{"id":227096,"date":"1966-03-14T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1966-03-13T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/arnold-rodricks-anr-vs-state-of-maharashtra-ors-on-14-march-1966"},"modified":"2018-07-29T21:13:15","modified_gmt":"2018-07-29T15:43:15","slug":"arnold-rodricks-anr-vs-state-of-maharashtra-ors-on-14-march-1966","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/arnold-rodricks-anr-vs-state-of-maharashtra-ors-on-14-march-1966","title":{"rendered":"Arnold Rodricks & Anr vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors on 14 March, 1966"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Arnold Rodricks & Anr vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors on 14 March, 1966<\/div>\n
Bench: P.B. Gajendragadkar, Cj, K.N. Wanchoo, M. Hidayatullah, J.C. Shah, S.M. Sikri<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nARNOLD RODRICKS & ANR.\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT:\n14\/03\/1966\n\nBENCH:\n\n\nACT:\nThe  Commissioners  of Divisions Act, 1957 (Bom.  Act  8  of\n1958). ss. 3(3) and 3(4)-Validity of-Delegation of powers to\nState Government whether excessive.\nLand  Acquisition Act (1 of 1894) s. 3(f)(2)  introduced  by\nBombay\tAmendment  Act\t35  of\t1953-Amended  definition  of\n'public purpose'  whether valid.\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\nThe office of commissioner was abolished in Bombay State  in\n1950  but  it was revived in 1958 by  the  Commissioners  of\nDivision Act passed by the Bombay Legislature.\tThe Schedule\nto  the\t Act amended various enactments for the\t purpose  of\nconferring  powers  on Commissioners  thereunder.   Sections\n3(3)  of  the  Act gave power to  the  State  Government  by\nnotification  to amend or delete any entry in  the  Schedule\nfor  the purpose of imposing any conditions or\trestrictions\nin the exercise of powers and discharge of duties  conferred\nor imposed on the Commissioner or to withdraw them.  Section\n3(4)  of the Act gave the State Government power  to  confer\nand  impose on the Commissioner powers and duties under\t any\nother  enactment  for the time being in force and  for\tthat\npurpose by notification to amend that enactment.  By  virtue\nof this power the State Government of Bombay by notification\nconferred  certain powers under the Land Acquisition Act  on\nthe  Commissioner and amended the relevant sections  of\t the\nLand  Acquisition  Act\taccordingly.  Under  the  powers  so\nconferred  the\tCommissioner of Bombay, in  1962,  commenced\nland  acquisition  proceeding in respect  of  certain  lands\nowned  by  the\tappellants,  the  alleged  purpose  of\t the\nacquisition  being \"development and utilisation of the\tsaid\nlands\tas  an\tindustrial  and\t residential   area\".\t The\npetitioner  filed  writ\t petitions  under  Art.\t 32  of\t the\nConstitution challenging the acquisition proceedings on\t the\ngrounds,mainly\t that\t(i)  s.\t 3(3)  and   3(4)   of\t the\ncommissioners Act constituted excessive delegation of  power\nto  the State Government and amounted to abdication  of\t its\nfunctions by the State Legislation and that (ii)  definition\nof 'public purpose' as amended by the Bombay Legislature  by\nintroducing  s.\t 3 (f) (2) in the Land Acquisition  Act\t was\nultra vires.\nHELD:Per Gajendragadkar, C.J., Hidayatullah and\t Sikri,\nJJ.-(i)\t The object of a. 3(3) of the Commissioners  Act  is\ntwo  fold;  first  to enable the Government  to\t impose\t any\nconditions  or\trestrictions on the exercise of\t powers\t and\ndischarge  of  duties  on  Commissioners  and  secondly\t  to\nwithdraw  them\tin  case it is felt  that  the\tCommissioner\nshould not exercise these powers.  There can be no objection\nto  this  since\t the State Government is in  charge  of\t the\nadministration and the whole object of the Commissioners Act\nis  Co\tenable it to run the administration as\tsmoothly  as\npossible.   The\t law which the Commissioners  or  the  State\nGovernment  or\tthe  other authorities\thave  to  administer\nremains the same; it is only the authority that is  changed.\n[897 E-G]\n(ii)It\tcannot be said that the powers conferred  under\t s.\n3(3)  and  3(4)\t on  the  State\t Government  are   unguided.\nSections 6 and 7 of the Act 885\n886\nindicate  the kinds of powers which may be conferred on\t the\nCommissioner.  Further the very nature of the office held by\nthe Commissioner and the duties performed by him up to\t1950\nwould  show  that  it  is  only\t the  duties  of  the  State\nGovernment  and of officers of equivalent  rank\t discharging\nrevenue and executive duties which would be conferred on the\nCommissioner.\tThere  can  be no  difference  in  principle\nbetween the State Legislature inserting a section in an\t Act\nenabling  the  State  Government to delegate  its  power  to\nanother authority and the Legislature in view of the  change\nin  the administrative set-up conferring power on the  State\nGovernment   to\t  confer  not  only  its   own\t duties\t  on\nCommissioners\tbut  also  of  other   officers\t  performing\nexecutive and revenue duties. [895 C-E]\n(iii)The  State\t Legislature  cannot be\t said  to  have\nabdicated  its powers in favour of the executive for it\t has\nlaid  down the legislative policy and wisely left it to\t the\nState Government to reorganise the administration consequent\non  the\t setting up of Commissioners Divisions.\t  The  State\nGovernment is after all in charge of the administration\t and\nit  knows specially in view of its previous experience\twhat\npowers of existing authorities including itself can suitably\nbe conferred on the Commissioners. [897 G898A]:\n(iv)It was not necessary to get the President's assent\tfor\nthe  notification amending the Land Acquisition Act  because\nthe  amendment of the Act became effective by virtue of\t the\nCommissioners  Act  which  had received the  assent  of\t the\nPresident, and not by virtue of the notification. [898 C]\n(v)  It was riot necessary to decide the question as to\t the\nvalidity of s.(f)(2) of the Land Acquisition Act as enacted\nby  the\t Bombay State Legislature because  the\tpurpose\t for\nwhich  the  land  were acquired in the present\tcase  was  a\n'public\t purpose' as defined in the Land Acquisition Act  as\nit   stood   before  the  amendment  made  by\tthe   Bombay\nLegislature, and it was not necessary for the respondents to\nrely  on  the  amendment to  sustain  in  the  notification.\nPublic\tpurpose\t varies\t with the time\tand  the  prevailing\nconditions  in\ttowns  like  Bombay  are  such\tthat  it  is\nimperative  that the State should do all it can to  increase\nthe  availability of residential and industrial sites.\t The\nwelfare\t of  a large section of the community is  a  'public\npurpose'. [899 D-E; 902 E]\n(Vi)There is no law which requires a scheme to be  prepared\nbefore\tissuing notifications under ss. 4 and 6 of the\tLand\nAcquisition  Act. [Desirability of preparing such  a  scheme\nbefore disposal of sites suggested]. [903 D]\nCase law referred to.\nPer  Wanchoo  and Shah JJ. (dissenting).-(i)  The  amendment\nintroduced  by\ts.  3(f)(2) in\tthe  definition\t of  'public\npurpose'  was within the concept of public purpose  in\tArt.\n32(2)  of the Constitution and could not be struck  down  as\nultra vires. [911 B]\n(ii)By enacting s. 3(3) of the Commissioners Act the  State\nLegislature in effect says that though it considers that the\nCommissioner should have certain powers it has conferred  on\nhim in the Schedule, the State Government may withdraw those\npowers.\t  This is not a provision for delegated\t legislation\nbut  a transfer by the Legislature of its own power to\tmake\nlaw  to the executive.\tFurther, if it can be considered  to\nbe  conferment of power of delegated legislation it  suffers\nfrom the vice of excessive delegation inasmuch as it gives a\npower to the executive to the extent of repealing a part  of\nthe law made by the legislature [912 G--913 B]\n(iii)The language of s. 3(4) is of the widest amplitude\nand gives blanket power to the State Government to amend any\nenactment which\n887\nmay  be in force for the time being in the State  by  making\nnecessary entries in the Schedule.  The provision cannot  be\nread  to  mean that it authorises the  State  Government  to\ndelegate  only its executive powers and duties\tunder  other\nenactments  besides those mentioned in the Schedule  to\t the\nCommissioner by the State Legislation.\tIt is not a case  of\nproviding  merely  for delegated  legislation  properly\t so-\ncalled\tbut  amounts to complete transfer of  its  power  of\nlegislation  by the legislature in this matter to the  State\nGovernment.  Sub-s. (4) wag therefore ultra vires and Sub-S.\n(5) which is consequential on it must fall with it. [913  C-\nD, H; 915 H-916B]\n(iv)As the proceedings under the land Acquisition Act  were\ntaken\tby  the\t Commissioner  by  powers  derived  from   a\nnotification  under  s. 3(4) the Commissioner ACt  which  is\nultra\tvires  the  said  proceedings  must  be\t   must\t  be\nquashed.[918 A]\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
ORIGINAL  JURISDICTION : Writ Petitions Nos. 66 and  146  of
\n1965.\n<\/p>\n
Petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the
\nenforcement of fundamental rights.\n<\/p>\n
Niren De, Additional Solicitor-General, Malcolm Pereira,  B.
\nR.  Agarwala,  G.  L.  Sanghi  and  H.\tK.  Puri,  for\t the
\npetitioners (in both the petitions).\n<\/p>\n
M.C.  Setalvad, N. S. Bindra and B. R. G. K.  Achar,  for
\nthe respondents (in both the petitions).\n<\/p>\n
The  judgment  of  GAJENDRAGADKAR, C.  J.  HIDAYATULLAH\t and
\nSIKRI, JJ, was delivered by SIKRI J. The dissenting  opinion
\nof WANCHOO AND SHAH JJ. was delivered by WANCHOO, J.
\nSikri,\tJ.  These two petitions under Art. 32  of  the\tcon-
\nstitution raise substantially the same questions of law\t and
\nwere  heard  together and may conveniently  be\tdisposed  of
\ntogether.   It\twould be convenient to give a few  facts  in
\nWrit Petition No. 66 of 1965.\n<\/p>\n
The petitioners who are citizens of India are owners of some
\nland  in Greater Bombay in the South Salsetta Taluka in\t the
\nBombay Suburban District.  There are four respondents to the
\npetition; the first is the State of Maharashtra, the  second
\nthe  Commissioner,  Bombay Division, the third\tthe  Special
\nLand  Acquisition  Officer and the  fourth  the\t Maharashtra
\nIndustrial    Development   Corporation,   established\t  by
\nnotification  under the Maharashtra  Industrial\t Development
\nAct,  1961.   The  predecessor\tin  office  of\tthe   second
\nrespondent, by notification dated March 30, 1962,  published
\nin  the\t Maharashtra Government Gazette, purporting  to\t act
\nunder  s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1  of  1894)-
\nhereinafter  referred to as the Act-notified that  the\tland
\nbelonging to the petitioners was likely to be needed “for  a
\npublic purpose, viz., for development
\n888<\/span>
\nand  utilisation  of  the said lands as\t an  industrial\t and
\nresidential  area”.   By  the said  notification  the  third
\nrespondent  was appointed to per,form the functions  of\t the
\nCollector  under  s. 5-A of the Act in respect of  the\tsaid
\nlands.\t Pursuant  to the said notification the\t third\tres-
\npondent\t issued\t a  notification under s. 4(1)\tof  the\t Act
\ncalling upon the petitioners to file their objections to the
\nacquisition   of  the  said  lands  under  the\t Act.\t The
\npetitioners filed their statement of objections and took the
\nobjection  that\t the  purpose  for  which  the\tlands\twere
\nrequired,  viz.,  development and utilisation  of  the\tsaid
\nlands as an industrial and residential area, was vague\tand
\nwas  not  genuinely  or\t properly  a  public  purpose.\t The
\npetitioners further pointed out that the said lands and\t the
\ncontiguous lands of the petitioners formed a compact area of
\nland  situate on the Central Salsette Railway Track and\t the
\nsaid  area  could by reason of its location  be\t easily\t and
\nwithout\t in the least degree adversely affecting the  scheme
\nof  the\t acquisition  be excluded therefrom  and  should  be
\nreleased   from\t  acquisition\taccordingly.\tThe    first
\npetitioner, Arnold Rodricks, pointed out in his letter dated
\nOctober 5, 1963, addressed to the Assistant Secretary to the
\nGovernment  of Maharashtra, that the Government had  already
\nacquired about 3 acres of his land for University Campus  in
\naddition  to his other lands acquired earlier by  the  State
\nGovernment  and\t that the said lands and  the  land  bearing
\nSurvey\tNo. 330 Hissa No. 2(part) and Survey No.  313  Hissa
\nNo.  14\t were the only lands left with the  petitioners\t and
\nthat the  petitioners  required the  same  for\ttheir  own
\nresidential   home.    On  October  7,\t1963,\tthe   second
\nrespondent, being satisfied after considering the report  of
\nthe  Collector\tunder sub-s. (2) of s. 5-A of Act  that\t the
\nsaid lands were needed to be acquired at the public ,expense
\nfor a public purpose, declared under the provisions of s.  6
\nof  the\t Act  that the lands were required  for\t the  public
\npurpose of “development and utilisation of the said lands as
\nindustrial  and\t residential area.” After the issue  of\t the
\nnotification under s. 6, usual notices under s. 9, cls.\t (3)
\nand (4) were issued by the third respondent and pursuant  to
\nthese  notices\tthe petitioners filed  their statement\tof
\nclaim  for  compensation  with the  third  respondent  under
\nprotest\t  and\twithout\t prejudice  to\ttheir\trights\t and
\ncontentions.  In the petition, the notifications dated March
\n30,   1962  and\t October  7,  1963,  and   the\t acquisition
\nproceedings and the enquiries purported to be held under  s.
\n5A  and\t s. 11 of the Act are challenged as  being  illegal,
\ninvalid and inoperative in law and without and\/or in  excess
\n,of jurisdiction, etc., on various grounds.
\nBefore we mention the points urged before us it is necessary
\nto   mention  that  the\t Bombay\t Legislature   amended\t the
\ndefinition of the expression “public purpose” in s. 3 of the
\nAct, and the definition in the Act as amended by the  Bombay
\nLegislature reads as follows :-\n<\/p>\n
\t      (f)   the expression “Public purpose” includes
\n\t      889<\/span>
\n\t      (1)   the\t  provision  of\t  village,sites\t  in
\n\t      districts in which the Appropriate  Government
\n\t      shall  have  declared by notification  in\t the
\n\t      official Gazette that it is customary for\t the
\n\t      Government  to  make  such  provision  and   a
\n\t      housing\tscheme\tas  defined  in-  the\tLand
\n\t      Acquisition (Bombay Amendment) Act, 1948; and
\n\t      (2)   the acquisition of land for purposes  of
\n\t      the development of areas from public  revenues
\n\t      or some fund controlled or managed by a  local
\n\t      authority\t and subsequent disposal thereof  in
\n\t      whole  or\t in part by  lease,  assignment,  or
\n\t      sale,  with  the object  of  securing  further
\n\t      development.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
The validity of s. 3(f)(2) above has been questioned  before
\nus.  Further, the Act was amended, by Virtue of notification
\nissued\tunder  s.3  (4)\t of  the  Bombay  Commissioners\t  of
\nDivisions  Act,\t 1957 (Bombay Act 8 of 1958)-which  for\t the
\nsake  of  brevity will be referred to as  the  Commissioners
\nAct.   The notification had amended ss. 3A, 4, 5A, 6, 7\t and
\n17 of the Act as follows
\n\t      “1. In section 3A,\n<\/p>\n
\t      (i)   after  the\twords  “State\tGovernment”,
\n\t      where they occur for the first time, the words
\n\t      “or the Commissioner” shall be inserted;\n<\/p>\n
\t      (ii)  after the words “by the State Government
\n\t      in this behalf” the words “or, as the case may
\n\t      be,    any   officer   authorised\t   by\t the
\n\t      Commissioner” shall be inserted.\n<\/p>\n
\t      2.    In section 4-\n<\/p>\n
\t      (i)   in\tsub-section  (1), after\t the  words,
\n\t      “appropriate  Government”\t the words  “or\t the
\n\t      Commissioner” shall be inserted;\n<\/p>\n
\t      (ii)  in\tsub-section  (2), after\t the  words,
\n\t      “such  Government” the words “or, as the\tcase
\n\t      may   be,\t by  the’  Commissioner”  shall\t  be
\n\t      inserted.\n<\/p>\n
\t      3.In section 5A, in sub-section (2)  after
\n\t      the words “appropriate Government”, where they
\n\t      occur at two places the words “or, as the case
\n\t      may   be,\t of  the  Commissioner”\t  shall\t  be
\n\t      inserted.\n<\/p>\n
\t      4.    In Section 6-\n<\/p>\n
\t      (i) in sub-section(1)-\n<\/p>\n
\t      (a) after the words “appropriate Government”
\n\t      the  words  “or,\tas  the\t case  may  be,\t the
\n\t      Commissioner” shall inserted;\n<\/p>\n
\t      126up.  CI\/66-14
\n\t      890<\/span>\n<\/p>\n
\t      (b)   after  the words “its orders” the  words
\n\t      “or,  as the case may be, under the  signature
\n\t      of the Commissioner” shall be inserted;\n<\/p>\n
\t      (ii)in  sub-section  (3),\t after\tthe  words
\n\t      “appropriate Government” the words “or, as the
\n\t      case  may\t be,  the  Commissioner”  shall\t  be
\n\t      inserted.\n<\/p>\n
\t      5.In  section 7, after the words “in  this
\n\t      behalf” the Words “or, as the case may be, the
\n\t      Commissioner” shall be inserted,\n<\/p>\n
\t      6.    In section 17-\n<\/p>\n
\t      (i)   in\tsub-section  (1),  after  the  words
\n\t      “appropriate  Government”\t the words  “or\t the
\n\t      Commissioner” shall be inserted.\n<\/p>\n
\t      (ii)  in sub-section (2)-\n<\/p>\n
\t      (a)   after  the words “the State\t Government”
\n\t      the  words  “or  the  Commissioner”  shall  be
\n\t      inserted;\n<\/p>\n
\t      (b)   after the words “appropriate Government”
\n\t      the  words  “or, as the case may\tbe,  of\t the
\n\t      Commissioner” shall be inserted;\n<\/p>\n
\t      (iii) in sub-section (4)-\n<\/p>\n
\t      (a)   after the words “appropriate Government”
\n\t      where they occur at two places, the words\t “or
\n\t      the case may be, of the Commissioner” shall be
\n\t      inserted;\n<\/p>\n
\t      (b)   for\t the words “it does so\tdirect”\t the
\n\t      words  “it  or  he does so  direct”  shall  be
\n\t      substituted.”\n<\/p>\n
\t      Mr.   Niren   De,\t  the\tlearned\t  Additional
\n\t      Solicitor-General\t appearing on behalf of\t the
\n\t      petitioners, raised four points before us,
\n\t      (1)That the declarations under ss. 4 and\t6
\n\t      of  the  Act  are essential  features  or\t are
\n\t      related to essential legislative policies\t and
\n\t      as such ss. 4 and 6 can only be amended by the
\n\t      legislature;\n<\/p>\n
\t      (2)That  s. 3(4) of the  Commissioners  Act
\n\t      suffers from excessive delegation;\n<\/p>\n
\t      (3)That s. 3(4) of the Commissioners Act is an
\n\t      abdication of the powers of the legislature in
\n\t      favour of the executive; and
\n\t      (4)Amendment  of the Act by a  notification
\n\t      is   a  law  which  requires  assent  of\t the
\n\t      President\t under arts. 31(2) and art.  254  of
\n\t      the  Constitution, and the assent\t not  having
\n\t      been obtained, the notification is bad.\n<\/p>\n
 891<\/span><\/p>\n
It  would  be  convenient to take  the\tfirst  three  points
\ntogether  because in substance they raise the point that  s.
\n3(4)  is bad, because the legislature should have  performed
\nthe  functions\tentrusted to the State Government  under  s.
\n3(4)  of the Commissioners Act.\t Mr. Niren De contends\tthat
\nfrom  1857 onwards the Indian statutes had made it the\tduty
\nof the State Government to decide whether a land was  likely
\nto  be\tneeded\tfor a public purpose or\t not  and  once\t the
\nGovernment   was   satisfied  the   declaration\t  was\tmade
\nconclusive.   He says that this is an essential\t legislative
\nfeature\t  of  the  Land\t Acquisition  Act  and\tthe   Bombay
\nLegislature   should   have  directly\tamended\t  the\tLand
\nAcquisition Act and not empowered the State Government to do
\nso.   He  says\tthat the State Legislature  has\t not  really
\ndecided\t that this essential legislative feature  should  be
\nchanged\t and it is incompetent to confer that power  on\t the
\nState  Government.  He further points out that\tthere  never
\nhas been any power of delegation in the Land Acquisition Act
\nsince  1857.   He  says\t that  it  is  well-settled  that  a
\nlegislature, cannot empower an executive authority to change
\nan Act in any essential features.  He further urges that the
\nCommissioners  Act does not give any guidance to  the  State
\nGovernment  as\tto which Acts should be amended or  not\t and
\npowers of which officers should be taken away and  conferred
\non  the Commissioners.\tHe urges that the language  is\twide
\nenough even to enable the judicial functions of courts under
\nthe  Civil Procedure Code and Criminal Procedure Code to  be
\nconferred on the Commissioners.\n<\/p>\n
Mr. Setalvad, who appears on behalf of the respondents, says
\nthat  what  you have to consider is the\t legislative  policy
\nunderlying   the   Commissioners  Act  and  not\t  the\tLand
\nAcquisition  Act.  He says that there is enough guidance  in
\nthe Commissioners Act and in the history of the\t legislation
\nto  enable  the State Government to decide what\t powers\t and
\nduties should be conferred on the Commissioners.  He further
\nsays  that  the State Government being in,  charge-  of\t the
\nadministration\t of   the  State  knows\t what\tduties\t can
\nappropriately be conferred on the Commissioners.  He  points
\nout  that the institution of the Commissioners is not a\t new
\nthing;\tit  was in existence before and\t as  the  Government
\nfound\tit   necessary\t to  revive   the   institution\t  of
\nCommissioners  instead of amending each act  separately\t and
\nconferring  powers on the State Government to  delegate\t its
\nfunctions,  it passed a comprehensive  legislation  enabling
\nthe  State  Government to do it.  He says that\tit  must  be
\nremembered that the Commissioners are revenue and  executive
\nofficers  and there is no question of conferring  powers  on
\nthem  under  the  Criminal  Procedure  Code  or\t the   Civil
\nProcedure Code.\n<\/p>\n
Let  us then first examine the scheme of  the  Commissioners
\nAct and the history of the legislation.\t The preamble of the
\nCommissioners Act reads as follows
\n892<\/span>
\n\t      “Whereas\tit is expedient to provide  for\t the
\n\t      offices  of Commissioners of divisions in\t the
\n\t      State of Bombay, for prescribing their  powers
\n\t      and duties and to make provisions for  matters
\n\t      consequent  on the provision for such  offices
\n\t      and for certain other matters.”\n<\/p>\n
\t      The  “Commissioner”. is defined to  mean\t“the
\n\t      Commissioner  of a division  appointed  under
\n\t      the law relating to land revenue as amended by
\n\t      the  Schedule  to this Act.” The\tBombay\tLand
\n\t      Revenue  Code,, 1879, has been amended by\t the
\n\t      Schedule\tand we may notice S. 6A inserted  by
\n\t      the Schedule.  Section 6A is as follows
\n\t      “6.  (1) The Commissioners of divisions  shall
\n\t      be appointed by the State Government.\n<\/p>\n
\t      (2)   The\t Commissioners\tshall  exercise\t the
\n\t      powers and discharge the duties conferred\t and
\n\t      imposed  on a Commissioner under this  Act  or
\n\t      under any law for the time being in force, and
\n\t      so  far  as is consistent therewith  all\tsuch
\n\t      other    powers\tor   duties    of    appeal,
\n\t      superintendence\tand  control  within   their
\n\t      respective  divisions, and over  the  officers
\n\t      subordinate  to them as may from time to\ttime
\n\t      be prescribed by the State Government.\n<\/p>\n
\t      (3)   The Commissioners shall also, subject to
\n\t      the control and the general or special  orders
\n\t      of the State Government, exercise such  powers
\n\t      and  discharge  such  duties,  as\t the   State
\n\t      Government  may confer or impose on  them\t for
\n\t      the   purpose   only  of\tcarrying   out\t the
\n\t      provisions  of any law for the time  being  in
\n\t      force, and so far as is consistent therewith.”
\n\t      ‘It   will be noticed that the Commissioner is
\n\t      enabled by sub-s.6A-(2)\tto  exercise  powers
\n\t      and discharge duties conferred not only by the
\n\t      Bombay  Land Revenue Code 1879 but  any  other
\n\t      law  for the time being in force.\t  “Division”
\n\t      is defined to mean the territories formed into
\n\t      a division under the Bombay Land Revenue Code,
\n\t      1879, or under that Code in its application to
\n\t      the Kutch and Saurashtra areas of the State of
\n\t      Bombay,  or  under  the  Madhya  Pradesh\tLand
\n\t      Revenue  Code,  1954, or under  the  Hyderabad
\n\t      Land Revenue Act.\t “Divisional officer”  means
\n\t      an  officer  appointed  as  such,\t immediately
\n\t      before  the commencement of the  Commissioners
\n\t      Act, under the provisions of-\n<\/p>\n
\t      (i)   section  5\tof the Bombay  Land  Revenue
\n\t      Code, 1879, or that section of the Code in its
\n\t      application to the Kutch area of the State  of
\n\t      Bombay,\n<\/p>\n
\t      (ii)  Section  5\tof  the\t said  Code-in\t its
\n\t      application  to  the Saurashtra  area  of\t the
\n\t      State  of Bombay and read with the  Government
\n\t      Notification in the Legal Department
\n\t       893<\/span>\n<\/p>\n
\t      (iii) No.\t 25398\/B, dated 1st November,  1956,
\n\t      issued   under  section  122  of\tthe   States
\n\t      Reorganisation  Act, 1956, section 9-A of\t the
\n\t      Madhya  Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1954,\tread
\n\t      with  Government Notification in\tthe  Revenue
\n\t      Department  No.RVA.1556-R, dated 1st  November
\n\t      1956, or\n<\/p>\n
(iv) section 4 of the Hyderabad Land Revenue Act.
\n“Existing law” is defined as “any enactment of a Legislature
\nother  competent authority in relation to matters  specified
\nin  List&  11  and  III\t in  the  Seventh  Schedule  to\t the
\nConstitution  in force in any part of the State\t immediately
\nbefore\tthe commencement of this Act and includes any  rule,
\nbye-law,  regulation, order, notification, scheme,  form  or
\nother instrument having the force of law made, prescribed or
\nissued\tunder any such enactment.” Section 3 may be set\t out
\nin full;\n<\/p>\n
\t      “3.  (1)\tFor  the  purposes  of\tconstituting
\n\t      offices  of  commissioners  of  divisions\t and
\n\t      conferring  powers  and  imposing\t duties\t  on
\n\t      Commissioners and for certain other  purposes,
\n\t      the  enactments specified in column 1  of\t the
\n\t      Schedule\tto this Act shall be amended in\t the
\n\t      manner and to the extent specified in column 2
\n\t      thereof
\n\t      (2)The   Commissioner   of   a\tdivision,
\n\t      appointed\t under\tthe  law  relating  to\tland
\n\t      revenue as amended by the said Schedule, shall
\n\t      exercise\tthe powers and discharge the  duties
\n\t      conferred\t and imposed on the Commissioner  by
\n\t      any law for the time being in force, including
\n\t      the enactments referred to in sub-section\t (1)
\n\t      as amended by the said Schedule.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (3)The State Government may by notification
\n\t      in  the Official Gazette amend or\t delete\t any
\n\t      entry  in\t the  Schedule for  the\t purpose  of
\n\t      imposing any conditions or restrictions on the
\n\t      exercise\tof  powers and discharge  of  duties
\n\t      conferred\t or imposed on the  Commissioner  or
\n\t      withdrawing them, as the case may be, and\t the
\n\t      Schedule shall be amended accordingly.
\n\t      (4)The  State  Government\t may  confer  and
\n\t      impose  on the Commissioner powers and  duties
\n\t      under  any other enactment for the time  being
\n\t      in  force\t and  for that\tpurpose\t may,  by  a
\n\t      notification  in the Official Gazette, add  to
\n\t      or  specify  in  the  Schedule  the  necessary
\n\t      adaptations   and\t  modifications\t  in\tthat
\n\t      enactment by way of amendment; and thereupon-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (a)every\tsuch enactment shall  accordingly
\n\t      be  amended  and have effect  subject  to\t the
\n\t      adaptations and modifications so made, and
\n\t       894<\/span>\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (b)the Schedule to this Act shall be deemed
\n\t      to be amended by the inclusion therein of\t the
\n\t      said provision for amending the enactment.”
\n\t      Section  4  repeals the  Bombay  Commissioners
\n\t      (Abolition  of  Office)  Act,  1950,  and\t the
\n\t      Central  Provinces  and  Berar   Commissioners
\n\t      (Construction  of\t References) Act  1948.\t The
\n\t      Bombay  commissioners  (Abolition\t of  Office)
\n\t      Act,1950\t(Bom. Act 28 of 1950) had  abolished
\n\t      the  office  of the Commissioner\tand  further
\n\t      provided that wherever a reference was to\t the
\n\t      Commissioner, the reference should be read  as
\n\t      a reference to the State Government or to such
\n\t      authority\t as  the  State\t Government  may  by
\n\t      general or special order appoint.\t The Central
\n\t      Provinces\t    and\t    Berar      Commissioners
\n\t      (Construction of References) Act, 1948 (61  of
\n\t      1948)    had    similarly\t   abolished\t the
\n\t      Commissioners Divisions of Nagpur, Jubbulpore,
\n\t      Chhatisgarh  and Berar, and had provided\tthat
\n\t      the  appointment\tof  Commissioners  to  these
\n\t      Divisions shall cease.  By S. 4 it was further
\n\t      provided\t that\t“all  enactments   and\t all
\n\t      notifications,   orders,\trules  and   byelaws
\n\t      issued, made or prescribed under any enactment
\n\t      which  immediately before the commencement  of
\n\t      this  Act were in force shall be construed  as
\n\t      if references therein to the Commissioner were
\n\t      references to the State Government or to\tsuch
\n\t      authority\t as  the State\tGovernment  may,  by
\n\t      notification, appoint.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      Sections\t5, 6, 7 and 8 of  the  Commissioners
\n\t      Act may also be set out in full :\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      “5.  If at the commencement of this  Act,\t any
\n\t      legal  proceedings  are  pending\tto  which  a
\n\t      Divisional   Officer  or\tDirector  of   Local
\n\t      Authorities is a party, the Commissioner shall
\n\t      be  substituted for the Divisional Officer  or
\n\t      the Director ,of Local Authorities in the said
\n\t      proceedings.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      6.    Subject  to the provisions made  in\t the
\n\t      Schedule, all existing laws shall, unless\t the
\n\t      context  otherwise requires, be ,construed  as
\n\t      if   references  therein\tto  the\t  Divisional
\n\t      Officer,\tor,  as\t the case  may\tbe,  to\t the
\n\t      Director of Local Authorities were  references
\n\t      to the Commissioner.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      7.    All instruments or documents executed or
\n\t      made before the commencement of this Act under
\n\t      or with reference to any existing law or\tany
\n\t      enactment\t specified  in the  Schedule  shall,
\n\t      unless  the  context  otherwise  requires,  be
\n\t      construed\t as  if references  therein  to\t the
\n\t      Divisional  Officer or the Director  of  Local
\n\t      Authorities    were    references\t   to\t the
\n\t      Commissioner.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      8.    All proceedings including proceedings by
\n\t      way  of  appeals, revision or  review  pending
\n\t      under  any  existing  law\t before\t the   State
\n\t      Government or a Divisional Officer or
\n\t       895<\/span>
\n\t      Director\tof  Local Authorities or  any  other
\n\t      officer  or authority immediately\t before\t the
\n\t      commencement of this Act shall, where disposal
\n\t      of the proceedings falls within the purview of
\n\t      the powers and duties of the Commissioner,  be
\n\t      transferred  to the Commissioner for  disposal
\n\t      according to law.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
It  seems to us that the underlying policy or the  essential
\nlegislative   feature  of  the\tCommissioners  Act   is\t  to
\nreintroduce  the  old offices of  Commissioners\t and  confer
\npowers\tand  duties  on them which  could  appropriately  be
\ndischarged by them.  The Legislature has no doubt left it to
\nthe State Government to decide whether any duties imposed on
\nit  or\tsome  of the auhorities should\tnow  under  the\t new
\nadministrative\tset  up\t system be discharged  by  the\tCom-
\nmissioners.   But  the Legislature has definitely  given  an
\nindication  of the kinds of powers that may be conferred  on
\nthem, in ss. 6 and 7. Further, the very nature of the office
\nheld by a Commissioner and the duties performed by him up to
\n1950  would  show that it is only the duties  of  the  State
\nGovernment  and of officers of equivalent  rank\t discharging
\nrevenue and executive duties which would be conferred on the
\nCommissioner.  We see no difference in principle between the
\nState Legislature inserting a section in an Act enabling the
\nState Government to delegate its power to another  authority
\nand   the  Legislature\tin  view  of  the  change   in\t the
\nadministrative\tset  up\t conferring  powers  on\t the   State
\nGovernment   to\t  confer  not  only  its   own\t duties\t  on
\nCommissioners\tbut  also  of  other   officers\t  performing
\nexecutive and revenue duties.\n<\/p>\n
This  Court  upheld the validity of s. 4  of  the  Essential
\nSupplies  (Temporary  Powers)  Act, 1946  (24  of  1946)  in
\nHarishankar  Bagla  v.\tThe  State  of\tMadhya\t Pradesh<\/a>(1).
\nSection 4 was in the following terms:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “4.  The\tCentral Government may\tby  notified
\n\t      order  direct  that the power to\tmake  orders
\n\t      under  section  3 shall in  relation  to\tsuch
\n\t      matters  and  subject to such  conditions,  if
\n\t      any, as may be specified in the direction,  be
\n\t      exercisable also by-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (a)   such officer or authority subordinate to
\n\t      the Central Government, or\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (b)   such State Government or such officer or
\n\t      authority subordinate to a State Government as
\n\t      may be specified in the direction.”
\n\t      The Court observed as follows:-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      “Section\t4  of the Act was  attacked  on\t the
\n\t      ground that it empowers the Central Government
\n\t      to delegate its own
\n\t      (1)   [1955] 1 S.C.R. 380 at pp. 389-390.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t       896<\/span><\/p>\n
\t      power  to make orders under section 3  to\t any
\n\t      officer or authority subordinate to it or\t the
\n\t      Provincial  Government  or to any\t officer  or
\n\t      authority\t  subordinate  to   the\t  Provincial
\n\t      Government as specified in the direction given
\n\t      by  the Central Government.  In  other  words,
\n\t      the  delegate has been authorised\t to  further
\n\t      delegate its powers in respect of the exercise
\n\t      of  the  powers  of  section  3.\tMr.  Umrigar
\n\t      contended\t that  it was  for  the\t Legislature
\n\t      itself  to specify the particular\t authorities
\n\t      or  officers  who could exercise\tpower  under
\n\t      section  3  and  it  was’\t not  open  to\t the
\n\t      Legislature to empower the Central  Government
\n\t      to   say\twhat  officer  or  authority   could
\n\t      exercise\tthe power.  Reference in  this\tcon-
\n\t      nection  was  made  to two  decisions  of\t the
\n\t      Supreme Court of the United States of America-
\n\t      Panama  Refining Co. v. Ryan(1) and  Schechter
\n\t      v.  United States(2).  In both these cases  it
\n\t      was  held that so long as the policy  is\tlaid
\n\t      down and a standard established by a  statute,
\n\t      no unconstitutional delegation of\t legislative
\n\t      power  is\t involved  in  leaving\tto  selected
\n\t      instrumentalities\t the making  of\t subordinate
\n\t      rules   within  prescribed  limits   and\t the
\n\t      determination of facts to which the policy  as
\n\t      declared\tby  the\t Legislature  is  to  apply.
\n\t      These  decisions in our judgment do  not\thelp
\n\t      the contention of Mr. Umrigar as we think that
\n\t      section 4 enumerates the classes of persons to
\n\t      whom  the\t power could be\t delegated  or\tsub-
\n\t      delegated by the Central Government and it  is
\n\t      not correct to say that the  instrumentalities
\n\t      have  not\t been selected\tby  the\t Legislature
\n\t      itself.\tThe decision of their  Lordships  of
\n\t      the    Privy  Council  in\t Shannon’s   case(3)
\n\t      completely  negatives  the  contention  raised
\n\t      regarding the invalidity of section 4. In that
\n\t      case  the\t Lt.-Governor in Council  was  given
\n\t      power to vest in a marketing board the  powers
\n\t      conferred\t by  section 4A(d)  of\tthe  Natural
\n\t      Products\tMarketing  (British  Columbia)\tAct,
\n\t      1936.  The attack on the act was that  without
\n\t      constitutional\tauthority    it\t   delegated
\n\t      legislative  power  to  the  Lt.-Governor\t  in
\n\t      Council.\t This  contention  was\tanswered  by
\n\t      their  Lordships\tin these terms:\t “The  third
\n\t      objection is that it is not within the  powers
\n\t      of  the Provincial Legislature to delegate  so
\n\t      called legislative powers to the\tLt.-Governor
\n\t      in  Council, or to give him powers of  further
\n\t      delegation.   This objection appears to  their
\n\t      Lordships\t subversive of the rights which\t the
\n\t      Provincial  Legislature enjoys  while  dealing
\n\t      with  matters  falling within the\t classes  of
\n\t      subjects in relation to which the Constitution
\n\t      has  granted legislative powers.\t Within\t its
\n\t      appointed sphere the Provincial Legislature is
\n\t      as supreme as any other Parliament; and it  is
\n\t      unnecessary to
\n\t      (1) 293 U.S. 388.\t       (3) [1938] A.C. 708.
\n\t      (2) 295 U.S. 495.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      897<\/span><\/p>\n
\t      try to enumerate the innumerable occasions  on
\n\t      which  Legislatures, Provincial, Dominion\t and
\n\t      Imperial,\t have entrusted various persons\t and
\n\t      bodies with similar powers to those  contained
\n\t      in this Act.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
It  would be noticed that s. 4 of the Essential\t Supplies  (
\nTemporary  Powers)  Act,  1946,\t left  it  to  the   Central
\nGovernment to decide three things; (1) the matters which can
\nbe delegated to the officers or authorities subordinate, (2)
\nthe  conditions\t subject to which the power to\tmake  orders
\nunder  s.  3 be exercised, and (3) the\tofficers  who  would
\nexercise the power to make orders under S. 3. In the present
\ncase,  the  Legislature has specified that it  is  only\t the
\nCommissioners to whom powers in an act can be delegated.  If
\na section similar to sub-s. (4) of s. 3 of the Commissioners
\nAct  had been inserted in every Act relating to\t matters  in
\nLists\t11  and\t 111,  it  would  have\tbeen  difficult\t  to
\ndistinguish  the decision in Bagla’s(1) case, except on\t the
\nground\tthat the State Government is also enabled to  confer
\npowers of some other authorities on Commissioners.  This  in
\nour opinion does not make any difference because the  Bombay
\nAct  28 of 1950 had also enabled State Government to  confer
\npowers of Commissioners on some other authorities.
\nWe  may\t mention that at one stage of the arguments  it\t was
\ncontended  that sub-s. (3) of s. 3 of the Commissioners\t Act
\nenabled the State Government to amend the Schedule and\tthis
\nshowed\t the  extent  of  delegation  made  to\t the   State
\nGovernment.   But, in our opinion, the object of sub-s.\t (3)
\nis  two fold; first to enable the Government to\t impose\t any
\nconditions  or\trestrictions on the exercise of\t powers\t and
\ndischarge  of duties on the Commissioners, and secondly,  to
\nwithdraw  them\tin case it is felt  that  the  Commissioners
\nshould\tnot exercise those powers.  We see no  objection  in
\nentrusting this function to the State Government because, as
\nmentioned  above, the State Government is in charge  of\t the
\nadministration and the whole object of the Commissioners Act
\nis  to\tenable it to run the administration as\tsmoothly  as
\npossible.  After all, the law which the Commissioners or the
\nState Government or the other authorities have to administer
\nremains the same; it is only the authority that is changed.
\nIt is really not necessary to consider the other cases cited
\nbefore us because the general principles are quite clear and
\nit is only in their application that difficulties arise.  We
\nhave  come  to the conclusion that the Legislature  has\t not
\nabdicated itself in favour of the executive but it has\tlaid
\ndown essential legislative policy and wisely left it to\t the
\nState Government to reorganise the administration consequent
\non  the\t setting up of Commissioners  Division.\t  The  State
\nGovernment  is after all in charge of administration and  it
\nknows,\tspecially in view of its previous  experience,\twhat
\npowers
\n(1)  [1955] 1 S.C.R. 380.\n<\/p>\n
898<\/span><\/p>\n
of  existing  authorities including itself can\tsuitably  be
\nconferred  on  the Commissioners.  We may mention  that\t the
\nBombay\tHigh Court has in two decisions (Ganesh\t Varayan  v.
\nCommissioner   Nagpur  Division,  Nagpur(1)  and   Sadruddin
\nSuleman Jhaveri v. J. H. Patwardhan(2)upheld the validity of
\nthe Commissioners Act.\n<\/p>\n
This  takes  us\t to the fourth point,  namely,\twhether\t the
\nassent\tof the President was necessary to  the\tnotification
\namending   the\t Act.  ,It  is\tcommon\t ground\t  that\t the
\nCommissioners  Act  received assent of the  President.\t The
\nquestion  that\tis raised is whether it\t is  necessary\tthat
\nassent\tof  the\t President  should  be\tobtained  for  every
\nnotification  issued under the Commissioners Act  which\t has
\nthe  effect  of amending any legislation in respect  of\t the
\nmatters\t in  the  concurrent List, i.e. List  III.   In\t our
\nopinion,  it is not necessary because the amendment  of\t the
\nAct became effective by virtue of the Commissioners Act\t and
\nnot  by\t virtue of the notification.  This Court  was  faced
\nwith  a similar problem in Harishanker Bagla and Another  v.
\nThe  State  of\tMadhya Pradesh<\/a>(3)  and\trepelled  a  similar
\ncontention in the following words:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “Conceding, however, for the sake of  argument
\n\t      that to the extent of a repugnancy between’ an
\n\t      order made under section 3 and the  provisions
\n\t      of  an  existing\tlaw, to the  extent  of\t the
\n\t      repugnancy,  the existing law stands  repeated
\n\t      by implication, it seems to us that the repeal
\n\t      is  not  by any Act of the delegate,  but\t the
\n\t      repeal  is  by  the  legislative\tAct  of\t the
\n\t      Parliament  itself.   By\tenacting  section  6
\n\t      Parliament  itself has declared that an  order
\n\t      made   under  section  3\tshall  have   effect
\n\t      notwithstanding  any  inconsistency  in\tthis
\n\t      order with any enactment other than this\tAct.
\n\t      This is not a declaration made by the delegate
\n\t      but  the Legislature itself has  declared\t its
\n\t      will that way in section 6. The abrogation  or
\n\t      the implied repeal is by force of the legisla-
\n\t      tive declaration contained in section 6 and is
\n\t      not by force of the order made by the delegate
\n\t      under section 3. The power of the delegate  is
\n\t      only  to make an order under section  3.\tOnce
\n\t      the delegate has made that order its power  is
\n\t      exhausted.   Section 6 then steps\t in  wherein
\n\t      the  Parliament has declared that as  soon  as
\n\t      such an order comes into being that will\thave
\n\t      effect   notwithstanding\t any   inconsistency
\n\t      there-, with contained in any enactment  other
\n\t      than this Act.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
In  our opinion the above reasoning applies to the facts  of
\nthis  case  and the Commissioners Act  having  received\t the
\nassent\tof  the\t President it is  not  necessary  that\tsome
\nfurther\t assent\t of  the President :should  be\tgiven  to  a
\nnotification.  We may mention that we are assu-
\n(1) [1964] 66 B.L.R. 807      (2) I.L.R. [1965] Bom. 394.\n<\/p>\n
\t     (3) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 380 at p. 392.\n<\/p>\n
899<\/span><\/p>\n
ning  and not laying down that it is possible to obtain\t the
\nassent of the President under the Constitution to the  issue
\nof a notification.\n<\/p>\n
In  conclusion we see no force in the contentions raised  by
\nMr. De on behalf of the petitioners and this takes us to the
\nnext  petition (W.P. No. 146 of 1965) in which\tMr.  Pereira
\nhas  raised some additional points.  He raised three  points
\nbefore\tus; (1) that no hearing was given to the  petitioner
\nunder s. 5A of the Act; (2) that the declaration under s.  6
\nis  a colourable exercise of power and (3) that s. 3(f)\t (2)
\nof  the Act, as amended in Bombay, is void and there  is  no
\npublic purpose involved in issuing the notification under s.
\n6 of the Act.\n<\/p>\n
There  is  no force in the first point because we  find,  on
\nlooking\t at  the  record, that\tthe  petitioners  raised  no
\nobjections  to\tthe acquisition and they  never\t wanted\t any
\nhearing\t on  this  point.  As they did\tnot  object  to\t the
\nacquisition, it is difficult to see what enquiries had to be
\nmade under s. 5A.\n<\/p>\n
We  may\t next  take up the question of the  validity  of  s.
\n3(f)(2).   In  our view it is not necessary to\tdecide\tthis
\npoint  because\twe  have come to  the  conclusion  that\t the
\nnotifications  issued under ss. 4 and 6 specified  a  public
\npurpose;   the\tpurpose\t specified  was\t    development\t  and
\nutilisation of the said lands as industrial and\t residential
\nareas.”\t In  our opinion this purpose is  a  public  purpose
\nwithin\tthe  Land  Acquisition Act as it  stood\t before\t the
\namendment  made\t by  the Bombay Legislature and\t it  is\t not
\nnecessary  for the respondents to rely on the  amendment  to
\nsustain the notification.  This Court in State of Bombay  v.
\nBhanji\tMunji<\/a>(1) upheld the requisitioning of  premises\t for
\nhousing\t a  person having no housing  accommodation  on\t the
\nground that this was a public purpose.\tThis Court  observed
\nat page 783 as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “In the present set of cases there is proof of
\n\t      a\t  public  purpose.  it\tis  given   in\t the
\n\t      affidavits made on behalf of the State and  in
\n\t      the  subsequent orders just quoted, namely  to
\n\t      house the homeless.  At that time the  housing
\n\t      situation in Bombay was acute, largely due  to
\n\t      the  influx of refugees.\tQuestions of  public
\n\t      decency, public morale, public health and\t the
\n\t      temptation  to  lawlessness and  crime,  which
\n\t      such a situation brings in its train, at\tonce
\n\t      arose;  and the public conscience was  aroused
\n\t      on  the ground of plain humanity.\t A  race  of
\n\t      proprietors   in\t the  shape   of   rapacious
\n\t      landlords\t who thrived on the misery of  those
\n\t      who could find no decent roof over their heads
\n\t      sprang into being.  Even the efficiency of the
\n\t\t\t    administration    was    threatened
\n  because
\n\t      Government  servants  could  not\tfind  proper
\n\t      accommodation.   Milder efforts to  cope\twith
\n\t      the evil proved ineffective.  It was necessary
\n\t      therefore for Government take more drastic
\n\t      (1)   [1955] 1 S.C.R. 777.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t       900<\/span><\/p>\n
\t      steps  and  in  doing so they  acted  for\t the
\n\t      public  weal.  There was consequently a  clear
\n\t      public   purpose\tand  an\t  undoubted   public
\n\t      benefit.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      In  the affidavit of S. R. Naik, Special\tLand
\n\t      Acquisition  Officer,  it is stated  that\t the
\n\t      State  Government had set up a study group  to
\n\t      consider\tand  recommend\ton  various  matters
\n\t      relating\tto  congestion\tin  the\t Island\t  of
\n\t      Bombay.  The Study group, inter alia, found
\n\t      “The said Study Group found as a result of its
\n\t      inquiry  that  there  had\t been  a  phenomenal
\n\t      increase\tin the population of the  Island  of
\n\t      Bombay  from 1948 to 1958 during which  period
\n\t      the population had shot up from 14.89 lakhs in
\n\t      1941 to an estimated 31 lakhs at the close  of
\n\t      1958.  It found that this enormous increase in
\n\t      population  had  resulted\t in  congestion\t  of
\n\t      traffic,\tdeficiency in open spaces  and\tplay
\n\t      fields  for’ schools, overcrowding in  trains,
\n\t      overcrowding  in\thouses,\t creation  of  slums
\n\t      etc.,  and that the increased  population\t had
\n\t      also  constituted an increasingly\t intolerable
\n\t      burden  on  the  sanitary\t circumstances\t and
\n\t      public utilities of the Island.  According to
\n\t      the  estimate of the Study Group based on\t the
\n\t      formula  adopted\tby the Director\t General  of
\n\t      Health Services of the Government of India the
\n\t      population of Greater Bombay would increase to
\n\t      a total staggering figure of 75 lakhs, by\t the
\n\t      year 1958.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      The Study Group also found that just as  there
\n\t      was  a  heavy concentration of  population  in
\n\t      Greater  Bombay  in a small area\tof  169\t sq.
\n\t      miles  there  was\t also  a  concentration\t  of
\n\t      industries  in Greater Bombay.  It found\tthat
\n\t      of  the  total  number  of   11,539’registered
\n\t      factories\t in the State of Maharashtra  as  in
\n\t      1958  Greater  Bombay  had  3,539\t  registered
\n\t      factories\t which meant that one-third  of\t the
\n\t      total  number  of factories in  the  State  of
\n\t      Maharashtra were in Greater Bombay alone.\t  Of
\n\t      the  total  number  of  factories\t in  Greater
\n\t      Bombay  as  many as 76 % were located  in\t the
\n\t      Island  of Bombay which admeasures only  26.19
\n\t      sq. miles out of the total Greater Bombay area
\n\t      of  169  sq. miles.  All\tthese  factories  in
\n\t      Greater Bombay employ 44 % of the total number
\n\t      of  factory workers in the State and 85  %  of
\n\t      the  factory  workers in Greater\tBombay\twere
\n\t      concentrated  within  the\t Island\t of   Bombay
\n\t      alone.   All  these  factors gave\t rise  to  a
\n\t      number  of problems including the\t problem  of
\n\t      traffic\t  housing     accommodation\t and
\n\t      deterioration of public utility services.
\n\t      As  regards housing the Study  Group  observed
\n\t      that  in\tthe  year  1958\t there\twere   about
\n\t      57,37,000\t tenements in Greater Bombay of\t all
\n\t      categories including a large portion
\n\t      901<\/span>
\n\t      of single room tenements.\t At the rate of five
\n\t      persons to a tenement the Study Group observed
\n\t      that  the\t then existing tenements  were\tonly
\n\t      enough  for 28 lakhs persons leaving 15  lakhs
\n\t      persons  to  be still  provided  with  housing
\n\t      accommodation.   The growth in population\t and
\n\t      the concentration of the population in a small
\n\t      area  also led to the deterioration of  public
\n\t      utility  services\t as observed  by  the  Study
\n\t      Group.  The Study Group suggested a number  of
\n\t      measures\tfor  relieving\tthe  congestion\t  of
\n\t      population  and  industries  in  the   Greater
\n\t      Bombay  including the shifting of\t industries,
\n\t      the  establishment of industrial estates,\t the
\n\t      establishment  of industries in  the  suburbs,
\n\t      the development of the suburbs, reclamation of
\n\t      land and reclamation of salt pans.”
\n\t      In  our opinion, on these facts it  cannot  be
\n\t      held  that  the  impugned\t notifications\twere
\n\t      issued  to subserve not a public\tpurpose\t but
\n\t      some private purpose.  It was observed by this
\n\t      Court  in\t Babu  Barkva Thakur  v.  The  State
\n\t      Bombay<\/a>;(1)
\n\t      “It  has been recognised by this Court in\t the
\n\t      case  of The State of Bombay V.  Bhanji  Munji
\n\t      and   Another<\/a>(2)\t that\tproviding    housing
\n\t      accommodation  to\t the homeless  is  a  public
\n\t      purpose.\tIn an industrial concern employing a
\n\t      large number of workmen away from their  homes
\n\t      it is a social necessity that there should  be
\n\t      proper  housing  accommodation  available\t for
\n\t      such  workmen.  Where a larger section of\t the
\n\t      community\t is  concerned,\t its  welfare  is  a
\n\t      matter of public concern.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      In Pandit Jhandu Lal v. The State of Punjab<\/a>(3)
\n\t      it was observed at page 467 :\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      “There is also no doubt that the structures to
\n\t      be made on the land would benefit the  members
\n\t      of the Co-operative Society.  But, the private
\n\t      benefit  of  a  large  number  of\t  industrial
\n\t      workers  becomes\tpublic\tbenefit\t within\t the
\n\t      meaning of the Land Acquisition Act.”
\n\t      It  was held in that case that acquisition  of
\n\t      building\tsites  for  residential\t houses\t for
\n\t      industrial labourers was for a public  purpose
\n\t      even  apart  from\t s. 17(2)  of  the  Act,  as
\n\t      amended\tby  the\t Land  Acquisition   (Punjab
\n\t      Amendment) Act.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      In  Smt.\tSomawanti v. The State of  Punjab(4)
\n\t      it was observed :\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      “Broadly\t speaking  the\texpression   “public
\n\t      purpose” would, however, include a purpose  in
\n\t      which the general
\n\t      (1) [1961]1 S.C.R 128 at p  137.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (2) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 777.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t       (3) [1961] 2 S.C.R. 459.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t       (4) A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 151
\n\t       902<\/span>
\n\t      interest\tof the community as opposed  to\t the
\n\t      particular interest of individuals is directly
\n\t      and vitally conterned.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      It was further observed at p. 163
\n\t      “Public  purpose\tis bound to  vary  with\t the
\n\t      times and the prevailing conditions in a given
\n\t      locality\tand  therefore\tit would  not  be  a
\n\t      practical\t  proposition  even  to\t attempt   a
\n\t      comprehensive definition.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
It  was\t urged before us that the State Government  was\t not
\nentitled  to  acquire  property from A and  give  it  to  B.
\nReliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme  Judicial
\nCourt of Massachusetts (204 Mass. 607).\t But as pointed\t out
\nby this Court, public purpose varies with the times and\t the
\nprevailing conditions in localities, and in some towns\tlike
\nBombay\tthe conditions are such that it is  imperative\tthat
\nthe State should do all it can to increase the\tavailability
\nof residential and in dustrial sites.  It is true that these
\nresidential and industrial sites will be ultimately allotted
\nto  members  of\t the public and they  would  get  individual
\nbenefit, but it is in the interest of the general  community
\nthat  these  members of the public should be  able  to\thave
\nsites  to  put\tup residential houses and sites\t to  put  up
\nfactories.    The   main  idea\tin  issuing   the   impugned
\nnotifications  was  not to think of the private\t comfort  or
\nadvantage  of  the  members of the public  but\tthe  general
\npublic\tgood.\tAt any rate, as pointed out in\tBabu  Barkya
\nThakur v. The State of Bombay<\/a>(1) a very large section of the
\ncommunity is concerned and its welfare is a matter of public
\nconcern.   In our view the welfare of a large proportion  of
\npersons\t living in Bombay is a matter of public concern\t and
\nthe  notifications  served to enhance the  welfare  of\tthis
\nsection\t of  the community and this is public  purpose.\t  In
\nconclusion  we\thold that the notifications  are  valid\t and
\ncannot\tbe impugned on the ground that they were not  issued
\nfor any public purpose.\n<\/p>\n
Mr.   Pereira  then  urged  that  the\tnotifications\twere
\ncolourable.    We  are\tnot  able  to  appreciate  how\t the
\nnotifications  are serving Any collateral object.   He\tsaid
\nthat he used the word “colourable” in the sense used by this
\nCourt  in Mst.\tSomawanti v. State of  Punjab(2)  Mudholkar,
\nJ., observed as follows :\n<\/p>\n
\t      “If  the purpose for which the land  is  being
\n\t      acquired\t by   the  State   is\twithin\t the
\n\t      legislative   competence\tof  the\t State\t the
\n\t      declaration  of the Government will  be  final
\n\t      subject,\thowever,  to  one  exception.\tThat
\n\t      exception\t is  that if there is  a  colourable
\n\t      exercise of power the declaration will be open
\n\t      to challenge at the instance of the  aggrieved
\n\t      party.  The power committed to the  Government
\n\t      by  the  Act is a limited power in  the  sense
\n\t      that it can be exer-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (1) [1961] 1 S.C.R. 128.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (2) A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 151.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t       903<\/span><\/p>\n
\t      cised  only where there is a  public  purpose,
\n\t      leaving  aside for a moment the purpose  of  a
\n\t      company.\t  If  it  appears  that\t  what\t the
\n\t      Government is satisfied about is not a  public
\n\t      but a private purpose or no purpose at all the
\n\t      action  of the Government would be  colourable
\n\t      as not being relatable to the power  conferred
\n\t      upon it by the Act and its declaration will be
\n\t      a\t nullity.   Subject to\tthis  exception\t the
\n\t      declaration of the Government will be final.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
No material has been placed before us that the exercise\t of’
\nthe  power  by the Government is colourable in\tthis  sense.
\nThe Government has the power to issue the notifications\t for
\na  public  purpose, and, as we have already  held  that\t the
\nnotifications were issued for a public purpose, there is  no
\nquestion of any colourable exercise of the power.
\nLastly,\t he  contended that the Government  had\t not  before
\nissuing the notifications prepared any scheme.\tThis is true
\nthat  the Government has not uptil now prepared\t any  scheme
\nfor  the  utilisation  of  the\tdeveloped  sites.   But\t the
\nnotification  itself shows that the sites would be  used  as
\nresidential  and  industrial sites.  There is  no  law\tthat
\nrequires   a  scheme  to  be  prepared\tbefore\t issuing   a
\nnotification  under  s.\t 4 or s. 6 of  the  Act.   We  have,
\nhowever,.   no\tdoubt  that  the  Government  will,   before
\ndisposing of the sites, have a scheme for their disposal.
\nIn  the\t result we see no force in any\tof  the\t contentions
\nurged  before  us  and we hold that  the  notifications\t are
\nvalid.\tThe petitions accordingly fail and are dismissed but
\nthere will be no order as to costs.\n<\/p>\n
Wanchoo, J. We regret we are unable to agree.
\nThese two petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution  raise
\ncommon questions of law and will be dealt with together.  We
\nmay  briefly state the facts in W. P. 66.  The facts in\t the
\nother petition are exactly similar except that the dates  of
\nthe notifications are in some cases different and the  lands
\nnotified  are  also  different.\t  On  March  30,  1962,\t the
\nCommissioner of Bombay Division issued a notification  under
\ns.  4  of  the\tLand  Acquisition  Act,\t No.  1\t of’   1894,
\n(hereinafter referred to as the Act).  By this\tnotification
\nhe declared that certain lands were likely to be needed\t for
\na  public purpose, namely, “for development and\t utilisation
\nof  the said lands as an industrial and\t residential  area”.
\nIn consequence, objections were invited under s. 5-A of\t the
\nAct  and  the Special Land Acquisition Officer,\t Bombay\t and
\nBombay\tSuburban  District  was notified as  the  person  to
\nperform\t the  functions of a Collector under s. 5-A  of\t the
\nAct.   After the proceedings under s. 5-A of’ the  Act\twere
\nover,  the  Commissioner  issued  another  notification\t  on
\nOctober 7, 1963 under s. 6 of the Act.\tBy this notification
\nhe
\n904<\/span>
\ndeclared that certain lands out of those notified under s. 4
\nwere  needed  to be acquired at the public expense  for\t the
\npublic\tpurpose already specified.  Some of the\t lands\twere
\nhowever\t exempted  and\tthe notification  under\t s.  4\twith
\nrespect\t thereto was cancelled.\t The petitioners are  owners
\nof  some of the lands included in the notification under  s.\n<\/p>\n
6.  On\treceipt of the notice under s. 9 of  the  Act,\tthey
\nrepresented to Government that their lands be released\tfrom
\nacquisition.  They were informed that this could not be done
\nand  thereupon the present petition was filed  to  challenge
\nthe legality of the proceedings taken under the Act.
\nTwo  main contentions have been urged in these petitions  on
\nbehalf\tof  the\t petitioners.\tIn the\tfirst  place  it  is
\ncontended that the impugned acquisition is not for a  public
\npurpose and is intended for sale to private persons, limited
\ncompanies  and\tcorporations for monetary gain, and  in\t any
\ncase,  the change in the definition of “public\tpurpose”  by
\nthe Land Acquisition (Bombay Amendment) Act, No. 35 of 1953,
\n(hereinafter  referred\tto as the 1953Act) by  which  a\t new
\nclause was added in s. 3 (f) of the Act was ultra vires\t the
\nconcept\t of  “public  purpose” within the  meaning  of\tthat
\nphrase in Art. 31 (2) of the Constitution.  The added clause
\nis in these words
\n\t      “The  acquisition of land for purposes of\t the
\n\t      development  of areas from public revenues  or
\n\t      some  fund  controlled or managed by  a  local
\n\t      authority\t and subsequent disposal thereof  in
\n\t      whole or in part by lease, assignment or sale,
\n\t      with   the   object   of\t securing    further
\n\t      development.”\n<\/p>\n
The  second attack arises in this way.\tBy the Bombay  Corn-
\nmissioners  (Abolition of Office) Act, (No. 28 of 1950)\t the
\noffice\tof  the\t Commissioner in the  State  of\t Bombay\t was
\nabolished  and\tthe  functions\tof  the\t Commissioner\twere
\ntransferred to the State Government or to such authority as
\nthe  State  Government\tmay  by\t general  or  special  order
\nappoint.   In  1958, how,ever, the Bombay  Commissioners  of
\nDivisions  Act, No. 8 of 1958, (hereinafter referred  to  as
\nthe 1958 Act) was passed by which the office of Commissioner
\nof  Division  in the State of Bombay was  revived.   We\t are
\nconcerned in the present appeal mainly with s. 3 (4) of this
\nAct.  By section 3 (1) it is provided that “for the purposes
\nof  constituting offices of Commissioners of divisions\t,and
\nconferring  powers and imposing duties on Commissioners\t and
\nfor  certain  other purposes, the  enactments  specified  in
\ncolumn I of the Schedule to this Act shall be amended in the
\nmanner\tand  to the extent specified in column\t2  thereof”.
\nSub-section (2) thereof provided that “the Commissioner of a
\ndivision,  appointed  under  the law  relating\tto  land  as
\namended by the said Schedule, shall exercise the powers and
\ndischarge   the\t duties\t conferred  and\t imposed   ,on\t the
\nCommissioner by any- law for the time being in force,
\n905<\/span>
\nincluding  the\tenactments  referred to\t in  sub-s.  (1)  as
\namended\t by the said Schedule”.\t The Schedule made a  number
\nof  amendments in the Bombay Revenue Code (No. 5  of  1879),
\nthe main amendment being that s. 6 provided for\t appointment
\nof  Commissioners for each division and s. 6-A provided\t for
\npowers\tand  duties of Commissioners.  Further,\t in  certain
\nsections of the Land Revenue Law as applied to various areas
\nin   the  reconstituted\t State\tof  Bombay  after  the\t re-
\norganisation   of   1956,  the\t word\t“Commissioner”\t was
\nsubstituted for the “State Government” in various  sections.
\nChanges\t were  also made in the Hyderabad Land\tRevenue\t Act
\n(No. 8 of 1317 F.) and the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue\tCode
\n(No. 2 of 1955) to bring them into line with this Act and to
\nprovide\t for the office of Commissioner and its\t powers\t and
\nduties.\t  Besides  these changes in the\t Land  Revenue\tCode
\napplicable  to\tvarious areas in the re-organised  State  of
\nBombay,\t the Schedule also made amendments in various  other
\nActs in force in the State of Bombay and “Commissioner”\t was
\nsubstituted  for “State Government” in these Acts.   Besides
\nthis,  “Commissioner  was  also substituted  for  “Board  of
\nRevenue” in certain Acts in force in areas which came to the
\nre-organised State of Bombay from the former Part B State of
\nHyderabad.  Changes were also made in the Police Act (No.  5
\nof  1861)  and\t“Commissioner,\twas  introduced\t in  certain
\nsections  thereof and a provision was made that\t the  Magis-
\ntrate  of the District should be under the  general  control
\nand  direction of the Commissioner.  Some changes were\tmade
\nin the Saurashtra Police Act (No. 18 of 1954), the Hyderabad
\nDistrict  Police  Act,\t(No.  X of 1329 F)  and\t the  Bombay
\nDistrict  Police Act, (No. 4 of 1890).\tThus  sections\t3(1)
\nand  3(2) as enacted by the Bombay legislature gave  certain
\npowers and imposed certain duties on Commissioners read with
\nthe amendments in the Schedule to the 1958 Act.\n<\/p>\n
\t      Further  provision  was made  in\tsub-sections
\n\t      (3),  (4)\t and (5) which may now be  set\tout.\n<\/p>\n
\t      They read thus :\n<\/p>\n
\t      “(3) The State Government may by\tnotification
\n\t      in  the Official Gazette amend or\t delete\t any
\n\t      entry  in\t the  Schedule for  the\t purpose  of
\n\t      imposing\tany  conditions or  restrictions  on
\n\t      the.  exercise  of  powers  and  discharge  of
\n\t      duties\tconferred   or\t imposed   on\t the
\n\t      Commissioner  or withdrawing them as the\tcase
\n\t      may  be,\tand the Schedule  shall\t be  amended
\n\t      accordingly.\n<\/p>\n
\t      (4)   The\t State\tGovernment  may\t confer\t and
\n\t      impose  on the Commissioner powers and  duties
\n\t      under  any other enactment for the time  being
\n\t      in  force\t and  for that\tpurpose\t may,  by  a
\n\t      notification in the Official Gazette add to or
\n\t      specify\tin   the  Schedule   the   necessary
\n\t      adaptations   and\t  modifications\t  in\tthat
\n\t      enactment by way of amendment; and thereupon–
\n\t      q2Sup CI\/66-12
\n906<\/span>\n<\/p>\n
(a)  every  such enactment shall accordingly be amended\t and
\nhave effect subject to the adaptations and modifications  so
\nmade, and\n<\/p>\n
(b)  the Schedule to this Act shall be deemed to be  amended
\nby the inclusion therein of the said provision for  amending
\nthe enactment.\n<\/p>\n
(5)  The  State\t Government may at any time in\tlike  manner
\ncancel\ta notification under sub-section (4), and  thereupon
\nthe   relevant\tenactment  shall  stand\t unamended  by\t the
\ncancelled  notification\t and the Schedule shall\t be  altered
\naccordingly.”\n<\/p>\n
It  will be seen that these three sub-sections\tprovided  an
\nintegrated scheme.  By sub-section (3) the State  Government
\nis  given the power by notification in the Official  Gazette
\nto amend or delete any entry in the Schedule for the purpose
\nof  imposing any conditions or restrictions on the  exercise
\nof  powers and discharge of duties conferred or\t imposed  on
\nthe  Commissioner or withdrawing them, as the case  may\t be,
\nand the Schedule shall be amended accordingly.\t Sub-section
\n(4)  empowers the State Government to confer and  impose  on
\nthe Commissioner powers and duties under any other enactment
\nfor the time being in force.  It further empowers the  State
\nGovernment for that purpose by notification in the  Official
\nGazette\t to add to or specify in the Schedule the  necessary
\nadaptations  and modifications in that enactment by  way  of
\namendment.  On such notification, such other enactment shall
\naccordingly  be\t amended  and have  effect  subject  to\t the
\nadaptations  and modifications so made, and the Schedule  to
\nthe 1958 Act, shall be deemed to be amended by the inclusion
\ntherein\t of the said provision for amending  the  enactment.
\nBy sub-section (5) the State Government was given the  power
\nto cancel a notification made under sub-s. (4) and thereupon
\nthe   relevant\tenactment  shall  stand\t unamended  by\t the
\ncancelled  notification\t and the Schedule shall\t be  altered
\naccordingly.   The contention of the petitioners is that  by
\nthese sub-sections, and particularly by sub-s. (4) of s.  3,
\nthere  was excessive delegation of legislative power to\t the
\nState  Government and further that these three\tsub-sections
\namount\t to   the  legislature\tabdicating  its\t  power\t  of
\nlegislation  in\t favour of the State Government.  So  it  is
\nurged  that these provisions, and particularly s. 3(4),\t are
\nultra  vires the power of the legislature inasmuch  as\tthey
\nsuffer\tfrom the vice of excessive delegation and amount  to
\nabdication of its power of legislation by the legislature in
\nfavour of the executive.\n<\/p>\n
The  petitions\thave  been opposed on behalf  of  the  State
\nGovernment, and it is contended that the new clause added to
\ns.  3(f) of the Act by the 1953 Act by which the  definition
\nof “public
\n907<\/span>
\npurpose”  was  amended is valid and what  the  addition\t has
\nprovided  is within the concept of “public purpose” as\tused
\nin  Art.  31(2) of the Constitution.  Further it  is  denied
\nthat  the  object  of the State\t Government  in\t making\t the
\nacquisition  is merely to sell the land acquired to  private
\nparties,  private  limited  companies  or  corporations\t for
\nmonetary  gain.\t As to s. 3(4) it is contended that it\tdoes
\nnot  suffer from the vice of excessive delegation  and\tdoes
\nnot  amount  to abdication of its legislative power  by\t the
\nlegislature in favour of the executive.\n<\/p>\n
We  shall first consider the question whether  the  addition
\nmade  by  the  Act  of 1953 in\tthe  definition\t of  “public
\npurpose”  is ultra vires the concept of “public purpose”  as
\nused  in Art. 31(2) of the Constitution.  “Public  purpose”,
\nis  not\t defined in Art. 31 of the Constitution; nor  is  it
\npossible to lay down any hard and fast definition of “public
\npurpose”.  The phrase came up for consideration before\tthis
\nCourt in the State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar
\nSingh  of  Darbhanga  and  Others<\/a>(1).\tIn  that  connection
\nMahajan\t J.  (as  he then was)\tobserved  that\t“the  phrase
\n‘public purpose’ has to be construed according to the spirit
\nof  the\t times\tin  which  the\tparticular  legislation\t  is
\nenacted.”  He  also  referred to Art. 39  of  the  Directive
\nPrinciples of State Policy in construing the phrase  “public
\npurpose”  after coming into force of the  Constitution.\t  In
\nthe  same  case, Das J. (as he then was) observed  that\t “no
\nhard  and fast definition can be laid down as to what  is  a
\n‘public purpose’ as the concept has been rapidly changing in
\nall  countries, but it is clear that it is the\tpresence  of
\nthe  element  of  general interest of the  community  in  an
\nobject\tor  aim that transforms such object or\taim  into  a
\npublic purpose, and whatever furthers the general  interests
\nof  the community as opposed to the particular\tinterest  of
\nthe individual must be regarded as a public purpose.”
\nWe respectfully agree with these observations.\tThere can be
\nno  doubt that the phrase “public purpose” has not a  static
\nconnotation,  which is fixed for all times.  There can\talso
\nbe no doubt that it is not possible to lay down a definition
\nof what “public purpose” is, particularly as the concept  of
\npublic\tpurpose may change from time to time.  There  is  no
\ndoubt  however\tthat  “public purpose”\tinvolves  in  it  an
\nelement\t of general interest of the community  and  whatever
\nfurthers  the general interest must be regarded as a  public
\npurpose.   It  is  in the light of this\t concept  of  public
\npurpose,  which is not static and is changing from  time  to
\ntime and in which there must always be an element of general
\ninterest  of  the  community that we have  to  look  at\t the
\naddition  made by the 1953 Act in the definition of  “public
\npurpose” in s. 3 (f)\t of the Act.\n<\/p>\n
(1) [1952] S.C.R. 889.\n<\/p>\n
908<\/span><\/p>\n
We. have already set out the addition.\tIt is in two  parts.
\nThe first part provides for acquisition of land for purposes
\nof  the\t development of areas from public revenues  or\tsome
\nfund controlled or managed by a local authority.  So far  as
\nthis  part is concerned, it is conceded by  learned  counsel
\nfor  the petitioners that development of areas with the\t aid
\nof  public revenue or some fund controlled or managed  by  a
\nlocal authority would be a public purpose.  Under this\tpart
\nthe  land  would  be acquired by the State  or\tby  a  local
\nauthority   for\t  the  purpose\tof  development\t  and\tthis
\ndevelopment will consist, _generally speaking, of  levelling
\nland,  providing  roads\t thereon,  providing  drainage\t and
\nelectric  lines and such other amenities as should  be\tmade
\navailable  at the time when the acquisition is made and\t the
\nland  is developed.  Such development generally speaking  is
\nnot  possible  through private agencies.  As  we  have\tsaid
\nalready,  it  is not disputed on behalf of  the\t petitioners
\nthat  such development would be a public purpose within\t the
\nconcept of the phrase in Art. 31(2) of the Constitution.
\nThe  attack of the petitioners is on the second part of\t the
\naddition  in  1953 which provides for  “subsequent  disposal
\nthereof\t in whole or in part by lease, assignment, or  sale,
\nwith  the  object of securing further  development.”  It  is
\nurged\tthat  all  these  words\t mean  is  that\t after\t the
\ndevelopment envisaged in the first part of the addition\t the
\nState or the local authority would be free to dispose of the
\nland  acquired in whole or in part by lease,  assignment  or
\nsale,  apparently  to private persons.\tThis,  it  is  said,
\nmeans  that the State or the local authority  would  acquire
\nland  in  the first instance and develop it  in\t the  manner
\nalready\t in dilated and thereafter make profit\tby  leasing,
\nassigning  or selling it to private individuals\t or  bodies.
\nIt  is\talso  said that the  object  of\t securing    further
\ndevelopment which is the reason sale or lease etc. is a very
\nvague  expression  and there is nothing to  show  what\tthis
\nfurther\t development comprises of.It is true that when\tthis
\npart  speaks of “subsequent disposal thereof in whole or  in
\npart by lease, assignment or sale”, it is not unlikely\tthat
\nthis disposal will take place to private persons and thus in
\nan  indirect way the State would be acquiring the land\tfrom
\none set of individuals and disposing it of to another set of
\nindividuals after some development.  If this were all, there
\nmay  be some force in the argument that such acquisition  is
\nnot  within the concept of “public purpose” as used in\tArt.
\n31(2).\t But  this  in our opinion is not  all.\t  We  cannot
\nignore\tthe  words  “with the  object  of  securing  further
\ndevelopment”, which appear in this provision. it would\thave
\nbeen a different matter if the provision had stopped at\t the
\nwords “lease, assignment or sale ” ; but the provision\tdoes
\nnot stop there.\t It says that such lease, assignment or sale
\nmust be with the object of securing further development, and
\nthese
\n909<\/span>
\nwords must be given some meaning.  It is true that the words
\n“further  development” have not been defined, but  that\t was
\nbound  to be so, for further development would\tdepend\tupon
\nthe  nature of the purpose for which the land  is  acquired.
\nOf  course, it is possible that further development  can  be
\nmade  by  the State itself or by the local  authority  which
\nacquires the land; but we see no reason why the State or the
\nlocal  authority  should  not have the\tpower  to  see\tthat
\nfurther\t  development  takes  place  even  through   private
\nagencies by lease, assignment or sale of such land.  So long
\nas  the object is development and the land is made  fit\t for
\nthe purpose for which it is acquired there is, no reason why
\nthe  State  should  not be permitted  to  see  that  further
\ndevelopment  of\t the land takes place in the  direction\t for
\nwhich the land is acquired, even though that may be  through
\nprivate agencies.  We have no doubt that where the State  or
\nthe local authority decides that further development  should
\ntake place through private agencies by disposal of the\tland
\nso acquired by way of lease, assignment or sale, it will see
\nthat  further  development which it has in  mind  does\ttake
\nplace.\tWe can see no reason why if the land so acquired  is
\nleased,\t assigned or sold, the State or the local  authority
\nshould not be able to impose terms on such lessee,  assignee
\nor vendee that will enable further development on the  lines
\ndesired\t to  take  place.  We also see no  reason  why\twhen
\nimposing  terms,  the State or the local authority  may\t not
\nprovide\t that  if  the further development  it\tdesires\t the
\nlessee,\t assignee or the vendee to make is not\tmade  within
\nsuch reasonable time as the State or the local authority may
\nfix,  the  land\t will  revert to  the  State  or  the  local
\nauthority  so that it may again be used for the\t purpose  of
\nfurther development which was the reason for the acquisition
\nof the land.\n<\/p>\n
Take  the  case where land is acquired for  the\t purpose  of
\ndevelopment of certain areas for residential purposes.\t The
\nState\tor  the\t local\tauthority  levels  the\tland   where
\nnecessary,  makes  a  lay  out,\t provides  roads,  drainage,
\nelectric lines and such other amenities as may be  available
\nwhereafter houses have to be built.  The State or the  local
\nauthority  may\tbuild these houses itself, but there  is  no
\nreason why if the purpose is development of certain land  as
\na residential area, the State or the local authority may not
\nlease,\tassign or even sell the lands laid out\tand  already
\ndeveloped  in  order that further  development\tof  building
\nhouses\tmay be achieved.  In such a case it will  always  be
\nopen  to  the  State Government or the\tlocal  authority  to
\nprovide,  and  we  have\t no doubt that\tit  will  always  so
\nprovide,  that\tthe  persons to whom  the  land\t is  leased,
\nassigned  or sold carry out the further object of  building
\nhouses.\t There is also no reason why the State or the  local
\nauthority  should  not\tprovide\t for  the  terms  on-  which
\nresidential  buildings would be made, the specifications  of
\nsuch
\n910<\/span>
\nbuildings,  and the time within which they should  be  made.
\nThere  is  also no reason why the terms should\tnot  provide
\nthat if the further object of development is not carried out
\nwithin a reasonable time, the land would revert to the State
\nor the local authority to be used for the purpose for  which
\nit  was\t acquired.  We have no doubt that the State  or\t the
\nlocal  authority  would see that such terms are\t imposed  on
\nthose  to whom lands are leased, assigned or sold  with\t the
\nobject of further development, by constructing houses  where
\nthe  scheme  is for residential purposes.  We have  also  no
\ndoubt that in imposing terms, the State or the local  autho-
\nrity  will  see\t that  the  purpose  for  which\t the  lease,
\nassignment  or\tsale  is  made\tis  carried  out  within   a
\nreasonable  time, failing which the land will revert to\t the
\nState  or  the local authority.\t These matters\tare  in\t our
\nopinion\t implicit in the words “with the object of  securing
\nfurther\t development”, and we have no reason to\t think\tthat
\nthe  State or the local authority would just dispose of\t the
\nland  so  acquired by lease or assignment  or  sale  without
\ncaring\tto see that further development which was the  basis
\nof acquisition takes place.\n<\/p>\n
We may refer in this connection to a similar provision in S.
\n41  of the Act, which provides for an agreement between\t the
\nprivate\t company  for  which the land is  acquired  and\t the
\nState, and which lays down that the agreement shall  provide
\nthe  terms on which the land shall be held by  the  company.
\nThere  is in our opinion no doubt that when  this  provision
\nspeaks of “with the object of securing further\tdevelopment”
\nit  implicitly requires that before the land so acquired  is
\nleased,\t assigned or sold, the State or the local  authority
\nshall see that the purpose for which the acquisition is made
\nis  carried  out  by persons to whom  the  land\t is  leased,
\nassigned or sold.  There is also in our opinion implicit  in
\nthis  provision that the State or the local authority  would
\nimpose\tterms  on the persons to whom the  land\t is  leased,
\nassigned  or sold and the terms should be such as to  ensure
\nthat the object of further development takes place within  a
\nreasonable’  time  and if the persons to whom  the  land  is
\nleased\tor  assigned or sold do not carry  out\tthat  object
\nwithin a reasonable time, the land would revert to the State
\nor the local authority so that it may again be used for\t the
\npurpose for which the acquisition was made.  If this-is\t the
\ntrue   import\tof   the   words   “with   the\t object\t  of
\nsecuring,further development” in this provision-and we\thave
\nno doubt that it is so-we fail to see how the provision made
\nby  the\t 1953 Act Providing for development in\ttwo  stages,
\nfirst  by the State or the local authority itself by  making
\nthe land fit for the purpose for which acquisition is  made,
\nand then by private persons also after the land is developed
\nby  the\t State or the local authority, is not for  a  public
\npurpose\t within the meaning of that phrase in Art. 31(2)  of
\nthe Constitution.  Population in India is rising and more
\n911<\/span>
\nor more industries are coming into being.  Therefore’  where
\nthe  acquisition  is  with  the\t object\t of  providing\t for
\nresidential and industrial development, we see no reason why
\nsuch  provision\t would\tnot be included in  the\t concept  of
\npublic purpose in the present context.\tWe are therefore  of
\nopinion that the words “with the object of securing  further
\ndevelopment”  have a meaning and if that meaning is what  we
\nhave  stated above (as to which we have no doubt) it  cannot
\nbe  said  that this provision made by the 1953\tAct  is\t not
\nwithin\tthe concept of Art. 31(2) of the  Constitution.\t  We
\ntherefore  hold that the amendment by the 1953\tAct  already
\nset  out  above is within the concept of public\t purpose  in
\nArt. 31(2) of the Constitution and cannot be struck down  as
\nultra vires.\n<\/p>\n
Delegated legislation is a well known modem device.  In view
\nof the complexities of modem life it is not possible for the
\nlegislature  to\t find time to make all\tthe  detailed  rules
\nwhich  are  necessary  to  carry  out  the  purposes  of  an
\nenactment;  so\tit  delegates to  an  appropriate  executive
\nauthority the power to make rules.  But before doing so, the
\nlegislature  itself enacts the law under which the power  is
\ndelegated and lays down the essential policy of the Act\t and
\nall  such essential matters which require to be included  in
\nthe Act itself.\t Having thus provided for all such essential
\nmatters\t in the enactment itself, the legislature leaves  it
\nto  a  subordinate authority which may be  some\t appropriate
\nexecutive authority to frame detailed rules to carry out the
\npurposes of the Act.  These rules are ancillary and subserve
\nthe  purposes of the enactment.\t They cannot go against\t the
\nprovisions  of the enactment and cannot in any\tmanner\tmake
\nany change in the provision of the enactment and are  merely
\nfor  the purpose of carrying out the essential policy  which
\nthe  legislature  has  laid down in  the  enactment  itself.
\nThese  rules  are  called delegated legislation\t and  it  is
\nimportant to remember that this delegated legislation cannot
\nin any way change the provisions of the enactment itself and
\nmust  only be resorted to for carrying out the\tpurposes  of
\nthe legislation itself.\t Such being the nature of  delegated
\nlegislation  we have to see whether the impugned  provisions
\nof  s. 3 are in accord with these principles.  If  they\t are
\nnot and if the legislature has conferred powers on the State
\nGovernment  beyond this such conferment of power  cannot  be
\ndelegated  legislation\tand is really an abdication  of\t its
\npower  by  the\tlegislature  and  transfer  of\tit  to\t the
\nexecutive.\n<\/p>\n
This brings us to a consideration of s. 3. Sub-sections\t (1)
\nand  (2)  of s. 3 read with the Schedule confer\t powers\t and
\nimpose\tduties\ton the Commissioner by virtue  of  the\t1958
\n‘Act.  itself.\tThen comes sub-section (3), and let  us\t see
\nwhat  exactly  it provides.  The State Government  is  given
\npower  by this sub-section to amend or delete any  entry  in
\nthe Schedule.  The amendment is for the purpose of  imposing
\nany conditions or restrictions on the
\n912<\/span>
\nexercise  of  powers and discharge of  duties  conferred  or
\nimposed\t on the Commissioner while deletion is with  respect
\nto  withdrawing any powers conferred by the Schedule on\t the
\nCommissioner.\tLeaving out the question of amendment,\tsub-
\nsection (3) confers power on the State Government to  delete
\nany  entry from the Schedule if it desires to  withdraw\t any
\npowers\tconferred  on the Commissioner\tby  the\t legislature
\nitself in the Schedule.\t In effect therefore the legislature
\nsays  by  sub-s. (3) that though it has deemed\tfit  in\t its
\nwisdom\tto  confer a certain power on the  Commissioner,  it
\nleaves\tit  to the State Government to withdraw\t that  power
\nfrom the Commissioner and     delete the necessary entry  in
\nthe Schedule with respect thereto.  So the State  Government
\nis given carte blanche to take away\tall  or any  of\t the
\npowers\tconferred  by  the  legislature\t itself\t under\t the
\nSchedule.   It\tmay also be added that the Schedule  in\t the
\npresent\t case  is very different from the  Schedule  in\t the
\nEdward Mills Co. Limited v. The State of Ajmer<\/a>(1).  In\tthat
\ncase s. 27 of the Minimum Wages Act. (11 of 1948) gave power
\nto the appropriate government after necessary formalities to
\nadd  to the schedule any employment in respect of  which  it
\nwas  of opinion that minimum rates of wages should be  fixed
\nunder  that Act.  It will be seen that the schedule in\tthat
\nAct merely enumerated certain employments while the Schedule
\nin  the 1958 Act amends a large number of enactments.\tThis
\nmethod\tis merely a convenient device for making  amendments
\nin  other enactments which would otherwise have found  place
\nin  the\t main body of the 1958 Act.  Further s.\t 27  of\t the
\nMinimum Wages Act did not give any power to the\t appropriate
\ngovernment to delete any entry from the schedule; it  merely
\ngave  power  to\t the appropriate government to\tadd  to\t the
\nschedule  and that delegation was upheld by this Court.\t  It
\nwill thus be seen that the provision in sub-s. (3) by  which
\nthe  State Government is even given the power to delete\t any
\nentry in the Schedule and withdraw if it wants to do so\t the
\npower conferred on the Commissioner by the legislature is  a
\nvery  different matter from addition to the  schedule  which
\nwas permitted by the Minimum Wages Act.\n<\/p>\n
It is clear that sub-s. (3) judged by the test of  delegated
\nlegislation has gone far beyond what the legislature can  do
\nwhen  it delegates its functions to an\texecutive  authority
\nfor  making  subordinate legislation’ As we  have  indicated
\nabove, sub-section (3) confers power on the State Government
\neven  to the extent of deleting any entry from the  Schedule
\nand  withdrawing the power conferred by the  legislature  in
\nits wisdom on the Commissioner.\t This in our opinion is\t not
\ndelegated legislation but transfer by the legislature of its
\npower  in  the matter of legislation to the  executive.\t  In
\neffect\tthe legislature says that though it  considers\tthat
\nthe Commissioner should have certain powers it has conferred
\non
\n(1)  [1955] 1 S.C.R. 735.\n<\/p>\n
913<\/span><\/p>\n
him in the Schedule, the State Government may withdraw those
\npowers\t which\tit  has\t thought  fit  to  confer   on\t the
\nCommissioner.\tWe  are of the opinion that this  is  not  a
\nprovision  for delegated legislation but a transfer  by\t the
\nlegislature  of\t its  power to make law\t to  the  executive.
\nFurther if it can be considered to be conferment of power of
\ndelegated legislation, it suffers from the vice of excessive
\ndelegation  inasmuch as it gives power to the  executive  to
\nthe  extent  of\t repealing a part of the  law  made  by\t the
\nlegislature.\n<\/p>\n
Then we come to sub-s. (4) and let us see what it  provides.
\nIt  says that the State Government may confer and impose  on
\nthe Commissioner powers and duties under any other enactment
\nfor  the time being in force and further gives power to\t the
\nState  Government to amend any such enactment by  adding  to
\nthe entries to the Schedule.  The language of the  provision
\nis  of the widest amplitude and gives blanket power  to\t the
\nState  Government  to amend any enactment which\t may  be  in
\nforce  for the time being in ,the State by making  necessary
\nentries\t in the Schedule.  It is however urged on behalf  of
\nthe  State  that we should read down this provision  in\t two
\nrespects.   As\tthe words stand, they confer  power  on\t the
\nState  Government to amend any enactment for the time  being
\nin force even though that enactment may be a law under\tList
\nI of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.\tIt is  urged
\nthat the legislature could not have meant to confer power on
\nthe State Government by this provision with respect to\tlaws
\nunder  List I of the Seventh Schedule to  the  Constitution,
\nfor  the  legislature  itself  had  no\tpower  to  make\t any
\namendment  in  laws  referable\tto List\t I  of\tthe  Seventh
\nSchedule.  We are of the opinion that the provision in\tsub-
\ns. (4) can be read down to this extent that the\t legislature
\ncould  never  have  intended  to give  power  to  the  State
\nGovernment  in matters in which it had itself no power.\t  We
\nshall therefore proceed on the basis that in sub-section (4)
\nthe  legislature  only referred to enactments which  it\t was
\nitself\tcompetent  to  pass under Lists 11 and\tIII  of\t the
\nSeventh Schedule to the Constitution.\n<\/p>\n
Secondly,  it is urged that we should read down this  provi-
\nsion and hold that all that the legislature intended thereby
\nwas  to give to the State Government power to confer on\t the
\nCommissioner  powers  and  impose  upon\t him  duties  of  an
\nexecutive  nature  which were conferred and imposed  on\t the
\nState  Government by laws referable to Lists II and  III  of
\nthe Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.  It is also  urged
\nthat all that the legislature intended by this provision  in
\nsub-section  (4) was to confer on the State  Government\t the
\npower  to  delegate  its own  executive\t power\tunder  other
\nenactments  not\t specified  in\tthe  Schedule  to  the\tCom-
\nmissioner.   We are unable to see on what principle  we\t can
\nread down this provision in this manner.  Even if we look at
\nthe sche-\n<\/p>\n
914<\/span><\/p>\n
dule as it was passed by the legislature we find that though
\nmostly “Commissioner” was substituted for “State Government”
\nin the enactments specified in the Schedule there are  other
\nprovisions  in\tthe Schedule as enacted by  the\t legislature
\nwhich go beyond this.  The Schedule therefore is of no\thelp
\nin  reading down the provision in sub-s. (4) in\t the  manner
\nsuggested.  Besides what learned counsel for the State\tasks
\nwhen he says that we should read down the provision in\tsub-
\ns.  (4)\t is that we should re-draft it\taltogether  and\t add
\nwords in it which are not to be found therein.\t Sub-section
\n(4) says that the State Government may confer and impose  on
\nthe   Commissioner  powers  and\t duties\t under\t any   other
\nenactment.   The nature of these powers and duties  are\t not
\nspecified  in the provision, and we fail to see how  we\t can
\nadd words in the sub-section, which would delimit the nature
\nof  these  powers  and duties as,  merely  executive  powers
\nconferred by other enactments on the State Government.\tSub-
\nsection (4) as it stands therefore does not merely authorise
\nthe State Government to delegate its executive power to\t the
\nCommissioner  under other enactments; it empowers the  State
\nGovernment to confer any powers and impose any duties  under
\nany  other enactment and to do so by amendment of the  other
\nenactment,  and if notification envisaged therein  is  made,
\nthe other enactment is accordingly amended and the  Schedule
\nis  also  amended by the inclusion of the provision  in\t the
\nnotification.\tAs  the words of sub-section  (4)  stand  we
\ncannot in any way read down this provision to mean that , it
\nonly  authorises  the  State  Government  to  delegate\t its
\nexecutive  powers and duties under other enactments  besides
\nthose  mentioned in the Schedule to the Commissioner by\t the
\nlegislature.  If that was all that the legislature intended,
\nwe do not see why a suitable provision to that effect  could
\nnot have been made by the legislature in sub-s. (4).  It  is
\nhowever\t clear from the scheme of S. 3 that is not all\tthat
\nthe legislature intended.  We have already referred to\tsub-
\ns.  (3)\t and  held that by that\t provision  the\t legislature
\nempowered  the State Government to amend or repeal  the\t law
\ncontained  in the Schedule to the 1958 Act.  By\t sub-section
\n(4)  it further empowered the State Government to amend\t any
\nother  law not mentioned in the Schedule, though  of  course
\nwith the object of conferring powers and imposing duties  on
\nthe  Commissioner  under other enactments which\t might\thave
\nbeen conferred by those enactments on other authorities.  In
\neffect\ttherefore the legislature was empowering  the  State
\nGovernment  by sub-s. (4) to substitute\t “the  Commissioner”
\nfor the other authorities which might be mentioned in  other
\nenactments with respect to any powers and duties thereunder.
\nTaking\ta concrete case to illustrate our point and to\tshow
\nthe  far reaching effect of the provision in sub-s.  (4)  we
\nmay refer to s.\t    18 of the Act.  Under that provision the
\nCollector has the power
\n915<\/span>
\nto  make reference to court in certain circumstances on\t the
\napplication of a person who has not accepted the award\tmade
\nby  the Collector.  Sections 20 to 28 confer powers  on\t the
\ncourt and impose duties on it when dealing with\t references.
\nThe  Act  was  not one of the enactments  mentioned  in\t the
\nSchedule as it was originally passed by the legislature.  On
\nthe  wide words used in sub-s. (4) it would be possible\t for
\nthe  State  Government\tto confer on  the  Commissioner\t the
\npowers conferred on the court and duties imposed on it by s.
\n18 to s. 28 by substituting the word “Commissioner” for\t the
\nword  “court”  in the relevant provisions.  If that  is\t the
\nextent\tof  the power conferred on the State  Government  by
\nsub-s. (4)-(and we have no doubt that it is so)-it is not  a
\ncase of providing merely for delegated legislation  properly
\nso-called  but amounts to complete transfer of its power  of
\nlegislation  by the legislature in this matter to the  State
\nGovernment.   We  fail to see why if the  intention  of\t the
\nlegislature  was  merely to provide for\t delegation  of\t its
\nexecutive power by the State Government to the\tCommissioner
\na  simple provision to the effect that the State  Government
\nmay  delegate  its power under any enactment  for  the\ttime
\nbeing in force to the Commissioner was not made.  Instead we
\nfind an integrated scheme in sub-sections (3), (4) and\t(5).
\nBy sub-section (3), the State Government is given the  power
\nto  amend the Schedule enacted by the legislature  and\ttake
\naway  from the Commissioner powers which the legislature  in
\nits  wisdom thought fit to confer on him.  This is  done  by
\nproviding  for deletion of any entry in the Schedule.\tThen
\nby sub-section (4) power is given to the State Government to
\nconfer\tpowers and impose duties on the\t Commissioner  under
\nany  other enactment by amending that enactment.  Lastly  by
\nsub-section (5) the State Government was given the power  to
\nundo  what  it had done under sub-section (4)  and  on\tsuch
\naction\tbeing  taken  the original provision  in  the  other
\nenactments  would  revive.  This scheme is  clear  from\t the
\nprovisions  of\tsub-sections  (3), (4) and (5)\tand  in\t our
\nopinion clearly amounts to transfer of its legislative power
\nby  the legislature to the State Government with respect  to
\nmatters\t dealt with in these sub-sections.  Further if\tthis
\nis  to be treated as a kind of delegation, then\t these\tsub-
\nsections  suffer from the vice of excessive  delegation\t for
\nthey not only authorise the State Government to frame  rules
\nin  the nature of subordinate legislation but give power  to
\nit to undo what the legislature itself has done by the\t1958
\nAct; they also give further power to the State Government to
\namend what the legislature may itself have provided in other
\nenactments already in force or what it may provide by  other
\nenactments  to\tbe  passed  in future.\t We  have  no  doubt
\ntherefore that sub-s. (4) cannot be read down in the  manner
\nurged  on behalf of the State.\tThere is also no doubt\tthat
\nas  this  provision  stands it is  a  complete\ttransfer  of
\nlegislative power by the legislature to the executive within
\nthe  ambit of sub-s. (4).  Sub-section (5) is  consequential
\nto,
\n916<\/span>
\nsub-s. (4) and will fall along with it.\t We are therefore of
\nopinion\t that the provisions contained in sub-sections\t(3),
\n(4)  and  (5) of S. 3 of the 1958 Act which are\t clearly  an
\nintegrated   scheme  are  ultra\t vires\tthe  power  of\t the
\nlegislature  for they amount to transfer by the\t legislature
\nof its legislative power to the State Government, and in any
\ncase  suffer from the vice of excessive delegation  if\tsuch
\nconferment  of power can be called delegation for  the\tpur-
\nposes of subordinate legislation.\n<\/p>\n
We may now refer to two decisions of the Bombay High Court
\nin  which S. 3(4) of the 1958 Act has been  upheld,  namely,\n<\/p>\n
(i) Ganesh Narayan v. Commissioner, Nagpur Division(1),\t and\n<\/p>\n
(ii)  Sadruddin\t Suleman  Jhaveri  v.  Patwardhan(2).\tWith
\nrespect we find that in these two cases no attempt has\tbeen
\nmade to construe the actual words used in S. 3(4) and it has
\nbeen  assumed  that  the section merely\t allowed  the  State
\nGovernment to confer on the ,Commissioner powers and  impose
\nduties\twhich  have been conferred or imposed on  the  State
\nGovernment  under other enactments.  We have  construed\t the
\nwords used in S. 3(4) and we are of the opinion that this is
\nnot  what they mean.  The words are of very  wide  amplitude
\nand as they stand they confer on the State Government  power
\nto amend any other Act and confer on the Commissioner powers
\nand  impose duties under those acts which may be conferred
\nthereunder  on any authority.  Further there is\t nothing  in
\nthe words of s. 3(4) confining conferment of powers of\texe-
\ncutive\tnature\tonly.  As the words stand,  any\t powers\t and
\nduties\t of   any  authority  can  be\tconferred   on\t the
\nCommissioner.\n<\/p>\n
Nor do we think that the principles laid down in the case of
\nHer  Majesty, the Queen v. Burah(3) and of Re.\t Delhi\tLaws
\nAct,  1912(4)  help  to sustain the  validity  of  S.  3(4).
\nBurah’s\t case(4) was a case of conditional  legislation\t and
\nnot of delegated legislation.  Act 22 of 1869 was enacted to
\nremove the Garo Hills from the jurisdiction of the tribunals
\nestablished  under the General Regulations and Act  and\t for
\nother  purposes.  It was to apply in the first\tinstance  to
\nGaro  Hills but S. 9 thereof gave power to  the\t Lieutenant-
\nGovernor to extend the provisions of this Act or any of them
\nto the Jaintia Hills, the Naga Hills and to such portion  of
\nthe Khasi Hills as for the time being forms part of  British
\nIndia.\t By  virtue of this power,  the\t Lieutenant-Governor
\nissued a notification extending the provisions of this\tAct
\nto  the Khasi and Jaintia Hills and excluding therefrom\t the
\njurisdiction of the Courts of Civil and Criminal Judicature.
\nThe Privy Council upheld the validity of S. 9 as a piece  of
\nconditional legislation.  It
\n(1)  [1964] 66 Bom.  Law Reporter 807.\n<\/p>\n
(3)  [1878] L.R. 5 I.A. 178.\n<\/p>\n
(2)  I.L.R. [1965] Bom. 394.\n<\/p>\n
(4)  [1951] S.C.R. 747.\n<\/p>\n
917<\/span><\/p>\n
will  be  seen\thowever\t that  all  that  was  left  to\t the
\nLieutenant-Governor by s. 9 was to apply a certain law which
\nhad  been  passed by a competent legislature  to  a  certain
\narea.\tThere was no provision in the law for any  amendment
\nof  that law or any other law before its application to\t new
\nterritories.   There is therefore no parallel  between\tthat
\ncase and the present case.\n<\/p>\n
We  are further of opinion that Re.  Delhi Laws Act  case(1)
\nalso cannot help the State.  The main question in that\tcase
\nwas  about  the\t extension of certain  laws  with  necessary
\nadaptations  and  modifications to Delhi.  It  was  in\tthat
\nconnection  that this Court held that was  also\t conditional
\nlegislation and laws in force. in other parts of India could
\nbe extended to Delhi subject to necessary modifications\t and
\nadaptations.  Even so this Court pointed out that it was not
\nopen  to the authority on whom such power was  conferred  to
\nmodify\tthem  in any essential feature when  ordering  their
\nextension.  )”at constitutes “essential feature” of a  piece
\nof legislation was a matter over which there was  difference
\nof  opinion  between the learned Judges of this\t Court;\t but
\nthey were agreed that no essential feature could be  altered
\nby  the power given to the executive to apply other laws  in
\nforce in India to the territory of, Delhi by modification or
\nadaptation.   This  would  also be more or less\t a  case  of
\nconditional  legislation and not of  delegated\tlegislation.
\nAs  pointed out by Mukherjea J. (as he was then) at p.\t1009
\nin Re.\tDelhi Laws Act’s case(1) “to repeal. or abrogate  an
\nexisting  law  is the exercise of an  essential\t legislative
\npower”.\t The amendment of a particular law falls also in the
\nsame  category,\t for  an amendment in effect  amounts  to  a
\npartial\t repeal\t of the existing provision  with,  may\tbe,,
\nsubstitution  in its place of another provision.   What\t the
\nlegislature has done in the present case is to give power to
\nthe  executive to amend other laws as it thinks fit for\t the
\npurpose\t of conferring powers on the Commissioner and  this
\nin,  our opinion is conferment of an  essential\t legislative
\nfunction on the executive which cannot be justified on\tthe-
\nprinciples laid down in Re.  Delhi Laws Act case(1).  As  we
\nread  s.  3(4), we are clearly of opinion  that\t it  confers
\npower on the State Government to amend any law it deems\t fit
\nfor  the purpose of conferring any powers and  imposing\t any
\nduties\ton  the Commissioner which may be imposed  by  other
\nlaws  on  any authority.  This is beyond the  power  of\t the
\nlegislature  and  is  really  abdication  of  its  essential
\nfunction  in this matter; and if it is a case of  delegation
\nit  suffers from the vice of excessive delegation.   We\t are
\ntherefore  of the opinion that the two cases of\t the  Bombay
\nHigh Court are not correctly decided.\n<\/p>\n
it is not in dispute that the amendments to the Act by which
\nthe power of the State Government was also conferred on\t the
\nCommissioner  under  sections 4, 5A and 6 of  the  Act\twere
\nmade-\n<\/p>\n
(1)  [1951] S.C.R. 747.\n<\/p>\n
918<\/span><\/p>\n
by notifications under s. 3(4) of the 1958-Act.\t As we\thave
\nheld that s. 3(4) of the 1958 Act is ultra vires the  powers
\nof  the\t legislature and as the Commissioner  had  no  power
\nunder  the  Act before such amendments to ss. 4, 5-A  and  6
\nwere  made  under s. 3(4) the notifications issued  in\tthis
\ncase under ss. 4 and 6 must fall and must be quashed.
\nIn the view we have taken it is unnecessary to consider\t the
\nother points which have been raised in these petitions.\t  We
\nwould\ttherefore   allow  the\tpetitions  and\t quash\t the
\nnotifications  under  ss. 4 and 6 of the Act issued  by\t the
\nCommissioner in the present ,cases.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t Petitions allowed.\n<\/p>\n
(1) [1951] S.C.R. 747.\n<\/p>\n
919<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Arnold Rodricks & Anr vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors on 14 March, 1966 Bench: P.B. Gajendragadkar, Cj, K.N. Wanchoo, M. Hidayatullah, J.C. Shah, S.M. Sikri PETITIONER: ARNOLD RODRICKS & ANR. Vs. RESPONDENT: STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 14\/03\/1966 BENCH: ACT: The Commissioners of Divisions Act, 1957 (Bom. […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-227096","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nArnold Rodricks & Anr vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors on 14 March, 1966 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/arnold-rodricks-anr-vs-state-of-maharashtra-ors-on-14-march-1966\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Arnold Rodricks & Anr vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors on 14 March, 1966 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/arnold-rodricks-anr-vs-state-of-maharashtra-ors-on-14-march-1966\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"1966-03-13T18:30:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2018-07-29T15:43:15+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@legaliadmin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@Legal_india\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"76 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/arnold-rodricks-anr-vs-state-of-maharashtra-ors-on-14-march-1966#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/arnold-rodricks-anr-vs-state-of-maharashtra-ors-on-14-march-1966\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\"},\"headline\":\"Arnold Rodricks & Anr vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors on 14 March, 1966\",\"datePublished\":\"1966-03-13T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2018-07-29T15:43:15+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/arnold-rodricks-anr-vs-state-of-maharashtra-ors-on-14-march-1966\"},\"wordCount\":13930,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"articleSection\":[\"Supreme Court of India\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/arnold-rodricks-anr-vs-state-of-maharashtra-ors-on-14-march-1966#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/arnold-rodricks-anr-vs-state-of-maharashtra-ors-on-14-march-1966\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/arnold-rodricks-anr-vs-state-of-maharashtra-ors-on-14-march-1966\",\"name\":\"Arnold Rodricks & Anr vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors on 14 March, 1966 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"1966-03-13T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2018-07-29T15:43:15+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/arnold-rodricks-anr-vs-state-of-maharashtra-ors-on-14-march-1966#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/arnold-rodricks-anr-vs-state-of-maharashtra-ors-on-14-march-1966\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/arnold-rodricks-anr-vs-state-of-maharashtra-ors-on-14-march-1966#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Arnold Rodricks & Anr vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors on 14 March, 1966\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"name\":\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"description\":\"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"alternateName\":\"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"alternateName\":\"Legal India\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"width\":512,\"height\":512,\"caption\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.facebook.com\\\/LegalindiaCom\\\/\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/Legal_india\"]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\",\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Legal India Admin\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/legaliadmin\"],\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/author\\\/legal-india-admin\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Arnold Rodricks & Anr vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors on 14 March, 1966 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/arnold-rodricks-anr-vs-state-of-maharashtra-ors-on-14-march-1966","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Arnold Rodricks & Anr vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors on 14 March, 1966 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","og_url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/arnold-rodricks-anr-vs-state-of-maharashtra-ors-on-14-march-1966","og_site_name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","article_published_time":"1966-03-13T18:30:00+00:00","article_modified_time":"2018-07-29T15:43:15+00:00","og_image":[{"width":512,"height":512,"url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Legal India Admin","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@legaliadmin","twitter_site":"@Legal_india","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Legal India Admin","Est. reading time":"76 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/arnold-rodricks-anr-vs-state-of-maharashtra-ors-on-14-march-1966#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/arnold-rodricks-anr-vs-state-of-maharashtra-ors-on-14-march-1966"},"author":{"name":"Legal India Admin","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea"},"headline":"Arnold Rodricks & Anr vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors on 14 March, 1966","datePublished":"1966-03-13T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2018-07-29T15:43:15+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/arnold-rodricks-anr-vs-state-of-maharashtra-ors-on-14-march-1966"},"wordCount":13930,"commentCount":0,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"articleSection":["Supreme Court of India"],"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/arnold-rodricks-anr-vs-state-of-maharashtra-ors-on-14-march-1966#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/arnold-rodricks-anr-vs-state-of-maharashtra-ors-on-14-march-1966","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/arnold-rodricks-anr-vs-state-of-maharashtra-ors-on-14-march-1966","name":"Arnold Rodricks & Anr vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors on 14 March, 1966 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website"},"datePublished":"1966-03-13T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2018-07-29T15:43:15+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/arnold-rodricks-anr-vs-state-of-maharashtra-ors-on-14-march-1966#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/arnold-rodricks-anr-vs-state-of-maharashtra-ors-on-14-march-1966"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/arnold-rodricks-anr-vs-state-of-maharashtra-ors-on-14-march-1966#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Arnold Rodricks & Anr vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors on 14 March, 1966"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","description":"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"alternateName":"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization","name":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","alternateName":"Legal India","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","width":512,"height":512,"caption":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","https:\/\/x.com\/Legal_india"]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea","name":"Legal India Admin","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Legal India Admin"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com","https:\/\/x.com\/legaliadmin"],"url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/author\/legal-india-admin"}]}},"modified_by":null,"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/227096","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=227096"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/227096\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=227096"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=227096"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=227096"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}