{"id":234186,"date":"1959-01-20T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1959-01-19T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/gopi-chand-vs-the-delhi-administration-on-20-january-1959"},"modified":"2018-08-06T04:04:34","modified_gmt":"2018-08-05T22:34:34","slug":"gopi-chand-vs-the-delhi-administration-on-20-january-1959","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/gopi-chand-vs-the-delhi-administration-on-20-january-1959","title":{"rendered":"Gopi Chand vs The Delhi Administration on 20 January, 1959"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Gopi Chand vs The Delhi Administration on 20 January, 1959<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1959 AIR 609, \t\t 1959 SCR Supl. (2) 87<\/div>\n
Author: P Gajendragadkar<\/div>\n
Bench: Das, Sudhi Ranjan (Cj), Das, S.K., Gajendragadkar, P.B., Wanchoo, K.N., Hidayatullah, M.<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nGOPI CHAND\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nTHE DELHI ADMINISTRATION\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT:\n20\/01\/1959\n\nBENCH:\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.\nBENCH:\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.\nDAS, SUDHI RANJAN (CJ)\nDAS, S.K.\nWANCHOO, K.N.\nHIDAYATULLAH, M.\n\nCITATION:\n 1959 AIR  609\t\t  1959 SCR  Supl. (2)  87\n CITATOR INFO :\n D\t    1960 SC 457\t (18,39)\n R\t    1976 SC 714\t (81)\n RF\t    1977 SC1884\t (12)\n RF\t    1991 SC1117\t (11)\n\n\nACT:\n       Criminal Trial--Temporary enactment--Provision for trial\t of\n       specified  offences  under  summons  procedure  in  notified\n       areas--Constitutional validity--Applicability to Proceedings\n       Pending\t on   expiry  of   enactment--Absence\tof   saving\n       provision--East\tPunjab Public Safety Act, 1949 (Punj. 5\t of\n       1949), ss. 36(1), 20--Constitution of India, Art.14--General\n       Clauses Act, 1879 (10 of 1879), s. 6.\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\nSection\t 36(1) of the East Punjab Public Safety\t Act,  1949,\n(Punj.\t5  Of  1949), which was passed in the  wake  of\t the\npartition disturbances in India with a view to ensure public\nsafety\tand the maintenance of public order,  provided\tthat\noffences  mentioned  therein  land  committed  in  the\tarea\ndeclared to be dangerously disturbed under S. 20 Of the Act,\nshould\tbe tried under the summons procedure  prescribed  by\nCh.   XX  of the Code of Criminal Procedure.  By  the  first\nnotification issued under s. 2o of the Act, the whole of the\nProvince of Delhi was declared to be a dangerously disturbed\narea;  subsequently  the second\t notification  purported  to\ncancel\tthe  first.  The third notification then  sought  to\nmodify the second by inserting into it the words \"except  as\nrespect\t things\t done  or omitted to  be  done\tbefore\tthis\nnotification  \".  The fourth and  last\tnotification  issued\nunder  s.  36(1)  of  the Act  sought  to  save\t proceedings\nthereunder  pending  after  the cancellation  of  the  first\nnotification.\tThe  appellant who was put up for  trial  in\nthree  cases  for  offences  ordinarily\t triable  under\t the\nwarrant\t procedure,  was tried under the  summons  procedure\naccording to s. 36(1) of the Act and the first\tnotification\nand  the trials were continued even after the expiry of\t the\nAct  in respect of substantial parts of them under the\tsame\nprocedure and ended in his conviction which was affirmed  by\nthe  High Court in appeal.  The Act was a temporary Act\t and\ncontained no provision saving pending proceedings.  'It\t was\ncontended on behalf of the appellant that the first part  of\nS.  36(1)  of the Act in treating the disturbed areas  as  a\nclass  by themselves and providing a uniform  procedure\t for\nthe  trial  of specified offences violated Art.\t 14  Of\t the\nConstitution  and that the continuance of the  trials  under\nthe  summons procedure even after the expiry of the Act\t was\ninvalid.\nHeld,\tthat   the  two\t tests\tof  the\t validity   of\t the\nclassification\tmade by the Legislature were, (1)  that\t the\nclassification must be based on an intelligible\t differentia\nand  (2) that this differentia must be reasonably  connected\nwith  the  object of the legislation.\tThus  tested,  there\ncould\tbe  no\tdoubt,\tin  the\t present  case,\t  that\t the\nclassification on a geographical basis made by the impugned\n88\nAct between areas that were dangerously disturbed and  other\nareas,\tin  the interest of speedy trial  of  offences,\t was\nperfectly justified.\nRam Krishna Dalmia v. justice Tendolkar, [1959] S.C.R.\t279,\nrelied on.\nLachmandas  Kewalram  Ahuja v. The State of  Bombay,<\/a>  [1952]\nS.C.R. 710, held inapplicable.\nBut since the impugned Act was a temporary Act and contained\nno  appropriate\t provision  saving  the\t summons   procedure\nprescribed by it, that procedure could not, on the expiry of\nthe Act,  apply to the cases pending against the  appellant.\nKrishnan  v. The State of Madras,<\/a> [1951] S.C.R. 621,  relied\non.\nWicks v. Director of Public Prosecutions,    [1947]\tA.C.\n362, referred to.\nThe  third and the fourth notifications, obviously  intended\nto  cure the absence of a saving provision in the Act,\twere\n'wholly\t outside the authority conferred on the delegate  by\ns. 2o or s. 36(1) of the Act and must be held to be invalid.\nWith  the issue of the second notification,  therefore,\t the\nentire\tprovince  of  Delhi  ceased  to\t be  a\t dangerously\ndisturbed area.\nIt was erroneous to apply by analogy the provisions of s.  6\nof the General Clauses Act to cases governed by a  temporary\nAct, such as the one in question, which did not contain\t the\nappropriate  saving  provision and contend  that  since\t the\ntrials\thad commenced validly, their continuance  under\t the\nsame  procedure\t even after the declaration  had  ceased  to\noperate\t and  subsequent orders of conviction  and  sentence\npassed therein were valid as well.\nSrinivasachari\tv.  The\t Queen, (1883) I.L.R.  6  Mad.\t336,\nMukund\tv.  Ladu,  (1901) 3 Bom.  L.R. 584  and\t Gardner  v.\nLucas, (1878) 3 A.C. 582, held inapplicable.\nRam  Singh  v. The Crown, A.I.R. 1950 East Punjab  25,\tdis-\napproved.\nSyed  Qasim Razvi v. The State of Hyderabad,<\/a>  [1953]  S.C.R.\n589, referred to and distinguished.\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeals Nos. 25-27
\nof 1955.\n<\/p>\n
Appeals from the judgments and order dated February 1, 1955,
\nof  the\t Punjab\t High Court (Circuit Bench),  Delhi  in\t Cr.
\nAppeals\t Nos. 5-D, 6-D and 13-D of 1952, arising out of\t the
\njudgments  and\torders dated December 22, 1951, of  the\t 1st
\nClass  Magistrate, New Delhi in Criminal Cases\tNos.  220\/2,
\n221\/2 and 223\/2 of 1949.\n<\/p>\n
89<\/span><\/p>\n
Ram Lal Anand and S. N. Anand, for the appellant.
\nH. J. Umrigar and T. M. Sen, for the respondent.
\n1959.  January 20.  The Judgment of the Court was  delivered
\nby
\nGAJENDRAGADKAR J.-These three appeals have, been filed\twith
\ncertificates granted by the High Court of Punjab under\tArt.
\n134(1)\t(c)  of the Constitution and they arise\t from  three
\ncriminal  cases filed against the appellant.  The  appellant
\nGopi  Chand  was the chief cashier, and Hukam Chand  was  an
\nassistant  cashier, in the United Commercial Bank Ltd.,\t New
\nDelhi.\t They were charged with the commission\tof  offences
\nunder s. 409 in three separate cases.  In the first case No.
\n223\/2  of  1949, the prosecution case was that on  or  about
\nApril  8,  1948, both had agreed to commit, or cause  to  be
\ncommitted, criminal breach of trust in respect of the  funds
\nof  the Bank where they were employed; and in  pursuance  of
\nthe  said  agreement they had committed criminal  breach  of
\ntrust in respect of the total amount of Rs. 1,65,000.\tThey
\nwere thus charged under ss. 408, 409 and 120B of the  Indian
\nPenal  Code.   The appellant was convicted  of\tthe  offence
\nunder  s.  409 read with s. 120 and  sentenced\tto  rigorous
\nimprisonment  for  seven  years.   Against  this  order\t  of
\nconviction  and sentence he preferred an appeal to the\tHigh
\nCourt of Punjab (No. 5-D of 1952).  The High Court confirmed
\nhis  conviction but altered the sentence imposed on  him  by
\ndirecting  that\t he  should  suffer  four  year’s   rigorous
\nimprisonment  and  pay a fine of Rs. 10,000  or\t in  default
\nsuffer rigorous imprisonment for fifteen months.  The  order
\nof  conviction\tand  sentence  thus  passed  gives  rise  to
\nCriminal Appeal No. 25 of 1955 in this Court.
\nIn  the\t second case (No. 221\/2 of 1949) the  appellant\t was
\ncharged\t with having committed an offence under ss. 408\t and
\n409  of\t the  Indian Penal Code in  that  he  had  committed
\ncriminal  breach  of trust in respect of an  amount  of\t Rs.
\n23,772-8-6.   The trial magistrate ,convicted the  appellant
\nof  the\t said offence and sentenced him to  suffer  rigorous
\nimprisonment for five years.\n<\/p>\n
12<\/span>
\n90<\/span><\/p>\n
On  appeal  (No. 6-D of 1952) the order\t of  conviction\t was
\nconfirmed  but\tthe sentence imposed on him was\t reduced  to
\nthree  years’ rigorous imprisonment.  This order  has  given
\nrise to Criminal Appeal No. 26 of 1955
\nin this Court.\n<\/p>\n
In  the third case (No. 220\/2 of 1949) the appellant,  Hukam
\nChand and Ganga Dayal were charged with having committed  an
\noffence\t under\ts. 409\/408 read with s. 120B of\t the  Indian
\nPenal Code in that all of them had agreed to commit criminal
\nbreach\tof  trust  in  respect of  the\tsum  of\t Rs.  10,000
\nbelonging  to  the Bank and that in pursuance  of  the\tsaid
\nagreement they had committed the criminal breach of trust in
\nrespect of the said amount.  The trial magistrate  convicted
\nthe  appellant of the offence charged and sentenced  him  to
\nfour  year’s rigorous imprisonment.  On appeal (No. 13-D  of
\n1952)  the High Court confirmed the conviction\tbut  reduced
\nthe sentence to two years’ rigorous imprisonment.  From this
\norder arises Criminal Appeal No. 27 of 1955 in this Court.
\nThe appellant has obtained a certificate from the High Court
\nunder  Art. 134(1) (c) of the Constitution because he  seeks
\nto  challenge  the validity of the order of  conviction\t and
\nsentence passe against him in the three cases on the  ground
\nthat  the  proceedings in all the said cases are  void.\t  He
\ncontends that, whereas the charges framed against him had to
\nbe tried according to the procedure prescribed for the trial
\nof warrant cases, the learned trial magistrate tried all the
\ncases according to the procedure prescribed for the trial of
\nsummons\t cases\tand  that makes\t void  all  the\t proceedings
\nincluding the final orders of conviction and the sentences.
\nThe point arises in this way.  The East Punjab Public Safety
\nAct,  1949  (Punj. 5 of 1949), hereinafter called  the\tAct,
\nwhich  came  into  force on March 29, 1949,  was  passed  to
\nprovide\t for  special measures to ensure public\t safety\t and
\nmaintenance  of public order.  It is common ground that\t the
\noffences with which the appellant was charged would normally
\nhave to be tried under the procedure prescribed by ch.\t XXI
\nof the Code of Criminal Procedure for the trial of warrant
\n91<\/span>
\ncases  but in fact they have been tried under the  procedure
\nprescribed  by ch.  XX for the trial of summons cases.\t The
\nsummons procedure differs from the warrant procedure in some
\nmaterial points.  Under the former procedure a charge is not
\nto  be\tframed\twhile under the latter a charge\t has  to  be
\nframed\tunder  s.  254 of the Code.   Similarly\t an  accused
\nperson\t gets(\tonly  one  chance  of  cross-examining\t the
\nprosecution  witnesses under the summons  procedure  whereas
\nunder the warrant procedure he is entitled to  cross-examine
\nthe  said  witnesses twice, once before the framing  of\t the
\ncharge and again after the charge is framed.  The  appellant
\nconcedes that the cases against him were tried according  to
\nthe summons procedure by reason of s. 36 of the Act and\t the
\nnotification  issued  under  it; but be\t contends  that\t the
\nrelevant  provisions  of  the Act are  ultra  vires  and  he
\nalternatively  argues that the proceedings in respect  of  a
\nsubstantial part were continued under the summons  procedure
\neven   after   the  Act\t had  expired\tand   the   relevant
\nnotifications  had ceased to be operative.  That is how\t the
\nvalidity  of the trial and of the orders of  conviction\t and
\nsentence is challenged by the appellant.\n<\/p>\n
It would be relevant at this stage to refer to the  material
\nprovisions of the Act and the relevant notifications  issued
\nunder  it.  The Act came into force on March 29,  1949.\t  It
\nwas passed to provide for special measures to ensure  public
\nsafety and maintenance of public order.\t Section’ 36 of\t the
\nAct  prescribes\t the procedure for the\ttrial  of  specified
\noffences;  under sub-s. (1) all offences under this  Act  or
\nunder  any  other  law\tfor the time being  in\tforce  in  a
\ndangerously  disturbed\tarea,  and in  any  other  area\t all
\noffences  under\t this Act and any other\t offence  under\t any
\nother law which the Provincial Government may certify to  be
\ntriable\t under\tthis  Act,  shall be  tried  by\t the  courts
\naccording to the procedure prescribed by the Code,  provided
\nthat in all cases the procedure prescribed for the trial  of
\nsummons\t cases\tby  ch.\t XX of the Code\t shall\tbe  adopted,
\nsubject, in the case of summary trials, to the provisions of
\nss. 263 to 265 of the Code.  For the avoidance of doubt sub-
\ns. (2) provided that
\n92<\/span>
\nthe  provisions\t of sub-s. (1) shall apply to the  trial  of
\noffences   mentioned  therein  committed  before  the\tcom-
\nmencement  of this Act, and in a dangerously disturbed\tarea
\ncommitted  before the date of the notification under s.\t 20,
\nin respect of it.  Under s. 20 the Provincial Government  is
\nauthorised by notification to declare that the whole or\t any
\npart of the Province as may be specified in the notification
\nto be a dangerously disturbed area.\n<\/p>\n
Four  notifications were issued under s. 20.  By  the  first
\nnotification  issued  on  July 8, 1949,\t the  whole  of\t the
\nProvince of Delhi was declared to be a dangerously disturbed
\narea  by  the  competent  authority.   It  appears  that  on
\nSeptember  28,\t1950, the said authority issued\t the  second
\nnotification  cancelling the first notification with  effect
\nfrom October 1, 1950.  This notification was followed by the
\nthird  notification on October 6, 1950, which  purported  to
\nmodify it by inserting the words ” except as respect  things
\ndone  or  omitted  to  be  done\t before\t the  date  of\tthis
\nnotification  after the words ” with effect from October  1,
\n1950   in  other  words,  this\tnotification  purported\t  to
\nintroduce  an  exception to the cancellation  of  the  first
\nnotification  caused  by  the  second,\tand  in\t effect\t  it
\npurported  to treat the Province of Delhi as  a\t dangerously
\ndisturbed  area in respect of things done or omitted  to  be
\ndone  before  the date of the said notification.   The\tlast
\nnotification was issued on April 7, 1951.  This notification
\nwas issued by the Chief Commissioner of Delhi in exercise of
\nthe powers conferred by sub-s. (1) of s. 36 of the Act,\t and
\nby  it he certified as being triable under the said  Act  in
\nany  area within the State of Delhi not being a\t dangerously
\ndisturbed  area\t the following offences, viz.,\tany  offence
\nunder  any  law\t other\tthan  the  aforesaid  Act  of  which
\ncognisance had been taken by any magistrate in Delhi  before
\nOctober\t 1,  1950,  and the trial of  it  according  to\t the
\nprocedure prescribed in ch. 4 of the said Act was pending in
\nany  court  immediately\t before the said date  and  had\t not
\nconcluded  before the date of the certificate issued by\t the
\nnotification.\n<\/p>\n
Let us now mention the facts about the trial of the
\n93<\/span>
\nthree  cases against the appellant about which there  is  no
\ndispute.  , The First Information Report was  filed  against
\nthe appellant on June 30, 1948.\t The trial commenced on July
\n18,  1949, and it was conducted according to  the  procedure
\nprescribed  by\tch.   XX of  the  Code’.   Some\t prosecution
\nwitnesses  were examined and cross-examined  before  January
\n26,  1950,  and the’ whole of the prosecution  evidence\t was
\nrecorded  before  August  14, 1951.  The  evidence  for\t the
\ndefence\t was  recorded\tup to November\t14,  1951,  and\t the
\nlearned magistrate pronounced his judgments in all the cases
\non December 22, 1951.\n<\/p>\n
For the appellant, Mr. Ram Lal Anand contends that s.  36(1)
\nof   the  Act  is  ultra  vires\t because  it  violates\t the
\nfundamental right of equality before law guaranteed by\tArt.
\n14 of the Constitution.\t His argument is that since offences
\ncharged against the appellant were triable under the warrant
\nprocedure under the Code, the adoption of summons  procedure
\nwhich  s.  36(1) authorised amounts  to\t discrimination\t and
\nthereby\t violates Art. 14.  It is the first part  of  sub-s.
\n(1) of s. 36 which is impugned by the appellant.  The effect
\nof  the\t impugned  provisions  is that,\t after\tan  area  is
\ndeclared to be dangerously disturbed, offences specified  in
\nit  would be tried according to the summons  procedure\teven
\nthough they have ordinarily to be tried according to warrant
\nprocedure.    The  question  is\t whether  in  treating\t the
\ndangerously disturbed areas as a class by themselves and  in
\nproviding for one uniform procedure for the trial of all the
\nspecified offences in such areas the impugned provision\t has
\nviolated Art. 14.\n<\/p>\n
The point about the construction of Art. 14 has come  before
\nthis   Court  on  numerous  occasions,\tand  it\t  has\tbeen
\nconsistently  held that Art. 14 does not  forbid  reasonable
\nclassifications\t for the purpose of legislation.   In  order
\nthat any classification made by the Legislature can be\theld
\nto  be\tpermissible  or\t legitimate two\t tests\thave  to  be
\nsatisfied.    The  classification  must\t be  based   on\t  an
\nintelligible  differentia  which  distinguishes\t persons  or
\nthings grouped together in one class from others left out of
\nit, and the differentia must have a
\n94<\/span>
\nreasonable  or rational nexus with the object sought  to  be
\nachieved  by the said impugned provision.  It is true  that,
\nin the application of these tests uniform approach might not
\nalways\thave been adopted, or, in dealing with the  relevant
\nconsiderations emphasis might have shifted; but the validity
\nof the two tests  that have to be applied in determining the
\nvires  of  the\timpugned statute under\tArt.  14  cannot  be
\ndoubted.\n<\/p>\n
In  the present case the classification has  obviously\tbeen
\nmade   on   a  territorial  or\tgeographical   basis.\t The
\nLegislature  thought it expedient to provide for the  speedy
\ntrial of the specified offences in areas which were notified
\nto be dangerously disturbed areas ; and for this purpose the
\nareas  in the State have been put in two  categories,  those
\nthat  are dangerously disturbed and others.  Can it be\tsaid
\nthat  this classification is not founded on an\tintelligible
\ndifferentia.?  In  dealing with this question  it  would  be
\nrelevant  to  recall the tragedy of the\t holocaust  and\t the
\nsavage butchery and destruction of property which  afflicted
\nseveral\t parts of the border State of Punjab in the wake  of
\nthe  partition\tof  India.   Faced  with  the  unprecedented
\nproblem. presented by this tragedy, the Legislature  thought
\nthat the dangerously disturbed areas had to be dealt with on
\na special footing; and on this basis it provided inter\talia
\nfor  the  trial of the specified offences  in  a  particular
\nmanner.\t  That\tobviously  is the genesis  of  the  impugned
\nstatute.  That being the position, it is impossible to\thold
\nthat the classification between dangerously disturbed  areas
\nof the State on the one hand and the non_ disturbed areas on
\nthe  other was not rational or that it was not based  on  an
\nintelligible differentia.  Then again, the object of the Act
\nwas  obviously\tto ensure public safety and  maintenance  of
\npublic\torder;\tand there can be no doubt  that\t the  speedy
\ntrial  of  the specified offences had an  intimate  rational
\nrelation  or nexus with the achievement of the said  object.
\nThere  is  no doubt that the procedure\tprescribed  for\t the
\ntrial of summons cases is simpler, shorter and speedier; and
\nso,  when  the dangerously disturbed areas were\t facing\t the
\nproblem\t  of  unusual  civil  commotion\t and   strife,\t the
\nLegislature was justified
\n95<\/span>
\nin  enacting  the  first part of s. 36\tso  that  the  cases
\nagainst persons charged with the commission of the specified
\noffences  could be speedily tried and disposed of.  We\tare,
\ntherefore, satisfied that the challenge to the vires of\t the
\nfirst  part of sub-s. (1) of s. 36 cannot be sustained.\t  In
\nthis connection we may refer to the recent decision of\tthis
\nCourt  in Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar<\/a> (1).\t The
\njudgment in that case has considered the previous  decisions
\nof this Court on Art. 14, has classified and explained them,
\nand has enumerated the principles deducible from them.\t The
\napplication of the principles there deduced clearly supports
\nthe validity of the impugned provisions.\n<\/p>\n
It is, however, urged by Mr. Ram Lal Anand that the decision
\nof  this Court in Lachmandas Kewalram Ahuja v. The State  of
\nBombay<\/a> (2) supports his contention that s. 36(1) is invalid.
\nWe are not impressed by this argument.\tIn Ahuja’s case\t (2)
\nthe  objects  of  the impugned Act were\t the  expediency  of
\nconsolidating and amending the law relating to the  security
\nof the State, maintenance of public order and maintenance of
\nsupplies  and  services essential to the  community  in\t the
\nState  of Bombay.  These considerations applied\t equally  to
\nboth  categories  of cases, those referred  to\tthe  Special
\nJudge  and those not so referred; and so, on the  date\twhen
\nthe  Constitution  came into force,  the  classification  on
\nwhich  s.  12  was based became\t fanciful  and\twithout\t any
\nrational  basis\t at  all.  That is  why,  according  to\t the
\nmajority   decision  s.\t 12  contravened  Art.\t14  of\t the
\nConstitution and as such was ultra vires.\n<\/p>\n
It  is\tdifficult  to see how this  decision  can  help\t the
\nappellant’s  case.   The impugned provision in\tthe  present
\ncase  makes  no distinction between one class of  cases\t and
\nanother,  much\tless  between cases  directed  to  be  tried
\naccording to the summons procedure before January 26,  1950,
\nand  those not so directed.  The summons procedure  is\tmade
\napplicable to all offences under the Act or under any  other
\nlaw  for  the  time  being in force;  in  other\t words,\t all
\ncriminal  offences are ordered to be tried according to\t the
\nsummons procedure in the dangerously disturbed areas.\tThat
\nbeing
\n(1) A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 538.\n<\/p>\n
(2) [1952] S.C.R. 710, 731.\n<\/p>\n
96<\/span><\/p>\n
so,  we do not think that the decision in Ahuja’s  case\t (1)
\nhas  any application at all.  Thus we feel no difficulty  in
\nholding\t that the impugned provision contained in the  first
\npart of s. 36(1) is constitutional and valid.
\nThen it is urged that the Act which came into force on March
\n29,  1949,  was due to expire and did expire on\t August\t 14,
\n1951,  and  so the proceedings taken against  the  appellant
\nunder  the  summons procedure after the\t expiration  of\t the
\ntemporary  Act were invaid.  It is argued that,\t in  dealing
\nwith  this point, it would not be permissible to invoke\t the
\nprovisions  of s. 6 of the General Clauses Act\tbecause\t the
\nsaid  section deals with the effect of repeal  of  permanent
\nstatutes.   This  argument  no doubt  is  well-founded.\t  As
\nCraies has observed, ” as a general rule, unless it contains
\nsome  special provisions to the contrary, after a  temporary
\nAct  has expired no proceedings can be taken upon it and  it
\nceases to have any further effect ” (2).  This principle has
\nbeen  accepted\tby this Court in Krishnan v.  The  State  of
\nMadras<\/a>\t(3).   ” The general rule in regard to\ta  temporary
\nstatute\t is “, observed Patanjali Sastri J., ” that, in\t the
\nabsence\t of special provision to the  contrary,\t proceedings
\nwhich  are being taken against a person under it  will\tipso
\nfacto terminate as soon as the statute expires”.  It is true
\nthat the Legislature can and often enough does avoid such an
\nanomalous consequence by enacting in the temporary statute a
\nsaving provision, and the effect of such a saving  provision
\nis in some respects similar to the effect of the  provisions
\nof s. 6 of the General Clauses Act.  As an illustration,  we
\nmay  refer  to the decision in Wicks v. Director  of  Public
\nProsecutions (4).  In that case ail offence against  Defence
\n(General)  Regulations\tmade  under  the  Emergency   Powers
\n(Defence)  Act, 1939, was committed during the\tcurrency  of
\nthe Act and the offender was prosecuted and convicted  after
\nthe  expiry  of\t the  Act.  The\t contention  raised  by\t the
\noffender  that his prosecution and conviction  were  invalid
\nbecause, at the relevant time, the temporary
\n(1)  [1952] S.C.R. 710, 731.\n<\/p>\n
(2)  Craies on ” Statute Law “, 5th Ed., P. 377.
\n(3)  [1951] S.C.R. 621, 628.\n<\/p>\n
(4)  [1947] A.C. 362.\n<\/p>\n
97<\/span><\/p>\n
Act  had  expired  was rejected in view\t of  the  provisions
\nof.,;.\t11,  sub-s.  3 of the  Act.   This  sub-section\t had
\nprovided  that\tthe expiry of the Act shall not\t affect\t the
\noperation  thereof  as respects things\tpreviously  done  or
\nomitted to be done.  The House of Lords agreed with the view
\nexpressed  by the Court of Criminal Appeal and held that  it
\nwas clear that Parliament( did not intend sub-s. 3 to expire
\nwith  the  rest\t of the Act and that  its  presence  in\t the
\nstatute\t is  a\tprovision  which  preserved  the  right\t  to
\nprosecute after the date of its expiry.\t Since the  impugned
\nAct  does  not\tcontain an appropriate\tsaving\tsection\t the
\nappellant  would  be  entitled to contend  that,  after\t the
\nexpiration  of the Act, the procedure laid down in it  could
\nno  longer be invoked in the cases then pending against\t the
\nappellant.  We would like to add that, in the present  case,
\nwe are not called upon to consider whether offences  created
\nby  a  temporary  statute  cease to  be\t punishable  on\t its
\nexpiration.\n<\/p>\n
For the respondent, Mr. Umrigar, however, contends that\t the
\nappellant is wrong in assuming that the Act in fact  expired
\non  August  14, 1951.  He has invited our attention  to\t the
\nprovisions  of\tAct  No. I of 1951 by  which  the  President
\nextended some of the provisions of the earlier temporary Act
\nin  exercise of the powers conferred by s. 3 of\t the  Punjab
\nState  Legislature (Delegation of Powers) Act, 1951  (46  of
\n1951),\tThe provisions of that Act extended to the whole  of
\nthe  State  of Punjab and came into force on  September\t 13,
\n1951.\tMr. Umrigar relied on s. 16 of Act 46 of 1951  which
\nrepealed the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949 (Punj. 5 of
\n1949) and the East Punjab Safety (Amendment) Ordinance, 1951
\n(5  of 1951) but provided that notwithstanding\tsuch  repeal
\nany   order   made,  notification   or\t direction   issued,
\nappointment  made or action taken under the said Act and  in
\nforce immediately before the commencement of this Act shall,
\nin  so far as it is not inconsistent therewith, continue  in
\nforce and be deemed to have been made, issued or taken under
\nthe corresponding provisions of this Act.  It must, however,
\nbe pointed out that this
\n13<\/span>
\n98<\/span>
\nAct  does  not\tcontinue  the  material\t provisions  of\t the
\nimpugned Act such ass. 20 and s. 36 ; and so s. 16 cannot be
\ninvoked\t for the purpose of validating the  continuation  of
\nthe  subsequent\t proceedings against the  appellant  in\t the
\ncases then pending against him.\n<\/p>\n
Besides, it is necessary to recall that s. 36(1) of the\t Act
\nprescribed  the application of the summons procedure in\t the
\ntrial  of specified offences only in  dangerously  disturbed
\nareas;\tand  so, unless it is shown that the  relevant\tarea
\ncould  be  treated as a dangerously disturbed  area  at\t the
\nmaterial  time,\t s. 36(1) would be inapplicable.   In  other
\nwords,\tthe  adoption  of the  summons\tprocedure  would  be
\njustified  only\t so long as the area in\t question  could  be
\nvalidly\t treated ,as a dangerously disturbed area and it  is
\ntherefore pertinent to enquire whether at the relevant\ttime
\nthe  area in question was duly and validly notified to be  a
\ndangerously disturbed area.\n<\/p>\n
We have already referred to the four notifications issued by
\nthe competent authority.  The second notification  purported
\nto  cancel  with  effect from October  1,  1950,  the  first
\nnotification which had declared the whole of the Province of
\nDelhi  as a dangerously disturbed area.\t A week\t thereafter,
\nthe  third notification sought to introduce an exception  to
\nthe  cancellation  as notified by the  second  notification.
\nApart from the question as to whether, after the lapse of  a
\nweek, it was competent to the authority to modify the second
\nnotification,  it  is  difficult to understand\thow  it\t was
\nwithin\tthe jurisdiction of the notifying authority  to\t say
\nthat  the whole of the Province of Delhi had ceased to be  a
\ndangerously disturbed area ” except as respects things\tdone
\nor  omitted to be done before the date of this\tnotification
\n“.  Section 20 of the Act under which this notification\t has
\nbeen issued authorised the Provincial Government to  declare
\nthat the whole or any part of the Province was a dangerously
\ndisturbed  area.  The notification could declare either\t the
\nwhole  or a part of the Province as a dangerously  disturbed
\narea; but s. 20 does not empower the notifying authority  to
\ntreat any area as being dangerously disturbed in respect  of
\ncertain things and not dangerously disturbed
\n99<\/span>
\nin  regard  to\tothers.\t  Authority  to’  declare  areas  as
\ndangerously disturbed has no doubt been validly delegated to
\nthe  Provincial\t Government;  but  no  authority  has\tbeen
\nconferred on the delegate to treat any area as disturbed for
\ncertain\t things\t and  not disturbed for\t others.   We  have,
\ntherefore, no doubt that in introducing the exception to the
\ncancellation  effected by the second notification the  third
\nnotification has gone outside the authority conferred by  s.
\n20  and is clearly invalid.  If that be so, it must be\theld
\nthat  the  whole  of the Province of Delhi ceased  to  be  a
\ndangerously disturbed area as from October, 1, 1950.
\nIt  was probably realised that the-third notification  would
\nbe  invalid and hence the fourth notification was issued  on
\nApril 7, 1951.\tThis purports to be a certificate issued  by
\nthe competent authority under the second part of s. 36, sub-
\ns.  (1).  This certificate seeks to achieve the same  result
\nby  declaring  that  though the State of  Delhi\t was  not  a
\ndangerously  disturbed area, the offences specified  in\t the
\nnotification   would  nevertheless  continue  to  be   tried
\naccording to the summons procedure.\n<\/p>\n
This  notification is clearly not authorised by\t the  powers
\nconferred by the second part of s. 36, sub-s. (1).  What the
\nProvincial Government is authorised to do by the second part
\nof  s.\t36(1) is to direct that in areas  other\t than  those
\nwhich  are dangerously disturbed all offences under the\t Act
\nand  any other offence under any other law should  be  tried
\naccording  to the summons procedure.  It is clear  that\t the
\nnotification  which the Provincial Government is  authorised
\nto  issue in this behalf must relate to all  offences  under
\nthe Act and any other offence under any other law.  In other
\nwords, it is the offences indicated which can be ordered  to
\nbe  tried  under the summons procedure by  the\tnotification
\nissued\t by  the  Provincial  Government.   The\t  Provincial
\nGovernment  is\tnot authorised to issue\t a  notification  in
\nregard\tto  the trial of any specified case  or\t cases;\t and
\nsince  it is clear that the notification in question  covers
\nonly pending cases and has no reference to offences or class
\nof offences under the Indian Penal Code,, it is outside the
\n100<\/span>
\nauthority  conferred by the second part of s. 36(1).  It  is
\nobvious\t  that\tthe  third  and\t the  fourth   notifications
\nattempted to cure the anomaly which it was apprehended would
\nfollow in regard to pending cases in the absence of a saving
\nsection\t in the Act.  If through inadvertence  or  otherwise
\nthe  Act did not contain an appropriate saving section,\t the
\ndefect could not be cured by the notifications issued either
\nunder  s. 20 or under s. 36(1) of the Act.  In\tissuing\t the
\nsaid  notifications the competent authority was taking\tupon
\nitself the functions of the Legislature and that clearly was
\noutside\t its authority as a delegate either under s.  20  or
\nunder s. 36(1) of the Act.\n<\/p>\n
Mr.  Umrigar, then, argues that the competent authority\t was
\nentitled to modify the notification issued by it because the
\npower  to issue a notification must also involve  the  power
\neither to cancel, vary or modify the same; and in support of
\nthis argument Mr. Umrigar relies on the provisions of s.  19
\nof  the Punjab General Clauses Act, 1898 (Punj. 1  of  1898)
\nwhich  in  substance corresponds to cl. 21  of\tthe  General
\nClauses\t Act,  1897  (10 of 1897).   In\t our  opinion,\tthis
\nargument  is  not well-founded.\t Section 19  of\t the  Punjab
\nGeneral Clauses Act, like s. 21 of the General Clauses\tAct,
\nembodies  a rule of construction, the nature and  extent  of
\nthe application of which must inevitably be governed by\t the
\nrelevant  provisions of the statute which confers the  power
\nto  issue  the\tnotification.\tThe  power  to\tcancel\t the
\nnotification  can  be  easily  conceded\t to  the   competent
\nauthority  and\tso also the power to modify or\tvary  it  be
\nlikewise  conceded;  but the said power must  inevitably  be
\nexercised  within  the limits prescribed  by  the  provision
\nconferring   the  said\tpower.\t Now  s.  20  empowers\t the
\nProvincial  Government to declare the whole or any  part  of
\nthe  Province to be a dangerously disturbed area; and  if  a
\nnotification  is issued in respect of the whole or any\tpart
\nof the Province it may be either cancelled wholly or may  be
\nmodified restricting the declaration to -a specified part of
\nthe  Province.\t The  power  to cancel\tor  modify  must  be
\nexercised in reference to the areas of the Province which it
\nis competent for the Provincial
\n101<\/span>
\nGovernment  to specify as dangerously disturbed.  The  power
\nto  modify cannot obviously include the power to  treat\t the
\nsame  area as dangerously disturbed for persons\t accused  of
\ncrimes\tcommitted in the past and not disturbed\t for  others
\naccused of the same or similar A, offences committed  later.
\nThat  clearly  is  a legislative function  which  is  wholly
\noutside the authority conferred on the delegate by s. 20  or
\ns.  36(1).  We must, therefore, hold that the third and\t the
\nfourth\tnotifications  are invalid and as a  result  of\t the
\nsecond\tnotification  the  whole of the\t Province  of  Delhi
\nceased\tto be a dangerously disturbed area from\t October  1,
\n1950.\n<\/p>\n
This  position\timmediately raises the\tquestion  about\t the
\nvalidity of the proceedings continued against the  appellant
\nin  the\t three cases pending against him under\tthe  summons
\nprocedure.   So\t long  as the State  of\t Delhi\twas  validly
\nnotified to be a dangerously disturbed area the adoption  of
\nthe  summons  procedure\t was  no  doubt\t justified  and\t its
\nvalidity Could not be impeached; but, with the\tcancellation
\nof  the relevant notification s. 36(1) of the Act ceased  to
\napply  and it was necessary that as from the stage at  which
\nthe  cases  against  the appellant then\t stood\tthe  warrant
\nprocedure  should  have been adopted; and since it  has\t not
\nbeen adopted the trial of the three cases is invalid and  so
\nthe  orders of conviction and sentence imposed\tagainst\t him
\nare  void.   That  in brief is\tthe  alternative  contention
\nraised before us by Mr. Ram Lal Anand.\n<\/p>\n
Mr.  Umrigar,  urges  that  since  the\ttrial  had   validly
\ncommenced under the summons procedure, it was unnecessary to
\nchange the procedure after October 1, 1950, and his case  is
\nthat  the  trial  is not defective in  any  manner  and\t the
\nchallenge  to  the  validity  of  the  impugned\t orders\t  of
\nconviction and sentence should not be upheld.  In support of
\nhis  argument Mr.Umrigar has invited our attention  to\tsome
\ndecisions which may now be considered.\tIn Srinivasachari v.
\nThe  Queen (1) the accused was tried by a Court of  Sessions
\nin  December 1882 on charges some of which were\t triable  by
\nassessors  and\tothers\tby  jury.   Before  the\t trial\t was
\nconcluded  the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882,  came\tinto
\nforce
\n(1)  [1883] I.L.R. 6 Mad. 336.\n<\/p>\n
102<\/span><\/p>\n
and  under  s. 269 of the Code all the said  charges  became
\ntriable by jury.  Section 558 of the Code had provided\tthat
\nthe provisions of the new Code had to be applied, as far  as
\nmay  be,  to  all cases pending in  any\t criminal  court  on
\nJanuary\t 1,  1883.  The case against the accused  which\t was
\npending\t on the date  when the new Act came into  force\t was
\nsubmitted  to the High Court for orders; and the High  Court
\ndirected  that by virtue of s. 6 of the General Clauses\t Act
\nthe trial must be conducted under the rules of procedure  in
\nforce  at the commencement of the trial.  It is\t clear\tthat
\nthe  decision  of  the\tHigh Court was\tbased  both  on\t the
\nspecific  provisions  of  s.  558  which  provided  for\t the
\napplication of the new Code to pending cases only as far  as
\nmay  be\t and  on the principles laid down in  s.  6  of\t the
\nGeneral\t Clauses  Act.\t That is why  that  decision  cannot
\nassist the respondent since s. 6 of the General Clauses\t Act
\nis inapplicable in the present case.\n<\/p>\n
The decision on Mukund v. Ladu (1) is also inapplicable\t for
\nthe same reasons.  It was a case where one act was  repealed
\nby  another and so the question as to the  applicability  of
\nthe provisions of the latter act had to be considered in the
\nlight of the provisions of s. 6 of the General Clauses\tAct.
\nThe  judgment  in  terms  does not refer to  s.\t 6  but\t the
\ndecision  is obviously based on the principles of  the\tsaid
\nsection.\n<\/p>\n
Then  Mr.Umrigar  relied on Gardner v. Lucas (2).   In\tthat
\ncase  s. 39 of the Conveyancing (Scotland) Act,\t 1874,\twith
\nwhich the court was dealing affected not only the  procedure
\nbut  also  substantive rights; and so it was held  that\t the
\nsaid  section  was  not retrospective  in  operation.\tThis
\ndecision  is  wholly  inapplicable and cannot  give  us\t any
\nassistance in the present case.\n<\/p>\n
Mr. Umrigar also placed strong reliance on a decision of the
\nFull  Bench  of the Punjab High Court in Ram  Singh  v.\t The
\nCrown (3).  That decision does lend support to Mr. Umrigar’s
\ncontention  that  the continuation of the  trial  under\t the
\nsummons procedure did not introduce any infirmity and was in
\nfact appropriate
\n(1) [1901] 3 Bom.  L.R. 584.  (2) [1878] 3 A.C. 582.
\n(3) A.I.R. 1950 East Punjab 25.\n<\/p>\n
103<\/span><\/p>\n
and  regular.  The case against Ram Singh had been  sent  to
\nthe  Court of Session under the provisions of s. 37  (1)  of
\nthe  Punjab Public Safety Act, 1948 (Punj. 2 of 1948)  at  a
\ntime when Luahiana District was declared to be a dangerously
\ndisturbed  area; before, however, the trial in the Court  of
\nSession\t actually  commenced the District ceased  to  be  a’
\ndangerously  disturbed area.  Even so, it was held that\t the
\nSessions  Judge\t should continue with the  trial  under\t the
\nprovisions  of\ts.  37\t(1) of the Act\tand  not  under\t the
\nordinary  provisions of the Code regarding  sessions  trial,
\nand should follow the procedure prescribed for the trial  of
\nsummons\t cases.\t  It appears that the judgment in  the\tcase
\nproceeded  on the assumption that the principles enacted  by
\ns.  6  of the General Clauses Act were applicable,  and\t so,
\nsince at the commencement of the proceedings the adoption of
\nthe  summons procedure was justified under s. 37 (1) of\t the
\nAct, the trial could continue under the same procedure\teven
\nafter  the  area had ceased to be  a  dangerously  disturbed
\narea.\tIn our opinion, it is erroneous to apply by  analogy
\nthe  provisions of s. 6 of the General Clauses Act to  cases
\ngoverned by the provisions of a temporary Act when the\tsaid
\nAct  does  not\tcontain\t the  appropriate  saving   section.
\nFailure\t to recognise the difference between cases to  which
\ns. 6 of the General Clauses Act applies and those which\t are
\ngoverned by the provisions of a temporary Act which does not
\ncontain\t the  appropriate saving section has  introduced  an
\ninfirmity in the reasoning adopted in the judgment.
\nBesides, the learned judges, with respect, were in error  in
\nholding\t that  the  application\t of  the  ordinary  criminal
\nprocedure  was\tinadmissible or impossible  after  the\tarea
\nceased\tto be dangerously disturbed.  No doubt\tthe  learned
\njudges\trecognised the fact that ordinarily  the  procedural
\nlaw  is\t retrospective in operation, but they  thought\tthat
\nthere  were some good reasons against applying the  ordinary
\nprocedural law to the case, and that is what influenced them
\nin  coming to the conclusion that the summons procedure\t had
\nto be continued even after the area ceased to be dangerously
\ndisturbed.  In this connection the learned
\n104<\/span>
\njudges\treferred  to the observation in Maxwell that  ”\t the
\ngeneral principle, however, seems to be that alterations  in
\nprocedure  are\tretrospective,\tunless there  be  some\tgood
\nreason against it (1) ; and they also relied on the decision
\nof  the Privy Council in Delhi Cloth and General Mills\tCo.,
\nLtd.  v. Income-tax Commissioner, Delhi<\/a> (2) in\twhich  their
\nLordships  have\t referred  with approval  to  their  earlier
\nstatement  of the law in the Colonial Sugar Refining Co.  v.
\nIrving\t(3)  that ” while provisions of\t a  statute  dealing
\nmerely\twith matters of procedure may properly, unless\tthat
\nconstruction  be textually inadmissible, have  retrospective
\neffect\tattributed  to them”.  The learned judges  took\t the
\nview  that these principles justified their conclusion\tthat
\n“where\tthe provisions of a statute dealing with matters  of
\nprocedure  are inapplicable to a certain proceeding  pending
\nat  the\t time  the statute came into  force,  they  must  be
\nregarded   as  textually  inadmissible\tso  far\t  as   those
\nproceedings  are concerned “. We are disposed to think\tthat
\nthis  view is not sound.  We do not think that the  adoption
\nof the ordinary warrant procedure was either inadmissible or
\ninapplicable at the stage where the trial stood in the\tcase
\nagainst Ram Singh (4).\tIt was wrong to assume that the ses-
\nsions  procedure would be inapplicable for the\treason\tthat
\nthe  provisions of the Code in regard to the  commitment  of
\nthe case to the Court of Session had not been complied with.
\nWith respect, the learned judges failed to consider the fact
\nthat the procedure adopted in sending the case to the  Court
\nof Session under s. 37(1) of the relevant Act was valid\t and
\nthe  only  question  which  they  had  to  decide  was\twhat
\nprocedure  should be adopted after Ludhiana ceased to  be  a
\ndangerously  disturbed area.  Besides, it was really  not  a
\ncase  of retrospective operation of the procedural  law;  it
\nwas  in fact a case where the ordinary procedure  which\t had
\nbecome\tinapplicable  by  the provisions  of  the  temporary
\nstatute\t became applicable as soon as the area\tin  question
\nceased to be dangerously disturbed.\n<\/p>\n
(1)  Maxwell  on ” Interpretation of Statutes “, 9th  Ed.,P.\n<\/p>\n
226.
\n(2) [1927] 9 Lah. 284.\t       (3) [1905] A.C. 369.\n<\/p>\n
(4) A.I.R. (1950) East Punjab 25.\n<\/p>\n
105<\/span><\/p>\n
In  this connection it is relevant to refer to the  decision
\nof this Court in Syed Qasim Razvi v. The State of  Hyderabad<\/a>
\n(1).   In  that\t case  this  Court  was\t dealing  with\t the
\nregulation called the Special Tribunal Regulation (V of 1358
\nFasli)\twhich had been promulgated by the Military  Governor
\nof  the Hyderabad State.  The said regulation  had  provided
\nthat  the(  Military  Governor may, by\tgeneral\t or  special
\norder,\tdirect that any offence or class of offences  should
\nbe tried by such tribunal, and the procedure for trial\tlaid
\ndown  by  it differed from the provisions of  the  Hyderabad
\nCriminal  Procedure  Code in several  material\tparticulars.
\nThe  cases against the accused were directed to be tried  by
\nthe  Special Tribunal on October 6, 1949.  The accused\twere
\nconvicted in September 1950 and their conviction on some  of
\nthe charges was upheld by the High Court in appeal in April,
\n1951.\tThe  accused then appealed to this  Court  and\talso
\napplied\t under Art. 32 of the Constitution for quashing\t the
\norders\tof  conviction and sentence on the ground  that\t the
\nSpecial Tribunal Regulation became void on January 26, 1950,
\nas  its\t provisions  contravened  Arts. 14  and\t 21  of\t the
\nConstitution  which  came into force on that date,  and\t the
\ncontinuation  of  the trial and conviction  of\tthe  accused
\nafter  that  date was illegal.\tIt is true  that  the  final
\ndecision  in  the  case, according  to\tthe  majority  view,
\nproceeded on the footing that the accused had  substantially
\nthe  benefit of a normal trial though there were  deviations
\nin  certain particulars and so his conviction could  not  be
\nset aside merely because the Constitution of India came into
\nforce  before  the  termination of the trial.\tAs  we\twill
\npresently  point  out, the relevant facts in  this  case  in
\nregard\tto  the\t deviation from\t the  normal  procedure\t are
\ndifferent  from\t those in Syed Qasim Razvi’s case  (1),\t but
\nthat  is another matter.  What is important for our  purpose
\nis  the\t view expressed by this Court  that  the  regulation
\nissued by the Military Governor of Hyderabad State could not
\nbe  impeached and so the Special Tribunal must be deemed  to
\nhave taken cognisance of
\n(1)  [1953] S.C.R. 589.\n<\/p>\n
14<\/span>
\n106<\/span><\/p>\n
the  case quite properly and its proceedings up to the\tdate
\nof  the coming in of the Constitution would also have to  be
\nregarded as valid.  Dealing with this point, Mukherjea,\t J.,
\nwho  delivered\tthe  judgment  of  the\tCourt,\tquoted\twith
\napproval the observations made in Lachmandas Kewalram  Ahuja
\nv. The State of Bombay<\/a>(1) that ,as the Act was valid in\t its
\nentirety  before the date of the Constitution, that part  of
\nthe proceedings before the Special Judge, which, up to\tthat
\ndate  had been regulated by the special procedure cannot  be
\nquestioned  “. Unfortunately this aspect of the\t matter\t was
\nnot properly placed before the Full Bench of the Punjab High
\nCourt  in the case of Ram Singh (2).  If the learned  judges
\nhad proceeded to deal with the question referred to them  on
\nthe  basis  that the initial submission of the case  to\t the
\nCourt  of Session under s. 37(1) of the Act was\t valid\tthey
\nwould  not  have come to the conclusion\t that  the  sessions
\nprocedure   was\t  inadmissible\tor   inapplicable   to\t the
\ncontinuation  of the case after Ludhiana had ceased to be  a
\ndangerously  disturbed area.  That is why we think that\t the
\nview taken by the Full Bench is erroneous.\n<\/p>\n
The position then is that as from October 1, 1950, the three
\ncases against the appellant should have been tried according
\nto  the warrant procedure.  It is clear that, at  the  stage
\nwhere the trial stood on the material date, the whole of the
\nprosecution  evidence had not been led and so there  was  no
\ndifficulty  in framing charges against the appellant in\t the
\nrespective cases and thereafter continuing the trial accord-
\ning  to the warrant procedure.\tHaving regard to the  nature
\nof  the\t charges  framed and the  character  and  volume  of
\nevidence  led,\tit is difficult to  resist  the\t appellant’s
\nargument  that\tthe  failure to frame charges  has-  led  to
\nprejudice;  and\t it  is\t not  at  all  easy  to\t accept\t the
\nrespondent’s  contention  that\tthe  double  opportunity  to
\ncross-examine  the prosecution witnesses which is  available
\nto  an accused person under the warrant procedure is  not  a
\nmatter\tof  substantive and valuable benefit  to  him.\t The
\ndenial of this opportunity must,
\n(1) [1952] S.C.R. 710, 731,
\n(2) A.I.R. 1950 East Punjab 25.\n<\/p>\n
107<\/span><\/p>\n
in  the circumstances of the present cases, be held to\thave
\ncaused prejudice to him.  We must accordingly hold that\t the
\ncontinuation  of  the trial of the three cases\tagainst\t the
\nappellant  according to the summons procedure subsequent  to
\nOctober 1, 1950, has vitiated the trial and has rendered the
\nfinal  orders of conviction and sentence invalid.   We\tmust
\naccordingly set aside the orders of conviction and  sentence
\npassed against the appellant in all the three cases.
\nThat  takes us to the question as to the final\torder  which
\nshould be passed in the present appeals.  The offences\twith
\nwhich  the appellant stands charged are of a  very  serious,
\nnature; and though it is true that he has had to undergo the
\nordeal of a trial and has suffered rigorous imprisonment for
\nsome  time that would not justify his prayer that we  should
\nnot order his retrial.\tIn our opinion, having regard to the
\ngravity\t of the offences charged against the appellant,\t the
\nends of justice require that we should direct that he should
\nbe tried for the said offences de novo according to law.  We
\nalso  direct  that the proceedings to be taken\tagainst\t the
\nappellant  hereafter should be commenced without  delay\t and
\nshould be disposed of as expeditiously as possible.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t Appeal allowed.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t Retrial ordered.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Gopi Chand vs The Delhi Administration on 20 January, 1959 Equivalent citations: 1959 AIR 609, 1959 SCR Supl. (2) 87 Author: P Gajendragadkar Bench: Das, Sudhi Ranjan (Cj), Das, S.K., Gajendragadkar, P.B., Wanchoo, K.N., Hidayatullah, M. PETITIONER: GOPI CHAND Vs. RESPONDENT: THE DELHI ADMINISTRATION DATE OF JUDGMENT: 20\/01\/1959 BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-234186","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nGopi Chand vs The Delhi Administration on 20 January, 1959 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/gopi-chand-vs-the-delhi-administration-on-20-january-1959\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Gopi Chand vs The Delhi Administration on 20 January, 1959 - 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