{"id":22662,"date":"1998-10-30T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1998-10-29T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/delhi-abibhavak-mahasangh-vs-union-of-india-and-others-on-30-october-1998"},"modified":"2016-06-21T11:14:48","modified_gmt":"2016-06-21T05:44:48","slug":"delhi-abibhavak-mahasangh-vs-union-of-india-and-others-on-30-october-1998","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/delhi-abibhavak-mahasangh-vs-union-of-india-and-others-on-30-october-1998","title":{"rendered":"Delhi Abibhavak Mahasangh vs Union Of India And Others on 30 October, 1998"},"content":{"rendered":"
Delhi High Court<\/div>\n
Delhi Abibhavak Mahasangh vs Union Of India And Others on 30 October, 1998<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1998 VIIAD Delhi 445, 76 (1998) DLT 457, 1999 (49) DRJ 766<\/div>\n
Author: Y Sabharwal<\/div>\n
Bench: Acj, C Mahajan<\/div>\n<\/p>\n
<\/pre>\n
JUDGMENT<\/p>\n
 Y.K. Sabharwal, J. <\/p>\n
 1.     There  has to be an element of public benefit or philanthropy  in  the running  of the schools. The schools are to be run for public good and  not for  private gain. The object has to be service to the Society and  not  to earn  profit. The public benefit and not private or benefit to  a  favoured section of the Society has to be the aim. Keeping these aims and objects in view  the schools are required to also follow and comply the provisions  of the  Delhi School Education Act (for short the Act’) and the  Rules  framed thereunder (for short ‘the Rules’) as also the affiliation Bye laws  framed by  Central  Board  of Secondary Education (‘the  Board’  for  short).  The schools are also required to comply the conditions upon which the land  may be  allotted to it by a public authority on concessional rates for  setting
\nup of a school building and its playground etc. <\/p>\n
 2.   The bone of contentions in these petitions is the order issued by  the Director  of  Education. The Director of Education, Delhi,  has  issued  an order  dated  10th September, 1997 requiring Managements  Managers  of  all recognized  unaided schools in National Capital Territory of Delhi  to  observe directions as under :-\n<\/p>\n
  1. No Registration Fee of more than Rs. 25\/- (Rupees Twenty Five) per student prior to admission shall be realised.\n<\/p>\n
      2.  No Admission Fee of more than Rs. 200\/- (Rupees Two  Hundred) per  student at the time of initial admission shall be  realised.      Admission Fee shall not be realised again from any student who is once  given admission . The Admission Fee realized from any  student  exceeding  Rs. 200\/- (Rupees Two Hundred) in  the  academic year 1997-98 shall be refunded to the parents\/students within  15      days of the date of the issue of the direction.\n<\/p>\n
      3. No caution money\/security of more than Rs. 500\/- (Rupees  Five Hundred)  per student shall be realized. The caution  money  thus collected shall be kept deposited in a scheduled bank in the name of  the concerned schools and shall be refunded to the school  at the  time of his\/her leaving the school alongwith  bank  interest thereon.  The  caution  money collected in  the  session  1997-98 exceeding  Rs.  500\/- shall be refunded to  the  parents\/students within 15 days of the issue of the directions.\n<\/p>\n
      4. No separate science fee or computer fee shall be realized from any student upto the secondary stage.\n<\/p>\n
      5.  The  fee structure of the school  (excluding  admission  fee, caution money, science fee and computer fee) shall be reviewed in a  meeting having the proper representatives of parents  and  the nominee of the Director of Education, to consider the feasibility  of reducing the fees and funds keeping in view the actual  financial requirement of the school.\n<\/p>\n
      This  order also sought to clarify that the rates of tuition  fee shall  remain the same as on 31st March, 1997 for  the  remaining part of the current academic session. It shall not be  increased,unless, it is found that the accumulated funds are not sufficient to meet with the liabilities, if any, for implementing the recommendations  of  the Central Fifth Pay Commission and  unless  the representatives  of  the parents\/teachers  associations  and  the nominee  of  the Director of Education are associated  with  such decisions.  The order further stipulates that the fees and  funds
\n     collected from the parents shall be utilised strictly in  accordance  with the Rule 177 of the Rules. No amount whatsoever  shall be  transferred  from  the recognised unaided school  fund  of  a school  to  the society or the trust as the case may  be  running that  school nor shall any expenditure be incurred, which is  not beneficial to the students or the employees of that school.\n<\/p>\n
 3.   The  writ petitioner (C.W. 3723\/97) claims that it is a federation  to whom  various  Parents’ Associations all over the country  are  affiliated. Amongst  others  10  such Parents’ Associations,  namely,  Larcers  Convent Parents’  Association, MSMS Parents’ Association, Parents’  Association  in the  Meera  Model School, Parents’ Association DAV School  Dayanand  Vihar, Parents’  Association Happy Model School, Janak Puri, Parents’  Association Apee Jay School, Parents’ Association Summer Field School, Kailash  Colony, Parents’ Association Blue Bells School, Parents’Association of Delhi Public School  and Parents’ Association (Dorings) have stated to have made  a  request to the petitioner Mahasangh (For short to be referred to  hereinafter as  ‘Mahasangh’) to take up the matter of fee hike etc., on  their  behalf.\n<\/p>\n
These parents’ associations, it is claimed have more than 10,000 parents as Members  whose children are studying in various unaided private schools  in Delhi.  The  ‘Mahasangh’  is deeply interested to see that  those  who  run schools  do  not run them commercially and exploit the students  and  their hapless parents by adopting various devices to extract huge amounts  taking undue advantage of circumstances.\n<\/p>\n
 4.   This  public  interest writ petition was filed on 8th  September  1997 impleading  about 30 unaided recognised public schools as  respondents  besides Union of India, Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi and some other Government Departments. The ‘Mahasangh’ seeks issue of appropriate writ against the Government to take necessary steps to regulate  admissions in the recognised unaided private schools in Delhi in order to  avoid and  to  check  demand of illegal money in the name  of  donations  by  the schools at the time of admissions; to frame policy or make necessary amendments in law regulating recognition and conditions thereof including admission and payment of fee etc. of the recognised unaided private schools.\n<\/p>\n
 5.   The main thrust of the grievance of the ‘Mahasangh’ is that recognised private unaided schools in Delhi are indulging in large scale  commercialisation of education which is against public interest. The commercialisation has  reached  to its present alarming situation, it is claimed,  by  ‘Mahasangh’  on  account of failure of the Government to perform  its  statutory functions under the Act and the Rules besides failure to insist on  schools to follow the affiliation bye-laws and the bye-laws framed by the Board.\n<\/p>\n
 6.   On the other hand, the legality of aforesaid order dated 10th  September,  1997  has  been challenged in C.W. 4021\/97 which has  been  filed  by Action Committee of unaided private schools besides five recognised unaided private  schools. The Action committee claims that 157  recognized  private unaided schools are its members and, therefore, the said Committee,  represents  large number of recognised unaided private schools. The list of  the said  157 schools has been placed on record. Some other schools  have  also filed  separate writ petitions challenging the order dated  10th  September 1997.\n<\/p>\n
 7.   Apart from petition filed by Mahasangh, other petitions have also been filed highlighting the aspect of commercialisation in the recognised unaided  private  schools and seeking issue of directions on  similar  lines  as
\nsought in the writ petition filed by ‘Mahasangh’.\n<\/p>\n
 8.   This  judgment  will  dispose of all petitions whether  filed  by  the schools  challenging  the  legality and validity of the  order  dated  10th September 1997 or filed by the parents or associations supporting the  said
\norder and seeking issue of appropriate writ to authorities to check exploitation and commercialisation in these schools.\n<\/p>\n
 9.   Considering  the  facts and circumstances of the case, as  an  interim measure,  a Division Bench of this court on 11th December 1997  had  passed the following order:-\n<\/p>\n
      “Rule D.B.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      Let the pleadings be completed within four weeks from today.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      In  view of the impact of the Fifth Pay Commission Report,  which has to be implemented by the schools, as an interim measure, till disposal of these writ petitions, it is ordered:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      (a)  that the concerned schools are permitted to enhance the  fee which  they  were  charging from the student as  on  31.3.97.  by maximum of 40 per cent w.e.f. 1.4.1997.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      (b) the schools which have increased the fee in implementation of the  Fifth  Pay Commission Report, beyond 40 per  cent  will  not entitled to any further increase.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      (c) The schools whose fee-hike is beyond 40 per cent, will  bring it  down  to 40 per cent as in (a) above from  the  next  billing cycle.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      (d) So far as the payments regarding security deposit,  admission fee, and registration fee are concerned, the rates prevailing  in each  school as on 31.3.1997, will continue to apply and no  hike for the time being is permitted.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      e)  In view of the above order, the operation of the order  dated 10th September 1997 is stayed.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      Looking  to the urgency of these matters we direct that  they  be listed  for  final disposal in the category of  regular  matters, within first five case on 14th January, 1998.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
 10.  Learned counsel for the parties have made elaborate submission for and against  the validity of action of the Director of Education in the  matter of  regulation of fee and other charges payable by the students in  schools which  receive  no aid from the Government. On behalf  of  ‘Mahasangh’  and Parents’  Associations,  various facets of how the  school  management  are violating Act, Rules and Bye-laws and indulging in large scale commercialisation,  nepotism and favouritism have been highlighted. On behalf  of  the school management, while seriously disputing these submissions it has  been contended that though the schools do not receive any financial aid from the Government,  the impugned order dated 10th September, 1997 has been  issued without any authority of law and it not only adversely affects their autonomy  but  is without jurisdiction, illegal, unsustainable and is  based  on non-existent material. The impugned order also violates the  constitutional protection  afforded to the minority schools is also one of the  contention put  forth. It has been submitted that insofar as the minority schools  are concerned, the order deserves to be quashed solely on the ground of  breach of the consitutional rights of the minority institutions.\n<\/p>\n
 11.  The  main  questions  to be examined are  whether  unaided  recognised schools  are indulging in commercialisation of education. Are the  students and their parents being exploited? If it is so, has the Government power to issue the impugned order to control and check henance of  commercialisation and  exploitation. The further question is whether the Government has  performed  its statutory functions as envisaged by the Act and the  Rules.  If not, what directions are required to be issued.\n<\/p>\n
 12.  It  cannot  be disputed and in fact has not been disputed  by  learned counsel appearing for the schools that the commercialisation and  exploitation is not permissible. The schools have, however, seriously disputed  the allegation of indulging in commercialisation and\/or exploitation. According to them the schools are being run on “No Profit No Loss Basis.”\n<\/p>\n
 13.  One  of  the serious charge against the schools is  transfer  of  huge amounts by the schools to the Society and \/or to other schools being run by the  same society. It is said to be in violation of the Act and the  Rules. Another  serious charge is that there is excess of income over  expenditure under  the head tuition fee, transportation etc. It has also been  stressed that  huge  amount  is charged from students as caution money  which  is  a source of generating capital fund. The impugned order has placed a restriction  on  the maximum amount to be charged under  various  heads  including caution  money.  It has also been stressed that lakhs of rupees  have  been found accumulated under the cholarship Fund. Further, it has been  pointed out that huge amounts have been taken from parents as non-interest  bearing
\nloans as a condition of giving admission to the children. The allegation is also  that huge amount have been collected and remained unspent  under  the head ‘Building Fund’. The main thrust of the Parents’ organisation,  however,  has  been on the exhorbitant and unjustified increase  on  account  of tuition  fee, annual charges, admission fee and security deposit  etc.  According to the schools, however, these increases were justified on  account of increase in the expenses and in particular the obligation of the schools to increase the salaries of the employees in compliance with the Fifth  Pay
\nCommission  which  has resulted in huge liabilities to be incurred  by  the schools for payment of salary to its teachers and other employees.\n<\/p>\n
 14.  It  appears that the authorities had conducted inspection of about  16 schools and on consideration of the inspection reports, the impugned  order was issued. One of the aspect to be considered would be whether on  inspection  of 16 schools out of hundreds in Delhi, a general order, namely,  the one which has been impugned by the schools can be issued or the authorities can make an order only against a particular school which may be found to be violating the provisions of the Act and Rules and indulging in commercialisation  or exploitation with a view to put an and to it. Another aspect  to
\nbe considered is whether the authorities have power in law to regulate  the amount of fee and other charges payable by the students or their parents to the unaided school. According to the schools, there is no such power.\n<\/p>\n
 15.  Let us first examine certain provisions of the Act, the Rules and Byelaws.\n<\/p>\n
 16.  Section  18  of  the Act deals with school fund.  Sub-Section  (3)  of Section  18 stipulates that in every recognised unaided school there  shall be  a fund called “Recognised Unaided School Fund”. The income accruing  to the  school by way of fees, any charges and payments which may be  realised by  the  school for other specific purposes and  any  other  contributions, endouments,  gifts and the like are credited to this Fund. Sub-section  (4) interalia,  provides that the income derived by unaided schools by  way  of fees  shall be utilised only for such educational proposes as may  be  prescribed  and the charges and payments realized and all other  contributions etc. received by the schools shall be utilized only for the specific purpose for  which  they were realised or received. Sub-section  (5)  requires  the
\nManaging  Committee to file every year with the Director of Education  such duly  audited  financial and other returns as may be prescribed  and  every such  return shall be audited by such authority as may be prescribed.  Rule 170, inter alia, provides that accounts of the school shall be liable to be inspected  by the Director of Education or any person authorised by him  in this  behalf and also by an officer from the office of Accountant  General, Central  Revenue.  Rule  180, inter alia, provides for  filing  by  unaided recognized schools returns and documents in accordance with Appendix II  by 31st  day  of July of each year. It also provides that accounts  and  other records  maintained by school shall be subject to examination by the  Auditors and Inspecting officers authorised by the Director in this behalf  and also  by  any officer authorised by the Controller and Auditor  General  of India. Under the bye-laws the Board is also authorised to conduct the audit to ensure that there is no diversion of funds or any other financial irregularity.\n<\/p>\n
 17.  Unfortunately, the examination of the accounts, returns and  documents has never been conducted though permission. It deserves to be noticed  that the Director of Education and the Board has to be ever vigilant so that any act which may show commercialisation or explitation may at once be  checked and  requisite remedial action taken. There are various provisions  in  the Act  and the Rules to enable the authorities to keep a proper check on  the working  and running of the schools and to take remedial steps. Section  20 provides  for the taking over of the management of the schools. Section  22
\nprovides for the constitution of the Delhi School Education Advisory  Board for  the  purpose of advising the Administrator on the  matters  of  policy relating  to education in Delhi. Section 24 provides for the inspection  of the schools. It also empowers the Director to issue any directions  requiring  the  school to rectify any defect or deficiency found at the  time  of inspection  or  otherwise in the working of the school and  on  failure  to comply with such direction to take such action as he may think fit  including withdrawal of recognition or taking over of the management. Section  28 is rule making power of the Administrator. The rules can be made in respect of  various  aspect incorporated in the said section.  Detailed  provisions have made in the Rules for regulation of education including the  constitution  of various Committees so that there is a check on the working of  the school and the compliance of the provisions of the Act and the Rules. There
\nare detailed provisions for granting recognition and for framing of  scheme of  management which has been dealt with in Chapter V of the  Rules.  Rules regarding  grant of admissions to the recognised schools can also be  made. The  Director of Education has power to regulate admissions Chapter XIV  of the Rules makes detailed provisions about the maintenance and operation  of the  school fund and also for utilisation of the funds realised by  unaided schools.  Rules also provide that income derived from collections for  specific  purposes  shall be spent only for such purpose. Chapter  XVII  deals with inspection of the schools.\n<\/p>\n
 18.  It  can thus seen that adequate provisions have been made in  the  Act and the Rules to keep a proper check even on unaided schools. Surprisingly, however, many of the aforesaid provisions in the Act and the Rules have not been  put to use by the authorities at appropriate time and stage. We  have no  doubt that on the authorities ensuring strict compliance and  adherence by  the schools of the provisions of the Act, the Rules and the  Bye  laws, can result, to a great extent in elimination of various problems highlighted by the petitioner organisation.\n<\/p>\n
 19.  The background under which the impugned order were issued as  discernable from government files may not be noticed. It seems that the government received complaints that number of public schools had arbitrarily increased fees  and other charges without any justification. A special committee  was constituted to conduct special inspections mainly to examine the justification of increasing the fees. The inspection was restricted to few prominent schools. To carry out the inspection 5 different teams comprising of  officers  of Directorate of Education were constituted to look into the  matter
\nof  accounts and to also examine whether fees charged is commensurate  with the facilities provided to the students and teachers. The inspection  teams were required to examine 5 years accounts and examine amounts received from students as fees\/other charges under each head including donations, security, building fund, activity fees, laboratory fees, games fees, horse riding fees etc. besides transportation\/bus charges and the amounts actually spent under  the specified heads. The committee was also required to  examine  if there  was any surplus under any head and how the surplus money  was  used.\n<\/p>\n
The  financial transactions between the school management and  the  society were also required to be checked. The inspection of 16 schools was conducted.  From a perusal of the inspection reports, the government  found  gross financial mismanagement and violation of various provisions of the Act  and the  Rules and observed that almost all the schools were charging  exhorbitant  admission  fee, caution money, tuition fee and  other  charges  under various  heads in violation of Section 18(4)(b) of the Act read  with  Rule 176. The Government also observed that by charging the exhorbitant  amounts
\nschools had granted large amount of surplus funds and in some of the  cases it was found that surplus money had been transferred to the parent  Society in  violation of Rule 177. Some of the Managing Committees of  the  Schools had  transferred the school fund for establishing the schools even  outside Delhi.  The  utilisation  of the funds was not found to be  in  the  manner prescribed  under  Rule 177. It was found that the  schools  were  spending money in purchasing and maintaining luxury cars etc. which were not  useful and  necessary  for the benefit of the students. It was observed  that  the financial  irregularities  had been noticed in all the schools  which  were inspected under Section 24(2) of the Act and the possibility of such irregularities  by  other  unaided recognised schools could not  be  ruled  out. Noticing that the Directorate of Education does not have sufficient  infrastructure  to carry out special inspections of about 800 such schools,  the general  directions in public interest were decided to be issued.  This  is the background under which the impugned order dated 10th September 1997 was issued.\n<\/p>\n
 20.  Before issue of the impugned order, the Government had issued a circular  dated 9th April 1997 to all the schools bringing to their notice  various  aspects  of admission of students, fees and  other  charges,  service conditions and management of affairs of the schools to be conducted strictly  in accordance with the Act and the Rules. Two public notices were  also issued, inter alia, requiring the schools to review\/ revise the fee  structure  for 1997-98 by convening a meeting of the Managing  Committee  having PTA  representatives and Director of Educations nominee and not  to  charge
\nvarious amounts under several heads mentioned in the public notice. Another public notice brought to the notice of all concerned that the government had set  up  a Private School Fee Structure Study Committee headed  by  Mr.  J. Veera Raghvan, former Secretary in the Ministry of Human Resource  Development  to  study  the fee structure of private  recognised  unaided  schools alongwith other charges, to study how the amounts so realised are utilised, to  provide facilities to the students and teachers, to indicate,  if  any, legal  provisions are being violated in charging higher fees etc. to  study
\nthe adequacy or otherwise of the existing legal provisions and  administrative measures to deal with the problem of uncontrolled increase in the  fee of school and to regulate the same and to suggest legislative and  administrative  measures  to regulate the fee and other charges in  such  schools. School Managements, Parents and general public were requested to send their views\/suggestions  by 23rd May, 1997 so that it could be considered by  the said Committee. V. Raghvan Committee on consideration of the entire  matter has submitted its report containing important recommendations.\n<\/p>\n
 21.  The report notices that extremely wide variations in the tuition  fees charged by various schools in Delhi was quite surprising because the salary and emoluments of teachers which constitute the main revenue expenditure on education  is more or less same across the schools. The report states  that the  real reason for the wide variations in the tuition fee has thus to  be sought  elsewhere.  Regarding  the difference in  facilities  provided  the report states that there is much (academic window dressing) in the name  of providing better facilities. It states that the latest fashion in the world
\nacademic market is used as justification for charging excessively high  fee but on deeper analysis it appears that much of this justification is spurious and the rich schools charge high fees to enforce a form of  segregation and  also in order to make profits or surpluses as high fee  attracts  rich students  and  families and becomes a status symbol that  could  be  highly divisive.  The  Committee was, however, conscious of the  fact  that  there should  be  ample scope for genuine educational innovations in  schools  to improve  the quality of education and make it world class and suitable  for the coming decades and thus it is not possible to lay down any uniform  set of fees to be charged by the schools. The Committee arrived at the  following principles governing the fixation of fees:-\n<\/p>\n
      1. Tuition fees must cover the basic salary expenses,  retirement benefits  and  all other basic academic  and  administrative  expenses.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      2.  Expenses on maintenance of buildings must also be covered  by the tuition fees.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      3.  Reasonable depreciation for building and equipment should  be provided for in the costing. Depreciation should not be  provided for the cost of the land. All depreciation provided for should be earmarked in a specific fund for eplacement of assets.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      4.  Other  fees such as admission fees, laboratory  fees,  sports fees  etc.  should  be charged on a reasonable  basis  i.e.  just      sufficient  to cover the cost. These fees should be charged  only ‘from  beneficiary students and not from all students  where  the      beneficiaries  are  limited.  For instance,  swimming  pool  fees tennis  fee  and Computer Fees should be charged from  those  who avail of the services.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
   5.  If there are surpluses from any of the fees  collected,  they should  be carried over to the next year for the benefit  of  the school  and used for the purpose for which the original fee  collection was intended.\n<\/p>\n
   6. In no case should the surpluses be siphoned off to the owner’s society  or  any  of its members or utilized  for  other  schools  managed by the same society. All surpluses should be utilised for the same school.\n<\/p>\n
   7.  The fees charged should generally be acceptable both  to  the  management  and to the parents concerned. This is  essentially  a  matter between the school and the parent group itself.  Different schools serve different strata of society. In theory there is  no limit  to the quality of education or innovation and,  therefore, to the cost. However, School managements should minimise the cost by reducing non academic expenses to essentials and avoiding  the approaches and attitudes of 5 star culture in schools.\n<\/p>\n
   8. 5-Star facilities in educational institutions are violative of the  spirit of the National System of Education as  envisaged  in NPE-1986 as modified in 1992. Instead of narrowing education gaps such facilities widen them and lead to eclecticism and  alienation. As such this should not be allowed particularly when the  Government has decided to make free and compulsory elementary education a  fundamental  right for all children upto the age of  14.  This policy also emphasizes the concept of a National System of Education  upto a given level when all students should have access  to
\n     education of a comparable quality. The policy states that  effective  measures will be taken in the direction of a common  school system recommended in 1968 policy. It also lays special  emphasis on  equalisation of educational opportunities by  addressing  the specific  needs of those who have been neglected so far. We  have not  reached the stage where we can have a common school  system. However,  this  remains the ultimate goal.  The  private  schools should,  therefore,  contribute towards this goal  by  minimising disparities  instead of widening them further  without,  however,
\n     affecting the quality of education.\n<\/p>\n
22.   Regarding donations the Committee was categorical that its linkage  to admissions should be strictly avoided as by the very nature donations  have to be voluntary and if schools used direct or indirect pressures to collect donation  it would be extortion and not donation. According to  the  report all  donations  either to the school or to the Society or  any  other  link organisation or person which have a bearing on the admission of children to school  should be banned and severely dealt with wherever such  collections are  found  to exist. Bearing in mind that the schools should  be  able  to
\nfinance  its capital expenditure the guidelines suggested by the  Committee were these:-\n<\/p>\n
  (a) Donations unconnected with admission may be collected by  the schools  from parents, well-wishers, philanthropists and  ex-students  provided these are not linked to admission and  these  are clearly accountable for under the relevant fund.\n<\/p>\n
   (b)  The schools may also levy building and equipment fees  which should be moderate and have a relationship to the proposed  capital projects. For instance, building fees may be collected over a period  of  30-40 years, spread over a large number  of  students either  by monthly or annual collections would be reasonable  but not exceeding three months tuition fees (This should be in  addition to cost of maintain the building for minor and major repairs which should be included under revenue expenditure).\n<\/p>\n
   (c)  Government  should assist the schools through  provision  of loan  at  an interest lower than the market  rate.  Such  schemes should  be worked out with H.D.F.C., HUDCO, LIC and other  financial  institutions including Banks. The possibility of  having  a fund  for  refinancing of loans by  such  financial  institutions could be considered.\n<\/p>\n
   (d)  The schools may without making it compulsory invite  interest-free loans or deposits from parents which should be  refunded to  the parents when the wards leave the school or even  earlier. Such  deposits  of  loans should be  linked  to  specify  capital projects and have the attraction of involving the parents in  the capital  projects  of  the school. There should  however,  be  no direct  or indirect pressure of compulsion of such  deposits  and should not certainly be linked to admission. The interest  earned on  such  deposits  and loans should be shown as  income  of  the concerned  capital  projects  and should  not  be  credited  into society’s  account.  It was added that these deposits  are  quite
\n     different from security \/caution deposits collected  compulsorily from  the  students. These caution money  and  security  deposits should  be refunded to the students when the student  leaves  the school.\n<\/p>\n
 23.  Regarding the procedure for fixation of fees in the unaided recognised schools the Committee noticed that the provisions of the Act and the  Rules were  not effectively implemented and thus there was a need  for  effective
\nimplementation  of the same and also for closer and harmonious working  and better  understanding  between  school management, parents  and  the  Delhi government. For fixation of fee following procedure was suggested:-\n<\/p>\n
      Fee Committee :\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      (i) Under the existing rules, prior approval of the Government is not  required  for fixing the school fee by unaided  school.  The Committee  is of the opinion that the school  managements  should continue to have the right and responsibility for fixing the fees keeping in view the guidelines setforth above. The Committee does not favour any system under which prior approval of Government is required  in  the matter of fixing of fees.  The  initiative  and freedom of the schools in regard to educational management should  be  adequately  recognized Government, will,  however,  have  the
\n     right  to intervene effectively wherever there  is  exoploitation and  unfair  practice or serious violation of guidelines  .  Such intervention  should  be  exceptional  but  when  it  occurs  the Government’s  decision will have to be binding and mandatory.  To avoid  such  interventions and to develop  harmonious  system  of working, it is suggested that there should be a Committee on fees which should meet every year in early December to provide specific  guidelines  to the schools for fee fixation of fees  for  the next academic year.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      (ii)  Such  a Committee should have nominees of  Government,  the Private Schools Management, Parents and Educationists who are the different stake-holders in the process. There are 900 Private Unaided Schools. The more important one among these are the  member of  the  organizations  like the Forum of  Publics  Schools,  the National Progressive Schools Conference and the Council of Public Schools  etc. We suggest that there should be five nominees  from these organisations and two others from representing the  schools who are not members of any of these organisations.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      We suggest that the composition of the above Committee may be  as follows:-  <\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n      (1)  Principal Secretary, Department of \n          Education, Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi          - Ex-Officio \n                                                       Chairman\n     (2)  Upto three officials not below\n     the rank of Deputy Director                  -Ex-Officio\n     (Education)                                   Members.\n     (3)  Upto five members of the Parents \n     Associations to be nominated by \n     the Director of Education                    -Members\n     (4)  Upto three Educationists to be \n     nominated by the Government                  Members\n     (5)  Upto seven persons representing \n     school managements (2 from Public School \n     Forum, I from Council of\n     Public School. 2 from National Progressive \n     School Conference and two others).           Members \n  \n\n<\/pre>\n
      (iii)  We  have used the word ‘Nominee’ instead  of  ‘Representatives’ of the organizations and the Govt. concerned to  emphasize the fact that once nominated the members will be acting in  their personal  capacity  and will not represent  any  group  interest.  Their  sole  purpose will be to assist the Government  in  laying down proper guidelines of fixations of fees in the best  interest of education of all students and of all institutions.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      (iv) BINDING DIRECTIVE : Such a Committee meeting in the month of December should be able to examine all likely development in  the coming  year and provide clear guidelines to the  school  managements by early January. The school management should, in turn, be able  to  finalise the fee structure by the end  of  January  and intimate the same to the Directorate of Education. In most  cases these  fee structure these finalized should be acceptable to  the Government.  Where, however, the Government feel that there is  a serious  departure from the guidelines or if there is any  unfair
\n     practice  or  exploitation they would have the power to  issue  a binding directive to revise the fees. Such a directive should  be issued by the end of March i.e. well before admission begin.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      (v) The 900 private schools referred to in this report are unaided  schools. There are numerous non-recognised schools  which  do not  come under the ambit of the Delhi Education Act. It is  suggested that the Act should be extended to all these schools  from Nursery onwards. The power to issue a binding instruction  should extend to all the non-recognised institution as well.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      (vi)  The Delhi Education Act, 1973 should be amended to  provide for  the directives to be binding on the management  of  schools.  Where such a binding directive is issued by the Govt., the school should  have  the right to appeal to a Tribunal set up  for  this purpose.  The  Tribunal should comprise three members,  one  with judicial background, an educationist and one member with administrative  backgrounds.  The  decision of the  Tribunal  should  be
\n     treated as final and binding on all parties. In the event of  the school  not complying with the binding directive even  after  the decision  of  the Tribunal (where there is an appeal  to  such  a Tribunal)  such non compliance should lead to legal  consequences which should include heavy penalties.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
 24.  The  Committee felt that extreme steps such as withdrawal of  recognition and takeover of the schools by the government cannot be easily resorted to and the same may also harm the interest of the students and teachers, there should be other simple and effective methods of ensuring the  observance  of  law and the rules in letter and spirit. That is  the  reason  for recommending  the empowerment of the Directorate of Education for issue  of binding  instructions  with  suitable safeguards for  appeal  and  decision making in non-bureaucratic manner.\n<\/p>\n
 25.  The recommendations of the Raghvan Committee for the year 1997-98  are pertinent and thus the same may be reproduced in verbatim as under:-\n<\/p>\n
 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE YEAR 1997-98   <\/p>\n
      (i) The genesis of setting up the present Committee can be traced to  the  unease and resentment caused among the  parents  by  the steep  hike  in fees for the academic year  1997-98.  Undoubtedly  this  increase  has caused hardship to the parents, who  are  now looking  for same relief. There is also the nagging feeling  that  many  schools  are indulging in profiteering  and  siphoning  off surplus  cash  for  personal benefit or benefits  of  the  parent society or of other schools. A case by case review in respect  of all  schools  which  have hiked their fees steeply  would  be  in order.  Such a scrutiny of Balance-Sheet and income and  expenditure  account of the last two or three years of each such  school
\n     will  create an understanding of the real situation and  will  on the  one  hand, allay the misgivings and exaggerated  complaints against  some schools and on the other hand enable Government  to deal  with  cases where there is profiteering and  excessive  fee collection. But this process of due examination and consequential  action  will  take time even if the  Directorate  of  Education’s finance  wing  is effectively strengthened. While  the  committee  recommends such a case by case examination as an ongoing process, there  is also the need for immediate action in regard  to  steep increase in fees during 1997-98.\n<\/p>\n
      (ii) The Committee understands that the main reason for  increase in fees in 1997-98 is the anticipated increase in expenditure due to  the  likely adoption of the recommendations of  the  Vth  Pay Commission.  Under the Delhi Education Act, it is  mandatory  for all the schools to adopt the scales of pay and allowances as  may be recommended by the Pay Commission and are accepted by  Government.  The School managements where, therefore, right in  anticipating the financial needs of implementing the Vth Pay Commission Report.  The  decisions on these recommendations have  just  been announced  by the Government of India and it will take some  more  time  before  the financial implications are  fully  worked  out.\n<\/p>\n
     Hence, we recommend that the amount realised through increase  or tuition  fees  during  1997-98 be credited by each  school  to  a separate  fund  (beyond a limit of 15% which may at best  be  attributed  to  the normal increase due to price rise  and  innovations).  This  fund should be used exclusively  for  meeting  the additional  expenditure  due to revision of pay  scales  and  its consequential effect including the payment of arrears. It  should be  possible for the schools to work out their precise  financial  obligations  well before the fees of the 3rd quarter of the  academic  year, 1997-98 are due. If any excess amount has been  collected  this should be adjusted in the bills of the 3rd  and  the
\n     4th quarter of the current year.\n<\/p>\n
      (iii)  It  has been brought to the notice of the  Committee  that some  schools have accumulated surpluses over the years in  terms of reserves or otherwise. These are often intended for renovation and other capital expenditure. The managements of schools may  be requested  to examine the possibility of utilising some of  these accumulates surplus funds for meeting the additional requirements consequent to the adoption of the Vth Pay Commission’s  Recommendations.  In  particular  there is a good case  for  meeting  the liability  towards arrears payments relating to the  period  upto
\n     13.3.1997 for the past accumulated surplus.\n<\/p>\n
      (iv)  There have been increases not only in Tuition fees  but  in  several  other fees such as Admission free, Computer fee,  Sports fee etc. In particular, the Committee feels that “Admission  fee” levied in certain schools are considerably exceeding the  ceiling of  Rs. 200\/- suggested in a Public Notice issued by the  Government of N.C.T. of Delhi. The Committee also doubts if the  amount of  Caution  Money  deposits that are being  collected  have  any actual relationship to the risk of breakage or damage, repairs or replacement  etc.  The  Committee recommends  that  the  Managing Committees of schools should be required to review the  increases of all the fees that are being levied in addition to the  tuition fee,  this  review should be undertaken with a view  to  bringing down  proposed increases to the minimum possible level.  This  is necessary especially because of the ultimate goal of keeping  the disparities among the schools as low as possible.\n<\/p>\n
      (v)  The  Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi has already  issued  a  Public Notice  requesting the Management of Schools to review  the  fees for 1997-98, they may now require that the Managing Committees of schools  be  convened with adequate notice enabling  the  P.T.A’s nominees and nominee’s of Directorate of Education to attend this meeting.  This  special meeting may be requested  to  review  the increases in respect of Tuition as well as other fees for 1997-98 keeping  in view the guidelines set forth above. The  Managements  should  be  able  to take a final decision in  this  matter  well
\n     before the payment of the 3rd quarter of the fees becomes due  in October 1997.\n<\/p>\n
 26.  In its concluding observations the Committee has rightly observed that donation  is  not a sector where the “commercial instinct”  should  operate and,  therefore, it was suggested that strict vigilance should be  kept  to
\nconduct transactions that do not enter the records and exemplary punishment meted  put whenever such instances are detected. It has also  noticed  that malpractices  and exploitation arise from the acute scarcity of  places  in good secondary schools and there is burgeoning demand for admission in good English medium schools which the existing ply is not able to meet.  Considering  the demand for various sections of Society which cannot  be  ignored and has to be satisfactorily addressed to, the Committee felt that all  its proposals for regulation of fees in private schools would be effective only when the Government and aided schools are strengthened and provide  genuine alternatives to private schools.\n<\/p>\n
 27.  Considering  the  aforesaid  recommendations  contained  in  V.Raghvan Committee report and in the facts and circumstances as noticed hereinbefore the impugned circular was issued.\n<\/p>\n
 28.  According  to  the Government the impugned order does not  placed  any restriction  on the schools to increase the tuition fee. The stand  of  the government is that by the impugned order the schools have only been told to hold meetings as postulated by the Act and the Rules which should also have participation  of the parents and the nominee of the Director of  Education and in the said meeting take a decision on enhancement of the tuition  fee. The government has supported the stipulation in the impugned order that the schools shall first exhaust accumulated funds with them for payment of  the
\narrears of salary and the other restrictions such as limitations on  admission fee, caution fee etc. The main bone of contention between the  parties is whether the Act and the Rules vest any power to place the restriction as contained  in the impugned order and if the answer to this question  is  in affirmative was there any justification for issue of the impugned order.\n<\/p>\n
 29.  It  was vehemently contended on behalf of the schools that Section  17 of  the  Act makes it clear that the government has power to  regulate  the fees  and charges payable by students of the aided schools and not by  students  of  unaided  schools. It may be useful to reproduce  section  17  as under:-\n<\/p>\n
      Section 17 : Fees and other charges  <\/p>\n
      (1)  No  aided  school shall levy any fee or  collect  any  other charge or receive any other payment except those specified by the Director.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      (2)  Every aided school having different rates of fees  or  other charges  or  different funds shall obtain prior approval  of  the prescribed authority before levying such fees or collecting  such charges or creating such funds.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      (3)  The  manager of every recognised school  shall,  before  the commencement  of each academic session, file with the Director  a full statement of the fees to be levied by such school during the ensuring academic session, and except with the prior approval  of the  Director, no such school shall charge, during that  academic session, any fee in excess of the fee specified by its manager in the said statement.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
 30.  It  can  not be disputed that sub section (1) and (2)  of  Section  17 applies only to the aided schools and only sub section (3) is applicable to the  unaided  schools.  The main obligation under sub section  (3)  on  the recognised schools is to file with the Director a full statement of fees to be  levied  by  such school during the ensuing academic  session.  It  also provides  that  except  with the prior approval, of the  Director  no  such schools shall charge during that academic session any fee in excess of  the fee  specified in the said statement. The contention is that  exclusion  of
\nunaided  schools with the scope and ambit of Section 17 and in  absence  of any other specific provision it is clear that the intendment of Legislature was  not  to place any restriction in the matter of levy of fee  and  other charges by unaided schools. The government has not disputed that subject to the  provisions  of Sub-section (3) of Section 17 there is  no  requirement that the unaided schools shall seek prior or subsequent approval of  Director of Education for enhancement of tuition fee and other charges. It  was, however,  strenuously contended on behalf of the government  and  Mahasangh
\nthat  the  interpretation sought to be placed on Section 17 does  not  show that in case the schools start levying exhorbitant fee and thus indulge  in commercialisation and profiteering from running the schools, the government would be helpless. In this respect it may be noticed that Section 3 of  the Act empowers the Administrator to regulate education in all the schools  in Delhi in accordance with the Act and the Rules made thereunder. It is  also not in serious dispute the commercialisation of education is impermissible. At this stage it may be useful to notice that the Bye laws under which  the schools are affiliated with CBSE and referred to above, inter alia,  stipulate  that the fee charges should be commensurate with the facilities  provided  by the institution; fee should normally be charged under  the  heads prescribed by the Department of Education of the State\/Union Territories of Schools of different categories; no capitation fee or voluntary  conditions for  gaining  admission in the school or for any other  purpose  should  be charged\/collected  in the name of the school and that the  unaided  schools should consult parents through Parents representatives before revising  the fees.  There cannot be any doubt that the schools are bound and obliged  to observed  and  follow the affiliation Bye laws. One of the  object  of  the Society setting up the schools as provided in the bye laws is that it shall ensure  that school is run as a community service and not as  business  and that  commercialisation  does  not take place in the school  in  any  shape whatsoever.  On the aspect of the nature of duties and obligations in  running  the educational institutions, we may notice here as to what  the  Supreme Court said in its celebrated decision in Unnikrishnan’s case .\n<\/p>\n
 31.  The Apex Court has held that the right to free education upto the  age of  14 years is a fundamental right. However, there is absolutely no  right to get recognition of educational institutions. The right to  establishment and  run the educational institution with State recognition arises only  on the  State permitting, pursuant to a policy decision or on the  fulfilllment of  conditions  of the Statute. Therefore, though it is  dependent  on  the permission  under  the Statute or the exercise of an  executive  power,  it cannot  qualify  to be a fundamental right. Thus, there is  no  fundamental right  under Article 19(1)(g) to establish an educational institutional  if recognition  or affiliation is sought for such an educational  institution.\n<\/p>\n
The educational institutions discharge a public duty and have, therefore, a duty  to act fairly and will be subject to Article 14 of the  constitution.\n<\/p>\n
The  absence  of  receipt by educational institution of any  aid  from  the government  would not detract such institutions from the nature  of  public duty.  After  reproducing some of the relevant extracts from  the  National Policy  of  Education the Supreme Court observed that  the  Private  Sector should  be involved and need encouragement to augment the much  needed  resources in the field of education thereby making as much progress as possible in achieving the constitutional goals in this respect but that does not mean that one should tolerate private institutions which are run as  financial adventures without morals or scruples with the only aim to make money. A word of caution, however, was added by the Supreme Court which is equally applicable while dealing with the cases of private schools as well and that is that all the private institutions do not belong to the aforesaid category.  There  are  institutions which have attained  great  reputation.  They surpass  the institutions run by the Government in many respects. They,  of course, require encouragement. But from this point of view controls have to be  continued and strengthened if the commercialisatioin of  education  and racketeering  has  to be prevented. The State should strive its  utmost  in this  direction.  The regulatory measures should ensure  that  the  private institutions maintain minimum standard and facilities; admissions should be
\nbased  only on merit; that norms of admission should be  predetermined  and should be transparent. An unaided institution cannot be compelled to charge the same fee as charged in the government institution as they have to  meet the  cost  of  imparting education from their own resources  and  the  main source  can only be the funds collected from the students and that  is  the concept of ‘self financing educational institutions’ and ‘cost based educational institutions’ come in. The cost of education, however, may vary from institution  to institution and in this respect many variable  factors  may
\nhave  to be taken into account. But one thing is clear that  commercialisation  of education cannot and should not be permitted which  intention  has been clearly expressed by the Parliament as well as the State  Legislatures in unmistakable terms. Further, both in the light of our tradition and from the standpoint of interest of general public commercialisation is positively  harmful; it is opposed to public policy. This is one of the reason  for the  conclusion that imparting education cannot be trade, business or  profession.  The education has never been commerce in this country. Making  it
\none  is opposed to the ethos, tradition and sensibilities of  this  Nation. Imparting  education  has always been treated as a religious  duty.  It  is treated as a charitable activity and never a trade or business. In its true aspect it is more a mission and a vocation. The grant of recognition and\/or affiliation to an educational institution is not a matter of course nor  is it a formality. Ordinarily speaking, no educational institution can run  or survive  unless it is recognised by the government or the  appropriate  authority  and\/or  is affiliated to one or the other  Board.  The  affiliated
\nprivate  educational institutions supplement the function performed by  the institutions of the State. It is not an independent activity but one closely  allied to and supplementary to the activity of the State. Thus,  it  is
\nobligatory in the interest of general public – upon the authority  granting affiliation or recognition to insist upon such condition as are appropriate to  ensure  not only education of requisite standard but also  fairness  in other  spheres  since the recognising\/affiliating authority  is  the  State which is under an obligation to impose such conditions as part of its  duty enjoined upon it by Article of the Constitution. It cannot allow itself  or its power and privilege to be used unfairly. It follows from the above that if  the Government finds any educational institution indulging  in  commercialisation  and \/ or exploitation the government would be  abdicating  its obligations  to keep quite and not to take appropriate  remedial  measures. The said measures can even fall short of withdrawal of recognition \/ affiliation which has to be only a last resort in case the government is  unable to curb the menance by other steps.\n<\/p>\n
 32.  The  details of the fee structure of 21 schools for last 5 years  have been  placed  on record to substantiate the argument that there  have  been manifold  increase  in the fees and other charges such  as  admission  fee, development  charges etc. Our attention was drawn to increase of  admission fee  in Bluebell School, Kailash Branch, New Delhi, from Rs. 400\/- in  1991 to  Rs. 1,000\/- in 1995-96 and Rs. 2,500\/- in 1997-98 and the monthly  tuition fee from about Rs. 275\/- in 1991-92 to Rs. 430-450 in 1996-97 and  Rs. 620-650  in 1997-98; in Ahlcon Public School. Mayur Vihar the  increase  of
\nadmission  fee  from  Rs. 2,000\/- to Rs. 5,000\/- in  1997-98  and  manifold increases  in  other charges including Caution fee etc. in the  span  of  5 years. It was submitted that these increases were not commensurate with the normal  increase in the cost of living; it had nothing to do with  any  pay hike and it demonstrate that the schools were indulging in exploitation  of students and are treating the education as any other business or trade.  It has  further  been urged that besides these hikes there  are  other  hidden expenses  for the parents to bear – some of its being the  compulsory  purchase of dress for the students from the school shop and also the compulsory purchase of books and stationery from the school shop itself at a  price much more than the market price.\n<\/p>\n
 33.  Chapter  IV of the Rules deal with school funds. Rule 172,  interalia, prohibits  Trust  or Society running any recognised school to  collect  fee contribution or other charges from any student. Amounts have to be collected only by the School and kept in school fund as provided in Rule 173. Rule 176 provides that income derived from the collection for specific  purposes shall  be  spent only for such purpose. Rule 177 states as to how  the  fee collected by unaided schools is to be utilised. It, inter alia,  stipulates that  funds  collected for specific purpose shall be spent solely  for  the
\nexclusive benefit of the students. Since considerable emphasis was laid  by the parties on Rule 177 it will be useful to reproduce the same as under:-\n<\/p>\n
  “177.  Fees  realised  by unaided recognised schools  how  to  be  utilised-\n<\/p>\n
      (1)  Income  derived by an unaided recognised schools by  way  of fees shall be utilised in the first instance for meeting the pay, allowances and other benefits, admissible to the employees of the school.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      Provided  that  savings, if any from the fees collected  by  such school  may  be utilised, by its managing committee  for  meeting      capital  or contingent expenditure of the school, or for  one  or more or the following educational purposes, namely:- \n \n\n      (a) award of scholarships to student; \n \n\n      (b) establishment of any other recognised school, or   \n \n\n      (c)  assisting any other school or educational  institution,  nor being  a college, under management of the same society for  trust by which the first mentioned school is run. \n \n\n      (2)  The  savings to in sub-rule (1) shall be  arrived  at  after providing for the following, namely:- \n \n\n      (a)  pension, gratuity and other specified retirement  and  other benefits admissible to the employees of the chool: \n \n\n      (b)  the needed expansion of the school or any expenditure  of  a development nature; \n \n\n      (c) the expansion of the school building or for the expansion  or construction of any building or establishment of hostel or expansion of hostel accommodation. \n \n\n      (d) co-curricular activities of the students. \n \n\n      (e)  reasonable reserve fund, not being less than ten percent  of such savings. \n \n\n<\/pre>\n
      (3) Funds collected for specific purposes, like sports, cocurricular  activities, sub-scrimptions for excursions  or  subscription for magazine, and annual charges, by whatever name called,  shall be spent solely for the exclusive benefit of the students of  the concerned  school  and shall not be included in the  savings  referred to in sub rule (2).\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      (4) The collections referred to in sub-rule (3) shall be administered in the same manner as the monies standing to the credit  of the Pupils Fund are administered.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
 34.  We were taken through the inspection reports in respect of some of the schools to show the transfer of huge amounts by some of the schools to  the Societies  running  the said schools. One of the schools which  has  transferred  surplus from the school fund and the transport fund to the  Society is  Bal Bharti Public School, Ganga Ram Hospital Road. In respect  of  this school the inspection report also states that Rs. 2,000\/- as caution  money is  being  collected from the students at the time of admission and  as  on 31st March 1997 the balance of caution money account in the school was  Rs. 64,98,738\/- and this amount should be entirely deposited in a separate bank account  and  returned to the students alongwith interest at  the  time  of their leaving the school. The inspection team further observed that against the  caution  money of aforesaid over Rs. 64 lakhs, the  school  had  fixed deposit of nominal amount of about Rs. 1.02.000\/- and about Rs.  1,82,000\/- were kept in the saving account and the school was unable to satisfactorily explain  as to how the balance sum of about Rs. 60 lakhs was  deployed.  In respect of Ryan International School it was observed that the balance-sheet reveals a surplus of Rs. 5.76 lakhs in the year 1992-93 and Rs. 22.74 lakhs in  1995-96 and on this account the total surplus for the past 5 years  was Rs. 52.35 lakhs and the caution money collected from the students stood  at
\nRs.  102.55 lakhs. In respect of Delhi Public School, R.K. Puram,  the  inspection team observed that the school had taken large amount of loan  from public  sector undertakings and from the parents. The loan from  Steel  Authority  of India was stated to have been taken for purchase of buses.  The loan  from parents is taken for development projects of the schools and  6% interest is payable as loan from parents. Huge amounts were outstanding  as loans from the schools. In respect of Rukmani Devi Public School,  Pitampura,  it was, inter alia, observed that an amount of Rs. 3,25,647\/- was  due to  the  school from the Rukmani Devi Public School, Rohini  to  whom  this school had given the loan. It was observed that it was not in order to give loan  to  other schools when this school is taking loan  from  society  and paying interest at the rate of 21%. The suggestion is that school is taking loan from its Society and paying high rate of interest whereas it is giving interest  free  loan  to another school. In respect  of  Francis  De  Sales School, Janakpuri, the report, inter alia, states that on scrutinising  the accounts it was revealed that funds are diverted to the Convent in the name of maintenance grant in violation of the rules and the amount so  diverted, according to the school authorities, are used for payment of honorarium and other expenditure in respect of religious staff. We may, however, note that according  to  the  school this religious staff was teaching  and  was  not charging any salary and, therefore, according to the school there would  be no  irregularity in payment of honorarium to the religious staff from  this fund. In respect of New Era Public School. Mayapuri, the inspection  report states  that  the scrutiny of the balance-sheet for the  year  ending  31st
\nMarch 1996 has shown that a sum of more than Rs. 2 crores had been collected as fee etc and only a sum of Rs. 64 lakhs had been shown towards payment of  salary. The balance sheet, as per inspection report, also  showed  that about  Rs.  26  lakhs were in excess of income over  expenditure  and  this amount had been transferred to Capital fund and a sum of Rs. 1.4 crores had been  accumulated  in Capital fund from past years and that  is  only  from excess  of income over the expenditure. The school was also stated to  have been  running 5 unapproved branches. Transport fee is being charged by  the school and receipt issued in the name of the Society which was in violation of  Rule  172.  The school had 78 staff members on roll.  However,  as  per Employers’ Provident Fund Account there were 313 employees working and  the names  included some of the employees who had left the school  in  previous year  and also those staff members who were working in  various  unapproved branches  of the school. Regarding the admission procedure it was  observed that in the year 1996-97 and 1997-98 no new admissions were done in Class I and  II and all students who were admitted in Class I were from  napproved branches and this practice was being followed for admission upto 5th  class and the school was admitting students in the VIth class on the basis of the affidavits  that  the  students  had not pursued  studies  in  any  regular schools. In respect of Apee jay School, Pitampura, inspection team  observed that the school has been diverting funds to Apee jay School, Seikh Sarai and has  shown liabilities of over Rs. 1.35 crores in 1992-93 and over  Rs.2.35 crores in 1993-94. It further observed that a comparison of bus fee charged and the amount paid to the Bus Contractor showed that the amount  collected from  the  students on this account was much higher than what in  fact  was paid  to the Bus Contractor. In respect of Springdales School,  Pusa  Road, the  inspection  team observed that heavy amount is  being  transferred  to
\nBuilding Fund out of the surplus of the school. In respect of Ahlcon Public School,  Mayur  Vihar  the inspection team also notices  that  the  Society accepts  loans from the Parents at the time of admission though  the  loans are returned with interest. The inspection team has noticed that payment of donations \/ loan was a pre-condition for admission to Nursery classes which was  in  violation  of the Rules. It has further noticed  that  the  school authorities have mortgaged the entire DDA land and building to Nanital Bank for Rs. 60 lakhs without taking any permission from the Department. It  was
\nsubmitted  that  aforesaid were some of facts which reflect the  extent  of element of commercialisation in private unaided schools in Delhi.\n<\/p>\n
 35.  In M.C.D. Vs. Children Book Trust,  the Apex court has held  that  Rule 177 requires the utilisation of the income  only  for  the purpose  mentioned in that Rule. The Rules do not contemplate  transfer  of fund from School to Society. Such transfer of funds are in disregard of the Rules.  Such  transfers  cannot, by any process of reasoning,  be  held  as voluntary  contributions received by the Society. The school being a  separate  entity premises occupied by the school will belong to it and  not  to the  Society. The Supreme Court has noticed with approval the  observations made  by  this court in Safdarjung Enclave Educational  Society  Vs.  Delhi Municipal  Corporation,  to the effect that  the  Society was  being run purely on commercial lines for purposes of profit and it  is the  receipt of income generated from the Society in the form  of  building fund  and donations etc. where are forced on students and  their  guardians and the same were not voluntary contributions. In our view, these  observations would not be diluted merely because the same were made in the context of  exemption  for payment of house tax under Section 115(4) of  the  Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. The Safdarjung Enclave Educational Society was running Green Field School recognised under the Act.\n<\/p>\n
 36.  In  Union  of India & another Vs. Jain Sabha. New Delhi  and  another,
\n the observations made by the Supreme Court are very pertinent.  The  Supreme Court said that where the public property is given  to such  institutions  practically free, stringent conditions have to  be  attached with respect to the user of the land and the manner in which schools or  other  institutions established thereon shall function.  The  condition imposed should be consistent with public interest and should always  stipulate that in case of violation of any of those conditions the land shall be resumed  by the government. Not only such conditions should  be  stipulated but constant monitoring should be done to ensure that those conditions  are being  observed  in practice. Without commenting on the  particular  school
\nbeing  run by the respondent before the Supreme Court it was observed  that it  is common knowledge that some of the schools are being run  totally  on commercial  lines. Huge amounts are being charged by way of  donations  and fees. The allotment of land belonging to the people on practically no price is meant for serving the public interest i.e. spread, of education or other charitable purposes; it is not meant to enable the allottees to make  money or profiteering with the aid of public property. It deserves to be  noticed that  to  most of the schools the land have been allotted at  almost  throw
\naway  prices.  Unfortunately, one of the reason for the  present  state  of affairs is lack of proper monitoring and supervision by the Directorate  of Education to ensure whether the Act and the Rules have been properly implemented or not. Practically there has been no audit of the accounts  despite Rule 180 which permits audit by Auditors and inspecting officers authorised by Directorate of Education and also by an officer authorised by  Comptroller  and  Auditor General of India. In this respect reference can  also  be made  to Articles 149 to 151 of the Constitution of India  prescribing  the duties  and  powers of Comptroller and Auditor General of India.  It  seems that  the  Directorate of Education never thought of getting  the  accounts audited either from his own officers or from the officers of the Comptraller and Auditor General of India. It may be noticed here that Section 22  of the  Act provides for constitution of Advisory Board for  School  Education for  purpose of advising the Administrator on matters of  policy  regarding
\neducation  in Delhi. The National Policy on Education also  stipulates  the constitution  of  Central Advisory Board and State Advisory  Board.  Clause 10.2  of  the  National Policy stipulates that Central  Advisory  Board  of Education  will play a pivotal role in reviewing  educational  development, determining  the  changes  required to improve the  system  and  monitoring implementation. Clause 10.4 stipulates the State Governments may  establish State  Advisory Board of Education on the lines of CABE. We have  not  been told as to what steps have been taken in this regard. However, these Boards can  render true and meaningful advise and suggestions for  development  of education  and  to make it within the reasonable reach of  a  citizen  with average  means and steps necessary to curb exploitation and  commercialisation.  It seems that in the past no such steps were taken and the  authorities  woke up on pouring in of consistent complaints from the  parents.  We may also note that Clause 10.9 of the National Policy stipulates that  nongovernment and voluntary efforts including the social activist groups  will be encouraged subject to proper management and financial assistance provided and steps will be taken to prevent the establishment of institutions set up the commercialise education.\n<\/p>\n
 37.  It  is thus evident that though private institutions play a vital  and pivotal  role to spread education but unfortunately, there are many  blacksheeps whose main aim is not to spread education but to make money.  Therefore,  it  is  necessary to sift blacksheeps from  the  other  institutions spreading education who are indeed doing a laudable work.\n<\/p>\n
 38.  The government has an obligation and duty to property exercise control and  check  the acts and deeds of the institutions which are  indulging  in profiteering  and exploitation. The government has ample power  to  control blacksheeps  and  regulate the activities of such institutions.  It  cannot remain a silent spectator on the activities of such institutions coming  to its notice. It is a different matter that had the government been  vigilant such  a  situation may not have arisen but that does not mean that  if  the government  has not taken action earlier it is precluded from so ding  now. It seems clear and even conceded by learned counsel for the government that no  permission  for increase of fees is necessary to be obtained  from  the government  either before the increase or later. The stand of  the  government, however, is that on complaint or otherwise if it comes to its  notice that  fee  and other charges and excessive it can issue directions  to  the schools  to reduce the same and if such a direction is not  complied  other steps  like  withdrawal  of recognition or takeover of the  school  can  be taken.  In respect of impugned order dated 10th September 1997 it  is  contended  for the government that it only requires the schools to hold  meetings of all concerned including representatives of Parents Teachers Association  and the nominee of government and to decide in the said meetings  if any  increase  is  necessary particularly where no  accumulated  funds  are available  with  the school. The government has also  supported  the  other restrictions  contained in the circular regarding maximum  charges  towards security,  admission fee etc. The contention was that since earlier  directive dated 2nd May 1997 was not complied with, the government was left with no option but to issue the circular in question. With reference to Rule 177 the submission on behalf of the government was that the saving envisaged by this  Rule does not mean planned saving. It only means  incidental  saving. The  contention  was  that deliberately higher amount of  fee  and  charges cannot  be levied to create saving. It was further submitted that  such  an interpretation is clear from the provisions of the Act and Rules but assuming  there is any ambiguity, such interpretation deserves to be adopted  in public interest considering the unequal bargaining power of the parents and students.  The higher fee and charges to create fund for  establishment  of other schools, it was explained, would be in the nature of forced donations from the students\/parents which is not permissible as only voluntary  donations  can be taken without linkage with admissions. If linked with  admissions  donations would no more remain voluntary. It would  become  involuntary.\n<\/p>\n
 39.  The explanation offered on behalf of schools is that the amounts spend by  the Convents on the Principal\/Nuns which have been objected to  by  the petitioner  and also referred to in the V. Raghvan Committee as  an  amount spent for religious purposes, is without any merits. It cannot be said that there  should be no objection to the payments to them since these  teachers i.e. Principal, Nuns etc do not charge any salary and if salary is paid  to them,  it would be much more than the amount spent on them under  the  head objected to. Such an explanation cannot be accepted. If one is not charging any  salary, other payments cannot be justified on the ground that  if  the salary  had been charged, the amount on that account would have  been  more than the amount paid under the religious head. The argument that the amount of fee and other charges cannot be regulated since it is not a condition of recognition is also difficult to be accepted.\n<\/p>\n
 40.  Besides Section 4 of the Act which deals with grant of recognition  it has to be kept in view that the Administrator under Section 3 is  empowered to regulate education in all schools in Delhi in accordance with the provisions  of the Act and Rules made thereunder. It has to be read in  the  Act and  the  Rules that power of the Administrator to regulate  education  includes  the power to curb commercialisation. Thus, if it is found that  the fee and other charges are wholly unreasonable and exhorbitant and amount to commercialisation, it would be the duty of the Administrator to step in and check  such  an activity before taking the extreme step  of  withdrawal  of recognition  and other harsh steps. The Director of Education is the  delegate  of  the Administrator. In this view the interpretation sought  to  be placed  upon Section 17 of the Act, by Mr. Jaitley and Mr.  Subramaniam  to show  lack of power to regulate fee looses much of its  significance.  With reference  to  Section 10 of the Act which deals with the salaries  of  the employees,  it was contended on behalf of the schools that the said  provision  only envisages that private schools shall not pay less salary etc  to their employees as compared to the employees of the corresponding status in the  schools run by the government and thus the private recognised  schools could pay higher salaries and, therefore, they could generate higher  revenue. There cannot be any quarrel with this proposition. We have no  hesitation  in accepting that higher salary etc can be paid to the  employees  of the  private  recognised schools and contention to the  contrary  urged  on behalf of Mahasangh has no merit. Therefore, the private schools can generate  higher  revenue.  We are not suggesting that  the  private  recognised
\nschools cannot charge higher fee. However, what cannot be done is that  the private recognised schools in the garb of power to generate higher  revenue to pay higher salaries to the employees, cannot levy unreasonably  exhorbitant amounts towards fees and charges. The right to pay higher salary  does not  mean  right  to pay unreasonably exhorbitant amount. What  is  such  an amount would depend upon facts of each case.\n<\/p>\n
 41.  Mr.  Jaitley had relied upon decision of the Supreme Court  in  A.B.C. Laminart  Pvt. Ltd & another Vs. A.P. Agencies. Salemi;\n<\/p>\n
in support of the interpretation placed by learned counsel on Section 17 of the Act to the effect that this provision excludes the power of  regulation of fee and other charges levied by unaided schools. The contention was that Section  17 provides for regulations of fee and other charges in the  aided schools and there was no such provision in respect of unaided schools  and, therefore, it is reasonable to deduce that the Legislature did not want  to place any such regulatory power with the authorities. In the cited decision the  Supreme  Court  has held that as regards construction  of  the  ouster clause when words like ‘alone’, ‘only’, ‘exclusive’ and the alike have been used  there  may be no difficulty. Even without such words  in  appropriate cases the maxim ‘expressio unius est exclusio alterius’ – expression of one is the exclusion of another – may be applied. There can be no quarrel  with this proposition. But it has to be borne in mind that the Supreme Court has further said that what is an appropriate case shall depend on the facts  on the  case. The rule of interpretation relied upon is not of such a  general application to which there may be no exception.\n<\/p>\n
 42.  We may notice another aspect in regard to the applicability of law  of interpretation  to deal with the rival submissions of both sides. One  submission  was that there is no power to regulate the quantum of fee in  view of the provisions of Act and the Rules as they stood. The other was that it was permissible to regulate fee etc. in view of the power of the government to regulate education in accordance with the Act and Rules. Once the object of the Act and the Rules is clearly understood that it is to spread  education  and ensure that there is no commercialisation and exploitation,  then two different interpretations sought to be placed by the parties present no difficulty  in resolving the issue. In Keshavji & Co. & others Vs.  Commissioner of Income Tax.  Justice Venkatchaliah (as his  Lordship  then was) speaking for the Supreme Court after noticing the case  law on the subject, observed that the rules of interpretation are not rules  of law; they are mere aids to construction end constitute some broad pointers. The  interpretative  criteria opposite in a given situation may,  by  themselves,  be mutually irreconcilable. It is the task of the court to  decide which  one, in the light of all relevant circumstances, ought  to  prevail. The  rules  of interpretation are useful servants but quite often  tend  to become  difficult masters. When these basic principles are kept in view  as also  the object of the Act there is no difficulty in concluding  that  despite the fact that Section 17(1) & (2) of the Act is not applicable to the private  recognised  unaided schools the government under the Act  and  the Rules has ample power to regulate fee and other charges to prevent  commercialisation  and exploitation, before considering to take the extreme  step of withdrawal of recognition and other harsh steps.\n<\/p>\n
 43.  The  cardinal  principle  of law is that every law  is  designated  to further  ends  of justice. The said purpose cannot be  frustrated  on  mere technologies while interpreting a Statute. Its purpose and spirit as  gathered  from the intendment has to be borne in mind. These aspects are to  be kept in mind for the correct interpretation of the Statute and the  adjudication  of rival submissions. The Supreme Court in Directorate of  Enforcement  Vs. Deepak Mahajan and another,   has observed that though the function of the courts is only to expound the  law and  not to legislate, nevertheless the Legislature cannot be asked to  sit to  resolve  the  differences in the implementation of  its  intention  and spirit  of  the law. In such circumstances it is the duty of the  court  to mould or creatively interpret the legislation by liberally interpreting the Statute.  Reference  has  been made in the cited decision to  some  of  the leading cases and to the opinion of the experts on interpretation of  Statutes.  It  would  be  useful to quote some  of  the  passages  from  Deepak Mahajan’s case as under:-\n<\/p>\n
      “25. In Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes. Tenth Edn. at page 229, the following passage is found:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      “Where  the language of a statute, in, its ordinary  meaning  and grammatical  construction, leads to a manifest  contradiction  of the  apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some  inconvenience or  absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended,  a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words,  and  even the structure of the sentence. Where  the  main object  and  intention  of a statute are clear, it  must  not  be reduced  to a nullity by the draftsman’s un skill fullness  or  ignorance of the law, except in a case of necessity, or the  absolute
\n     intractability of the language used.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      26. In Sea fort Court Estates Ltd. Vs. Asher Denning, J. Said :\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      “When  a defect appears a Judge cannot simply fold his hands  and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task of  finding the intention of Parliament….and then he must  supplement  the written work so as to give ‘force and life’  to  the intention  of  the legislature. A Judge should  ask  himself  the question how if, the makers of the Act had themselves come across this  ruck in the texture of it, they would have straightened  it out?  He must then do as they would have done. A judge  must  not alter  the  material of which the Act is woven, but  he  can  and should iron out the creases.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      27.  Though  the above observations of Lord Denning  were  disapproved  in appeal by the House of Lords in Magor and St.  Mellons  Vs. Newport Corpn. Sarkar, J. speaking for the Constitution Bench in M. Pentiah Vs. Muddala Veeramallappa adopted that reasoning of Lord  Denning.  Subsequently also Beg. C.J.  in  Bangalore  Water Supply  and Sewerage Board Vs. A. Rajappa approved  the  observations of Lord Denning stating thus: (SCC p. 286, para 148) <\/p>\n
      “Perhaps, with the passage of time, what may be described as  the extension  of a method resembling of the ‘arm-chair rule’ in  the construction  of  wills. Judges can more frankly  step  into  the shoes of the legislature where an enactment leaves its own intentions in much too nebulous or uncertain a state.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      28.  It  will be befitting, in this context, to recall  the  view expressed by Judge Frank in Guiseppi Vs.Walling which read thus:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      “The  necessary generality in the wordings of many statutes,  and ineptness of drafting in other frequently compels the courts,  as best  as  they  can, to fill in the gaps, an  activity  which  no matter  how  one may Label it, is in part legislative.  Thus  the courts  in their way, as administrators perform the task of  supplementing statutes. In the case of courts, we call it ‘interpretation’  or ‘filling in the gaps’; in the case of administrators
\n     we call it ‘delegation’ or authority to supply the details”.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      29.  Subba Rao, C.J. speaking for the Bench in Chandra Mohan  Vs. State of U.P. has pointed out that the fundamental rule of interpretation  is that in construing the provisions of the Constitution  or the Act of Parliament, the Court “will have to find  out the  express intention from the words of the Constitution or  the Act,  as  the case may be…” and eschew the  construction  which will  lead to absurdity and give rise to practical  inconvenience or make the provisions of the existing law nugatory.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      A.P. Sen,J. in Organo Chemical Industries Vs. Union of India  has stated thus: (SCR P.89: SCC p.586, para 23):\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      “A bare mechanical interpretation of the works ‘devoid of concept or purpose’ will reduce most of legislation of futility. It is  a salutary rule, well established, that the intention of the legislature must be found by leading the statute as a whole.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      30.  Krishna Iyer, J. has pointed out in his inimitable style  in Chairman,  Board  of mining Examination and  Chief  Inspector  of Mines  Vs. Ramjee: “To be literal in meaning is to see  the  skin and miss the soul of the Regulation.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      31. True, normally courts should be slow to pronounce, the legislature to have been mistaken in its constantly manifested opinion      upon  a matter resting wholly within its will and take its  plain ordinary  grammatical  meaning of the words of the  enactment  as affording the best guide, but to winch up the legislative intent, it is permissible for courts to take into account of the ostensible  purpose and object and the real legislative  intent.  Other wise, a bare mechanical interpretation of the words and  application  of the legislative intent devoid of concept of purpose  and
\n     object will render the legislature inane. In cases of this  kind,  the question is not what the words in the relevant provision mean  but  whether  there are certain grounds for  inferring  that  the legislature intended the exclude jurisdiction of the courts  from authorising the detention of an arrestee whose arrest was effected  on the ground that there is reason to believe that  the  said person has been guilty of an offence punishable under the  provisions of FERA or the Customs Act which kind of offences  seriously,  create a dent on the economy of the nation and lead to  hazardous consequences. Authorities, a few of which we have referred to above, show that in given circumstances, it is permissible for courts  to have functional approaches and look into the  legislative  intention  and  sometimes it may be even  necessary  to  go behind  the words and enactment and take other factors into  consideration to give effect to the legislative intention and to the purpose  and  spirit  of the enactment so that  no  absurdity  or practical  inconvenience may result and the legislative  exercise and its scope and object may not become futile.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
 44.  In  view  of the aforesaid legal positions we have  no  difficulty  in rejecting  the  extreme proposition that Directorate of  Education  has  no power  to regulate the fee and other charges levied by  private  recognised unaided schools.\n<\/p>\n
 45.  In  the  present  case on the interpretation sought to  be  placed  on Section 17 it cannot be inferred that despite the authorities finding  that they  levy of the fee and other charges was exhorbitant,  unreasonable  and
\namounted  to exploitation and profiteering in the name of education,  still it cannot ask the school management to rectify it and in such an eventuality the only course open to authorities is to straightaway proceed to  withdraw recognition or take over the school management. Further, even the fact that  various provisions of the Act and the Rules make distinction  between aided  and  unaided school by itself does not mean that  under  no  circumstances  the  schools can be asked to regulate the fee and  other  charges. Referring to a stipulation in the impugned order that first the accumulated
\namount  shall  be exhausted, it was contended for the  schools  managements that  under Rules the schools cannot be told that funds collected  for  one purpose should be used for another purpose. We do not think that the stipulation in impugned circular violates any rule. In fact, in the present case it is not a question of a fund collected for one purpose being asked to  be used  for another. It may have to be examined by a Committee as to how  the surplus  amount which has been direct to be used by the Schools to pay  the arrears  to salary etc. instead of increasing fee and other charges at  the
\nfirst  instance got accumulated. It is not open to the schools  to  contend that  they are being asked to use funds for purpose other than the one  for which  it  was collected. How surplus were accumulated is the  question  of fact  which  may  have to be gone into each individual case.  We  are  also unable  to accept the contention that diversion of funds as being  objected by petitioners and the administration, would adversely affect the expansion of  the education or that the opening of the new schools would  be  jeopardised.  In our view, higher amount of fee and charges cannot be  levied  on
\nthe  ground  of  so called expansion requiring creation of  funds.  If  any amount is to be generated for such a purpose it has to be under a  separate head and not compulsive and involuntary payment under the garb of  increase in  the  fee and other charges. Further, nobody stops the  Society  of  the Trust which may have set up the school to generate its own funds needed for expansion for opening of new schools.\n<\/p>\n
 46.  The contention on behalf of the schools that the real question is  end use  of the money received as fee and charges from the students  cannot  be accepted entirely. It has to be borne in mind that in the Act & Rules there
\nis  prohibition  from use of an amount for purpose other than the  one  for which  it is charged. Further allowing such diversion of use of amount  can result  in  abuse  of the power to fix fee and other  charges.  The  amount collected  as  tuition  fee has ordinarily to be utilised  for  payment  of salary and allowances of employees and if there is some incidental  surplus amount  under the said head, it may be used for other educational  purposes but  not that higher tuition fee can be levied knowing as to what would  be the  funds required for salary and allowances but in fact keeping  in  mind the  other  expenses which may have to be incurred by the school.  For  the same  reason we find it difficult to accept the contention urged on  behalf of the schools that assuming higher admission fee is charged, it results in increase of revenue of the school resulting in levy of lesser tuition  fee. Ordinarily the admission fee amount is to be used for expenses in regard to the  admission and it is only incidental surplus which can be utilised  for other  educational  purposes. This would be applicable to levy  of  charges under  different  heads.  We are unable to accept that if  revenue  of  the school  as a whole matches with the entire expenditure of the school,  then there should be no objection from any quarters. There is also no  substance in  the  plea that the impugned circular suffers  from  non-application  of mind. The facts noticed hereinbefore show to the contrary.\n<\/p>\n
 47.  The  forceful  submission put forth on behalf of the  schools  by  Mr. Jaitley and by Mr. Gopal Subramaniam that what can be regulated and  interfered  with  is the use of the amounts collected by the schools  from  the students and not the quantum also deserve to be rejected. It is same  argument  that only end use of the amount collected is the relevant  consideration and not whether the amount collected for one head is spent on another. The scheme of the Act and the Rules is that there should be no diversion of funds  and what is collected shall be spent for same purpose barring  accidental  savings.  The incidental use of sums collected for  some  ancillary purpose may be different but not the deliberate levy for one purpose  knowing  that  for the said purpose the amount required may be  much  less  and
\nknowing  that the excess amount is levied and collected and later used  for another  purpose.  We do not think that the object of the Act  would  stand satisfied  on  simply  showing that the amounts collected  were  spent  for educational  purposes. There may be some stray cases of such  diversion  of funds  taking  placed.  The approach relating to such stray  cases  may  be different.  The  approach  would, however, be different when  one  finds  a continuous pattern of such diversion which is not permissible under the Act and  the Rules and cannot be permitted under the garb of  spreading  education.  But  these are some of the aspects to be examined on facts  in  each case.\n<\/p>\n
 48.  We  have  also  no difficulty in accepting the  proposition  that  the expenses may have to differ from school to school depending upon the nature of activities in the schools. It is not being suggested that if for legitimate  and  reasonable  activities to be provided to  the  students,  higher expenses  are to be incurred the burden of it cannot be placed on the  students. Our approach in no manner adversely affects the autonomy of  unaided schools.  We agree that autonomy of such schools has to be  respected.  But under  the  garb of autonomy the commercialisation of education  cannot  be permitted.  It  cannot  be said that because of the autonomy  of  limit  on charging  any  sum from students can be fixed under any  head  despite  the expenditure under that head.\n<\/p>\n
 49.  Another  submission put forth by Mr. Subramaniam, that an  independent Committee  can  be appointed to go into the question  whether  the  amounts transferred by the schools to the Societies were used or not for educational  purposes  and  if such a Committee comes to  the  conclusion  that  the amounts transferred from the schools to Societies were not spent by  Societies  for educational purposes, the Societies\/Trust can be directed to  use such amount for educational purposes cannot be accepted in view of prohibition for transfer of amounts from the Schools to the Societies. In view  of the  provisions  of the Rules we are unable to accept the  contention  that transfer  of funds from School of Society is permissible. Further, as  contended it may be that in the field of education one has to pay not only for the  present  but also for the future as well, but that has to  be  in  the nature  of  voluntary donation. For the expansion of education  for  future generation unreasonable demand cannot be made from the present students and their parents.\n<\/p>\n
 50.  There  can  be no doubt that the substantial increase in the  fee  and charges  leads to considerable amount of discontentment amongst a  substantial  number of parents as it affects their pockets in these days  of  high inflation. The argument of high inflation is also applicable to schools who have to incur expenses. It cannot be ignored that to meet the increased  in the expenses, the schools have necessarily to generate funds by  increasing the amount of fee and charges. The present problem has arisen on account of payments  to be made as a result of acceptance of the Vth  Pay  Commission.\n<\/p>\n
The  increased  salaries to the school staff had to be paid.  According  to schools the fee and charges were increased to meet this additional  burden. According to the Parents’ Association, however, the schools had huge  accumulated amounts wherefrom the additional burden on the schools could easily be  met  and  the schools were only using the recommendations  of  Vth  Pay Commission  as  an excuse and under that garb the fee  has  been  increased manifold.\n<\/p>\n
 51.  For  the examination of the rival contentions a close  examination  of the facts, figures and accounts of each school was necessary. Neither  this court  is fully equipped nor it is possible for this court on the facts  of the  present case, to even otherwise undertake this exercise in respect  of each  individual school. Such an exercise has to be undertaken by  authorities or by an independent committee which this court may appoint. With  the large number of private unaided recognised schools in Delhi, such an  exercise by itself may be a time consuming process. If a particular school,  on examination  of facts and figures is found to be indulging in the  malpractice  of increasing the fees and charges in the garb of the  implementation of the Vth Pay Commission or otherwise is found to be indulging in  commercialisation the Government is not without power to take appropriate  action under  the  Act  and the Rules against such erring  school.  Presently  the question  has also been raised as to the validity of exercise of  power  by issue of impugned general order directing all schools not to charge  higher fee and charges in terms thereof and not restricting to schools which  were
\ninspected.\n<\/p>\n
 52.  The power to regulate fee etc. is also sought to be derived by  Director of Education from Section 24 of the Act, which reads as under:-\n<\/p>\n
      Sec. 24 – Inspection of Schools   <\/p>\n
      (1)  Every recognised school shall be inspected at least once  in each financial year in such manner as may be prescribed.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      (2)  The  Director  may also arrange special  inspection  of  any school on such aspects of its working as may, from time to  time, be considered necessary by him.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      (3) The Director may give directions to the manager requiring the manager to rectify any defect to deficiency found at the time  of inspection of otherwise in the working of the school.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      (4) If the manager fails to comply with any direction given under  sub-section (3), the director may, after considering the explanation  or report, if any, given or made by the Manager, take  such action as he may think fit, including-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      (a) stoppage of aid, <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
      (b) withdrawal of recognition, or  <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
      (c)  except in the case of a minority school, taking over of  the  school under Section 20.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
 53.  Assuming power to regulate fee etc. can be inferred from Section 24, a bare perusal of Section shows that it does not confer any general power  on Director  of  Education. Reading of sub-section (3) and (4) of  Section  24 shows  that only specific directions in respect of a particular  school  in which  a  defect or deficiency may be found at the time  of  inspection  or otherwise,  can alone be issued. On failure to comply with  any  directions given under sub-section (3), the Director of Education, as contemplated  by sub-section (4), can take suitable action including withdrawal of  recognition  etc. It was contended that assuming Section 24 could be applied,  the 16  schools  on inspection of which alleged defects and  deficiencies  were found then action against only those schools, after following the procedure
\nlaid down in the Act and the Rules, could alone be taken. We may also  note another  Rule which shows that if any school indulges in  commercialisation of education, the Director of Education is not powerless to take  appropriate action. Rule 50 in Chapter IV provide for condition for recognition  of private schools. Under the said rule a recognised school has to continue to follow  the  conditions specified in the Rules. Sub rule (iv)  of  Rule  50 provides that the school is not run for profit to any individual, group  or association  of individuals or any other person. If the Director of  Education finds that the school is being run for profit, such a school would  be violating a condition of recognition and thus it can be asked to rectify it failing which to face the consequences which may be withdrawal of  recognition as a result of not continuing to fulfill the condition of  recognition. The  Director of Education would be justified in asking the school  to  explain  facts  which according to Director of Education may  show  that  the school  is being run for profit. The school is obliged to explain facts  to the  satisfaction of Director of Education. If it is unable to do  so,  the Director  of  Education  can ask the school to reduce  the  fee  and  other charges  which according to the Director show that the school is  indulging in  the profit motives. In our view, it would not be open to the school  to say  that  the Director of Education has no power to direct the  school  to reduce  the  fee  and other charges as no such power vested  in  respect  of unaided  schools  because Section 17(1) & (2) of the Act  applies  only  to aided  schools.  The direction to reduce the fee and charges  is  to  avoid straightaway taking the extreme step of withdrawal of recognition or taking over  the  school.  It is an opportunity given to the school  so  that  the Director of Education may not resort to withdrawal of recognition or  steps for taking over of the management are not taken. It only amounts to  granting  an  additional  opportunity to the school so that  on  compliance  the extreme  action of withdrawal of recognition or taking over  of  management etc.  may be avoided. But for the findings and recommendations  of  Raghvan report which makes the present case as quite peculiar and to which we  will advert a little later, we find force in the submission that Section 24  and
\nRule 50 are applicable to specific schools which may be found to be violating  these  provisions. Despite this conclsion, we feel that  the  problem here  is  peculiar which necessitated issue of general order which  per  se cannot be held to be illegal in facts and circumstances of these cases.\n<\/p>\n
 54.  Regarding  the contention that the defaulter schools may be  asked  to explain  individually and action as permissible in law  against  particular school  may be taken instead of treating unequals as equals, it has  to  be
\nborne  in mind that when the problem is so deep rooted and the  sample  inspection  of few schools shows a pattern, it would be difficult  to  accept the  submission that in such circumstances the impugned  circular  covering all  schools would per se be bad. The Raghvan report has found wide  variations in tuition fee charged by various schools though emoluments of teachers which is main revenue expenditure is more or less same in all  schools. It has also been found that reasons for these variations have to be  sought elsewhere. As noticed earlier, the impugned order has not place a  complete
\nban on increase of fee. The matter can be discussed in a proper meeting  to be attended by all concerned and fee increased even as per impugned  order. If any particular school can show that for reasons special to it, it has to levy higher charges on account of other heads like admission fee,  security and  caution  money etc. it could have brought those special facts  to  the notice of the administration which would have considered it.\n<\/p>\n
 55.  Learned counsel for the Parents’ Association took us through  voluminious record to show the free structures in various private unaided  schools to  support  their arguments that there was a trend in various  schools  to increase  fee and other charges without any rhyme or reason  and  contended that  the  said  increase examined in the light of the  chart  of  expenses prepared by them show how commercialisation and profit motive exists in the schools.  Attention  was  also  drawn to other  charges  like  dress,  took charges, building fund, caution money, loans, donations etc. being  charged
\nby  the  schools. Likewise, learned counsel for the schools  also  took  us through  the record and charts etc. got prepared by them and were at  pains to  justify  the  levy of fee and collections of  charges  and  strenuously submitted  that the schools were not indulging in any profit  motive.  They submitted that the schools were doing a real service to the Society. It was also  contended that a perusal of the results of these private  schools  as compared to government schools by itself is an indication of the extent  of the  interest in development of education these private schools  take.  The further  contention was that providing other facilities like swimming  pool and sports complex etc. were part of development of the child and helps  in furthering education. Large amounts are spent on such facilities which were not available in most of the government schools.\n<\/p>\n
 56.  The  schools  with which we are concerned are in the  nature  of  self financing  private  educational institutions. While  observing  that  these schools  are not profit making ventures, it deserves to be  clearly  understood  that these private schools are the need of the day, they  are  doing laudable  work  and augment the affairs of the government in the  field  of education. The limited control of the government can only be with a view to safeguard against commercialisation and exploitation.\n<\/p>\n
 57.  Before  welcome  to the concluding part and  consider  the  directions required to be issued in these matters appointing an independent  committee to examine various factual aspects, it would be appropriate to briefly deal with  the  contention regarding the impact of impugned  order  on  minority educational institutions. It was urged that the impugned order violates the rights of the minorities protected under Article 30 of the Constitution  of India. All minorities, whether based on religion or language, under Article 30(1) of the Constitution have the right to establish and administer educational  institutions  of  their choice. The Government under  the  garb  of adopting regulatory measures cannot be permitted to destroy the administrative autonomy of the educational institutions run by the minorities as such interference would make the constitutional provisions nugatory and  illusory.  There cannot be any interference with the administrative  autonomy  of the institutions managed by the minorities. Their right under Article 30(1) is absolute. There can be no limitation on the rights of the minorities  to administer  educational  institutions. This constitutional right  has  been specifically  recognised  in the Act and the Rules. Section 5  of  the  Act which,  inter  alia,  provides the framing of a  scheme  of  management  of Schools by the Managing Committee of every recognised school,  specifically stipulates in the Second proviso that so much of the section as relates  to the  previous approval of the appropriate authority, shall not apply  to  a
\nscheme  of  management for an unaided minority school.  Likewise,  Rule  59 which, inter alia, provides the constitution of the Managing Committees  of the  recognised  schools with the nominees also of  Director  of  Education again  recognise the right of the minority institutions to  administer  the schools  without  any interference from the director of  Education  of  the Government.  The  right  of the minority  institutions  of  administer  the schools  without any interference from the Government have been  reiterated by the Supreme Court in various pronouncements.\n<\/p>\n
 58.  The  leading decision on this issue is of The Kerala Education  Bill’s case, 1959 SCR 995. According to this decision, in judging the validity  of any law, regard must be had to its real intendment and effect on the rights
\nof the aggrieved parties rather than on its form. The right protected under Article 30(1) cannot be taken away or abridged even indirectly by making  a law because the legislative power is subject to fundamental rights. In this decision  a  clause  in the proposed law requiring that no  fee  should  be charged for tuition in the primary classes was held to infringe the  fundamental rights of the minority communities in respect of recognised  schools to be established after the commencement of the Education Bill validity  of which was being examined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court also  took note of Directive Principles contained in Article 45 requiring the State to endeavour to provide, within a period of 10 years from the commencement  of the Constitution, free and compulsory education for all children until they
\ncomplete the age of 14 years. On this aspect, reference can also be made to Unni Krishnan’s decision.\n<\/p>\n
 59.  In  Frank  Anthony Public School Employees’ Association Vs.  Union  of India  and  others, , it was held that “the  extent  of  the right  under Article 30(1) is to be determined, not with reference  to  any concept of State necessity and general societal interest but with reference to the educational institutions themselves, that is, with reference to  the goal  of  making the institutions effective vehicles of education  for  the minority  community  or other persons who resort to them. It  follows  that regulatory measures which are designed towards the achievement of the  goal of  making the minority educational institutions effective instruments  for imparting  the  education cannot be considered to impinge upon  the  rights guaranteed by Article 30(1) of the Constitution. The question in each  case is whether the particular measure is, in the ultimate analysis, designed to achieve such goal, without of course nullifying any part of the right of the management in substantial measure.”\n<\/p>\n
 60.  The  right to administer cannot obviously include the right to  maladminister.  The question in the present case, however, would be whether  the impugned  circular in fact amounts to setting at naught any  maladministration or its likelihood or in the garb of regulation or of setting at naught the  maladministration,  the impugned Circular tends to  interfere  in  the administration of the educational institutions run by the minorities.\n<\/p>\n
 61.  In  Mrs. Y. Theclamma Vs. Union of India and others,
\nthe  question that came up for consideration before the Supreme  Court  was whether  Section 8(4) of the Delhi School Education Act  which,  interalia, provided  that no employee shall be suspended without the approval  of  the Director  of Education would be applicable to the minority institutions  or not.  The  case of the minority institutions was that  it  encroached  upon their  right  under  Article 30(1) of the Constitution.  Relying  upon  the decision in the case of Frank Anthony Public School the Supreme Court  held
\nthat  the endeavour of the court in all cases has been to strike a  balance between  the  Constitutional obligation to protect what is secured  to  the employees  under  Article  30(1) and the social necessity  to  protect  the
\nmembers  of the staff against arbitrariness and victimisation. It  was  accordingly held that Section 8(4) cannot be said to have encroached upon the right of the minorities under Article 30(1).\n<\/p>\n
 62.  The right to freely administer educational institutions by  minorities as  provided  for  under Article 30(1) does not permit  the  minorities  to
\nindulge in commercialisation of education in the garb of this constitutional protection. It is no doubt true that unlike Article 19, the  fundamental freedom to establish and administer educational institutions of  minorities guaranteed  under clause (1) of Article 30 is absolute in terms; it is  not
\nmade  subject to any reasonable restrictions of the nature the  fundamentalfreedoms enshrined in Article 19 may be subject to (Sidhrajbhai Sabbai  and
\nothers  Vs. State of Gujarat and another, AIR 1963 SC 540) but there is  no right to maladministration and the regulations made in the true interest of education cannot be held to be violative of Article 30(1).\n<\/p>\n
 63.  The  impugned order has to satisfy a dual test – the test of  reasonableness and the test that it is regulative of the educational character  of the  institution and is conducive to making the institutions  an  effective vehicle or education for the minority community or other persons who resort to  it. The same position would emerge from the decisions in The  Ahmedabad St.  Xaviers College Society and another Vs. State of Gujarat and  another, . Lilly Kurian Vs. Sr. Lewing and others, ,
\nand St. Stephen’s College Vs. University of Delhi, .\n<\/p>\n
 64.  The  net effect of the aforesaid discussion is that on the  aspect  of commercialisation and exploitation, minority institutions would be similarly  placed  as other institutions. If the Government on the facts  of  each
\nminority institutions is able to show that these institutions are indulging in commercialisation of the education and maladministering the  educational institutions,  to regulate this evil if any order is issued which places  a restriction on amount of fee to be charged, it would not be unconstitutional.\n<\/p>\n
 65.  In  view of the aforesaid discussion our conclusions may be  summaries as under:-\n<\/p>\n
      (i) It is the obligation of the Administrator and or Director  of Education  to prevent commercialisation and exploitation in  private unaided schools including schools run by minorities.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      (ii)  The tuition fee and other charges are required to be  fixed in a validly constituted meeting giving opportunity to the representatives of Parent Teachers Association and Nominee of Director of Education of place their viewpoints.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      (iii)  No  permission  from Director of  Education  is  necessary  before or after fixing tuition fee. In case, however, such fixing is  found to be irrational and arbitrary there are  ample  powers under the Act and Rules to issue directions to school to  rectify it  before resorting to harsh measures. The question  of  commercialisation of education and exploitation of parents by individual schools can be authoritatively determined on thorough examination of accounts and other records of each school.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      (iv)  The Act and the Rules prohibit transfer of funds  from  the  school to the society or from one school to another.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      (v)  The tuition fee cannot be fixed to recover capital  expenditure to be incurred on the properties of the society.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      (vi)  The  inspection of the schools, audit of the  accounts  and compliance of the provisions of the Act and the Rules by  private recognised unaided schools could have prevented the present state of affiars.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      (vii)  The  authorities\/Director of Education has failed  in  its obligation  to  get the accounts of  private  recognised  unaided schools audited from time to time.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      (viii)  The  schools\/societies can take voluntary  donations  not connected with the admission of the ward.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      (ix) On the peculiar facts of these petitions there is no per  se illegality in issue of the impugned circular dated 10th September  1997.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      (x)  An independent statutory Committee, by amendment of law,  if necessary, deserves to be constituted to go into factual  matters and  adjudicate disputes which may arise in future in the  matter of fixation of tuition fee and other charges.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      (xi) The Government should consider extending Act and Rules  with  or without modifications to all schools from Nursery onward. <\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      Having  bestowed  our thoughtful consideration to  the  submission  of counsel for the parties and afore noticed detail facts and circumstances, we are of the view that an independent Committee deserves to be appointed  for the period covered by impugned order dated 10th September, 1997 upto  start of  academic session in the year 1999, to look into the cases of the  individual  schools and determine, on examination of record and  accounts  etc. Whether increase of tuition fee and other charges, on facts would be justified  or not. Eliminating the element of commercialisation and in light  of
\nthis  decision the Committee would determine fee and other charges  payable by students of individual schools. We do not think that it would be desirable  at present to permit any further increase than what has  already  been permitted  by order dated 11th December, 1997. We would, therefore,  extend the  aforequoted order dated 11th December, 1997 till decision of cases  of individual schools by Committee appointed by this judgment.\n<\/p>\n
 66.  We, accordingly, appoint a Committee comprising of Ms. Justice Santosh Duggal, a retired Judge of this court as Chairperson with power to nominate two  persons – one with the knowledge of Accounts and Second from field  of education  in consultation with Chief Secretary of NCT of Delhi  to  decide matters of fee and other charges leviable by individual schools in terms of this decision. We request the Committee to decide the claims of  individual schools  as expeditiously as possible after granting an opportunity to  the Schools. Director of Education and a representative of the Parent  Teachers Association  and  such other person as the Chairperson may  deem  fit.  The terms and conditions including fees\/honorarium payable and other facilities to be provided by the State Government to the Chairperson and other members
\nof the Committee would be discussed by the Chief Secretary with the  Chairperson and finalized within 10 days.\n<\/p>\n
 67.  All  the  petitions  are disposed of in the above  terms  leaving  the parties to bear their own costs.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Delhi High Court Delhi Abibhavak Mahasangh vs Union Of India And Others on 30 October, 1998 Equivalent citations: 1998 VIIAD Delhi 445, 76 (1998) DLT 457, 1999 (49) DRJ 766 Author: Y Sabharwal Bench: Acj, C Mahajan JUDGMENT Y.K. Sabharwal, J. 1. There has to be an element of public benefit or philanthropy in the […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[14,8],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-22662","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-delhi-high-court","category-high-court"],"yoast_head":"\nDelhi Abibhavak Mahasangh vs Union Of India And Others on 30 October, 1998 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/delhi-abibhavak-mahasangh-vs-union-of-india-and-others-on-30-october-1998\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Delhi Abibhavak Mahasangh vs Union Of India And Others on 30 October, 1998 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/delhi-abibhavak-mahasangh-vs-union-of-india-and-others-on-30-october-1998\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"1998-10-29T18:30:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2016-06-21T05:44:48+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@legaliadmin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@Legal_india\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"91 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/delhi-abibhavak-mahasangh-vs-union-of-india-and-others-on-30-october-1998#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/delhi-abibhavak-mahasangh-vs-union-of-india-and-others-on-30-october-1998\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\"},\"headline\":\"Delhi Abibhavak Mahasangh vs Union Of India And Others on 30 October, 1998\",\"datePublished\":\"1998-10-29T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2016-06-21T05:44:48+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/delhi-abibhavak-mahasangh-vs-union-of-india-and-others-on-30-october-1998\"},\"wordCount\":18025,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"articleSection\":[\"Delhi High Court\",\"High Court\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/delhi-abibhavak-mahasangh-vs-union-of-india-and-others-on-30-october-1998#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/delhi-abibhavak-mahasangh-vs-union-of-india-and-others-on-30-october-1998\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/delhi-abibhavak-mahasangh-vs-union-of-india-and-others-on-30-october-1998\",\"name\":\"Delhi Abibhavak Mahasangh vs Union Of India And Others on 30 October, 1998 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"1998-10-29T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2016-06-21T05:44:48+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/delhi-abibhavak-mahasangh-vs-union-of-india-and-others-on-30-october-1998#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/delhi-abibhavak-mahasangh-vs-union-of-india-and-others-on-30-october-1998\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/delhi-abibhavak-mahasangh-vs-union-of-india-and-others-on-30-october-1998#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Delhi Abibhavak Mahasangh vs Union Of India And Others on 30 October, 1998\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"name\":\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"description\":\"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"alternateName\":\"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"alternateName\":\"Legal India\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"width\":512,\"height\":512,\"caption\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.facebook.com\\\/LegalindiaCom\\\/\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/Legal_india\"]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\",\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Legal India Admin\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/legaliadmin\"],\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/author\\\/legal-india-admin\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Delhi Abibhavak Mahasangh vs Union Of India And Others on 30 October, 1998 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/delhi-abibhavak-mahasangh-vs-union-of-india-and-others-on-30-october-1998","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Delhi Abibhavak Mahasangh vs Union Of India And Others on 30 October, 1998 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","og_url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/delhi-abibhavak-mahasangh-vs-union-of-india-and-others-on-30-october-1998","og_site_name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","article_published_time":"1998-10-29T18:30:00+00:00","article_modified_time":"2016-06-21T05:44:48+00:00","og_image":[{"width":512,"height":512,"url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Legal India Admin","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@legaliadmin","twitter_site":"@Legal_india","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Legal India Admin","Est. reading time":"91 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/delhi-abibhavak-mahasangh-vs-union-of-india-and-others-on-30-october-1998#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/delhi-abibhavak-mahasangh-vs-union-of-india-and-others-on-30-october-1998"},"author":{"name":"Legal India Admin","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea"},"headline":"Delhi Abibhavak Mahasangh vs Union Of India And Others on 30 October, 1998","datePublished":"1998-10-29T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2016-06-21T05:44:48+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/delhi-abibhavak-mahasangh-vs-union-of-india-and-others-on-30-october-1998"},"wordCount":18025,"commentCount":0,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"articleSection":["Delhi High Court","High Court"],"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/delhi-abibhavak-mahasangh-vs-union-of-india-and-others-on-30-october-1998#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/delhi-abibhavak-mahasangh-vs-union-of-india-and-others-on-30-october-1998","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/delhi-abibhavak-mahasangh-vs-union-of-india-and-others-on-30-october-1998","name":"Delhi Abibhavak Mahasangh vs Union Of India And Others on 30 October, 1998 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website"},"datePublished":"1998-10-29T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2016-06-21T05:44:48+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/delhi-abibhavak-mahasangh-vs-union-of-india-and-others-on-30-october-1998#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/delhi-abibhavak-mahasangh-vs-union-of-india-and-others-on-30-october-1998"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/delhi-abibhavak-mahasangh-vs-union-of-india-and-others-on-30-october-1998#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Delhi Abibhavak Mahasangh vs Union Of India And Others on 30 October, 1998"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","description":"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"alternateName":"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization","name":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","alternateName":"Legal India","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","width":512,"height":512,"caption":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","https:\/\/x.com\/Legal_india"]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea","name":"Legal India Admin","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Legal India Admin"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com","https:\/\/x.com\/legaliadmin"],"url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/author\/legal-india-admin"}]}},"modified_by":null,"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/22662","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=22662"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/22662\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=22662"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=22662"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=22662"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}