appearing   for   the   respective   parties   would   operate   as   relevant<\/p>\n
    precedents for answering the legal controversy involved in the cases<\/p>\n
    in   hand.      It   is  always   advisable   that   in   deciding  such   cases,  one<\/p>\n
    should avoid the temptation to decide cases by matching the colour of<\/p>\n
    one  case  against  the  colour  of  another.  Thus,   we  proceed   now  to<\/p>\n
    refer to the judgments cited before us.\n<\/p>\n
    41.<\/p>\n
                  According to the learned Public Prosecutor appearing for<\/p>\n
    the State, there are various judgments of the Supreme Court and of<\/p>\n
    this   Court   as   well   which   have   taken   the   view   that   pre-inquiry   to<\/p>\n
    registration of the FIR is permissible though in exceptional cases and<\/p>\n
    such an inquiry is not prohibited under the provisions of the Code.\n<\/p>\n
    The  scheme of the Code keeps some element of discretion with the<\/p>\n
    investigating officer which itself indicates the need for pre-verification<\/p>\n
    of reliability and credibility of information and at least ensurement of<\/p>\n
    the ingredients which would constitute a cognizable offence within the<\/p>\n
    meaning of the Code.   It is also argued that vesting of such power<\/p>\n
    may   be   essential   in   the   interest   of   proper   regulation   of   criminal<\/p>\n
                                                               ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 13:57:18 :::<\/span>
\n                                            51<\/span><\/p>\n
    investigation which will also help in avoiding absurd result.\n<\/p>\n
    42.          In the case of  State of Uttar Pradesh vs Bhagwant Kishore<\/p>\n
    Joshi,  AIR<\/a> 1964 SC 221, the Supreme Court was concerned with a<\/p>\n
    question under Section 5A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947<\/p>\n
    under  which  investigating   officer   not  below  the   rank  of   the   Deputy<\/p>\n
    Superintendent of Police, who make an inquiry, should take action in<\/p>\n
    furtherance   thereto   only   with   the   previous   permission   of   the<\/p>\n
    Magistrate   to   put   a   statutory   safe-guard.     The   Supreme   Court   in<\/p>\n
    reference to the case where Bhagwant Joshi who was working as a<\/p>\n
    Booking Clerk at Sharanpur was stated to have committed criminal<\/p>\n
    breach of trust in respect of Rs.49\/1\/0-.  The High Court had acquitted<\/p>\n
    the   accused   on   the   ground   that   investigation   made   by   the   Sub-\n<\/p>\n
    Inspector,   Mathura   before   he   obtained   the   permission   of   the<\/p>\n
    Additional District Magistrate vitiated the entire trial.   Explaining the<\/p>\n
    word “investigation” and setting aside the judgment of the High Court<\/p>\n
    in reference to the scope of preliminary inquiry, Mudholkar, J. while<\/p>\n
    concurring with the judgment authored by Subba Rao, J., for himself<\/p>\n
                                                            ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 13:57:18 :::<\/span>
\n                                             52<\/span><\/p>\n
    and Raghubar Dayal, J., held as under :-\n<\/p>\n
             “18. What is investigation is not defined in the Code
\n             of Criminal Procedure; but in (1955) 1 SCR 1150 : ((S)
\n             AIR   1955   SC   196)   this   Court   has   described   the
\n             procedure for investigation as follows :\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                  “Thus, under the Code investigation consists
\n                  generally   of   the   following   steps;   (1)
\n                  Proceeding to the spot, (2) Ascertainment of<\/p>\n
                  the facts and circumstances of the case, (3)
\n                  Discovery   and   arrest   of   the   suspected<\/p>\n
                  offender, (4) Collection of evidence relating to
\n                  the   commission   of   the   offence   which   may<\/p>\n
                  consist   of   (a)   the   examination   of   various
\n                  persons   (including   the   accused)   and   the
\n                  reduction of their statements into writing, if the
\n                  officer   thinks   fit,   (b)   search   of   places   or<\/p>\n
                  seizure of things considered necessary for the
\n                  investigation and to be produced at the trial,<\/p>\n
                  and (5) formation of the opinion as to whether
\n                  on   the   material   collected   there   is   a   case   to
\n                  place the accused before a Magistrate for trial
\n                  and  if   so taking  the  necessary  steps  for the<\/p>\n
                  same by the filing of a charge-sheet under S.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                  173.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<\/blockquote>\n
             This   Court,   however,   has   not   said   that   if   a   police
\n             officer takes merely one or two of the steps indicated
\n             by it, what he has done must necessarily be regarded
\n             as   investigation.     Investigation,   in   substance,  means
\n             collection of evidence relating to the commission of the<\/p>\n
                                                              ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 13:57:19 :::<\/span>
\n                                      53<\/span><\/p>\n
     offence.  The Investigating Officer is, for this purpose,
\n     entitled   to   question  persons  who,  in   his  opinion,  are<\/p>\n
     able   to   throw   light   on   the   offence   which   has   been
\n     committed   and   is   likewise   entitled   to   question   the<\/p>\n
     suspect   and   is   entitled   to   reduce   the   statements   of
\n     persons   questioned   by   him   to   writing.     He   is   also
\n     entitled   to   search   the   place   of   the   offence   and   to
\n     search other places, with the object of seizing articles<\/p>\n
     connected with the offence.  No doubt, for this purpose
\n     he has to proceed to the spot where the offence was
\n     committed and do various other things.   But the main
\n     object of investigation being to bring home the offence<\/p>\n
     to the offender the essential part of the duties of an
\n     Investigating  Officer   in  this  connection is,   apart  from<\/p>\n
     arresting the offender, to collect all material necessary
\n     for   establishing   the   accusation   against   the   offender.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     Merely   making   some   preliminary   enquiries   upon
\n     receipt of information from an anonymous source or a
\n     source   of   doubtful   reliability   for   checking   up   the
\n     correctness   of   the   information   does   not   amount   to<\/p>\n
     collection of evidence and so cannot be regarded as
\n     investigation.  In the absence of any prohibition in the<\/p>\n
     Code,   express   or   implied,   I   am   of   opinion   that   it   is
\n     open to a Police Officer to make preliminary enquiries
\n     before registering an offence and making a full scale
\n     investigation into it.  No doubt, S. 5A of the Prevention<\/p>\n
     of   Corruption   Act   was   enacted   for   preventing
\n     harassment   to   a   Government   servant   and   with   this
\n     object in view investigation, except with the previous
\n     permission   of   a   Magistrate,   is   not   permitted   to   be<\/p>\n
     made   by   an   officer   below   the   rank   of   a   Deputy
\n     Superintendent   of   Police.  Where,   however,   a   Police
\n     Officer   makes   some   preliminary   enquiries,   does   not
\n     arrest   or   even  question   an  accused  or   question   any
\n     witness but merely makes a few discreet enquiries or<\/p>\n
                                                        ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 13:57:19 :::<\/span>
\n                                    54<\/span><\/p>\n
     looks at some documents without making any notes, it
\n     is difficult to visualise how any possible harassment or<\/p>\n
     even   embarrassment   would   result   therefrom   to   the
\n     suspect or the accused person.   If no harassment to<\/p>\n
     the accused results from the action of a Police Officer
\n     how can it be said to defeat the purpose underlying S.
\n     5A ?   Looking at the matter this way, I hold that what
\n     Mathur   did   was   something   very   much   short   of<\/p>\n
     investigation   and,   therefore,   the   provisions   of   S.   5A
\n     were not violated.  Since no irregularity was committed
\n     by him there is no occasion to invoke the aid of the
\n     curative provisions of the Code.”\n<\/p>\n
                        ig                      (Emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
     21. …..”Even   so   the   said   police   officer   received   a
\n     detailed   information   of   the   offences   alleged   to   have
\n     been   committed   by   the   accused   with   necessary
\n     particulars,   proceeded   to   the   spot   of   the   offence,<\/p>\n
     ascertained   the   relevant   facts   by   going   through   the
\n     railway   records   and   submitted   a   report   of   the   said<\/p>\n
     acts.  The said acts constituted an investigation within
\n     the   meaning   of   the   definition   of   investigation   under
\n     Section   4(1)   of   the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure   as
\n     explained by this Court.   The decisions cited by the<\/p>\n
     learned   counsel   for   the   State   in   support   of   his
\n     contention   that   there   was   no   investigation   in   the
\n     present case are rather wide off  the mark.   In In re
\n     Nanumuri Annadayya a Division Bench of the Madras<\/p>\n
     High Court held that an informal enquiry on the basis
\n     of   a   vague   telegram  was  not  an  investigation  within
\n     the meaning of Section 157 of the Code of Criminal
\n     Procedure.    In In re Rangarujulu, Ramaswami, J.  of
\n     the Madras High Court described the following three<\/p>\n
                                                    ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 13:57:19 :::<\/span>
\n                                         55<\/span><\/p>\n
          stages a policeman has to pass in a conspiracy case :\n<\/p>\n
                  “….   hears   something   of   interest   affecting   the
\n          public security and which puts him on the alert; makes<\/p>\n
          discreet   enquiries,   takes   soundings   and   sets   up
\n          informants and is in the second stage of  qui vive  or
\n          lookout;   and   finally   gathers   sufficient   information
\n          enabling him to bite upon something definite and that<\/p>\n
          is   the   stage   when   first   information   is   recorded   and
\n          when investigation starts.”\n<\/p>\n
          This   graphic   description   of   the   stages   is   only   a<\/p>\n
          restatement of the principle that a vague information
\n          or   an   irresponsible   rumour   would   not   in   itself<\/p>\n
          constitute   information   within   the   meaning   of   Section
\n          154 of the Code or the basis for an investigation under<\/p>\n
          Section 157 thereof.  In State of Kerala v M.J. Samuel
\n          a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court ruled that, it can
\n          be   stated   as   a  general  principle   that  it  is  not   every
\n          piece   of   information   however   vague,   indefinite   and<\/p>\n
          unauthenticated it may be that should be recorded as
\n          the   first   information   for   the   sole   reason   that   such<\/p>\n
          information   was   the   first,   in   point   of   time,   to   be
\n          received by the police regarding the commission of an
\n          offence.   The   Full   Bench   also   took   care   to   make   it
\n          clear that whether or not a statement would constitute<\/p>\n
          the first information report in a case is a question of
\n          fact and would depend upon the circumstances of that
\n          case….”\n<\/p>\n
    43.     In the case of  P. Sirajuddin, etc. vs State of Madras, etc.,<\/p>\n
                                                          ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 13:57:19 :::<\/span>
\n                                               56<\/span><\/p>\n
    1970 (1) SCC 595, the Supreme  Court  while  again dealing with a<\/p>\n
    case relating to an offence under Sections 161 and 165 of the Indian<\/p>\n
    Penal   Code   and   Sections   5(1)   (a)   and   (d)   of   the   Prevention   of<\/p>\n
    Corruption Act in relation to the appellant who was stated to be Chief<\/p>\n
    Engineer in the Highways and Rural Works, Madras observed that the<\/p>\n
    provisions of the Code are aimed at securing a fair investigation into<\/p>\n
    the facts and circumstances of the criminal case, however, serious a<\/p>\n
    crime and however incriminating the circumstances may be against<\/p>\n
    the person supposed to be guilty of a crime.  The aim of the Code is<\/p>\n
    to secure conviction if it can be had by use of utmost fairness on the<\/p>\n
    part   of   the   officer   investigating   into   crime   before   lodging   a   charge<\/p>\n
    sheet.  The purpose is to avoid undue and unwarranted harassment.\n<\/p>\n
    The Court held as under :-\n<\/p>\n
               “19. All the above provisions of the Code are aimed
\n               at   securing   a   fair   investigation   into   the   facts   and
\n               circumstances of the criminal case, however, serious
\n               the   crime   and   however   incriminating   the
\n               circumstances may be against a person supposed to<\/p>\n
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\n                                               57<\/span><\/p>\n
               be   guilty   of   a   crime   of   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure
\n               aims at securing a conviction if it can be had by the<\/p>\n
               use   of   utmost   fairness   on   the   part   of   the   officers
\n               investigating   into   the   crime   before   the   lodging   of   a<\/p>\n
               charge-sheet. Clearly the idea is that no one should
\n               be   put   to   the   harassment   of   a   criminal   trial   unless
\n               there are good and substantial reasons for holding it.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    44.           In the famous case of  Ch. Bhajan Lal  (State of Haryana<\/p>\n
    and   others   vs   Ch.   Bhajan   Lal   and   others<\/a>,  AIR   1992   SC   604,   the<\/p>\n
    Supreme Court laid down principles relating to inquiry, investigation<\/p>\n
    as well as quashing of a FIR in some elaboration.   In this case also,<\/p>\n
    the Court was concerned with a complaint relating to commission of<\/p>\n
    offence under Section 5(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.  While<\/p>\n
    stating the principle that in a cognizable offence, the powers of the<\/p>\n
    investigating officer under Section 157 of Chapter XII are unfettered,<\/p>\n
    the Court cautioned that it should be exercised in strict compliance<\/p>\n
    with the provisions of the Chapter.   The primary question before the<\/p>\n
    Court was in relation to exercise of inherent powers under Section<\/p>\n
    482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in relation to quashing the first<\/p>\n
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\n                                                 58<\/span><\/p>\n
    information   report   and   holding   the   same   as   not   justified,   Their<\/p>\n
    Lordships also laid down guidelines in relation to the powers of the<\/p>\n
    investigating   officer   and   the   officer   in   charge   of   a   police   station   in<\/p>\n
    terms of Section 154(1) of the Code.       The view expressed by the<\/p>\n
    Bench on this aspect of the matter which is relied upon by the learned<\/p>\n
    Counsel appearing for the State is summed up in paragraphs 79 to 82<\/p>\n
    of the judgment, which reads as under :-\n<\/p>\n
                “79. The   gravaman   of   the   accusation   is   that   Ch.<\/p>\n
                Bhajan Lal has amassed huge assets by misusing his
\n                ministerial  authority  earlier  to  1986 which  assets  are
\n                disproportionate   to   his   known   and   licit   sources   of<\/p>\n
                income.  It has been repeatedly pointed out that mere
\n                possession of any pecuniary resources or property is<\/p>\n
                by   itself   not   an   offence,   but   it   is   the   failure   to
\n                satisfactorily account for such possession of pecuniary
\n                resources   or   property   that   makes   the   possession
\n                objectionable  and   constitutes   the   offences   within   the<\/p>\n
                ambit of Sec. 5(1)(e) of the Act.   Therefore, a police
\n                officer with whom an investigation of an offence under
\n                Section   5(1)(e)   of   the   Act   is   entrusted   should   not
\n                proceed   with   a   pre-conceived   idea   of   guilt   of   that<\/p>\n
                person indicted with such offence and subject him to
\n                any   harassment   and   victimisation,   because   in   such
\n                offence   and   subject   him   to   any   harasment   and
\n                victimisation, because in case the allegations of illegal
\n                accumulation of wealth are found during the course of<\/p>\n
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\n                                     59<\/span><\/p>\n
     investigation as baseless, the harm done not only to
\n     that   person   but   also   to   the   office,   he   held   will   be<\/p>\n
     incalculable and inestimable.\n<\/p>\n
     80. In this connection it will be appropriate to recall
\n     the views expressed by Mitter, J. in Sirajuddin v. State
\n     of Madras (1970) 3 SCR 931 : (AIR 1971 SC 520) in
\n     the following words (at p. 526 of AIR) :\n<\/p>\n
          ”      Before a public servant, whatever be his
\n          status,   is   publicly   charged   with   acts   of
\n          dishonesty   which   amount   to   serious<\/p>\n
          misdemeanour   or   misconduct   of   the   type
\n          alleged in this case and a first information is<\/p>\n
          lodged   against   him,   there   must   be   some
\n          suitable   preliminary   enquiry   into   the<\/p>\n
          allegations   by   a   responsible   officer.     The
\n          lodging   of   such   a   report   against   a   person
\n          specially one who like the appellant occupied
\n          the   top   position   in   a   department,   even   if<\/p>\n
          baseless, would do incalculable harm not only
\n          to   the   officer   in   particular   but   to   the<\/p>\n
          department   he   belonged   to,   in   general   …..\n<\/p>\n
          The means adopted no less than the end to
\n          be achieved must be impeccable.”\n<\/p>\n
     81. Mudholkar, J. in a separate judgment in State of
\n     Uttar   Pradesh   v.   Bhagwant   Kishore   Joshi<\/a>   (1964)   3
\n     SCR 71 at p. 86: (AIR 1964 SC 221 at p. 227) while<\/p>\n
     agreeing with the conclusion of Subba Rao, J. (as he
\n     then was) has expressed his opinion stating :\n<\/p>\n
          “In   the   absence   of   any   prohibition   in   the
\n          Code, express or implied, I am of opinion that<\/p>\n
                                                       ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 13:57:19 :::<\/span>
\n                                            60<\/span><\/p>\n
                   it   is   open   to   a   police   officer   to   make
\n                   preliminary   enquiries   before   registering   an<\/p>\n
                   offence and making a full scale investigation
\n                   into it.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
              82. We are in agreement with the views expressed
\n              by   Mitter,   J.   and   Mudholkar,   J.   in   the   above   two
\n              decisions.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    45.          It can also be usefully noticed at this stage itself that a<\/p>\n
    Division   Bench   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of  Dnyandeo   Krishna<\/p>\n
    Chaudhary and another vs State of Maharashtra and  others, 1999 (2)<\/p>\n
    Mh. L. J. 134,  had also taken the view that where the report discloses<\/p>\n
    cognizable offence, police must register the crime and proceed further<\/p>\n
    as per the provisions of the Act and had relied on the case of Bhajan<\/p>\n
    Lal (supra) and issued certain directions as police had not registered<\/p>\n
    the case.\n<\/p>\n
    46.          Another   case   which   expanded   the   principle   of   criminal<\/p>\n
    jurisprudence and referred to the scope of an inquiry and investigation<\/p>\n
                                                            ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 13:57:19 :::<\/span>
\n                                             61<\/span><\/p>\n
    as contemplated under the provisions of the Code is Jacob Mathew vs<\/p>\n
    State of Punjab and<\/a> another,  (2005) 6 SCC 1, where a case against<\/p>\n
    the Appellant was registered under Section 304A of the Indian Penal<\/p>\n
    Code for causing death due to negligence by administering medicine<\/p>\n
    of which knowledge was not possessed by the Doctor.  Emphasizing<\/p>\n
    the   need   for   a   proper   investigation   and   even   conducting   of   a<\/p>\n
    preliminary inquiry prior to registration of a case against the Doctors<\/p>\n
    charged with such offences, the Court held as under :-\n<\/p>\n
              “52.  Statutory   rules   or   executive   instructions
\n              incorporating certain guidelines need to be framed and<\/p>\n
              issued by   the  Government  of  India  and\/or  the  State
\n              Government in consultation with the Medical Council<\/p>\n
              of India. So long as it is not done, we propose to lay
\n              down   certain   guidelines   for   the   future   which   should
\n              govern   the   prosecution   of   doctors   for   offences   of
\n              which criminal rashness or criminal negligence is an<\/p>\n
              ingredient.     A   private   complaint   may   not   be
\n              entertained   unless   the   complainant   has   produced
\n              prima facie evidence before the Court in the form of a
\n              credible opinion given by another competent doctor to<\/p>\n
              support the charge of rashness or negligence on the
\n              part   of   the   accused   doctor.   The   investigating   officer
\n              should, before proceeding against the doctor accused
\n              of   rash   or   negligent   act   or   omission,   obtain   an
\n              independent   and   competent   medical   opinion<\/p>\n
                                                             ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 13:57:19 :::<\/span>
\n                                             62<\/span><\/p>\n
               preferably   from   a   doctor   in   government   service,
\n               qualified  in  that  branch of  medical practice who can<\/p>\n
               normally   be   expected   to   give   an   impartial   and
\n               unbiased opinion applying the  Bolam  test to the facts<\/p>\n
               collected   in   the   investigation.   A   doctor   accused   of
\n               rashness   or   negligence,   may   not   be   arrested   in   a
\n               routine  manner  (simply  because  a  charge  has  been
\n               levelled against him).   Unless his arrest is necessary<\/p>\n
               for   furthering   the   investigation   or   for   collecting
\n               evidence   or   unless   the   investigating   officer   feels
\n               satisfied that the doctor proceeded against would not
\n               make himself available to face the prosecution unless<\/p>\n
               arrested, the arrest may be withheld.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    47.          In the case of Shashikant vs Central Bureau of Investigation<\/p>\n
    and others<\/a>, JT 2006 (9) SC 603, the appellant claimed himself to be a<\/p>\n
    vigilant employee and made an anonymous complaint to the Central<\/p>\n
    Bureau   of   Investigation   alleging   corrupt   practices   and   financial<\/p>\n
    irregularities   on   the   part   of   some   officers   of   his   Department.   A<\/p>\n
    preliminary   inquiry   was   conducted,   statements   of   various   persons<\/p>\n
    were recorded and then a case was registered. After registration of<\/p>\n
    the first information report, recommendations were made for holding<\/p>\n
    departmental proceedings against the concerned officers. The Court<\/p>\n
    while approving conducting of a preliminary inquiry and referring to<\/p>\n
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\n                                             63<\/span><\/p>\n
    the   Central   Bureau   of   Investigation   Manual   which   provides   for   a<\/p>\n
    preliminary inquiry in terms of paragraph 9.1 of the CBI Manual, made<\/p>\n
    out a distinction between a preliminary inquiry and regular case.   In<\/p>\n
    this context, the Court held as under :-\n<\/p>\n
              “19. Although ordinarily in terms of Section 154 of the
\n              Code,   when   a   report   is   received   relating   to   the<\/p>\n
              cognizable offence, a First Information Report should
\n              be   lodged,   to   carry   out   a   preliminary   inquiry   even<\/p>\n
              under the Code is not unknown.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
              20. When an anonymous complaint is received, no
\n              investigating officer would initiate investigative process
\n              immediately thereupon.  It may for good reasons carry
\n              out   a   preliminary   enquiry   to   find   out   the   truth   or<\/p>\n
              otherwise of the allegations contained therein.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                            …..         …..          …..\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
              25.  Only   an   anonymous   complaint   was   made   in<\/p>\n
              June 2004.  Evidently it was within the province of the
\n              first   respondent   to   commence   a   preliminary   inquiry.
\n              The   procedure   laid   down   in   the   CBI   Manual   and   in
\n              particular   when   it   was   required   to   inquire   into   the<\/p>\n
              allegation of the corruption on the part of some public
\n              servants,   recourse   to   the   provisions   of   the   Manual
\n              cannot be said to be unfair.  It did not find any reason
\n              to convert the preliminary inquiry into a regular case.
\n              Pursuant to or in furtherance of the recommendation<\/p>\n
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\n                                               64<\/span><\/p>\n
               made by the first respondent, which had received the
\n               imprimatur   by   the   Central   Vigilance   Commssion,<\/p>\n
               departmental proceedings were initiated.  The Central
\n               Vigilance   Commission   advised  the  Railway  Board  to<\/p>\n
               initiate   minor   penalty   proceedings   against   the
\n               delinquent officers by a letter dated 4-8-2005.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    48.           The view taken by the Supreme Court in Shashikant’s case<\/p>\n
    (supra) was reiterated with greatest significance by equi bench of the<\/p>\n
    Supreme Court in Rajinder Singh Katoch v.  Chandigarh Admn. & Ors.,<\/a><\/p>\n
    (2007) 10 SCC 69 where the Court was concerned with the allegation<\/p>\n
    of   wrongful   restraint   by   co-sharer   under   Section   339   of   the   Indian<\/p>\n
    Penal   Code.     Defining   the   limitation   of   the   said   provision   and   its<\/p>\n
    applicability to the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court also<\/p>\n
    dwelt upon the scope of Sections 154, 156 and 157 of the Code of<\/p>\n
    Criminal Procedure. The Supreme Court after noticing the judgment<\/p>\n
                    s case (supra), held as under:\n<\/p>\n
    in Ramesh Kumari’<\/p>\n
               “8. Although the officer  in charge of a police station
\n               is legally bound to register a first information report in
\n               terms   of   Section   154   of   the   Code   of   Criminal<\/p>\n
                                                                ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 13:57:19 :::<\/span>
\n                                     65<\/span><\/p>\n
     Procedure, if the allegations made by them give rise to
\n     an offence which can be investigated without obtaining<\/p>\n
     any   permission   from   the   Magistrate   concerned,   the
\n     same by itself, however, does not take away the right<\/p>\n
     of the competent officer to make a preliminary enquiry,
\n     in a given case, in order to find out as to whether the
\n     first   information   sought   to   be   lodged   had   any
\n     substance   or   not.     In   this   case,   the   authorities   had<\/p>\n
     made   investigations   into   the   matter.     In   fact,   the
\n     Superintendent of Police himself has, pursuant to the
\n     directions issued by the High Court, investigated into
\n     the matter and visited the spot in order to find out the<\/p>\n
     truth   in   the   complaint   of   the   petitioner   from   the
\n     neighbours.  It was found that the complaint made by<\/p>\n
     the appellant was false and the same had been filed
\n     with an ulterior motive to take illegal possession of the<\/p>\n
     first floor of the house.\n<\/p>\n
     9.    Ms   Madan   contended   that   the   right   of   the
\n     appellant   to   live   in   the   joint   family   cannot   be   taken<\/p>\n
     away.   Right  of  a co-sharer  to enjoy  the joint  family
\n     property is a civil right.  Such a right, if denied by the<\/p>\n
     other co-sharers for one reason or the other, must be
\n     enforced by taking recourse to the remedies available
\n     under the civil laws.\n<\/p>\n
     10. Criminal proceedings, in our opinion, cannot be
\n     taken recourse to for enforcing such a civil right.   In
\n     any   event,   in   a   case   of   this   nature   where   the
\n     authorities bound by law have already investigated into<\/p>\n
     the matter and found that the allegations made by the
\n     appellant   against   Respondent   4   were   not   correct,   it
\n     would not  be proper  for  us to  issue  any direction to
\n     Respondents 1 to 3 to lodge a first information report.\n<\/p>\n
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\n                                               66<\/span><\/p>\n
               11. We are not oblivious to the decision of this Court<\/p>\n
               in Ramesh Kumari v. State (NCT of Delhi ) wherein
\n               such   a   statutory   duty   has   been   found   in   the   police<\/p>\n
               officer.     But,   as   indicated   hereinbefore,   in   an
\n               appropriate case, the police officers also have a duty
\n               to make a preliminary enquiry so as to find out as to
\n               whether allegations made had any substance or not.\n<\/p>\n
    49.           Taking cue from either of the above referred judgments<\/p>\n
    and within the scope of the principles enunciated in those judgments,<\/p>\n
    different benches of this Court also took somewhat similar view.  The<\/p>\n
    Division Bench of this Court in the case of Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.\n<\/p>\n
    v. Nobiletto  Finlease and Investment Pvt. Ltd.,  2005(3) Mh.L.J. 512,<\/p>\n
    primarily   on   the   first   principle,   of   course  while   concerning   with   the<\/p>\n
    case instituted upon a private complaint in terms of Section 200 of the<\/p>\n
    Code of Criminal Procedure for an offence under Section 406 of the<\/p>\n
    IPC   and   referring   to   Rule   113(12)   of   the   Bombay   Police   Manual,<\/p>\n
    1959, held that,  holding preliminary inquiry even prior to recording of<\/p>\n
    F.I. R.  in terms of Section 154 was not impermissible and in fact in a<\/p>\n
    given   case,   such   an   inquiry   would   be   necessary.     The   Bench<\/p>\n
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\n                                              67<\/span><\/p>\n
    expressed   the   view   that   the   F.I.   R.   would   have   to   be   registered<\/p>\n
    wherever  it   makes   out  cognizable  offence,   but  in   cases  where   the<\/p>\n
    accusations made in the complaint are doubtful, certainly the police<\/p>\n
    authorities   can   inquire   as   to   whether   the   accusations    prima   facie<\/p>\n
    appear to be disclosing a cognizable offence but in no case the police<\/p>\n
    authority can be permitted to say that it would not make any record in<\/p>\n
    relation to such an inquiry or the steps taken by them in relation to the<\/p>\n
    preliminary inquiry in the station diary.\n<\/p>\n
    50.           Another Bench of this Court in its judgment delivered on<\/p>\n
    2nd November, 2007 in Criminal Writ Petition No.89 of 2007  (Kalpana<\/p>\n
    Kutty v. State of Maharashtra), while dealing with the provisions under<\/p>\n
    Section 51 of the Copyright Act, it  being a cognizable offence and<\/p>\n
    while   dealing   with   the   grievance   of   the   petitioner   in   the   petition<\/p>\n
    regarding non-registration of FIR,   after referring to the judgment of<\/p>\n
    the Supreme Court in the above referred cases as well as in Ramesh<\/p>\n
    Kumari’s   case   (supra),    concurred   with   the   view   expressed   in   the<\/p>\n
    judgment in  Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited’s case   (supra),   and held<\/p>\n
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\n                                               68<\/span><\/p>\n
    that if a complaint appears to be in need of further inquiry to ascertain<\/p>\n
    whether   cognizable   offence   is   disclosed   or   not,   preliminary   inquiry<\/p>\n
    can  be   conducted  before  taking   a   decision   whether  to  register  the<\/p>\n
    offence or not.   Prior to the judgment in Kalpana Kutty’s case (supra),<\/p>\n
    the   judgment,   which   has   given   rise   to   the   present   reference   in<\/p>\n
    Shyamsundar   Agarwal’s   case   (supra),  came   to   be   delivered   on   30th<\/p>\n
    April,   2007.     The   Court   did   refer   to   the   various   judgments   of   the<\/p>\n
    Supreme   Court   including   the   judgment   in  Lallan   Choudhary’s  case<\/p>\n
    (supra),  and   Ramesh   Kumari’s  case   (supra)  and   after   a   detail<\/p>\n
    discussion, the Bench concluded as under:-\n<\/p>\n
               “57. From   the   above   discussion,   the   following
\n               conclusions   emerge,   which   answer   the   questions
\n               raised before us.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                     (a) When   an   information   relating   to   the
\n                         commission   of   a   cognizable   offence   is
\n                         received   by   an   officer   in   charge   of   a   police
\n                         station, he has to register a FIR as required<\/p>\n
                         by   section   154(1)   of   the   Code.     If   the
\n                         information   discloses   a   cognizable   offence,
\n                         FIR must be registered.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                     (b) If the information received does not disclose a<\/p>\n
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\n                               69<\/span><\/p>\n
           cognizable offence but indicates the necessity
\n           for further inquiry, preliminary inquiry may be<\/p>\n
           conducted   to   ascertain   whether   cognizable
\n           offence is disclosed or not.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (c)   Where the source of information is of doubtful
\n           reliability   i.e.   an   anonymous   complaint,   the
\n           officer-in-charge   of   the   police   station   may<\/p>\n
           conduct a preliminary inquiry to ascertain the
\n           correctness of the information.\n<\/p>\n
     (d) If his inquiry discloses cognizable offence, he<\/p>\n
         must   register   FIR.     If   it   does   not,   he   must
\n         accordingly inform the superior officer and the<\/p>\n
         superior   officer   shall   communicate   the
\n         decision to the complainant.\n<\/p>\n
     (e) Preliminary   inquiry   has   to   be   done   having
\n         regard to Rule 113(12) of the Bombay Police
\n         Manual and all the steps taken by the police<\/p>\n
         officer while conducting the preliminary inquiry
\n         must be reflected in the station diary.\n<\/p>\n
     (f)   Preliminary   inquiry   must   be   expeditious   and
\n           as far as possible it must be discreet.\n<\/p>\n
     (g) Before   a   public   servant   is   publicly   charged
\n         with   acts   of   dishonesty   which   amount   to
\n         serious   misdemeanour   or   misconduct   and   a
\n         FIR   is   lodged   against   him,   there   must   be<\/p>\n
         some   suitable   preliminary   enquiry   into   the
\n         allegations,   by   a   responsible   officer.     But
\n         preliminary   enquiry   is   not   restricted   only   to
\n         cases where the accused are public servants
\n         or   doctors   or   professionals   holding   top<\/p>\n
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\n                              70<\/span><\/p>\n
           positions.     As   to   in   which   case   preliminary
\n           inquiry is necessary will depend on facts and<\/p>\n
           circumstances of each case.\n<\/p>\n
     (h) As to what type of preliminary inquiry is to be
\n         conducted   will   depend   on   the   facts   and
\n         circumstances of each case.\n<\/p>\n
     (i)   Observations of this court in Kotak Mahindra’ s
\n           [2005 ALL MR (Cri) 1983] (supra),  cover the
\n           procedure   and   modalities   of   preliminary
\n           inquiry which will have to be followed by the<\/p>\n
           police officer.\n<\/p>\n
           It is only in cases where cognizable offence is
\n           not   disclosed   and   there   is   need   to   conduct<\/p>\n
           further inquiry to ascertain whether cognizable
\n           offence   is   disclosed   or   not   that   the   police
\n           officer can conduct preliminary inquiry and not
\n           in all cases.   The police officer cannot avoid<\/p>\n
           his   duty   of   registering   offence   if   cognizable
\n           offence is disclosed.   Action may have to be<\/p>\n
           taken against an erring officer who   does not
\n           register the FIR if information received by him
\n           discloses cognizable offence.\n<\/p>\n
     (k) Whether   a   writ   petition   under   Article   226   of
\n         the   Constitution   of   India   or   a   petition   under
\n         section   482   of   the   Code   filed   by   a   person
\n         making a grievance that though the complaint<\/p>\n
         filed   by   him   discloses   a   cognizable   offence,
\n         the police have not registered offence, should
\n         be entertained by this court or not will depend
\n         on facts and circumstances of each case.\n<\/p>\n
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\n                                             71<\/span><\/p>\n
                    (l)   Ordinarily,   aggrieved   person   should   be
\n                          relegated to the alternative remedy of filing a<\/p>\n
                          private complaint.\n<\/p>\n
                    (m) However,   in   gross   cases   of   grave   injustice,
\n                        such   petitions   can   be   entertained   by   this
\n                        court.     Such   cases   would   obviously   be<\/p>\n
                        exceptional.”\n<\/p>\n
    51.           The decision of the Division Bench in Kalpana Kutty’s case<\/p>\n
    (supra) refers to similar analysis and conclusions as in Shyamsundar<\/p>\n
    Agarwal’s
\n             case (supra).   The Bench which dealt with the case in hand<\/p>\n
    had formed an opinion with reference to the clauses (b) and (c) of<\/p>\n
    paragraph   57   of  Shyasmsundar’
\n                                     s   judgment   (supra)   and  even   other<\/p>\n
    clauses   that   the   law   was   not   correctly   stated   in   these   judgments<\/p>\n
    particularly   keeping   in   mind   the   principles   stated   in  Prakash   Singh<\/p>\n
    Badal’s  case   (supra)   and   found   that   the   clauses   particularly   the<\/p>\n
    clauses (b) to (f) were not contemplated in law and thus felt compelled<\/p>\n
    to make a reference to a larger bench.\n<\/p>\n
    52.           Now we may proceed to examine the view expressed by<\/p>\n
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\n                                               72<\/span><\/p>\n
    the Supreme Court in some other cases.  At the very outset, we may<\/p>\n
    notice that none of these judgments or legislative interpretation even<\/p>\n
    prohibit   or   take   the   view   that   preliminary   inquiry   pre-registration   is<\/p>\n
    impermissible in law.\n<\/p>\n
    53.           The learned Counsel appearing for the State while relying<\/p>\n
    upon paragraph 80 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in  Bhajan<\/p>\n
    Lal’s  case   (supra)   contended   that   the   preliminary   inquiry   pre-\n<\/p>\n
    registration to FIR is permissible and the principle enunciated by the<\/p>\n
    Supreme   Court   in  Bhagwant   K.   Joshi’
\n                                               s   case   (supra)   has   been<\/p>\n
    reiterated by the Supreme Court with approval.  While arguing to the<\/p>\n
    contrary, the learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent placed<\/p>\n
    heavy reliance upon paragraphs 27 to 32 of the judgment to argue<\/p>\n
    that   the   use   of   the   words   `no   other   option   except   to   enter   the<\/p>\n
    substance thereof in the prescribed form’ clearly mandates that the<\/p>\n
    reasonableness or credibility of the information cannot be examined<\/p>\n
    by  the  officer   in  charge   of   a   police   station   and  should  register   the<\/p>\n
    information immediately.   In order to place these contentions in their<\/p>\n
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\n                                          73<\/span><\/p>\n
    correct perspective, it will be useful to reproduce the above referred<\/p>\n
    paragraphs relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Respondent.\n<\/p>\n
    The said paragraphs read as under :-\n<\/p>\n
             “27. Before   discussing   which   of   the   submissions
\n             ought to prevail, we shall in the foremost deal with the<\/p>\n
             legal   principles   governing   the   registration   of   a
\n             cognizable   offence   and   the   investigation   arising
\n             thereon.   Section   154(1)   is   the   relevant   provision
\n             regarding the registration of a cognizable offence and<\/p>\n
             that provision reads as follows:-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                       “Every information relating to the commission
\n             of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer in<\/p>\n
             charge of a police station, shall be reduced to writing
\n             by him or under his direction, and be read over to the
\n             informant; and every such information, whether given
\n             in writing or reduced to writing or reduced to writing as<\/p>\n
             aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it, and
\n             the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be<\/p>\n
             kept   by   such   officer   in   such   form   as   the   State
\n             Government may prescribe in this behalf.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
             28.       The   above   sub-section   corresponds   to<\/p>\n
             Section 154 of the Old Code (Act of 1955) and also to
\n             Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1882
\n             (Act X of 1882) except for the slight variation in that
\n             expression`local Government’ had been used in 1882<\/p>\n
             in the place of `State Government’        .   Presently, on the
\n             recommendations   of   the   41   Report   of   the   Law
\n                                                 st<\/p>\n
             Commission, the sub-sections (2) and   (3) have been
\n             newly   added   but   we   are   not   concerned   with   those
\n             provisions as they are not relevant for the purpose of<\/p>\n
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\n                                      74<\/span><\/p>\n
     the   disposal   of   this   case   except   for   making   some
\n     reference   at   the   appropriate   places,   if   necessitated.\n<\/p>\n
     Section 154(1) regulates the manner of recording the
\n     First Information Report relating to the commission of a<\/p>\n
     cognizable offence.\n<\/p>\n
     29.        The legal mandate enshrined in Section 154
\n     (1) is that every information relating to the commission<\/p>\n
     of a “cognizable offence” (as defined under Section 2\n<\/p>\n
     (c) of the Code) if given orally (in which case it is to be
\n     reduced   into   writing)   or   in   writing   to   “an   officer   in
\n     charge   of   a   police   station”   (within   the   meaning   of<\/p>\n
     Section 2(o) of the Code) ;and signed by the informant
\n     should be entered in a book to be kept by such officer<\/p>\n
     in such form as the State Government may prescribe
\n     which   form   is   commonly   called   as   “First   Information<\/p>\n
     Report” and which act of entering the information in the
\n     said form is known as registration of a crime or a case.\n<\/p>\n
     30.        At   the   stage   of   registration   of   a   crime   or   a<\/p>\n
     case   on   the   basis   of   the   information   disclosing   a
\n     cognizable offence in compliance with the mandate of<\/p>\n
     a   Section   154(1)   of   the   Code,   the   concerned   police
\n     officer cannot embark upon an enquiry as to whether
\n     the   information,   laid   by   the   informant   is  reliable   and
\n     genuine or otherwise and refuse to register a case on<\/p>\n
     the   ground   that   the   information   is   not   reliable   or
\n     credible.  On the other hand, the officer in charge of a
\n     police station is statutorily obliged  to register a case
\n     and  then   to   proceed  with   the   investigation  if   he   has<\/p>\n
     reason to suspect the commission of an offence which
\n     he  is   empowered  under  Section   156  of  the  Code  to
\n     investigate, subject to the proviso to Section 157.  (As
\n     we have proposed to make a detailed discussion about
\n     the power of a police officer in the field of investigation<\/p>\n
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\n                                     75<\/span><\/p>\n
     of  a  cognizable  offence   within  the  ambit  of   Sections
\n     156 and 157 of the Code in the ensuing part of this<\/p>\n
     judgment,   we   do   not   propose   to   deal   with   those
\n     sections in extenso in the present context.)   In case,<\/p>\n
     an   officer   in   charge   of   a   police   station   refuses   to
\n     exercise the jurisdiction vested on him and to register
\n     a   case   on   the   information   of   a   cognizable   offence,
\n     reported  and  thereby violates the  statutory duty  cast<\/p>\n
     upon him, the person aggrieved by such refusal can
\n     send the substance of the information in writing and by
\n     post to the Superintendent of Police concerned who if
\n     satisfied   that   the   information   forwarded   to   him<\/p>\n
     discloses   a   cognizable   offence,   should   either
\n     investigate the case himself or direct an investigation<\/p>\n
     to   be   made   himself   or   direct   an   investigation   to   be
\n     made by any police officer subordinate to him in the<\/p>\n
     manner provided by sub-section (3) of Section 154 of
\n     the Code.\n<\/p>\n
     31.          Be   it   noted   that   in   Section   154(1)   of   the<\/p>\n
     Code,   the   legislature   in   its   collective   wisdom   has
\n     carefully   and   cautiously   used   the   expression<\/p>\n
     “information” without qualifying the same as in Section
\n     41(1) (a) or (g) of the Code wherein the expressions,
\n     “reasonable complaint” and “credible information” are
\n     used.     Evidently,   the   non-qualification   of   the   word<\/p>\n
     “information”   in Section 154(1) unlike   for the reason
\n     that the police officer should not refuse to record an
\n     information relating to the commission of a cognizable
\n     offence and to register a case thereon on the ground<\/p>\n
     that   he   is   not   satisfied   with   the   reasonableness   on
\n     credibility   of   the   information.     In   other   words,
\n     reasonableness’ or `credibility’ of the said information
\n     is not a condition precedent for registration of a case.
\n     A comparison of the present Section 154 with those of<\/p>\n
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\n                                          76<\/span><\/p>\n
          the earlier codes will indicate that the legislature had
\n          purposely   thought   it   fit   to   employ   only   the   word<\/p>\n
          “information”   without     qualifying   the   said   word.
\n          Section 139 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1861<\/p>\n
          (Act XXV of 1861) passed by the Legislative Council of
\n          India   read   that   `every   complaint   or   information’
\n          preferred   to   an   officer   in   charge   of   a   police   station
\n          should   be   reduced   into   writing   which   provision   was<\/p>\n
          subsequently modified by Section 112 of the Code of
\n          1872 (Act X of 1872) which thereafter read that `every
\n          complaint’    preferred to an officer in charge of a police
\n          station   shall   be   reduced   into   writing.     The   word<\/p>\n
          `complaint’ which  occurred in previous two Codes of
\n          1861 and 1872 was deleted and in that place the word<\/p>\n
          `information’   was used in the Codes of 1882 and 1955
\n          which word is now used in Sections 154, 155, 157 and<\/p>\n
          190(c) of the present Code of 1973 (Act II of 1974).
\n          An overall reading of all the Codes makes it clear that
\n          the   condition   which   is   sine   qua   non   for   recording   a
\n          First   Information   Report   is   that   there   must   be   an<\/p>\n
          information   and   that   information   must   disclose   a
\n          cognizable offence.\n<\/p>\n
          32.        It   is,   therefore,   manifestly   clear   that   if   any
\n          information   disclosing   a   cognizable   offence   is   laid
\n          before an officer in charge of a police station satisfying<\/p>\n
          the  requirements of  Section 154(1) of  the Code,  the
\n          said police officer has no other option except to enter
\n          the substance thereof in the prescribed form, that  is to
\n          say,   to   register   a   case   on   the   basis   of   such<\/p>\n
          information.”\n<\/p>\n
    54.       In the case of  Mohindro v. State of Punjab,  AIR<\/a> 2001 SC<\/p>\n
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\n                                              77<\/span><\/p>\n
    2113, the Bench of the Supreme Court by a short order held that:-\n<\/p>\n
               “………. Though the learned Counsel appearing for the
\n               State of Punjab stated that there had been an inquiry,
\n               we   fail   to   understand   as   to   how   there   can   be   an
\n               enquiry   without   registering   a   criminal   case.     On   the<\/p>\n
               facts   alleged,   it   transpires   that   the   appellant
\n               approached the police for registering a case and get
\n               allegation   investigated   into   and   yet   for   no   reasons
\n               whatsoever the police failed to register the case.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    The Supreme Court directed the registration of the case.\n<\/p>\n
    55.           Thereafter, in the case of Ramesh Kumari v. State (N.C. T.\n<\/p>\n
    of   Delhi   )   &   Ors.,    AIR   2006   SC   1322,  the   Supreme   Court,   while<\/p>\n
    referring to the Bhajan Lal’s case (supra) and while directing the case<\/p>\n
    to be registered and transferred to the Central Bureau Investigation<\/p>\n
    for further investigation, held as under:-\n<\/p>\n
               “3. Mr.Vikash   Singh.   Learned   Additional   Solicitor
\n               General,   at   the   outset,   invites   our   attention   to   the
\n               counter-affidavit   filed   by  the   respondent   and   submits
\n               that pursuant to the aforesaid observation of the High
\n               Court   the   complaint\/representation   has   been<\/p>\n
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\n                                         78<\/span><\/p>\n
          subsequently examined by the respondent and found
\n          no   genuine   case   was   established.       We   are   not<\/p>\n
          convinced   by   this   submission   because   the   sole
\n          grievance  of   the   appellant  is   that   no   case  has  been<\/p>\n
          registered   in   terms   of   the   mandatory   provisions   of
\n          Section   154(1)   of   the   Criminal   Procedure   Code.
\n          Genuineness or otherwise of the information can only
\n          be   considered   after   registration   of   the   case.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          Genuineness or credibility of the information is not a
\n          condition precedent for registration of a case.  We are
\n          also clearly of the view that the High court erred in law
\n          in dismissing the petition solely on the ground that the<\/p>\n
          contempt petition was pending and the appellant had
\n          an   alternative   remedy.     The   ground   of   alternative<\/p>\n
          remedy or pending of the contempt petition would be
\n          no   substitute   in   law   not   to   register   a   case   when   a<\/p>\n
          citizen   makes   a   complaint   of   a   cognizable   offence
\n          against the Police Officer.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          4.            That   the   Police   Officer   mandatorily<\/p>\n
          registers a case on a complaint of a cognizable offence
\n          by the citizen under Section 154 of the Code are no<\/p>\n
          more res integra.  The point of law has been set at rest
\n          by   this   Court   in   the   case   of   State   of   Haryana   and
\n          others v. Bhajan Lal and others<\/a>, 1992 Supp (1) SCC\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          335.  This Court after examining the whole gamut and<\/p>\n
          intricacies of the mandatory nature of Section 154 of
\n          the Code has arrived at the finding in paras 31 and 32
\n          of the judgment as under: AIR 1992 SC 604, Paras 30,
\n          31 and 32.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    56.     In the case of  Superintendent of Police, CBI Ors. v. Tapan<\/p>\n
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\n                                              79<\/span><\/p>\n
    Kumar Singh, (2003)  6 SCC 175,   the Supreme Court, while setting<\/p>\n
    aside   the   order   of   the   High   Court   in   exercise   of   its   revisional<\/p>\n
    jurisdiction   quashed   the   General   Diary   Entry,   the   FIR   and   the<\/p>\n
    investigation, observed as under:-\n<\/p>\n
              “19.           The High Court fell into an error in thinking
\n              that the information received by the police could not be<\/p>\n
              treated as a first information report since the allegation
\n              was vague inasmuch as it was not stated from whom<\/p>\n
              the   sum   of   rupees   one   lakh   was   demanded   and
\n              accepted.     Nor   was   it   stated   that   such   demand   or<\/p>\n
              acceptance was made as motive or reward for doing or
\n              forbearing   to   do   any   official   act,   or   for   showing   or
\n              forbearing to show in exercise of his official function,
\n              favour   or   disfavour   to   any   person   or   for   rendering,<\/p>\n
              attempting to render any service or disservice to any
\n              person.  Thus there was no basis for a police officer to<\/p>\n
              suspect the  commission of an offence which  he was
\n              empowered   under   Section   156   of   the   Code   to
\n              investigate. <\/p><\/blockquote>\n
              20.          It   is   well   settled   that   a   first   information
\n              report is not an encyclopaedia, which must disclose all
\n              facts and details relating to the offence reported.   An<\/p>\n
              informant may lodge a report about the commission of
\n              an offence though he may not know the name of the
\n              victim or his assailant.  He may not even know how the
\n              occurrence   took   place.     A   first   informant   need   not
\n              necessarily   be   an   eyewitness   so   as   to   be   able   to<\/p>\n
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\n                                     80<\/span><\/p>\n
     disclose   in   great   detail   all   aspects   of   the   offence
\n     committed.       What   is   of   significance   is   that   the<\/p>\n
     information   so   lodged   must   provide   a   basis   for   the
\n     police   officer   to   suspect   the   commission   of   a<\/p>\n
     cognizable  offence.    At  this stage  it  is  enough  if  the
\n     police   officer   on   the   basis   of  the   information   given
\n     suspects the commission of a cognizable offence, and
\n     not   that   he   must   be   convinced   or   satisfied   that   a<\/p>\n
     cognizable   offence   has   been   committed.     If   he   has
\n     reasons   to   suspect,   on   the   basis   of   information
\n     received,   that   a   cognizable   offence   may   have   been
\n     committed, he is bound to record the information and<\/p>\n
     conduct an investigation.    At  this stage  it is also not
\n     necessary   for   him   to   satisfy   himself   about   the<\/p>\n
     truthfulness   of   the   information.     It   is   only   after   a
\n     complete investigation that he may be able to report on<\/p>\n
     the   truthfulness   or   otherwise   of   the   information.
\n     Similarly, even if the information does not furnish all the
\n     details he must find out those details in the course of
\n     investigation   and   collect   all   the   necessary   evidence.\n<\/p>\n
     The information given disclosing the commission of a
\n     cognizable offence only sets in motion the investigative<\/p>\n
     machinery,   with   a   view   to   collect   all   necessary
\n     evidence, and thereafter to take action in accordance
\n     with   law.   The   true   test   is   whether   the   information
\n     furnished provides a reason to suspect the commission<\/p>\n
     of   an   offence,   which   the   police   officer   concerned   is
\n     empowered   under   Section   156   of   the   Code   to
\n     investigate.    If it does, he has no option but to record
\n     the   information   and   proceed   to   investigate   the   case<\/p>\n
     either himself or depute any other competent officer to
\n     conduct the investigation.   The question as to whether
\n     the   report   is   true,   whether   it   discloses   full   details
\n     regarding   the   manner   of   occurrence,   whether   the
\n     accused   is   named,   and   whether   there   is   sufficient<\/p>\n
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\n                                             81<\/span><\/p>\n
              evidence   to   support   the   allegations   are   all   matters
\n              which   are   alien   to   the   consideration   of   the   question<\/p>\n
              whether   the   report   discloses   the   commision   of   a
\n              cognizable   offence.   Even   if   the   information   does   not<\/p>\n
              give   full   details   regarding   these   matters,   the
\n              investigating   officer   is   not   absolved   of   his   duty   to
\n              investigate the case and discover the true facts, if he
\n              can.”\n<\/p>\n
                                                 ( Emphasis supplied )<\/p>\n
    57.          In the case of Lallan Choudhary & Ors. v. State of Bihar &<\/p>\n
    Anr.,  AIR   2006   SC   3376,  the   Supreme   Court   again   reiterated   the<\/p>\n
    principle   while   observing   that   there   was   no   justification   for   not<\/p>\n
    registering a case despite endorsement of the complaint by Special<\/p>\n
    Divisional   Magistrate   and   the   charge   sheet   was   submitted   much<\/p>\n
    thereafter in that context for an offence under Sections 345, 332, 334<\/p>\n
    of Indian Penal Code, the Court held as under: –\n<\/p>\n
                                                              ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 13:57:20 :::<\/span>
\n                                           82<\/span><\/p>\n
            “10.           The mandate of Section 154 of the Code is
\n            that at the stage of registration of a crime or a case on<\/p>\n
            the   basis   of   the   information   disclosing   a   cognizable
\n            offence,   the   police   officer   concerned   cannot   embark<\/p>\n
            upon an enquiry as to whether the information, laid by
\n            the informant is reliable and genuine or otherwise and
\n            refuse   to   register   a   case   on   the   ground   that   the
\n            information is not relevant or credible.  In other words,<\/p>\n
            reliability,   genuineness   and   credibility   of   the
\n            information   are   not   the   conditions   precedent   for
\n            registering a case under Section 154 of the Code.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
            11.             ………. It is well settled principle of law that
\n            in criminal trial, investigation is proceeded by an FIR<\/p>\n
            on   the   basis   of   written   complaint   or   otherwise
\n            disclosing the offence said to have been committed by<\/p>\n
            the accused.  In the present case, a grave miscarriage
\n            of   justice   has   been   committed   by   the   SHO   of
\n            concerned Police Station by not registering an FIR on
\n            the basis of offence disclosed in the complaint petition.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
            The   concerned   police   officer   is   statutorily   obliged   to
\n            register the case on the basis of the offence disclosed<\/p>\n
            in the complaint petition and proceed with investigation
\n            in   terms   of   procedure   contained   under   Sections   156
\n            and 157 of the Code.  The FIR registered by the Police
\n            would   clearly   disclose   that   the   complaint   for   offence<\/p>\n
            under Section 395 IPC has been deliberately omitted
\n            and,   therefore,   no   investigation,   whatsoever,   was
\n            conducted for the offence under Section 395 IPC.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    58.        This  view was   also  taken  by the  Supreme  Court   in  the<\/p>\n
    case of   Madhu Bala vs Suresh Kumar & Ors.,<\/a> (1997) 8 SCC 476.   In<\/p>\n
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\n                                             83<\/span><\/p>\n
    that   case,   the   Court   was   primarily   concerned   with   the   power   of<\/p>\n
    Magistrate   and   compliance   to   the   direction   contained   in   terms   of<\/p>\n
    provisions under Section 156(3) for investigation.  While emphasizing<\/p>\n
    the   need   for   formal   registration   of   the   case,   the   Supreme   Court<\/p>\n
    observed that the police are normally duty bound to register a case.\n<\/p>\n
    Thereafter, in a more recent judgment in the case of  Prakash Singh<\/p>\n
    Badal  &  Another vs State  of  Punjab & Others,  (2007)  1 SCC 1,  the<\/p>\n
    Supreme   Court   was   primarily   concerned   with   the   case   of   the<\/p>\n
    appellants who have been charged under the provisions of Prevention<\/p>\n
    of Corruption Act, 1988 for having assets disproportionate to known<\/p>\n
    source of income and alleged to have committed an offence under<\/p>\n
    Sections 8 and 9 of the Act.  The question of sanction for prosecution<\/p>\n
    of the said appellant arose and in this backdrop the Supreme Court<\/p>\n
    also dealt with the remedy available in terms of Section 154(3).    The<\/p>\n
    Court has held as under: –\n<\/p>\n
              “65.         The   legal   mandate   enshrined     in   Section
\n              154(1)   is   that   every   information   relating   to   the
\n              commission of a “cognizable offence” [as defined under<\/p>\n
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\n                                         84<\/span><\/p>\n
     Section 2(c) of the Code] if given orally ( in which case
\n     it   is   to   be   reduced   into   writing   )   or   in   writing   to   “an<\/p>\n
     officer in charge of a police station” [within the meaning
\n     of   Section   2(0)   of   the   Code]   and   signed   by   the<\/p>\n
     informant should be entered in a book to be kept by
\n     such officer in such form as the State Government may
\n     prescribe   which   form   is   commonly   called   as   “first
\n     information   report”   and   which   act   of   entering   the<\/p>\n
     information in the said form is known as registration of
\n     a crime or a case.\n<\/p>\n
     66.            At the stage of registration of a crime or a<\/p>\n
     case   on   the   basis   of   the   information   disclosing   a
\n     cognizable offence in compliance with the mandate of<\/p>\n
     Section   154(1)   of   the   Code,   the   police   officer
\n     concerned   cannot   embark   upon   an   enquiry   as   to<\/p>\n
     whether the information laid by the informant is reliable
\n     and genuine or otherwise and refuse to register a case
\n     on   the   ground   that   the   information   is   not   reliable   or
\n     credible.  On the other hand, the officer in charge of a<\/p>\n
     police   station   is   statutorily   obliged   to   register   a   case
\n     and   then   to   proceed   with   the   investigation   if   he   has<\/p>\n
     reason to suspect the commission of an offence which
\n     he   is   empowered   under   Section   156   of   the   Code   to
\n     investigate,   subject   to   the   proviso   to   Section   157
\n     thereof.  In case an officer in charge of a police station<\/p>\n
     refuses to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him and to
\n     register   a   case   on   the   information   of   a   cognizable
\n     offence reported and thereby violates the statutory duty
\n     cast upon him, the person aggrieved by such refusal<\/p>\n
     can   send   the   substance   of   the   information   in   writing
\n     and by post to the Superintendent of Police concerned
\n     who if satisfied that the information forwarded to him
\n     discloses   a   cognizable   offence,   should   either
\n     investigate the case himself or direct an investigation to<\/p>\n
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\n                                     85<\/span><\/p>\n
     be made by any police officer subordinate to him in the
\n     manner provided by sub-section (3) of Section 154 of<\/p>\n
     the Code.\n<\/p>\n
     67.            It has to be noted that in Section 154(1) of
\n     the Code, the legislature in its collective wisdom has
\n     carefully   and   cautiously   used   the   expression
\n     “information” without qualifying the same as in Sections<\/p>\n
     41(1)(a)   or   (g)   of   the   Code   wherein   the   expressions
\n     “reasonable  complaint”  and   “credible   information”  are
\n     used.       Evidently,   the   non-qualification   of   the   word
\n     “information” in Section 154(1) unlike in Sections 41(1)<\/p>\n
     (a) and (g) of the Code may be for the reason that the
\n     police officer should not refuse to record an information<\/p>\n
     relating to the commission of a cognizable offence and
\n     to register a case thereon on the ground that he is not<\/p>\n
     satisfied   with   the  reasonableness  or   credibility  of   the
\n     information.       In   other   words,   “reasonableness”   or
\n     “credibility”  of   the   said   information   is   not   a   condition
\n     precedent for registration of a case.   A comparison of<\/p>\n
     the present Section 154 with those of the earlier Codes
\n     will indicate that the legislature had purposely thought it<\/p>\n
     fit   to   employ   only   the   word   “information”   without
\n     qualifying the said word.   Section 139 of the Code of
\n     criminal Procedure of 1861 (Act 25 of 1861) passed by
\n     the   Legislative   Council   of   India   read   that   “every<\/p>\n
     complaint   or   information”   preferred   to   an   officer   in
\n     charge of a police station should be reduced ino writing
\n     which provision was subsequently modified by Section
\n     112 of the Code of 1872 (Act of 1872) which thereafter<\/p>\n
     read   that   “every   complaint”  preferred   to   an   officer   in
\n     charge of a police station shall be reduced in writing.
\n     The word “complaint” which occurred in previous two
\n     Codes of 1861 and 1872 was deleted and in that place
\n     the word “information” was used in the Codes of 1882<\/p>\n
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\n                                             86<\/span><\/p>\n
              and   1898   which   word   is   now   used   in   Sections   154,
\n              155, 157 and 190(c) of the Code.   An overall reading<\/p>\n
              of all the Codes makes it clear that the condition which
\n              is sine qua non for recording a first information report is<\/p>\n
              that there must be an information and that information
\n              must disclose a cognizable offence.\n<\/p>\n
              68.           It is, therefore, manifestly clear that if any<\/p>\n
              information   disclosing   a   cognizable   offence   is   laid
\n              before an officer in charge of a police station satisfying
\n              the   requirements   of   Section   154(1)   of   the   Code,   the
\n              said police officer has no other option except to enter<\/p>\n
              the substance thereof in the prescribed form, that is to
\n              say,   to   register   a   case   on   the   basis   of   such<\/p>\n
              information.”\n<\/p>\n
    59.          We may also notice that in recent orders passed by the<\/p>\n
    Supreme   Court   particularly   in   the   case   of  Lalita   Kumari     vs<\/p>\n
    Government   of  Uttar   Pradesh  in  Writ   Petition  (Crl)  No.68  of  2008<\/p>\n
    dated 14th July, 2008, the Supreme Court has given certain directions<\/p>\n
    and   has   noticed   with   some   emphasis   that   there   are   innumerable<\/p>\n
    cases that where the complainant is a practical person, the FIRs are<\/p>\n
    registered immediately while in other cases they are registered after<\/p>\n
    quite   some   time   and   the   Station   Officer   of   the   concerned   Police<\/p>\n
    Station   is   pressurizing   the   complainant   to   withdraw   the   complaint.\n<\/p>\n
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\n                                           87<\/span><\/p>\n
    The   Court   passed   further  direction   to   all  the   Governments  through<\/p>\n
    the Chief Secretaries to the respective States.\n<\/p>\n
    60.          It is evident from the analysis of the above judgments of<\/p>\n
    the Supreme Court as well as this Court that there are some what<\/p>\n
    divergent points of view taken by the different Benches of the Court.\n<\/p>\n
    Of course, they cannot be termed as diametrically divergent views.\n<\/p>\n
    They can be easily reconciled if looked from appropriate perspective<\/p>\n
    in the backdrop of respective facts.  The judgments which have taken<\/p>\n
    the view that there is permissibility within the scope of Section 154 for<\/p>\n
    an officer in charge of a police station to conduct some kind of an<\/p>\n
    inquiry pre-registration of the FIR have stated so to be an exception<\/p>\n
    and not the rule. In other words, it has to be one of those rare cases<\/p>\n
    where recourse to such a procedure may be adopted.  As a rule and<\/p>\n
    as requirement of law, the police officer in charge of a police station is<\/p>\n
    stated to have hardly any discretion in registering the case once the<\/p>\n
    information given to such an officer discloses a cognizable offence.\n<\/p>\n
    The   essence   appears   to   be   that   the   information   should   disclose<\/p>\n
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\n                                               88<\/span><\/p>\n
    commission of a cognizable offence which alone would vest power<\/p>\n
    and   jurisdiction   in   the   officer   in   charge   to   put   into   motion   the<\/p>\n
    investigation machinery.  It needs to be noticed with some emphasis<\/p>\n
    that it is not necessary that FIR should be registered for the purposes<\/p>\n
    of setting the mechanism of investigation into motion.  It is sufficient<\/p>\n
    that a cognizable offence is disclosed by the information given.  This<\/p>\n
    is   the   true   implication   of   the   provisions   of   Section   154   read   with<\/p>\n
    Section 157 of the Code.  The Supreme Court and Privy Council have<\/p>\n
    consistently   taken   the   view   that   for   investigation   to   commence,<\/p>\n
    registration of a FIR is not a  sine qua non  (Emperor vs Khwaja  Nazir,<\/p>\n
    AIR<\/a> (32) 1945 PC 18,  and Apren Joseph @ Current Kunjukunju and<\/p>\n
    others vs State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1).\n<\/p>\n
    61.           One of the arguments raised before us on behalf of the<\/p>\n
    Petitioners   was   that   the   judgments   relied   upon   by   the   State   are<\/p>\n
    judgments on their own facts and cannot be constituted as precedent<\/p>\n
    of law settling or answering proposition involved in the present case.\n<\/p>\n
    Somewhat   similar   is   the  contention   on   behalf   of  the  State.     It   can<\/p>\n
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\n                                               89<\/span><\/p>\n
    hardly be disputed that the dictum of the Supreme Court and even<\/p>\n
    this Court are judgments on facts and circumstances of those cases.\n<\/p>\n
    In each case, whether for and against the proposition of law, there<\/p>\n
    were peculiar circumstances.  Despite ingredient of the Section being<\/p>\n
    satisfied,   the   police   had   intentionally   not   registered   or   delayed   the<\/p>\n
    registration of information disclosing the cognizable offence.  While in<\/p>\n
    other  cases,   there   was   an  over-zeal  on  the  part   of  the  police   and<\/p>\n
    while even conducting the pre-registration inquiry they acted unfairly.\n<\/p>\n
    Still, a third class of cases is where despite an offence having been<\/p>\n
    made   out   the   investigating   agency   or   the   police   officer   in   charge,<\/p>\n
    neither entered upon a preliminary inquiry pre-registration nor even<\/p>\n
    registered the case thus compelling the aggrieved party to approach<\/p>\n
    the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.   There<\/p>\n
    are also cases where the investigation was so unfair and opposed to<\/p>\n
    the rule of law that parties had come for quashing of an FIR or for<\/p>\n
    transfer   of   investigation   to   CBI.     Whichever   view   is   accepted   as<\/p>\n
    correct exposition of law, the basic principle therein is necessity of<\/p>\n
    bona fide exercise of power and unbiased and fair investigation of an<\/p>\n
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\n                                               90<\/span><\/p>\n
    alleged offence by the police.  Rule of criminal jurisprudence make no<\/p>\n
    exception to the principle that a fair investigation is the soul of proper<\/p>\n
    administration of criminal justice system.  Criminal justice system has<\/p>\n
    two   components.     The   role   of   the   State   and   role   of   the   judiciary.\n<\/p>\n
    Exercise of power or authority by any of these components has to<\/p>\n
    ensure due protection with dignity to the rights of a complainant as<\/p>\n
    well as suspect and the society at large, while ensuring that there is<\/p>\n
    no adverse impact on the social fabric of the society.\n<\/p>\n
    62.           It is required to be noticed with some emphasis that the<\/p>\n
    judgment in the case of Bhagwant Kishore Joshi (supra) is a judgment<\/p>\n
    delivered by a Bench of three Judges, while all the other judgments<\/p>\n
    relied on by either parties are judgments by two Judge Bench.  In that<\/p>\n
    case, the Supreme Court had clearly taken the view while explaining<\/p>\n
    the word “investigation” that merely making some preliminary inquiry<\/p>\n
    upon   receipt   of   the   information   from   an   anonymous   source   or   a<\/p>\n
    source of doubtful reliability for checking up the  correctness of  the<\/p>\n
    information does not amount to collection of evidence and so cannot<\/p>\n
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\n                                             91<\/span><\/p>\n
    be   regarded   as   investigation.   The   Court   further   clarified   that   in<\/p>\n
    absence of  any  prohibition  in  the  Code,  express or implied,  it  was<\/p>\n
    open to the police officer to make such preliminary inquiry.\n<\/p>\n
    63.          The judgment of Ramesh Kumari vs State, ((2006) 2 SCC<\/p>\n
    677, was duly noticed by the Supreme Court in the case of Rajinder<\/p>\n
    Singh Katoch  (supra). The judgment in  Rajinder Singh Katoch  (supra)<\/p>\n
    had  been  pronounced after  the  judgment   of  the  Supreme   Court  in<\/p>\n
    Badal’s
\n          case (supra).  In other words, the view taken in Rajinder Singh<\/p>\n
    Katoch’s
\n             case (supra) is in the latest judgment where the subject in<\/p>\n
    controversy has been discussed in some detail.\n<\/p>\n
    64.          In   other   words,   the   judgments   of   the   Courts   have<\/p>\n
    permitted   and   accepted   the   practice   of   pre-registration   inquiry,   of<\/p>\n
    course with a limited compass and with utmost caution.  It is obvious<\/p>\n
    that   such   limited   inquiry   is   not   specifically   and\/or   by   necessary<\/p>\n
    implication   prohibited   under   the   provisions   of   Section   154   of   the<\/p>\n
    Code.   It is expected of the officer in charge of the police station to<\/p>\n
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\n                                               92<\/span><\/p>\n
    examine whether the information received is disclosing a cognizable<\/p>\n
    offence   or   not.     In   absence   of   such   disclosure,   he   attains   no<\/p>\n
    jurisdiction to look into the matter or authority to investigate without<\/p>\n
    leave of the Court if the offence is non-cognizable.  Even during this<\/p>\n
    limited process of examining and conducting some kind of an inquiry<\/p>\n
    to establish those ingredients, the officer concerned is to do nothing<\/p>\n
    which   is   unjust   or   unfair.     He   essentially   must   examine   the<\/p>\n
    complaint\/information as it comes to him.\n<\/p>\n
    65.           In   the   case   of  S   N   Sharma   vs   Bipen   Kumar   Tiwari   and<\/p>\n
    others<\/a>,  AIR   1970  SC   786,   ,   a   three   Judge   Bench   of   the   Supreme<\/p>\n
    Court   while   dealing   with   the   provisions   of   Section   157,   held   as<\/p>\n
    under :-\n<\/p>\n
               “….   Section   157   requires   that,   whenever   such
\n               information   is   received   by   an   officer   in   charge   of   a<\/p>\n
               police-station   that   he   has   reason   to   suspect   the
\n               commission of an offence which he is empowered to
\n               investigate under Section 156, he must forthwith send
\n               a   report   of   it   to   the   Magistrate   empowered   to   take
\n               cognizance   of   such   an   offence   upon   a   police   report<\/p>\n
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\n                                             93<\/span><\/p>\n
            and,   at   the   same   time,   he   must   either   proceed   in
\n            person,   or   depute   one   of   his   subordinate   officers   to<\/p>\n
            proceed,   to   the   spot   to   investigate   the   facts   and
\n            circumstances of the case, and, if necessary, to take<\/p>\n
            measures for discovery and arrest of the offender. This
\n            provision is qualified by a proviso which is in two parts.
\n            The   first   clause   of   the   proviso   enables   an   officer   in
\n            charge of a police station not to proceed to make an<\/p>\n
            investigation  on  the   spot  or   to   depute  a  subordinate
\n            officer   for   that   purpose  if   the   information  received  is
\n            given against a person by name and the case is not of
\n            a   serious   nature.   The   second   clause   of   the   proviso<\/p>\n
            permits the officer in charge of a police station not to
\n            investigate the case if it appears to him that there is no<\/p>\n
            sufficient ground for entering on an investigation.   The
\n            report to be sent to the Magistrate under Sub-section<\/p>\n
            (1) of Section 157 requires that in each of the cases
\n            where   the   officer   in   charge   of   the   police   station
\n            decides to act under the two clauses of the proviso, he
\n            must   state   in   his   report   his   reasons   for   not   fully<\/p>\n
            complying   with   the   requirements   of   Sub-section   (1)
\n            and,   in   addition,   in   cases   where   he   decided   not   to<\/p>\n
            investigate   on   the   ground   mentioned   in   the   second
\n            clause  of   the   proviso,  he   is  required  to  notify   to  the
\n            informant  the fact that he will not investigate the case
\n            or cause it to be investigated. ……”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    66.        Whenever information is received by an officer in charge<\/p>\n
    of a police station and that he has reason to suspect the commission<\/p>\n
    of an offence which he is required to investigate under Section 156,<\/p>\n
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\n                                               94<\/span><\/p>\n
    he must forthwith send a report of it to the Magistrate empowered to<\/p>\n
    take cognizance of such an offence.   The provision is qualified by a<\/p>\n
    proviso which is in two parts.  The first clause of the proviso enables<\/p>\n
    an officer in charge  of a  police  station not to  proceed to  make  an<\/p>\n
    investigation on the spot or to depute a subordinate officer for that<\/p>\n
    purpose if the information received is given against a person by name<\/p>\n
    and the case is not of a serious nature.  The second proviso permits<\/p>\n
    investigating officer not to investigate the offence if it appears to him<\/p>\n
    that   there   is   no   sufficient   ground   for   entering   on   an   investigation.\n<\/p>\n
    These two provisos seen in the light of the word `if’
\n                                                         as is used by the<\/p>\n
    Legislature   at   the   very   opening   of   the   provisions   of   Section   157<\/p>\n
    introduces some element of discretion,   of course, a very restricted<\/p>\n
    one which again has to be exercised bona fide and fairly.\n<\/p>\n
    67.           There   is   an   inseparable   link   between   the   provisions   of<\/p>\n
    Sections 154 and 157 of the Code.  Both these provisions fall under<\/p>\n
    Chapter XII of the Code and provide a chain right from receipt of a<\/p>\n
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\n                                               95<\/span><\/p>\n
    information relating to commission of a cognizable offence up to the<\/p>\n
    institution of process of investigation and submission of the relevant<\/p>\n
    report to the Court of competent jurisdiction.  It is a settled principle of<\/p>\n
    law that all the relevant provisions of an Act should be examined to<\/p>\n
    construe a provision. The Court has to examine impact of a provision<\/p>\n
    keeping in view the scheme of the Code.   Of course in some of the<\/p>\n
    cases   afore-referred,   with   reference   to   the   facts   of   that   case,   the<\/p>\n
    Supreme Court has observed that  the officer  in charge of a police<\/p>\n
    station is required to register the case upon receiving the information.\n<\/p>\n
    In Sirajuddin’s
\n                   case (supra) which again had peculiar facts relating to<\/p>\n
    Anti Corruption Department, the Court said that inquiry officer must<\/p>\n
    not act under any   pre-conceived idea of guilt of the person whose<\/p>\n
    conduct has been inquired into and emphasized that Code of Criminal<\/p>\n
    Procedure   is   an   enactment   designed,  inter   alia,   to   ensure   fair<\/p>\n
    investigation of the allegation.   In this case, which has been relied<\/p>\n
    upon   by   the   Petitioners,   the   Supreme   Court   clearly   stated   the<\/p>\n
    principle   that   the   procedure   adopted   against   the   appellant   before<\/p>\n
    laying   of   FIR,   though   not   in   terms   forbidden   by   law,     was   so<\/p>\n
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\n                                               96<\/span><\/p>\n
    unprecedented  and  outrageous  as  to   shock  one’
\n                                                       s  sense   of   justice<\/p>\n
    and   fair   play.     The   doctrine   of   fair   play   and   unbiased   mind   is<\/p>\n
    underlying feature of the view expressed by the Supreme Court in this<\/p>\n
    case. Thus, the Supreme Court condemned the manner in which the<\/p>\n
    investigation was conducted pre-registration and did not come to the<\/p>\n
    conclusion that such inquiry pre-registration was impermissible.\n<\/p>\n
    68.<\/p>\n
                  Even in the case of  Tapan Kumar  (supra), the Supreme<\/p>\n
    Court culled out a very fine distinction stating that on the information<\/p>\n
    given to the police officer, even if he suspects the commission of a<\/p>\n
    cognizable   offence   or   not,   he   must   be   convinced   or   satisfied   that<\/p>\n
    cognizable offence has been disclosed in the information. If he has<\/p>\n
    reasons   to   suspect   on   the   basis   of   information   received   that   a<\/p>\n
    cognizable offence may have been committed, he is bound to record<\/p>\n
    information and conduct an investigation.   The emphasis is that the<\/p>\n
    police   officer   has   reasons   to   suspect   commission   of   a   cognizable<\/p>\n
    offence. Of course, it is not the requirement of law that a police officer<\/p>\n
    has   to   verify   the   truthfulness   of   the   allegations   pre-registration,   if<\/p>\n
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\n                                             97<\/span><\/p>\n
    taken   on   its   face   value,   the   information   discloses   a   cognizable<\/p>\n
    offence.   In the case of Lallan Chaudhary (supra) also the Supreme<\/p>\n
    Court held that reliability, genuineness and credibility of information<\/p>\n
    are not the conditions precedent for registering a case under Section<\/p>\n
    154 of the Code.\n<\/p>\n
    69.          There is hardly any judgment, which in express terms has<\/p>\n
    taken the view that any kind of inquiry by the officer in charge of a<\/p>\n
    Police Station is forbidden and prohibited under the law.   It is one<\/p>\n
    thing to say that it is mandatory duty or obligation of the Police Officer<\/p>\n
    to register the FIR when the information provided to him is in relation<\/p>\n
    to the commission of a cognizable offence but still another thing to<\/p>\n
    say that after noting the information brought to his notice and before<\/p>\n
    recording   the   substance   thereof   in   the   notified   book   (   i.e.   FIR<\/p>\n
    Register) the law prohibits in express terms to make any inquiry in<\/p>\n
    relation to the commission of that offence.    The paramount condition<\/p>\n
    attached to exercise of duty under Section 154 is that it should be<\/p>\n
    performed bona fidely, fairly and without any undue delay.\n<\/p>\n
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\n                                               98<\/span><\/p>\n
    70.           The   provisions   of   Section   154   of   the   Code   impose   an<\/p>\n
    absolute obligation and  duty upon the officer in  charge  of  a  police<\/p>\n
    station to record information in the prescribed book of a cognizable<\/p>\n
    offence (FIR  register),  but  it  is difficult  for the Court to  construe  in<\/p>\n
    absence of any express language that this provision forbids any kind<\/p>\n
    even   preliminary   inquiry   prior   to   registration   of   the   FIR.     We   are<\/p>\n
    unable  to   notice   anything   in   the   language  of   the   section   which   by<\/p>\n
    necessary implication debars in law such an inquiry.   The Supreme<\/p>\n
    Court in the case of Bhagwant Kishore Joshi (supra), a judgment which<\/p>\n
    was delivered by a three Judge Bench, took the view that such an<\/p>\n
    inquiry, of course for a very limited purpose and bona fide object, was<\/p>\n
    not  debarred   under   the   provisions  of   Section   154.     Again,   a   three<\/p>\n
    Judge   Bench   of   the   Supreme   Court   in   the   case   of  Jacob   Mathew<\/p>\n
    (supra), in unambiguous terms declared that pre-registration inquiry<\/p>\n
    would be permissible, but again for a class of persons i.e. Medical<\/p>\n
    Practitioners. The investigating agency was cautioned in that case not<\/p>\n
    to   cause   harassment   to   the   Doctors   in   furtherance   to   a   private<\/p>\n
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\n                                               99<\/span><\/p>\n
    complaint unless some prima facie evidence of rash and negligent act<\/p>\n
    on the part of the accused Doctor was brought on record before the<\/p>\n
    investigating   officer.     The   principle   enunciated   in   both   these<\/p>\n
    judgments, particularly in the case of Bhagwant Kishore Joshi (supra),<\/p>\n
    is   not   subject   matter   of   a   detailed   discussion   by   any   of   the<\/p>\n
    subsequent Benches of the Supreme Court,   except in the case of<\/p>\n
    Rajinder   Singh   Katoch  (supra),   a   judgment   pronounced   by   a   two<\/p>\n
    Judge Bench of the Supreme Court after declaration of law in Prakash<\/p>\n
    Singh   Badal’s
\n                    case   (supra)   which   also   specifically   noticed  Ramesh<\/p>\n
    Kumari’
\n          s case (supra) and declared the principle that some kind of<\/p>\n
    preliminary   inquiry   would  be  permissible  prior   to  registration  of  the<\/p>\n
    case.  It needs to be noticed at the cost of repetition that judgments of<\/p>\n
    the Supreme Court delivered by two Judges Bench have taken the<\/p>\n
    view that there is no option with the police officer in charge of a police<\/p>\n
    station but to register the FIR.  The view is obviously relateable to the<\/p>\n
    facts   of   those   cases   and   in   all   those   cases   the   conduct   of     the<\/p>\n
    investigating   agency   had   been   deprecated   and   the   Court   took   the<\/p>\n
    view that reliability, genuineness and credibility of information are not<\/p>\n
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\n                                              100<\/span><\/p>\n
    the condition precedent for registration of a case under Section 154<\/p>\n
    and provisions of Section 154 are mandatory and officer in charge of<\/p>\n
    police   station   is   duty   bound   to   register   the   case   on   receiving   the<\/p>\n
    information disclosing a cognizable offence.   (See  Lallan Chaudhary<\/p>\n
    (supra)   and   Ramesh   Kumari  (supra)).     However,   in   the   case   of<\/p>\n
    Mohindro (supra), the Court observed on facts of that case that for no<\/p>\n
    reason   whatsoever   the   police   had   not   registered   the   case   and<\/p>\n
    proceeded to pass the appropriate direction.\n<\/p>\n
    71.           Thus   it   is   evident   that   information   must   relate   to<\/p>\n
    `commission of a cognizable offence’.\n<\/p>\n
                                          If the information given ex facie<\/p>\n
    is so absurd or lacks essential ingredients of the allegedly committed<\/p>\n
    cognizable offence, the investigating officer after making a due entry<\/p>\n
    in the prescribed books like daily diary, general diary or station diary<\/p>\n
    or daily roznamachar, could step into the limited preliminary inquiry<\/p>\n
    and then within a very short time and most expeditiously register the<\/p>\n
    FIR   unless   the   information   does   not   disclose   commission   of   a<\/p>\n
    cognizable offence.  Such exercise has to be bona fide, fair and must<\/p>\n
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\n                                            101<\/span><\/p>\n
    stand to the test of judicious exercise of power. Such cases would be<\/p>\n
    by and large very few and rare cases where the police officer has to<\/p>\n
    conduct preliminary inquiry pre-registration of a FIR for a very limited<\/p>\n
    period.   Taking an example of such rare and exceptional cases, an<\/p>\n
    informant by a telephone makes a call that there has been a blast at a<\/p>\n
    railway station causing injury and death  of number of  persons and<\/p>\n
    names the persons who has alleged to have effected the bomb blast.\n<\/p>\n
    A police officer is obliged to make an entry in the daily diary register<\/p>\n
    and at least would verify the same by ringing up the nearest police<\/p>\n
    station or the railway authority in charge of the railway station where<\/p>\n
    such an incident is informed to have been occurred.   If no incident<\/p>\n
    has occurred at the railway station, the question of registering the FIR<\/p>\n
    would hardly arise and he could proceed in accordance with law on<\/p>\n
    the   basis   of   the   entry   made   in   the   daily   diary   register\/station<\/p>\n
    diary\/roznamachar .   In the case of  Tapan Kumar Singh  (supra), the<\/p>\n
    Supreme Court has even held that an entry in the daily diary\/station<\/p>\n
    diary or roznamachar itself can be a FIR.\n<\/p>\n
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\n                                            102<\/span><\/p>\n
    72.          Another aspect which the Court may have to examine is<\/p>\n
    avoiding absurd results while ensuring compliance to the provisions of<\/p>\n
    Section 154 of the Code.    In a given case, where a person of public<\/p>\n
    importance or a public figure is stated to be abroad by print and press<\/p>\n
    media, thus information is given to everybody and the informant goes<\/p>\n
    to  the  police  station  and lodges  a report that  he  was  assaulted or<\/p>\n
    legally   confined   by   that   person   (public   figure)   in   Mumbai.     Such<\/p>\n
    information may not demand instant registration of the FIR and after<\/p>\n
    making due entry in the daily dairy register, the police officer may be<\/p>\n
    within his rights at least to verify that fact reflected in the media before<\/p>\n
    actually registering a first  information report  in the prescribed book<\/p>\n
    which   ultimately   then   must   lead   to   entire   investigation   process,<\/p>\n
    collection of evidence and presenting a report in terms of Section 173<\/p>\n
    (2) of the Code.   Still further, there might be cases where information<\/p>\n
    given by the informant may not indicate or suspect commission of a<\/p>\n
    cognizable offence but some verification or some further information<\/p>\n
    may bring those cases within the ambit of commission of a cognizable<\/p>\n
    offence   thus   instantaneously   registerable   in   accordance   with   the<\/p>\n
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\n                                                103<\/span><\/p>\n
    provisions of Section 154 of the Code.     We have already said that<\/p>\n
    such cases would be exceptional and rare.   As a normal course the<\/p>\n
    police   officer   in  charge  of  a   police  station   is  bound   to   register   the<\/p>\n
    information in relation to commission of a cognizable offence and this<\/p>\n
    is an absolute duty on the part of such officer.\n<\/p>\n
    73.            One of the arguments is that whosoever furnishes false or<\/p>\n
    incorrect   information   to   the   police   or   a   public   servant   commits   an<\/p>\n
    offence punishable under Sections 177 and 180 of the Indian Penal<\/p>\n
    Code.     Thus   no   matter   how   absurd   incorrect   or   false   information<\/p>\n
    might have been furnished to the  police officer, the FIR should be<\/p>\n
    registered   forthwith.   We   are   unable   to   find   much   merit   in   this<\/p>\n
    submission for the reason that this will only generate more and more<\/p>\n
    litigation which is not the object of any law much less a procedural<\/p>\n
    law.     The   scheme   of   the   Code   does   give   element   of   very   limited<\/p>\n
    discretion   to   the   investigating\/police   officer   and   a   concept   of<\/p>\n
    preliminary inquiry within the very limited scope afore-indicated is not<\/p>\n
    forbidden   in   law.   Thus,   it   will   achieve   a   greater   object   if   in   those<\/p>\n
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\n                                             104<\/span><\/p>\n
    exceptional and rare cases the investigating officer makes an entry in<\/p>\n
    the daily diary register\/station diary or roznamachar and upon a very<\/p>\n
    limited   criminal   inquiry   registers   the   FIR   within   two   days   or   even<\/p>\n
    otherwise proceeds in accordance with the provisions of the Code.\n<\/p>\n
    74.           The scheme of the Criminal Procedure Code examined in<\/p>\n
    conjunction   with   the   provisions   of   the   Indian   Penal   Code   also<\/p>\n
    provides an inbuilt safeguard against non-registration or undue delay<\/p>\n
    in registering the FIR.  Firstly, in terms of Section 154(3) of the Code,<\/p>\n
    an   informant   or   complainant   has   a   right   to   approach   the   higher<\/p>\n
    authorities   in   the   case   of   non-registration   praying   not   only   for<\/p>\n
    registration but even investigation by a higher authority.    In addition<\/p>\n
    to this, a public servant who disobeys law or direction of law is liable<\/p>\n
    to be proceeded against and punished in terms of Sections 166 and<\/p>\n
    217 of the Indian Penal Code.  This approach will draw equi-balance<\/p>\n
    between the triangular protection projected under the scheme of the<\/p>\n
    Code i.e. protection to victim\/complainant, accused and the society at<\/p>\n
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\n                                              105<\/span><\/p>\n
    large.    On the one hand, non-registration of  a FIR  instantaneously<\/p>\n
    results in harassment to the victim, avoidance of obedience of law as<\/p>\n
    well   and   adversely   affects   the   society   as   it   ultimately   results   in<\/p>\n
    deterioration in law and order.   On the other hand, registration of a<\/p>\n
    cognizable   offence   can   lead   to   instant   arrest   of   the   suspect   and<\/p>\n
    various other consequences which are contemplated in law.   Some<\/p>\n
    times they can even become irreversible and jeopardize the interest<\/p>\n
    and   protection   of   the   suspect   and   also   result  in   social   resentment<\/p>\n
    which adversely affects the administration of criminal justice.\n<\/p>\n
    75.           The law and particularly the criminal law is an instrument<\/p>\n
    to   protect   the   interest   of   the   society.     The   distinction   between   a<\/p>\n
    cognizable offence and non-cognizable offence is to be kept in mind<\/p>\n
    by the Court for proper appreciation of the arguments raised before<\/p>\n
    us.       The   officer   in   charge  of   police   station   has  wide   powers  and<\/p>\n
    complete freedom in investigating the cognizable offence without any<\/p>\n
    check or interference including arresting of the suspect.  While in the<\/p>\n
    case of non cognizable offence, the investigating officer is not entitled<\/p>\n
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\n                                             106<\/span><\/p>\n
    to even take on investigation much less arrest the suspect without the<\/p>\n
    leave of  the Court    of competent jurisdiction.     In order  to prevent<\/p>\n
    abuse of such power it is essential that the discretion given to the<\/p>\n
    officer   in   charge   of   a   police   station   is   limited   to   bare   minimum<\/p>\n
    necessary and the provision is not given undue liberal construction or<\/p>\n
    meaning.   While following the view expressed by the Supreme Court<\/p>\n
    in three Judge Bench cases of  Bhagwant Kishore Joshi (supra)  and<\/p>\n
    Jacob Mathew (supra),   it can safely be stated that the power to make<\/p>\n
    preliminary inquiry to pre-registration of a case can be exceptionally<\/p>\n
    or rarely exercised by the officer in charge of a police station that too<\/p>\n
    after he enters the information in the relevant books like daily diary or<\/p>\n
    general diary as known by different nomenclature at different places,<\/p>\n
    and after concluding the preliminary inquiry expeditiously, preferably<\/p>\n
    not exceeding the period of two days register the FIR in accordance<\/p>\n
    with the law and\/or proceed under other provisions of the Code as is<\/p>\n
    evident from proviso (b) to Section 157(1) of the Code.\n<\/p>\n
    Police Manual <\/p>\n
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\n                                              107<\/span><\/p>\n
    76.           Now   let   us   also   examine   if   the   police   authorities   or<\/p>\n
    investigating agency is controlled by any directions in relation to the<\/p>\n
    registration of a case and conducting investigation.   Section 154(1)<\/p>\n
    contemplates   that   the   information   in   regard   to   commission   of<\/p>\n
    cognizable offence shall be reduced in writing and substance thereof<\/p>\n
    should   be   recorded   in   the   book   prescribed   by   the   competent<\/p>\n
    Government in that behalf. Thus, it is for the Government to notify the<\/p>\n
    format of recording of FIR register.   The learned Counsel appearing<\/p>\n
    for the State placed on record the copy of the prescribed form relating<\/p>\n
    to FIR under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.    This<\/p>\n
    proforma has as many as 13 columns and is required to be signed by<\/p>\n
    the   complainant   and   the   officer   in   charge   of   a   police   station,   and<\/p>\n
    thereafter, within the prescribed period has to be sent to the Court of<\/p>\n
    competent jurisdiction which has to make endorsement thereon.\n<\/p>\n
    77.           The Maharashtra Police Manual Part-III also deal with the<\/p>\n
    subject in question.   Rule 113 in Chapter IV of the Bombay Police<\/p>\n
    Manual,   is  another  provision  which   can   usefully  be  noticed  for  the<\/p>\n
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\n                                             108<\/span><\/p>\n
    purposes   of   better   understanding   of   the   scheme   of   investigation<\/p>\n
    prescribed   under   the   Code   read   in   conjunction   with   the   Standing<\/p>\n
    Orders and the Police Manual.  For registration of the FIRs, the State<\/p>\n
    Government is required to provide two kinds of registers, one is for<\/p>\n
    registration   of   cognizable  offence   and   another   is   for   registration   of<\/p>\n
    non-cognizable offence (Refer Sections 154   and 155 of the Code,<\/p>\n
    respectively.)       Not only this, in terms of Section 157(1), the State<\/p>\n
    Government   is   required   to   prescribe     the   manner   in   which   the<\/p>\n
    Investigating Officer is expected to inform the authorities concerned in<\/p>\n
    the   notified   format,   once   he   decides   not   to   enter   upon   the<\/p>\n
    investigation.   In Standing Order No.6 issued by the Bombay Police,<\/p>\n
    it has been stated, inter alia, that as soon as the information is given,<\/p>\n
    it   should   be   recorded   without   waiting   for   the   appearance   of   the<\/p>\n
    aggrieved party.  It also follows that once the information is given and<\/p>\n
    the   police   machinery   has   been   set   in   motion,   there   can   be   no<\/p>\n
    withdrawal by the aggrieved party of the complaint.   Clause (3) of the<\/p>\n
    said   Standing   Order   further   contemplates   that   where   the   officer<\/p>\n
    himself   either   suspects   commission   of   an   offence   or   has   actually<\/p>\n
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\n                                              109<\/span><\/p>\n
    witnessed the commission thereof though it is not obligatory on his<\/p>\n
    part to record an FIR in terms of Section 154 but it is always desirable<\/p>\n
    even in those cases for him to record an FIR.   In terms of Clause (6)<\/p>\n
    of the said Standing Order, each cognizable offence reported must be<\/p>\n
    registered in the Cognizable Crime Register (P.M. 37e) by the officer<\/p>\n
    recording F.I.R. even if it is treated and disposed of under Section<\/p>\n
    157(1)(b) of the  Code.   Clause 11 of the said  Standing Order has<\/p>\n
    some  relevancy   and   rather   than   referring   to   its   contents,   it  will   be<\/p>\n
    useful to reproduce the said clause:-\n<\/p>\n
               “11.  When   cognizable   offence   is   not   immediately
\n               disclosed. – If the information, through whatever channel<\/p>\n
               received,   does   not   disclose   a   cognizable   offence   but
\n               indicates the necessity for further enquiry, the S. H. O.
\n               should   note   the   information   in   the   Station   Diary   and
\n               make further inquiries; he should proceed to the place<\/p>\n
               concerned   if   necessary.     If   after   such   enquiry,   he   is
\n               satisfied that the facts disclose a cognizable offence, he
\n               should deal with it according to law.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    78.           Rule 113 of Section 3 of Chapter IV of the Bombay Police<\/p>\n
    Manual ( dealing with the investigation of crimes) reads as under:-\n<\/p>\n
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\n                                    110<\/span><\/p>\n
     “113.          First Information of a Cognizable Offence.-\n<\/p>\n
     (1)            Section   154   of   the   Criminal   Procedure<\/p>\n
     Code   requires   that   every   information   of   the
\n     commission of a cognizable offence, when given to the<\/p>\n
     officer in charge of a Police Station, should, if given
\n     orally, be reduced to writing by the officer himself or
\n     under   his   supervision.     It   is   not   necessary   that   the
\n     information must be given necessarily by the person<\/p>\n
     aggrieved   by   the   commission   of   the   offence.\n<\/p>\n
     “Information” as contemplated by the Section is not the
\n     same thing as a “complaint” as defined in Section 4(n)
\n     of   the   Criminal   Procedure   Code.     It   follows   that   as<\/p>\n
     soon as information is given, it should be recorded at
\n     once   without   waiting   for   the   appearance   of   the<\/p>\n
     aggrieved party.   It also follows that once the Police
\n     machinery   has   been   set   in   motion   by   the   giving   of<\/p>\n
     information,   there   can   be   no   withdrawal   by   the
\n     aggrieved party.   Further, it is not necessary that the
\n     information   must   be   given   by   a   person   having   first
\n     hand information of the commission of the offence, so<\/p>\n
     long as the person giving it undertakes responsibilities
\n     entailed by given it.\n<\/p>\n
                   …..         …..          …..\n<\/p>\n
     (12)   It   is   always   advisable,   before   recording   first<\/p>\n
     information, to warn the informant against giving false or
\n     exaggerated   information   and   also   to   give   him   an
\n     opportunity to think coolly what he wishes to say.  If the
\n     information,   through   whatever   channel   received,   does<\/p>\n
     not   disclose   a   cognizable   offence   but   indicates   the
\n     necessity for further enquiry, the Police Station Officer
\n     should   note   the   information   in   the   station   diary   and
\n     proceed to the place concerned; and if after inquiry he is
\n     satisfied that the facts disclose a cognizable offence, he<\/p>\n
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\n                                           111<\/span><\/p>\n
          should deal with it according to law.”\n<\/p>\n
    79.      Rule 115 of the Police Manual reads as under :-\n<\/p>\n
          “115.  Registration of Cognizable Offences. –
\n          (1)   All   cognizable   offences   reported   must   be<\/p>\n
          registered in the Cognizable Crime Register (P.M. 37e)
\n          by   the   officer   in   charge   of   the   Police   Station,   even   if
\n          treated   under   Section   157(1)(b)   of   the   Criminal
\n          Procedure   Code.   (G.R.,   H.D.,   No.   1575\/2   dated   1st<\/p>\n
          September 1937).\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          (2)       There  should be  two  separate  Crime  Registers
\n          maintained, one for Indian Penal Code (Classes I to V)<\/p>\n
          offences   and   the   other   for   Class   VI   offences   in   the
\n          offices   of   the   Superintendents   of   Police   in   charge   of
\n          sub-divisions and Sub-Divisional Police Officers, and in
\n          Police   Station   offices   which   ordinarily   register   200   or<\/p>\n
          more   offences   per   year.   Other   Police   Stations   should
\n          have   only   one   register.   (I.G.’ s   No.   26,   dated   19th<\/p>\n
          December 1946).\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          (4)  Complaints referred to the Police for enquiry under
\n          Section   156   or   202,   Criminal   Procedure   Code   should<\/p>\n
          not be entered in the Superintendent’s        or Sub-Divisional
\n          Officers’ Crime Register, but they should be entered in
\n          the Police Station Crime Register under an `M’ number
\n          at the end.   (G.R. J.D., No. 4086, dated 14th  July 1911<\/p>\n
          and No. 7244, dated 19th December 1911).\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          (5)     Cases   enquired  into   under  Section   174,   Criminal
\n          Procedure Code should be entered into Crime Register,
\n          in a separate portion of the Register reserved for this<\/p>\n
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\n                                        112<\/span><\/p>\n
          purpose.  This portion should be further divided into two
\n          parts   i.e.,   for   (a)   accidental   deaths   and   (b)   other<\/p>\n
          unnatural deaths.  In case there is slightest suspicion of
\n          foul play, offence should be registered.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    80.      Clause 3 of Standing Order No. 34 reads as under :-\n<\/p>\n
          “(3)  Events to be recorded in Station Diary  – Below
\n          are   some   of   the   events   and   occurrences   which   must
\n          necessarily be recorded.  The time of the events should<\/p>\n
          be shown as from 0-00 hours to 24-00 hours and not by
\n          reference to a.m. or p.m. <\/p>\n
               (1)     The   time   of   taking   over   Station   House   Duty<\/p>\n
          mentioning the number of prisoners then in the lock-up,
\n          the firearms and ammunition usually kept in charge of
\n          the Station House Officer for emergencies, the condition
\n          of the lock-up and the amount of bail deposit money or<\/p>\n
          other exhibits taken over from the relieved officer.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
             (2)  The time of registration of all cognizable and non-
\n          cognizable   cases,   showing   the   sections   of   law   under
\n          which they are recorded.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
               (3)     The   arrests   of   suspected   criminals,   deserters,
\n          absconders, vagrants and lunatics, mentioning the time
\n          and   place   and   the   circumstances   of   their   arrest;   the<\/p>\n
          explanations offered by the arrested persons in respect
\n          of the property found with them or about their presence
\n          in the particular place at the time of arrest, their native
\n          place and whether they had previous convictions should
\n          also be recorded.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
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\n                                              113<\/span><\/p>\n
                              ….          …..          …..”<\/p>\n
    81.           Cumulative   reading   of   these   abstracts   of   the   Police<\/p>\n
    Manual as well as that of Standing Orders clearly show that there is<\/p>\n
    an obligation on the part of the Police Officer in charge of a police<\/p>\n
    station to register FIR and once the police machinery has been set in<\/p>\n
    motion, there cannot be reversal of process but it essentially must be<\/p>\n
    taken to its logical end, i.e. filing of a Report under Section 173 of the<\/p>\n
    Code   of   Criminal   Procedure   or   to   a   situation   contemplated   under<\/p>\n
    Section 157(3).   Clause 12 prescribes that if the information through<\/p>\n
    whatever channel received does not disclose a cognizable offence but<\/p>\n
    indicates the necessity for further inquiry, the Police Station Officer<\/p>\n
    should note information in the Station Diary and proceed to concerned<\/p>\n
    place   and   if   after   inquiry   he   is   satisfied   that   the   facts   disclose<\/p>\n
    cognizable offence, he should deal with the matter in accordance with<\/p>\n
    the law.     In other words, there is no much discretion vested in the<\/p>\n
    Officer in charge of a Police Station; it only gives him some leverage<\/p>\n
    in exceptional cases where upon the information received, it is difficult<\/p>\n
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\n                                                 114<\/span><\/p>\n
    for any person of common prudence to say that a cognizable offence<\/p>\n
    at  that  stage is  made  out  and there  may  be need to  look  into  the<\/p>\n
    matter and after proceeding with preliminary inquiry, the information<\/p>\n
    should   be   registered   without   any   further   delay.     Examining   and<\/p>\n
    analyzing from closer angle, there is hardly any variation in the judicial<\/p>\n
    view  and  the language  of the Police Manual and Standing Orders.\n<\/p>\n
    All   these   are   primarily   intended   to   achieve   the   purpose   of   fair<\/p>\n
    investigation   while   ensuring   that   no   member   of   the   society   or<\/p>\n
    informant   or   a   victim   is   put   to   any   inconvenience   or   harassment<\/p>\n
    because  of  inaction  or delayed  action  on  the  part  of   the  Officer  in<\/p>\n
    charge of the Police Station.\n<\/p>\n
    The Law relating to other Countries like Sweeden, United
\n    Kingdom and United States of America.\n<\/p>\n
    82.            The Code of Criminal Procedure and Indian Penal Code<\/p>\n
    control   the   basic   investigation   and   inquiry   or   trial   of   any   criminal<\/p>\n
    offence   in   India.     It   is   in   the   administration   of   criminal   justice,   the<\/p>\n
    prosecution plays a very significant role. In relation to investigation<\/p>\n
                                                                    ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 13:57:22 :::<\/span>
\n                                             115<\/span><\/p>\n
    and prosecution of criminal charges, the role of prosecutor is limited<\/p>\n
    to   the   proceedings   in   a   trial   before   the   Court   of   Competent<\/p>\n
    Jurisdiction.   In the statutes and the practice adopted under certain<\/p>\n
    other   systems   particularly   like   U.K.,   U.S.A.   and   Sweden,   etc.,   the<\/p>\n
    Public Prosecutors plays a role of greatest significance and to a large<\/p>\n
    extent   they   control   even   investigation,   and   particularly   process   of<\/p>\n
    filing   of   a   charge   sheet   before   the   competent   Court.     Preliminary<\/p>\n
    inquiry, pre-registration of a FIR or recording of a substantive report,<\/p>\n
    is   not   entirely   unknown   under  the   scheme  of   criminal   investigation<\/p>\n
    even in other parts of the world.   The laws, in United Kingdom, which<\/p>\n
    are of some relevance, can be referred at this juncture.   The Police<\/p>\n
    and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984 deals with the powers of police and<\/p>\n
    the   investigating   agency   in   relation   to   search,   seizure,   arrest,<\/p>\n
    detention and various other matters relating to collection of evidence<\/p>\n
    and even exclusion of unfair evidence and Criminal Justice and Public<\/p>\n
    Order   Act,   1994   and   Criminal   Justice   and   Public   Order   Act,   1994<\/p>\n
    explain the powers of police and the investigating agency in relation<\/p>\n
    to search, seizure, arrest, detention and various other matters relating<\/p>\n
                                                             ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 13:57:22 :::<\/span>
\n                                               116<\/span><\/p>\n
    to collection of evidence and even exclusion of unfair evidence.  The<\/p>\n
    former   Act   mainly   deals   with   the   investigation   and   powers   of   the<\/p>\n
    Investigating Officer while the latter deals with the procedure adopted<\/p>\n
    in   Court,   Imputations   on   character   and   Course   of   Justice,         Pre-\n<\/p>\n
    charge   consultation   between   the   Investigators   and   duty   of<\/p>\n
    Prosecutors.     (Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 – 1994<\/p>\n
    Chapter 33 – https:\/\/www.opsi.gov.uk\/)  <\/p>\n
                  Guidelines in accordance with the very law in relation to<\/p>\n
    83.<\/p>\n
    making a report read as under:-\n<\/p>\n
                  “How to make a Report –\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                  The   victim   can   report   a   crime   to   the   police   by
\n                  phoning the police station, going into the local police<\/p>\n
                  station,   or   by   phoning   999.     It   is  also   possible   to
\n                  report   a   crime   online   at  www.police.uk.     A   friend,
\n                  relative or witness may also make a complaint  on
\n                  behalf of the victim.  The victim will need to give the<\/p>\n
                  police   full   details   and   information   about   what
\n                  happened.  However, the victim’s complaint may not
\n                  go any further if the police do not believe that they
\n                  have enough information to proceed.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                  Giving Statement –\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
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\n                                            117<\/span><\/p>\n
                 If the police have reasonable grounds to believe that<\/p>\n
                 an   offence   has   been   committed   they   will   need   to
\n                 take a formal statement from the victim.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                 The   victim   will   be   required   to   attend   the   police
\n                 station and sit in an interview room with at least one
\n                 police   officer   and   give   her   account   of   what<\/p>\n
                 happened.   In some circumstances the police  can
\n                 attend   her   home   and   take   a   statement   from   her.
\n                 With   certain   types   of   cases,   such   as   sexual
\n                 offences,   the   police   may   need   to   ask   the   victim<\/p>\n
                 intimate   questions   about   the   offence   committed
\n                 against her.   She will also then be asked to check<\/p>\n
                 and sign her statement.   This statement will be the
\n                 basis of the complaint against the accused.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                 Some police stations have special facilities for cases
\n                 involving   sexual   violence,   such   as   a   rape   suite,
\n                 specially   trained   police   officers   and   rape   victim<\/p>\n
                 chaperones.     These   should   be   more   informal
\n                 surroundings   and   the   police   involved   should   have<\/p>\n
                 experience of dealing with these types of cases.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                 What will happen Next –\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                 Once a formal statement has been made the police will
\n                 begin to investigate the offence.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    84.          In Sweden, the police often lead the criminal investigation<\/p>\n
    and   once   the   police   officers   have   reached   the   stage   at   which<\/p>\n
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\n                                               118<\/span><\/p>\n
    someone   can   be   reasonably   suspected   of   having   committed   the<\/p>\n
    offence, a prosecutor takes over the preliminary investigation work. In<\/p>\n
    Stockholm, once a crime has come to the attention of the police, a<\/p>\n
    preliminary investigation is initiated.  The object is to find out who can<\/p>\n
    be   suspected   of   the   crime   and   whether   or   not   there   is   sufficient<\/p>\n
    evidence   to   initiate   an   action.   The   procedure   for   reporting<\/p>\n
    investigation and its presentation before the Court is well explained.\n<\/p>\n
    85.           All reports of incidents, whether from victims, witnesses or<\/p>\n
    third   parties   and   whether   crime   related   or   not,   will   result   in   the<\/p>\n
    registration   of   an   incident   report   by  the   police.   Following   the   initial<\/p>\n
    registration, an incident will be recorded as a crime (notifiable offence)<\/p>\n
    if,   on   the   balance   of   probabilities,   the   circumstances   amount   to   a<\/p>\n
    crime   as   defined   by   law   and   there   is   no   credible   evidence   to   the<\/p>\n
    contrary.       Once   recorded,   a   crime   would   remain   recorded   unless<\/p>\n
    there was additional verifiable information to disprove that a crime had<\/p>\n
    occurred.     (   25302   Procedure   –   Investigation   of   Volume   Crime   –\n<\/p>\n
    https:\/\/www.hampshire.polio.uk\/NR) <\/p>\n
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\n                                            119<\/span><\/p>\n
    86.          The   structure   of   criminal   investigations   can   be   either<\/p>\n
    reactive,   where   the   police   respond   to   a   crime   that   has   already<\/p>\n
    occurred, or proactive, where the investigation may go on before and<\/p>\n
    during   the   commission   of   the   offence.       The   reactive   criminal<\/p>\n
    investigation process can be organized into several stages.   The first<\/p>\n
    stage is initial discovery and response.  Of course, before the criminal<\/p>\n
    investigation process can begin, the police must discover that a crime<\/p>\n
    occurred or the victim (or witness) must realize that a crime occurred<\/p>\n
    and notify the police.  The second stage is the initial investigation and<\/p>\n
    it follows in different subsequent stages.    (Law Library – American<\/p>\n
    Law   &   Legal   Information   –   “https:\/\/law.jrank.org\/pages\/1655\/Police-\n<\/p>\n
    Criminal-Investigations-Structure            criminal   -investigations.html”><\/p>\n
    Police: )<\/p>\n
    87.          The above references suggest that reporting a matter to<\/p>\n
    the police by itself may not amount to recording of a formal statement.\n<\/p>\n
    The police officers need to believe that they have enough information<\/p>\n
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\n                                             120<\/span><\/p>\n
    to   proceed   with   the   commission   of   a   crime   involved.       There   is<\/p>\n
    sufficient scope provided in law for the police officer investigating the<\/p>\n
    offence to satisfy himself before recording a formal statement, which<\/p>\n
    in turn  commences the police investigation of the offence.     Some<\/p>\n
    element  of   discretion,  of  course,  which  is required  to  be  exercised<\/p>\n
    fairly and in accordance with law, admits our procedure.     We have<\/p>\n
    already noticed that in order to register a FIR in accordance with the<\/p>\n
    provisions of Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the only<\/p>\n
    condition   precedent   is   that   the   information   should   relate   to<\/p>\n
    commission   of   a   cognizable   offence.     To   proceed   with   an<\/p>\n
    investigation further in terms of Section 157, the information received<\/p>\n
    by the police officer in charge of a police station should have reason<\/p>\n
    to   suspect   the   commission   of   offence,   which   he   is   empowered   to<\/p>\n
    investigate   under   Section   156   of   the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure.\n<\/p>\n
    There   appears   to   be   some   substance   in   the   submissions   of   the<\/p>\n
    respondents   that   the   officer   in   charge   of   a   police   station   gets<\/p>\n
    jurisdiction to investigate only upon information relating to commission<\/p>\n
    of a cognizable offence.     The possibility of an officer examining the<\/p>\n
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\n                                              121<\/span><\/p>\n
    matter   and   assuring   himself   of   suspecting   or   commission   of   a<\/p>\n
    cognizable offence restricted inquiry in some extra ordinary situations<\/p>\n
    cannot   absolutely   be   ruled   out.       The   Scheme   of   Criminal<\/p>\n
    Investigation, as referred above, is that the Police officer in charge of<\/p>\n
    a   police   station   must   register   the   case   without   delay   and   in   fact<\/p>\n
    instantaneously.   The need to take recourse to exceptional situation<\/p>\n
    has to be very rare and that too subject to the specified limitations.\n<\/p>\n
    Law of Precedent<\/p>\n
    88.           The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners made<\/p>\n
    an attempt to convince us that the judgments of the Supreme Court<\/p>\n
    permitting   a   preliminary   inquiry   pre-registration   of   an   FIR   are   the<\/p>\n
    judgments   in   their   own   facts   and   cannot   be   applied   to   create<\/p>\n
    precedent to the cases in hand.       According to him, the judgments<\/p>\n
    taking the contrary view of the Supreme Court and relied upon by him<\/p>\n
    can be adopted by this Court as a correct principle of law and thus<\/p>\n
    should be followed.       He placed reliance upon the judgment in the<\/p>\n
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\n                                           122<\/span><\/p>\n
    case of  Amarnath Omprakash vs State of  Punjab,  (1985)1 SCC 345<\/p>\n
    and  Sangam Tape Co. vs Hans Raj,<\/a>    (2005) 4 SCC 331.   However,<\/p>\n
    while describing the above submissions without any basis on behalf<\/p>\n
    of the State it was contended that the views of the Larger Benches of<\/p>\n
    the   Supreme   Court   would   be   binding   as   they   have   enunciated   a<\/p>\n
    principle of law which has subsequently  been followed even in the<\/p>\n
    latest   judgment   of   the   Supreme   Court   in  Rajendra   Singh’s case<\/p>\n
    (supra), the same principle has been adopted and we should follow<\/p>\n
    that principle alone.\n<\/p>\n
    89.          In relation to Law of Precedent, it is a settled principle that<\/p>\n
    a judgment would be applicable as precedent to the subsequent case<\/p>\n
    only   where  ratio   decidendi  is   squarely   applicable   on   facts   to   a<\/p>\n
    subsequent case.  A Division Bench of Punjab High Court in the case<\/p>\n
    of   Rohtash   vs   State   of   Haryana   and   others<\/a>,  Civil   Writ   Petition<\/p>\n
    No.2936 of 2002, decided on 7th  March 2002 placed in somewhat<\/p>\n
    similar situation, held as under:-\n<\/p>\n
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\n                                          123<\/span><\/p>\n
     “…   The   obligation   upon   the   court   to   follow   the
\n     precedent   law   is   subject   to   well   accepted   limitation.\n<\/p>\n
     These limitations play an effective role for helping the
\n     court to provide sound reasoning, wherever there are<\/p>\n
     divergent  view taken  by  equi-benches of  the  highest
\n     court of land. One pertinent principle, as enunciated by
\n     the   Hon’b    le   Apex   Court   is   that   the   judgment
\n     pronounced by a later bench should normally hold the<\/p>\n
     field   and   particularly   when   the   judgment   of   the   later
\n     bench is a reasoned one and applies to the facts of the
\n     subsequent cases.  The Hon’          ble Supreme Court in this
\n     case held as under :-\n<\/p>\n
          “…. Precedents which enunciate rules of law<\/p>\n
          form the foundation of administration of justice
\n          under   our   system.   This   is   a   fundamental<\/p>\n
          principle   which   every   Presiding   Officer   of   a
\n          Judicial Forum ought to know, for consistency
\n          in   interpretation   of   law   alone   can   lead   to
\n          public confidence in our judicial system.  This<\/p>\n
          Court has laid down time and again precedent
\n          law   must   be   followed   by   all   concerned;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          deviation from the same should be only on a
\n          procedure known to law. A subordinate Court
\n          is bound by the enunciation of law made by
\n          the superior Courts.  A coordinate Bench of a<\/p>\n
          Court cannot pronounce judgment contrary to
\n          declaration of law made by another Bench.  It
\n          can   only   refer   it   to   a   larger   Bench   if   it
\n          disagrees with the earlier pronouncement<\/p>\n
          ……            ………..                  ……….\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          We are indeed sorry to note the attitude of the
\n          tribunal  in   this  case  which  after   noticing  the<\/p>\n
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\n                                              124<\/span><\/p>\n
                  earlier   judgment   of   a   coordinate   Bench   and
\n                  after noticing the judgment of this Court, has<\/p>\n
                  still   thought   it   fit   to   proceed   to   take   a   view
\n                  totally contrary to the view taken in the earlier<\/p>\n
                  judgment   thereby   creating   a   judicial
\n                  uncertainty in regard to the declaration of law
\n                  involved   in   this   case.     Because   of   this
\n                  approach of the later Bench of the tribunal in<\/p>\n
                  this case, a lot of valuable time of the Court is
\n                  wasted and the parties to this case have been
\n                  put to considerable hardship……”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                          The Hon’
\n                                 ble Apex Court further observed that a
\n             caution need to be taken while applying the principle of<\/p>\n
             judicial   precedents   as   decision   of   the   court   and   its
\n             observations   must   be   read   in   context   in   which   they<\/p>\n
             appear. In the judgment discussion is made to explain
\n             and   not   to   define.   In   this   regard   reference   can   be
\n             made to the case of Haryana Financial Corporation &
\n             Anr. v. M\/s  Jagdamba Oil Mills & Anr.  J.T.<\/a>  2002 (1)<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
             484.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    90.         A   Full   Bench   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of  M\/s   Emkay<\/p>\n
    Exports vs Madhusudan Shrikrishna, Appeal No.370 of<\/a> 2007 decided<\/p>\n
    on 26th June 2008, held as under : –\n<\/p>\n
             “6. The concept of precedent has attained important
\n             role   in   administration   of   justice   in   the   modern   times.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
             The   case   before   the   Court   should   be   decided   in
\n             accordance with law and the doctrines.   The mind of<\/p>\n
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\n                                      125<\/span><\/p>\n
     the Court should be clearly reflecting on the material in
\n     issue with regard to the facts of the case.  The reason<\/p>\n
     and   spirit   of   case   make   law   and   not   the   letter   of   a
\n     particular   precedent.     Halsbury’        s   “The   Laws   of<\/p>\n
     England”,   explained   the   word   “ratio   decidendi”  as   “It
\n     may be laid down as a general rule that that part alone
\n     of a decision by a Court of Law is binding upon Courts
\n     of   coordinate   jurisdiction   and   inferior   Courts   which<\/p>\n
     consists of the enunciation of the reason or principle
\n     upon  which   the  question  before  the   Court   has  really
\n     been   determined.     This   underlying   principle   which
\n     forms the only authoritative element of a precedent is<\/p>\n
     often termed the ratio decidendi.”  It is by the choice of
\n     material   facts   that   the   Court   create   law.   The   law   so<\/p>\n
     created   would   be   a   good   precedent   for   similar
\n     subsequent cases unless it falls within the exceptions<\/p>\n
     hereinafter indicated.\n<\/p>\n
     7.      The doctrine of precedent  relates to following of
\n     previous decisions within its   limitations.   It introduces<\/p>\n
     the concept of finality and adherence to the previous
\n     decisions and while attaining it, it creates consistency<\/p>\n
     in   application   of   law.   The   later   judgment   should   be
\n     similar to the earlier judgment, which on material facts
\n     are   the   same.   Finding  ratio   decidendi  is   not   a
\n     mechanical   process   but   an   art   which   one   gradually<\/p>\n
     acquires through practice.   What is really involved in
\n     finding the  ratio decidendi  of a case is the process of
\n     abstraction.   Ratio decidendi is a term used in contrast
\n     to obiter dictum which is not necessarily binding in law.\n<\/p>\n
     According   to   Sir   John       Salmond,   “a  precedent   is   a
\n     judicial   decision,   which   contains   in   itself   a   principle.
\n     The only principle which forms its authoritative element
\n     is   often   termed   the  `ratio   decidendi’  .       The   concrete
\n     decision is binding between the parties to it, but it is the<\/p>\n
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\n                                            126<\/span><\/p>\n
            abstract  ratio   decidendi  which   alone  has  the   force   of
\n            law as regards the world at large”. According to Austin,<\/p>\n
            the   general   reasons   or   principles   of   judicial   decision
\n            abstracted from peculiarities of the case are commonly<\/p>\n
            styled by writers on jurisprudence as `ratio decidendi’          .\n<\/p>\n
            8.     Amongst   the   principles   of   law   governing   the
\n            binding   value   of   judgments,   doctrine   of   precedent   is<\/p>\n
            not   only   a   well   accepted   principle   but   is   one   of   the
\n            most pertinent facets of judicial interpretation.  A ruling
\n            of Bench of higher court is considered to be binding on
\n            the lower courts and the courts having a smaller Bench<\/p>\n
            structure.     Earlier   judgments   are   even   taken   to   be
\n            binding   on   subsequent   equi   Bench   unless   and   until<\/p>\n
            reasons   compelling   for   taking   a   divergent   view   are
\n            stated.  To apply this principle, the court must examine<\/p>\n
            by   process   of   appropriate   reasoning   as   to   the
\n            applicability of the precedent cited before the court or
\n            even which of the views expressed by a higher court or
\n            even a larger Bench or even a Bench of equi strength<\/p>\n
            is more aptly applicable to the facts and circumstances
\n            of the case in hand.  The essence of law of precedent<\/p>\n
            is its applicability on the basis of ratio decidendi.  The
\n            importance   and   significance   of   adherence   to   law   of
\n            precedent was emphasized by the Supreme Court in
\n            the   case   of  S.I.   Rooplal   and   another   v.   Lt.   Governor<\/p>\n
            through  Chief   Secretary,   Delhi   and  others,  A.I.R.   2000
\n            SC 594.\n<\/p>\n
    91.        Where there are conflicting or divergent views, the Court<\/p>\n
    has freedom to pick up any view which applies to the facts of the case<\/p>\n
                                                               ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 13:57:22 :::<\/span>
\n                                          127<\/span><\/p>\n
    which it has dealt with.  It will be useful to refer to a dictum stated by a<\/p>\n
    Division Bench of this Court in the case of  Mansing Surajsingh Padvi<\/p>\n
    vs The State of Maharashtra,<\/a> 1968 Bom. L.R. 654, where the Court not<\/p>\n
    only discussed in detail the Law of Precedent but even outlined the<\/p>\n
    rudiment which will be applicable for following law of precedent in the<\/p>\n
    event of conflicting views. The Court observed :\n<\/p>\n
             ”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                     We   do   not   find   it   possible   to   accept   this
\n             argument. The ratio of Jayvantisinghji’        s case must be<\/p>\n
             deduced on a consideration of the judgments of those
\n             Judges who favoured the final decision of the Court,
\n             i.e.   Sinha   C.J.   And   Das   and   Ayyangar   JJ.     In
\n             Salmond’   s Jurisprudence, 12th  ed. the learned author<\/p>\n
             has observed (p. 183) :\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                   “Where there are several different judgments, as
\n             in a case on appeal, the ratio must be ascertained from
\n             the judgments of those in favour of the final decision”.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                    …..               ……               ……\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
             “….. To say that such an express decision on a point of<\/p>\n
             law has no binding authority amounts to an assertion
\n             that a point of law decided by a Court ceases to be a
\n             binding   precedent   if   it   is   shown   that   a   particular
\n             argument was not considered in deciding the point. An
\n             assertion to that effect is clearly wrong. In Somavanti<\/p>\n
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\n                                           128<\/span><\/p>\n
            v.   State   of   Punjab,   Mudholkar   J.   delivering   the
\n            judgment of the majority of the Supreme Court said (p.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
            794) :\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                  “….   The   binding   effect   of   a   decision   does   not
\n            depend   upon   whether   a   particular   argument   was
\n            considered therein or not, provided that the point with
\n            reference   to   which   an   argument   was   subsequently<\/p>\n
            advanced was actually decided.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                   …..         …..          …..\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
            “…. It is well established that when a case is decided
\n            on two grounds, both the grounds constitute the ratio<\/p>\n
            of the case.  We are thus unable to reconcile the ratios
\n            of the two cases of the Supreme Court and are faced<\/p>\n
            with the unhappy task of choosing between them.  The
\n            duty of a lower Court in such an eventuality has been
\n            thus   stated   in   Salmond   on   Jurisprudence,   12th  ed.,
\n            page 153:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                   “Where   authorities   of   equal   standing   are<\/p>\n
            irreconcilably  in  conflict,  a  lower  court has the  same
\n            freedom   to   pick   and   choose   between   them   as   the
\n            schizophrenic court itself.  The lower court may refuse
\n            to follow the later decision on the ground that it is the<\/p>\n
            latest authority.  Which of these two courses the court
\n            adopts depends, or should depend, upon its own view
\n            of what the law ought to be.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    92.        In the case of Union of India v. K.S. Subramanian,<\/a> (1976)<\/p>\n
    3 SCC 677, the Supreme Court held as under : –\n<\/p>\n
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\n                                                129<\/span><\/p>\n
              “12.   We do not think that the difficulty before the High
\n              Court   could   be   resolved   by   it   by   following   what   it<\/p>\n
              considered to be the view of a Division Bench of this
\n              Court in two cases and by merely quoting the views
\n              expressed  by  larger  benches  of  this  Court   and   then
\n              observing that these were insufficient for deciding the<\/p>\n
              point before the High Court.  It is true that, in each of
\n              the cases cited before the High Court, observations of
\n              this Court occur in a context different from that of the
\n              case  before  us.    But,  we  do  not  think that  the  High<\/p>\n
              Court acted correctly in skirting the views expressed
\n              by larger benches of this Court in the manner in which<\/p>\n
              it had done this.  The proper course for a High Court,
\n              in   such   a   case,   is   to   try   to   find   out   and   follow   the<\/p>\n
              opinions expressed by larger benches of this Court in
\n              preference to those expressed by smaller benches of
\n              the Court.   That is the practice followed by this Court
\n              itself.  The practice has now crystallized into a rule of<\/p>\n
              law declared by this Court.  If, however, the High Court
\n              was   of   opinion   that   the   views   expressed   by   larger<\/p>\n
              benches of this Court were not applicable to the facts
\n              of   the   instant   case   it   should   have   said   so   giving
\n              reasons supporting its point of view.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    93.          Similar view was expressed in the case of State of U.P. vs<\/p>\n
    Ramchandra,<\/a>  (1976)   4   SCC   52.    Division   Bench   of   this   Court   in<\/p>\n
    Rajendra Mansukhlal vs Commissioner of Police Greater Bombay,<\/a>  1988<\/p>\n
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\n                                              130<\/span><\/p>\n
    Mh.L. J. 1988 and Full Bench of this Court in Kamaleshkumar Patel vs<\/p>\n
    Union of  India,  1994  Mh.L.   J.  1699,  have  taken   somewhat  similar<\/p>\n
    view.\n<\/p>\n
    Conclusion And Discussions On Merits<\/p>\n
    94.           Keeping in view the above settled cannons of applicability<\/p>\n
    of Law of Precedent, we have made a humble attempt to reconcile<\/p>\n
    the   different   views   expressed   and   carved   out   a   balanced   and   a<\/p>\n
    practical   view   which   would   achieve   the   object   of   fair   investigation<\/p>\n
    while   adhering   to   principles   of   Criminal   Jurisprudence   and   without<\/p>\n
    compromising powers of the Investigating Officer as prescribed under<\/p>\n
    the Code but fully securing the interest of a victim and a complainant.\n<\/p>\n
    The   Larger   Benches   of   the   Supreme   Court   while   interpreting   the<\/p>\n
    provisions of Section 154 accepted the concept of preliminary inquiry<\/p>\n
    pre-registration,     of   course,   within   a   very   limited   scope   and   for   a<\/p>\n
    definite purpose. This is to be adopted in rare and exceptional cases.\n<\/p>\n
    The   absolute   rule   will   be   wherever   the   information   in   relation   to<\/p>\n
    commission of a cognizable offence is disclosed, the same ought to<\/p>\n
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\n                                            131<\/span><\/p>\n
    be registered immediately.         In the case of  Jacob Mathews (supra),<\/p>\n
    the findings and conclusions are clear and unambiguous.  Of course<\/p>\n
    they are meant for class of persons i.e. Medical Practitioners but it is<\/p>\n
    founded on a construction and interpretation of provision of Section<\/p>\n
    154 which do not change with the class of persons.   This case may<\/p>\n
    not entirely support its applicability to all class of cases but certainly is<\/p>\n
    indicative   of   acceptance   of   concept   of   preliminary   inquiry   pre-\n<\/p>\n
    registration of FIR.   Such a view was even stated earlier with clearer<\/p>\n
    dictum in the case of  Sevi vs State of Tamil Nadu,   1981 Suppl. SCC<\/p>\n
    43, where the Court held as under: –\n<\/p>\n
              “3. One of the disturbing features of the case is the
\n              strange conduct of PW 15 the Sub-Inspector of Police.
\n              According   to   him   he   was   told   by   PW   10   on   the
\n              telephone that there was some rioting at Kottaiyur and<\/p>\n
              that some persons were stabbed.  He made an entry in
\n              the   general   diary   and   proceeded   to   Kottaiyur   taking
\n              with   him   the   FIR   book,   the   hospital   memo   book   etc.
\n              This was indeed very extraordinary conduct on the part<\/p>\n
              of the Sub-Inspector of Police.   If he was not satisfied
\n              with   the   information   given   by   PW   10   that   any
\n              cognizable offence had been committed he was quite
\n              right   in   making   an   entry   in   the   general   diary   and
\n              proceeding   to   the   village   to   verify   the   information<\/p>\n
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\n                                               132<\/span><\/p>\n
               without registering any FIR.  But, we have yet not come
\n               across any case where an officer in-charge of a police<\/p>\n
               station   has   carried   with   him   the   FIR   book.     The   first
\n               information report book is supposed to be at the Police<\/p>\n
               Station House all the time.   If the Sub-Inspector is not
\n               satisfied   on   the   information   received   by   him   that   a
\n               cognizable offence has been committed and wants to
\n               verify the information his duty is to make an entry in the<\/p>\n
               general   diary,   proceed   to   the   village   and   take   a
\n               complaint   at   the   village   from   someone   who   is   in   a
\n               position   to   give   a   report   about   the   commission   of   a
\n               cognizable offence.  Thereafter, the ordinary procedure<\/p>\n
               is to send the report to the police station.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    The bare reading of this view, in light of the judgment of the Supreme<\/p>\n
    Court pronounced by the larger Benches, fully support the view that<\/p>\n
    we have taken.\n<\/p>\n
    95.           By   following   the   view   of   the   larger   Bench   in  Bhagwant<\/p>\n
    Kishor   Joshi’s
\n                     case   (supra)  as   well   as   following   latest   view   of   the<\/p>\n
                                            case (supra), we are not in
\n    Supreme court in Rajendra Singh Katoch’s<\/p>\n
    any way suggesting the correctness or otherwise of the other view.  In<\/p>\n
    our   humble   opinion,   the   views   of   the   larger   Bench   and   the   latest<\/p>\n
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\n                                             133<\/span><\/p>\n
    Bench can more appropriately be followed by this Court.\n<\/p>\n
    96.           The   analytical   examination   and   interpretation   of   the<\/p>\n
    relevant provisions of law seen in light of the judgments of the larger<\/p>\n
    Benches as well as latest judicial dictum expressed by the Supreme<\/p>\n
    Court’s
\n            smaller Benches, does in definite terms indicate and support<\/p>\n
    the view that there is no prohibition in law for a police officer in charge<\/p>\n
    of   a   police  station  to   make   a   preliminary  inquiry  pre-registration   of<\/p>\n
    FIR.   Though   obligation   on   the   part   of   the   police   officer   to<\/p>\n
    record\/register   information   in   regard   to   cognizable   offence<\/p>\n
    instantaneously is absolute, still there is an exception, of course, a<\/p>\n
    very  rare one.    In those  extra ordinary  cases  which will fall in this<\/p>\n
    exception, the investigating officer is expected to act fairly, objectively<\/p>\n
    and with unequivocal intention and commitment to uphold the rule of<\/p>\n
    law for maintaining norms of administration of criminal justice.   The<\/p>\n
    officer  is  expected  to act  without  undue  delay and without  causing<\/p>\n
    prejudice to any of the parties affected in that process.\n<\/p>\n
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\n                                             134<\/span><\/p>\n
    97.           The concept of pre-registration inquiry is not unknown to<\/p>\n
    law.   Even   the   systems   of   other   countries   suggest   that   such   an<\/p>\n
    approach is not opposed to settled canons of criminal jurisprudence.\n<\/p>\n
    Undoubtedly,  a communi observantia non est recedendum is the maxim<\/p>\n
    controlling the provisions of  Section 154 of the Criminal Procedure<\/p>\n
    Code.  Any how, we are not concerned with the factual matrix of the<\/p>\n
    cases referred as they would have to be dealt with by the referring<\/p>\n
    Bench in accordance with law, but without any hesitation we notice<\/p>\n
    that   in   the   case   of  Vimal   Appaso   Lohar,  Writ   Petition  No.2031  of<\/p>\n
    2007,   where alleged accused in another case died in police custody<\/p>\n
    and non registration of the FIR regarding custodial  death does not<\/p>\n
    stand to any plausible reason.  Such kinds of cases by any stretch of<\/p>\n
    law  or   even   imagination   would   not   fall   within   the   limited   exception<\/p>\n
    stated by us.\n<\/p>\n
    98.           The   purpose   of   preliminary   inquiry   pre-registration   is   to<\/p>\n
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\n                                            135<\/span><\/p>\n
    avoid absurd results, avoid undue harassment to any person at the<\/p>\n
    behest   of   unscrupulous   complainant   and\/or   where   the   information<\/p>\n
    given   patently   does   not   disclose   a   cognizable   offence   and<\/p>\n
    necessitates   some   kind   of   inquiry   to   finally   bring   the   alleged<\/p>\n
    occurrence within or outside the definition of a cognizable offence as<\/p>\n
    that is sine qua non for registering a case and putting into motion the<\/p>\n
    police investigating machinery.  Patent falsity may again be a ground<\/p>\n
    for providing time for the complainant as well as the officer concerned<\/p>\n
    to   act   in   accordance   with   law   without   delay.     A   patently   false<\/p>\n
    information   or   an   information   leading   to   absurd   results   has   twin<\/p>\n
    consequences.     It   may   expose   the   informant   to   penal   action   in<\/p>\n
    accordance with law in the event of giving a false information.   The<\/p>\n
    other   being   that   on   such   information   the   entire   investigation<\/p>\n
    machinery is unnecessarily put to motion which in terms of law has to<\/p>\n
    be taken to its logical end.  The Supreme Court in Bhagwant K Joshi’
\n                                                                       s<\/p>\n
    case (supra) said that :\n<\/p>\n
              “This   graphic   description   of   the   stages;   is   only   a<\/p>\n
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\n                                             136<\/span><\/p>\n
              restatement of the principle that a vague information or
\n              as irresponsible rumour would  not in itself  constitute<\/p>\n
              information within the meaning of S. 154 of the Code
\n              or the basis for an investigation under S.157 thereof.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    The   information   thus   has   to   be   in   relation   to   commission   of   a<\/p>\n
    cognizable   offence   and   not   an   irresponsible   information   or   an<\/p>\n
    information which in law cannot form the basis for setting the requisite<\/p>\n
    investigation   mechanism   into   action.   Even   in   all   these   cases,   the<\/p>\n
    officer   in   charge   of   a   police   station   shall   have   to   and   without<\/p>\n
    exception   make   an   entry   in   the   daily   diary   register\/station<\/p>\n
    diary\/roznamachar as well as record the action taken in furtherance<\/p>\n
    thereto.  After some time and in our opinion not exceeding two days,<\/p>\n
    the   investigating   officer   either   should   register   regular   case   by<\/p>\n
    registration of a FIR or follow the other permissible course in terms of<\/p>\n
    the Code of Criminal Procedure. The purpose of every investigation in<\/p>\n
    relation   to   a   commission   of   crime   or   even   suspicion   in   that<\/p>\n
    investigation has to be just, fair and expeditious.  The purpose of an<\/p>\n
    investigation and\/or any inquiry for that matter is to attain the truth.\n<\/p>\n
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\n                                               137<\/span><\/p>\n
    The interpretation of law so given necessarily accept the maxim ut res<\/p>\n
    valeat potius pereat.   Thus, an approach which will help to further all<\/p>\n
    the   object   of   law   would   be   in   the   public   interest   and   would   avoid<\/p>\n
    abuse   of   the   process   adopted   in   relation   to   a   procedural   law.\n<\/p>\n
    Arbitrary will or even a bit of discretion neither vests nor can ever be<\/p>\n
    intended   to   vest   in   a   police   officer   while   exercising   his  power   and<\/p>\n
    authority under the provisions of Sections 154 to 157 of the Code.\n<\/p>\n
    Absolute rigidity may not give desired results as ultimately fair play<\/p>\n
    could   be   the   sufferer.     Reference   can   aptly   be   made   to   the<\/p>\n
    observations of Sir James Macintosh, a philosopher as under :-\n<\/p>\n
               “There is not, in my opinion, in the whole compass of
\n               human affairs, so noble a spectacle as that which is
\n               displayed in the progress of jurisprudence. Where we<\/p>\n
               may   contemplate   the   cautious   and   unwearied
\n               exertions of wise men through a long course of ages,
\n               withdrawing   every   case   as   it   arises   from   the
\n               dangerous   power   of   discretion   and   subjecting   it   to
\n               inflexible   rule,   extending   the   dominion   of   justice   and<\/p>\n
               reason, and gradually contacting within the narrowest
\n               possible limits, the domain of brutal force and arbitrary
\n               will.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
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\n                                             138<\/span><\/p>\n
    99.          The Court has wide powers in terms of Section 482 of the<\/p>\n
    Code. In exercise of  its inherent jurisdiction, the  Court  has passed<\/p>\n
    orders quashing FIRs, over-seeing the investigation with an intention<\/p>\n
    to ensure that interest of justice does not suffer. This inherent powers<\/p>\n
    of the Court in relation to quashing of a FIR have categorically spelt<\/p>\n
    out the ground like where the allegations in the report or the complaint<\/p>\n
    taken on its face value and accepted in their entirity do not constitute<\/p>\n
    the offence alleged.   (See  Abasaheb Yadav Honmane vs The State of<\/p>\n
    Maharashtra and<\/a> another,  2008 (2) Mh. L. J. 856).         Similarly it is<\/p>\n
    expected of an officer in charge of a police station in relation to the<\/p>\n
    information received by him to examine that a cognizable offence had<\/p>\n
    been committed or is suspected to have been committed.   The Court<\/p>\n
    will have to keep in mind that the police has a dual function and duties<\/p>\n
    to discharge.  Prevention of crime is one of the most important facets<\/p>\n
    of the police force, while on the other hand it is to investigate crimes<\/p>\n
    committed.     It   appears   to   us   that   the   scheme   of   the   Code   does<\/p>\n
    provide   some,   but   very   limited   element   of   discretion   to   the<\/p>\n
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\n                                              139<\/span><\/p>\n
    investigating officer which has to be based upon appropriate reasons,<\/p>\n
    which has to be exercised fairly and in fact judiciously in the larger<\/p>\n
    public   interest   and   in   compliance   with   the   principles   of   criminal<\/p>\n
    jurisprudence.\n<\/p>\n
    100.          The   Order   of   Reference   to   a   larger   Bench   specifically<\/p>\n
    refers to Clauses (a) and (b) of Paragraph 57 of the judgment of the
\n                                   ig           s case (supra).  Different
\n    Division Bench of this Court in Shyam Sundar’<\/p>\n
    questions were discussed and diverse directions were issued under<\/p>\n
    Paragraph 57 of the judgment with which we are really not concerned<\/p>\n
    stricto senso.  The referring Bench pin-pointed the direction related to<\/p>\n
    registration of FIR.   Thus, in other words, the extent of liberty to the<\/p>\n
    officer in charge of a police station in the matter of registration of FIR<\/p>\n
    is the core issue before us.   The Division Bench in  Shyam Sundar’
\n                                                                      s<\/p>\n
    case   (supra)   felt   that   there   was   some   liberty.     While   the   referring<\/p>\n
    Bench noticed the judgment of the Supreme Court in  Prakash Singh<\/p>\n
    Badal’
\n         s  case (supra) and found that the view of the Bench in  Shyam<\/p>\n
    Sundar’s
\n            case  (supra) required reconsideration and therefore referred<\/p>\n
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\n                                             140<\/span><\/p>\n
    the matter to a larger Bench.   We have attempted to deal with this<\/p>\n
    core issue microscopically in light of the judgment of larger and latest<\/p>\n
    Benches   of   the   Supreme   Court   of   India.     The   close   study   of   the<\/p>\n
    various judgments of the Courts, in our opinion, does not bring the<\/p>\n
    respective  views  within   the   ambit  of   diametrically   conflicting   views.\n<\/p>\n
    After   considering   the  ratio   decidendi  and   on   conjoint   reading,   one<\/p>\n
    case safely see the fine distinction of `absolute duty’ in law on one<\/p>\n
    hand and `no prohibition’ in law on the other.  The judgments of the<\/p>\n
    Court which have taken the view that there is no option with the police<\/p>\n
    officer but to register a case suggestively imply as if the officer in law<\/p>\n
    has no other power.  But none of the judgments have in unambiguous<\/p>\n
    language   stated   that   the   law   prohibits   in   all   situations   preliminary<\/p>\n
    inquiry   pre-registration   of   FIR.     But   the   Legislature   has   conveyed<\/p>\n
    without ambiguity an absolute obligation on the part of the officer in<\/p>\n
    charge of a police station to register the information. The Legislature<\/p>\n
    has by no specific language prohibited, in exceptional and rare cases,<\/p>\n
    instantaneous   preliminary   inquiry   strictly   in   accordance   with   the<\/p>\n
    prescribed   procedure.   This   aspect   of   law   certainly   needs   some<\/p>\n
                                                               ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 13:57:23 :::<\/span>
\n                                          141<\/span><\/p>\n
    clarification which we have attempted to provide.  Non-performance of<\/p>\n
    such duty is not permissible in law but  in the event of default, the<\/p>\n
    complainant has been provided with remedies.  Making provisions for<\/p>\n
    remedies certainly does not indicate or can be an excuse for any kind<\/p>\n
    of non-performance of duty.  The obligation in terms of Section 154 is<\/p>\n
    specific and unambiguous.\n<\/p>\n
    101.<\/p>\n
                The   balanced   and   practical   view   in   law   necessarily   is<\/p>\n
    neither to amplify jurisdiction or power nor to curtail it unnecessarily.\n<\/p>\n
    The law commands a person holding a public office to discharge his<\/p>\n
    duties in accordance with the law and without delay.  In terms of the<\/p>\n
    provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, police officer in charge<\/p>\n
    of a police station cannot avoid the responsibility to record information<\/p>\n
    as contemplated by the provisions of Section 154 read with the Police<\/p>\n
    Manual and the Standing Orders issued by the State of Maharashtra.\n<\/p>\n
    Analysis of the above referred judicial decisions thus persuade us to<\/p>\n
                                          s case (supra) does not state
\n    hold that the judgment in Shyam Sundar’<\/p>\n
    the entire law correctly.  The statement of law spelt out in paragraph<\/p>\n
                                                           ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 13:57:23 :::<\/span>
\n                                              142<\/span><\/p>\n
    57(b) needs to be clarified to bring it in line with the enunciated law.\n<\/p>\n
    Intrinsic   command   of   law   requires   an   officer   in   charge   of   a   police<\/p>\n
    station   to   record   the   FIR   instantaneously.     Further   to   bring   this<\/p>\n
    principle in harmony with the ground realities, it can safely be stated<\/p>\n
    that in exceptional and rare cases, the concerned police officer could<\/p>\n
    penultimately defer instantaneous recording of FIR in the prescribed<\/p>\n
    register   (Form   No.P.M.   37e)   but   only   and   only   after   recording   the<\/p>\n
    information received in the Daily Diary Register while also mentioning<\/p>\n
    reasons   for   adopting   such  a   course   and   then   to   proceed   to   make<\/p>\n
    preliminary inquiry.   Such preliminary inquiry needs to be concluded<\/p>\n
    in the  shortest possible time and which, in our opinion,  should not<\/p>\n
    exceed two days then the officer should record the FIR as prescribed<\/p>\n
    in law without fail and\/or to adopt any course of action as permissible<\/p>\n
    in law.   This would satisfy the requirements of achieving legislative<\/p>\n
    object as well as would be suiting the ground reality by adopting a<\/p>\n
    more practical approach.   As it may not be possible for the Court to<\/p>\n
    accept ideologue view devoid of any flexibility in exceptional or rare<\/p>\n
    cases.  Having deliberated at some length on various aspects of the<\/p>\n
                                                                ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 13:57:23 :::<\/span>
\n                                           143<\/span><\/p>\n
    legal controversies raised in the present reference, in our considered<\/p>\n
    view the following principles can be culled out as correct exposition of<\/p>\n
    law :\n<\/p>\n
             (a) The expression “shall” appearing in Section 154 of<\/p>\n
                 the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure   is   mandatory.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                 The Section places an `absolute duty’
\n                                                      on the part<\/p>\n
                 of   the   `officer   in   charge   of   a   police   station’  to<\/p>\n
                 record information and place substance thereof in<\/p>\n
                 the   prescribed   book,   where   the   information<\/p>\n
                 supplied   or   brought   to   his   notice   shows<\/p>\n
                 commission of a cognizable offence.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
             (b) As   the   law   does   not   specifically   prohibit<\/p>\n
                 conducting   of   a   limited   preliminary   inquiry,   pre-<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                 registration of FIR in exceptional and rare cases<\/p>\n
                 by the officer in charge of a police station, he may<\/p>\n
                 penultimately thus enter upon a preliminary inquiry<\/p>\n
                                                              ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 13:57:23 :::<\/span>
\n                               144<\/span><\/p>\n
     in relation to information supplied of commission of<\/p>\n
     a   cognizable   offence   but   only   and   only   upon<\/p>\n
     making due entry in the Daily Diary\/Station Diary\/<\/p>\n
     Roznamachar   instantaneously   with   reasons   as<\/p>\n
     well   as   the   need   for   adopting   such   a   course   of<\/p>\n
     action.   Such   inquiry   should   be   completed<\/p>\n
     expeditiously and in any case not later than two<\/p>\n
     days.   Thereafter, the FIR should be recorded in<\/p>\n
     the   prescribed   register   and\/or   the   officer   should<\/p>\n
     take any other recourse permissible to him strictly<\/p>\n
     in accordance with the provisions of the Code of<\/p>\n
     Criminal Procedure under which he is empowered<\/p>\n
     to investigate.   Such cases can be illustrated by<\/p>\n
     giving   an   example   i.e.   when   the   information<\/p>\n
     received in regard to commission of a cognizable<\/p>\n
     offence   would   patently   cause   absurd   results   or<\/p>\n
     report   of   happening   of   events,   authenticity   of<\/p>\n
     which ex facie is extremely doubtful.\n<\/p>\n
                                                ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 13:57:23 :::<\/span>
\n                                              145<\/span><\/p>\n
               (c) The law inescapably requires the police officer to<\/p>\n
                    register  the  information (FIR) received  by him  in<\/p>\n
                    relation   to   commission   of   a   cognizable   offence.\n<\/p>\n
                    Under   the   Scheme   of   the   Code,   no   choice   is<\/p>\n
                    vested in the police officer between recording or<\/p>\n
                    not   recording   the   information   received.     The<\/p>\n
                    concerned   officer   would   aptly   take   recourse   to<\/p>\n
                    clause (a) as a normal rule while could adopt the<\/p>\n
                    course of action as stated in clause (b) above as<\/p>\n
                    an exceptional and rare case.\n<\/p>\n
    102.          Having answered the questions of law, we direct the Writ<\/p>\n
    Petitions   to   be   listed   before   the   appropriate   Bench   for   disposal   in<\/p>\n
    accordance with law.\n<\/p>\n
                                                      CHIEF JUSTICE<\/p>\n
                                                                ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 13:57:23 :::<\/span>
\n                                                146<\/span><\/p>\n
                                                      (S.J. VAZIFDAR, J.)<\/p>\n
                                                      (A.A. SAYED, J.)<\/p>\n
    sng\/Sep.08\/res.js\/crimisc271-07final.sxw<\/p>\n
                                                             ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 13:57:23 :::<\/span>\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Bombay High Court Mumbai 400 022 vs The State Of Maharashtra on 8 October, 2008 Bench: S.J. Vazifdar, A.A. Sayed 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL MISC. APPLICATION NO. 271 OF 2007 IN WRIT PETITION NO. 982 OF 2007 ALONG WITH CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 219 OF 2007 IN […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[11,8],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-223655","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bombay-high-court","category-high-court"],"yoast_head":"\nMumbai 400 022 vs The State Of Maharashtra on 8 October, 2008 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/mumbai-400-022-vs-the-state-of-maharashtra-on-8-october-2008\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Mumbai 400 022 vs The State Of Maharashtra on 8 October, 2008 - 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