{"id":225553,"date":"1990-03-16T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1990-03-15T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/hundraj-kanyalal-sajnani-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-16-march-1990"},"modified":"2016-11-04T17:04:48","modified_gmt":"2016-11-04T11:34:48","slug":"hundraj-kanyalal-sajnani-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-16-march-1990","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/hundraj-kanyalal-sajnani-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-16-march-1990","title":{"rendered":"Hundraj Kanyalal Sajnani Etc vs Union Of India And Ors on 16 March, 1990"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Hundraj Kanyalal Sajnani Etc vs Union Of India And Ors on 16 March, 1990<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1990 AIR 1106, \t\t 1990 SCR (1) 994<\/div>\n
Author: P Sawant<\/div>\n
Bench: Mukharji, Sabyasachi (Cj), Ray, B.C. (J), Sharma, L.M. (J), Sawant, P.B., Ramaswamy, K.<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nHUNDRAJ KANYALAL SAJNANI ETC.\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nUNION OF INDIA AND ORS.\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT16\/03\/1990\n\nBENCH:\nSAWANT, P.B.\nBENCH:\nSAWANT, P.B.\nRAMASWAMY, K.\nMUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (CJ)\nRAY, B.C. (J)\nSHARMA, L.M. (J)\n\nCITATION:\n 1990 AIR 1106\t\t  1990 SCR  (1) 994\n 1990 SCC  Supl.  577\t  JT 1990 (2)\t145\n 1990 SCALE  (1)492\n\n\nACT:\n    Indian Income-Tax,\t1961\/1. T. 0.  Group A and  Group-B-\nRecruitment  Rules 1988 and Seniority Rules, 1973.  Sections\n116,  117,  118 and 120---Group A and Group  B\tOfficers  of\nIncome Tax Department--Classification--Whether constitution-\nal--Seniority List of 1973--Whether valid.\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\n    The\t main  petition\t has been filed\t by  the  Income-tax\nOfficers  Group-A, challenging the Seniority Rules of  1973,\nwhich  were framed by the Department pursuant to the  direc-\ntions  given by this Court in an earlier case B.S. Gupta  v.\nUnion of India, [1975] Supp. SCR 491. The circumstances that\nled  to\t the filing of the instant petitions may  be  stated\nthus:\n    The Government by virtue of the Rules propounded in\t its\nletter\tdated 29th September 1944, re-organised the  Income-\ntax services into Class I and Class II. The said Rules inter\nalia  laid down that recruitment to the cadre of  Income-tax\nOfficers  Group-A  shall  be from two  sources\ti.e.  direct\nrecruitment  and promotion, the quota for the two being\t 80%\nand  20% respectively. In 1945, the Government framed  fresh\nrecruitment rules wherein it was provided that the  recruit-\nment  from the said sources will be made as per\t the  direc-\ntions of the Government, in effect, keeping the\t recruitment\nquotas\tin  abeyance.  In September,  1949,  the  Government\nframed Seniority Rules and it was laid down that the  promo-\ntees  who had been certified by the Federal  Public  Commis-\nsion,  in any calendar year, shall be senior to\t all  direct\nrecruits  who completed their probation during that year  or\nafter  and are confirmed with effect from the date  in\tthat\nyear  or after. In the year 1950, the Seniority\t Rules\twere\nagain revised and the concerned Rule 1(f)(iii) was  amended.\nBy  its letter dated 18.10.1951, the Government revised\t the\nquotas\tof  direct recruits and promotees, in that,  in\t the\ncase  of direct recruits the quota was reduced from  80%  to\n66-2\/3%\t while in the case of promotees, the quota  was\t en-\nhanced\tfrom  20%  10  33-1\/3% and  also  amended  the\tRule\n1(f)(iii)  of 1950 Rules. This revision, in effect,  gave  3\nyears' weightage in seniority to the promotees. These  rules\ncontinued to\n995\noperate\t till  1959. Between 1959 and 1960, 114\t posts\twere\nupgraded  to those of Income Tax Officers Group 'A' and\t the\npromotees  were\t appointed  to the said\t posts\tduring\tthat\nperiod.\n    One Jaisinghani, a direct recruit challenged the consti-\ntutional  validity of Rule 1(f)(iii) and (iv) of 1952,\tSen-\niority Rules by means of a writ petition in the High  Court,\nwhich gave 3 years' weightage to the promotees in the matter\nof  fixation  of their seniority and the  implementation  of\nquota. The High Court rejected the writ petition. In appeal,\nthis  Court  held that the quota having been  fixed  by\t the\nGovernment  in exercise of the powers conferred on it  under\nRule 4 of the 1945 Rules, the same was valid. The Court also\nupheld\tthe weightage given to the promotees under the\t1952\nRules. The Court further directed that roster system  should\nbe  adopted by framing an appropriate rule for\tworking\t out\nthe quota system between the direct recruits and  promotees.\nIt  may\t be  mentioned that the court  gave  this  direction\nbecause it was of opinion that the promotees were in  excess\nof the prescribed quota for each of the years 1951 to  1956,\nand that they had been illegally appointed. It was therefore\ndirected that the seniority of Jaisinghani and others  simi-\nlarly  placed be re-adjusted and the Government should\tpre-\npare a fresh seniority list in accordance with law.\n    Pursuant  to the direction given by the Court, the\tgov-\nernment prepared seniority list which was challenged in\t the\nDelhi High Court by two separate writ petitions one by\tB.S.\nGupta,\ta  promotee  of 1962 and another by  M.C.  Joshi,  a\ndirect\trecruit. The High Court dismissed the writ  petition\nof  Gupta but substantially allowed the one filed by  Joshi.\nIn appeal this court by its order dated 16.8.1972 in Gupta's\ncase  AIR  1972 SC 262, held that seniority list  was  valid\nwith regard to the promotions made upto January 15, 1959 but\nthe same was not valid for the period thereafter. The  court\naccordingly  set aside the list to the extent  it  concerned\nthe  period  from 16.1.1959 and directed the  Department  to\nprepare a fresh seniority list in accordance with the obser-\nvations and directions of this Court. The court came to\t the\nconclusion that with the upgrading of large number of  posts\nand  appointments of the promotees, the quota rule had\tcol-\nlapsed and with that seniority rule giving weightage to\t the\npromotees had collapsed. The court held that quota rule came\nto an end on 16.1.1959. In pursuance of the aforesaid direc-\ntion,  the  government\tframe the impugned  1973  Rules\t and\nprepared  a  fresh seniority List on February  1973,  giving\nretrospective  effect to the Rules from 15.1.1959. The\tGov-\nernment\t also  challenged the quota of direct  recruits\t and\npromotees, making it 50% for each of them i.e. 1:1. Seniori-\nty  of officers upto 15.1.59 was fixed as per old Rules\t and\nthe\n996\nseniority  from\t 16.1.1959 was fixed as per  new  rules;  73\npromotees  though  promoted  between 1956-58  could  not  be\naccommodated under the old rules, their seniority was  fixed\nunder the new rules.\n    In\tthe present petitions, the petitioners contend\tthat\nthis Court gave its direction in Gupta's case [1975] 1,\t SCR\n104;  because for want of sufficient material the court\t had\ncome  to  the conclusion that the quota for  recruitment  of\ndirect recruits and promotees had broken down as the  promo-\ntees  were appointed in excess of their\t entitlement  though\nthe  requisite material showing the contrary was in  posses-\nsion of the government, which was suppressed. It is asserted\nby them that the material shows that in fact the appointment\nof the promotees was short of their quota. Hence they  claim\nthat  not only the 1973 Rules be set aside but the  appoint-\nments of the promotees be made and their seniority be  fixe-\ndaccording to the rules prevailing prior of the said  Rules.\nIn the connected writ petitions, besides these\tcontentions,\nvalidity of amendment of Sec. 117 of the Income Tax Act; and\nclassification of Income Tax Officers in Group A and Group B\nofficers have also been questioned.\nDismissing the writ petitions this Court held:\n    HELD:  It is clear from the table that  the\t petitioners\npromotees  have\t calculated  the  posts\t in  the  sanctioned\nstrength not only in Grade II but also in Grade I Posts when\nthe posts available to them for promotion were only in grade\nI1.  Hence,  their  further  calculations  of  the   working\nstrength,  the vacancies and the quota available to them  in\nthe  vacancies and of the dificiencies or the excess in\t the\nquota are erroneous. [1009F]\n    Even  the Government had independently come to the\tcon-\nclusion\t as early as in 1986 that neither the Rules of\tsen-\niority nor the Seniority List of 1973 had done injustice  to\nthe  promotees.\t In fact, the Rules of 1973  had  rised\t the\nquota of the promotees from 33-1\/3% to 50%. The seniority of\nthe  promotees was adjusted upto 15th January, 1959  on\t the\nbasis  of the earlier quota Rule and the Seniority of  those\nwho  were  appointed later and of those who  were  found  in\nexcess of their quota upto that date, were adjusted  accord-\ning to the new Rule. [1016F-G]\n    What this Court wanted to convey in the earlier part  of\nits judgment was that when the Government decides to fill in\nthe vacancies, it is not necessary to defer the appointments\nfrom  one  source pending the appointments  from  the  other\nsource. But that is when the Government\n997\ndecides to fill in the vacancies and not before it. [1017F]\n    Power is vested in the legislature to appoint  different\nclasses of officers and this carries with it also the  power\nto  demarcate their duties, functions and  responsibilities.\nWhether\t in fact there is such a division of  powers,  func-\ntions  and responsibilities or not, has nothing to  do\twith\nthe  validity  of  the power  to  make\tthe  classification.\n[1019H; 1020 A]\n    The distinction between Group-A and Group-B Officers has\nbeen  in existence from the very beginning. The\t distinction\nhas  been  maintained statutorily with distinct\t powers\t and\njurisdiction, hierarchical position and eligibility qualifi-\ncations.  The sources of their appointment and the  authori-\nties  vested with the power to appoint them have  also\tbeen\ndifferent. The distinction between the two further has\tbeen\nmade on the basis of the class of work and the responsibili-\nty  entrusted  to  each. The work which is of  more  than  a\nroutine\t nature and which involves a detailed  investigation\neither\ton account of the class of assessees or of the\tcom-\nplexities of the returns filed, is entrusted to the officers\nbelonging  to Groups Group-A (now  Assistant  Commissioners)\nwhile the assessment work of a summary nature or of  returns\ninvolving  simple  transactions\t is  entrusted\tto  Officers\nbelonging to Group-B (now ITOs). [1023C-E]\n    By the very nature of the operation involved, the admin-\nistration has to have the power to classify the work and  to\nappoint personnel with different skill and talent to execute\nthe  different types of work. The legislature being  mindful\nof  this  need has deliberately created the two\t classes  of\nofficers  as is evident from the provisions of\tSection\t 117\neven  prior to its present amendment. Even after the  amend-\nment  the said distinction has been maintained.\t After\t1987\namendment the situation has further changed and the  duties,\nfunctions, jurisdiction and powers of the officers have been\nrationalised clearly demarcating the spheres of work. In  an\norganisation of this kind, with country wide offices dealing\nwith  various  categories  of assessees\t and  incomes,\tsome\ndislocation functional overlapping and want of uniformity in\nthe assignment of work during some period is not unexpected;\nand it does appear that during some period, the situation in\nthe  Department\t was out of joint. That is  why\t steps\twere\ntaken  to straighten it out by amending the Income  Tax\t Act\nand making the rules and issuing the relevant notifications,\ncirculars and orders. [1024B; 1026B-C]\n    If\tduring this period on account of the  exigencies  of\nservice,  some ad hoc appointments of Group B officers\twere\nmade to Group A posts,\n998\nand  Grade 1I or Group B officers were required\t to  perform\nthe same functions and discharge the same duties as Group  A\nofficers,  they can at best claim the emoluments of Group  A\nofficers,  but\tcertainly not the equalisation\tof  the\t two\nposts of that account. [1026D-E]\n    S.G.  Jaisinghani v. Union of India and Ors.,  [1967]  2\nSCR  703;  B.S Gupta etc. v. Union of India and\t Ors\/  etc.,\n[1975]\t1  SCR 104; Kamal Kanti Dutta and Ors. v.  Union  of\nIndia  and Ors.,<\/a> [1980] 3 SCR III; K.M. Bakshi v.  Union  Of\nIndia, AIR 1962 SC 1139; Federation of A11 India Customs and\nCentral Excise Stenographers (Recognised) and )rs. v.  Union\nof  India and Ors., [1988] 3 SCC 91; V. Markandeya and\tOrs.\nv.  State  of Andhra Pradesh and Ors., [1989]  3,  SCR\t191,\nreferred to.\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
    ORIGINAL  JURISDICTION: Writ Petition Nos. 4146 of\t1978
\nand 546-47 of 1983.\n<\/p>\n
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India .)
\n    Rajinder  Sachhar, Govind Das, T.S. Krishnamurthy  lyer,
\nA.K. Sanghi, Ravinder Bana, R.B. Misra, Miss A.\t Subhashini,
\nBhisamber  Lai\tand Miss Gitanjali Mohan for  the  appearing
\nparties.\n<\/p>\n
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
\n    SAWANT,  J.\t These\tthree petitions\t raise\tsome  common
\nissues, and hence they are being disposed of by this  common
\njudgment.\n<\/p>\n
W.P. No. 4146of 1978.\n<\/p>\n
    This petition is filed by the promotee Income Tax  Offi-
\ncers  Group-A  seeking to challenge the Seniority  Rules  of
\n1973  on  the  ground that they were framed  pursuant  to  a
\ndirection  given by ,this Court in Bishan Sarup v. Union  of
\nIndia  & Ors.,<\/a> [1975] Suppl. SCR 491 decided on\t August\t 16,
\n1972.  According to the petitioners, the said direction\t was
\ngiven because for want of sufficient material, the Court had
\ncome to the conclusion that the quota for recruitment of the
\ndirect\trecruits  and the promotees had broken down  as\t the
\npromotees  were appointed in excess of their entitlement  in
\nthe  quota.  According\tto the\tpetitioners,  the  requisite
\nmaterial  showing the contrary was in the possession of\t the
\nGovernment  but did not come forth, then. The said  material
\nshows  that in fact the appointments of the  promotees\twere
\nshort of their quota. The petitioners, therefore, claim that
\nnot only the
\n999<\/span>
\nSeniority  Rules  of 1973 should be set aside, but  the\t ap-
\npointments  of the promotees be made and their seniority  be
\nfixed,\taccording to the Rules prevailing prior to the\tsaid
\nRules.\n<\/p>\n
    2. The relevant facts necessary to dispose of the  peti-
\ntion are as follows.\n<\/p>\n
    Pursuant  to  the Rules propounded in  their  letter  of
\nSeptember 29, 1944, the Government reorganised the  existing
\nIncome\tTax services into Class-I and Class-II.\t The  Rules,
\namong  other things, laid down that the recruitment  to\t the
\ncadre  of  Income  Tax Officers–Group-A will  be  from\t two
\nsources,  viz., direct recruitment and promotion, the  quota
\nfor the two being 80%–20% respectively.\n<\/p>\n
    In\t1945, the Government framed fresh Recruitment  Rules
\nfor  the said cadre of Class-I and Class-II ITOs. Rule 3  of
\nthe  said Rules reiterated that the recruitment to the\tsaid
\ncadre will be from the two sources, viz., direct recruitment
\nand  promotion. Rule 4 of the said Rules, however,  provided
\nthat  the recruitment from the said sources will be made  as
\nper the discretion of the Government. This provision had the
\neffect\tof  virtually keeping in  abeyance  the\t recruitment
\nquotas\tfor the direct recruits and the promotees laid\tdown
\nin the Recruitment Rules of September 29, 1944.
\n    On\tSeptember 9, 1949, the Government  framed  Seniority
\nRules.\tRule 1(f)(iii) thereof provided that  the  promotees
\nwho had been certified by the Federal Public Service Commis-
\nsion  in  any calendar year shall be senior  to\t all  direct
\nrecruits  who completed their probation during that year  or
\nafter,\tand are confirmed with effect from the date in\tthat
\nyear or after. On January 1, 1950, the Seniority Rules\twere
\nrevised\t and  the aforesaid Rule 1(f)(iii)  was\t amended  as
\nfollows:\n<\/p>\n
“(f)  The  seniority  of direct recruits  recruited  on\t the
\nresults\t of  the  examinations held by\tthe  Federal  Public
\nService\t Commission in 1944, and subsequent years, shall  be
\nreckoned as follows:\n<\/p>\n
(i)  Direct  recruits of an earlier examination\t shall\trank
\nabove those recruited from subsequent examination.\n<\/p>\n
(ii) Direct recruits of any one examination shall rank inter
\nse  in\taccordance with the ranks obtained by them  at\tthat
\nexamination.\n<\/p>\n
1000<\/span><\/p>\n
(iii)  The promotees who have been certified by the  Commis-
\nsion  in  any calendar year shall be senior  to\t all  direct
\nrecruits  who complete their probation during that  year  or
\nafter and are confirmed with effect from a date in that year
\nor after.\n<\/p>\n
\t Provided  that\t a  person  initially  recruited  as
\nClass-II  Income Tax Officer, but subsequently appointed  to
\nClass I on the results of a competitive examination conduct-
\ned by the Federal Public Service Commission shall, if he has
\npassed the departmental examination held before his appoint-
\nments  to Class I service, be deemed to be promotee for\t the
\npurpose of seniority.”\n<\/p>\n
    3.\tBy  its letter of October 18, 1951,  the  Government
\nrevised\t the quotas of direct recruits and promotees  (which
\nwas  earlier  laid  down in their letter  of  September\t 29,
\n1944), from 80% and 20% to 66-2\/3% and 33-1\/3%. On September
\n5,  1952 the Government also revised further  the  Seniority
\nRule 1(f)(iii) of January 24, 1950 as follows:
\n“(f)  The  seniority  of direct recruits  recruited  on\t the
\nresults\t of  the  examinations held by\tthe  Federal  Public
\nService\t Commission in 1944, and subsequent years, shall  be
\nreckoned as follows:\n<\/p>\n
(i)  Direct  recruits of an earlier examination\t shall\trank
\nabove those recruited from a subsequent examination.\n<\/p>\n
(ii) Direct recruits of any one examination shall rank inter
\nse  in\taccordance with the ranks obtained by them  at\tthat
\nExamination.\n<\/p>\n
(iii)  Officers promoted in accordance with the\t recommenda-
\ntion of the Departmental Promotion Committee before the next
\nmeeting\t of  the Departmental Promotion Committee  shall  be
\nsenior\tto all direct recruits appointed on the results\t of’
\nthe examinations held by the Union Public Service Commission
\nduring the calendar year in which the Departmental Promotion
\nCommittee met and the three previous years.”\n<\/p>\n
    It\twill thus be clear that this  revision,,among  other
\nthings, gave to the promotees, a weightage of three years in
\nseniority. These Rules continued to operate till 1959.\n<\/p>\n
1001<\/span><\/p>\n
    4.\tIt  appears that between 1959 and  1960,  about\t 114
\nposts were upgraded to those of Income Tax Officers Group-A,
\nand  the promotees were appointed to the said  posts  during
\nthe relevant period.\n<\/p>\n
    5.\tOne  Jaisinghani, a direct  recruit  challenged\t the
\nconstitutional validity of Seniority Rule 1(f)(iii) and (iv)
\nof  1952  Seniority Rules which had in\teffect\tgiven  three
\nyears’ weightage to the promotees in the matter of  fixation
\nof their seniority, and also the improper implementation  of
\nthe  quota  by\tthe Government, by filing  a  writ  petition
\nbefore\tthe Punjab High Court. The High Court  rejected\t the
\nwrit  petition,\t and in the appeal filed  against  the\tsaid
\ndecision, this Court, by its decision in S.G. Jaisinghani v.
\nUnion of India & Ors., [1967] 2 SCR 703 held that the  quota
\nwas  fixed  by the Government by its letter of\tOctober\t 15,
\n1951  in exercise of the power given to it under Rule  4  of
\nthe  Recruitment  Rules of 1945 and hence it was  valid\t and
\nproper.\t The  Court also upheld the weightage given  to\t the
\npromotees  under  the Seniority Rules of  1952.\t The  Court,
\nhowever,  directed that for future years, the roster  system
\nshould be adopted by framing an appropriate rule for working
\nout the quota between the direct recruits and the promotees,
\nand that a roster should be maintained indicating the  order
\nin which appointments are made by direct recruitment and  by
\npromotion, in accordance with the percentage fixed under the
\nstatutory  Rules for each source of recruitment.  The  Court
\ngave these directions because the Court came to the  conclu-
\nsion  that  the promotees were in excess of  the  prescribed
\nquota  for each of the years 1951 to 1956 and  onwards,\t and
\nthat they had been illegally so promoted. The Court  further
\nheld  that the appellant Jaisinghani was entitled to a\twrit
\ncommanding  the respondents to adjust the seniority  of\t the
\nappellant and other officers similarly placed like him,\t and
\nto  prepare  a fresh seniority list in accordance  with\t law
\nafter adjusting the recruitment for the period 1951 to\t1956
\nand onwards, in accordance with the quota rule prescribed in
\nthe Government-letter of October 18, 1951. The Court, howev-
\ner, made it clear that the said order would not affect\tsuch
\nClass  II  officers who had been  appointed  permanently  as
\nAssistant Commissioners of Income Tax.\n<\/p>\n
    6.\tPursuant  to the direction given by the\t Court,\t the
\nGovernment prepared a Seniority List on July, 15, 1968. This
\nSeniority  List\t was challenged in Delhi High Court  in\t two
\nseparate  writ\tpetitions, one filed by one  B.S.  Gupta,  a
\npromotee  of  1962 and another by one M.C. Joshi,  a  direct
\nrecuit.\t The  Delhi High Court by its decision of  July\t 29,
\n1970  dismissed Gupta’s petition and  substantially  allowed
\nJoshi’s\t petition  and gave directions to  prepare  a  fresh
\nseniority List. Against the
\n1002<\/span>
\ndecision  in  both the petitions, Gupta filed  two  separate
\ncivil appeals. By its decision dated August 16, 1972 in\t the
\nsaid appeals in B.S. Gupta case (supra) briefly known as 1st
\nGupta  case,  this Court held that the\tSeniority  List\t was
\nvalid  with regard to the promotions made upto\tJanuary\t 15,
\n1959,  since it was prepared on the basis of the quota\trule
\nof October 18, 1951 and the Seniority Rule 1(f)(iii) of 1952
\nSeniority Rules. The Court, however, held that the said List
\nwould  not  be valid for the period thereafter.\t The  Court,
\ntherefore,  set\t aside the said list to the extent  it\tcon-
\ncerned\tthe period from 16.1. 1959 onwards and directed\t the
\nDepartment  to prepare a fresh seniority list, in the  light
\nof  the\t observations made in the judgment. The\t Court\talso
\ndirected  that\tthe  seniority list from  January  15,\t1959
\nshould be prepared in accordance with a seniority rule to be
\nframed afresh by the Government. The Court observed that the
\nproceedings will have to be kept pending till such seniority
\nlist  was prepared and filed before the Court. It is  neces-
\nsary to state here that the Court had given the said  direc-
\ntion  because  it had come to the conclusion that  with\t the
\nupgrading of a large number of posts and the appointments of
\nthe  promotees made to them, the quota rule  had  collapsed,
\nand  with that, the seniority Rule giving weightage  to\t the
\npromotees  had also collapsed. The decision to\tupgrade\t 100
\nposts was taken in January 1959 and the remaining 114  posts
\nin the year 1960. The Court, therefore, held that the  quota
\nrule  came  to an end on January 16, 1959 when\tsanction  to
\nupgrade\t 100 temporary posts was given by the President\t and
\nwith that went the seniority Rule.\n<\/p>\n
    7.\tIn pursuance of the above direction, the  Government
\nframed the impugned Seniority Rules of 1973, and prepared  a
\nfresh seniority list on February 9, 1973, giving  retrospec-
\ntive  effect  to the said Rules from January 15,  1959.\t The
\ngist  of the 1973 Seniority Rules was that the seniority  of
\nthe  direct  recruits and promotees appointed  on  and\tfrom
\nJanuary 16, 1959 was to be fixed as follows: First  promotee
\nand then direct recruit and so on. The result of these Rules
\nwas  that not only the seniority Rule but also the quota  of
\nthe  direct recruits and the promotees was changed from\t 66-
\n2\/3% and 33.1\/3% to 50% and 50% or 1: 1. It may be mentioned
\nhere that the new seniority list was prepared by fixing\t the
\nseniority  upto\t 15th  January, 1959 according\tto  the\t old
\nSeniority Rules, and the seniority from 16th January 1959 on
\nthe basis of the new Rules. However, 73 of the promotees who
\nwere promoted in excess of their quota between 1956-58 could
\nnot  be accommodated as per the earlier quota rule,  in\t the
\nlist  of  seniority prepared upto 15th\tJanuary,  1959,\t and
\nhence  the  seniority  of the said 73  promotees  was  fixed
\naccording to the new seniority Rules which
\n1003<\/span>
\napplied\t to the appointments made from 16th  January,  1959.
\nBoth the new Rules and the new Seniority List were filed  in
\nthis Court as per the earlier direction.\n<\/p>\n
    8. The same Shri B.S. Gupta challenged both the validity
\nof  the new Seniority Rules of 1973 and as well as  the\t new
\nSeniority List. This Court by its decision dated 16th April,
\n1974  in  Bishan Sarup Gupta etc. etc. v. Union of  India  &
\nOrs.  etc. etc., [1975] 1 SCR 104, known as 2nd Gupta  case,
\nupheld\tboth  the Seniority Rules as well as  the  Seniority
\nList.\n<\/p>\n
    9.\tIt  further appears that one Kamal Kanti  Dutta\t and
\nothers had also filed an independent writ petition challeng-
\ning the Seniority List of February 9, 1973. It was dismissed
\nby  this  Court by its decision dated 23rd  April,  1980  in
\nKamal Kanti Dutta & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.,<\/a> [1980]  3
\nSCR  811 upholding the validity of the said Seniority  List.
\nWhile  disposing of the said writ petition, this Court\tmade
\nthe  following\tobservations on which a strong\treliance  is
\nplaced by the present petitioners:\n<\/p>\n
“It  shall have been noticed that we have refused to  recon-
\nsider our decisions not so much because of the view taken in
\nthe  various cases cited by the learned\t Solicitor  General,
\nlike  Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, [1965] 1 SCR\t933,
\n947,948 that this Court should not review its decisions\t too
\nreadily,  as because on merits, we see no justification\t for
\nreconsidering  the judgment already rendered by this  Court.
\nNo fresh facts are brought to our notice by way of discovery
\nof new and important evidence which would justify  reconsid-
\neration\t of  the decisions already rendered  by\t this  Court
\nafter the most careful examination of the competing  conten-
\ntions. The Report of the Rajya Sabha Committee on  petitions
\nshows,\tas  already indicated that the\trelevant  files\t are
\nstill’not traceable”\n<\/p>\n
That  judgment\twas by a majority with\tJustice\t D.A.  Desai
\ndelivering a dissenting judgment. Since the petitioners here
\nare relying also upon some observations made in the dissent-
\ning judgment, we may reproduce them here:\n<\/p>\n
“In  the  light of the materials now placed  especially\t the
\nfiles which were withheld from the Court and the  Committee,
\nthe only view that I express is that enough compelling and
\n1004<\/span>
\nnecessary  material has been placed on record making  out  a
\nstrong case for reconsideration of these decisions.”\n<\/p>\n
    The\t Committee referred to in the aforesaid\t observation
\nis the Rajya Sabha Petition Committee.\n<\/p>\n
    10.\t The present petition had also come to be  dismissed
\nerroneously  along  with the Writ Petition  of\tKamal  Kanti
\nDutta  (supra). It was restored for hearing on September  9,
\n1980.\n<\/p>\n
    11.\t On  July 28, 1982, the Parliamentary  Committee  on
\nSubordinate Legislation published its 12th Report wherein it
\nreferred  to a letter of February 4, 1976 from the  Minister
\nof State for Finance. The Committee stated that the Seniori-
\nty  Rules  of  1973 were unfair and  hence  they  should  be
\nscrapped  with effect from January 15, 1959 and\t that  fresh
\nequitable  seniority rules be framed. The  Committee  recom-
\nmended\tthat  the  artificial distinction  between  the\t ITO
\nGroup-A\t and Group-B should be abolished as they  were\tper-
\nforming identical functions and were working on interchange-
\nable posts. The Committee also recommended the grant of\t the
\nsame  weightage\t in  seniority to the  promotees  from\t15th
\nJanuary, 1959 as was available to them before that date. The
\nCommittee,  further recommended an increase in the quota  of
\npromotions from Group-B to Group-A on account of an unprece-
\ndented stagnation of Group-B service, as a direct result  of
\nthe  Seniority Rules of 1973. It does not appear that  these
\nrecommendations\t were  accepted. We are referring  to  these
\nrecommendations\t of  the Committee because  the\t petitioners
\nhave  made  a  reference to them and not  because  they\t are
\nlegally binding.\n<\/p>\n
    12.\t Thereafter, on February 16, 1983, the\taccompanying
\nWrit  Petitions, viz., Nos. 546-47 of 1983 were filed  chal-
\nlenging\t (i) the validity of Section 117 of the\t Income\t Tax
\nAct, 1961, (ii) the classification of Income Tax Officers in
\nGroUp-A\t and Group-B Officers, (iii) the Seniority Rules  of
\n1973 and (iv) the Seniority List prepared on their basis.
\n    The\t last two reliefs claimed in the said petitions\t are
\ncommon\tto the present petition and hence they will be\tdis-
\nposed  of along with the judgment in the present  case.\t The
\nfirst two reliefs and the reliefs claimed incidental thereto
\nwill be dealt with separately.\n<\/p>\n
    13. It is further necessary to note that while admitting
\nthe accompanying petitions, the Court had passed the follow-
\ning order:\n<\/p>\n
1005<\/span><\/p>\n
“Subject  to  the specific condition  that  the\t petitioners
\nshall not be permitted to reopen whatever classification was
\nmade  in  the cadre of ITOs, in the past as  also  inter  se
\nseniority  between direct recruits and promotees  which\t had
\nbeen upheld by the decisions of this Court in S.C.  Jaising-
\nhani,  B.S. Gupta and KK Dutta’s case, rule nisi limited  to
\nthe  question  whether\tthe  classification  of\t ITOs,\tinto
\nGroup-A\t and Group-B u\/s. 117 of the IT Act, 1961 is  viola-
\ntive of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Even if\t the
\nissue  is answered in affirmative, the petitioners  will  be
\nentitled  to  the  relief, if any,  only  prospectively\t for
\nfuture implementation of the decisions from the date of\t the
\njudgment  in the Petition. This order will not preclude\t any
\ncontention  that can and may be raised in the Writ  Petition
\nNo.  4 146\/78-H.K. Sajnani v. UOI & Ors., to be examined  on
\nmerits.”\n<\/p>\n
    14.\t On May 3, 1983, this Court passed an order  in\t CMP
\nNos.  13200  and 6762 of 1983 in both the  present  and\t the
\naccompanying writ petitions as follows:\n<\/p>\n
“In  allowing prayer (i) of CMP No. 6762\/83, we direct\tWrit
\nPetition Nos. 546-47\/83 be heard alongwith Writ Petition No.
\n4146\/78\t and  that the grounds challenging the\tvalidity  of
\nseniority  rule 1973 as taken in Writ Petition Nos.  546-47\/
\n83  are allowed to be taken in Writ Petition No. 4146\/78  in
\nso  far as the prayer (iii) of CMP is concerned,  we  direct
\nthe Government to file a statement in this Court before July
\n15,  1983 as to the result of the examination of the  recom-
\nmendation  of the Committee on Subordinate  Legislation\t and
\ndecision   and\tother  measures\t taken\tby  the\t  Government
\nthereon.”\n<\/p>\n
    15.\t On February 27, 1985, the Court gave  direction  to
\nthe  Government in CMP No. 1903 of 1983 in the present\tWrit
\nPetition  to allow the petitioners inspection of  the  files
\nrelating  to the vacancies. The inspection was completed  on
\nOctober 7, 1985 which according to the petitioners shows the
\nfollowing  facts: (i) that the relevant record is  available
\nand  was always available with the Government and  that\t its
\nproduction  was deliberately withheld from this Court,\t(ii)
\nthat the promotions were all within quota and that there was
\nno  excess.  Rather there was a\t deficiency  in\t promotions,\n<\/p>\n
(iii)  that the quota rule was adhered to from year to\tyear
\nright  from the year 1951 upto the date of the\tjudgment  in
\nthe 1st Gupta case (supra), (iv) that the quota rule did
\n1006<\/span>
\nnot  collapse  on  15.1.1959, (v) that as  required  by\t the
\nexigencies  of the service, the quota rule  was\t amended\/re-
\nlaxed in the years 1958 and 1959, (vi) that in applying\t the
\nquota  rule in pursuance of the man~ damus,  the  Government
\ndid  not follow the principles decided by this Court in\t 1st
\nGupta case (supra) and committed the following errors:\n<\/p>\n
(a) The Government did not apply the quota to the  vacancies
\nexisting at a particular point of time. Instead of doing so.
\nit  misinterpreted the quota rule of 66-2\/3% and 33.1\/3%  as
\nif  it required that a ratio of 2:1 had to be maintained  in
\nthe  cadre of Income Tax Officers and as if there had to  be
\none   promottee\t against  every\t 2  direct  recruits.\tThis
\nerroneous interpretation was applied in clear breach of\t the
\nprinciple  laid\t down by this Court in the  1st\t Gupta\tcase
\n(supra).\n<\/p>\n
(b)  Another error committed by the Government\tin  applying
\nthe  quota  rule in violation of the principles\t decided  by
\nthis  Court in the 1st Gupta Case (supra) was that the\tsub-
\nstantive  vacancies  in\t the temporary posts  which  were  a
\nregular part of the cadre and which eventually became perma-
\nnent  were not taken into account while applying  the  quota
\nrule,  with the result that the promotees were denied  their
\nshare in such vacancies. The most harmful thing done by\t the
\nGovernment was that it did not take into account substantive
\nvacancies  in  temporary posts till 1963  for  applying\t the
\nquota rule and worked out the excess in promotions  ignoring
\nsuch vacancies. But, they started taking into account  those
\nvery vacancies for direct recruitment from 1963 onwards.  If
\nsuch vacancies were taken into account prior to 1963 and the
\nquota  rule  was applied to them, there would have  been  no
\nexcess\tin promotions as was erroneously worked out. On\t the
\ncontrary,  there was a deficiency in promotions\t because  of
\nthe incorrect application of the quota rule.\n<\/p>\n
(c)  The promotees were not given their full quota  even  in
\nthe permanent vacancies which should have bee given to\tthem
\ninrespective  of whether the direct recruitment was made  in
\nfull.  There  was under utilisation of quota of\t direct\t re-
\ncruits with the result that the promotees were denied  their
\nlegitimate  share  even\t in permanent  vacancies.  In  these
\ncircumstances, the actual appointments were taken as  vacan-
\ncies  and  were bound to result inevitably  into  excess  of
\npromotions.\n<\/p>\n
16.  On\t the basis of these facts, which  according  to\t the
\npetition-\n<\/p>\n
1007<\/span><\/p>\n
ers  were revealed in their inspection, their case  is\tthat
\ntheir allegation, that the relevant files were available and
\nyet  were  not\tproduced before the Court  and\tthe  further
\nallegation  that there were no excess promotions were  borne
\nout.  This shows that the direction given in the  1st  Gupta
\ncase (supra) to frame new rules and, hence, the new Seniori-
\nty  Rules of 1973 framed pursuant to these directions,\twere
\nunwarranted, unjust and illegal.\n<\/p>\n
    17.\t The petitioners further contend that the  principle
\nthat  the vacancies mean those the Government wants to\tfill
\nis  not compatible with the principle laid down in  the\t 1st
\nGupta case (supra) that the promotees should get their share
\nof  the quota irrespective of whether the  direct  recruits’
\nquota  is filled, or not. But in the present case, the\tcon-
\ntrary has happened, viz., the promotees’ quota is calculated
\non  the\t basis of the appointments of  the  direct  recruits
\ncausing\t thereby injustice to the promotees by depriving  so
\nmany of them of their chances of promotion which were other-
\nwise available.\n<\/p>\n
    18. It is also the contention of the petitioners that in
\nfact, there were vacancies and the Government wanted to fill
\nthose vacancies. This is evidenced by the fact that when new
\nposts  were created for the purpose of assessment work,\t the
\ndirect recruits were not available and hence, the promotions
\nwere made from Group-B to Group-A, and even Group-B Officers
\nwere  appointed\t against Group-A posts\tand  they  performed
\nidentical functions as of Group-A Officers. This  contention
\nhas  also a bearing on the issue involved in Writ  Petitions
\nNos.  546-47 of 1983 and we will deal with it in  that\tcon-
\ntext, later.\n<\/p>\n
    19.\t While these petitions were pending, the  Government
\non  January 24, 1988 amended the Income Tax Act,  1961\twith
\neffect\tfrom April 1, 1988 and, among other things,  changed
\nthe designation of Income Tax Officers and Assistant Commis-
\nsioners as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t Pre-Amendment\t\t  Post-Amendment\n   (a)\t  Income Tax Officers\t   Income Tax Officers\n\t  (Group-B)\n   (b)\t  Income Tax Officers\t   Assistant Commissioners\n\t  (Group A)\n   (c)\t  Assistant Commisioners    Deputy Commissioner.\n<\/pre>\n
The  amendment also substituted Sections 116, 117,  118\t and
\n120 with
\n1008<\/span>
\neffect\tfrom the same date, i.e., April 1, 1978\t and  autho-
\nrised  the Central Board of Direct Taxes to issue  notifica-
\ntions  authorising Chief Commissioners and Commissioners  of
\nIncome\tTax to classify the work of newly designated  Income
\nTax Officers and Assistant Commissioners, and to provide for
\nthe  jurisdiction of the Income Tax Officers  and  Assistant
\nCommissioners  on the basis of quantum of income.  According
\nto  the petitioners, this was done to destroy the  cause  of
\naction Writ Petition Nos. 546-47 of 1983.\n<\/p>\n
    20. On May 12, 1988, the Government framed New Rules  of
\nRecruitment, among other things, providing for quota of\t 50%
\neach  to the promotees and direct recruits. In\tconsequence,
\nan  application for amendment of Writ Petitions Nos.  546-47
\nof 1983 was filed raising additional grounds.\n<\/p>\n
    21.\t It will thus be apparent that the whole  foundation
\nof  the\t case  of the petitioner-promotees  in\tthe  present
\npetition  is that the Seniority Rules of 1973 were  made  by
\nthe  Government pursuant to the direction of this  Court  in
\nthe  1st  Gupta\t case (supra) on August 16,  1972  and\tthat
\ndirection  was given by this Court because on the  basis  of
\nthe material produced by the Government, this Court had come
\nto the conclusion that the promotees were promoted in excess
\nof their quota. According to them, however, the new material
\nwhich they have discovered shows that in fact there were not
\nonly  no excess promotees but in fact there was a  shortfall
\nin their promotions as per their entitlement in the quota.\n<\/p>\n
    22.\t Both  on behalf of the Government as  well  as\t the
\nrespondent  Union  of India and the direct recruits,  it  is
\npointed\t out to us that the so-called new material  produced
\non behalf of the petitioner-promotees far from proving their
\nallegation, supports the conclusion to which this Court\t had
\narrived\t at in the 1st Gupta case (supra). In  this  connec-
\ntion,  it is pointed out that admittedly, there were at\t the
\nrelevant time Class-I and Class-II posts of Income Tax Offi-
\ncers corresponding to Group-A and Group-B posts. Class-I  or
\nGroup-A\t consisted of Grade-I and Grade-II Officers  whereas
\nClass-II or Group-B consisted of Grade-II Officers.  Group-B
\nOfficers  were\tentitled  to be promoted  first\t to  Group-A
\nGrade-II posts. Hence, the vacancies available for promotion
\nto the promotees which ought to be taken into  consideration
\nat any point of time are the vacancies in Grade-II posts  of
\nClass-I\t or Group-A. However, it is obvious from page 32  of
\nVolume-II  of their petition, that the\tpetitioner-promotees
\nhave taken into consideration vacancies not only in Grade-II
\nposts but also in Grade-I posts to show
\n1009<\/span>
\nthat  in fact not only they were not promoted in excess\t but
\ntheir  promotions  were short of the  vacancies\t which\twere
\navailable  to them in their quota. We may  reproduce  herein
\nbelow  the  relevant table of the sanctioned  strength,\t the
\nvacancies,  the\t quota for promotees, the actual  number  of
\npromotions  made  and their deficit or excess in  the  quota
\nsince  1951 to 1958 as calculated by the petitioners on\t the
\nsaid  page 32. According to the petitioners, the figures  in
\nthe table are taken from the newly discovered files:\n<\/p>\n
———————————————————–\n<\/p>\n
\t     VACANCY POSITION FROM 1951– 1958\n<\/p>\n
————————————————————
\nYear\t      Total Working  Total     Quota   Actual Def-<\/p>\n
\nSanctioned\t    Strength Vacancies of pro- No. of icit\nStrength\t    Gr.I Gr.II\t       motions promo-  (-)\n\t\t\t\t\t       tions.  or\nGrade I Grade II\t\t\t\t      Exc-\n\t\t\t\t\t\t      ess(+)\n<\/pre>\n
———————————————————–\n<\/p>\n
1951  216+200 = 416    77 + 98 = 175 241   80\t  -\n1952  224+221 = 445    83 +113 = 196 249   83\t  49  (-) 34\n<\/pre>\n
1953  224+221 = 445   130 +129 = 259 186   62\t  38  (-) 24
\n1954  224+221 = 445   169 +157 = 326 119   40\t  31  (-)  9
\n1955  224+221 = 445   154 +217 = 371  74    25\t  24  (-)  1
\n1956  224+221 = 445   187 +214 = 401  44    15\t  25  (+) 10
\n1957  287+248 = 535   224 +184 = 408 127    42\t  26  (-) 16
\n1958  290+248 = 538   213 +202 = 415 123    41\t  28  (-) 13
\n97-10=87 Net Deficiency\n<\/p>\n
———————————————————–\n<\/p>\n
    23. It is clear from the above table that the  petition-
\ner-promotees  have  calculated the posts in  the  sanctioned
\nstrength  not  only in Grade II posts but  also\t in  Grade-I
\nposts.\tWhen the posts available to them for promotion\twere
\nonly  in Grade-II. Hence, their further calculations of\t the
\nworking\t strength, the vacancies and the quota available  to
\nthem in the vacancies and of the deficiencies or the  excess
\nin the quota are erroneous. On behalf of the Government, the
\nfollowing  calculations\t have  been made  for  the  relevant
\nperiod\tfrom 1951 to 1958 on the basis of the actual  vacan-
\ncies in the sanctioned strength of Grade-II posts of Group-A
\n(Class-I).  These calculations show that in fact during\t the
\nsaid  period, the promotees were promoted to Grade-II  posts
\nof  Group-A (Class-T) in excess to the extent of 93.  There-
\nfore,  the deficiency of 97 which they have shown  in  their
\nappointments during the said period is obviously wrong.\t The
\nsaid table first handed over to us by Shri Govind
\n1010<\/span>
\nDas, Counsel for the Government is prepared on the basis  of
\nthe  very same figures on page 32 of the Writ Petition.\t It,
\nnow,  forms an annexure\t to the additional  affidavit  dated
\n23rd January, 1990 filed by one Ravi Kumar, Under Secretary,
\nDepartment of Revenue, Ministry of Finance. The table is  as
\nfollows:\n<\/p>\n
Year   Sanctioned  Working  Vacancies  Quota  Actual  Excess
\n       Grade II\t   Strength\t       of pro- promo-\n<\/p>\n
       Class I\t   Gr.II,Cl.I\t       motion  tion as\n\t\t\t\t       33%     stated\n\t\t\t\t\t       at 32.\n<\/pre>\n
———————————————————–\n<\/p>\n
1951\t  200\t       98\t102\t 34\n1952\t  221\t      113\t108\t 36\t 49\t  13\n1953\t  221\t      129\t 92\t 31\t 38\t   7\n1954\t  221\t      157\t 64\t 21\t 31\t  10\n1955\t  221\t      217\t  4\t  1\t 24\t  23\n1956\t  221\t      214\t  7\t  2\t 25\t  23\n1957\t  248\t      184\t 64\t 22\t 26\t   4\n1958\t  248\t      202\t 46\t 15\t 28\t  13\n\t\t\t\t\t\t      --------\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t  93<\/span>\n<\/pre>\n
————————————————————\n<\/p>\n
       24.  The\t figures shown in the above table  are\tself
\nexplanatory. Confronted with these figures, the\t petitioners
\ncame out with another . chart the relevant extract of  which
\nis as follows:\n<\/p>\n
———————————————————–
\n  Total Vacancies\t    Direct Recruits\tPromotees
\nYear  Sanc- Work-  Va-\tQuo- Actu-  Excess\/ Quota Act- Exce-\n<\/p>\n
      tion- ing\t   can- ta   als    Shortage\t  tual ss\/\n      ed    Stren- cies\t\t\t\t  pro- Shor-\n      in Gr. in Gr. in Gr.\t\t\tmotio- tage\n       II      II     II\t\t\tns.\n1      2\t3     4\t  5    6       7      8\t  9\t10\n<\/pre>\n
———————————————————–\n<\/p>\n
1952   221    113   108\t  72   33    (-)39   36\t  49  (+) 13\n1953   221    129    92\t  61   28    (-)33   31\t  38  (+)  7\n1954   221    157    64\t  43   52    (+) 9   21\t  31  (+) 10\n1955   221    217     4\t   3   53    (+)50    1\t  24  (+) 23\n1956   221    214     7\t   5   48    (+)43    2\t  25  (+) 23\n1957   248    184    64\t  43   27    (-)16   21\t  26  (+)  5\n1958   248    202    46\t  31   99    (+)68   15\t  28  (+) 13\n<\/pre>\n
———————————————————–\n<\/p>\n
\t\t    385\t 258  340     + 82  127\t 221   + 94\n<\/p>\n
———————————————————–\n<\/p>\n
1011<\/span><\/p>\n
By  producing this chart the attempt of the petitioners,  is
\nto show that the direct recruits were appointed in excess of
\ntheir quota to the extent of 82 during the relevant  period.
\nThe interesting feature of this chart, however, is that\t the
\npetitioners admit that they were also appointed in excess of
\ntheir quota during the period to the extent of 94 as against
\n93  shown in the chart prepared on behalf of the  respondent
\nUnion  of India (the difference of one being on\t account  of
\nthe  calculation  of the excess as 5 for the  year  1957  as
\nagainst 4 calculated by the respondents for the same  year).
\nOn the basis of this chart, it is contended that in view  of
\nthe  fact that both direct recruits and promotees  were\t ap-
\npointed in excess of their quota, it could not be said\tthat
\nthe quota had broken down.\n<\/p>\n
    25.\t In  the first instance, the chart prepared  by\t the
\npetitioners  themselves shows that the conclusion which\t was
\narrived\t at  by this Court in the 1st Gupta  case  that\t the
\npromotees  were appointed in excess of their quota  is\tcor-
\nrect,  and demolishes the very foundation of their  case  in
\nthe  present  petition\tnamely, that  the  newly  discovered
\nmaterial  shows\t that not only they were  not  appointed  in
\nexcess of their quota, but were in fact short of it. Second-
\nly, assuming that their figures of the appointment of direct
\nrecruits  during the relevant period are correct  (since  so
\nfar, it was never their contention that the direct  recruits
\nwere appointed in excess of their quota and, therefore,\t the
\nrespondents  had  no  opportunity to  meet  it),  that\tonly
\nstrengthens  the conclusion of this Court in the  1st  Gupta
\ncase  that  the quota-rule had broken down.  The  quota-rule
\ndoes not collapse only when the appointments from one source
\nalone are disproportionately deficient or in excess.\n<\/p>\n
    26.\t It was then contended on behalf of the\t petitioners
\nthat  the Government’s method of working out  the  vacancies
\nwas wrong. It is not necessary for us to go into this  alle-
\ngation\tand to find out the correct way of working  out\t the
\nvacancies. This is so because firstly, the petitioners\thave
\ncome  to this Court by the present petition on the basis  of
\nthe vacancies worked out by the Government but which  vacan-
\ncies according to the petitioners, were suppressed.  Second-
\nly, their own chart shows that the vacancies were worked out
\nby  the Government by deducting the annual working  strength
\nfrom  the sanctioned strength, every year. The quota of\t the
\npromotees shown by the petitioners in their chart is further
\non  the basis of the vacancies so arrived at and is  not  on
\nthe  basis of the appointment of the direct recruits  as  is
\nalleged by them which allegation is the basis of their other
\ncontention in the petition. Thirdly, it is to be  remembered
\nthat in the present petition it
\n1012<\/span>
\nis the petitioners’ contentions that the new figures of\t the
\ndeficiencies  in the promotions have been worked out by\t the
\npetitioners on the basis of the notings made in the  missing
\nfiles which were not available at the time this Court decid-
\ned  the\t 1st Gupta case (supra). Hence, even  assuming\tthat
\nthese  notings have an intrinsic evidentiary value to  prove
\nthe  annual vacancies available on the relevant\t dates,\t the
\npetitioners’  contentions stand disproved even on the  basis
\nof the said notings. Lastly, and this according to us is  an
\nequally\t damaging  fact as far as the  petitioners’  present
\ncase  is concerned, the figures of the\tsanctioned  strength
\nand the vacancies which are worked out by this Court in\t the
\n1st Gupta case (supra) are almost identical with the figures
\nshown by the petitioners themselves in their new chart\twith
\nonly  a\t negligible  difference at some\t points.  This\tfact
\nstrikes at the very root of the present petition because the
\nonly  ground on which the petitioners have  approached\tthis
\nCourt  by  way of this petition is that the figures  of\t the
\nannual\tvacancies  were suppressed by the  respondents\tfrom
\nthis  Court  and it is this suppression which had  led\tthis
\nCourt  to come to the conclusion that the promotees were  in
\nexcess\tof their quota and to give a direction to frame\t the
\nnew Seniority Rule and to prepare the fresh Seniority  List.
\nThe  so called new material, on the other hand, proves\tthat
\nthe  directions\t given in the 1st Gupta\t case  (supra)\twere
\nbased on proper calculations and were justified.\n<\/p>\n
    27.\t It is also not correct to say that this  Court\t had
\ngiven  the direction in question only because there  was  an
\nabsence of material to show the annual vacancies in a  year.
\nThis is clear from the following passage in the decision  in
\nthe 1st Gupta case (supra) at pp 501-502:\n<\/p>\n
\t “In the absence of any material which gives us\t the
\nactual vacancies in a year, we think that in order to imple-
\nment  the  mandamus as far as it can possibly  be  done,  it
\nwould be reasonable to accept the figures of appointments in
\nthose years as substantially representing the actual  vacan-
\ncies.  There is’ also a subsidiary reason why those  figures
\nmay  reasonably be accepted. It is true that the quota\trule
\nrefers\tto vacancies but the vacancies are  those  vacancies
\nwhich the Government wants to fill. It is the prerogative of
\nthe  Government,  reflected further in Rule  4\treferred  to
\nabove, whether any vacancy may be filled at all or not. Even
\nif there are 100 vacancies in a particular year the  Govern-
\nment  is not bound to fill all those vacancies. It may\tfill
\nonly  90 of them and nobody can insist that  the  Government
\nshall fill up all the vacancies. Therefore, when
\n1013<\/span>
\nthe  quota  rule refers to vacancies it is implicit  in\t the
\nrule  that the vacancies are vacancies which the  Government
\nwants  to fill, whatever may be the actual number of  vacan-
\ncies. The actual appointments are, therefore, in the absence
\nof any evidence to the contrary, the correct measure of\t the
\nvacancies  which  the Government wanted to fill.  From\tthat
\npoint of view also it will be permissible to proceed on\t the
\nfooting\t that the actual appointments represent\t the  actual
\nvacancies which the Government wanted to fill. For  example,
\nif in the year 1953, 53 posts were filled by direct recruits
\nand 38 by promotees the total vacancies sought to be  filled
\nwould be 91 in which case the promotees would be entitled to
\n30  vacancies. That is how the Government has  proceeded  to
\ndetermine  the\texcess for each year from 1953\tto  1957  as
\nshown  at  Annexure ‘N’ (p. 26 Vol. 1 in  C.A.\tNo.  2060(n)
\n1971).\tIn our opinion the procedure adopted by the  depart-
\nment in determining the excess number of promotees appointed
\nin the several years is substantially correct. Annexure\t ‘N’
\nbegins\twith  the year 1953. It should begin with  the\tyear
\n1952 and not 1953. Indeed the 5 year period starts from 1951
\nand ends with 1956 but since there was no promotion in\t1951
\nthe question of excess in that year does not arise. For\t the
\npurposes of the mandamus the seniority list will have to  be
\nresettled  from the year 1952 showing not merely the  excess
\nfrom  the years 1953 to 1956 but from 1952 to 1956.  At\t the
\nend  of\t 1956 the progressive total of the excess  over\t the
\nquota will be known and this excess, as already pointed out,
\nis liable to be absorbed in the quota of the years  succeed-
\ning 1956.”\n<\/p>\n
(Emphasis supplied)
\n    This is apart from the fact that as we have shown earli-
\ner,  in\t fact the actual vacancies worked out by  the  Court
\napproximated  the actual appointments. And in any case,\t the
\nquota for the promotees worked out on the basis of the\tsaid
\nvacancies and the calculation of the excess of promotions on
\nthe basis of the said quota was very nearly correct and\t the
\nso called new material would not have made any difference to
\nthe conclusion which was arrived at in that case.\n<\/p>\n
    28.\t The  other contention of the  petitioners,  namely,
\nthat  while  calculating the vacancies, the  Government\t had
\ncalculated  only the permanent posts and not  the  temporary
\nposts has also no substance in it. It is not suggested\tthat
\nthe figures of the sanctioned and the working
\n1014<\/span>
\nstrength  of and the vacancies in Grade-II posts of  Group-A
\n(Class-I)  shown  by  the petitioners on page  32  of  their
\npetition or in the new chart do not include temporary posts.
\nWhat  is more, in fact in the 1st Gupta case (supra) one  of
\nthe  contentions of the direct recruits was that  the  quota
\nrule should relate to vacancies only in permanent posts\t and
\nnot  temporary\tposts. That contention was not\taccepted  in
\nthat  case  either by the promotees or the  Government.\t The
\ncourt  also pointed out in that case that there was  nothing
\nin  the Rules of 1945 or the quota Rule of 1951\t which\tsaid
\nthat the vacancies must be vacancies in permanent posts. The
\nCourt observed that indeed the whole cadre had consisted  of
\npermanent  and\ttemporary posts for years, and there  was  a
\ndifference  between  permanent vacancies  in  permanent\t and
\ntemporary posts on the one hand and the permanent and tempo-
\nrary  posts on the other. It was also pointed out  that\t a11
\nthe  direct  recruits from 1948 onwards were  initially\t ap-
\npointed\t against temporary posts. The Court had,  therefore,
\nrejected  in that case the direct recruits’ contention\tthat
\nthe  vacancies referred to in the quota Rule were  vacancies
\nonly in the permanent posts. This shows that the  Government
\nhad  always counted the vacancies both in the permanent\t and
\nthe temporary posts and the promotees had accepted this as a
\nfact  then.  There is no material placed before us  to\tshow
\nthat this was not so then. On the contrary, whatever materi-
\nal  the\t petitioners have annexed to their petition  and  to
\nwhich  our  attention  was invited shows that  in  fact\t the
\nGovernment had always calculated the vacancies on the  basis
\nof the sanctioned strength of both the permanent and  tempo-
\nrary  posts.  We  may refer only to two\t Annexures  in\tthis
\nconnection. The extract from File No. 20(22)56\/Ad. VI  which
\nis  Annexure 7 on page 125 of the petition shows that as  on
\n1st  July,  1956 the total sanctioned strength of  Grade  II
\nposts of ITO (Class I) were calculated as 248 consisting  of
\n207  permanent and 41 temporary posts. So also\tthe  nothing
\nfrom  File No. 22\/4\/58\/Ad. VI which are Annexure 11 on\tpage
\n155 of the petition mention the actual strength of  Grade-II
\nposts  of ITO (Class I) as 248 which consists of 207  perma-
\nnent and 41 temporary posts. Both the charts produced by the
\npetitioners  which we have discussed earlier show the  sanc-
\ntioned\tstrength  of the said cadre for the years  1957\t and
\n1958 each as 248. The vacancies and the quota of the  direct
\nrecruits  and  promotees have also been worked\tout  by\t the
\npetitioners  on the basis of this strength in both the\tsaid
\ncharts.\t This material, therefore, belies  the\tpetitioners’
\ncontention that the Government had not taken into considera-
\ntion  the  temporary  posts for working\t out  the  vacancies
\nduring the relevant period.\n<\/p>\n
In his affidavit dated January 31, 1967 filed in Jaisinghani
\ncase
\n1015<\/span>
\n(supra),  Shri\tR.C. Dutta, the then Finance  Secretary\t had
\nfurther\t clearly stated that the vacancies  were  calculated
\nwith reference to the following information: (i) addition to
\ncadre  strength, temporary or permanent as the case may\t be,
\nand  (ii) vacancies arising during a particular period as  a
\nresult of death, retirement, promotion, resignation, removal
\netc. of the officers in particular posts. This has been\t the
\nstand  of the respondent-Union of India from the  beginning,
\nand  beyond  making a bare allegation to the  contrary,\t the
\npetitioners have not placed any material in support of their
\nsaid contention. The Chart produced by them on the  contrary
\nproceeds  on  the  footing that the vacancies  in  both\t the
\ntemporary and the permanent posts had to be calculated.\n<\/p>\n
    29. Much has also been made of the fact that the Parlia-
\nmentary Committee on Subordinate Legislation had, as pointed
\nout above, recommended the reconsideration of the  Seniority
\nRules and the Seniority List of 1973, as allegedly they\t had
\ndone  injustice to the promotees. Apart from the  fact\tthat
\nthe  said recommendations have not legally  binding  effect,
\nthey were also not accepted by the Government. In his letter
\nof October 31, 1976 addressed to the Chairman of the Commit-
\ntee on Subordinate Legislation, the then Minister of Finance
\nhad stated as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “I  have  gone through the Eighth  Report  of\t the
\nCommittee  on Subordinate Legislation submitted to  the\t Lok
\nSabha on 7th May, 1986.\n<\/p>\n
2.  I am afraid, however, there is hardly any scope for\t the
\nGovernment  to take any significant action in the matter  as
\nthe  alleged  grievances  of the  promotee-officers  of\t the
\nIncome-tax Department are unreal and imaginary. In the past,
\nthe  prospects, position and power enjoyed by the  promotees
\nhappened  to  be  better only because of  a  systematic\t and
\npersistent  violation of Rules. The said violation of  Rules
\nitself\tled  to prolonged litigation which  repeatedly\twent
\nupto the Supreme Court. It was finally laid to rest in\tB.S.
\nGupta’s\t case when the Supreme Court approved the  Seniority
\nRules, 1973 and Seniority List. These Rules and the Seniori-
\nty List were prepared in accordance with the Supreme Court’s
\nown  directive\tand were approved by it after  giving  ample
\nopportunities to both the sides to present their case. These
\nRules  were  declared by the Supreme Court to be  ‘just\t and
\nfair’. It is significant that
\n1016<\/span>
\nthe  promotees\tthemselves admittedly could  not  propose  a
\nbetter alternative. The Seniority Rules, therefore, call for
\nno change.\n<\/p>\n
3.  As for quota, originally the promotees were\t given\tonly
\n20%  of the Group ‘A’ vacancies. Unfilled vacancies were  to
\nbe  carned over as part of direct recruitment quota for\t the
\nsubsequent  year.  The intention obviously was\tto  maintain
\ncertain\t standard of quality in the personnel sanctioned  to
\nthe  service. Between 1951 to 1958 the quota was  raised  to
\n1\/3rd  in  favour of the promotees. In 1973,  the  promotion
\nquota was raised to 30% which is the highest in any  service
\nunder the Central Government.\n<\/p>\n
4.  The\t question of weightage is inextricably\tlinked\twith
\nthat of quota. The weightage allowed to the promotees earli-
\ner was in view of the low quota of 20% or 33-1\/2%  available
\nto  them at that time. When the Rules were revised and\tthee
\nquota  of promotees was enhanced to 50% the weightage  given
\nin the matter of promotion was simultaneousIy withdrawn. The
\nSupreme Court itself upheld its abolition and observed\tthat
\nthe  promotees could not “after obtaining the benefit  of  a
\nhigher percentage of recruitment to Class I service, legiti-
\nmately object to the abolition of weightage enjoyed formerly
\nin the matter of seniority.”\n<\/p>\n
    The\t letter\t is annexed to the additional  Affidavit  of
\nRavi Kumar (supra).\n<\/p>\n
    It will thus be seen that even the Government had  inde-
\npendently  come to the conclusion as early as in  1986\tthat
\nneither\t the  Rules of Seniority nor the Seniority  List  of
\n1973 had done injustice to the promotees. In fact, the Rules
\nof  1973 had raised the quota of the promotees from  33-1\/3%
\nto  50%.  The seniority of the promotees was  adjusted\tupto
\n15th  January, 1959 on the basis of the earlier\t quota\tRule
\nand  the seniority of those who were appointed later and  of
\nthose  who  were found in excess of their  quota  upto\tthat
\ndate, were adjusted according to the new Rules.\n<\/p>\n
    30.\t Two  other contentions advanced on  behalf  of\t the
\npetitioners  on the basis of the alleged new  material\twere
\nthat firstly, while calculating the vacancies in the post of
\nGrade-II Officers in Group-A, the vacancies in all the posts
\nabove the said post were not taken into
\n1017<\/span>
\naccount,  and secondly, the number of vacancies\t should\t not
\nhave  been equated with the number of posts  the  Government
\nfilled but should have been calculated on the basis of their
\nactual\texistence.  According to the  petitioners,  if\tboth
\nthese factors had been taken into consideration at the\ttime
\nof  the\t decision in the 1st Gupta case (supra),  the  Court
\nwould not have found promotees in excess of their quota.  To
\nsome extent these contentions are interlinked.
\n    The first contention proceeds firstly on the basis\tthat
\nthe  notings in the relevant files made by the Officer\tcon-
\ncerned\thave  an intrinsic evidentiary value  to  prove\t the
\nactual\tvacancies in the different categories  and  secondly
\npresumes  that\tthe  number of vacancies  as  calculated  in
\nGrade-II posts of Group-A there did not already reflect\t the
\nvacancies in the higher posts. In the absence of  sufficient
\nmaterial  before us, it is not possible to accept such\tpre-
\nsumption.\n<\/p>\n
    The second contention need not even be considered in the
\npresent\t case,\tfor  as has been pointed  out  earlier,\t the
\nactual\tvacancies approximated the appointments made  during
\nthe relevant period. Hence, whether the quota was calculated
\non the basis of the actual vacancies or on the basis of\t the
\nappointments  made, it would have made no difference to\t the
\nconclusion  that this Court had arrived at in the 1st  Gupta
\ncase  (supra)  that  the promotions were in  excess  of\t the
\nquota. What is more, even this argument has been answered by
\nthis Court in that case as shown above, and we see no reason
\nto  differ  from the view taken there on  the  point.  There
\nappears to be an obvious confusion on the part of the  peti-
\ntioners\t with  regard to what this Court has stated  in\t the
\nearlier part of the judgment in the 1st Gupta case  (supra).
\nRead  with  the passage which we have quoted from  the\tsaid
\njudgment,  what this Court wanted to convey in\tthe  earlier
\npart of the judgment was that when the Government decides to
\nfill  in  the vacancies, it is not necessary  to  defer\t the
\nappointments  from one source pending the appointments\tfrom
\nthe other source. But that is when the Government decides to
\nfill in the vacancies and not before it.\n<\/p>\n
    31. In the result, we find no substance in the  petition
\nand  dismiss  the same. The Rule stands discharged.  In\t the
\ncircumstances, however, there will be no order as to costs.
\nWRIT PETITION NOS. 546-47 OF 1983.\n<\/p>\n
    32.\t As stated earlier while narrating the facts of\t the
\nearlier\t petition, these petitions are filed by\t two  Income
\nTax Officers for them-\n<\/p>\n
1018<\/span><\/p>\n
selves\tand as the representatives of the All India  Federa-
\ntion of Income Tax Gazetted Service Association. The Federa-
\ntion represents all the Group-B ITOs and all ITOs in  Group-
\nA,  Assistant Commissioners and Commissioners promoted\tfrom
\nGroup-B.  Among the parties to the petitions  is  respondent
\nNo.  4\tthe Indian Revenue Service Association\trepresenting
\ndirectly  recruited Group-A Officers and  Assistant  Commis-
\nsioners\t and Commissioners promoted from  directy  recruited
\nGroup-A ITOs.\n<\/p>\n
    33.\t The main grievance of the petitioners is  that\t the
\nclassification of ITOs into two classes, namely, Group-A and
\nGroup-B\t is discriminatory and violative of Articles 14\t and
\n16 of the Constitution because (a) the classification is not
\nmade on an intelligible differentia and (b) the\t differentia
\nhas  no relationship to the object sought to be achieved  by
\nthe Income Tax Act, 1961 inasmuch as the Officers  belonging
\nto  the two Groups do identical work and  perform  identical
\nfunctions. It is also the contention of the petitioners that
\ntheir  work and posts are interchangeable, and\tin  practice
\nthey  form  one cadre. By maintaining  the  differentiation,
\nallege the petitioners, the Government in effect is  denying
\nequal  opportunity, equal pay and equal status\tto  Officers
\ndoing identical work and performing identical functions.  To
\nattack\tthe classification, the petitioners had\t also  chal-
\nlenged\tthe  constitutional validity of Section 117  of\t the
\nIncome Tax Act, 1961 before its amendment by the Direct\t Tax
\nLaws (Amendment) Act, 1987. After the amendment of the\tsaid
\nsection by the amending Act of 1987, they have amended their
\npetition and have challenged not only the amended  provision
\nof  the said section but also the amendment made to  Section
\n116, 118 and 120, and the Recruitment Rules of 1988 and\t the
\nnotifications, circulars and orders issued pursuant thereto.
\nThe  attack  against the amended sections and the  Rules  of
\n1988,  notifications  etc. is on the ground  that  they\t are
\nviolative  of  Articles 14 and 16 of  the  Constitution.  In
\naddition,  they have also challenged the amended  provisions
\non  the\t ground that they are mala fide and are\t enacted  to
\ndestroy\t the  cause  of action in their\t petition.  In\tthis
\ncontext,  they\thave also attacked the Seniority  Rules\t and
\nSeniority List of 1973.\n<\/p>\n
    34.\t In  support of their contention  that\tthe  amended
\nprovisions  of\tthe Act are mala fide they contend  that  by
\namending the Act, the Government took the power to itself to
\nframe  the  new Recruitment Rules of 1988 and to  issue\t the
\nrelevant  notifications,  circulars and orders\twhereby\t the
\nclassification\tof  the Income Tax Officers in\tClass-I\t and
\nClass-II  could\t be  justified. In this\t connection,  it  is
\npointed\t out that it is by virtue of these new\tpowers\tthat
\nthe Government for the first
\n1019<\/span>
\ntime  got an authority to demarcate the jurisdiction of\t the
\npowers\tof Class-A and Class-B ITOs and thus to justify\t the
\nsaid classification. In the absence of the amendment and the
\nRules,\tNotifications, Circulars and Orders issued  pursuant
\nthereto,  the said classification was unjustifiable  in\t law
\nand  was  liable to be struck down. It is,  therefore,\talso
\ncontended that the said classification assuming it is justi-
\nfied,  can only act prospectively from 1st April, 1988\tfrom
\nwhich  date  it\t is brought into operation,  and  would\t not
\njustify\t the  classification of Officers prior to  the\tsaid
\ndate,  and hence those Officers who belonged to\t Group-B  on
\nthe  day prior to the coming into operation of\tthe  amended
\nprovisions, should be treated as belonging to Group-A.\n<\/p>\n
    35.\t We  are not impressed by this\tcontention.  In\t the
\nfirst  instance, the presumption underlying this  contention
\nis that the provisions of the Act prior to its amendment  by
\nthe amending Act of 1987 did not permit such classification,
\nwhich  presumption is patently incorrect. While\t the  provi-
\nsions of sub-section (1) of Section 117 prior to its  amend-
\nment gave power to the Central Government to appoint,  among
\nothers,\t the  Income Tax Officers of  Class-I  service,\t the
\nprovisions  of sub-section (2) thereof vested power  in\t the
\nCommissioner to appoint as many ITOs of Class-II service  as
\nmight  be  sanctioned  by the Central  Government.  It\twas,
\nhowever,  contended that in spite of these clear  provisions
\nof  sub-sections (1) and (2) of the unamended  Section\t117,
\nthey  had to be read down to deny the power to appoint\tITOs
\nof  Class-II or Group-B. This was so because,  according  to
\nthe petitioners, the provisions of Sections 116, 118 and 124
\nas they stood then, only referred to Income Tax Officers  as
\none  class  and did not make a distinction between  them  as
\nClass-I and Class-II Officers. In the first instance, it  is
\nan elementary rule of the interpretation of Statutes that no
\nprovision  of  a  statute should be read  as  redundant.  No
\nreason is ascribed by the petitioners to ignore the specific
\nprovisions  of\tSection 117(1) and (2) except that  the\t two
\nclasses\t of officers mentioned therein were not referred  to
\nin  the\t other\tprovisions of the Act.\tSecondly,  when\t the
\nlegislature had made a special provision for the two classes
\nvesting\t in two different authorities the power\t to  appoint
\nthem,  it must be presumed that the legislature had a  defi-
\nnite  objective\t in  view. While making\t the  provision\t for
\nClass-II  ITOs,\t the legislature seemed to be aware  of\t the
\nfact that there may be different categories of assessees and
\nassessments  requiring\tdifferent  standards  of  equipment,
\nskill  and  talent to deal with them, and it  was  therefore
\nnecessary to invest the Central Government with the power to
\nappoint\t and  to sanction the appointment of  the  different
\nclasses\t of  officers to meet the  requirement.\t This  power
\nvested by the legislature to appoint different classes
\n1020<\/span>
\nof officers carried with it also the power to demarcate\t the
\nduties,\t functions and responsibilities of the two.  Whether
\nin  fact there is such a division of powers,  functions\t and
\nresponsibilities or not, has nothing to do with the validity
\nof the power to make the classification. If in spite of such
\nclassification, the different classes in fact exercised\t the
\nsame powers and performed the same duties and functions,  it
\nmay  invite abolition of the classification. But  it  cannot
\ninvalidate  the\t power to classify. Hence, we  are  not\t im-
\npressed by the contention that the legislature had no  power
\nto  classify the Income Tax Officers into two classes  under
\nthe unamended provisions of the Act.\n<\/p>\n
    36.\t If therefore the legislature had itself  classified
\nthe  Officers  into two grades or categories and  given\t the
\npower to the Government to appoint, and\/or to sanction their
\nappointments, as the case may be, under the unamended provi-
\nsions  of the Act, it can hardy be argued that the  amending
\nAct  was passed mala fide to destroy the cause of action  in
\nthe  present petitions. This is apart from the fact that  no
\nlegislation can be challenged on the ground that it is\tmala
\nfide.  Hence the challenge to the amended provisions of\t the
\nAct  and  the  Rules, notifications,  circulars\t and  orders
\nissued pursuant to it, must fail. 1t is not further suggest-
\ned that the Rules, notifications, circulars, orders etc. are
\nultra  vires the Act. There is, therefore, no merit in\tthis
\nattack.\n<\/p>\n
    37.\t Coming now to the second contention ‘which  is\t the
\nmain  foundation of the present petitions, namely, that\t the
\nOfficers  of the two classes in fact perform the same  func-
\ntions and duties, and exercise the same powers and have\t the
\nsame jurisdiction and, therefore, there is no  justification
\nfor the said classification, it is first necessary to  exam-
\nine  the facts relied upon by the petitioners in support  of
\nthis contention. According to the petitioners, the  Officers
\nof  the two classes were always performing the\tsame  duties
\nand  function, and exercising the same power  and  jurisdic-
\ntion.  Their posts were also interchangeable. In fact,\tmany
\nof the Officers belonging to Group-B functioned as  Officers
\nbelonging  to Group-A. Even after the amendment,  which\t has
\ndemarcated the jurisdiction of the two classes on the  basis
\nof  income,  the  basic function of  making  the  assessment
\nremain the same and there is no change in the nature of\t job
\nperformed  by  them. It is also submitted that once  a\tcase
\ncomes  under the jurisdiction of an Income Tax Officer,\t the
\nOfficer continues to exercise his jurisdiction over the said
\ncase  even if in subsequent years the same assesee  files  a
\nreturn\tof higher income. Hence, the very classification  of
\nOfficers based on the return of income is totally  arbitrary
\nand  violative of the petitioners’ fundamental rights  under
\nArticles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It is
\n1021<\/span>
\nfurther\t pointed  out  that in fact the\t number\t of  regular
\npromotions from Group-B to Group-A during the period 1973 to
\n1982 were only 585 as against the ad hoc promotions of\t1197
\nduring the same period. Similarly, during the period 1982 to
\n1985,  the number of regular promotions were 262 as  against
\nthe further ad hoc promotions of 200 during the same period.
\nThis  shows  that the Income Tax Officers  of  Group-B\twere
\ndoing  the work of Officers belonging to Group-A in a  large
\nnumber\tthough on an ad hoc basis. This further\t shows\tthat
\nalthough  there\t was  a need for regular  promotion  of\t the
\nOfficers  from Group-B to Group-A, the Government was  using
\nGroup-B Officers in a large number to perform the duties  of
\nGroup-A\t Officers without giving them regular promotion\t and
\nwas  thus maintaining an artificial distinction between\t the
\ntwo groups without justification.\n<\/p>\n
    38. As has been stated in the affidavit filed on  behalf
\nof  respondents\t 1 & 2, although both  Group-A\tand  Group-B
\nOfficers have equal powers, the ITOs of Group-A are general-
\nly  placed in-charge of important wards and  cases  carrying
\nhigher\tresponsibilities, whereas the Officers belonging  to
\nGroup-B are normally entrusted with less important wards and
\ncases.\tA large majority of them have to deal  with  summary
\nassessments  only. It is further pointed out that under\t the
\nAct,  prior to its amendment of 1987, the power\t to  appoint
\nthe  Officers belonging to Group-A, i.e. Class-I was  vested
\nin  the Central Government while the power to appoint  Offi-
\ncers belonging to Group-B, i.e., Class-II was vested in\t the
\nCommissioner  of  Income Tax. The same\tdistinction  in\t the
\nappointing  authorities continues even after the  amendment.
\nThe Assistant Commissioner, i.e., the former ITOs of Group-A
\nare appointed by the Central Government whereas the power to
\nappoint Income Tax Officers, i.e., the former Group-B  Offi-
\ncers,  can be vested by the Central Government in the  Board
\nor a Director General or a Chief Commissioner or a  Director
\nor Commissioner. The respondents further deny that there was
\never  an  interchangeability of the two posts,\tand  contend
\nthat  they always remained separate. They point out that  in
\nfact,  the post of Group-A. Officers has two  grades,  i.e.,
\nGrade-I\t and Grade-II. Grade-II post of Group-A\t has  always
\nbeen  a promotional post for Group-B Officers. Their  scales
\nof pay have also been different and have been fixed  keeping
\nin view the distinction between the two Groups which  belong
\nto-two\tdifferent  cadres. This Court had in  fact  in\tK.M.
\nBakshi\tv.  Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 1139 gone  into\t the
\nmatter pertaining the distinction between the two Groups  of
\nOfficers, and had upheld the said classification.\n<\/p>\n
39. There is further no dispute that the posts of Income Tax
\n1022<\/span>
\nOfficer Group-A junior scale or Grade-II, are filled 50%  by
\ndirect\trecruitment  through the Civil\tService\t Examination
\nheld  by  the  Union Public Service Commission\tand  50%  by
\npromotion  on  the basis of selection  by  the\tDepartmental
\nPromotion  Committee  from Income Tax Officers\tGroup-B\t who
\nhave  rendered not less than 5 years’ service in that  post.
\nThe appointments to the posts of Income Tax Officers Group-B
\nare  made 100% by promotion from Income Tax  Inspectors\t who
\nbelong\tto Grade-C or Class-I11 service. The appointment  to
\nthe  posts  of\tIncome Tax Inspectors are  made\t 33-1\/3%  by
\ndirect\trecruitment and 66-2\/3% by promotion from the  lower
\ngroup  of  Class-C  service. The result has  been  that\t the
\npresent strength of about 2,500 ITOs of Group-B consists  of
\nall but 185 promotees (who were recruited ad hoc only in one
\nyear,  i.e., in 1969) from the lower GroupC posts.  What  is
\nmore, as pointed out above, the Income Tax Officers Group-B,
\nand Income Tax Officers Group-A junior scale, belong to\t two
\ndifferent  cadres  and not to the same cadre of\t Income\t Tax
\nOfficer.  Hence those who joined the lower  Group-C  service
\ncannot claim equality in conditions of service with  Group-A
\nOfficers  who are either recruited directly on the basis  of
\nthe Civil Services Examination or are promoted from  Group-B
\non the basis of seniority-cum-merit.\n<\/p>\n
    40. It is also pointed out on behalf of the\t respondents
\nthat  after changing the designation of the Income  Tax\t Au-
\nthorities  and\tdesignating the former ITOs of\tGroup-A\t and
\nGroup-B\t as Assistant Commissioners and\t ITOs  respectively,
\ntheir jurisdictions have been regulated. The basic principle
\nfollowed in demarcating the jurisdiction of the two  classes
\nof  Officers is the quantum of the return of income\/loss  as
\non  1st\t April\tof  the Financial Year.\t If  the  return  of
\nincome\/loss  is\t of  Rs.5 lakhs and above, it  goes  to\t the
\nDeputy\tCommissioner; if of Rs.2 lakhs and above  but  below
\nRs.5 lakhs, it goes to the Assistant Commissioner (i.e., the
\nformer Group-A Officers); and if it is below Rs.2 lakhs,  it
\ngoes  to the Income Tax Officers (the former  Group-B  Offi-
\ncers). It is also pointed out that the Government has  since
\nissued\ta notification on March 30, 1988 making\t the  Income
\nTax  Officers and Tax Recovery Officers subordinate  to\t the
\nAssistant  Director  or\t Assistant  Commissioner.   Further,
\nwhereas\t Assistant Commissioners of Income Tax (former\tITOs
\nof  Group-A)  are now empowered to writ off a sum  upto\t Rs.
\n1,000  if they are convinced that the amount is\t irrecovera-
\nble, in similar circumstances, the ITOs, i.e., former  Offi-
\ncers  belonging\t to Group-B, are empowered to  writ  off  an
\namount\tupto Rs.500 only. When the assessment is made  under
\nsub-section (3) of Section 143 or Section 147 for the  rele-
\nvant  assessment year, the power to issue notice under\tSec-
\ntion 148 is vested only in an Assessing Officer of the\trank
\nof
\n1023<\/span>
\nAssistant  Commissioner\t or  Deputy  Commissioner.   Section
\n274(2)\tof the Act prescribes monetary limits regarding\t the
\npowers of the Income Tax Officer and Assistant\tCommissioner
\nfor  imposing penalty. That provision shows that Income\t Tax
\nOfficer (i.e., the former Group-B Officer) has authority  to
\nimpose\tpenalty upto Rs. 10,000, whereas the Assistant\tCom-
\nmissioner  (former  Group-A Officer) has  the  authority  to
\nimpose penalty upto Rs.20,000 without the prior approval  of
\nthe Deputy Commissioner.\n<\/p>\n
    41.\t The material placed on record by  the\trespondents,
\nthus, shows that the distinction between Group-A and Group-B
\nOfficers has been in existence from the very beginning.\t The
\ndistinction  has been maintained statutorily  with  distinct
\npowers and jurisdiction, hierarchical position and eligibil-
\nity qualifications. The sources of their appointment and the
\nauthorities vested with the power to appoint them have\talso
\nbeen different. The distinction between the two further\t has
\nbeen made on the basis of the class of work and the  respon-
\nsibility entrusted to each. The work which is of more than a
\nroutine\t nature and which involves a detailed  investigation
\neither\ton account of the class of the assessees or  of\t the
\ncomplexities  of  the  returns filed, is  entrusted  to\t the
\nOfficers belonging to Group-A (now Assistant  Commissioners)
\nwhile the assessment work of a summary or routine nature  or
\nof the assessees filing routine returns or returns involving
\nsimple\ttransactions is entrusted to Officers  belonging  to
\nGroup-B\t (now  ITOs). Although,\t therefore,  apparently\t the
\noutfit of the function and its procedural part is the  same,
\nin practice the assessments differ from assessees to  asses-
\nsees, summoning different degrees of knowledge,\t application
\nof  mind,  resourcefulness, acumen and taken  to  scrutinize
\nthem.  Hence,  merely because sometimes, on account  of\t the
\nexigencies  of work the Officers belonging to  Group-B\twere
\nentrusted  with\t the  work of the Officers  of\tGroup-A,  it
\ncannot\tbe claimed that the two posts are of an equal  rank.
\nThe  handling of the higher category of work may entitle  an
\nOfficer of the lower rank to emoluments of the higher  post.
\nBut  that cannot obliterate the distinction between the\t two
\nposts.\tTo accept the plea of-the petitioners to equate\t the
\ntwo posts or to merge them on that account, is to negate the
\nwhole statutory scheme and also to ignore the fact that\t the
\nGroup-B\t post  (i.e.,  the present post of the\tITO)  is  an
\nintermediate  post between that of the Income Tax  Inspector
\nand  the  Group-A post (i.e, the present post  of  Assistant
\nCommissioner)  which  is  a promotional\t post  for  Officers
\nbelonging  to Group-B. The Group-A post is further a  selec-
\ntion post and the promotee has to satisfy certain qualifica-
\ntions to be eligible for being considered for the said post.
\nThe two posts, therefore, always belonged to
\n1024<\/span>
\ntwo  different cadres carrying different scales of  pay\t and
\nother  service conditions. Thus, this is not a case  of\t the
\ntwo posts being equal in status or of belonging to the\tsame
\nclass.\tThe distinction between the two is ordained  by\t the
\nStatute\t and is necessary for its proper implementation.  By
\nthe  very nature of the operation involved, the\t administra-
\ntion  has  to  have the power to classify the  work  and  to
\nappoint personnel with different skill and talent to execute
\nthe  different types of work. The legislature being  mindful
\nof  this  need has deliberately created the two\t classes  of
\nofficers  as is evident from the provisions of\tSection\t 117
\neven  prior to its present amendment. Even after the  amend-
\nment the said distinction has been maintained. The fact that
\nthis distinction has all along been real and not nominal  is
\nclear  from  the difference in the  power  and\tjurisdiction
\nstatutorily  vested in the two classes of  Officers.  Hence,
\nthe intention of the legislature to have the two classes  of
\nOfficers  to discharge different types of work\tis  manifest
\nand in practice the distinction has always been\t maintained.
\nIt  is\tonly when the exigencies of the work  required\tthat
\nsome  officers belonging to Group-B were promoted on  ad-hoc
\nbasis  to  the posts of Group-A\t officers.  Such  exigencies
\noccur  in every organisation, and to cope up with  them\t the
\nauthorities have to improvise. That, however, cannot  equate
\nthe two unequal posts.\n<\/p>\n
    42. The very same argument for equating these two class-
\nes  of\tOfficers  was advanced in K.M. Bakshi  v.  Union  of
\nIndia,\t(supra).  It was pointed out by this Court  in\tthat
\ncase  that the Income Tax services were reconstituted by  an
\norder  of the Government of India dated September 29,  1944,
\nand  later on in 1953, Section 5 of the Income Tax  Act\t was
\namended\t to give effect to this reconstitution. One  of\t the
\nfeatures  of  the reconstitution was that in  place  of\t one
\nclass  of Income Tax Officers two classes came\tinto  exist-
\nence,  namely, Class-I and Class-II ITOs.  Class-I  Officers
\nwere  eligible to be promoted to the higher post of  Commis-
\nsioners\t and Assistant Commissioners, and Class-II  Officers
\ncould obtain such promotion only after having first  reached
\nthe  status of Class-I Officers. A percentage of the  vacan-
\ncies  in the posts of Class-I Officers was to be  filled  by
\npromotion  of  Class-II\t Officers, and the  rest  by  direct
\nrecruitment. It was also pointed out that Class-I post being
\na promotional post for Class-II Officers, the two posts were
\nnot equal. Dealing with the argument of equal pay for  equal
\nwork, the Court pointed out that if that argument were to be
\naccepted literally, even the incremental scales of pay fixed
\ndependent  upon the duration of an Officer’s  service  could
\nnot be justified. It appears that in that case the Court was
\ncalled\tupon  to deal with a bland assertion  that  the\t two
\nposts were equal and it was not contended that
\n1025<\/span>
\nthe  duties and functions discharged by them were  equal  in
\nnature and hence the Court had no occasion to deal with\t the
\nsaid  contention.  We have already pointed  out\t above\tthat
\nthere is a difference in the nature, scope and responsibili-
\nty  of the duties entrusted to the two\tOfficers  justifying
\nthe  differentiation. This is apart from the fact  that\t the
\nmatter has now been set at rest by the Rules, notifications,
\ncirculars  and\torders which have  been\t issued\t demarcating
\nclearly the functions and jurisdiction of the two.\n<\/p>\n
    43. As has been held in Federation of All India  Customs
\nand  Central  Excise Stenographers (Recognised)\t &  Ors.  v.
\nUnion  of<\/a> lndia & Ors., [1988] 3 SCC 91 the  differentiation
\nin two classes can be justified on the basis of “the  nature
\nand the type of the work done  ……….The same amount  of
\nphysical  work\tmay entail different quality of\t work,\tsome
\nmore  sensitive,  some requiring more  tact,  some  less–it
\nvaries\tfrom nature and culture of employment.\tThe  problem
\nabout equal pay cannot always be translated into a mathemat-
\nical  formula.\tIf it has a rational nexus with\t the  object
\nsought\tfor  ……….\t a certain amount of value  judgment
\nof  the\t administrative\t authorities who  are  charged\twith
\nfixing the pay-scales has to be left with them and it cannot
\nbe  interfered with by the Court unless it  is\tdemonstrated
\nthat either it is irrational or based on no basis or arrived
\nmala  fide either in law or in fact”. The Court there  found
\nthat in the light of the averments made and the facts point-
\ned out, it was not possible to say that the  differentiation
\nthere was based on no rational nexus with the object  sought
\nto be achieved. The Court noted that the differentiation was
\njustified on the dissimilarity of the responsibility, confi-
\ndentiality  and\t the relationship with\tpublic\tetc.  though
\nthere  was  similarity\tin the functional  work.  The  court
\nfurther\t observed  there that often the\t difference  in\t the
\nfunctions and the responsibilities is a matter of degree and
\nthe  administration  is required to make  a  value  judgment
\nwhile classifying the posts and fixing the different  condi-
\ntions of service for them. So long as the value judgment  is
\nmade  bona fide, it is not questionable. The same  view\t has
\nbeen  reiterated  by this Court in V. Markendeya &  Ors.  v.
\nState of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.,<\/a> [1989] 3 SCC 191.\n<\/p>\n
    44. At the cost of repetition, we may state that in\t the
\npresent\t case the distinction between the two posts is\tmade
\nby  the\t statute  itself and that distinction  has  been  in
\nexistence since long. The appointing authorities of the\t two
\nposts are different. In fact, the Group-A post (the  present
\npost  of the Assistant Commissioner) had two  grades,  viz.,
\nGrade-I\t and Grade-II, and Grade-II post was  a\t promotional
\npost for
\n1026<\/span>
\nofficers belonging to Group B (the present ITO). The  nature
\nof work entrusted to the two classes of posts, the responsi-
\nbility\twhich  goes with it and the power  and\tjurisdiction
\nvested\tin them vary. The mere fact that some Group B  offi-
\ncers are capable of performing the work of Group-A  officers
\nand in fact on some occasions in the past they were appoint-
\ned  ad\thoc or otherwise, to discharge the work of  Group  A
\nofficers cannot equate the two posts. Such a demand, to\t say
\nthe least, is irrational for if this contention is accepted,
\nin no organisation the hierarchy of posts can be  justified.
\nAfter the 1987 Amendment, further, the situation has changed
\nand  the  duties, functions, jurisdiction and power  of\t the
\nofficers  have\tbeen rationalised  clearly  demarcating\t the
\nspheres of work of the two. In an organisation of this kind,
\nwith  contrywide offices dealing with various categories  of
\nassessees and incomes, some dislocation, functional overlap-
\nping and want of uniformity in the assignment of work during
\nsome  period  is  not unexpected; and it  does\tappear\tthat
\nduring some period, the situation in the Department was\t out
\nof joint. That is why steps were taken to straighten it\t out
\nby  amending  the Act and making the rules and\tissuing\t the
\nrelevant notifications. circulars and orders. If during this
\nperiod on account of the exigencies of service, some ad\t hoe
\nappointments of Group B officers were made to Group A posts,
\nGrade-II  or Group-B officers were required to\tperform\t the
\nsame  functions\t and discharge the same\t duties\t as  Group-A
\nofficers,  they can at best claim the emoluments of Group  A
\nofficers,  but\tcertainly not the equalisation\tof  the\t two
\nposts on that account.\n<\/p>\n
    45. Since the alleged equality of posts was the  founda-
\ntion  of the other contentions raised in the petitions,\t the
\nsaid  contentions must also fail and need not be dealt\twith
\nseparately. The contentions which are common to the  earlier
\npetition have already been dealt with.\n<\/p>\n
    46. In the circumstances, we find no substance in  these
\npetitions.  The petitions are, therefore, dismissed and\t the
\nrule  granted  in  each is discharged with no  order  as  to
\ncosts.\n<\/p>\n
    47. Before parting with these petitions, we cannot\thelp
\nobserving  that\t although  the issues raised  in  a11  these
\npetitions were set at rest by this Court conclusively earli-
\ner, the petitioners thought it necessary to tax the precious
\ntime  of the Court by approaching it once again\t on  grounds
\nwhich  were  least justified. We hope and  trust  that\tthis
\ndecision  puts a final lid on the alleged grievances of\t the
\npetitioners and no new pretexts are found hereafter to\ttake
\nup the same contentions under other garbs.\n<\/p>\n
Y.LaI\t\t\t\t\t\t   Petitions\ndismissed.\n1027<\/span>\n\n\n\n<\/pre>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Hundraj Kanyalal Sajnani Etc vs Union Of India And Ors on 16 March, 1990 Equivalent citations: 1990 AIR 1106, 1990 SCR (1) 994 Author: P Sawant Bench: Mukharji, Sabyasachi (Cj), Ray, B.C. (J), Sharma, L.M. (J), Sawant, P.B., Ramaswamy, K. PETITIONER: HUNDRAJ KANYALAL SAJNANI ETC. Vs. RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA AND […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-225553","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nHundraj Kanyalal Sajnani Etc vs Union Of India And Ors on 16 March, 1990 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/hundraj-kanyalal-sajnani-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-16-march-1990\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Hundraj Kanyalal Sajnani Etc vs Union Of India And Ors on 16 March, 1990 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/hundraj-kanyalal-sajnani-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-16-march-1990\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"1990-03-15T18:30:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2016-11-04T11:34:48+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@legaliadmin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@Legal_india\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"68 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/hundraj-kanyalal-sajnani-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-16-march-1990#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/hundraj-kanyalal-sajnani-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-16-march-1990\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\"},\"headline\":\"Hundraj Kanyalal Sajnani Etc vs Union Of India And Ors on 16 March, 1990\",\"datePublished\":\"1990-03-15T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2016-11-04T11:34:48+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/hundraj-kanyalal-sajnani-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-16-march-1990\"},\"wordCount\":11620,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"articleSection\":[\"Supreme Court of India\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/hundraj-kanyalal-sajnani-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-16-march-1990#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/hundraj-kanyalal-sajnani-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-16-march-1990\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/hundraj-kanyalal-sajnani-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-16-march-1990\",\"name\":\"Hundraj Kanyalal Sajnani Etc vs Union Of India And Ors on 16 March, 1990 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"1990-03-15T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2016-11-04T11:34:48+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/hundraj-kanyalal-sajnani-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-16-march-1990#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/hundraj-kanyalal-sajnani-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-16-march-1990\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/hundraj-kanyalal-sajnani-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-16-march-1990#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Hundraj Kanyalal Sajnani Etc vs Union Of India And Ors on 16 March, 1990\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"name\":\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"description\":\"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"alternateName\":\"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"alternateName\":\"Legal India\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"width\":512,\"height\":512,\"caption\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.facebook.com\\\/LegalindiaCom\\\/\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/Legal_india\"]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\",\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Legal India Admin\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/legaliadmin\"],\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/author\\\/legal-india-admin\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Hundraj Kanyalal Sajnani Etc vs Union Of India And Ors on 16 March, 1990 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/hundraj-kanyalal-sajnani-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-16-march-1990","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Hundraj Kanyalal Sajnani Etc vs Union Of India And Ors on 16 March, 1990 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","og_url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/hundraj-kanyalal-sajnani-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-16-march-1990","og_site_name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","article_published_time":"1990-03-15T18:30:00+00:00","article_modified_time":"2016-11-04T11:34:48+00:00","og_image":[{"width":512,"height":512,"url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Legal India Admin","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@legaliadmin","twitter_site":"@Legal_india","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Legal India Admin","Est. reading time":"68 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/hundraj-kanyalal-sajnani-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-16-march-1990#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/hundraj-kanyalal-sajnani-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-16-march-1990"},"author":{"name":"Legal India Admin","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea"},"headline":"Hundraj Kanyalal Sajnani Etc vs Union Of India And Ors on 16 March, 1990","datePublished":"1990-03-15T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2016-11-04T11:34:48+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/hundraj-kanyalal-sajnani-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-16-march-1990"},"wordCount":11620,"commentCount":0,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"articleSection":["Supreme Court of India"],"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/hundraj-kanyalal-sajnani-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-16-march-1990#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/hundraj-kanyalal-sajnani-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-16-march-1990","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/hundraj-kanyalal-sajnani-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-16-march-1990","name":"Hundraj Kanyalal Sajnani Etc vs Union Of India And Ors on 16 March, 1990 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website"},"datePublished":"1990-03-15T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2016-11-04T11:34:48+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/hundraj-kanyalal-sajnani-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-16-march-1990#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/hundraj-kanyalal-sajnani-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-16-march-1990"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/hundraj-kanyalal-sajnani-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-16-march-1990#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Hundraj Kanyalal Sajnani Etc vs Union Of India And Ors on 16 March, 1990"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","description":"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"alternateName":"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization","name":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","alternateName":"Legal India","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","width":512,"height":512,"caption":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","https:\/\/x.com\/Legal_india"]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea","name":"Legal India Admin","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Legal India Admin"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com","https:\/\/x.com\/legaliadmin"],"url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/author\/legal-india-admin"}]}},"modified_by":null,"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/225553","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=225553"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/225553\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=225553"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=225553"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=225553"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}