{"id":235473,"date":"2008-04-21T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2008-04-20T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/surjit-singh-vs-mahanagar-telephone-nigam-ltd-on-21-april-2008"},"modified":"2017-02-03T04:32:28","modified_gmt":"2017-02-02T23:02:28","slug":"surjit-singh-vs-mahanagar-telephone-nigam-ltd-on-21-april-2008","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/surjit-singh-vs-mahanagar-telephone-nigam-ltd-on-21-april-2008","title":{"rendered":"Surjit Singh vs Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd on 21 April, 2008"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Surjit Singh vs Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd on 21 April, 2008<\/div>\n
Author: M Katju<\/div>\n
Bench: H. K. Sema, Markandey Katju<\/div>\n
           CASE NO.:\nAppeal (civil)  5354 of 2002\n\nPETITIONER:\nSurjit Singh\n\nRESPONDENT:\nMahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT: 21\/04\/2008\n\nBENCH:\nH. K. Sema & Markandey Katju\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
J U D G M E N T
\nREPORTABLE<\/p>\n
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5354 OF 2002<\/p>\n
Markandey Katju, J.\n<\/p>\n
1.\tThis appeal by special leave has been filed against the impugned
\njudgment of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court dated 10.1.2002 in
\nLPA No. 665 of 2001.\n<\/p>\n
2.\tHeard Shri R.L. Kapoor, learned counsel for the appellant and Shri
\nAmarendra Saran, learned Addl. Solicitor General for the respondent.\n<\/p>\n
3.\tThe facts of the case are that the appellant and his wife are living
\ntogether at their residence in Rajouri Garden, Delhi.  At that residence, there
\nis one telephone line bearing No. 5121187 in the name of appellant Surjit
\nSingh and there is also another telephone line bearing No. 5416493 at the
\nsame residence in the name of the appellant’s wife.  There is a third
\ntelephone line bearing No. 3265301 in the name of the appellant and
\ninstalled at the business premises of the appellant at 1195, Chahrahat
\nBuilding, Jama Masjid, Delhi.\n<\/p>\n
4.\tIt appears that there were arrears of telephone dues in connection with
\nline No. 5416493 which was in the name of the appellant’s wife.  For non-
\npayment of the telephone dues in connection with this line, the other two
\nlines in the name of the appellant being 5121187 at his residential premises
\nand line No. 3265301 at his business premises were disconnected.\n<\/p>\n
5.\tThe contention of the appellant was that the telephone lines in his own
\nname being line No. 5121187 at his residence and line No. 3265301 at his
\nbusiness premises should not be disconnected on account of non-payment of
\ndues in connection with the line in the name of his wife being line No.
\n5416493.  He contended that he and his wife are two separate legal entities,
\nand he could not be penalized for the fault of his wife.\n<\/p>\n
6.\tThe appellant filed a writ petition in the Delhi High Court which was
\ndismissed by a learned Single Judge  by his judgment dated 25.9.2001 and
\nhis appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court was also dismissed
\nby the impugned judgment dated 10.1.2002.  Hence, this appeal before this
\nCourt.\n<\/p>\n
7.\tLearned counsel for the appellant has relied on Rule 443 of the Indian
\nTelegraph Rules which states:\n<\/p>\n
“443.  Default of payment — If, on or before the due date,
\nthe rent or other charges in respect of the telephone
\nservice provided are not paid by the subscriber in
\naccordance with these rules, or bills for charges in
\nrespect of calls of phonograms or other dues from the
\nsubscriber are not duly paid by him, any telephone or
\ntelephones or any telex service rented by him, may be
\ndisconnected without notice.  The telephone or
\ntelephones, or the telex so disconnected may, if the
\nTelegraph Authority thinks fit, be restored, if the
\ndefaulting subscriber pays the outstanding dues and the
\nreconnection fee together with the rental for such portion
\nof the intervening period as may be prescribed by the
\nTelegraph Authority from time to time.  The subscriber
\nshall pay all the above charges within such period as may
\nbe prescribed by the telegraph authority from time to
\ntime.”\n<\/p>\n
8.\tLearned counsel for the appellant submitted that in view of Rule 443
\nthe telephone lines in the name of the appellant could not have been
\ndisconnected because of non-payment of dues in respect of the line in the
\nname of his wife.\n<\/p>\n
9.\tLearned counsel for the appellant invited our attention to the decision
\nof a Learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in Dr. B.V. Manek
\nvs. Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd AIR 1996 Bom 53.  We have
\ncarefully perused the aforesaid decision and find that it is distinguishable.  In
\nthat case, the telephone line of the petitioner had been disconnected because
\nof non-payment of the dues of another line which was in the name of his
\nfather.  The learned Single Judge of the High Court held that the Department
\ncannot disconnect the telephone of the subscriber on account of the default
\ncommitted by a relation of such subscriber.  \tIt has not been mentioned in the
\nsaid decision of the Bombay High Court that the petitioner’s father was
\neconomically dependent on the petitioner.\n<\/p>\n
10.\tIn the present case which is before us it has come on the record that
\nthe appellant’s wife is a housewife who is living with the appellant at his
\nresidential premises at Rajouri Garden, Delhi.  It has not been alleged that
\nthe appellant’s wife has an independent source of income by doing some
\nbusiness or by some service etc.   In these circumstances, it can be inferred
\nthat the payment of the bill of the telephone line in the name of the
\nappellant’s wife was being made by the appellant himself, since his wife has
\nno independent source of income and is economically dependent on him.\n<\/p>\n
11.\tIn our opinion, we have to draw a distinction between the cases where
\na relative who though living in the same house has an independent source of
\nincome, and cases where one relative is dependent on another. While in the
\nformer case if there are two different lines, one in the name of the relative
\nwho is economically independent and has his own source of income and the
\nother in the name of the petitioner, it could be held that non-payment of dues
\nby the relative cannot lead to the consequence of the disconnection of the
\ntelephone line of the petitioner.  However, in the latter category of cases i.e.
\nwhere one relative is economically dependent on another, the position, in our
\nopinion, is wholly different.  For instance, if there is a telephone line in the
\nname of a minor child of a father, and another telephone line in the name of
\nthe father, and both of them are living together in the same house, then
\nobviously the telephone bills of the telephone line in the name of the minor
\nchild is being paid by the father.  Hence, in our opinion, for non-payment of
\nthe bills of the telephone line in the name of the minor child, the telephone
\nline of the father can be disconnected.\n<\/p>\n
12.\tSimilarly, there can be a case where the husband and wife are living in
\nthe same house and both have independent sources of income, and the wife
\nherself is paying for the bills in connection with the telephone line in her
\nown name, whereas the husband is paying for the bills of his own telephone
\nline.  In such a case, for non-payment of the bill of the wife the telephone
\nline of the husband cannot be disconnected.\n<\/p>\n
13.\tAs stated above, in the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the
\nBombay High Court, it is not mentioned that the father was economically
\ndependent on the petitioner.  Hence, the aforesaid decision can be of no help
\nin deciding the present dispute, since necessary factual details are lacking.\n<\/p>\n
14.\tLearned counsel for the appellant then invited our attention to the
\ndecision of a learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Y.
\nPridhvi Kumar vs. The General Manager, Telecom District, Hyderabad
\nAIR 1993 AP 131.   We have carefully perused the said decision and find
\nthat that decision is also distinguishable.  In the said decision it appears that
\nthere was a telephone line in the name of the mother and another telephone
\nline in the name of the son, and both were living together.  There were dues
\nin the name of the mother and it was held by the Andhra Pradesh High Court
\nthat in that situation the liability could not be fastened on the son and his
\ntelephone line could not be disconnected.  It is not clear from the aforesaid
\ndecision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court whether the mother was
\neconomically dependent on her son.  It is quite possible that the mother was
\neconomically dependent on her husband who was paying her bills.  It is also
\npossible that the mother was a working woman with an independent source
\nof income.  Hence, the appellant in the present case cannot derive any
\nbenefit from the aforesaid decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court.\n<\/p>\n
15.\tLearned counsel for the appellant also sought to rely on the decision
\nin Santokh Singh vs. Divisional Engineer, Telephones, Shillong and
\nothers AIR 1990 Gauhati 47.  However, it appears that an appeal was filed
\nagainst the aforesaid judgment in this Court being Civil Appeal No.
\n2849\/1991 titled Divisional Engineer Telephone & Ors. vs. Sardar
\nSantokh Singh decided on 22.4.2001 by this Court.  In the said decision it
\nwas held that the judgment of the Gauhati High Court in Santokh Singh vs.
\nDivisional Engineer Telephone & Ors shall not be treated as a precedent.\n<\/p>\n
16.\tOn the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent has relied on
\nthe decision of a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Madan Tayal
\n& Pran Kr. Tayal vs. MTNL 1989 (16) DRJ 51, the decision of a learned
\nSingle Judge of the Delhi High Court in Rajiv Gosain vs. MTNL in Civil
\nWrit Petition No. 6343\/1981 decided on 20.4.2000, and the decision of a
\nlearned Single Judge of Delhi High Court in Sukh Dayal Narula vs. MTNL
\nin Civil Writ Petition No. 1693\/1996 decided on 26.9.1997.  In these
\ndecisions the Delhi High Court has held that the telephone line of a
\nsubscriber can be disconnected for non-payment of dues of a relative who is
\nliving in the same premises.  Learned counsel also relied on the decision of
\nthe Gujarat High Court in Indravadan Pranlal Shah vs. General
\nManager, Ahmedabad Telephones District Kharpur, Ahmedabad &
\nAnr. AIR 1990 Guj 85 in which it was held that the telephone of the
\npetitioner can be disconnected if there is failure by the firm in which he is a
\npartner to pay the dues of the telephone line in the name of the firm.\n<\/p>\n
17.\tLearned counsel for the appellant has invited our attention to Rule
\n2(pp) of the Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951 which defines a ‘subscriber’ as
\nfollows:\n<\/p>\n
” ‘Subscriber’ means a person to whom a telephone
\nservice has been provided by means of an installation
\nunder these rules or under an agreement”.\n<\/p>\n
18.\tLearned counsel for the appellant submitted that in view of the
\ndefinition of subscriber in Rule 2(pp), the telephone lines in the name of the
\nappellant could not have been disconnected for default in the payment of
\ndues in connection with the telephone line in the name of his wife.\n<\/p>\n
19.\tWe have already stated above that where two relatives are living in
\nthe same house a distinction has to be drawn between a telephone line in the
\nname of a person who is economically dependent on another (who may be
\nthe husband, father etc.), and the telephone line in the name of a person who
\nhas an independent source of income from which he is paying the telephone
\nbills.  In the case of the former, i.e. a person who is economically dependent
\non another who is paying his telephone bills, the telephone line in the name
\nof such other relative on whom the subscriber is dependent can be
\ndisconnected for non-payment of the telephone bills of the nominal
\nsubscriber.\n<\/p>\n
20.\tLearned counsel for the appellant protested that such an interpretation
\nwould be in the teeth of the language used in Rule 443 read with Rule 2(pp)
\nof the Indian Telegraph Rules.\n<\/p>\n
21.\tIt is true that on a literal interpretation of Rule 443, we would have to
\naccept the contention of learned counsel for the appellant.  However, in our
\nopinion, in this case, the literal rule has not to be adopted, because we have
\nalso to see the intention of the rule.  The intention obviously was that
\npayment of telephone dues should be made promptly, otherwise the
\ntelephone department will suffer.  We have, therefore, to take an
\ninterpretation which effectuates and furthers the intention of Rule 443, i.e.
\nthe telephone bills should be paid in time.\n<\/p>\n
22.\tIn the case of a wife who is a housewife and is economically
\ndependent on her husband, obviously the telephone bills in connection with
\nthe line in her name are being paid by her husband and not by herself.
\nHence, we have to adopt a purposive construction in this case and not go by
\nthe literal rule of interpretation.\n<\/p>\n
23.\tThough, no doubt, ordinarily the literal rule should be applied while
\ninterpreting a statute or statutory rule, but the literal rule is not always the
\nonly rule of interpretation of a provision in a statute, and in exceptional
\ncases the literal rule can be departed from.  As observed in the Constitution
\nBench decision of this Court in R.L. Arora vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and
\nothers<\/a> 1964 (6) SCR 784:\n<\/p>\n
“Further, a literal interpretation is not always the only
\ninterpretation of a provision in a statute, and the court has
\nto look at the setting in which the words are used and the
\ncircumstances in which the law came to be passed to
\ndecide whether there is something implicit behind the
\nwords actually used which would control the literal
\nmeaning of the words used in a provision of the statute.
\nIt is permissible to control the wide language used in a
\nstatute if that is possible by the setting in which the
\nwords are used and the intention of the law-making body
\nwhich may be apparent from the circumstances in which
\nthe particular provision came to be made.”\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t\t\t (emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
24.\tHence it follows that to interpret a statute one has to sometimes
\nconsider the context in which it has been made and the purpose and object
\nwhich it seeks to achieve.  A too literal interpretation may sometimes
\nfrustrate the very object of the statute, and such an approach should be
\neschewed by the Court.\n<\/p>\n
25.\tIn Hindustan Lever Ltd. vs. Ashok Vishnu Kate and others<\/a>
\n1995(6) SCC 326 (vide para 42) this Court observed:\n<\/p>\n
\t“Francis Bennion in his Statutory Interpretation
\nSecond Edn., has dealt with the Functional Construction
\nRule in Part XV of his book.  The nature of purposive
\nconstruction is dealt with in Part XX at p. 659 thus:\n<\/p>\n
\t“A purposive construction of an enactment is
\none which gives effect to the legislative purpose
\nby-\n<\/p>\n
\t(a)\tfollowing the literal meaning of the
\nenactment where that meaning is in accordance
\nwith the legislative purpose (in this Code called a
\npurposive-and-literal construction), or <\/p>\n
\t(b)\tapplying a strained meaning where the
\nliteral meaning is not in accordance with the
\nlegislative purpose (in the Code called a
\npurposive and strained construction).”\n<\/p>\n
At p. 661 of the same book, the author has considered the
\ntopic of “Purposive Construction” in contrast with literal
\nconstruction.  The learned author has observed as under:\n<\/p>\n
\t“Contrast with literal construction – Although
\nthe term ‘purposive construction’ is not new, its
\nentry into fashion betokens a swing by the
\nappellate courts away from literal construction.
\nLord Diplock said in 1975: ‘If one looks back to
\nthe  actual  decisions of the [House of Lords] on
\nquestions of statutory construction over the last
\n30 years one cannot fail to be struck by the
\nevidence of a trend away from the purely literal
\ntowards the purposive construction of statutory
\nprovisions’.  The matter was summed up by
\nLord Diplock in this way –\n<\/p>\n
\t   …I am not reluctant to adopt a purposive
\nconstruction where to apply the literal meaning
\nof the legislative language used would lead to
\nresults which would clearly defeat the purposes
\nof the Act.  But in doing so the task on which a
\ncourt of justice is engaged remains one of
\nconstruction, even where this involves reading
\ninto the Act words which are not expressly
\nincluded in it.”\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t\t\t (emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
\tWe respectfully agree with the view expressed above.\n<\/p>\n
26.\tIn our opinion, in this case, a purposive construction has to be adopted
\nin interpreting Rule 443 of the Indian Telegraph Rules.\n<\/p>\n
27.\tWe may also consider the matter from the point of view of our
\ntraditional principles of interpretation.  The great Sanskrit grammarian
\nNagesh Bhatt in his book ‘Param Laghu Manjusha’ has said that a word or
\nphrase can have three meanings:\n<\/p>\n
\t“(i)\tAbhidha i.e. literal meaning; (ii) Lakshana
\ni.e. the indicative or suggestive meaning; (iii) Vyanjana
\ni.e. the figurative meaning.\n<\/p>\n
\tUsually the literal meaning is followed, but some
\ntimes the suggestive or figurative meanings are adopted.
\nAs regards the suggestive meaning (Lakshana) the oft
\nquoted example is ‘xaxk;ke~ a?kks”k’ : i.e. “I
\nlive on the Ganges.” This sentence cannot be literally
\ninterpreted because no one can live on the surface of the
\nGanges river.  Hence it has to be interpreted to mean “I
\nlive on the bank of the Ganga river.”\n<\/p>\n
\t\tAs regards the third meaning Vyanjana, the oft
\n\tquoted example is ‘xrks vLredZ’ which means:\n<\/p>\n
“The sun \thas set.”  Here the real meaning has in fact nothing
\nto do \twith the sun or its setting, but it really means “light
\nthe \tlamp” or “let us go home” (because the sun has
\nset).\n<\/p>\n
28.\tIn our opinion, in the present case, we have to adopt the Lakshana (or
\nLinga) rule of interpretation rather than the Shruti or Abidha (the literal)
\nrule.  In other words, Rule 443 of the Indian Telegraph Rule has to be
\ninterpreted in a purposive sense.  Hence the telephone line in the name of the
\nperson who is really paying the bills in connection with the telephone line in
\nthe name of another person who is economically dependent on the former
\ncan be disconnected for non payment of bills in connection with the
\ntelephone line in the name of the latter.  Such an interpretation would
\neffectuate the intention of Rule 443, which is that telephone bills should be
\npaid promptly.\n<\/p>\n
29.\tAlso, it would make no difference whether the telephone line is at the
\nresidence or at the business premises, even if the two are entirely separate.
\nHence in our opinion both the telephone lines in the name of the appellant,
\none at his residence and the other at his business premises, can be
\ndisconnected for non-payment of the dues in connection with the line in the
\nname of his dependent wife.\n<\/p>\n
30.\tWe can also utilize the Mimansa Rules of Interpretation in
\ninterpreting Rule 443.\n<\/p>\n
31.\tIt is deeply regrettable that in our Courts of law, lawyers quote
\nMaxwell and Craies but nobody refers to the Mimansa Principles of
\nInterpretation.  Today our so-called educated people are largely unaware
\nabout the great intellectual achievements of our ancestors and the intellectual
\ntreasury they have bequeathed us.  The Mimansa Principles of Interpretation
\nis part of that intellectual treasury, but it is distressing to note that apart from
\na reference to these principles in the judgment of Sir John Edge, the then
\nChief Justice of Allahabad High Court, in Beni Prasad v. Hardai Devi (1892)
\nILR 14 All 67 (FB), there has been almost no utilization of these principles
\neven in our own country (except by one of us, M. Katju, J.).\n<\/p>\n
32.\tIt may be mentioned that the Mimansa Rules of Interpretation were
\nour traditional principles of interpretation used for over two and a half
\nthousand years, laid down by Jaimini whose Sutras were explained by
\nShabar, Kumarila Bhatta, Prabhakar, etc.  These Mimansa Principles were
\nregularly used by our great jurists like Vijnaneshwara (Author of
\nMitakshara), Jimutvahana (author of Dayabhaga), Nanda Pandit, etc.
\nwhenever they found any conflict between the various Smritis or any
\nambiguity or incongruity therein.  There is no reason why we cannot use
\nthese principles on appropriate occasions.  However, it is a matter of deep
\nregret that these principles have rarely been used in our law Courts.  It is
\nnowhere mentioned in our Constitution or any other law that only Maxwell’s
\nPrinciples of Interpretation can be used by the Court.  We can use any
\nsystem of interpretation which helps us solve a difficulty.  In certain
\nsituations Maxwell’s principles would be more appropriate, while in other
\nsituations the Mimansa principles may be more suitable.\n<\/p>\n
33.\tThe books on Mimansa are almost all in Sanskrit, but there is one
\ngood book called the ‘Mimansa Rules of Interpretation’ by Prof. K.L.
\nSarkar published in the Tagore Law Lecture Series, which may be seen.\n<\/p>\n
34.\tIt may be mentioned that the Mimansa Rules of Interpretation were
\ncreated for resolving the practical difficlties in performing the Vedic yagyas.
\nThe rules for performing the various yagyas were given in books called
\nBrahmanas e.g. Shatapath Brahman, Aitareya Brahman, Taitereya Brahman,
\netc.  There were many ambiguities, conflicts, incongruities, ellipses etc. in
\nthe Brahmana texts, and hence principles of interpretation had to be created
\nfor this purpose.  Thus the Mimansa principles were originally created for
\nreligious purposes, but they were so rational and logical that subsequently
\nthey began to be used in law, grammar, logic, philosophy etc., that is, they
\nbecame of universal application.\n<\/p>\n
35.\tJaimini in Sutra 6: 3: 9 states:\n<\/p>\n
“When there is a conflict between the purpose and the
\nmaterial, the purpose is to prevail, because in the absence
\nof the prescribed material a substitute can be used, for the
\nmaterial is subordinate to the purpose”.\n<\/p>\n
36.\tTo explain this it may be mentioned that the Brahmanas state that the
\nprescribed Yupa (sacrificial post for tying the sacrificial animal) must be
\nmade of Khadir Wood.  However, Khadir wood is weak while the animal
\ntied may be restive.  Hence, the Mimansa principle (stated above) permits
\nthat the Yupa can be made of Khadar wood which is strong.  Now this
\nsubstitution is being made despite the fact that the prescribed wood is
\nKhadir, but this prescription is only subordinate or accessory to the
\nperformance of the yagya, which is the main object.  Hence, if it comes in
\nthe way of the yagya being performed, it can be modified or substituted.\n<\/p>\n
37.\tIn this connection we may also refer to the Wooden Sword Maxim
\n(Sphadi Nyaya), which is a well known Maxim in the Mimansa system.
\nThis Maxim states “what is prescribed as a means to an action, is to be taken
\nin a sense suited to the performance of the action” (vide Jaimini 3:1:2,
\nquoted in the book ‘Mimansa Rules of Interpretation’ by K.L. Sarkar at p.\n<\/p>\n
185).  The word ‘ Spha’ in Sanskrit means a sword, which is normally a
\nmetallic object for cutting.  However, ‘Spha’ in connection with a Yagya has
\nto be interpreted as a wooden sword, because in a Yagya a small wooden
\nsword called ‘Spha’ is used which is a pushing instrument (as a Yagya
\nrequires no cutting instrument, but only a pushing instrument).  Thus,
\n‘Sphadi  Nyaya’ implies that we have to see the object of the text to correctly
\ninterpret it.\n<\/p>\n
38.\tIn the Mimansa system, the literal rule of interpretation is called the
\nShruti (or Abhida) principle, and ordinarily it is this principle which is to be
\napplied when interpreting a text.  However, there are exceptional situations
\nwhen we have to depart from the literal rule and then certain other principles
\nhave to be resorted to e.g. (1) the Linga (also called Lakshana) principle or
\nthe suggestive power of words or expressions, (2) the Vakya principle or
\nsyntactical arrngement, (3) the Prakarana principle, which permits
\nconstruction by referring to other texts in order to make the meaning clear,
\n(4) the Sthana (position) principle which means the relative position of one
\ntext with reference to another, (5) the Samakhya (name) principle which
\nmeans the connection between different passages by the indication accorded
\nby the derivative words of a compound name.\n<\/p>\n
39.\tIn the present case we are of the opinion that the Linga (Lakshana)
\nprinciple will apply.\n<\/p>\n
40.\tLinga really means interpretation by understanding the context, and it
\nis a departure from the literal rule of interpretation.\n<\/p>\n
41.\tThe Linga principle can be illustrated by the decision of this Court in
\nU.P. Bhoodan Yagna Samiti  vs.  Brij Kishore AIR<\/a> 1988 SC 2239 where
\nthe words `landless person’ were held to mean ‘landless peasant’ and not
\nlandless businessmen.\n<\/p>\n
42.\tHere we see that the Court has departed from the literal rule of
\ninterpretation, because by the literal rule even a very rich businessman who
\nowns no land will be regarded as a landless person.  Since the object of the
\nU.P. Bhoodan Act was to give some land to the landless peasants, the
\nexpression ‘landless person’ was interpreted to mean ‘landless peasant’ only.
\nThis interpretation was necessary otherwise the entire object of the U.P.
\nBhoodan Act would be frustrated and land donated for distribution to
\nlandless peasants could be grabbed by rich businessmen on the ground that
\nthey owned no land, although they may have huge amount of wealth in the
\nform of shares in their companies, securities, crores of rupees in banks etc..\n<\/p>\n
43.\tWe may also like to point out that there is a difference between Linga
\n(Lakshana) principle and the Vakya principle.  In the former no violence is
\ndone to the wording of the text, but the words or expressions are construed
\ndifferently from the literal sense, and hence Linga is really construction by
\ncontext.  In Vakya, however, some violence is done to the text, e.g. by
\nconnecting two separate sentences, or by adding words or expressions, or by
\ntransferring words or expressions up or down a sentence.  This violence may
\nsometimes become necessary to save the text from becoming meaningless or
\nabsurd, just as the surgeon may have to do violence to the body (by
\noperation) to save the patient’s life.  For this purpose the Uha principle is
\nutilized (The Uha principle or use of reason, is generally applied for
\nconstruction of texts).  In this connection it may be mentioned that Maxwell
\nalso permits doing violence to the statute in exceptional situations.  He says
\n“Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical
\nconstruction leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the
\nenactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice,
\npresumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies
\nthe meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence.  This may
\nbe done by departing from the rules of grammar, by giving an unusual
\nmeaning to particular words, by altering their collocation, by rejecting them
\naltogether, or by interpolating other words, under the influence, no doubt, of
\nan irresistible conviction that the legislature could not possibly have
\nintended what the words signify, and that the modifications thus made are
\nmere corrections of careless language and really give the true intention”.
\nThus, in S.S. Kalra vs. Union of India 1991(2) SCC 87 this Court observed
\nthat sometimes courts can supply words which have been accidentally
\nomitted.  (See also the rulings mentioned in G.P. Singh’s book “Principles of
\nStatutory Interpretation” 9th Edition, 2004 pages 70 to 77).\n<\/p>\n
44.\tThe principle of Linga is illustrated by Jaimini in numerous Sutras
\nand Adhikarnas.  Thus the Pranabhrit Adhikarana which is based on
\nJaimini’s Sutra 28, Chapter IV, Book 1 shows how words acquired a wider
\nmeaning by the Linga or Lakshana process.\n<\/p>\n
45.\tIn the Taittiriya Samhita (5.3.1.2) there is a passage :
\n“He disposes the Pranabhrit –   gkFR’r min|kfr”\n<\/p>\n
46.\tAgain in the same Samhita (5.7.2.5) there is a similar passage :
\n“He disposes the Ajyani – AT;ku(jsrk
\nmin|kfr”\n<\/p>\n
47.\tNow what is the meaning of Pranabhrit in the one case and of Ajyani
\nin the other ?  The words Pranabhrit and Ajyani are respectively the names
\nof two Mantras or verses which begin with those words.  These verses are
\nused in consecrating bricks required for a certain purpose in a yagya.  From
\nthis fact the bricks consecrated by the Pranabhrit Mantra acquired the name
\nof Pranabhrit.  Similarly the bricks consecrated by the Ajyani Mantra
\nacquired the name of Ajyani.  But in course of time the whole heap of bricks
\nof a particular kind came to be called Pranabhrit, because one or two bricks
\nof that heap were consecrated as Pranabhrit bricks.  Thus the instance of
\nPranabhrit becomes a maxim for extending the scope of a name in the above
\nmanner.  In fact, the meaning of the words Pranabhrit and Ajyani in these
\ncases is determined by the peculiar association of the words and by the
\ncontext of the passages in which they are used.  Such a use is called
\nLingasamabaya (embodiment of the Linga).\n<\/p>\n
48.\tNanda Pandit, in his work ‘Dattaka Mimansa’, refers to the Pranabhrit
\nmaxim to show that although the word `substitute’ was at first applied in
\nexpress term only to six descriptions of sons, later the word by general use
\nbecame applicable to all the twelve descriptions.\n<\/p>\n
49.\tThe Pranabhrit maxim  gkFR’r U;k; states :\n<\/p>\n
\t“The peculiar feature of one leading object
\nbelonging to a class may give name to the whole class.”\n<\/p>\n
50.\tPranabhrit literally means filling with life or inspiring life; but the
\nexpression forms the commencement of a Mantra which is used in
\nconsecrating certain bricks.  Hence the word has come to mean a kind of
\nbricks (gkFR’nkfnSCnkukaa! LrqR;IZRoef|djFe).  This is
\nthe way in which the word Ajyani also has come to mean another class of
\nbricks.\n<\/p>\n
51.\tThe Pranabhrit maxim applies in the present case also because we
\nhave to fill life (i.e. given an appropriate interpretation) to the word
\n`subscriber’ in Rule 443 of the Indian Telegraph Rules.\n<\/p>\n
52.\tThe Pranabhrit maxim is often used in the interpretation of a text by
\ntreating it as illustrative and not exhaustive. The illustrative rule of
\ninterpretation is a departure from the literal rule which normally has to be
\nadopted while construing a text.   However, sometimes departures from the
\nliteral rule are permissible, and one of such departures is the illustrative rule.
\nTo give an example, in Sanskrit there is an oft-quoted statement “Kakebhyo
\nDadhi Rakshitam”  which means “protect the curd from the crows”.  Now in
\nthis sentence the word ‘crow’ is merely illustrative and not exhaustive.  The
\nstatement does not mean that one should protect the curd only from crows
\nbut allow it to be eaten up by cats, dogs or to get damaged by dirt or filth etc.
\nIt really means that one should protect the curd from all dangers.  Hence the
\nword ‘crow’ in the above statement is only illustrative and not exhaustive.\n<\/p>\n
53.\tWe can take another example.  In the U.S. Constitution, Article 1
\nSection 8 states that Congress (the American Parliament) can raise Armies
\nand Navies.  There is no mention of an Air Force there, obviously because
\nthere were no aircraft in 1791 when the U.S. Constitution was promulgated.
\nThe first aircraft was invented by the Wright brothers in 1903.  However,
\ntoday’s reality is that a modern Army cannot fight without air cover.
\nAmendment to the U.S. Constitution is a very ardous and lengthy procedure
\nbecause it requires two-third majority of both Houses of Congress and
\nratification by three-fourth of the States.  By the time this is done, the enemy
\nmay invade and occupy the country.  Hence the words   `Armies and Navies’
\nhave to be interpreted as illustrative  and not exhaustive, and they really
\nmean all armed forces necessary for the security of the country (which
\nwould include an Air Force, also).\n<\/p>\n
54.\tThus Article 1 Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution has to be interpreted
\nnot by applying the Shruti rule (literal rule), but by applying the Linga rule.
\nThe words ‘Armies and Navies’ in Article 1 Section 8 are to be construed not
\nliterally but as suggestive.  In other words, they are only illustrative, and
\nthey really mean all Armed Forces necessary for the security of the country.\n<\/p>\n
55.\tWe may also refer to Maxwell’s ‘Interpretation of Statutes’ where it is
\nstated :\n<\/p>\n
“But it is another elementary rule, that a thing which is
\nwithin the letter of a statute is not within the statute
\nunless it be also within the real intention of the
\nLegislature, and the words, if sufficiently flexible, must
\nbe construed in the sense which, if less correct
\ngrammatically, is more in harmony within that intention.
\nLanguage is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be
\nincapable of being used in more than one sense; and to
\nadhere rigidly to its literal and primary meaning in all
\ncases would be to miss its real meaning in many.  If a
\nliteral meaning had been given to the laws which forbade
\na layman to “lay hands” on a priest, and punished all who
\ndrew blood in the street, the layman who wounded a
\npriest with a weapon would not have fallen within the
\nprohibition, and the surgeon who bled a person to save
\nhis life, would have been liable to punishment.  On a
\nliteral construction of his promise, Mohammed II.’s
\nsawing the Venetian Governor’s body in two, was no
\nbreach of his engagement to spare his head; nor
\nTamerlane’s burying alive a garrison, a violation of his
\npledge to shed no blood.”\n<\/p>\n
\tMaxwell also states:\n<\/p>\n
“The words of a statute are to be understood in the sense
\nin which they best harmonize with the subject of the
\nenactment and the object which the Legislature has in
\nview.  Their meaning is found not so much in a strictly
\ngrammatical or etymological propriety  of language, nor
\neven in its popular use, as in the subject or in the
\noccasion on which they are used and the object to be
\nattained.”\n<\/p>\n
(emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
56.\tThus, in both systems of interpretation, the Mimansa system as well
\nas Maxwell’s  system, it is emphasized that the intention of a statute has
\noften to be seen to properly interpret it, and it is not that the Court can never
\ndepart from the literal rule of interpretation.  It all depends on the context,
\nthe subject-matter, the purpose for which the provision was made, etc.  <\/p>\n
57.\tAs already stated above, while construing Rule 443 we have to give
\nan interpretation which subserves the intention of the Rule which is that
\ntelephone bills should be promptly paid, otherwise the department will be
\nshort of the funds needed for financing the telephone services which are to
\nbe rendered to the consumers.  After all, the salary of the employees of the
\ntelephone department have to be paid, the telephone equipment has to be
\nmaintained, repaired and kept up-to-date.  Sometimes new technology has to
\nbe introduced.  There may be various other requirements for which funds
\nmay be required, and all these can only be possible if the telephone bills are
\npaid in time.   Hence, in our opinion, the word ‘subscriber’ in Rule 2(pp) has
\nto be given a wider meaning, as already stated above.\n<\/p>\n
58.\tIn view of the above, we find no merit in this appeal which is
\naccordingly dismissed.  There shall be no order as to costs.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Surjit Singh vs Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd on 21 April, 2008 Author: M Katju Bench: H. K. Sema, Markandey Katju CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 5354 of 2002 PETITIONER: Surjit Singh RESPONDENT: Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd DATE OF JUDGMENT: 21\/04\/2008 BENCH: H. K. Sema & Markandey Katju JUDGMENT: J U D G […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-235473","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nSurjit Singh vs Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd on 21 April, 2008 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/surjit-singh-vs-mahanagar-telephone-nigam-ltd-on-21-april-2008\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Surjit Singh vs Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd on 21 April, 2008 - 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