{"id":229408,"date":"2010-08-24T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2010-08-23T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/bombay-dyeing-and-manufacturing-vs-mehar-karan-singh-on-24-august-2010"},"modified":"2016-07-25T00:58:34","modified_gmt":"2016-07-24T19:28:34","slug":"bombay-dyeing-and-manufacturing-vs-mehar-karan-singh-on-24-august-2010","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/bombay-dyeing-and-manufacturing-vs-mehar-karan-singh-on-24-august-2010","title":{"rendered":"Bombay Dyeing And Manufacturing … vs Mehar Karan Singh on 24 August, 2010"},"content":{"rendered":"
Bombay High Court<\/div>\n
Bombay Dyeing And Manufacturing … vs Mehar Karan Singh on 24 August, 2010<\/div>\n
Bench: R. S. Dalvi<\/div>\n
                                           1                                            nm-4248\n\nPGK\n                IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY\n                  ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION\n\n\n\n\n                                                                                  \n                    Notice of Motion No.4248 of 2008\n\n\n\n\n                                                          \n                                   IN\n                          Suit No.3313 of 2008\n\n\n\n\n                                                         \nBombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co.Ltd.                        ... Plaintiff\n             v\/s.\nMehar Karan Singh             ...                              ... Defendant\n\n\n\n\n                                               \nMr.A.S. Doctor with Mr.N.H.Seervai, Sr.Advocate with\nMr.P.A. Kabadi i\/by M\/s.Doijode & Associates for Plaintiff.\n                               \nMr.S.H. Doctor, Sr.Advocate with Mr.Rajiv Kumar                                           with\nMr.Abhishek Khare i\/by M\/s.Khare & Legal for Deft.\n                              \n        -----\n\n                              CORAM : SMT.ROSHAN DALVI, J.\n              \n\nDate of reserving the order : 20th                     July, 2010\nDate of pronouncing the order :                   24th August, 2010\n           \n\n\n\nORDER :\n<\/pre>\n
    1.    The    Defendant    was    the       whole    time     Director            of     the
\n         Plaintiff-Company      appointed         under      the       Agreement              of
\n         employment dated 22.8.2005, Exhibit-A to the Plaint,<\/p>\n
         for the period 24.7.2004 to 23.7.2009. Under the said
\n         agreement,   he     inter   alia       agreed     not      to      divulge           or
\n         disclose confidential information of any nature to any
\n         person.    The parties agreed that such information shall
\n         be the property of the Company. The relevant clauses of<\/p>\n
                                                          ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 16:19:36 :::<\/span>
\n                                 2                                   nm-4248<\/p>\n
    the agreement read thus:-\n<\/p>\n
             10.Mr.Singh shall not, except in the proper
\n            course of his duties during the continuance of<\/p>\n
            his employment with the Company or any time
\n            thereafter divulge or disclose to any persons
\n            whomsoever or make use whatsoever for his own
\n            purpose or for any purpose of any information<\/p>\n
            knowledge obtained by him during his
\n            employment as to the business and\/or affairs
\n            of the Company and\/or the know-how,
\n            technology, methods, machines, compositions,
\n            knowledge, information and other data, trade<\/p>\n
            secrets, formulate and process of
\n            manufacturing of various products by the<\/p>\n
            Company and\/or list of companies customers and
\n            suppliers (and likewise in relation to the
\n            Company s associated companies) all of which<\/p>\n
            information is or may be confidential with the
\n            exception of any information generally made
\n            available to the public or make or take copies
\n            of the manuals, tracings, blueprints, drawing<\/p>\n
            books, papers containing such confidential
\n            information without authority taken prior to<\/p>\n
            making or taking copies, such copies may
\n            contain the whole information substantially
\n            similar information from the original manual,
\n            tracings, drawings, blueprints, papers, books<\/p>\n
            etc. Mr.Singh shall during the continuance of
\n            his employment hereunder, also use his best
\n            endeavours to prevent any person publishing
\n            disclosing such confidential information
\n            PROIVDED HOWEVER that any such divulgence or<\/p>\n
            disclosures by Mr.Singh to officers and
\n            employees of the Company solely for the
\n            purpose of business of the Company shall not
\n            be deemed to be a contravention of his clause.<\/p>\n
            11. All notes, books, papers memoranda and
\n            other documents or any trade secrets of<\/p>\n
                                      ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 16:19:36 :::<\/span>
\n                                      3                                            nm-4248<\/p>\n
               confidential information concerning the
\n               business of the Company (and the associated
\n               companies) which shall be acquired, received<\/p>\n
               or made by Mr.Singh during the course of his
\n               employment hereunder and\/or incidental to his<\/p>\n
               employment, shall be the property of the
\n               and shall be surrendered by Mr.Singh
\n               to someone duly authorized on their behalf at
\n               the termination of his employment or at the<\/p>\n
               request of the Board (or any other designated
\n               persons) at any time during the course of his
\n               employment.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                                        (Emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
    2. The Defendant was bound in principle by the Code of<\/p>\n
      Ethics   and   business   of       the    Plaintiff.        He      certified
\n      compliance      thereof   in        the     years       following               his<\/p>\n
      employment being 2006, 2007 and 2008.                       The relevant
\n      clause of the code of ethics runs thus:-\n<\/p>\n
                     19. CONCURRENT EMPLOYMENT<\/p>\n
                   An employee of a WADIA Company shall
\n                   not, without the prior approval of the
\n                   Managing Director of the Company, accept<\/p>\n
                   employment or a position of responsibility
\n                   (such as a consultant or a director) with
\n                   any other company, nor provide free-lance
\n                   service to anyone. In the case of an
\n                   Executive\/Whole-time Director or the<\/p>\n
                   Managing\/Joint Managing\/Deputy Directors
\n                   such prior approval must be obtained from
\n                   the Board of Directors of the Company.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n\n                                                 (Emphasis supplied)\n\n\n\n\n                                                    ::: Downloaded on - 09\/06\/2013 16:19:37 :::<\/span>\n                                                   4                                            nm-4248\n\n<\/pre>\n
    3. The Defendant is stated to have divulged confidential
\n         information to a competitor being Dawnay Day India Land<\/p>\n
         Private Limited (DD) by way of forwarding on e-mail a
\n         manual       of     a     customised          software       for       real         estate<\/p>\n
         business of the Plaintiff obtained by the Plaintiff
\n         upon        payment          of    consideration        from         the        software<\/p>\n
         producer Oracle.                  The Defendant is shown to have taken
\n         up initially employment by the directorship and later
\n         by way of being an Executive Director on the Board of<\/p>\n
         various Companies being DD Group Companies which has
\n         come to be discontinued or terminated by DD.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    4.    The        Defendant s            employment    with       the       Plaintiff             no<\/p>\n
         longer subsists. The Defendant claims to have resigned
\n         and        the    Plaintiff          claims     to     have      terminated               his<\/p>\n
         services as whole time Director.\n<\/p>\n
    5.        The     suit       is    essentially        for     injunction               against
\n         divulgence and disclosure of confidential information.\n<\/p>\n
         The suit is also for money claim for damages upon the
\n         divulgence claimed by the Plaintiff as also for refund
\n         of    excess        salary        paid   to    the   Defendant            during          his
\n         tenure as whole time Director. The Notice of Motion is<\/p>\n
         for the aforesaid injunction as well as the order of
\n         deposit of the excess remuneration paid with interest
\n         at 18% per annum from the date of the payment made to
\n         the Defendant until realisation.\n<\/p>\n
                                                                 ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 16:19:37 :::<\/span><\/p>\n
                                               5                                             nm-4248<\/p>\n
    6. It may at once be mentioned that the two reliefs are<\/p>\n
      upon two entirely different causes of action which have
\n      been sought to be merged in the suit and the ad voleram<\/p>\n
      Court fee required to be paid upon damages claimed by
\n      the Plaintiff for divulgence of information as also for<\/p>\n
      refund of the excess salary suffers from mis-joinder of
\n      causes of action              and cannot be considered in a single
\n      suit upon payment of consolidated Court fee once. Since<\/p>\n
      the        suit    as   well       as       the     Notice      of       Motion           are
\n      essentially in respect of confidential information and<\/p>\n
      the interim relief which is sought is essentially for
\n      injunction in respect of the confidential information<\/p>\n
      of     the        Plaintiff,        that          relief      alone         shall           be
\n      considered.             The    relief        of     deposit       prayed          by      the<\/p>\n
      Plaintiff          cannot     be    granted        in   the     same        suit        upon
\n      payment of one Court fee and, therefore, shall not be<\/p>\n
      considered on merits.                     The Plaintiff may take such
\n      proceedings as required in respect of the relief of<\/p>\n
      refund \/ deposit claimed.\n<\/p>\n
    7. The Plaintiff s case of divulgence of confidential
\n             information and the reliefs that could be granted<\/p>\n
      to     the        Plaintiff        must      be      seen      from          the        twin
\n      situations :\n<\/p>\n
           (i)      If the information sought to be protected is<\/p>\n
                                                              ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 16:19:37 :::<\/span>
\n                                           6                                               nm-4248<\/p>\n
             confidential and would fall within the broad
\n             and     wide           confidentiality                    clause             being<\/p>\n
             Clause-10         in    the           aforesaid       Agreement              dated
\n             22.8.2005.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    (ii)     If    the       Defendant             is    shown        to      have        acted
\n             contrary        to     the        terms       of    the        confidential<\/p>\n
             clause in the agreement and is susceptible to
\n             such act in future.\n<\/p>\n
    8.     During the subsistence of the period of contract
\n    with the Plaintiff, the Defendant is shown to have<\/p>\n
    executed a Terms of Contract with DD on 2.3.2006. He
\n    was later appointed Director of DD.                                The first such<\/p>\n
    appointment      is       shown       to        be    on    12.5.2006             by      the
\n    statutory Form-32 submitted by DD under the digital<\/p>\n
    signature      of     his       authorised             signatory            and       which
\n    appointment is not disputed.                          A year thereafter the<\/p>\n
    Defendant      is        shown        to       have        been      appointed              as
\n    Executive      Director          of       DD    under       statutory           Form        32<\/p>\n
    showing his appointment as such on 28.9.2007 which
\n    is also not disputed.\n<\/p>\n
    9. The Defendant is shown to have filed his income<\/p>\n
    tax    returns       for      the         year       2007-08       in       which         the
\n    computation         of     his      taxable           income         is      shown          to
\n    containing income from salary from DD as well as the
\n    Plaintiff which is also not disputed.\n<\/p>\n
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                               7                                            nm-4248<\/p>\n
    10. The Defendant is shown to have attended Board
\n    meetings   of   the    Plaintiff    as     per      the        statutory<\/p>\n
    requirements under the Companies Act from 26.10.2005
\n    until 27.5.2008, which includes the period of the<\/p>\n
    Defendant s contract with the Plaintiff as well as
\n    his   service   as    Director    and    later        as       Executive
\n    Director with DD.\n<\/p>\n
    11. The factum of the Defendant owing allegiance to<\/p>\n
    the Plaintiff as well as         competitor is coupled with
\n    the fact that the Defendant has shown division of<\/p>\n
    his loyalty and affinity to the Plaintiff which has
\n    been demonstrated by certain e-mails admittedly sent<\/p>\n
    by the Defendant to one of the Directors of the
\n    Plaintiff.\n<\/p>\n
    12. The first of such e-mails is dated 18.9.2006<\/p>\n
    which   makes   interesting      reading     and       exhibits            the
\n    Defendant s trait of integrity . It would be apt to
\n    cite the entire of it which runs thus:-\n<\/p>\n
            From
\n            To : Ness Wadia, nesss@wadiagroup.com
\n            Sent :Mon Sept 18 00:36:12 2006
\n            Subject: Confidential: Visit by Chairman of
\n            UK Financial Services Company<\/p>\n
                                             ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 16:19:37 :::<\/span>
\n                                  8                                         nm-4248<\/p>\n
              Dear Ness<\/p>\n
              An old friend of mine is visiting from UK over
\n              the next week or so.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
              He is the Chairman of a Financial Services \/
\n              Real Estate Property Finance Company with
\n              Assets over US$ 10 billion.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
              He is keen that I join the Board of the
\n              Holding Company in the UK as a non-executive
\n              director and become the Vice Chairman of their<\/p>\n
              India venture.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
              I think he wants to see whether he should or
\n              should not do so and I would like to take your
\n              permission to see if this fructifies.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
              It can help our non-BDMC financing of some
\n              projects in the WG, however, this is far away.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
              It may not happen at all, but I wanted to tell
\n              you first.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
              Do keep this with your self since nothing may
\n              come out of this.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
              I had mentioned this to the Chairman in
\n              passing about an year ago (at the time the
\n              Mills case was on), that something may happen,
\n              said he generally encouraged non-executive
\n              director positions of senior staff in the<\/p>\n
              Group.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
The E-mail makes a reference to an old friend visiting from
\nthe U.K. The friend is the Chairman of a Financial Services
\n\/   real   estate   property   finance   Company       (which          is      the<\/p>\n
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\n                                     9                                            nm-4248<\/p>\n
Plaintiff s competitor with regard to the Plaintiff s real
\nestate business).          The E-mail shows that that friend is<\/p>\n
keen that the Defendant joined the Board of the holding
\nCompany in the U.K. as an non-executive director and become<\/p>\n
the Vice Chairman of their India venture.                       The Defendant
\nshows that that is merely a proposal and the Defendant<\/p>\n
would    see    if    this    fructifies.        The      Defendant              seeks
\npermission of the e-mailee on the grounds set out by him in
\nthe e-mail which runs thus:\n<\/p>\n
            It can help our non
\n                              ig               BDMC Financing of some
\n          projects in the WG.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          The Defendant passes off the proposal as a mere<\/p>\n
          possibility which may not happen but assures the
\n          e-mailee that he wanted to tell you first .\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          He   quoted   the     Chairman    in    that       he      generally
\n          encouraged    non-executive       director         positions              of<\/p>\n
          senior     staff    in   the   group     Companies             of      the
\n          Plaintiff.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
        13.     It may at once be mentioned that by the time
\n        the    Defendant     e-mailed    the     said     proposal             marked
\n         confidential        by him he was already a director of<\/p>\n
        DD, whose Chairman was from the U.K.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
        14.     This ambiguous, dilatory and mis-directed e-<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n        mail was replied by the Director                     O.K.         It would\n\n\n\n\n                                                   ::: Downloaded on - 09\/06\/2013 16:19:37 :::<\/span>\n                                     10                                              nm-4248\n\n<\/pre>\n
    show that perhaps in future the Defendant s friend,
\n    who was in real estate finance business, may offer<\/p>\n
    him a position as non-executive director in his U.K.
\n    Company and to become the Vice Chairman of his India<\/p>\n
    Venture which might help to finance some projects of
\n    the Plaintiff and which was told to the e-mailee<\/p>\n
    first, though it was mentioned to the Chairman in
\n    the passing a year before, and which was expected to
\n    be kept confidential until anything happened on that<\/p>\n
    score.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    15. Soon after
\n                          ig  this e-mail was sent, which was
\n    during    his    directorship          of   DD,     on      1.10.2006,              the<\/p>\n
    Defendant was appointed Vice Chairman of DD, a fact
\n    which    the    Plaintiff s          officer    came         to     learn         from<\/p>\n
    DD s     officer     in    an    e-mail        sent        much         later         on
\n    18.8.2008       when      the    Plaintiff            investigated                  the<\/p>\n
    Defendant s conduct.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    16. In a more direct request for permission under
\n    another    e-mail      sent     to    the     same      director            of      the
\n    Plaintiff       on     8.2.2007,        the    Defendant                requested
\n    permission to join the Board of DD (U.K.) as an<\/p>\n
    external director and\/or DD (India) as director and
\n    to lead that Company as their Vice Chairman.                                        The
\n    Defendant       stated        that      it        was        a        governance
\n    assignment. The Defendant followed the request with<\/p>\n
                                                      ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 16:19:37 :::<\/span>
\n                                   11                                            nm-4248<\/p>\n
    the reason<\/p>\n
             This    lateral     input     will      give        insights             to
\n            apply to our business here .\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      He further assured that it would not be impinging<\/p>\n
      on    his work and if it did then               he would review
\n      it or reduce it.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    17. It may be mentioned that though the Defendant
\n    became a director since 12.5.2006 on the Board of DD<\/p>\n
    and    was   also    appointed     Vice    Chairman               of      DD      on
\n    1.10.2006, he e-mailed for permission to join the<\/p>\n
    Board and to be the Vice Chairman only on 8.2.2007
\n    much after he had acted in those positions without<\/p>\n
    the requisite permission.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    18. On 22.2.2007, he e-mailed various other officers
\n    of the Plaintiff upon, it appears, certain eyebrows<\/p>\n
    being raised in his Organisation.                  He clarified that
\n    he had taken specific permission of the Chairman and
\n    the Director in that behalf and requested them not
\n    to talk to outsiders on that subject.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    19.     During      his    contract     period         and       after          his
\n    appointment         with    the       competitor             Company              as
\n    aforesaid, the Defendant, as before, sent his letter<\/p>\n
                                                  ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 16:19:37 :::<\/span>
\n                                         12                                                 nm-4248<\/p>\n
    affirming          and    confirming          his    compliance                with        the
\n    code of conduct of the Company.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    20.      It        may    at   once           be     mentioned                that         the<\/p>\n
    Defendant s          conduct         was       against              the        code          he
\n    confirmed last on 9.4.2007.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    21.      The       Defendant    signed             the     contract            of      being
\n    Managing Director of DD (India) on 19.8.2007, which<\/p>\n
    fact also the Plaintiff came to learn, much later,
\n    through the e-mail dated 18.8.2008 of the officer of<\/p>\n
    DD (India).\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    22.      It appears that the Defendant would have been
\n    sought        to    be     replaced           by    another             officer.             On<\/p>\n
    1.10.2007, the Defendant e-mailed the Chairman of
\n    the Plaintiff that he resigned from the Plaintiff<\/p>\n
    for   personal           reasons.        He   had    communicated                   to     the
\n    Chairman the replacement.                     He claimed to be allowed<\/p>\n
    to look after his options.                     He informed the Chairman
\n    that he would take up the role of Vice Chairman and
\n    Managing Director of DD (India), which he had not
\n    until then done, if that assignment was still open<\/p>\n
    for him. It may be mentioned that he had already
\n    been appointed director as well as Vice Chairman as
\n    well as the Managing Director of DD by then.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                                                             ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 16:19:37 :::<\/span><\/p>\n
                                      13                                              nm-4248<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
    23.    The Chairman of the Plaintiff replied to the
\n    e-mail on 2.10.2007. This was whilst he was unaware<\/p>\n
    of the Defendant s varied appointments diametrically
\n    contrary     to     code      of      conduct        he       confirmed              and<\/p>\n
    different    from       the   various            permissions           he      sought
\n    earlier.      The       Chairman       expressed          surprise           at      the<\/p>\n
    Defendant s request to look at his options and his
\n    commitment to any other Company which the Defendant
\n    had   confirmed     as     untrue       upon       the     rumours           in      the<\/p>\n
    Company.    Nevertheless,             the    Chairman          apologised              if
\n    the   Defendant         was
\n                             ig   hurt          and    hence,         he       resigned
\n    because    the     Defendant          was    going       through           enormous
\n    stress and strain due to the health problems of his<\/p>\n
    father.      The Chairman called upon the Defendant to
\n    meet him the next day              after sleeping over it.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    24.    For whatever be the reason either appeasement<\/p>\n
    or    guilt the         Defendant           by     his       e-mails              dated
\n    2.10.2007 and 20.10.2007, once again apologised to<\/p>\n
    the Plaintiff s Chairman and in a verbose e-mail set
\n    out unclear options.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    25.    It is unmistakable that during the Defendant s<\/p>\n
    contract of employment as whole time Director of the
\n    Plaintiff-Company          and        during       the      period           he      was
\n    amenable to and confirmed the code of ethics of the
\n    Plaintiff,        the    Defendant           joined         the         Board          of<\/p>\n
                                                       ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 16:19:37 :::<\/span>
\n                                        14                                              nm-4248<\/p>\n
    Directors of DD, became its Vice Chairman and later
\n    his Managing Director without disclosing that fact<\/p>\n
    contractually          required          to     be       disclosed,                filed
\n    income-tax returns reflecting his two services and<\/p>\n
    received and appropriated salaries as well as other
\n    perquisites from both the Companies unknown to one<\/p>\n
    another.        Even        after       his   employment             with        DD      as
\n    Director, Vice Chairman and Managing Director, he
\n    attended Board meetings of the Plaintiff.                                        Having<\/p>\n
    double        played        both        the     Companies              and         their
\n    respective           Chairmen,
\n                            ig                the         Defendant                  sought
\n    permissions,           beating around the bush, even after
\n    his several contractual position was entered into,<\/p>\n
    confirmed and well on its way.                           It is the act of
\n    such a dis-loyalist that the Plaintiff s case of the<\/p>\n
    Defendant having sought to part with confidential
\n    information       of    the        Plaintiff         must       be       seen.         The<\/p>\n
    parties       were     in    e-culture.          Their          correspondence
\n    through e-mail is an accepted mode of communication.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    They are attuned to and would be exposed from such
\n    technology.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    26.      The    Plaintiff s         suspicion          being         raised,           the<\/p>\n
    Board of Directors of the Plaintiff in its Board
\n    meeting dated 27.5.2008, inter alia resolved that
\n    the employment of the Defendant as an employee as
\n    well     as    Executive       Director          be       terminated               after<\/p>\n
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\n                                         15                                                nm-4248<\/p>\n
    giving him the requisite 30-day notice in terms of
\n    his contract of employment.                        Thereafter on 7.6.2008,<\/p>\n
    a    notice    in   that       behalf         came      to     be      sent        to     the
\n    Defendant and he was directed to hand over charge to<\/p>\n
    the Plaintiff s officer.                      The Defendant s laptop as
\n    well as other movable properties given by way of<\/p>\n
    perquisites to him were taken back.                              From the laptop
\n    further       e-mails     of    the       Defendant             were        retrieved.
\n    Two of such e-mails are of direct importance for<\/p>\n
    adjudication of the reliefs sought by the Plaintiff
\n    upon considering the Defendant s conduct. The e-mail<\/p>\n
    dated    15.12.2007        sent          by       the   Defendant             to      three
\n    officers       of   DD      shows             a    process           document             for<\/p>\n
    tendering\/PO\/WO forwarded to them.                                The attachment
\n    to     the     e-mail      shows          BDRED Tendering                   PO       &      WO<\/p>\n
    Processes.doc.          The e-mail shows that the document
\n    attached was encapsulated in the ERP oracle system<\/p>\n
    at     BDMC    (Plaintiff).                That         was      the        Enterprise
\n    Resource Programme (ERP) customised by the Plaintiff<\/p>\n
    from the system provider, oracle. The manual showed
\n    how    the    operation        of        customised           software            of      the
\n    Plaintiff could be effected.                        The Defendant e-mailed
\n    that that system was the first in the world which is<\/p>\n
     NZN system solution for real estate business .                                             He
\n    also    e-mailed        that     he       thought          that         intellectual
\n    property       in   the    customised               software            was       jointly
\n    owned (by the Plaintiff and oracle).                                  It is indeed<\/p>\n
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\n                                     16                                            nm-4248<\/p>\n
    stated to have been purchased by the Plaintiff at a
\n    cost of Rs.93 Lakhs. He e-mailed that the e-mailees<\/p>\n
    would enjoy the document attached.                      He assured that
\n    they could discuss it at the next EC meeting.                                       He<\/p>\n
    further      e-mailed       that         he     would            like             our
\n    system     (DD) to be        even more robust                    and         to be<\/p>\n
    followed 100% .          He further e-mailed that                      he would
\n    critically    evaluate      the        documents        along         with        the
\n    officers     of     DD    and        deploy     it      throughout                the<\/p>\n
    organisation.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    27.<\/p>\n
             The manual of the customised software of the
\n    Plaintiff, which was indeed the Plaintiff s property<\/p>\n
    and more so an intellectual property, by way of the
\n    Plaintiff having paid consideration for the same to<\/p>\n
    its author oracle, came to be verbatim forwarded to
\n    a competitor which the Defendant was to evaluate and<\/p>\n
    explain the officers of that competitor and utilise
\n    the same in their organisation.                    There cannot be a<\/p>\n
    more stark theft of such property and it s misuse
\n    thereupon. In fact, the act of the Defendant would
\n    tantamount     to     the       tort     of     conversion               of       the
\n    Plaintiff s property for the use of its competitor,<\/p>\n
    aided,    assisted,       explained       and      evaluated              by      the
\n    Defendant. It may even amount to an infringement of
\n    the Plaintiff s copyright, though that case is not
\n    pleaded.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                                                    ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 16:19:37 :::<\/span><\/p>\n
                                     17                                               nm-4248\n\n\n\n    28.     The      Court     is        not     concerned                with          the\n\n\n\n\n                                                                              \n<\/pre>\n
    intricacies and the delicacies of the manual itself.
\n    It is also not concerned with its worth.                             The e-mail<\/p>\n
    dated       15.12.2007    amply      makes    out         a     case        of      the
\n    Plaintiff s          property     being      in       danger           of        being<\/p>\n
    damaged       and     alienated       causing            injury            to       the
\n    Plaintiff       in     relation      to     its       business              by      its
\n    alienation.          Of course, the actual damage suffered<\/p>\n
    by    the    Plaintiff     would      only    surface             much        later.
\n    That would be for the Plaintiff to prove as and when<\/p>\n
    the damage would occur or upon the damage having
\n    already       occurred.     A        case    for          injuncting                the<\/p>\n
    Defendant who is habituated to double dealings ever
\n    since his contract of service with the Plaintiff, is<\/p>\n
    made out.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    29.     Another e-mail, which was retrieved from his
\n    computer, is dated 21.2.2008 sent by the Defendant<\/p>\n
    to the officers of DD. The subject of that e-mail
\n    was the       format of an MOU draft .                    It was attached
\n    to the e-mail.          The e-mail shows that the format was
\n    used by the Plaintiff s officers for a project in<\/p>\n
    Goa.    The Defendant e-mailed                just for its format,
\n    I am circulating the same . Though an MOU may not
\n    constitute       intellectual         property,             yet        it        would
\n    certainly be the Plaintiff s property brazenly mis-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                                                      ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 16:19:37 :::<\/span><\/p>\n
                                       18                                               nm-4248<\/p>\n
      utilised by the Defendant, exhibiting it to be so.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      30.        The   instances     need        not   be    multiplied.                   The
\n      Defendant is also alleged to have                         poached            certain<\/p>\n
      employees of the Plaintiff.                  However, that aspect is
\n      of lesser importance and need not be considered.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      31.        The   Plaintiff s          case       that        the         Defendant
\n      committed        trespass      of    the     Plaintiff s             proprietary<\/p>\n
      rights is prima facie made out from the aforesaid e-
\n      mails.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    32.    The    Defendant s      contract        was      terminated             by      the<\/p>\n
      Notice dated 9.6.2008, to which surprisingly, the
\n      Defendant expressed surprise and as the last straw<\/p>\n
      alleged that he had resigned in October 2007.                                      That
\n      was the e-mail of 1.10.2007 cited above, which came<\/p>\n
      to    be     replied     with        the     Chairman s             apology            on
\n      2.10.2007 followed by the Defendant s e-mail also of<\/p>\n
      2.10.2007,        showing      no     trace      of     resignation.                 The
\n      Defendant s        false       case     of       resignation              is       made
\n      forgetting       the    fact    that       he    has     attended            several
\n      Board meetings of the Plaintiff after his alleged<\/p>\n
      resignation        of   1.10.2007,          taken      salary          and       other
\n      perquisites from the Plaintiff after that day which
\n      are reflected in his income-tax returns, along with
\n      the salary received also from DD and the fact that<\/p>\n
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\n                                             19                                                 nm-4248<\/p>\n
      he    made    allegations             against         the      Plaintiff             of      his
\n      laptop       being    seized          only       in    July        2008        after         the<\/p>\n
      termination of his contract in June 2008.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    33. Upon the Defendant s contract being terminated, the
\n      Plaintiff informed the Chairman of DD of that fact<\/p>\n
      on 9.6.2008.          It appears that in a decent overture
\n      the Chairman of DD has expressed his gratitude to
\n      the Plaintiff to have brought that matter to his<\/p>\n
      attention       and        himself          sought           to        terminate             the
\n      Defendant s contracts with DD.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                              ig                                   This has been set\n      out   in     the     e-mail       of       the    Chairman             of     DD     to      the\n      Chairman        of      the           Plaintiff               dated            11.8.2008.\n                            \n      Consequently,          his       contract             with        DD       came        to      be\n<\/pre>\n
      terminated on 8.8.2008. Even a public notice in that<\/p>\n
      behalf       came     to     be        given          by     DD       in      two        local
\n      newspapers.           Further, two e-mails dated 14.8.2008<\/p>\n
      and     18.8.2008          confirmed              the          ceasure             of        all
\n      associations of DD with the Defendant. The Defendant<\/p>\n
      resigned       from        DD        (U.K.).          His       nomination               being
\n      revoked from another sister concern in India and he
\n      was sought to be removed as director of two other DD
\n      Group Companies where he refused to resign.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    34. The Plaintiff has also contended that the Defendant
\n      has been privy to confidential information of the
\n      Plaintiff          which        he     may       have         gathered              at       the<\/p>\n
                                                                 ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 16:19:37 :::<\/span>
\n                                         20                                                 nm-4248<\/p>\n
      Plaintiff s Board meetings as well as through the
\n      Plaintiff s strategic business plans which also the<\/p>\n
      Plaintiff       seeks       to        injunct      the          Defendant              from
\n      disclosing       to        outsiders          being           the        Plaintiff s<\/p>\n
      confidential         information.           The    confidentiality                     term
\n      in the Defendant s contract with the Plaintiff is<\/p>\n
      indeed     wide.      It     encompasses           the        information                and
\n      knowledge       obtained         by     the       Defendant             during           the
\n      course     of    his       employment         as       to     the        Plaintiff s<\/p>\n
      affairs. It includes the knowhow technology, methods
\n      and   other     data    ig of    the     Plaintiff             with        regard          to
\n      information       which         is,    as    well        as      which         may       be,
\n      confidential.          The       Plaintiff             has         contended               in<\/p>\n
      paragraph       17    of    the       Plaint       that        aside         from        the
\n      Plaintiff s          software          the      Defendant                has         other<\/p>\n
      materials        and        documents             as        well          as         other
\n      confidential information.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    35. It has been argued on behalf of the Plaintiff by<\/p>\n
      Mr.A.S. Doctor that the matters dealt with at the
\n      Board s meetings to which the Defendant was a privy
\n      were not matters in the public domain, though they
\n      may not be, stricto sensu, trade secrets.                                    They must<\/p>\n
      not be, therefore, made available to any members of
\n      the public.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n\n\n    36.   This   information           is     claimed         to       be      Plaintiff s\n\n\n\n\n                                                             ::: Downloaded on - 09\/06\/2013 16:19:37 :::<\/span>\n                                         21                                           nm-4248\n\n<\/pre>\n
      property and cannot be divulged or disclosed by the
\n      Defendant        to        outsiders.               The          confidential<\/p>\n
      information set out by the Plaintiff is in respect
\n      of   business      plans         of    real    estate        business,             the<\/p>\n
      product     mix       of        the     Plaintiff       in       respect             of
\n      developing real estate, the decisions of the area in<\/p>\n
      square footage, the capital and revenue expenditure
\n      and the budgets of the Plaintiff.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    37. The kind of relationship between the Plaintiff and
\n      the Defendant must be first seen to understand the<\/p>\n
      perspective in which they function. Is it a purely
\n      business or contractual relationship ? OR does it go<\/p>\n
      further     to        a     fiduciary          character?              Fiduciary
\n      relationship is defined in Black s Law Dictionary,<\/p>\n
      Eighth Edition at page 658 thus:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                       A person who is required to act for the
\n                      benefit of another person on all matters
\n                      within the scope of their relationship;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                      one who owes to another the duties of good
\n                      faith, trust, confidence, and candor the
\n                      corporate officer is a fiduciary to the
\n                      corporation.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    38. The     position         of     the       Defendant       vis-a-vis              the
\n    Plaintiff in being privy to any information that he
\n    receives by virtue of his position in the Company is
\n    also   in   the    capacity         of    a    constructive           trust.             A<\/p>\n
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\n                                                22                                            nm-4248<\/p>\n
          constructive           trust    as         defined       in        Black s             Law
\n          Dictionary, Eighth Edition, page 1547 reads thus:-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                     …. the formula through which the
\n                   conscience of equity finds expression. When
\n                   property has been acquired in such<\/p>\n
                   circumstances that the holder of the legal
\n                   title may not in good conscience retain the
\n                   beneficial interest, equity converts him into
\n                   a trustee. Beatty vs. Guggenheim Exploration
\n                   Co., 122 N.E. 378, 380 (N.Y. 1919) (Cardozo,<\/p>\n
                   J.)<\/p>\n
                       A       person,   who    is     required       to      act      for       the<\/p>\n
                    benefit         of   another        person,        on      all       matters
\n                    within the scope of their relationship and one
\n                    who owes to another the duties of good faith,<\/p>\n
                    trust, confidence and candor is in a fiduciary<\/p>\n
                    relationship with that other.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
The       case    of       a    corporate      officer     in       relation             to      his<\/p>\n
Corporation is one such.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    39.    In Black s Law Dictionary Eight Edition at page 1533<\/p>\n
          trade secret is defined as a formula, process, device
\n          or other business information that is kept confidential
\n          to maintain an advantage over the competitors.                                    It is
\n          the    information         which          includes     formula,              pattern,
\n          compilation, programme, device, method, technique or<\/p>\n
                                                               ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 16:19:37 :::<\/span>
\n                                               23                                           nm-4248<\/p>\n
      process.       That derives independent economic value from
\n      not being generally known or readily ascertainable by<\/p>\n
      others     who       can        obtain        economic       value          from         its
\n      disclosure or use.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    40.    Pollock     &     Mulla         Indian    Contract       Act,         Thirteenth<\/p>\n
      Edition at page 838 sets out the concepts of Trade
\n      Secrets    and       Confidential            Information.         The      extent          of
\n      protection           of        Trade         Secrets        and        Confidential<\/p>\n
      Information of an employer is seen from the fact that
\n      an    employer       can       protect
\n                                      ig            the   trade     secrets            without
\n      preventing the use of the employee s own knowledge,
\n      skill and experience even if this is acquired during<\/p>\n
      the course of employment.                     Hence, the test, which has
\n      been laid down, is that whatever information can be<\/p>\n
      carried by the employee in his head, it may be used by
\n      him    after     his      contract       expires       or    in      his       business<\/p>\n
      thereafter        but          all     the      confidential             information
\n      including list of customers which cannot be verbatim<\/p>\n
      copied by the employee cannot be used by him to the
\n      detriment of his employer.                    This is on the footing that
\n      an employee owes a duty of fidelity to its employer not
\n      to disclose to others or to use for his own profit the<\/p>\n
      trade    secrets          or    confidential         information             which         he
\n      learns during the course of his employment.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    41. The implied terms in the contract of employment of the<\/p>\n
                                                             ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 16:19:37 :::<\/span>
\n                                               24                                              nm-4248<\/p>\n
          employee       resisting          giving        out       any         confidential
\n          information despite there being no express mention of<\/p>\n
          it in the contract is based on the law of confidence.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    42.    In the case of Saltman Engineering Coy. Ld., Ferotec
\n          Ltd. and Monarch Engineering Coy. (Mitcham), Ld. vs.<\/p>\n
          Campbell Engineering Coy., Ld., (1948) 65 R.P.C. 203,
\n          this    principle      has    been       enunciated         by      Lord        Justice
\n          Greene M.R. at page 215 thus:-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                  The information, to be confidential, must, I<\/p>\n
                 apprehend, apart from contract, have the necessary
\n                 quality of confidence about it, namely, it must
\n                 not be something which is public property and<\/p>\n
                 public knowledge. On the other hand, it is
\n                 perfectly possible to have a confidential
\n                 document, be it a formula, a plan, a sketch, or
\n                 something of that kind, which is the result of<\/p>\n
                 work done by the maker upon materials which may be
\n                 available for the use of anybody; but what makes<\/p>\n
                 it confidential is the fact that the maker of the
\n                 document has used his brain and thus produced a
\n                 result which can only be produced by somebody who
\n                 goes through the same process.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<\/blockquote>\n
In that case, the Plaintiffs were the owners of copyright
\nof certain drawings of tools for the manufacture of leather<\/p>\n
punches. The design was delivered by the Plaintiffs to the
\nDefendants          to   manufacture         tools.         There        was      an      implied
\ncondition          in    the     delivery          of    the    drawings             that         the
\nDefendants          would      not    use   such        drawings       for      others. The
\nPlaintiffs          alleged          that   the         Defendants         converted              the<\/p>\n
                                                                ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 16:19:37 :::<\/span>
\n                                          25                                         nm-4248<\/p>\n
drawings to their own use and infringed the copyright by
\nreproducing the same for their manufacturing purposes.                                    It<\/p>\n
was held that there was an implied term in the contract
\nthat drawings entrusted to the Defendants for the purpose<\/p>\n
of     such      contract     were    confidential.    The        obligation              of
\nconfidence was transposed to the Defendants by delivery of<\/p>\n
the drawings.          The Defendants knew that the drawings were
\nthe property of the Plaintiffs and they were given to the
\nDefendants only for the purpose of manufacturing of tools<\/p>\n
for the Plaintiffs.             Hence, it was held that the document
\nwould be confidential, if it is the result of the work done<\/p>\n
by its maker, even if matters on which he worked were
\nmatters of public domain and if the Defendants used it for<\/p>\n
any purpose other than what they were entrusted they had
\nbroken the obligation of confidence.               This was held to be a<\/p>\n
matter of confidence, even if it was not so stated in the
\ncontract because the law implies an obligation to treat<\/p>\n
such        confidential matters in a confidential way.                           Hence,
\nif         the   Defendants    used     that   information           directly             or<\/p>\n
indirectly without the express or implied consent of the
\nPlaintiffs, they would be guilty of an infringement of the
\nPlaintiffs         rights.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     43.    In the case of Terrapin Ltd. vs. Builders                    Supply Co.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
           (Hayes) Ld., Taylor Woodrow Ld., And Swiftplan Ld.,
\n           1960 R.P.D. 128, the law of confidence again came to be
\n           considered. That was an action to restrain misuse of<\/p>\n
                                                      ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 16:19:37 :::<\/span>
\n                                          26                                               nm-4248<\/p>\n
    information given by the Plaintiffs to the Defendants
\n    in     construction       of        portable           buildings              for         the<\/p>\n
    Plaintiffs.      The Plaintiffs marketed portable buildings
\n    initially called          Mark 24           and later improved their<\/p>\n
    technique      which     was    stressed              skin     technique              which
\n    provided a flat roof rendering the units much lighter<\/p>\n
    and thus easily transportable.                    The parties intended to
\n    enter into a contract for 5 years which broke down.
\n    The Defendants marketed a portable building called                                        S ,<\/p>\n
    the brochure of which showed the same features as those
\n    of   the     Plaintiffs. ig    It    was    held        following                 Saltman
\n    Engineering s case (supra) by Lord Evershed M.R. (Per
\n    Majority) that the Defendants could be restrained from<\/p>\n
    using the design of the portable building advertised by
\n    them    in    that     brochure.          The     Plaintiffs                case        that<\/p>\n
    information of the Plaintiffs                    design was used by the
\n    Defendants in breach of confidence in the production of<\/p>\n
    the Defendants         mobile building was                      considered from
\n    the evidence relating to the information given by the<\/p>\n
    Plaintiffs           representative               to         the          Defendants
\n    representative.          The     Court          had    to     see       whether           the
\n    information      so    given        was,    under        the       circumstances,
\n    confidential and whether that information was used by<\/p>\n
    the Defendants. Having answered these questions in the
\n    affirmative, the case for injunction against breach of
\n    confidence of the information provided was held to have
\n    been made out.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                                                            ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 16:19:37 :::<\/span><\/p>\n
                                          27                                              nm-4248<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
     44.    In a later case of Seager vs. Copydex, Ltd., 1967(2)<\/p>\n
           All England Report 415 (CA), the use of information
\n           obtained in confidence by committing breach of such<\/p>\n
           confidence came to be considered placing reliance upon
\n           the cases of Saltman Engineering and Terrapin Ltd. both<\/p>\n
           (supra). It was held (Per Lord Denning M.R.) that when
\n           the Defendant made use, albeit honestly of information
\n           which had been received in confidence which was not<\/p>\n
           available to the public, he was liable for breach of
\n           confidence, entitling the Plaintiff to damages.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
In that case the Plaintiff invented a carpet grip patented<\/p>\n
as         Klent . The Defendant was to market it. The parties
\nnegotiated. During the negotiations the Plaintiff disclosed<\/p>\n
to the Defendant the features of the                     Klent         grip as also
\nits idea for an alternative carpet grip with a                                  V        tang.\n<\/p>\n
The Defendant had desired to only market                      Klent          grip.         The
\nnegotiations broke down.               The Defendant made a carpet grip<\/p>\n
of its own but with spikes which would not infringe the
\nPlaintiff s         patent     embodying      in   it      the        idea          of     the
\nalternative grip of the            V     tang with the strong point and
\nnamed it          Invisigrip . The Plaintiff contended that that<\/p>\n
was        the   very   name   mentioned      by   the      Plaintiff               to     the
\nDefendant during the course of negotiations.                          The Defendant
\ncontended that the alternative grip was result of its own
\nidea and not derived from the information given by the<\/p>\n
                                                         ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 16:19:37 :::<\/span>
\n                                              28                                          nm-4248<\/p>\n
Plaintiff.          The co-incidences of making the grip led the
\nCourt       to    conclude      that    though       the   Defendant             may       have<\/p>\n
honestly believed that the alternative grip was his own
\nidea he must have unconsciously used the information given<\/p>\n
by    the    Plaintiff.          Relying          upon   the   decision            of      Lord
\nJustice Greene M.R. in Saltman Engineering s case (supra)<\/p>\n
that       confidential         information          directly        or        indirectly
\nobtained from the Plaintiff without the consent, express or
\nimplied of the Plaintiff would make the Defendant guilty of<\/p>\n
infringement of the Plaintiff s rights,                          it was held that
\nthe Defendant had breached the Plaintiff s confidence in<\/p>\n
obtaining that information.\n<\/p>\n
       45. Relying upon the decision in the case of Cranleigh
\n       Precision Engineering Co. Ltd. vs. Bryant, (1956) 3 All<\/p>\n
       England Report 301 holding that a person, who obtained
\n       information in confidence, is not allowed to use it as<\/p>\n
       a     springboard         for    activities         detrimental               to      the
\n       persons who made the confidential communication,                                        it<\/p>\n
       was       held    that    breach       of     confidential            information
\n       depended upon the broad principle of equity that he who
\n       receives         information     in        confidence      shall          not       take
\n       unfair advantage of it.\n<\/p>\n
Such common law doctrine would, therefore, apply even to
\nthe     information         which      has        been   published          or      can        be
\nascertained by the public. Such information cannot be used<\/p>\n
                                                           ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 16:19:37 :::<\/span>
\n                                         29                                          nm-4248<\/p>\n
to the prejudice of the person who gave it without the
\nconsent of that person.\n<\/p>\n
    46.    The   case    of   Seager    (supra)   considered              when        such<\/p>\n
          information is in part public and in part private. In
\n          that case the patent specification of the klent grip<\/p>\n
          was available to the public.            The information with
\n          regard to the alternative grip was private.                       When such
\n          information is mixed the recipient, it is held, must<\/p>\n
          take special care to use only the material which is in
\n          the public domain.     ig He should go to the public source
\n          and get it. He should not get a start over others by
\n          using the information which he received in confidence<\/p>\n
          and without paying for it. It was observed in that case
\n          that   the    Defendant      should   not     have         granted            the<\/p>\n
          alternative type of grip as quickly as they did except
\n          by what they had learnt in their discussion with the<\/p>\n
          Plaintiff.    They learnt that it was possible to make an
\n          alternative grip in the form of         V      tang and they were<\/p>\n
          told about the special shape required as well as its
\n          strength. It was held, following upon              Cranleigh s case
\n          (supra) that it was the springboard which enabled the
\n          Defendant     to    devise     Invisigrip        and        to       get        it<\/p>\n
          patented.     Hence, even though the Defendants did not
\n          infringe the Plaintiffs        patent, they were held to have
\n          infringed the confidential information they received
\n          under common law and that infringed the Plaintiffs<\/p>\n
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\n                                       30                                         nm-4248<\/p>\n
          rights.    The Defendants were held liable in damages for
\n          infringing the duty of confidence even though held not<\/p>\n
          to be dishonest and had only subconsciously reproduced
\n          the Plaintiffs     grip infringing the Plaintiffs                    common<\/p>\n
          law rights.\n<\/p>\n
    47.    In the further case of Coco v. A.N. Clark (Engineers)
\n          Ltd., (1969) 2 R.P.C. 41, the essential elements of a
\n          cause of action for breach of confidence were laid down<\/p>\n
          thus:-\n<\/p>\n
          (i) The information was of a confidential.\n<\/p>\n
          (ii) It was indicated in circumstances importing an
\n              obligation of confidence.\n<\/p>\n
          (iii) There was an authorised use of the information.\n<\/p>\n
In that case the Plaintiff designed a Moped engine and<\/p>\n
sought co-operation of the Defendants in its manufacturing.
\nThe       Plaintiff     disclosed   details   of   the     design          and       the
\nproposals of the manufacture to the Defendants. The parties
\nfell out and the Defendants manufactured their own engine.\n<\/p>\n
The Defendants           engine closing resembled the Plaintiff s
\ndesign.        The    Plaintiff     brought   an   action           before           the
\nDefendants could sell the product proposed by it to be
\nmanufactured.           Though an injunction did not come to be<\/p>\n
                                                   ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 16:19:37 :::<\/span>
\n                                   31                                          nm-4248<\/p>\n
granted, it was observed that the Plaintiff s remedy in
\ndamages remained.\n<\/p>\n
48. In   what   may   be   described   as   a   poetic        expression,<\/p>\n
    Megarry, J. described the equitable jurisdiction in
\n    cases of breach of confidence, as an ancient law,<\/p>\n
    thus:-\n<\/p>\n
                Confidence is the cousin of trust.\n<\/p>\n
He cited Sir Thomas More, Lord Chancellor thus:-\n<\/p>\n
           Three things are to be helpt in Conscience;\n<\/p>\n
           Fraud, Accident and things of Confidence.\n<\/p>\n
Again citing Lord Greene M.R. in Saltman Engineering s case<\/p>\n
(supra),     the   three     requirements       of      the         ambit           of
\nconfidential information was laid down at pages 47 and 48<\/p>\n
thus:-\n<\/p>\n
             the information must be of a confidential
\n           nature. As Lord Greene said in the Saltman case
\n           at page 215, something which is public property
\n           and public knowledge cannot per se provide any
\n           foundation for proceedings for breach of<\/p>\n
           confidence. However confidential the circumstances
\n           of communication, there can be no breach of
\n           confidence in revealing to others something which
\n           is already common knowledge. But this must not be
\n           taken too far. Something that has been constructed
\n           solely from materials in the public domain may
\n           possess the necessary quality of being by the<\/p>\n
                                                ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 16:19:37 :::<\/span>
\n                                32                                        nm-4248<\/p>\n
          application of the skill and ingenuity of the
\n          human brain. Novelty depends on the thing itself,
\n          and not upon the quality of its constituent parts.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          Indeed, often the more striking the novelty, the
\n          more commonplace its components.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
           The second requirement is that the information
\n          must have been communicated in circumstances
\n          importing an obligation of confidence. However<\/p>\n
          secret and confidential the information, there can
\n          be no binding obligation of confidence if that
\n          information is blurted out in public or is
\n          communicated in other circumstances which negative<\/p>\n
          any duty of holding it confidential.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
           Thirdly, there must be an unauthorised use of the
\n          information to the detriment of the person
\n          communicating it.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
49.    Public domain   is defined in Black s Law Dictionary,<\/p>\n
      Eighth Edition at page 1265 thus:-\n<\/p>\n
               When copyright, trademark, patent, or trade-
\n              secret rights are lost or expire, the
\n              intellectual property they had protected<\/p>\n
              becomes part of the public domain and can be
\n              appropriated by anyone without liability for
\n              infringement.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
               Public domain is the status of an invention,<\/p>\n
              creative work, commercial symbol, or any other
\n              creation that is not protected by any form of
\n              intellectual property. Public domain is the
\n              rule: intellectual property is the exception.
\n              J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and
\n              Unfair Competition 1.01[2], at 1-3 (3d ed.
\n              1996).\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                                           ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 16:19:37 :::<\/span><\/p>\n
                                         33                                           nm-4248\n\n\n\nLord    Megarry     observed     that    information         which         is      partly\n\n\n\n\n                                                                               \npublic       and   partly   private     may     pose   some        difficulty              as\nobserved by Lord Denning in Seager s case (supra).                               In that\n\n\n\n\n                                                       \n<\/pre>\n
case the Defendant would have to segregate the two; he
\nwould be free to use the former and must take no advantage<\/p>\n
of     the    latter.       He    must        not   use     the        confidential
\ncommunication as a          springboard        as observed in the case of
\nCranleigh s case (supra) and Seager s case (supra).\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
It would have to be seen in this case which part of what<\/p>\n
the    Plaintiff      disclosed    as        confidential        information               is
\ntruly so confidential as not to have been in the knowledge<\/p>\n
of the public or in public domain such that the Defendant
\ncould not have used it as a springboard either by himself,<\/p>\n
or     passed it on to those others with whom he proposed to
\nwork or already worked.\n<\/p>\n
       50. In the case of Universal Thermosensors Ltd. vs.<\/p>\n
       Hibben and others, 1992 (3) All England Law Reports 257
\n       at page 266, the test of what the employee can carry
\n       outside his employment and his work has been enunciated
\n       thus:-\n<\/p>\n
                  …. they were entitled to approach the
\n             plaintiff s customers, and seek and accept orders
\n             from them. Still further, they were entitled to
\n             use for their own purposes any information they
\n             carried in their heads regarding the identity of<\/p>\n
                                                       ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 16:19:37 :::<\/span>
\n                                  34                                          nm-4248<\/p>\n
        the plaintiff s customers, or customer contracts,
\n        or the nature of the customers product
\n        requirements, or the plaintiff s pricing policies,<\/p>\n
        provided they had acquired the information
\n        honestly in the ordinary course of their<\/p>\n
        employment and had not, for instance, deliberately
\n        sought to memorise lists of names for the purposes
\n        of their own business. What the defendants were
\n        not entitled to do was to steal documents<\/p>\n
        belonging to the plaintiff, or to use for their
\n        own purposes information, which can sensibly be
\n        regarded as confidential information, contained in
\n        such documents regarding the plaintiff s customers
\n        or customer contacts or customer requirements or<\/p>\n
        the prices charged. Nor were they entitled to
\n        copy such information onto scraps of paper and<\/p>\n
        take these away and then use the information in
\n        their own business.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    51. In the case of Rivendell Forest Products Ltd. vs.
\n    Georgia-Pacific Corporation and Timothy L. Cornwell, 31<\/p>\n
    U.S.P.Q.2d 1472, the United States of Court of Appeals,<\/p>\n
    Tenth Circuit, considered a wrongful appropriation of a
\n    trade secret.    In that case the Defendant was employed
\n    by the Plaintiff, who had lumber business as a                         reload<\/p>\n
    wholesaler .     The Plaintiff had designed a computer
\n    software    system   developed     over   the      years         which         it
\n    asserted was a trade secret under Colorado Law.                                It<\/p>\n
    enabled the Plaintiff to provide its customers with
\n    special    service   to   manage   its    distribution               centres
\n    which other competitors did not have. By virtue of the
\n    system, the Plaintiff s employees could give immediate
\n    answers to customers       questions on phone inquiries as<\/p>\n
                                               ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 16:19:37 :::<\/span>
\n                                    35                                           nm-4248<\/p>\n
    to   prices,   quantities,     places       and   delivery            for       the
\n    various lumber sizes to be delivered.                  The Plaintiff s<\/p>\n
    employee the Defendant had learnt about the software
\n    system though he had not developed it.                     He leaked the<\/p>\n
    information    relating   to        the   software      system          to      the
\n    competitor against whom also the action was brought.\n<\/p>\n
    The Plaintiff alleged infringement of its trade secret
\n    under the Colorado s Trade Secrets Act, which defined
\n    trade secret thus:-\n<\/p>\n
                Trade secret means the whole or any<\/p>\n
             portion or phase of any scientific or
\n             technical information, design, process,
\n             procedure, formula, improvement, confidential<\/p>\n
             business or financial information, listing of
\n             names, addresses, or telephone numbers, or
\n             other information relating to any business or
\n             profession which is secret and of value. To<\/p>\n
             be a trade secret the owner thereof must
\n             have taken measures to prevent the secret from<\/p>\n
             becoming available to persons other than those
\n             selected by the owner to have access thereto
\n             for limited purposes.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Quoting from the earlier decision in Kodekey Electronics,
\nInc. vs. Mechanex Corp., 486 F. 2d 449 (10th Cir.1973), it
\nwas observed thus:\n<\/p>\n
          a trade secret consists of any formula, patent,
\n         device, plan, or compilation of information which
\n         is used in one s business, and which gives him an
\n         opportunity to obtain an advantage over
\n         competitors who do not know it.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                                                  ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 16:19:37 :::<\/span><\/p>\n
                                      36                                            nm-4248<\/p>\n
            In that case we also noted that generally just
\n            what constitutes a trade secret under the above<\/p>\n
            definition is a question of fact for the trial
\n            court.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Considering these definitions, the elements which could be
\nidentified as a trade secret, although the exact definition<\/p>\n
may   not    be    possible,   was    laid    down      as       the       following
\nfactors:-\n<\/p>\n
      (1) The extent to which the information is known
\n            outside the business.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      (2) The extent to which it is known to those inside
\n            the business i.e. by the employees.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      (3) The precautions taken by the holder of the trade<\/p>\n
            secret to guard the secrecy of the information.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      (4) The savings effected and the value to the holder
\n            in having the information as against competitors.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      (5) The amount of effort or money expended in
\n            obtaining and developing the information; and<\/p>\n
      (6) The amount of time and expense it would take for
\n            others to acquire and duplicate the information.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Drawing     from   Kodekey s   case       (supra),     it      was       held        that<\/p>\n
                                                     ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 16:19:37 :::<\/span>
\n                                         37                                              nm-4248<\/p>\n
novelty and intention were not elements required in                                     trade
\nsecret doctrines. But a computer software was protected<\/p>\n
under the typical trade secret statutes and doctrine. (30
\nGeo. Wash Law Rev. 909)<\/p>\n
It was observed that a computer software system of the<\/p>\n
Plaintiff took nine years to develop at a cost of nearly a
\nmillion dollars.            The employee Defendant knew it well and
\nhad    a   significant       role   although        he    was     not       a     computer<\/p>\n
expert.         He was contacted by the Defendant and was later
\nhired      by   the    Defendant ig who      was    the     competitor              of      the
\nPlaintiff to develop a new computer software system for the
\ncompetitor.             Upon     its      development            the          competitor<\/p>\n
consolidated its entire distribution division of about 100
\ndistribution          centres   which     was      not    done      before.               Upon<\/p>\n
consolidation itself the employees was offered the task to
\ndevelop the system. The Plaintiff s system                              was the only<\/p>\n
one which        one its employee was familiar with and was the
\nonly    one     in    the   industry    which      could      provide           immediate<\/p>\n
answers on all aspects of the customers                            need. Upon the
\nfact that employee left the Plaintiff s services and joined
\na competitor and very soon the competitor had a software
\nsystem developed which was for all practical purposes the<\/p>\n
same as the one which was developed by the Plaintiff,                                         it
\nwas held that there could be breach of confidence which had
\nto be ascertained in evidence of the parties.\n<\/p>\n
                                                          ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 16:19:37 :::<\/span><\/p>\n
                               38                                       nm-4248<\/p>\n
52. Of course, the procedure of summary judgments in
\n    civil     practice followed in the U.S. by the Trial<\/p>\n
    Judge was held not applicable in a case such as this in
\n    which oral evidence would be required of the breach of<\/p>\n
    confidence and of handing out confidential information.
\n    Since the Plaintiff s system was the only one in the<\/p>\n
    industry but later his competitor had developed such a
\n    system,   the information let out was held to be a trade
\n    secret which included even the elements which were<\/p>\n
    otherwise in public domain.      It was held that trade
\n    secret could consist of a combination of elements,<\/p>\n
    characteristics and components which were in public
\n    domain.    It was observed     The protection is merely<\/p>\n
    against breach of faith and reprehensible means of
\n    learning another s secret.\n<\/p>\n
In this case, e-mailing the manual as a dot.doc document of<\/p>\n
the software purchased by the Plaintiff at the cost of Rs.
\n93 Lakhs would be a matter impliedly within the ambit of<\/p>\n
confidence in the Plaintiff s Corporation.              The officers
\nincluding the Defendant who knew of this software, even
\nwithout an express clause in their employment agreement or
\nin the employees   Code of Ethics, were enjoined not to part<\/p>\n
with the information.    Though the original software itself
\nmay be kept by the Plaintiff in its safe custody, the
\nmanual showing the use of the software was confidential
\ninformation which could not have been parted with.                    It is<\/p>\n
                                         ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 16:19:37 :::<\/span>
\n                                              39                                           nm-4248<\/p>\n
not in issue that it was.                 What is in issue is only whether
\nit would tantamount to confidential information.                                     In fact<\/p>\n
the definition of trade secret enunciated above shows that
\nit would be confidential information and not within public<\/p>\n
domain.\n<\/p>\n
    53. What would be in public domain, therefore, must be
\n          understood to conceptualise what the Defendant may give
\n          away as matters already in the knowledge of the public<\/p>\n
          and in which there is nothing confidential.                              The list
\n          of confidential matters enumerated in paragraph 17 of<\/p>\n
          the Plaint indeed shows what competitors in real estate
\n          field would have knowledge of and what they would use<\/p>\n
          and    require     just    as   much      as    the     Plaintiff             would.
\n          Information       relating      to       strategic       business             plans,<\/p>\n
          product mix, square footage of construction, capital
\n          expenditure or revenue budgets cannot be claimed to be<\/p>\n
          matters      of   any    confidential          nature     which         no      other
\n          competitor would know.\n<\/p>\n
    54.    A similar case was considered by this Court in the
\n          case    of    Star      India   Private         Limited        vs.        Laxmiraj
\n          Seetharam Nayak &<\/a> anr., 2003 (3) Bom. C.R. 563.                                     The<\/p>\n
          Plaintiff was in the business of acquiring copyright in
\n          cinematographic           films.        Upon     resignation              of        its
\n          employee, the Plaintiff sought an order restraining him
\n          inter alia from divulging the confidential information<\/p>\n
                                                            ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 16:19:37 :::<\/span>
\n                                              40                                              nm-4248<\/p>\n
          and     trade    secret     and         knowledge        relating             to       the
\n          Plaintiff s business including the Plaintiff s business<\/p>\n
          plans,     strategies,        marketing          policies,               franchisee
\n          agreements,      affiliates        \/    joint    ventures,              etc.           The<\/p>\n
          Plaintiff       itemised    the        so-called       trade         secrets           and
\n          confidential       information.          It    was     observed            that        the<\/p>\n
          itemised list exhibited to the Plaint did not show any
\n          trade    secret    or   confidential           information.                  All       the
\n          items    were     within     the       knowledge        of      the        concerned<\/p>\n
          persons. Anyone in any employment for some period would
\n          know certain facts which would come to his knowledge<\/p>\n
          without any special effort.                   It would be openly known
\n          information as the rates of advertisement which were in<\/p>\n
          public domain and every businessman generally knows the
\n          rates of his rivals.              These were observed to be not<\/p>\n
          even     open secrets .       It was observed that mere use of
\n          the     word     strategy,         policy       decisions             or       crucial<\/p>\n
          policies        did not give            them character of secrecy.
\n          These items are well-known to the personal of the sales<\/p>\n
          department. They could be anticipated by a prudent and
\n          clever businessman in the field.\n<\/p>\n
    55.     In     that    case      when     the       Court      called            upon        the<\/p>\n
          Plaintiff s Counsel to illustrate even one item of the
\n          trade secret which the Defendant had acquired during
\n          the course of his employment, it was not illustrated on
\n          the premise that it could not be revealed or disclosed.\n<\/p>\n
                                                               ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 16:19:37 :::<\/span><\/p>\n
                                            41                                             nm-4248<\/p>\n
      It was held that parties, contract rates and other
\n      items and conditions could not be called trade secrets.\n<\/p>\n
      Every player in the field of his game knows the rules
\n      of the game and the strategies of the rivals. Such<\/p>\n
      things could not be called trade secrets.                             At best they
\n      could       be   called     the   human        skills       acquired            by      the<\/p>\n
      concerned persons in the field.                      Such skill could not
\n      be called a proprietary right of the Plaintiff-Company.
\n      The skill which was acquired by the 1st Defendant was<\/p>\n
      by    his    own   virtue     which       he   had    developed             with        his
\n      personality, with his inherent qualities and with his<\/p>\n
      hard    work       and    experience.            He      had       acquired             the
\n      refinement and polish over his skill by experience.                                       He<\/p>\n
      was not paid the sumptuous remuneration on account of
\n      his knowledge of some trade secrets or the confidential<\/p>\n
      information. Acquisition of excellence was a very long
\n      process in the career of every one. No one else could<\/p>\n
      have proprietary rights or interest in such acquisition
\n      of excellence.            Such excellence could not be acquired<\/p>\n
      merely by possessing a trade secret of any one.\n<\/p>\n
    56. The striking illustration given by the Court was of a
\n      salesman who left the Company much like a heart surgeon<\/p>\n
      who    left      the     hospital.        Neither     of      these         could         be
\n      prevented from performing a surgery or negotiating with
\n      the customers on the premise that they acquired the
\n      skill by experience and those skills can be carried<\/p>\n
                                                            ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 16:19:37 :::<\/span>
\n                                    42                                       nm-4248<\/p>\n
          with the employee.   It has been observed thus:-\n<\/p>\n
                 He learns from the experience how to talk with
\n                the different people differently and how to<\/p>\n
                canvas for the sale of the product successfully.
\n                He knows the selling points of a particular
\n                product by experience.     He acquires good and
\n                sweet tongue if he is a salesman dealing with<\/p>\n
                the female folks for the products required by
\n                them.    He learns the art of tackling the
\n                illiterate people. He comes to know how to deal
\n                with the old and aged people.      He knows the
\n                quality of his products. He knows the rates. He<\/p>\n
                might perhaps also be knowing the cost of the
\n                products and the profit margin of the employer.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                All these factors cannot be called trade
\n                secrets.   As disclosed by the 1st defendant in
\n                his detailed affidavit on the basis of the<\/p>\n
                documentary evidence it cannot be said that the
\n                advertising business of the plaintiff wholly
\n                depended on any trade secret or confidential
\n                information as repeatedly and rightly submitted<\/p>\n
                by Shri Sibal that the business of advertisement
\n                depended on the popularity of the serial and the<\/p>\n
                programme time during which the serial was
\n                displayed. There is no secret in such business
\n                which can attract the shackles stipulated in
\n                Clause 12 of the contract.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    57. This would apply to the injunction sought by the
\n          Plaintiff with regard to the enumeration in paragraph<\/p>\n
          17 of the Plaint which the Plaintiff, under the guise
\n          of its confidentiality, seeks to prevent from being
\n          disclosed to others.\n<\/p>\n
    58.    However, the injunction with regard to the use of the<\/p>\n
                                              ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 16:19:37 :::<\/span>
\n                                    43                                         nm-4248<\/p>\n
    software by keeping and understanding the manual is
\n    quite   another    matter.      This    would     fall        within          the<\/p>\n
    mischief of the common law relating to confidential
\n    information as held in the case of BLB Institute of<\/p>\n
    Financial Markets Ltd. vs. Ramakar Jha, 2008 (4) Arb.
\n    LR 12 (Delhi). The employee of the institution who had<\/p>\n
    himself developed business strategies for the Plaintiff
\n    institution threatened to use it for his own purpose or
\n    other authors.      The Plaintiff acquired rights in what<\/p>\n
    was developed by its employee by virtue of granting its
\n    employee a huge salary and perquisites which were from<\/p>\n
    time to time increased under the agreement with the
\n    employee for not parting with information during the<\/p>\n
    period of his employment contract.             During such period
\n    itself the employee threatened and ultimately resigned<\/p>\n
    and was about to join the employment of another and
\n    divulge the proprietary confidential information which<\/p>\n
    was by way of study materials and handouts of different
\n    specialised course which the Plaintiff institution ran<\/p>\n
    as   Post    Graduate       Diploma    Courses.         The         negative
\n    convenant in the employment contract was allowed to be
\n    enforced under Section 27 of the Contract Act.                                The
\n    service contract was held to be a contract of trust and<\/p>\n
    faith and the material resources and infrastructure, it
\n    was held, cannot be allowed to be used by a rival
\n    through     the   conduct      of     the   employee              divulging
\n    confidential      systems     developed     and        used          by       the<\/p>\n
                                                ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 16:19:37 :::<\/span>
\n                                           44                                           nm-4248<\/p>\n
       Plaintiff during the course of its employees service
\n       agreement.        It was held, placing reliance upon Zee<\/p>\n
       Telefilms Ltd. & anr. vs. Sundial Communications Pvt.
\n       Ltd. & ors., 2003 (27) PTC 457 (Bom.) (DB) = 2003(5)<\/p>\n
       BCR 404 in which it was held at page 409 that the right
\n       to    restrain         the    publication        of       a       work          using<\/p>\n
       confidential information is a broader right than the
\n       proprietary       right      of   copyright,      though          the       law       of
\n       confidence is different from the law of copyright. It<\/p>\n
       held that a breach of good faith in publishing an idea
\n       or information acquired by a person in confidence could<\/p>\n
       be restrained by an injunction if it has not become
\n       public knowledge otherwise.\n<\/p>\n
Upon investment by the institute to the tune of more than<\/p>\n
Rs.100 Lakhs in launching an individual curriculum, setting
\nup    of    the   art    infrastructure,        it     was   held        that        though<\/p>\n
stricto      senso      the    Plaintiff        did    not      have         copyright,
\ndivulging the Plaintiff s business to its rival would cause<\/p>\n
it    irreparable        injury     which      could    be     prevented             by      an
\ninjunction upon breach of the Plaintiff s confidence.\n<\/p>\n
     59. Taking a holistic view of the scenario that emerges<\/p>\n
       from a reading of all the aforesaid judgments spanning
\n       the last half century of the common law of confidence
\n       analogous        to    the    contractual         obligation               of       the
\n       Defendant, the Plaintiff s case of injunction sought in<\/p>\n
                                                         ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 16:19:37 :::<\/span>
\n                                          45                                             nm-4248<\/p>\n
      respect of the manual of the Plaintiff s software and
\n      in    respect    of   the    most       of   itemised         intangible              and<\/p>\n
      incorporeal       rights       would         have        been           considered
\n      differently.\n<\/p>\n
    60. The Plaintiff has a proprietary right in the manual<\/p>\n
      of customised software sent by the Defendant to the
\n      officers of DD, however, remains at large.                             Even if DD
\n      does    not     misuse      that    e-mail,      the         fact        that         the<\/p>\n
      Defendant had its custody, its future misuse cannot be
\n      ruled out and rather can be anticipated given his past<\/p>\n
      conduct. The competitors using or developing their real
\n      estate business plans and strategies identical to those<\/p>\n
      of the Plaintiff as reflected in the manual e-mailed by
\n      the    Defendant      to    them    would      cause         damage           to      the<\/p>\n
      Plaintiff using such software assisted by the manual
\n      provided by the Plaintiff. However, the                        case which the<\/p>\n
      Plaintiff       disclosed      in        its    business              plans           and
\n      strategies or its product mix and its budgets cannot be<\/p>\n
      on par.\n<\/p>\n
    61. Though the Defendant has exhibited himself as a man
\n      of No-Confidence, who has proved to be untrustworthy<\/p>\n
      and disloyal, the Plaintiff s case stretched to the
\n      Plaintiff s decisions or plans with regard to the real
\n      estate business, its expenditure or the decisions of
\n      the extent of the construction are not matters which<\/p>\n
                                                          ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 16:19:37 :::<\/span>
\n                                       46                                             nm-4248<\/p>\n
      are   even   prima    facie    shown      by   the      Plaintiff             to     be
\n      copyable     products     as     the        Plaintiff s              customised<\/p>\n
      software except, of course, documents such as the MOU
\n      relating to the Goa Project of the Plaintiff shown<\/p>\n
      above which are sought to verbatim copied. Though the
\n      Defendant    who     attended    the      Board       meetings             of      the<\/p>\n
      Company from time to time, minutes of which are shown
\n      to the Court, would have amassed the information and
\n      knowledge    with    regard     to    the      Plaintiff s             plans         of<\/p>\n
      operation,    the     Defendant       cannot      be      injuncted              from
\n      disclosing    those     plans,
\n                             ig            if   any,     to      the       competitor
\n      except for what would cause injury or damage to the
\n      Plaintiff by such disclosure alone, if he carried them<\/p>\n
       in his head . The competitors in the real estate,
\n      which is a fiercely competitive market, cannot be taken<\/p>\n
      to be driven by the Defendant s disclosure alone.\n<\/p>\n
    62. Hence, the following order:-\n<\/p>\n
                                ORDER<\/p>\n
    (i)The Defendant shall not, in any manner, divulge or
\n      hand over the confidential information contained in the<\/p>\n
      manual of the software attached to the E-mail of the
\n      Defendant dated 15.12.2007 as also the Memorandum of
\n      Understanding attached to the Defendant s E-mail dated
\n      21.2.2008 relating to the Goa property of the Plaintiff<\/p>\n
                                                       ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 16:19:37 :::<\/span>
\n                                  47                                         nm-4248<\/p>\n
      to any person or Company or any of the Plaintiff s
\n      competitors or utilise the same for the Defendant s own<\/p>\n
      use in any manner whatsoever.\n<\/p>\n
    (ii)   There   shall   be   no    order   in    respect            of       the
\n      particulars of the information contained in paragraph<\/p>\n
      17 of the Plaint.\n<\/p>\n
    (iii) Prayer (b) is refused.          However, the Plaintiff<\/p>\n
      shall be entitled to separately sue in respect of the
\n      said prayer and apply for relief in that Suit.\n<\/p>\n
    (iv)The Notice of Motion is disposed of.\n<\/p>\n
    (v)No order as to costs.\n<\/p>\n
      The ad-interim order, if any, shall continue for 2<\/p>\n
weeks.\n<\/p>\n
                                          (SMT.ROSHAN DALVI, J.)<\/p>\n
                                              ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 16:19:37 :::<\/span>\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Bombay High Court Bombay Dyeing And Manufacturing … vs Mehar Karan Singh on 24 August, 2010 Bench: R. S. Dalvi 1 nm-4248 PGK IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION Notice of Motion No.4248 of 2008 IN Suit No.3313 of 2008 Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co.Ltd. … Plaintiff v\/s. Mehar […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[11,8],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-229408","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bombay-high-court","category-high-court"],"yoast_head":"\nBombay Dyeing And Manufacturing ... vs Mehar Karan Singh on 24 August, 2010 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/bombay-dyeing-and-manufacturing-vs-mehar-karan-singh-on-24-august-2010\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Bombay Dyeing And Manufacturing ... vs Mehar Karan Singh on 24 August, 2010 - 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