{"id":234198,"date":"2002-02-26T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2002-02-25T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/k-sridhar-kumar-vs-the-union-of-india-on-26-february-2002"},"modified":"2017-01-27T12:28:11","modified_gmt":"2017-01-27T06:58:11","slug":"k-sridhar-kumar-vs-the-union-of-india-on-26-february-2002","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/k-sridhar-kumar-vs-the-union-of-india-on-26-february-2002","title":{"rendered":"K. Sridhar Kumar vs The Union Of India on 26 February, 2002"},"content":{"rendered":"
Madras High Court<\/div>\n
K. Sridhar Kumar vs The Union Of India on 26 February, 2002<\/div>\n
       \n\n  \n\n  \n\n \n \n  IN THE HIGH COURRT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS           \n\n Dated:- 26-02-2002\n\n Coram \nThe hon'ble Mr. Justice P. SATHASIVAM   \n\n Writ Petition Nos. 2402 of 2002 and Writ Petition Nos.3333 of 2002 and W.P.M.P. Nos. 3331 of 2002\n        and W.P.M.P. Nos. 4684 of 2002\n\n\nW.P.No. 2402 of 2002 \n\n K. Sridhar Kumar.\n\n                                   .. Petitioner.\n\n                              Vs.\n\n  1. The Union of India,\n   Ministry of Law, Justice and\n   Company Affairs, represented by\n   its Secretary, New Delhi.\n\n2. The Government of Tamil Nadu, \n   represented by Chief Secretary,\n   Fort St. George, Chennai-600 009.\n\n3. The Government of Tamil Nadu, \n   represented by Secretary, Home Department, \n   Fort St. George, Chennai-600 009.\n\n4. The Registrar-General,\n   High Court, Madras-104.\n\n                                     ..Respondents.<\/pre>\n
W.P.No. 3333 of 2002.\n<\/p>\n
R. Suresh Kumar.\n<\/p>\n
                                     .. Petitioner.\n<\/p>\n
                             Vs.\n<\/p>\n
1. Union of India,
\n   represented by Ministry of Law,
\n   Justice and Company Affairs, New Delhi.\n<\/p>\n
2. State of Tamil Nadu,
\n   represented by Secretary to Ministry of Law,
\n   Fort St. George, Chennai-600 009.\n<\/p>\n
3. The Registrar,
\n   High Court of judicature at Madras,
\n   Chennai-104.\n<\/p>\n
                                          .. Respondents.\n<\/p>\n
            Petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
\n            for issue of a Writ of Declaration as stated therein.\n<\/p>\n
!   Mr.V. Balasubramanian:- For petitioner in
\n                                    W.P.No. 2402 of 2002.\n<\/p>\n
            Mr. K. Vijayan, Senior Counsel for M\/s La Law:-\n<\/p>\n
            For petitioner in W.P.No. 3333 of 2002.\n<\/p>\n
^   Mr. R. Muthukumaraswamy, Additional Advocate
\n            General (and assisted by Mr. D. Krishnakumar,
\n            Special Government Pleader):- For Respondents
\n            2 and 3 in both cases.\n<\/p>\n
:                                 COMMON ORDER      <\/p>\n
Since  the  issue  raised  in  both  the  writ   petitions   relates   to
\nestablishment  of  a  Bench of the Madras High Court at Madurai, they are
\nbeing disposed of by the following common order.\n<\/p>\n
2.  The petitioner in W.P.No.  2402 of 2002, who is a practising Advocate
\nof the High Court, Madras seeks to issue a Writ of Declaration to declare
\nthe whole process of establishment of a Permanent Bench  of  Madras  High
\nCourt at Madurai is unconstitutional and illegal.\n<\/p>\n
3.  The  petitioner  in  Writ  Petition  No.  3333 of 2002, who is also a
\npractising Advocate of the High Court, Madras, prays for  issuance  of  a
\nWrit  of  Declaration  to  declare  the  decision  under Clause 31 of the
\nLetters Patent  of  High  Court  of  Madras  seeking  to  constitute  and
\nestablish a Bench of the High Court of Madras at Madurai as illegal, void
\nand  unconstitutional  for  being  passed in violation of the legislative
\npowers of the Parliament under Article 246 read with Entry 78, List I  of
\nVII  Schedule  of the Constitution of India and inconsistent with Article
\n214 of the Constitution of India.\n<\/p>\n
4.  First I shall deal with Writ Petition No.  2402 of 2002, wherein  the
\nonly ground raised  and  argued  by  Mr.    V.   Balasubramanian, learned
\ncounsel for the petitioner is that the High Court of Madras is not a High
\nCourt of a new State within the  meaning  of  Section  2  (i)  of  States
\nReorganisation  Act,  1956,  but  is  an  existing State as defined under
\nSection 2 (g) of the said Act and, therefore, the whole process initiated
\nby the High Court  to  establish  a  Bench  at  Madurai  is  against  the
\nprovisions of  the  State  Reorganisation  Act, 1956, hence illegal.  The
\nother ground urged by him is that the Constitution of India also does not
\ncontemplate such a situation of establishing a  Bench  of  a  High  Court
\noutside the Principal seat of the said High Court.\n<\/p>\n
5.   On  direction,  learned  Additional  Advocate  General  appeared for
\nrespondents 2 and 3.  He elaborately argued by drawing  my  attention  to
\nThe  Indian  High Courts Act, 1861; Letters Patent, 1862; Letters Patent,
\n1865; The Indian High Court Act, 1865; The Indian High court  Act,  1911;
\nThe Government of India Act, 1915; The Government of India Act, 1935; The
\nConstitution  of  India,  1950;  The  Government  of India (Adaptation of
\nIndian Laws) Order, 1937 and 1950; General Clauses Act, 1897;  and  (The)
\nStates Reorganisation Act, 1956.\n<\/p>\n
6.   At the outset, it is to be mentioned that the Full Court of the High
\nCourt has taken note of a report of a Committee of Three  Judges  of  the
\nMadras  High  Court and have resolved to have a Circuit Bench of the High
\nCourt of Madras at Madurai, subject to various conditions.   While  doing
\nso,  the  High  Court  has  taken  note of the recommendations of Justice
\nJaswandh Singh Commission, which had recommended the establishment  of  a
\nCircuit  Bench  of the Madras High Court at Madurai to cater the needs of
\nSouthern Part of the State,  subject  to  various  conditions.    Justice
\nJaswandh  Singh  Commission  had  suggested  that  the recommendations be
\nimplemented by issuance of a Notification by the  Hon’ble  Chief  Justice
\nwith  the  approval  of  the  Governor  under Section 51 (3) of the State
\nReorganisation Act, 1956.  Pursuant to the  Resolutions  passed  by  this
\nCourt,  action  has  been  taken to establish a Circuit Bench at Madurai,
\npursuant to which huge amounts have been spent  in  acquiring  lands  and
\nputting up  buildings.  It is at this stage, both the writ petitions have
\nbeen filed.  Since the issue involved pertains  to  the  jurisdiction  to
\nhave  a permanent or a Circuit Bench of a High Court in places other than
\nthe Principal seat of the High  Court,  it  is  necessary  to  trace  the
\nhistory of the High Courts in India.\n<\/p>\n
7.  The Indian High Courts Act, 1861 was passed on 6th August, 1861 which
\nempowered  the  Crown  to  establish,  by  Letters  Patent  High court of
\nJudicature at Calcutta for the Bengal Division, High Court of  Judicature
\nat  Madras for Madras Division and High Court of Judicature at Bombay for
\nthe Bombay Division.  On the basis of the authority given by  the  Indian
\nHigh  Courts Act, 1861, the Crown issued Letters Patent on 14th May 1862,
\nestablishing High Court of Judicature at Calcutta.    On  26-6-1862,  the
\nLetters  Patent  establishing  the  High  Court at Bombay and Madras were
\nissued.  It may be noted that all the said Letters Patent were  identical
\nin terms.\n<\/p>\n
8.   Clause  30  of  the  Letters Patent, 1862, provided that whenever it
\nshall appear to the Governor in Council that the Jurisdiction  and  power
\nvested  in the High Court should be exercised in any place other than the
\nusual place of city or such places by way of  Circuit,  the  Governor  in
\nCouncil can authorise and direct the Judges of such Court to hold sitting
\nin such  place  or  places  accordingly.   The Letters Patent of 1862 was
\nrepealed and re-enacted  by  the  Letters  Patent,  1865,  which  contain
\nsimilar provision in Clause 31.  The said Clause is as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
“31.   Judges  may be authorised to sit in any place by way of circuit or
\nspecial commission- And We do  further  ordain  that  whenever  it  shall
\nappear  to  the  Governor-in-Council convenient that the jurisdiction and
\npower by these Our Letters Patent or by the recited Act,  vested  in  the
\nsaid  High Court of Judicature at Madras should be exercised in any place
\nwithin the jurisdicti on of any Court now subject to the  superintendence
\nof  the said High Court other than the usual place of sitting of the said
\nHigh Court, or at several such places by way of circuit, the proceedings,
\nin cases before the said High Court at such  place  or  places  shall  be
\nregulated  by  any law relating thereto, which has been or may be made by
\ncompetent legislative authority for India.”\n<\/p>\n
It is clear  from  the  said  Clause  that  the  Governor-in-Council  can
\nauthorise  and  direct  the  Judges  of  the High Court concerned to hold
\nsitting in any such place  or  places  other  than  the  usual  place  of
\nsitting.\n<\/p>\n
9.   Next came the Indian High Courts Act, 1865 which made alterations in
\nthe Territorial Jurisdiction of  the  Chartered  High  Court  established
\nunder the  High  Courts  Act, 1861.  The Indian High Courts Act, 1911 was
\npassed empowering His Majesty to establish High Courts in  any  territory
\nwithin His Majesty’s dominion in India.\n<\/p>\n
10.   In  the  year 1915, the Government of India Act, 1915 was passed by
\nthe  British  Parliament  consolidating  and  re-enacting  the   existing
\nstatutes concerning  the  Government  of  India and the High Courts.  The
\nGovernment of India Act, 1915 provided for the Constitution, Jurisdiction
\nand Powers of the High Courts.  It may be stated that the High  Court  at
\nPatna,  the high Court at Lahore were established under the Government of
\nIndia Act, 1915 in the years 1916 and 1919 respectively.\n<\/p>\n
11.  The  Government  of  India  Act,  1935  was  passed  which  included
\nprovisions  regulating  the establishment, Constitution, Jurisdiction and
\nPowers of the High Courts.  The High Court at Nagpur was  established  in
\nthe year 1936 under the Government of India Act, 1935.\n<\/p>\n
12.   It  may  be  stated  that all the High Courts established under the
\nIndian High Courts Act, 1861, the Government  of  India  Act,  1915,  the
\nGovernment of  India  Act,  1935 were established by Letters Patent.  The
\nGovernment of India Act, 1935, like the Government  of  India  Act,  1915
\ncontained  provisions  in  Section  223  to  continue  in  force with the
\nexisting Laws including the Letters Patent.\n<\/p>\n
13.  After the Government of India Act, 1935 was passed,  the  Government
\nof  India (Adaptation of Indian Laws) Order, 1937 was passed to bring the
\nprovisions of the existing Laws in accord  with  the  provisions  of  the
\nGovernment of  India Act.  In terms of the Adaptation Order, wherever the
\nexpression Governor in Council was used in existing Laws, it must be read
\nas `Provincial Government’.  Thus, the Letters Patent, 1865, which was in
\nan existing Law and continued to be in operation, had to be read with the
\nexpression `Provincial Government’ in the place of “Governor in Council.”\n<\/p>\n
14.  The Constitution of India was enacted on 26-01-1950.  Article 214 of
\nthe Constitution provided that there shall be  a  High  Court  for  every
\nState.   Article  225  of  the  Constitution provided that subject to the
\nprovisions of the  Constitution,  the  Jurisdiction  and  the  Powers  in
\nrelation  to  the  Administration  of Justice including any power to make
\nRules and to regulate the sitting of the  Court  shall  be  the  same  as
\nimmediately before  the commencement of the Constitution.  Article 372 of
\nthe Constitution also continued in force all the Laws  in  force  in  the
\nterritory of India before the Constitution.  Clause 2 of Article 372 also
\nenable  the  President  to pass orders for adaptation and modification of
\nsuch Laws.  The Letters Patent,  1865  was  an  existing  Law  which  was
\ncontinued  in  force by the Government of India Act, 1915; the Government
\nof India Act, 1935; and the Constitution, 1 950.\n<\/p>\n
15.  The President of India passed orders known as the Adaptation of Laws
\nOrder, 1950, as per which the expression `Provincial’ was to be  read  as
\n`State’.   Thus, for the expression `Governor in Council’ in Clause 31 of
\nLetters Patent was to be read as `Provincial Government’ by virtue of the
\n1937 Adaptation Order and as `State Government’ by  virtue  of  the  1950
\nAdaptation Order.    As per the General Clauses Act, the Government would
\nbe the Governor.  Thus the expression, `Governor’ has to be read  in  the
\nplace of the expression `Governor in Council’.\n<\/p>\n
16.   After the Constitution, new High Courts have been established, some
\nof them are as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
1.  High Court of Andhra Pradesh, created by the
\nAndhra State Act, 1953.\n<\/p>\n
2.  High Court of Kerala.\n<\/p>\n
3.  High Court of Mysore.\n<\/p>\n
4.  High Court of Rajasthan.\n<\/p>\n
High Courts of Kerala, Mysore and Rajasthan were
\nestablished by the State Re-organisation Act,1956\n<\/p>\n
5.  High Court of Gujarat established by the Bombay
\nRe-organisation Act, 1960.\n<\/p>\n
6.  High Court of Gowhati, established by the
\nNorth-East Re-organisation Act, 1971.\n<\/p>\n
7.  High Court of Himachal Pradesh, established
\nby the State of Himachal Pradesh Act, 1970.\n<\/p>\n
All the afore-said Acts including the States Reorganisation Act,  1956  ,
\nwhich  established  various  High Courts contain the provisions providing
\nfor  the  place  of  the  permanent  City  of  the  High  Court  and  the
\nJurisdiction  to  have either permanent Benches or Circuit Benches, place
\nor places outside the principal seat.  All the said  provisions  provided
\nfor,<\/p>\n
i) the place of the principal seat of the
\nHigh Court,<\/p>\n
ii) for establishment of permanent Bench
\nother than the principal seat by the
\nNotification of the President, after
\nconsulting the Governor and Chief Justice;\n<\/p>\n
iii) to provide for a Circuit Bench outside
\nthe place of principal seat by the
\nChief Justice with the approval of the
\nGovernor.\n<\/p>\n
Section  51  of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 is one such provision
\ndealing with the States which were the subject matter of  the  said  Act,
\nwhile  other  enactment  dealt with similar subject relating to the other
\nHigh Courts established by the respective enactments.   In  this  regard,
\nthe  learned Additional Advocate General relied on a decision of the Apex
\nCourt in the case of Umaji v.  Radhikabai, reported in All India Reporter
\n1986 Supreme Court page 1272.\n<\/p>\n
In that case, the question which falls for determination is  “Whether  an
\nappeal  lies  under  Clause  15  of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High
\nCourt to a Division Bench of two judges  of  that  High  Court  from  the
\njudgment  of  a single Judge of that High Court in a petition filed under
\nArticle 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India?” After  tracing  history
\nof  constitution  of various High Courts, Letters Patent, Constitution of
\nIndia, Their Lordships have held as follows:- (para 109)<\/p>\n
“109………The power of a High Court to make  rules  of  Court  and  to
\nregulate  the sittings of the Court and members thereof sitting singly or
\nin Division Courts is to be found in its Charter, whether it be a statute
\nor Letters Patent.  The position with respect to existing High Courts has
\nalready been set out in detail above.  So far as High Courts  which  came
\ninto  existence after the commencement of the Constitution are concerned,
\nwhenever new High Courts were set up the relevant statute made provisions
\nin that behalf, for instance, the Andhra  State  Act,  1953,  the  States
\nReorganisation  Act, 1956, the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960, the Delhi
\nHigh Court Act, 1966, and the State of Himachal Pradesh Act, 1970.  It  i
\ns  the  charter  of  the  High  Court  which generally confers a right of
\nintra-Court appeal and it is the rules made under the rule  making  power
\nof  the  High Court which generally provide which matters are to be heard
\nby a single Judge and which by a Division Bench though at times  statutes
\nmay  also do so, as for example, the Kerala High Court Act, 1958, and the
\nKarnataka High Court Act, 1961.  Where by the charter  of  a  High  Court
\nmatters  are  not required to be heard by any particular number of Judges
\nand such charter provides for an intra-Court appeal from the decision  of
\na single Judge, whether such an appeal would lie or not would depend upon
\nwhether  by  the  rules  made  by  the  High Court in the exercise of its
\nrule-making power the matter is heard by a single  Judge  or  a  Division
\nBench subject to the condition that such right of appeal is not otherwise
\nexcluded.”\n<\/p>\n
17.   It  would  thus  be seen that the jurisdiction of the High Court to
\nhave either a permanent Bench or a Circuit Bench in a  place  other  than
\nthe  principal  seat is a matter which has been dealt with by the Charter
\nor by the various enactments which created the said High Courts.  It  may
\nbe  useful  to  refer  to  the  judgment of the Supreme Court in State of
\nMaharashtra v.  Narayan,<\/a> reported in  All  India  Reporter  1983  Supreme
\nCourt page  46.   The appeal before the Supreme Court is by Special Leave
\nwhich is directed against the judgment and order of the Bombay High Court
\ndated 14-12-1981.  By its judgment the High Court struck  down  an  order
\ndated  27-8-1981  by which the Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court, in
\nexercise of his powers under sub-section (3) of Section 51 of the  States
\nReorganisation  Act, 1956 (in short “the Act”) with the prior approval of
\nthe Governor of Maharashtra, directed that the Judges and Division Courts
\nof the High Court of Bombay shall also sit at Aurangabad with effect from
\n27-8-1981 for the disposal of cases arising out of the Marathwada  Region
\nof the  State  of  Maharashtra.    Since  the learned Additional Advocate
\nGeneral heavily relied on the three Judge Bench  of  the  above  referred
\ndecision, more  facts  in  that  case  are  to  be  noted.   By virtue of
\nsub-section (1) of Section  49,  the  High  Court  of  Bombay  exercising
\nimmediately before the appointed day i.e.  November 1, 1956, jurisdiction
\nin  relation  to  the existing State of Bombay, was deemed to be the High
\nCourt for the new State of Bombay constituted under  sub-section  (1)  of
\nSection 8  of  the  Act.   Immediately before the appointed day, i.e., on
\nOctober  27,  1956,  the   Central   Government   while   telegraphically
\ncommunicating  to  the  then  Chief Justice (Chagla, C.J.) the issue of a
\nPresidential Order under  sub-section  (1)  of  Section  51  of  the  Act
\nappointing  Bombay to be the principal seat of the High Court for the new
\nState of Bombay with effect from November 1, 1956, conveyed that as  from
\nthat  date  the  High  Court shall function only at that place unless the
\nChief Justice issued an order under sub-section (3) of Section 51 of  the
\nAct that  temporary Benches may also function at other places.  The Chief
\nJustice was advised  that  he  should  issue  such  notification  on  the
\nappointed day,  i.e.   November 1, 1956, for the establishment of Circuit
\nBenches at Nagpur and Rajkot with a view to preserve  the  continuity  of
\njudicial  administration,  since the High Court of Madhya Pradesh had its
\nprincipal seat at Nagpur and the High  Court  of  Saurashtra  at  Rajkot,
\nprior to the appointed day.  The then Chief Justice accordingly issued an
\norder  under  sub-section  (3)  of  Section  51 of the Act with the prior
\napproval of the Governor by which he appointed Nagpur and  Rajkot  to  be
\nplaces  at  which the Judges and Division Courts of the Bombay High Court
\nwould also sit with effect from November 1, 1956.   The  two  Benches  at
\nNagpur  and  Rajkot  continued  to  function  till  May  1, 1960 when the
\nbilingual State of Bombay was bifurcated into two separate States  –  The
\nState   of  Maharashtra  and  the  State  of  Gujarat  –  by  the  Bombay
\nReorganisation Act, 1960.  Due to  continued  demand  of  the  people  of
\nMarathwada  region for the establishment of a permanent Bench of the High
\nCourt at Aurangabad under sub-section (2) of Section 51 of the  Act,  the
\nState  Government  first  took  up  the issue with the then Chief Justice
\n(Kantawala, C.J.) in 1977.  On March  22,  1978,  the  State  Legislative
\nAssembly  passed  a  unanimous  resolution  supporting  a  demand for the
\nestablishment of a permanent Bench of the High Court at Aurangabad.   The
\nsaid  move  was  also  supported  by the State Bar Council of Maharashtra
\nAdvocates’ Association of Western India,  several  bar  associations  and
\npeople in  general.    The  State  Government  thereafter  took a Cabinet
\ndecision in January, 1981 to establish a  permanent  Bench  of  the  High
\nCourt  at  Aurangabad  and  this  was  conveyed  by  the Secretary to the
\nGovernment of Maharashtra, Law and Judiciary Department, communicated  by
\nhis letter dated 3-2-1981 to the Registrar and he was requested, with the
\npermission   of   the   Chief  Justice,  to  submit  proposals  regarding
\naccommodation for the Court and residential  bungalows  for  the  Judges,
\nstaff, furniture etc.    necessary for setting up the Bench.  As a result
\nof this communication, the Chief Justice wrote to the Chief  Minister  on
\n26-2-1981  signifying  his  consent  to  the establishment of a permanent
\nBench at Aurangabad.  On 20-7-1981, the Law Secretary addressed a  letter
\nto  the  Registrar  requesting him to forward, with the permission of the
\nChief Justice, proposal as is required under sub-section (3)  of  Section
\n51 for  the  setting  up of a Bench at Aurangabad.  In reply to the same,
\nthe Registrar by his letter  dated  24-7-1981  conveyed  that  the  Chief
\nJustice  agreed  with  the suggestion of the State Government that action
\nhad to be taken under sub-section (3) of Section 51 of the Act for  which
\nthe  approval of the Governor was necessary and he enclosed a copy of the
\ndraft order which the Chief Justice proposed to issue  under  sub-section
\n(3) of  Section  51 of the Act.  On 10-8-1981, the Law Secretary conveyed
\nto the Registrar the approval of the Governor.  On 27-8-1981,  the  Chief
\nJustice  issued  an order under sub-section (3) of Section 51 of the Act.
\nThe High Court has set aside the  impugned  notification  issued  by  the
\nChief  Justice  under  sub-section  (3)  of  Section 51 of the Act on the
\nfollowing grounds, namely:  (1) The impugned order issued  by  the  Chief
\nJustice  under  subsection  (3) of Section 51 of the Act was not directly
\nconnected with or related to problems arising out of  the  reorganisation
\nof the States  i.   e.  there is no nexus between the purpose and objects
\nof the Act and the setting up of Aurangabad as  a  venue  for  additional
\nseat  of  the High Court, (2) The provisions of the Act and in particular
\nof Section 51 were not intended to be  operative  indefinitely  and  they
\nwere meant to be exercised either immediately or within a reasonable time
\nand  therefore  the  exercise  of  the  power  by the Chief Justice under
\nsubsection (3) of Section 51 of the Act appointing Aurangabad as a  place
\nwhere the Judges and Division Courts of the High Court may also sit after
\na  lapse  of 26 years is constitutionally impermissible, (3) The State of
\nMaharashtra was not a new State within the meaning  of  Section  51  read
\nwith  section  2  (1)  of  the Act after the bifurcation of the bilingual
\nState of Bombay into the State of Maharashtra and the  newly  constituted
\nState  of  Gujarat under Section 3 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960
\nand therefore the  power  of  the  President  of  India  to  establish  a
\npermanent  Bench  or  Benches  of  the High Court under subsection (2) of
\nSection 51 of the Act and that of the Chief Justice to appoint  with  the
\nprior approval of the Governor a place or places where the Judges and the
\nDivision  Courts  of  the  High  Court may also sit under sub-section (3)
\nthereof, can no longer be exercised, (4) The power conferred on the Chief
\nJustice under sub-section (3) of Section 51 of the Act to appoint a place
\nor places where the Judges or the Division Courts of the High  Court  may
\nalso  sit,  does  not  include a power to establish a Bench or Benches at
\nsuch places, and he had no power or authority under  sub-section  (3)  of
\nSection  51  of the Act to issue administrative directions for the filing
\nor institution of proceedings at such  a  place,  and  (5)  The  impugned
\nnotification issued by the Chief Justice under sub-section (3) of Section
\n51  of the Act was a colourable exercise of power and therefore liable to
\nbe struck down.\n<\/p>\n
In the light of the said contentions, Their Lordships  have  referred  to
\nsub-section (1) of Section 49 and Section 51 of the Bombay Reorganisation
\nAct, 1960  etc.    Regarding  the questions raised by the High Court, the
\nHonourable Supreme  Court  in  para  14  held  that  “the  provisions  of
\nsub-sections  (2)  and  (3)  of Section 51 of the Act are supplemental or
\nincidental to the provisions made by Parliament under Articles 3 and 4 of
\nthe Constitution.  In para 15, Their Lordships have held thus:-\n<\/p>\n
“15.  It is a matter of common knowledge that  Parliament  considered  it
\nnecessary  to  reorganize the existing States in India and to provide for
\nit and other matters connected therewith and with that end in  view,  the
\nStates Reorganisation   Act,   1956   was   enacted.    As  a  result  of
\nreorganization, boundaries of various States changed.  Some of the States
\nmerged into other States in its entirety, while some States got split and
\ncertain parts thereof merged into one State and other parts into another.
\nThese provisions were bound to give rise, and did give rise,  to  various
\ncomplex problems.    These problems are bound to arise from time to time.
\nThe Act is a permanent piece of legislation on the Statute Book.  Section
\n14 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 provides that, where, by any  Central
\nAct  or  Regulation,  any  power  is  conferred,  then unless a different
\nintention appears, that power may be  exercised  from  time  to  time  as
\noccasion arises.    The  section embodies a uniform rule of construction.
\nThat the power may be exercised from time to time  when  occasion  arises
\nunless a contrary intention appears is therefore well settled.  A statute
\ncan be  abrogated only by express or implied repeal.  It cannot fall into
\ndesuetude or become inoperative  through  obsolescence  or  by  lapse  of
\ntime…”\n<\/p>\n
Their Lordships have further held thus:-\n<\/p>\n
“Para  17…It  became  necessary  for the more convenient transaction of
\njudicial business to establish, as from the appointed day, two Benches of
\nthe High Court at Nagpur and Rajkot to deal  with  matters  arising  from
\nVidarbha and Saurashtra regions respectively…\n<\/p>\n
Para 19.    The only other point to be considered, and this was the point
\nprincipally stressed in this appeal, is whether the  power  conferred  on
\nthe  Chief  Justice  under  sub-section  (3)  of Section 51 of the Act to
\nappoint a place or places where the Judges and Division Courts  may  also
\nsit,  does  not  include  a power to establish a Bench or Benches at such
\nplace or places, nor that he had any power  or  authority  thereunder  to
\nissue   administrative  directions  for  the  filing  or  institution  of
\nproceedings at such a place.  There  is  quite  some  discussion  in  the
\njudgment  of  the High Court on the distinction between the “sittings” of
\nthe Judges and Division Courts and the “seat” of the High Court and after
\ngoing into the history of the constitution of the various High Courts  in
\nIndia  and  the  Letters  Patent  constituting such High Courts, the High
\nCourt holds that the exercise of the power by  the  Chief  Justice  under
\nsub-section (3) of Section 51 of the Act is bad in law as it brings about
\na territorial  bifurcation  of  the  High  Court.   According to the High
\nCourt, the Judges and Division Courts at  Aurangabad  were  competent  to
\nhear  and  decide  cases  arising  out of the districts of the Marathwada
\nregion assigned to them by the Chief Justice, but the Chief  Justice  had
\nno  power  or  authority under subsection (3) of Section 51 of the Act to
\nissue  administrative  directions  for  the  filing  or  institution   of
\nproceedings at such a place.  The judgment of the High Court mainly rests
\non  the  decision  of  the  Kerala High Court in Manickam Pillai Subbayya
\nPillai v.  Assistant Registrar, High Court, Kerala, Trivandrum, AIR<\/a>  1958
\nKerala 188  and the minority view of Raina, J.  in Abdul Taiyab Abbasbhai
\nMalik v.  Union of India, AIR 1977 Madh Pra 116 (FB), following the  Kera
\nla view.\n<\/p>\n
Para  20………It  is  impossible to conceive of a High Court without a
\nseat being assigned to it.  The place where it would  sit  to  administer
\njustice  or,  in other words, where its jurisdiction can be invoked is an
\nessential and indispensable feature of the legal institution, known as  a
\nCourt.   Where  there  is  only  one  seat  of  the  High  Court, it must
\nnecessarily have all the attributes of the principal seat.  But where the
\nHigh Court has more than one seat, one of them may  or  may  not  be  the
\nprincipal seat  according  to  the  legislative scheme.  It is both sound
\nreason and commonsense to say that the High Court of Bombay is located at
\nits principal seat at Bombay, but it also has a  seat  at  the  permanent
\nBench at  Nagpur.    When  the  Chief  Justice makes an order in terms of
\nsub-section (3) of Section 51 of the Act that Judges and Division  Courts
\nof  the High Court shall also sit at such other places, the High Court in
\nthe generic sense has also a seat at such other places….\n<\/p>\n
Para 22.    It  must  here  be  mentioned  that  provisions  similar   to
\nsub-section  (3)  of  Section  51  of  the  Act existed in almost all the
\nLetters Patent or the Acts under which the various High Courts have  been
\nconstituted.    While  introducing  the  Bill  of  1861  in  the  British
\nParliament for the establishment  of  the  High  Courts  for  the  Bengal
\nDivision of the Presidency of Fort William and also at Madras and Bombay,
\nSir  Charles  Wood,  Secretary  of  State  for  India, laid stress on the
\nadvantage of the Judges of  the  new  Courts  going  on  circuit  to  try
\ncriminal cases.  He said:\n<\/p>\n
“Now  according to the provisions of this Bill, the Judges of the Supreme
\nCourt may be sent on circuit throughout the country.  ..  ..  ..  It  may
\nbe  impossible  in  a  country like India to bring justice to every man’s
\ndoor, but at all events the system now proposed will bring it far  nearer
\nthan at present.\n<\/p>\n
Para 23.   When we examine the constitution of the various High Courts in
\nIndia, one thing is clear that whenever a High Court was  established  by
\nLetters Patent under Section 1 of the Indian High Courts Act, 1861 called
\nthe  Charter  Act,  or  under Section 113 of the Government of India Act,
\n1935, the High Court was erected and established at  a  particular  place
\nmentioned in  the  Letters Patent.  Section 1 of the Charter Act provided
\nthat it shall be lawful for her Majesty,  by  Letters  Patent  under  the
\ngreat  seal of the United Kingdom, to erect and establish a High Court of
\nJudicature at Fort William at Bengal  for  the  Bengal  Division  of  the
\nPresidency  of the Fort William, and by like Letters Patent, to erect and
\nestablish like High Courts at Madras and Bombay  for  these  Presidencies
\nrespectively.   In pursuance of these provisions by Letters Patent issued
\nby Her Majesty in 1862, the Chartered High Courts of Calcutta, Madras and
\nBombay were established.  In virtue of the powers conferred by Section 16
\nof the Act the Crown by Letters Patent established in 1866 at Agra a High
\nCourt of Judicature for North-Western Provinces  for  the  Presidency  of
\nFort  William,  to be called a High Court of Judicature for North-Western
\nProvinces.  The seat of the High Court for  the  North-Western  Provinces
\nwas  shifted  from  Agra  to  Allahabad  in  1869 and its designation was
\naltered to the High Court of Judicature  at  Allahabad  by  Supplementary
\nLetters  Patent  issued  in  1919  in pursuance of Section 101 (5) of the
\nGovernment of India Act, 1915.  The expression “erect and  establish”  in
\nrelation  to  a  High  Court  meant  nothing  more  than  to indicate the
\nestablishment of the High Court at a  particular  place  where  the  High
\nCourt  was  competent to transact every kind of business arising from any
\npart of the territory within its jurisdiction.\n<\/p>\n
Para 24.  Cl.  31 of these Letters Patent for the High Court of  Calcutta
\nprovides  for  “exercise  of  jurisdiction elsewhere than at the ordinary
\nplace of sitting of the High Court” and it reads as follows:\n<\/p>\n
“And  we  do  further  ordain  that  whenever  it  shall  appear  to  the
\nGovernor-General in Council convenient that the jurisdiction and power by
\nthese  our Letters Patent, or by the recited Act, vested in the said High
\nCourt of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal, should be exercised in any
\nplace  within  the  jurisdiction  of  any  Court  now  subject   to   the
\nsuperintendence  of  the  said  High Court, other than the usual place of
\nsitting of the said High Court, or at  several  such  places  by  way  of
\ncircuit,  the  proceedings  in  cases  before the said High Court at such
\nplace or places shall be regulated by any law relating thereto which  has
\nbeen or may be made by competent legislative authority for India.”\n<\/p>\n
The  Letters  Patent for the High Courts of Madras and Bombay are mutatis
\nmutandis in almost the same terms, Clause  31  of  these  Letters  Patent
\nsimilarly  provided  for  “exercise of jurisdiction elsewhere than at the
\nordinary place of sitting of the High Court.” It would  appear  therefrom
\nthat  the  power  to  direct  that the High Court shall sit at a place or
\nplaces other than the usual place of sitting of these High Courts  was  a
\npower  of  the  Governor-General in Council, and the proceedings in cases
\nbefore the said High Courts at such place or places were to be  regulated
\nby  any law relating thereto which had been or might be made by competent
\nlegislative authority of India.\n<\/p>\n
Para 25…  The creation of a permanent Bench  under  subsection  (2)  of
\nSection   51  of  the  Act  must  therefore  bring  about  a  territorial
\nbifurcation of the High Court.  Under sub-section (1) and subsection  (2)
\nof  section  51  of the Act the President has to act on the advice of the
\nCouncil of Ministers as ordained by Article 74 (1) of  the  Constitution.
\nIn both  the  matters  the decision lies with the Central Government.  In
\ncontrast, the power of the Chief Justice to appoint under sub-section (3)
\nof Section 51 of the Act the sittings of the Judges and  Division  Courts
\nof  the  High Court for a new State at places other than the place of the
\nprincipal seat or the permanent Bench is in the  unquestioned  domain  of
\nthe  Chief  Justice,  the  only condition being that he must act with the
\napproval of the Governor.  It is basically an internal matter  pertaining
\nto the  High Court.  He has full power, authority and jurisdiction in the
\nmatter of allocation of business of the High Court which flows  not  only
\nfrom  the provision contained in sub-section (3) of Section 51 of the Act
\nbut inheres in him in the very nature of things.    The  opinion  of  the
\nChief  Justice to appoint the seat of the High Court for a new State at a
\nplace other than the principal seat under sub-section (3) of  Section  51
\nof  the  Act  must  therefore normally prevail because it is for the more
\nconvenient transaction of judicial business.   The  non  obstante  clause
\ncontained in sub-section (3) of Section 51 gives an over-riding effect to
\nthe power  of  the Chief Justice.  There is no territorial bifurcation of
\nthe High Court merely because the Chief Justice directs under sub-section
\n(3 ) of Section 51 of the Act that the Judges and Division  Courts  shall
\nalso  sit  at  such  other  places  as  he  may, with the approval of the
\nGovernor, appoint.  It  must  accordingly  be  held  that  there  was  no
\nterritorial bifurcation of the Bombay High Court merely because the Chief
\nJustice  by  the  impugned  notification  issued under sub-section (3) of
\nSection 51 of the Act directed that the Judges and Division Courts  shall
\nalso sit at Aurangabad.  The Judges and Division Courts at Aurangabad are
\npart  of the same High Court as those at the principal seat at Bombay and
\nthey exercise jurisdiction as Judges of  the  High  Court  of  Bombay  at
\nAurangabad.  The  Chief Justice acted within the scope of his powers.  We
\nsee no substance in the charge that the impugned notification  issued  by
\nthe  Chief  Justice  under sub-section (3) of Section 51 of the Act was a
\ncolourable exercise of power.\n<\/p>\n
Para 26.  As to the scope and effect of sub-section (3) of Section 51  of
\nthe Act,  the question came up for consideration before Chagla, C.J.  and
\nBadkas, J.  in Seth Manji Dana v.  Commissioner  of  Income-tax,  Bombay,
\nCivil Appeal No.<\/a>   995 of 1957 (Bom), decided on July 22, 1958.  This was
\nan application by which the validity of Rule 254 of  the  Appellate  Side
\nRules   was  challenged  insofar  as  it  provided  that  all  income-tax
\nreferences presented at Nagpur should be heard at the principal  seat  of
\nthe  High Court at Bombay, and the contention was that the result of this
\nrule was that it excluded income-tax references from the jurisdiction  of
\nthe High  Court  functioning  at  Nagpur.    In repelling the contention,
\nChagla, C.J.  observed:\n<\/p>\n
“Legally, the position is quite clear.   Under  Section  51  (3)  of  the
\nStates Reorganization Act, the Judges sitting at Nagpur constitute a part
\nof the  High  Court of Bombay.  They are as much a part of the High Court
\nof Bombay, and if we might say so distinguished part of the High Court of
\nBombay, as if they were sitting under the same roof  under  which  Judges
\nfunction in  Bombay.    All that happens is that the Chief Justice, under
\nthe powers given to him under the Letters Patent distributes the work  to
\nvarious  Judges  and  various  Divisional  Benches, and acting under that
\npower he distributes certain work to the Judges sitting at Nagpur.”
\nHe then continued:\n<\/p>\n
“All that Rule 254 does it to permit as a matter of  convenience  certain
\nmattes to  be  presented  at Nagpur to the Deputy Registrar.  If Rule 254
\nhad not been enacted, all matters would have to be  presented  at  Bombay
\nand  then  the  Chief  Justice  would  have  distributed those matters to
\ndifferent Judges, whether sitting in Bombay or at Nagpur.  It is  out  of
\nregard  and  consideration  for  the  people  of  Vidarbha  and for their
\nconvenience that this rule is enacted, so that litigants  should  not  be
\nput  to  the inconvenience of going to Bombay to present certain matters.
\nTherefore, this particular rule has nothing whatever to  do  either  with
\nSection   51   (3)   of   the  States  Reorganisation  Act  or  with  the
\nConstitution.”\n<\/p>\n
With regard to Rule 254, he went on to say:\n<\/p>\n
“Now, having disposed of the legal aspect of the matter, we turn  to  the
\npractical  aspect,  and  let us consider whether this rule inconveniences
\nthe people at Nagpur.  If  it  does,  it  would  certainly  call  for  an
\namendment of  that  rule.    Now,  there  is  particular  reason  why all
\nIncome-tax References should be heard in Bombay and that reason is  this.
\nThe High Court of Bombay for many years, rightly or wrongly, has followed
\na  particular policy with regard to Income-tax References and that policy
\nis that the same Bench should hear Income-tax References, so  that  there
\nshould  be  a  continuity  with  regard  to  the decisions given on these
\nReferences.  I know that other High Courts have referred to  this  policy
\nwith praise because they have realised that the result of this policy has
\nbeen  that  Income-tax  Law  has  been  laid  down  in a manner which has
\nreceived commendation from various sources.  The other reason is  and  we
\nhope  we  are  not  mistaken  in  saying so that the number of Income-tax
\nReferences from Nagpur are very few.  If the number was large undoubtedly
\na very strong case would be made out for  these  cases  to  be  heard  at
\nNagpur.”\n<\/p>\n
He then concluded:\n<\/p>\n
“After  all, Courts exist for the convenience of the litigants and not in
\norder to maintain any particular system of law or any  particular  system
\nof administration.    Whenever  a Court finds that a particular rule does
\nnot serve the convenience  of  litigants,  the  Court  should  be  always
\nprepared to change the rule.”\n<\/p>\n
The ratio  to  be  deduced from the decision of Chagla, C.J.  is that the
\nJudges and Division Courts sitting at Nagpur were functioning as if  they
\nwere the Judges and Division Courts of the High Court at Bombay.\n<\/p>\n
Finally, Their Lordships have concluded:  (para 27)<\/p>\n
“27…..With  respect,  we  are of the opinion that the view expressed by
\nChagla, C.J.  in Manji Dana’s case, Civil Appeal No.  995  of  1957,  D\/-
\n22-7-1958 (Bom) (supra),  is  to  be  preferred.    Chagla, C.J.  rightly
\nobserves that the  Judges  and  Division  Courts  at  a  temporary  Bench
\nestablished  under  sub-section  (3) of Section 51 of the Act function as
\nJudges and Division Courts of the High Court at the principal  seat,  and
\nwhile  so  sitting  at  such  a  temporary  Bench  they  may exercise the
\njurisdiction and power of the High Court itself in relation  to  all  the
\nmatters entrusted to them.”\n<\/p>\n
It  is  clear  from  the  Supreme Court that the constitution of the High
\nCourt depends on the statute creating it and  also  recognised  that  the
\nprovisions  similar to Section 51 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1 956
\nexisted in all the Letters Patent or the Acts  under  which  the  various
\nHigh Courts have been constituted.\n<\/p>\n
18.  Thus every High Court whether it was created by Letters Patent or by
\nother  Enactments,  they could have Benches outside the principal seat by
\nvirtue of the provisions contained in the Letters Patent or in  the  Acts
\nwhich created  them.  The assumption of the petitioner that Section 51 of
\nthe States Reorganisation Act is only the source of power and that if the
\nHigh Court is not covered by the said Act, it can have no Benches outside
\nthe principal seat is misconceived.  Accordingly the  contention  of  the
\nAdditional  Advocate  General  that in so far as the Madras High Court is
\nconcerned, it could have Benches outside Madras by virtue of Clause 31 of
\nthe Letters Patent, 1865 read with the Adaptation Order, 1937 and 1950 is
\nwell founded.  That apart, the Madras High Court will also be covered  by
\nthe  States  Reorganisation  Act, 1956, since the Madras is also a State,
\nwhich was the subject matter of Reorganisation  in  terms  of  section  4
\nwhich occurs in Part II of the Act.  I have already referred to Section 2\n<\/p>\n
(i)  of Part I and Section 4 of Part II of the Act which would comprehend
\nMadras as the “new State” within the meaning of the said Act.  Section  4
\nof  Part  II of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 speaks about transfer
\nof territory from Travancore-Cochin to Madras.  It says that as from  the
\nappointed  day,  there  shall  be  added  to  the  State  of  Madras  the
\nterritories  comprised  in  the  Agastheeswaram,  Thovala,  Kalkulam  and
\nVilavancode  taluks  of  Trivandrum  district and the Shencottah taluk of
\nQuilon district, and thereupon-\n<\/p>\n
(a) the said territories shall cease to form part
\nof the existing State of Travncore-Cochin;\n<\/p>\n
(b) the territories comprised in the Agastheeswaram,
\nThovala, Kalkulam and Vilavancode taluks shall
\nform a separate district to be known as Kanya kumari
\nDistrict in the State of Madras; and\n<\/p>\n
(c) the territories comprised in the Shencottah taluk
\nshall be included in and become part of Tirunelveli
\ndistrict in the State of Madras.\n<\/p>\n
As rightly argued by  the  learned  Additional  Advocate  General,  those
\nprovisions,  namely,  Section  2  (i) of Part I and Section 4 of Part II,
\nwould comprehend Madras as the “new State”  within  the  meaning  of  the
\nStates Reorganisation  Act.  In any event, as pointed out earlier, Madras
\nHigh Court would have the power to establish Benches outside Madras under
\nthe Letters Patent of 1865.  I have already referred to the  judgment  of
\nthe  Supreme Court reported in All India Reporter 1963 Supreme Court page
\n46 (cited supra), and particularly in para  25,  the  Supreme  Court  has
\nemphasized the power of the Chief Justice which reads as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
“The  power  of  the  Chief  Justice  to appoint under sub-section (3) of
\nSection 51 of the Act the sittings of the Judges and Division  Courts  of
\nthe  High  Court  for  a  new State at places other than the place of the
\nprincipal seat or the permanent Bench is in the  unquestioned  domain  of
\nthe  Chief  Justice,  the  only condition being that he must act with the
\napproval of the Governor.  It is basically an internal matter  pertaining
\nto the  High Court.  He has full power, authority and jurisdiction in the
\nmatter of allocation of business of the High Court which flows  not  only
\nfrom the provision contained in sub-section (3) of Section 51 of the Act,
\nbut inheres in him in the very nature of things.”\n<\/p>\n
Therefore,  so  far  as  Circuit Benches are concerned, it is an internal
\nmatter of the High Court, over which the Chief Justice  is  the  ultimate
\nauthority.  For  all  the above reasons, Writ Petition No.  2402 of 20 02
\ndeserves to be dismissed.\n<\/p>\n
19.  While highlighting the case of the petitioner in Writ  Petition  No.
\n3333 of 2002,  Mr.    K.    Vijayan, learned senior counsel, has raised a
\ncontention that Article 214 of the Constitution  provides  for  one  High
\nCourt for each State and that the impugned decision is opposed to Article\n<\/p>\n
214.   This contention is wholly misconceived and, in fact, is covered by
\nthe Judgment of the Supreme Court reported in  A.I.R.1983  Supreme  Court
\npage 46  (cited  supra).   Paragraph 26 which I have already referred to,
\nlays down that the Judges sitting outside the principal seat are as  much
\na part  of the High Court.  The Supreme Court proceeded to state that the
\nJudges and Division Courts  of  the  High  Court  at  a  temporary  Bench
\nfunction as Judges and Division Courts of the High Court at the principal
\nseat.   In that decision, in paragraph 25 the Supreme Court has also held
\nthat the Judges and Division Courts at Aurangabad are part  of  the  same
\nHigh Court  as those at the principal seat at Bombay.  The above passages
\nof the Supreme Court would clearly answer the above contention.   Learned
\nAdditional Advocate General has also very much relied on another judgment
\nof the  Five Judge Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Bhuwal v.  Deputy
\nDirector of Consolidation (FB),  reported  in  All  India  Reporter  1977
\nAllahabad page  488.    The following two questions have been referred to
\nthe Full Bench for its opinion:\n<\/p>\n
1.  Whether the first proviso to Clause 14  of  the  U.P.    High  Courts
\n(Amalgamation)  Order,  1948,  is  in conflict with the provisions of the
\nConstitution relating to the constitution and organization  of  the  High
\nCourts (namely,  Arts.    214,  230,  231)  and  the  Scheme contemplated
\ntherein, and is saved by Art.  226 or Art.  372 or any other  Article  of
\nthe Constitution after its enforcement on 26-1-1950?\n<\/p>\n
2.   Whether  the  jurisdiction  and  power  of the Allahabad High Court,
\nconferred on the Judges sitting at Lucknow under Clause 14  of  the  U.P.
\nHigh  Courts  (Amalgamation)  Order,  1948,  include the jurisdiction and
\npower under Art.  226 of the Constitution?\n<\/p>\n
As far as the first question is concerned, Sri S.P.  Gupta,  counsel  for
\nthe  petitioner  in  that  case,  submitted  that  the  first  proviso to
\nparagraph 14 of the United Provinces High  Courts  (Amalgamation)  Order,
\n1948  is consistent (sic) (inconsistent?) with Articles 214, 226, 227 and
\n228 of the Constitution and also the general scheme of  the  constitution
\nof the High Courts under the Constitution.  It was contended that Article
\n214 of the Constitution provides for the existence of a single High Court
\nin  each  State  and there cannot be two separate judiciaries in the same
\nState.  It was urged that the test of singularity of  a  High  Court,  as
\ncontemplated  by  the  Constitution, in a State should be its capacity to
\njudicially function throughout its territory from the place where  it  is
\nerected.  The singularity of the Chief Justice or common set of Judges or
\na   common  seal  should  not  be  the  correct  test  to  find  out  the
\nconstitutionally contemplated  singularity.    It  was   submitted   that
\naccording to  the  decision  of the Supreme Court in Nasiruddin v.  State
\nTransport Appellate  Tribunal  (AIR<\/a>  1976  S.C.    331)  on   a   correct
\ninterpretation  of  the  first  proviso to paragraph 14 of the Order, the
\nJudges at Lucknow have exclusive jurisdiction in respect of cases arising
\nin the areas in Oudh and the  Judges  and  Division  Benches  sitting  at
\nAllahabad  High  Court have no jurisdiction to entertain cases in respect
\nof the areas of Oudh.  This, it was contended, in substance  amounted  to
\nthe  existence  of  two  separate  judiciaries  in the same State and ran<\/p>\n
counter to Articles 214, 226, 227 and 228 of the Constitution.  The  said
\ncontention was hotly disputed by the counsel appearing for the other side
\ni.e Oudh Bar Association.  Their conclusion at para 5 is relevant:\n<\/p>\n
“5.   As  a  result  of  paragraph 3 of the Order, as from the 26th July,
\n1948, the then High Court at Allahabad and the erstwhile Chief  Court  in
\nOudh  stood  amalgamated and a new High Court was constituted by the name
\nof the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad.  By reason of paragraph  4,
\nthe  permanent  Judges  of  the two erstwhile Courts and their additional
\nJudges became permanent or additional  Judges  of  the  new  High  Court.
\nInstead  of  there continuing to remain two Chief Justices, the erstwhile
\nChief Justice of Allahabad High Court became the Chief Justice of the new
\nHigh Court.  Paragraph 7 (1) provides that:\n<\/p>\n
“The new High Court shall have, in respect of the  whole  of  the  United
\nProvinces,  all such original, appellate and other jurisdiction as, under
\nthe law in force immediately before the appointed day, is exercisable  in
\nrespect  of  any  part  of  that  Province by either of the existing High
\nCourts.”\n<\/p>\n
The submission made by Sri Gupta loses sight of a clear distinction  that
\nexists  between  the High Court as such and the Judges who constitute it.
\nAs held by the majority of the Judges constituting the Full Bench of this
\nCourt in Nirmal Dass Khaturia v.  State Transport ( Appellate)  Tribunal,
\nU.P.   Lucknow  (AIR  1972  All  200  (FB,  the  nature and extent of the
\njurisdiction enjoyed by a court and the manner in which that jurisdiction
\nwill be  exercised  are  two  distinct  matters.    How  and  where   the
\njurisdiction  will be exercised by the Judges are matters governed by the
\npractice and procedure  prescribed  by  law  and  the  place  of  sitting
\nappointed for  them.    In  our  opinion  while  paragraph 7 of the Order
\ndefines the jurisdiction of the new High Court, paragraph 14 is concerned
\nwith the manner in which that jurisdiction is to be exercised.    It  was
\nnot  disputed  before  us  that it is open to the Chief Justice under the
\nRules of the Court to allocate different classes of cases  to  individual
\nJudges or Division Benches of this Court.  Thus the Chief Justice has the
\npower  to  order that individual Judges or Division Benches of this Court
\nwill entertain cases arising out of separate districts of the State.   In
\nthe  event  of such an order being passed, it cannot be contended that in
\nsubstance the High Court had been split up merely because by reason of an
\norder of the Chief  Justice  other  Judges  of  the  Court  do  not  have
\njurisdiction  to  entertain  and  decide  cases arising out of a district
\nallocated to a particular Judge or Division Bench.  The first proviso  to
\nparagraph  14,  in  our  opinion,  amounts  to  no  more than a statutory
\nallocation of cases arising out of certain district to the Judges of this
\nCourt sitting at Lucknow and is in no fashion,  in  conflict  with  Arts.
\n214, 226, 227 or 228 or any other provisions of the Constitution.”\n<\/p>\n
Finally  they  concluded that the jurisdiction and power of the Allahabad
\nHigh Court conferred on the Judges sitting at Lucknow under paragraph  14
\nof the  U.P.    High  Courts  (Amalgamation)  Order,  1948,  include  the
\njurisdiction and power under Article 226 of the Constitution.    By  this
\njudgment,  the Allahabad High Court has clearly held that paragraph 14 of
\nthe U.P.  High Courts  (Amalgamation)Order  which  provides  for  Benches
\noutside the  principal seat is valid.  While doing so, the Full Bench has
\nheld that there was no violation of Article 14  of  the  Constitution  of
\nIndia.\n<\/p>\n
20.   Accordingly,  I  reject  the first contention raised by the learned
\nsenior counsel for the petitioner.\n<\/p>\n
21.  The second contention of Mr.  Vijayan, learned  senior  counsel,  is
\nthat  the  jurisdiction to deal with High Courts is a Parliamentary power
\nunder Entry 78 of List I and in the absence of any Parliamentary  Law  or
\nConstitutional provision,  no  such  decision  can  be taken.  As rightly
\nargued by  the  learned  Additional  Advocate  General,  this  contention
\nignores Articles 225 and 372 of the Constitution, which read as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
“Article 225.    Jurisdiction  of  existing  High Courts.- Subject to the
\nprovisions of this Constitution and to the provisions of any law  of  the
\nappropriate  Legislature  made  by  virtue  of  powers  conferred on that
\nLegislature by this  Constitution,  the  jurisdiction  of,  and  the  law
\nadministered  in,  any  existing High Court, and the respective powers of
\nthe Judges thereof in relation to the administration of  justice  in  the
\nCourt,  including  any  power  to make rules of Court and to regulate the
\nsittings of the Court and of members thereof sitting alone or in Division
\nCourts, shall be the same as immediately before the commencement of  this
\nConstitution:\n<\/p>\n
Provided   that  any  restriction  to  which  the  exercise  of  original
\njurisdiction by any of  the  High  Courts  with  respect  to  any  matter
\nconcerning  the  revenue  or  concerning  any  act ordered or done in the
\ncollection thereof was subject immediately  before  the  commencement  of
\nthis  Constitution  shall  no  longer  apply  to  the  exercise  of  such
\njurisdiction.\n<\/p>\n
Article 372.    Continuance  in  force  of  existing   laws   and   their
\nadaptation.-  (1)  Notwithstanding the repeal by this Constitution of the
\nenactments referred to in Article 395 but subject to the other provisions
\nof this Constitution, all the laws in force in  the  territory  of  India
\nimmediately  before  the commencement of this Constitution shall continue
\nin force therein until altered or repealed  or  amended  by  a  competent
\nLegislature or other competent authority.\n<\/p>\n
(2) For the purpose of bringing the provisions of any law in force in the
\nterritory  of India into accord with the provisions of this Constitution,
\nthe President may by order make such  adaptations  and  modifications  of
\nsuch  law,  whether by way of repeal or amendment, as may be necessary or
\nexpedient, and provide that the law shall, as from such date  as  may  be
\nspecified  in  the  order,  have  effect  subject  to the adaptations and
\nmodifications so made, and any such adaptation or modification shall  not
\nbe questioned in any court of law.\n<\/p>\n
(3) Nothing in clause (2) shall be deemed-\n<\/p>\n
(a)  to  empower  the President to make any adaptation or modification of
\nany law after the expiration of three years from the commencement of this
\nConstitution; or\n<\/p>\n
(b) to prevent any competent Legislature  or  other  competent  authority
\nfrom  repealing  or amending any law adapted or modified by the President
\nunder the said clause.\n<\/p>\n
Explanation I.- The expression “law  in  force”  in  this  article  shall
\ninclude  a  law  passed  or  made  by  a  Legislature  or other competent
\nauthority in the territory of  India  before  the  commencement  of  this
\nConstitution  and  not  previously  repealed,  notwithstanding that it or
\nparts of it may not be then in operation either at all or  in  particular
\nareas.\n<\/p>\n
Explanation  II.-  Any  law  passed  or  made  by  a Legislature or other
\ncompetent authority in the territory of India  which  immediately  before
\nthe commencement of this constitution had extraterritorial effect as well
\nas  effect  in  the  territory  of  India  shall,  subject  to  any  such
\nadaptations  and  modifications  as  aforesaid,  continue  to  have  such
\nextra-territorial effect.\n<\/p>\n
Explanation   III.-  Nothing  in  this  article  shall  be  construed  as
\ncontinuing any temporary law in force  beyond  the  date  fixed  for  its
\nexpiration   or  the  date  on  which  it  would  have  expired  if  this
\nConstitution had not come into force.\n<\/p>\n
Explanation IV.- An Ordinance promulgated by the Governor of  a  Province
\nunder  section  88  of  the  Government  of India Act, 1935, and in force
\nimmediately before the commencement of this  Constitution  shall,  unless
\nwithdrawn  by  the  Governor of the corresponding State earlier, cease to
\noperate at the expiration of six weeks from the first meeting after  such<\/p>\n
commencement  of the Legislative Assembly of that State functioning under
\nclause (1) of Article 382, and nothing in this article shall be construed
\nas continuing any such Ordinance in force beyond the said period.”\n<\/p>\n
As rightly argued by the learned Additional Advocate General, while under
\nthe Constitution, the power to deal with Jurisdiction of Courts is vested
\nin the Parliament under Entry  78  List  I,  the  same  Constitution  has
\nenacted  Article 372 which continues in force all existing Laws including
\nthe Letters Patent and also has enacted Article 225 which  provides  that
\nuntil  a  Law  passed  by  an  appropriate Legislature, the Jurisdiction,
\npowers  of  Courts  shall  be  the  same  as   immediately   before   the
\nConstitution.   Thus,  the  Letters  Patent  and  the  various Acts which
\ncreated the High Courts continued to be Laws in force and  saved  by  the
\nConstitution,  which  provided  for Benches to be established outside the
\nprincipal seat.\n<\/p>\n
22.  The scheme  of  the  Constitution  also  is  clear  by  the  various
\nEnactments  brought  about  under  the Constitution, which while creating
\nHigh Courts provided for the Benches to be established at places  outside
\nthe principal  seat.   It may useful to refer to a Full Bench Judgment of
\nthe Andhra Pradesh High Court, reported in 1957 Andhra Pradesh  page  49,
\nwherein  the  Full  Bench  has  construed  that  the Letters Patent would
\nconstitute Laws in force  within  the  meaning  of  Article  225  of  the
\nConstitution.  In  Dimitrios Paizis v.  Motor Vessel “Nicos”, reported in
\nA.I.R.  1983 Bombay page 178 would also  go  to  show  that  the  Letters
\nPatent  was an existing Law, which continued to be in force, by virtue of
\nthe Government of India  Act,  1915  and  1935;  accordingly  the  second
\ncontention of  Mr.K.   Vijayan, learned senior counsel for the petitioner
\ndeserves to be rejected.\n<\/p>\n
23.  The third contention of Mr.  K.  Vijayan was that Clause 31  of  the
\nLetters  Patent  cannot  be  invoked  since  the  expression `Governor in
\nCouncil’ is used therein and there is no such authority in existence.  In
\nthis context, it is to be noted that learned Additional Advocate  General
\nhas  already  referred  to  the Government of India (Adaptation of Indian
\nLaws) Order, 1937 and the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950, as  per  which,
\nthe  expression  `Governor in Council’ had become ‘provincial Government’
\nand thereafter ‘State Government’.  The expression ‘State Government’, as
\ndefined in Section 3 (60) (c) ( which is applicable at present) means the
\nGovernor and, therefore, the expression ‘Governor’ has to be read in  the
\nplace  of  the  expression  ‘  Governor  in  Council’ in Clause 31 of the
\nLetters Patent.  Learned Additional Advocate General  has  also  produced
\nthe  relevant  extract from the Government of India (Adaptation of Indian
\nLaws) Order, 1937  as  well  as  the  Adaptation  of  Laws  Order,  1950.
\nAccordingly,  the  third contention of the learned senior counsel for the
\npetitioner is also liable to be rejected.\n<\/p>\n
24.  It may also be useful to refer a decision of the Apex Court in  S.I.
\nCorporation (P.) Ltd.    V.  Secretary, Board of Revenue, reported in All
\nIndia Reporter 1964 page 207 which lays down that the expression “subject
\nto the provisions of the Constitution” occurring in Article  225  of  the
\nConstitution   means   that  it  should  not  be  inconsistent  with  the
\nConstitutional Provisions other than the question relating to Legislative
\ncompetence.  In other words, the Supreme Court has held that all existing
\nlaws will  continue  in  force  without  reference  to  the  question  of
\nLegislative  competence,  subject  to the same being not in conflict with
\nany specific provision of the Constitution.  Clause  31  of  the  Letters
\nPatent  has  not  been  shown to be in conflict with any provision of the
\nConstitution.  On the other hand, the said provision is  consistent  with
\nthe  scheme  of  the  Constitution, more particularly Article 231 (2) (c)
\nwhich contemplates a common High Court for two or more States to  have  a
\nBench in  a  place  other  than  the principal seat.  That apart, several
\nenactments passed by the Parliament transferable to Entry 78  List  I  to
\nthe  VII  Schedule contained provision providing for the establishment of
\nBenches  outside  the  place  where  the  principal  seat  is   situated.
\nAccordingly,  there  is  no merit in any one of the contentions raised by
\nMr.  K.  Vijayan, learned senior counsel.  Though he has  referred  to  a
\ndecision  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  Federation  of  Bar Association in
\nKarnataka v.  Union of India, reported in 2000 (5) Supreme 267 :   (2000)
\n6 S.C.C.    page  714,  even in the penultimate paragraph Their Lordships
\nhave observed that there is no  use  in  harping  on  the  situations  in
\ncertain  other  larger  States where High Courts have benches established
\naway from the principal seat due to  variety  of  reasons.    In  such  a
\ncircumstance,  I  am of the view that the said decision is not helpful to
\nthe petitioner’s case.\n<\/p>\n
25.  In the light of what is stated above, there are  no  merits  in  the
\nabove writ petitions and they are liable to be dismissed.  Before parting
\nwith  these  cases,  as stated earlier, both the writ petitions have been
\nfiled by two practicing  advocates  of  the  High  Court,  Madras.    The
\npetitioner  in the former case got enrolled in the year 1986 and has been
\npractising in this Court on all branches of law.  Though  the  petitioner
\nin  the  latter case did not set out the details regarding his enrolment,
\nhowever, it is stated that he is a practising lawyer in the  Madras  High
\nCourt.   There  is no explanation by either of them for filing these writ
\npetitions at  this  juncture.    It  is  pertinent  to  note  that   only
\nconsidering  the  plight  of the litigant public, escalation in transport
\nand  other  incidental  charges,  the  Committee  has   recommended   the
\nconstitution of  a Bench at Madurai.  According to the learned Additional
\nAdvocate General, the structural work for the Madurai Bench  has  already
\nbeen completed.    It  is  not their case that they were not aware of the
\nreport of the Jaswandh Singh Commission recommending  constitution  of  a
\nBench  at  Madurai  for  the  benefit of the litigant public hailing from
\nSouthern Districts, and of the earmarking of substantial amount  for  the
\nconstruction  of  the  Court-halls,  administrative  blocks,  residential
\nquarters for the Judges etc.  even a year back.  The  details  about  the
\norders  passed  by the Government and the stages of construction work, as
\nwell as the inspection by the  Hon’ble  Chief  Justice  etc.,  have  been
\nflashed by the Medias at every stage.  As stated earlier, the petitioners
\nbeing practising advocates in the High Court, they cannot plead ignorance
\nof the  above  developments.    As  rightly  pointed  out  by the learned
\nAdditional Advocate General, both the writ petitions have to be dismissed
\nin limine on the ground of laches.  Even on merits, as stated above,  the
\nwrit  petitions  are  lacking even the basic ingredients justifying their
\nclaim.  In any event, this Court places on record its displeasure in  the
\nact  of  the  petitioners in filing these writ petitions unmindful of the
\nprecious time of this Court which otherwise could have been  utilised  in
\nother better  and  genuine  cases.    This  Court  places  o n record the
\nstrenuous efforts made by the  learned  Additional  Advocate  General  in
\nplacing all the relevant materials to arrive at a just decision.\n<\/p>\n
26.   For  all  the above reasons, both the writ petitions are dismissed.
\nNo costs.  Consequently, W.P.M.P.Nos.  3331 and 4684  of  2002  are  also
\ndismissed.\n<\/p>\n
26-02-2002
\nIndex:- Yes\/No\/I
\nR.B.\n<\/p>\n
P.  SATHASIVAM,J.\n<\/p>\n
P.D.Common Order
\nin W.P.Nos.2402
\nand 3333 of 2002
\nand WPMP.Nos.\n<\/p>\n
3331 and 4684\/2002  <\/p>\n
Dt:- 26-02-2002<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Madras High Court K. Sridhar Kumar vs The Union Of India on 26 February, 2002 IN THE HIGH COURRT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS Dated:- 26-02-2002 Coram The hon’ble Mr. Justice P. SATHASIVAM Writ Petition Nos. 2402 of 2002 and Writ Petition Nos.3333 of 2002 and W.P.M.P. Nos. 3331 of 2002 and W.P.M.P. Nos. 4684 of […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[8,13],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-234198","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-high-court","category-madras-high-court"],"yoast_head":"\nK. Sridhar Kumar vs The Union Of India on 26 February, 2002 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/k-sridhar-kumar-vs-the-union-of-india-on-26-february-2002\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"K. Sridhar Kumar vs The Union Of India on 26 February, 2002 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/k-sridhar-kumar-vs-the-union-of-india-on-26-february-2002\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2002-02-25T18:30:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2017-01-27T06:58:11+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@legaliadmin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@Legal_india\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"50 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/k-sridhar-kumar-vs-the-union-of-india-on-26-february-2002#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/k-sridhar-kumar-vs-the-union-of-india-on-26-february-2002\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\"},\"headline\":\"K. Sridhar Kumar vs The Union Of India on 26 February, 2002\",\"datePublished\":\"2002-02-25T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2017-01-27T06:58:11+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/k-sridhar-kumar-vs-the-union-of-india-on-26-february-2002\"},\"wordCount\":9939,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"articleSection\":[\"High Court\",\"Madras High Court\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/k-sridhar-kumar-vs-the-union-of-india-on-26-february-2002#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/k-sridhar-kumar-vs-the-union-of-india-on-26-february-2002\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/k-sridhar-kumar-vs-the-union-of-india-on-26-february-2002\",\"name\":\"K. Sridhar Kumar vs The Union Of India on 26 February, 2002 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"2002-02-25T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2017-01-27T06:58:11+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/k-sridhar-kumar-vs-the-union-of-india-on-26-february-2002#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/k-sridhar-kumar-vs-the-union-of-india-on-26-february-2002\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/k-sridhar-kumar-vs-the-union-of-india-on-26-february-2002#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"K. Sridhar Kumar vs The Union Of India on 26 February, 2002\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"name\":\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"description\":\"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"alternateName\":\"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"alternateName\":\"Legal India\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"width\":512,\"height\":512,\"caption\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.facebook.com\\\/LegalindiaCom\\\/\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/Legal_india\"]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\",\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Legal India Admin\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/legaliadmin\"],\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/author\\\/legal-india-admin\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"K. Sridhar Kumar vs The Union Of India on 26 February, 2002 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/k-sridhar-kumar-vs-the-union-of-india-on-26-february-2002","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"K. Sridhar Kumar vs The Union Of India on 26 February, 2002 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","og_url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/k-sridhar-kumar-vs-the-union-of-india-on-26-february-2002","og_site_name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","article_published_time":"2002-02-25T18:30:00+00:00","article_modified_time":"2017-01-27T06:58:11+00:00","og_image":[{"width":512,"height":512,"url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Legal India Admin","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@legaliadmin","twitter_site":"@Legal_india","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Legal India Admin","Est. reading time":"50 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/k-sridhar-kumar-vs-the-union-of-india-on-26-february-2002#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/k-sridhar-kumar-vs-the-union-of-india-on-26-february-2002"},"author":{"name":"Legal India Admin","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea"},"headline":"K. Sridhar Kumar vs The Union Of India on 26 February, 2002","datePublished":"2002-02-25T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2017-01-27T06:58:11+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/k-sridhar-kumar-vs-the-union-of-india-on-26-february-2002"},"wordCount":9939,"commentCount":0,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"articleSection":["High Court","Madras High Court"],"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/k-sridhar-kumar-vs-the-union-of-india-on-26-february-2002#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/k-sridhar-kumar-vs-the-union-of-india-on-26-february-2002","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/k-sridhar-kumar-vs-the-union-of-india-on-26-february-2002","name":"K. Sridhar Kumar vs The Union Of India on 26 February, 2002 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website"},"datePublished":"2002-02-25T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2017-01-27T06:58:11+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/k-sridhar-kumar-vs-the-union-of-india-on-26-february-2002#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/k-sridhar-kumar-vs-the-union-of-india-on-26-february-2002"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/k-sridhar-kumar-vs-the-union-of-india-on-26-february-2002#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"K. Sridhar Kumar vs The Union Of India on 26 February, 2002"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","description":"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"alternateName":"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization","name":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","alternateName":"Legal India","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","width":512,"height":512,"caption":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","https:\/\/x.com\/Legal_india"]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea","name":"Legal India Admin","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Legal India Admin"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com","https:\/\/x.com\/legaliadmin"],"url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/author\/legal-india-admin"}]}},"modified_by":null,"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/234198","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=234198"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/234198\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=234198"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=234198"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=234198"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}