{"id":223890,"date":"1975-10-03T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1975-10-02T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/bar-council-of-maharashtra-vs-m-v-dabholkar-etc-etc-on-3-october-1975"},"modified":"2018-01-14T13:31:52","modified_gmt":"2018-01-14T08:01:52","slug":"bar-council-of-maharashtra-vs-m-v-dabholkar-etc-etc-on-3-october-1975","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/bar-council-of-maharashtra-vs-m-v-dabholkar-etc-etc-on-3-october-1975","title":{"rendered":"Bar Council Of Maharashtra vs M. V. Dabholkar Etc. Etc on 3 October, 1975"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Bar Council Of Maharashtra vs M. V. Dabholkar Etc. Etc on 3 October, 1975<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1976 AIR 242, \t\t 1976 SCR (2)\t 48<\/div>\n
Author: V Krishnaiyer<\/div>\n
Bench: Krishnaiyer, V.R.<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nBAR COUNCIL OF MAHARASHTRA\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nM. V. DABHOLKAR ETC. ETC.\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT03\/10\/1975\n\nBENCH:\nKRISHNAIYER, V.R.\nBENCH:\nKRISHNAIYER, V.R.\nSARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH\nGUPTA, A.C.\nFAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA\n\nCITATION:\n 1976 AIR  242\t\t  1976 SCR  (2)\t 48\n 1976 SCC  (2) 291\n CITATOR INFO :\n E&R\t    1978 SC 548\t (106)\n R\t    1981 SC 344\t (48)\n RF\t    1981 SC 477\t (5)\n\n\nACT:\n     Professional  conduct-Soliciting\twork-If\t amount\t  to\nmisconduct-Disciplinary\t Committee  of\tState  Bar  Council-\nDefects in its working.\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\n     The rule  of law  cannot  be  built  on  the  ruins  of\ndemocracy for  where law ends tyranny begins. If such be the\nkeynote thought\t for the  very survival of our Republic, the\nintegral  bond\t between  the\tlawyer\tand  the  public  is\nunbreakable. And  the vital  role of the lawyer depends upon\nhis probity  and professional  life style.  Be it remembered\nthat the  central function  of the  legal profession  is  to\npromote the  administration of\tjustice. If  the practice of\nlaw is\tthus a\tpublic utility\tof great  implications and a\nmonopoly is  statutorily granted by the nation, it obligates\nthe lawyer  to observe\tscrupulously those  norms which make\nhim worthy  of the  confidence of  the community in him as a\nvehicle of  justice-social justice.  The Bar  cannot  behave\nwith doubtful  scruples or  strive to  thrive on litigation.\nCanons of conduct cannot be crystalised into rigid rules but\nfelt by\t the collective\t conscience of\tthe practitioners as\nright. [55 F-H].\n     Justice cannot  be attained  without the  stream  being\npellucid throughout  its course\t and that is of great public\nconcern, not merely professional care. [50 F].\n     The  respondents,\t who  were   lawyers  practising  in\ncriminal courts,  were charged\twith professional misconduct\nunder s.  35(1) of  the Advocates  Act, 1961,  in that\tthey\npositioned themselves  at the  entrance to  the Magistrates'\nCourts, watchful  of the arrival of potential litigants\t and\nat sight, rushed towards the clients in an ugly scrimmage to\nsnatch the  briefs. to\tlay claim to the engagements even by\nphysical fight\tto undercut  fees, and\tby  this  unedifying\nexhibition sometimes  carried even  into  the  Bar  Library,\nsolicited and  secured work  for themselves. The Bar Council\nof Maharashtra\tconsidered The\tcomplaint received  from the\nHigh Court  against the\t lawyers and  referred the matter to\nits  Disciplinary   Committee\tfor   further\tprobe.\t The\nDisciplinary Committee\tof the\tState Bar  Council held\t the\nrespondents guilty  of professional misconduct and suspended\nthem from  practising as  advocates for\t a period  of  there\nyears. On  appeal, the\tDisciplinary Committee\tof  the\t Bar\nCouncil of  India held that under  r. 36 of the rules framed\nunder s.  49(c) of the Advocates Act in order to be amenable\nto the disciplinary jurisdiction the advocates must have (i)\nsolicited work\t(ii) from a particular person and (iii) with\nrespect to  a case.  It held  that unless the three elements\nwere satisfied\tit could  not be  said that  an advocate had\nacted  beyond  the  standard  or  professional\tconduct\t and\netiquette. It therefore, absolved all the respondents of the\ncharge cf professional misconduct. The State Bar Council has\ncome in appeal to this Court.\n^\n     HELD: Rule 36 of the rules framed under s. 49(c) of the\nAdvocates Act, fairly construed, sets out wholesome rules of\nprofessional conduct  and the  dissection of  the said rule,\nthe way\t it has\t been done  by\tthe  Disciplinary  Tribunal,\ndisfigure it. [59 C].\n     (1) The  canons of\t ethics and  propriety far the legal\nprofession totally  taboo  conduct  by\tway  of\t soliciting,\nadvertising.  scrambling   and\tother  obnoxious  practices,\nsubtle or clumsy for betterment of legal business. Law is no\ntrade, briefs no merchandise and so the leaven of commercial\ncompetition or\tprocurement should  not vulgarise  the legal\nprofession. [60 C]\n49\n     (2)(a) The\t procedure adopted  by the State Bar Council\nin referring  the  cases to its Disciplinary Committee is in\ndue compliance with s. 35(1) of the Advocates Act. [51 C-D].\n     (b) The  contention that  the  resolution\tof  the\t Bar\nCouncil did  not ex  facie disclose  that it  had reason  to\nbelieve that  the  advocates  were  guilty  of\tprofessional\nmisconduct had\tno merit.  The\trequirement  of\t \"reason  to\nbelieve\" cannot\t be converted  into a  formalised procedural\nroad block, it being essentially a barrier against frivolous\nenquiries. lt  is implicit  in the  resolution\tOf  the\t Bar\nCouncil, when  it says\tthat it has considered the complaint\nand  decided   to  refer  the  matter  to  the\tDisciplinary\nCommittee, that\t it had\t reason to  believe as prescribed by\nthe statute. [51 D-E].\n     (3) The  State Tribunal  has, from\t a processual angle,\nfallen far short of norms like proper numbering of witnesses\nand exhibits,  indexing and  avoidance of  mixing up  of all\ncases together,\t default in  examination of the respondents,\nconsideration  separately   of\tthe  circumstances  of\teach\ndelinquent for\tconvicting  and\t sentencing  purposes.\tMore\nattention to  the specificity  in recording evidence against\neach deviant instead of testimonial clubbing together on all\nthe respondents,  could have  made the\tproceedings clearer,\nfairer and  in keeping\twith court methodology without over-\njudicialised formalities. The consolidation of all cases and\ntrying\tthem   all  jointly,   although\t the  charges  there\ndifferent episodes,   obviously violative of fair trial. [59\nD-F].\n     (4) (a)  The profound  regret of  these cases  lies not\nonly in\t the appellate\tDisciplinary  Tribunal's  subversive\nview of\t the law  of  professional  conduct  that  attempted\nsolicitation by\t snatching briefs and catching clients is of\nno  ethical   moment,  or   contravention  of  the  relevant\nprovisions, but\t also in  the naive  innocence of  fair\t and\nspeedy\tprocedure   displayed  by   the\t State\tDisciplinary\nTribunal  in  clubbing\ttogether  various  charges  levelled\nagainst the  advocates in  one common  trial, mixing  up the\nevidence   against   many,   recording\t omnibus   testimony\nslipshodly,  not   maintaining\ta   record  of\t each  day`s\nproceedings, examining\twitnesses in  the  absence  of\tsome\nrespondents taking  eight years to finish in trial involving\ndepositions of\tfour  witnesses and omission to consider the\nevidence against each alleged delinquent individually in the\nsemi-penal  proceeding.\t  True,\t a  statutory  Tribunal\t may\nordinarily regulate its procedure without too much rigidity,\nsubject to  the rules  of natural  justice, but\t large scale\ndisregard of  well-known norms\tof fair\t process  makes\t one\nwonder whether some at least of the respondents had not been\nhandicapped and whether justice may not be a casualty if the\nTribunal   is\t not   alerted\t  about\t   its\t  processual\nresponsibilities. [52 B-D]\n     (b) The Appellate Tribunal was wholly wrong in applying\nr. 36  which was  promulgated only in 1965 while the alleged\nmisconduct took\t place earlier.\t  What\tthis Tribunal forgot\nwas that the legal profession in India has been with us even\nbefore the  British and\t coming to  decades of this century,\nthe provisions\tof s.  35 of the Advocates Act, s. 10 of the\nBar Councils  Act and  other\t enactments  regulating\t the\nconduct of  legal  practitioners  have\tnot  turned  on\t the\nsplitting up  of   the text  of any  rule but  on the  broad\ncanons of ethics and high tone of behaviour well-established\nby case\t law and  long accepted\t by the\t soul  of  the\tbar.\nProfessional ethics  were bourn with the organised bar, even\nas moral norms arose with civilised society. The exercise in\ndiscovering the three elements of r. 36 was as unserviceable\nas it was supererogatory. [59 G-H].\n     (c) It  is a  misfortune that  a disciplinary body of a\ndimensionally get  and growing public utility profession has\nlost its  vision, blinkered  by, r.  36 (as misconstrued and\ntrisected by it.) [60 G].\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 1461 to
\n1468 of 1974.\n<\/p>\n
     From the  Judgment and order dated the 14th April, 1974
\nof the\tDisciplinary Committee\tof the\tBar Council of India
\nNew Delhi  in D.C. Appeals Nos 15 to 19 and 21, 22 and 25 of
\n1973.\n<\/p>\n
50<\/span><\/p>\n
     V. S.  Desai, Vimal  Dave, Miss  Kailahs Mehta  for the
\nAppellants.\n<\/p>\n
Respondents appeared in person in CAs. 1461 and 1467-1468.\n<\/p>\n
     Sakuddin  F.   Bootwala  and   Mrs.  Urmila  Sirur\t for
\nRespondents in CAs. 1462-1464
\n     V. N. Ganpule for Respondent in C.A. 1465.\n<\/p>\n
     D. V.  Patel and  Mrs. K. Hingorani for the Bar Council
\nof India.\n<\/p>\n
     S. K. Sinha for the Bihar State Bar Council.\n<\/p>\n
     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
\n     KRISHNA IYER,  J.-These appeals  have filled us as much
\nwith deep  sorrow as with pained surprise. I he story of the
\nalleged ‘profession misconduct’ and the insensitivity of the
\ndisciplinary authority to aberrant professional conduct have
\nbeen the  source of  our  distress,  as\t we  will  presently
\nexplain, after unfurling the factual canvas first.\n<\/p>\n
     The first\tchapter of  the\t litigation  in\t this  Court
\nrelated of  the standing,  of the State Bar Council to appal
\nto this\t Court, under  s.38 of\tthe advocates Act, 1961 (the
\nAct,  for   short)  against   appeallate  decision   of\t the
\nDisciplinary Tribunal appointed by the Bar Council of India.
\nThis Court  upheld the competence to appeal, thus leading us
\nto the\tpresent stage  of disposing  of the  eight cases  on
\nmerits.\n<\/p>\n
     The   epileptic   episodes-what   other   epithet\t can
\nadequately express  tile solicitation  circus dramatised  by
\nthe  witnesses\t as  practised\tby  the\t panel\tof  advocate
\nrespondents before  us? make us blush in the narration. For,
\nafter all  do we  not all  together belong”  to\t the  ‘inner
\nrepublic of  bencher and  bar’? The putative delinquents are
\nlawyers practising  in the  criminal courts  in Bombay City.
\nTheir profession  ordains a  high level of ethics as much in
\nthe means as in the ends. Justice cannot be attained without
\nthe stream  being pellucid throughout its course and that is
\nof great  public  concern,  not\t merely\t professional  care.
\nBriefly\t expressed,   these  practitioners,   according\t  to
\ntestimony; recorded  by\t the  State  Disciplinary  Tribunal,
\npositioned themselves  at the  entrance to  the\t Magistrates
\nCourts, watchful  of the  arrival of potential litigants. At
\nsight, they rushed towards the clients ill an ugly scrimmage
\nto snatch  the briefs,\tto lay claim to the engagements even
\nby physical  fight, to undercut fees, and by this unedifying
\nexhibition, sometimes  carried even  into the  Bar  Library,
\nsolicited and  secured work for themselves. If these charges
\nwere true,  any member\tof the Bar with elementary ethics in
\nhis bosom  would be  outraged at  his brethren’s conduct and
\nyet, in\t reversal  of  the  State  Disciplinary\t Committee’s
\nfinding,  the  appellate  Tribunal  at\tthe  national  level
\nappears to  have entered  a verdict,  based on a three point
\nformula, that  this conduct,  even if true, was after all an
\nattempt to solicit practice and did not cross the borderline
\nof misconduct?\tThe Bar\t Council of the State OF Maharashtra
\n(the appellant before us) and the Bar Council of India which
\nis a  party respondent, have expressed consternation at this
\nview of the law of professional misconduct and we share this
\nalarm Were  this view  right, it  is difficult\tto call\t the
\nlegal profession noble. Were this
\n51<\/span>
\nunderstanding of deviant behaviour sound, there is little to
\ndistinguish  between railway porters and legal practitioners
\nalthough we  do\t not  mean  to\thurt  the  former  and\thave
\nmentioned a  past practice, to drive home our present point?
\nWe do  not wish\t to dilate further on the evidence in so far
\nas it  concerns each  of the respondent-advocates in view of
\ncertain developments  which we\twill presently notice. There
\nare eight  cases but  we are  relieved from  dissecting\t the
\nevidence against  most of  them for  reasons which  we\twill
\nhopefully and shortly state.\n<\/p>\n
     The Bar  Council of  Maharashtra, by its resolution No.
\n29 dated  August 8,  1964 considered  the complaint received
\nfrom the  High Court  against  one  Kelawala  and  15  other
\nAdvocates among\t whom are  those charged  with\tprofessional
\nmisconduct and covered by the present appeals, under s.35(1)
\nof the Act, and presumably having reason to believe that the
\nprofessional misconduct\t alleged required  a  further  probe
\nreferred  the  case  to\t its  disciplinary  committee.\tThis
\nprocedure is in due compliance with s.35(1) of’ the Act and,
\nalthough the  respondent in  C.A. 1467\/74  (A. K. Doshi) has
\ncontended that the resolution of the Bar Council does not ex
\nfacie disclose\tthat it\t had  reason  to  believe  that\t the
\nadvocates involved  were guilty\t of professional misconduct,
\nwe see no merit in it The requirement of ‘reason to believe’
\ncannot be converted into a formalised procedural road block,
\nit being  essentially a barrier against frivolous enquiries.
\nIt is implicit in the resolution of the Bar Council, when it
\nsays that  it has  considered the  complaint and  decided to
\nrefer the  matter to the disciplinary committee, that it had
\nreason to believe, as prescribed by the statute
\n     Such blanket reference to the disciplinary body, so far
\nas we  are concerned,  related to  the\trespondent  in\tC.A.
\n1461\/74 (Dhabolkar),  C.A. 1462\/74  (Bhagtani), C.A. 1463\/74
\n(Talati), C.A.\t1464\/74 (Kelawala),  C.A.  1465\/74  (Dixit),
\nC.A. 1466\/74  (Mandalia), C.A..\t 1467\/74  (Doshi)  and\tC.A.
\n1468\/74 (Raisinghani).\tAll the cases were tried together as
\na unified proceeding and disposed of by a common judgment by
\nthe  Disciplinary  Committee,  a  methodology  conducive  to
\nconfusion and  prejudice as  we will  explain later  in this
\njudgment. The  respondents in  the various appeals before us
\nwere found  guilty ‘of\tconduct which  seriously lowers\t the
\nreputation of  the Bar\tin the\teyes of the public’ and they
\nwere suspended\tfrom practising as Advocates for a period of
\nthree years.  Appeals were  carried to\tthe Bar\t Council  of
\nIndia and”  in accordance with the statutory provision, they
\nwere referred  to the Disciplinary Committee appointed by it
\nunder s.  37(2)\t of  the  Act.\tThe  Appellate\tDisciplinary
\nCommittee  heard   the\tappeals\t  and\tabsolved   them\t  of
\nprofessional  misconduct.   Aggrieved  by  this\t verdict  of
\nreversal, the  Bar Council  of Maharashtra  has appealed  to
\nthis Court.  The initial  hurdle of  locus standi  has\tbeen
\nsurmounted  as\t stated\t earlier,  we  have  been  addressed
\narguments on the merits by Shri V. S. Desai on behalf of the
\nappellant. He  has canvassed  the correctness of the finding
\nof fact\t in each  case\talthough  with\tvarying\t degrees  of
\ndiffidence,  but   turned  his\tforensic  fusillade  on\t the
\nsomewhat  startling   concept  of   professional  misconduct
\nadopted by that disciplinary Tribunal
\n52<\/span>
\n     We will  proceed to deal with each appeal separately so
\nfar as\tthe factual  foundation for the charges is concerned
\nbut discuss  the legal\tquestion later\tas  it\taffects\t not
\nmerely the  advocates ranged  as respondents  but the Bar in
\nIndia and  the public in the country. The profound regret of
\nthese cases  lies not  only in\tthe  appellate\tdisciplinary
\ntribunal’s  subversive\tview  of  the  law  of\tprofessional
\nconduct that
\n attempted  solicitation by  snatching briefs  and  catching
\nclients is  or no  ethical moment,  or contravention  of the
\nrelevant provisions, but also in the naive innocence of fair
\nand speedy  procedure displayed\t by the\t State\tDisciplinary
\nTribunal  in  clubbing\ttogether  various  charges  levelled
\nagainst 16  advocates in  one common  trial, mixing  up\t the
\nevidence   against   many,   recording\t omnibus   testimony
\nslipshodly,  not   maintaining\ta   record  of\t each  day’s
\nproceedings, examining\twitnesses in  the  absence  of\tsome
\nrespondents, taking  eight years to finish a trial involving
\ndepositions  of\t four  witnesses  and  the  crowning  piece,
\nomission to  consider  the  evidence  against  each  alleged
\ndelinquent individually in the semi-penal proceedings. True,
\na statutory  tribunal may  ordinarily regulate its procedure
\nwithout too  much rigidity, subject to’ the rules of natural
\njustice, but  large-scale disregard  of well-known  norm  of
\nfair process  makes us\twonder whether\tsome at least of the
\nrespondents have  not been  handicapped and  whether justice
\nmay not\t be a  casualty if the tribunal is not alerted about
\nits processual\tresponsibilities. We  have some observations
\nto make\t about\tthe  Tribunals\tat  the\t State\tand  at\t the
\nappellate levels  in the  further stages  of this  judgment.
\nHowever, we  find it convenient to dispose of the appeals on
\nthe evidence, on the assumption that if, in fact, there have
\nbeen snatching\tand fighting and like solicitation exercises
\nindulged in  by any  of the  respondents, such conduct is in
\ngross  breach\tof  professional   behaviour   and   invites
\npunishment.\n<\/p>\n
   A case-by-case disposal is desirable and so we begin with
\nDabholkar (respondent  in  C.A.\t 1461\/74)  who\tappeared  in
\nperson to  plead in defence. The evidence against him is far
\nfrom satisfactory and suffers from generalised imputation of
\nmisconduct against a group of guilty lawyers. To dissect and
\npick   out   is\t  an   erroneous   process,   except   where
\nindividualised activities  are clearly deposed to. Moreover,
\nthe only witness who implicates him swears: ‘I have not seen
\nhim actually  snatching away  the papers. I did not hear the
\ntalk Mr. Dabholkar had with the persons’. Moreover, he was a
\nsenior public  prosecutor. We  also record  the fact that he
\nexpressed distress as the arguments moved on. Apart from the
\nweak  and   mixed  evidence   against  him,   there  is\t the
\ncircumstance that  he is around 68 years old. With a ring of
\ntruth he  submitted that  he was  too old  to  continue\t his
\npractice in  the profession  and had resolved to retire into
\nthe sequestered\t vale of life. He frankly admitted that even
\napart from the evidence, if there were any sins of the past,
\nhe would  not Pursue  the path\tof professional\t impropriety
\nhereafter having  decided virtually  to step out of the Bar.
\nexcept for  a limited  Purpose. He  had just four cases left
\nwith him which he desired to complete. having received fees.
\nHe further  represented that he did not intend to accent any
\nnew briefs  or appear  in any  Court except  to\t the  little
\nextent that the Bombay Paints & Allied Products.\n<\/p>\n
53<\/span><\/p>\n
Limited\t  (Chembur,   Bombay),\t a   large   company   which
\noccasionally A\tengaged him  in small  cases chose  to brief
\nhim. We\t are inclined  to take him at his word, particularly
\nbecause he  has put  himself out  of harm’s  way by  a clear
\nassurance about\t his  future  plans.  On  the  evidence,  we
\nexonerate him  from professional misconduct and otherwise we
\nrecord him solemn statement to the Court.\n<\/p>\n
     Shri Bhagthani,  respondent in  C.A. 1462\/74,  has\t not
\nengaged counsel,  nor appeared in person, but as we examined
\nthe evidence,  assisted by  Shri Desai,\t we  found  precious
\nlittle against\thim. That  extinguishes the charge. No need,
\ntherefore,  arises   for  punishing  him  or  reversing\t the
\nappellate Tribunal’s acquittal.\n<\/p>\n
     The respondent  in C.A.  1463\/74 is Talati. He has been
\nfound  ‘not  guilty’  in  appeal  but,\tas  we\tperused\t the
\nevidence,  it\tbecame\tfairly\t clear\tthat  some  acts  of
\nmisconduct had been made out, although the evidence suffered
\nfrom omnibus  implication. His\tcounsel, Mr.  Zakuriddin  F.
\nBootwala, however  made a submission which has moved us into
\nshowing some  consideration for\t this respondent.  Shri Zaki
\nrepresented  that   his\t client\t  had  stood  the  vexatious
\nmisfortune of  a long, protracted, litigation before the two
\ntribunals and  a later round in this Court when the question
\nof locus  standi of  the State Bar Council was gone into. He
\nwas in\tpoor circumstances  and had suffered considerably on
\nthis score.  Further, he has given an undertaking expressing
\nunqualified regret  for his deviant behaviour and has prayed
\nfor the\t clemency of the Court, promising to turn a new leaf
\nof proper  professional conduct,  if he\t were  permitted  to
\npractice. Taking  note of  the compassionate  conspectus  of
\ncircumstances attendant\t on his\t case and  in  view  of\t the
\ntender of  unconditional regret which expiates, in part, his
\nguilt, we  allow  the  appeal,\tbut  reduce  the  period  of
\nsuspension inflicted by way of punishment by the Maharashtra
\nTribunal from  three years to a period upto December 31 this
\nyear (1975)  . In  short, we find him guilty and reluctantly
\nrestore the verdict of the original tribunal, but reduce the
\npunishment to suspension from practice, as aforesaid.\n<\/p>\n
     The  respondent   in  C.A.\t 1464\/74  is  Kelawala.\t His
\ncounsel, Mr.  Zaki, submitted  that  this  practitioner\t had
\nbecome purblind\t and was ready to give an undertaking to the
\nCourt that  he would  no longer\t practice in the profession.
\nWhile there is some evidence against him, an overall view of
\nthe testimony,\tdoes not  persuade us to take a serious view
\nof the\tcase against him. Moreover, being old and near-blind
\nand having  undertaken to  withdraw from  the profession for
\never, it  is but  fair that he spends the evening years left
\nto him without the stigma of gross misconduct. In this view,
\nwe do  not disturb the finding of the Disciplinary Committee
\nof the Bar Council of India hut record the undertaking filed
\nby Shri\t Zaki that his client Kelawala will not practice the
\nprofession of law any longer. H
\n     The respondent  in C.A.  1465\/74 is Dixit for whom Shri
\nGannule appeared.  Shri Desai,\tfor the\t appellant, took  us
\nthrough the evidence
\n54<\/span>
\nagainst this lawyer but fairly agreed that the evidence was,
\nby any\tstandard, inadequate  to bring\thome the  guilty  of
\nmisconduct.  We\t readily  hold\thim  rightly  absolved\tfrom
\nprofessional misconduct.\n<\/p>\n
     The respondent  in C.A. 1466\/74 is Mandalia. He did not
\nappear in  person or  through counsel.\tThe reason is fairly
\nobvious. The  evidence is  so little that it is not possible
\nnor proper  to pick  out with  precision and  assurance\t any
\nparticular ‘soliciting’\t act to infer guilt. Shri Desai, for
\nthe appellant,\twas fair  enough to accede to this position.
\nHis exculpation cannot, therefore, be interfered with.\n<\/p>\n
     The only  contesting respondent  is Doshi-C.A. 1467\/74.
\nHe contests  his guilt\tand pursues  his plea with righteous
\npersistence and\t challenges the evidence and its credibility
\nprojecting his\tgrievance about processual improprieties. We
\nwill consider  both these  facts of his legitimate criticism
\ndespite his  cantankerous arguments which we have heard with
\nforbearance, remembering  that a  party arguing his own case
\nmay, perhaps,  not be  able to discipline himself to observe
\nthe minimal  decorum that  advocacy in\tCourt obligates. The
\nrespondent displayed,  as the  proceedings in this Court ran
\non, his\t art of\t irritating interruptions,  his exercises in
\npopping up  and down heedless of the Court’s admonition, and
\nhis skill in remaining references to what was not on record.
\nThe fine  art of advocacy suffers mayhem when irrelevant men
\nindelicately brush  with it.  The State\t Tribunal’s  records
\nreveal that  Shri Doshi\t had not  spared their\tpatience  or
\nsense of  pertinence. Having  said all this, we are bound to
\nexamine the  evidence against  him fairly.  Such a  scrutiny
\nshows that the best witness Shri Shertukde, the President of
\nthe Bar\t Association and otherwise a respected Member of the
\nBar, has  not involved\thim in\tany malpractice.  Even\tShri
\nPathare, the  only one\tto rope him in, merely gives omnibus
\ntestimony ambivalent  in places\t and unspecific\t about some,
\nincluding Doshi.  There is  little else\t brought  home\twith
\nclarity against\t loquacious Doshi. To convict him out of the
\nvague; lips of Pathare may perhaps be a credulous folly. The
\ngrouping of  a number  of advocates  in a sort of mass trial
\nhas prejudiced\tShri Doshi,  a consequence  which could\t and
\nshould have  been avoided. He had other grievances of denial
\nof fair\t opportunity which`we could not verify for want of a
\ndaily diary or order sheet. We are satisfied by a perusal of
\nthe record  that  this\trespondent  has\t had  an  impressive
\nbackground of  social service.\tcommendable testimonials  of
\nhis  legal  skills  from  competent  persons  and  some\t law
\npractice in  various Courts  and consultancy work for social
\nwelfare institutions  which are apt to dissuade him from the
\ndisreputable  bouts   in  the  ‘pathological’  area  of\t the
\nEsplanade Police  Courts in  Bombay. Even assuming that this
\noverzealous gentleman  had exceeded  the  strict  bounds  of
\npropriety,  we\t are  not   satisfied  that  the  charge  of
\nprofessional misconduct,  as laid  has been  brought home to
\nhim. What  we have  observed about his conduct in this Court
\nmust serve  as a sufficient admonition to wean him away from
\nimproper conduct.  We do  not interfere with the exculpation
\nsecured by him before the appellate Tribunal hopeful that he
\nwill  canalize\t his  professional   energies  in   a\tmore
\ndisciplined way to be useful to himself and. more
\n55<\/span>
\nimportantly, to\t his unsolicited’ clientele. After all, even
\na sinner  has A\t a future and given better court manners and
\nless turbulent\tbellicosity, Shri  Doshi appears  to have  a
\nfair professional  weather ahead  in the  City. We  hold him
\nunblemished so far as the vice of solicitation is concerned,
\nbut caution him to refine himself in advocacy.\n<\/p>\n
     Shri Raisinghani  is tho  respondent in  C.A.  1468\/74.
\nShri V. S. Desai took us though the evidence against him and
\nalthough he  is 65 years old, the evidence shows that he has
\nphysically fought  two rival  advocates\t in  the  course  of
\nsnatching the  briefs from  clients, entering  the Esplanade
\ncriminal  courts.  One\tof  these  fights  resulted  in\t his
\ntrousers being\ttorn and the other assault by him was on Mr.
\nMandalia one  of the  respondents  in  these  appeals.\tShri
\nMandalia had  filed a  complaint against  Raisinghani but in
\nthe criminal  court they  lived down  their earlier skirmish
\nand compounded\tthe case.  Be that  as it  may, we find that
\nShri Raisinghani is not merely an old man but a refugee from
\nPakistan who,  leaving his  properties there has migrated to
\nAhmedabad with\this family.  Apparently he  is in  penurious
\nenvirons  and\tstay  in   the\trefugee\t colony\t in  Bombay,
\nincidentally attending\tto his claims to the properties left
\nbehind in  Pakistan and\t acquiring some\t evacuee property in
\nlieu of\t what he  has lost.  Staying in\t Kalyan Refugee Camp
\nthis lawyer,  afflicted with  distress and  dotage, is\talso
\nattending the  Magistrate’s Court  to make  a  living.\tThis
\ncommiserative social  milieu may  not  absolve\thim  of\t the
\nmisconduct which,  we are  satisfied, the  testimony in\t the
\ncase,  has  established.  Even\tso,  Shree  Raisinghani\t has
\nappeared in  person and\t has given an undertaking expressing
\nremorse, praying  to be\t shown clemency\t and assuring  that,
\neconomic pressure  notwithstanding, he\twill not go anywhere
\nnear  professional  pollution  in  the\tlast  years  of\t his
\npractice at  the Bar.  We are inclined to take a sympathetic
\nview of his septuagenarian situation, record his apology and
\nassurance,  restore  the  verdict  of  guilt  by  the  State
\nDisciplinary Committee but reduce the punitive part of it to
\na period of suspension until December 31, this year (1975).\n<\/p>\n
     Now  to   the  legal   issue  bearing   on\t canons\t  of
\nprofessional conduct. The rule of law cannot be built on the
\nruins of  democracy, for  where law  ends tyranny begins. If
\nsuch be\t the keynote  thought for  the very  survival of our
\nRepublic, the  integral bond  between  the  lawyer  and\t the
\npublic is  unbreakable. And  the vital\trole of\t the  lawyer
\ndepends upon  his probity and professional life-style. Be it
\nremembered that the central function of the legal profession
\nis to promote the administration of justice. If the practice
\nof law\tis thus a public utility of great implications and a
\nmonopoly is  statutorily granted by the nation, it obligates
\nthe lawyer  to observe\tscrupulously those  norms which make
\nhim worthy  of the  confidence of  the community in him as a
\nvehicle of  justice-social justice.  The Bar  cannot  behave
\nwith doubtful  scruples or  strive to  thrive on litigation.
\nCanons of conduct cannot be crystalised into rigid rules but
\nfelt by\t the collective\t conscience of\tthe practitioners as
\nright:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “It must  be a conscience alive to the proprieties
\n     and the  improprieties incident  to the  discharge of a
\n     sacred public
\n     L 1276 SCI\/75
\n56<\/span>
\n     trust.  lt\t  must\tbe  a  conscience  governed  by\t the
\n     rejection of  self-interest and  selfish  ambition.  It
\n     must be a conscience propelled by a consuming desire to
\n     play  a   leading\trole   in  the\tfair  and  impartial
\n     administration of\tJustice,  to  the  end\tthat  public
\n     confidence may be kept undiminished at all times in the
\n     belief that  we shall  always seek truth and justice in
\n     the 13  preservation of  the rule\tof law. It must be a
\n     conscience\t not  shaped  by  rigid\t rules\tof  doubtful
\n     validity, but  answerable only  to a  moral code  which
\n     would drive  irresponsible judges\tfrom the profession.
\n     Without such  a conscience, there should be no judge(1)
\n     and, we, may add, no lawyer.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Such is\t the high  standard set\t for professional conduct as
\nexpounded by courts in this country and elsewhere.\n<\/p>\n
     These background observations will serve to size-up the
\ngrave misapprehension  of the  law of professional ethics by
\nthe tribunal  appoint ed  by the  Bar Council  of India. The
\ndisciplinary body,  acquitting everyone\t on non-violation of
\nbounds of propriety argued.\n<\/p>\n
\t  “Rule 36 (of the Bar Council of India on Standards
\n     of Professional Conduct and Etiquette) is as follows:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t       An  Advocate   shall  not   solicit  work  or
\n     advertise either  directly, or  indirectly\t whether  by
\n     circular,\t   advertisements,\ttouts,\t    personal
\n     communications, interviews\t not warranted\tby  personal
\n     relations, furnishing  newspaper comments\tor procuring
\n     his photograph to be published in connection with cases
\n     in which he has been engaged or concerned. .” ..
\n     Hence  in\t order\tto   be\t amendable  to\tdisciplinary
\n     jurisdiction, the\tAdvocates must\thave  (1)  solicited
\n     work (2) from a particular person (3) with respect to a
\n     case. Unless  all the  three elements are satisfied, it
\n     cannot be\tsaid that  an Advocate\thas acted beyond the
\n     standard of professional conduct and  etiquette. It has
\n     been stated  that the conduct of the Advocate concerned
\n     did not  conform to  the highest standards of the legal
\n     profession. It  is not  that every body must conform to
\n     the highest  standards of\tthe legal  profession. It is
\n     enough if\tan Advocate  conforms to  the  standards  of
\n     professional con  duct and\t etiquette as referred to in
\n     the rules”.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     *\t\t *\t      *\t\t     *
\n\t  “He (witness Mantri) says further that 7 Advocates
\n     who are  personally present  today I  have seen each of
\n     them standing  either on the first floor, near the lift
\n     or on  the first  floor either  near the lift or in the
\n     lobbies of the
\n(1) Hastings,  Hon. John  S., “Judicial Ethics as it Relates
\n     to Participation in Money Making Activities”-Conference
\n     on Judicial Ethics, p. 8, The School of Law, University
\n     of Chicago (1964).\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
57<\/span><\/p>\n
     Esplanade Court  and trying  to solicit  work from\t the
\n     persons A\tcoming to  the Esplanade  Court.  This\tmere
\n     attempt to solicit is nothing.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  “In order  to be  within the\tmischief of rule 36,
\n     not merely canvassing is enough, but canvassing must be
\n     for a  case With  the person  who\thad  not  till\tthen
\n     engaged a\tlawyer. There  is nothing  to show either of
\n     these things:  none of  the persons who might have been
\n     subjected to  these solicitations\tas they\t are stated,
\n     have been\texamined  to  prove  the  case.\t Hence\tthis
\n     evidence does  not establish anything within rule 36.”.
\n     . .  All that is necessary for us to see is whether the
\n     three items  referred to have been complied with and we
\n     find that\tthey have  not been complied with because we
\n     do not  know what\twas the nature of the communication,
\n     we do  not know  in  connection  with  which  case\t the
\n     solicitation took\tplace and with whom the conversation
\n     took place.  Hence Mr.  Shertukade’s  evidence  is\t not
\n     sufficient for  the purpose  of taking any disciplinary
\n     action under rule 36.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     *\t  *    *    *\t *
\n\t  “Mr. Krishnarao  V. Pathumdi\tis the first witness
\n     in this  case (case  of Raisinghani).  He says:  “I had
\n     seen Kelawala, Mr. Baria; Mr. Raisinghani, Mr. Bhagtani
\n     approaching  the\tpeople\tvisiting   the\t Court\t and
\n     soliciting work from them”. This we have already slated
\n     is far  below the\trequirement required  to  be  proved
\n     under  rule   36….He  says   that  he  had  seen\t Mr.
\n     Raisinghani approaching  people and soliciting work. He
\n     did  not\tascertain  the\tnames  of  the\tpersons\t who
\n     approached because\t it was\t not his  business.  But  as
\n     stated above,  is evidence does not establish the three
\n     elements required to be proved under rule 36 because we
\n     do not know what was the personal communication between
\n     him and  the persons  solicited. We do not know whether
\n     it related to a case or not.” ….Then the next witness
\n     is Mr. Sitaram Gajanan Shertukade. In cross-examination
\n     by\t Mr.   Rai  singhani  he  says:\t “I  have  seen\t Mr.
\n     Raisinghani  accosting   people.  I   have\t  seen\t Mr.
\n     Raisinghani snatching  the papers from the hands of the
\n     litigating public. I have seen this more than 10 times.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     The  litigating   public  from  whom  the\tpapers\twere
\n     snatched did  not say  anything that  there was a fight
\n     between Mr.  Raisinghani  and  other  lawyer  over\t the
\n     papers which  were snatched.  I did  not contact  those
\n     persons from  whom the  papers were snatched nor talked
\n     to them so he was not concerned with this Therefore his
\n     evidence cannot be sufficient (Emphasis, ours)
\n58<\/span>
\n     We may,  illustratively,  quote  an  excerpt  from\t the
\nevidence of  the Bar  Association President and one-time Bar
\nCouncil Member\tShri Shertukade\t to show  the injury  to the
\nprofile\t of   the  profession\tthe  curious   view  of\t the
\ndisciplinary tribunal has inflicted:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “I have  seen Mr.  Raisinghani accosting people. I
\n     have seen Mr. Raisinghani snatching the papers from the
\n     hands of  litigating public. I have seen this more than
\n     10 times  There was  a fight between Mr. Rasinghani and
\n     Mr. Baria.\t made oral  complaint to the C.P.M. I do not
\n     remember who  was present\tat that\t time. In that fight
\n     Mr. Raisinghani s pant was torn… There was assault by
\n     Mr. Raisinghani  on Mr.  Mandalia and I had advised Mr.
\n     Mandalia to  file a  complaint against Mr. Raisinghani.
\n     Mr. Mandalia  did file  a case  against Mr. Raisinghani
\n     but it was compounded.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     How  can\ta  disciplinary\t  authority,  aware  of\t its
\naccountability to  the Indian  Bar, functioning as the stern
\nmonitor holding\t the punitive  mace to preserve professional
\npurity and  promote public  commitment and  appreciative  of
\nwhat is\t disgraceful, dishonourable and unbecoming judged by
\nthe standards  of conduct  set for  this noble\tcalling\t and
\ndeviations damaging  to its  public image,  find its  way to
\nhold such  horrendous misbehaviour  as snatching,  catching,
\nfighting, and  under-cutting as\t not outraging the canons of
\nconduct without exposing itself to the charge of dereliction
\nof public  duty on  the trisection of r. 36 and blind to the
\n‘law for lawyers’?\n<\/p>\n
     It has  been universally  understood, wherever there is
\nan organised bar assisting in administering justice, that an
\nattorney solicitor,  barrister or advocate will be suspended
\nor  disbarred\tfor  soliciting\t  legal\t business.  And\t the
\n‘snatching’ species  of solicitation are more revolting than
\nambulance chasing’, advertising and the like. If the learned
\nprofession is  not a  money-making trade  or a\tscramble for
\nporterage but a branch of the administration of justice, the
\nview of\t the appellate disciplinary tribunal is indefensible
\nand deleterious.  We, as  a legal fraternity, must and shall
\nlive up to the second and live down the first. by observance
\nof high\t standards and dedication to the dynamic rule of law
\nin a developing country.\n<\/p>\n
     It is  unfortunate that  the Maharashtra  tribunal\t has
\nslurred\t over\tvital  procedural  guidelines.\tProfessional
\nmisconduct prescribed  by  s.  35  of  the  Act\t has  to  be
\nunderstood in  the setting  of a  calling to  which Lincoln,
\nGandhi, Lenin  and a  galaxy of great men belonged. The high
\nmoral tone  and the  considerable public  service the bar is
\nassociated with\t and its  key role  in the developmental and
\ndispute-processing  activities\t and,  above   all,  in\t the
\nbuilding up  of a just society and constitutional order. has
\nearned for  it a monopoly to practise law and an autonomy to
\nregulate its  own internal  discipline.\t This  heavy  public
\ntrust should  not be  forfeited by  legalising or  licensing
\nfights for  briefs affrays  in\tthe  rush  towards  clients,
\nundercutting and  wrangling among  members. Indeed,  we were
\nscandalized when  one of  the respondents  cited a  decision
\nunder the Suppression of Immoral Traffic Act to prove
\n59<\/span>
\nwhat is\t ‘soliciting’.\tThe  odious  attempt  to  equate  by
\nimplication the\t standards for the two professions was given
\nup after  we severely  frowned on  it. But  the disciplinary
\ntribunal’s view\t that an  attempt to solicit did not matter,
\nthat professional  misconduct rested  solely on r. 36 of the
\nrules framed  under s.\t49(c) and  that r. 36 was made up of
\nthree components,  shows how an orientation course in canons
\nof conduct and etiquette in the socio-ethical setting of the
\nlawyer, the public and professional responsibility may be an
\neducative asset\t to disciplinary  tribunals and Bar Councils
\nwhich appoint tribunals and regulate professional conduct by
\nrules. Cicero  called the  law\t‘a  noble  profession’,\t but
\nFrederick the Great described lawyers as ‘leeches’. We agree
\nthat r.\t 36, fairly  construed, sets  out wholesome rules of
\nprofessional conduct  although the  canons of ethics existed
\neven prior to r. 36 and the dissection of the said rule; the
\nway  it\t  has  been   done  by\tthe  disciplinary  tribunal,
\ndisfigures it.\tIt is  also clear that r. 36 is not the only
\nnidus of professional ethics.\n<\/p>\n
     Indeed, the  State\t tribunal  has,\t from  a  processual
\nangle, fallen  far short  of norms  like proper numbering of
\nwitnesses and  exhibits, indexing and avoidance of mixing up
\nof  all\t cases\ttogether,  default  in\texamination  of\t the
\nrespondents consideration,  separately, of the circumstances
\nof each\t delinquent for\t convicting and sentencing purposes.
\nMore attention\tto the\tspecificity  in\t recording  evidence
\nagainst\t each\tdeviant\t instead   of  testimonial  clubbing
\ntogether  of  all  the\trespondents,  would  have  made\t the
\nproceedings  clearer   fairer  and  in\tkeeping\t with  court
\nmethodology, without  over judicialised\t formalities. Indeed
\nthe consolidation  of 16  cases and  trying them all jointly
\nalthough the charges were different episodes, were obviously
\nviolative of  fair trial.  And 8  years for  an\t enquiry  so
\nsimple and  brief: We  express the  hope that improvement of
\nthis branch of law relating to disciplinary proceedings will
\nreceive better\tattention  from\t the  Bar  Council  and\t the
\ntribunal members.  What prophylactic prescription can ensure
\nfundamentally fair  hearing or\tdue process  better than  by
\nchoosing persons  of sense and sensibility familiar with the
\nbasics of  trial procedure and conscientious about avoidance
\nof prejudice  and delay\t ? Rules may regulate, but men apply
\nthem. Both are important.\n<\/p>\n
     The appellate disciplinary tribunal was wholly wrong in
\napplying r.  36 which was promulgated only in 1965 while the
\nalleged misconduct  took place\tearlier. What  this tribunal
\nforgot was  that the legal profession in India has been with
\nus even\t before the  British and  coming to  decades of this
\ncentury, the  provisions of r. 35 of the Advocates Act s. 10
\nof the\tBar Councils Act and other enactments regulating the
\nconduct of  legal  practitioners  have\tnot  turned  on\t the
\nsplitting up of the text of any rule but on the broad canons
\nof ethics  and high  tone of  behaviour well  established by
\ncase-law  and\tlong  accepted\tby  the\t soul  of  the\tbar.
\nProfessional ethics  were born\twith the organised bar, even
\nas moral norms arose with civilised society. The exercise in
\ndiscovering  the   ‘three  elements’   of  r.\t36  was\t  as
\nunserviceable as it was as supererogatory.\n<\/p>\n
60<\/span><\/p>\n
     The ruling\t in In\tthe matter of ‘P’ an Advocate(1); In
\nre: Shri  M. Advocate  of Supreme  Court of India(2); In the
\nmatter of  an Advocate(3);  Govt. Pleader v. Siddick(4) were
\ncited before  us and  no judge, nor lawyer will be in doubt,
\neven without  study of\tcase law,  that snatching  briefs by
\nstanding at  the door of the court house and in fighting for
\nthis  purpose\tis  too\t  dishonourable,   disgraceful\t and
\nunbecoming  to\tbe  approved  even  for\t other\tprofessions.
\nImagine two  or three  medical men  manhandling a patient to
\nclaim him  as a client\tThe law has suffered at the hands of
\nthe appellate  tribunal.  Lest\tthere  should  be  lingering
\ndoubts we  hold that  the canons of ethics and propriety for
\nthe  legal  profession\ttotally\t taboo\tconduct\t by  way  of
\nsoliciting,  advertising,  scrambling  and  other  obnoxious
\npractices,  subtle   or\t clumsy,  for  betterment  of  legal
\nbusiness. Law  is no trade, briefs no merchandise and so the
\nleaven of  commercial competition  or procurement should not
\nvulgarise the  legal profession.  Canon 27  of\tProfessional
\nEthics of the American Bar Association states:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “It  is  unprofessional  to  solicit\tprofessional
\n     employment\t by   circulars,   advertisements,   through
\n     touters or by personal communications or interviews not
\n     warranted by personal relations.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     We wish  to put beyond cavil the new call to the lawyer
\nin the\teconomic order.\t In the days ahead, legal aid to the
\npoor and  the weak,  public interest  litigation  and  other
\nrule-of law  responsibilities will  demand a whole new range
\nof responses  from the\tbar or\torganised social groups with
\nlawyer\tmembers.  Indeed,  the\thope  of  democracy  is\t the
\ndynamism  of  the  new\tfrontiersmen  of  the  law  in\tthis
\ndeveloping  area   and\twhat   we  have\t  observed   against
\nsolicitation and  alleged profit’  making vices\t are distant
\nfrom such  free service to the community in the Jural sector
\nas part of the profession’s tryst with the People of India.\n<\/p>\n
     It is  a misfortune  that\ta  disciplinary\t body  of  a
\ndimensionally great  and growing  public utility  profession
\nhas lost its vision, blinkered by r. 36 (as misconstrued and
\ntrisected by  it). For\tthe practice  of Law  with expanding
\nactivist horizons,  professional ethics cannot be contain ed
\nin a  Bar Council  rule nor in traditional cant in the books
\nbut in\tnew canons  of conscience  which  will\tcommand\t the
\nmembers of the calling of justice to obey. rules of morality
\nand utility, clear in the crystallized case-law and concrete
\nwhen tested on the qualms of high norms-\n<\/p>\n
     (1) (1964)1 S. C. R. 697.\t    (2) (1956) S. C. R. 811.
\n     (3) I. L. R. 63 Cal. 869.\t      (4) 31 Bom. L. R. 625.\n<\/p>\n
61<\/span><\/p>\n
simple enough  in given\t situations,  though  involved\twhen
\nexpressed in  a single sentence. We but touch upon this call
\nto the calling of law, as more is not necessary in the facts
\nof these cases.\n<\/p>\n
     The law  has  thus\t been  set  right,  the\t delinquents
\nidentified and\tdealt with,  based on individualised deserts
\nand the\t appeals are disposed of in the trust that standards
\nand sanctions  befitting the national Bar will be maintained
\nin  such  dignified  and  deterrent  a\tmanner\tthat  public
\nconfidence in  this arm\t of the\t justice-system\t is  neither
\nshaken nor shocked.\n<\/p>\n
     Parties will bear their costs throughout.\n<\/p>\n
P.B.R.\n<\/p>\n
62<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Bar Council Of Maharashtra vs M. V. Dabholkar Etc. Etc on 3 October, 1975 Equivalent citations: 1976 AIR 242, 1976 SCR (2) 48 Author: V Krishnaiyer Bench: Krishnaiyer, V.R. PETITIONER: BAR COUNCIL OF MAHARASHTRA Vs. RESPONDENT: M. V. DABHOLKAR ETC. ETC. DATE OF JUDGMENT03\/10\/1975 BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. SARKARIA, […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-223890","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nBar Council Of Maharashtra vs M. V. Dabholkar Etc. 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