{"id":237063,"date":"1987-04-15T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1987-04-14T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/dev-singh-ors-vs-registrar-punjab-haryana-high-on-15-april-1987"},"modified":"2018-09-21T23:45:07","modified_gmt":"2018-09-21T18:15:07","slug":"dev-singh-ors-vs-registrar-punjab-haryana-high-on-15-april-1987","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/dev-singh-ors-vs-registrar-punjab-haryana-high-on-15-april-1987","title":{"rendered":"Dev Singh & Ors vs Registrar, Punjab & Haryana High … on 15 April, 1987"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Dev Singh & Ors vs Registrar, Punjab & Haryana High … on 15 April, 1987<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1987 AIR 1629, \t\t 1987 SCR (2)1005<\/div>\n
Author: V Khalid<\/div>\n
Bench: Khalid, V. (J)<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nDEV SINGH & ORS.\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nREGISTRAR, PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT & ORS.\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT15\/04\/1987\n\nBENCH:\nKHALID, V. (J)\nBENCH:\nKHALID, V. (J)\nPATHAK, R.S. (CJ)\n\nCITATION:\n 1987 AIR 1629\t\t  1987 SCR  (2)1005\n 1987 SCC  (3) 169\t  JT 1987 (3)\t 34\n 1987 SCALE  (1)869\n CITATOR INFO :\n RF&E\t    1992 SC2219\t (53,58,63,135)\n\n\nACT:\n    Rules and Orders of the Punjab High Court Vol. I,  Chap-\nter 18-A, Rules IX and X: Dismissal of ministerial staff  of\nsubordinate  courts by District Judge--Service\tappeal\tdis-\nposed of by High Court--Whether judicial decision.\n    Constitution  of  India, Articles 136 and  235:  Removal\nfrom service of ministerial staff by District  Judge-Service\nappeal dismissed by High Court--Decision whether judicial or\nadministrative-Whether\tassailable in petition\tfor  special\nleave.\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\n    Sub-section (2) of Section 35 of the Punjab Courts\tAct,\n1918 confers power of appointment of ministerial officers of\nall courts controlled by a District Court and their  suspen-\nsion  and  removal on the District  Court.  Sub-section\t (3)\nmakes  every appointment subject to such rules as  the\tHigh\nCourt  may prescribe in this behalf, while  sub-section\t (4)\nmakes  orders  passed by the District Judge subject  to\t the\ncontrol of the High Court.\nChapter 18-A of the High Court Rules and Orders framed under\nSection\t 35(3)\tcontrols  the  appointments,  promotion\t and\npunishment  of\tministerial officials in  the  District\t and\nother civil courts, other than the High Court. Sub-rule 2(a)\nof  Rule  IX in that Chapter enables the District  Judge  to\ninflict\t any  of the penalties mentioned  in  sub-rule\t(1):\ncensure,  fine, recovery of any pecuniary loss,\t withholding\nof  increments or promotions, suspension, removal  and\tdis-\nmissal\tof the ministerial officers of his own court or\t any\ncourt  subordinate  to\thim other than the  Court  of  Small\nCauses. Sub-rule (2) of Rule X provides 'for appeals to\t the\nHigh  Court  against penalties. Sub-rule  (3)  requires\t the\npersons\t appealing to the High Court to do so by a  petition\nto  the\t District Judge, who shall forward the same  to\t the\nRegistrar of the High Court with remarks that he may wish to\nmake.  After reading the petition the High Court may  either\n(a) summarily reject it without hearing the petitioner;\t (b)\nrefer it to the District Judge for report and on receipt  of\nsuch report reject the petition without hearing; or (c) hear\nthe  petitioner,  and  where other persons are\theld  to  be\nconcerned such other person in open court.\n1006\nSub-rule (4) forbids the petitioners to attend personally at\nthe  High Court unless summoned and provides for  communica-\ntion  to them of orders on their petitions through the\tDis-\ntrict Judge.\n    The appellants, who were the employees in the ministeri-\nal  establishment of the courts at Ferozepur and Zira,\twere\nalleged to have taken a prominent part in raising objection-\nable  slogans against the Judicial Magistrate and  the\tDis-\ntrict Judge, in a demonstration organised by the subordinate\ncourt officials, to protest against the slapping of a subor-\ndinate\tby the Judicial Magistrate, Zira. They were  charge-\nsheeted\t for  their misconduct. After enquiry it  was  found\nthat they contravened Rule 7(1) of the Government  Employees\n(Conduct) Rules, 1966 by acting prejudicially to the  public\norder, decency and morality and were dismissed from  service\nby  the\t District  Judge in his capacity  aS  the  punishing\nauthority.\n    The\t appellants  preferred a service appeal\t before\t the\nHigh Court which was dismissed.\n    While granting the special leave on 2nd April, 1982 this\nCourt made the following order:\n\t      \"Appeal will be heard  .......  on the prelim-\n\t      inary  issue as to whether the High  Court  in\n\t      disposal\tof appeal was acting in\t administra-\n\t      tive capacity under Art. 235 or as a  Tribunal\n\t      or  as a High Court and the  circumstances  in\n\t      which the appeal was maintained, if so.\"\n    It\twas contended on behalf of the appellants  that\t the\ndecision  of  the High Court in this case was  the  judicial\ndecision of a tribunal which could be examined by this Court\nunder Article 136 of the Constitution.\nDismissing the appeal, the Court,\n    HELD: 1.1 The appeal is not maintainable. Every decision\nor order by an authority which has a duty to act  judicially\nis not subject to appeal to this Court. Article 136  contem-\nplates appeals only from adjudications of courts and  tribu-\nnals.  Such adjudication must doubtless be judicial. if\t the\npower  exercised was administrative in nature it  would\t ex-\nclude such a tribunal from the ambit of Article 136. [1029C;\n1028H; 1020D]\n    1.2 Every authority which is required to act  judicially\neither\tby  its constitution or by virtue of  the  authority\nconferred upon it is\n1007\nnot necessarily a tribunal for the purposes of Article\t136.\nA  tribunal,  whose adjudication is subject to\tappeal\tmust\nbesides\t being\tunder a duty to act judicially,\t be  a\tbody\ninvested with the judicial power of the State. [1029A]\n    1.3\t There is a clear distinction between courts of\t law\nexercising  judicial powers and other bodies.  Decisions  by\ncourts\tare  clearly  judicial. That Is not  the  case\twith\nbodies\texercising  administrative or executive\t powers.  In\ncertain matters even judges have to act administratively and\nin so doing may have to act quasi-judicially in dealing with\nmatters entrusted to them. It is only where the\t authorities\nare required to act judicially either by express  provisions\nof the statute or by necessary implication that the decision\nof  such an authority would amount to a quasi-judicial\tpro-\nceeding.  When\tJudges in exercise of  their  administrative\nfunctions  decide cases it cannot be said that\ttheir  deci-\nsions  are either judicial or quasi-judicial decisions.\t The\ntest that has to be applied to find out whether an order  is\na  judicial order or not is the existence of a\tlis  between\nthe parties. [1028F; 1025C]\n    In\tthe instant case, the High Court while disposing  of\nthe  appeal  was  not acting as a tribunal.  It\t was  acting\npurely administratively. It was not resolving any dispute or\ncontroversy between two adversaries but only exercising\t its\npower of control over the subordinate judiciary which is the\nsame  as  control under Article 235 of the  Constitution  of\nIndia. [1028E; 1027C; 1029B; 1013C]\n    Durga  Shankar  Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh  &  Ors.,<\/a>\n[1955]\t1 SCR 267; Bachhittar Singh v. The State of  Punjab,<\/a>\n[1962] Snppl. 3 SCR 713; Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v.\nP.N.  Sharma & Anr,<\/a> [1965] 2 SCR 366; Harinagar Sugar  Mills\nLtd. v. Shyam Sundar Jhunjhunwala,<\/a> [1962] 2 SCR 339; Jaswant\nSugar Mills Ltd. v. Lakshmichand and others<\/a>, [1963] Suppl. 1\nSCR  242; Engineering Mazdoor Sabha v. Hind Cycles  Limited,\nBombay,<\/a> [1963] Suppl. 1 SCR 625; Indo-China Steam Navigation\nCo. Ltd. v. Jasjit Singh, Additional Collector of Customs  &\nOrs.,<\/a>  [1964] 6 SCR 594 and APHLC v. M.A. Sangma,  [1978]  1\nSCR 393, referred to.\n    2.1 In deciding the appeal under Rule X in Chapter\t18-A\nthe  High Court exercises only a supervisory  administrative\ncontrol\t over the subordinate courts and does not act  as  a\ntribunal disposing of an appeal involving a lis between\t two\nrival parties and arriving at a judicial decision. [1019D]\n1008\n    2.2 The appeal under Rule X(3) has to be by a  petition,\nto be routed through the District Judge who sends it to\t the\nRegistrar  of the High Court. These are procedural  formali-\nties which normally govern appeals preferred before the High\nCourt  on the administrative side. The permission  given  to\nthe authority who imposes penalty to record his own  remarks\nwhich he wishes to make concerning his own order is  further\nproof  of the fact that what the High Court has to  consider\nis not a matter on the judicial side but one in its power of\ncontrol\t and  superintendence over the\tsubordinate  courts.\n[1018A]\n 2.3  The  procedure contained in Rule X(3) of\thearing\t the\npetition  not similar to the procedure followed\t in  regular\njudicial  proceedings.\tIt is not obligatory  for  the\tHigh\nCourt to hear the petitioner. It can go into the papers\t and\nreject it summarily without giving the petitioner an  oppor-\ntunity to be heard. Alternative, it could get a report\tfrom\nthe  District Judge and on receipt of such a report  dismiss\nit without hearing the petitioner. Thirdly, it could give  a\nhearing to the petitioner and also those who will be affect-\ned. This manner of disposal of the petition makes it  appar-\nent  that it is not strictly a judicial proceeding  but\t has\nall  the  trappings of an administrative proceeding  and  an\nadministrative decision. [1018E-H]\n    2.4 Sub-rule (4) of Rule X again marks a complete depar-\nture from the normal judicial proceeding before a court. The\npetitioners  are forbidden to attend personally at the\tHigh\nCourt.\tThey  can do so only when summoned.  In\t a  judicial\nproceeding,  the party has a right to appear  personally  or\nthrough\t counsel.  This denial also robs the appeal  of\t its\ncharacter of a judicial proceeding. [1019C]\n   2.5 The fact that Rule X is found in Chapter 18-A,  which\ndeals  with control, also gives the administrative shade  to\nthe proceeding under this Rule. Section 35(4) of the  Punjab\nCourts Act, 1918, which stipulates that any order passed  by\nthe  District Judge under this section shall be\t subject  to\nthe  control of the High Court, further fortifies  the\tview\nthat the proceedings under Rule X(3) and the decisions\tmade\nthereunder are not judicial in nature. [1019E]\n    It\tcannot, therefore, be said that in the instant\tcase\nthe High Court while deciding the appeal acted as a tribunal\nwhose order can be challenged before this Court under  Arti-\ncle 136 of the Constitution. [1019F]\n    [The  Registrar to transfer the records of the  case  to\nthe High Court. The latter to take the petition on its\tfile\nas a petition under\n1009\nArticle\t 226  and  dispose  of\tthe  matter  expeditiously.]\n[1029D]\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
    CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1278  of
\n1982.\n<\/p>\n
    From  the  Judgment\t and Order dated  30.9.1981  of\t the
\nPunjab\tand  Haryana High Court in Service  Appeals  of\t the
\nAppellants.\n<\/p>\n
    V.M. Tarkunde, Mrs. Urmila Kapur and Ms. Janki  Sriniva-
\nsan for the Appellants.\n<\/p>\n
Kapil Sibal and Ratbin Dass for the Respondents.
\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by
\n    KHALID,  J. 1. The appellants were the employees in\t the
\nministerial  establishment of the Courts at  Ferozepore\t and
\nZira having entered into service varying from the year\t1952
\nto 1965. They are members of the Punjab Civil Courts  Clerks
\nAssociation.  On 24th July, 1980, there was an\tincident  in
\nthe  Court  of Shri N.S. Mundra,  Judicial  Magistrate,\t 1st
\nClass, Zira. On that day, one Jagdish Lal, a Senior Ahmad of
\nthe  Court was slapped. He is one of the appellants in\tthis
\nappeal. On the day he was slapped, he presented a  represen-
\ntation\tto  the District and Sessions Judge Shri  Nehra.  An
\nenquiry\t was  directed to be held by the  Senior  Sub-Judge,
\nFerozepore into the incident. In this enquiry, it was  found
\nthat Shri Mundra, Judicial Magistrate, Zira slapped  Jagdish
\nLal. This incident caused resentment in the Association\t and
\nthe  Association, therefore, felt that something  should  be
\ndone  to  demonstrate this resentment. Accordingly,  it\t was
\ndecided by the Association that a request should be made  to
\nthe  District  and Sessions Judge, Ferozepore,\tto  transfer
\nJagdish\t Lal  from the Court at Zira to any other  Court  so
\nthat calm could be restored. The appellants among others met
\nthe  District  and Sessions Judge for this  purpose  on\t 28-
\n71980. It is alleged that the Sessions Judge did not  accede
\nto the request of the representatives of the Association  to
\nplead their case before him. This aggravated the  situation.
\nThough\tthe association and their representatives  including
\nthe appellants were keen to resolve the matter, the District
\nand  Sessions Judge adopted a hardened attitude. The  matter
\ncame to the notice of the High Court. An enquiry by  Justice
\nS.P.  Goyal  of\t the High Court of Punjab  and\tHaryana\t was
\ndirected  to  be held and it was scheduled for\t9th  August,
\n1980. He was to reach the Canal Rest House at 4.00 P.M., but
\nhe could reach only at 7.30 P.M. At that time, the  District
\nand Sessions Judge, along with other Judicial
\n1010<\/span>
\nofficers  were present to receive him. A  demonstration\t was
\norganised  by  the subordinate Court  officials.  There\t was
\ncontinued  slogan  shouting from 4.00 P.M.  till  7.30\tP.M.
\nbefore\tJustice Goyal’s arrival. The appellants are said  to
\nhave  taken a prominent part in raising\t objectionable\tslo-
\ngans. The slogans are:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “N.S.  Mundra Murdabad; N.S. Mundra  Hai\tHai;
\n\t      Dakia  Mahajan Superintendent  Murdabad;\tB.S.
\n\t      Nehra  Murdabad; B.S. Nehra naun Chalta  Karo;
\n\t      Katal Nehra Murdabad; B.S. Nehra Murdabad;”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
The  appellants\t were  charge-sheeted for  this\t conduct  of
\ntheirs.\n<\/p>\n
    2.\tJustice Goyal alighted from his car and went  inside
\nthe visiting room of the rest house. He called the represen-
\ntatives of the Association. Some of them met him. They\tcame
\nout after the meeting. There were other demonstrators  wait-
\ning for the result of the talks. After they came back, those
\nwho  raised  slogans disbursed. On 11th\t August,  1980,\t the
\nDistrict  Judge\t sent a letter to Shri G.S.  Khurana,  Chief
\nJudicial Magistrate, Ferozepore, to hold preliminary enquiry
\ninto  the demonstration by the Court officials in  front  of
\nthe  Canal  Rest  House and the slogans\t raised\t there.\t Mr.
\nKhurana recorded the statements of some officers on the same
\nday  and submitted his report on that very day\titself.\t Ac-
\ncording to his report, the appellants had taken a  prominent
\npart  in raising objectionable slogans in question.  On\t the
\nbasis  of this report, the District Judge placed the  appel-
\nlants under suspension by his order dated 14-8-1980. On 12th
\nAugust,\t 1980,\tthe District Judge had\tintimated  the\tHigh
\nCourt  about the finding in the preliminary report  and\t had
\nsought\tguidance  of  the High Court.  The  appellants\twere
\nsupplied with the articles of the charges and statements  of
\nimputation  etc.  They gave their replies.  While  admitting
\nthat they had taken part in the demonstration on the day  in
\nquestion they denied that they had taken a prominent part in
\nthe  demonstration as leaders in raising  objectionable\t and
\ndefamatory slogans against their superior officers. A formal
\nenquiry\t was ordered against these appellants. After  a\t de-
\ntailed enquiry it was found that the appellants had  contra-
\nvened  inter  alia  Rule 7(1) of  the  Government  Employees
\n(Conduct) Rules, 19.66. and had thus acted prejudicially  to
\nthe  public order, decency and morality and thereby  contra-
\nvened Rule 7(1) of the Government Employees (Conduct) Rules,
\n1966. The District Judge, Ferozepore in his capacity as\t the
\npunishing  authority then served a show cause notice on\t all
\nthe appellants as to why the penalty of dismissal from serv-
\nice  be not imposed on them. The appellants submitted  their
\nexplanation. After
\n1011<\/span>
\nconsidering  the replies, the District Judge, by  his  order
\ndated  17.11.1980, imposed on them punishment  of  dismissal
\nfrom service.\n<\/p>\n
    3. The appellants preferred a service appeal in the High
\nCourt  of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh. The\t High  Court
\nconsidered the various contentions raised by the  appellants
\nin  detail and dismissed the appeal as having no merit.\t One
\nof  the employees who had also filed appeal before the\tHigh
\nCourt withdrew his appeal and is now reported to be practis-
\ning law.\n<\/p>\n
    This appeal has, therefore, come up before us by special
\nleave  under  Article 136, against the order of\t the  Single
\njudge in the above mentioned service appeal.
\n    We\thave given only the bare facts in this judgment\t for
\nthe  reason  that this Court issued notice on  the  SLP\t for
\nconsideration  of  a preliminary point only  which  will  be
\nevident\t by the orders passed on 3.12. 198 1,  4-1-1982\t and
\n2-4-1982.\n<\/p>\n
\t      “Order of the Court on 3-12-1981:
\n\t      Issue  show cause notice on SLP returnable  on
\n\t      4-1-1982,\t on the question as to\twhether\t the
\n\t      High  Court in disposing of the appeal of\t the
\n\t      petitioners   was\t acting\t in   administrative
\n\t      capacity\tor as a Tribunal or as\tHigh  Court.
\n\t      There  will be interim injunction\t restraining
\n\t      the respondents from evicting petitioner No. 2
\n\t      from  Government accommodation held by him  on
\n\t      the condition that the said petitioner contin-
\n\t      ues  to pay rent or compensation\tat  hitherto
\n\t      charged, pending notice.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      “Order of the Court on 4. 1. 1982:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      Special  leave  petition to be  heard  on\t the
\n\t      question\twhether the High Court in  disposing
\n\t      of the appeal of the petitioners was acting in
\n\t      an  administrative capacity under Article\t 235
\n\t      or  as  a Tribunal or as the High\t Court.\t The
\n\t      special leave petition to be heard on 9.2.1982
\n\t      on this question. Stay to continue till then.”
\n\t      “Order of the Court on 2.4. 1982:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      Special leave granted. Printing of records and
\n\t      filing  of statement of case  dispensed  with.
\n\t      Security dispensed with. Appeal will be  heard
\n\t      on present papers on the preliminary issue  as
\n\t      to  whether  the\tHigh Court  in\tdisposal  of
\n\t      appeal
\n\t      1012<\/span>
\n\t      was  acting in administrative  capacity  under
\n\t      Article 235 or as Tribunal or as a High  Court
\n\t      and the circumstances in which the appeal\t was
\n\t      maintained, if so. Hearing of appeal will\t be-
\n\t      fixed  on\t second Tuesday in  July  1982\tpre-
\n\t      emptorily subject to overnight’s part heard.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
From the above orders it is clear that the question that  is
\nto  be\tdecided in this appeal is whether  an  appeal  under
\nArticle\t 136 lies to this Court from the order\tunder  chal-
\nlenge. That being so, it is necessary to consider the nature
\nof the appeal before the High Court and the rules  governing
\nthat  appeal, before discussing the questions of law  raised
\nby the appellant’s counsel with reference to various author-
\nities  of  this Court, to contend that article 136  was\t at-
\ntracted.\n<\/p>\n
    4.\tThe appointment of the ministerial officers  of\t the
\nDistrict Courts and Courts of Small Causes and their suspen-
\nsion and removal are provided under Section 35 of the Punjab
\nCourts Act, 1918. That Section reads as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t\t    “35(1)  The ministerial officers of\t the
\n\t      District\tCourts\tand Courts of  Small  Causes
\n\t      shall  be\t appointed and,may be  suspended  or
\n\t      removed by the Judges of those Courts  respec-
\n\t      tively.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (2)  The\tministerial officers of\t all  Courts
\n\t      controlled  by  a District Court,\t other\tthan
\n\t      Courts  of Small Causes, shall  be  appointed,
\n\t      and  may be suspended or removed by  the\tDis-
\n\t      trict Court.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (3) Every appointment under this section shall
\n\t      be subject to such rules as the High Court may
\n\t      prescribe in this behalf, and in dealing\twith
\n\t      any  matter under this Section, a Judge  of  a
\n\t      Court of Small Causes shall act subject to the
\n\t      control of the District Court.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (4) Any order passed by a District Judge under
\n\t      this  section shall be subject to the  control
\n\t      of the High Court.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    5.\tThe High Court framed rules under this\tsection\t for
\nthe  subordinate services attached to or controlled by\tDis-
\ntrict  Courts.\tThese rules apply  to  subordinate  services
\nattached  to Civil Courts other than the High Court,  namely
\nto  ministerial\t and menial establishment  of  District\t and
\nSessions Judge, Sub-Judge and Courts of Small Causes.  Chap-
\nter
\n1013<\/span>
\n18-A  of  the rules is the one relevant for our\t purpose.  A
\nclose  study  of the scheme and the  various  provisions  of
\nChapter\t 18-A  would make it abundantly clear that  the\t ap-
\npointments, promotions, punishments etc. of the\t ministerial
\nofficials of the Courts subordinate to the High Court,\twere
\nfully  within the powers of the District and Sessions  Judge
\nsubject\t to the control of the High Court. Chapter  18-A  is
\ncaptioned  ‘control’. Though there were changes effected  by
\nnotifications  issued by the State of Punjab  regarding\t ap-
\npointments,  promotions in other services, after the  coming
\ninto  force  of\t the Government of India Act,  1935,  it  is
\nenough to note for our purpose that the appointment,  promo-
\ntion and punishment of ministerial officials in the District
\nor other Civil Courts continued to be governed by the  rules
\nin Chapter 18-A of the High Court Rules and Orders.\n<\/p>\n
    6. Control in chapter 18-A is the same as control  under
\nArticle 235 of the Constitution of India, Articles 233,\t 234
\nand  235  of the Constitution of India deal  with  the\tHigh
\nCourts’ control over the subordinate judiciary. Article\t 227
\ndeals  with the power of superintendence over all Courts  by
\nthe High Court. Its predecessor section in the Government of
\nIndia Act, 1935 was Section 224 which dealt with administra-
\ntive functions of the High Court. Article 233 deals with the
\nappointment  of\t District Judges and Article  234  with\t the
\nrecruitment of persons other than the District Judges to the
\njudicial  service. Article 235 deals with the  control\tover
\nsubordinate  courts  and the control under this\t Article  is
\nwider than the control under the corresponding provision  of
\nthe  Government of India Act. For our purpose, it is  suffi-
\ncient to note that Chapter 18-A contains provisions relating
\nto the control of the High Court over the subordinate  judi-
\nciary.\n<\/p>\n
    7. For the purpose of this appeal, we are concerned only
\nwith  Rules IX and X of the rules in Chapter 18-A.  Rule  IX
\ndeals  with punishment. We extract the entire section  since
\nit  would be profitable to have a correct look at this\tsec-
\ntion.\n<\/p>\n
\t      “IX–Punishment–(1)  The following  penalties
\n\t      may for good and sufficient reasons be imposed
\n\t      upon members of the ministerial staff:-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (i) Censure,\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t (ii)  Fine of an amount not  exceeding\t one
\n\t      month’s  salary for misconduct or\t neglect  in
\n\t      the performance of duties,
\n\t      1014<\/span>\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t    (iii) Recovery from pay of the whole  or
\n\t      part  of any pecuniary loss caused to  Govern-
\n\t      ment by negligence or breach of orders,\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t    (iv) Withholding of increments or promo-
\n\t      tion including stoppage at efficiency bar,\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (v) Suspension,\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (vi) Removal, and\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (vii) Dismissal.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (2)(a)  Any  of  the above  penalties  may  be
\n\t      inflicted by the District Judge on the  minis-
\n\t      terial officers of his own Court of any  Court
\n\t      subordinate to him other than a Court of Small
\n\t      Causes, and on the menials of his own Court.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t       (b)  The\t Judge of a Court  of  Small
\n\t      Causes may inflict any of the above  penalties
\n\t      on the ministerial officers or menials of\t his
\n\t      own Court.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t       (c) The District Judge may, with\t the
\n\t      previous sanction of the High Court,  delegate
\n\t      to any Subordinate Judge the power to  inflict
\n\t      penalties given in clause (a) to be  exercised
\n\t      by  the  Subordinate Judge  in  any  specified
\n\t      portion of the district subject to the control
\n\t      of the District Court.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Note:-\tThis  delegation has been made to  the\tSenior\tSub-
\nJudge,.\t 1st Class, in each district in regard to the  proc-
\ness-serving  establishment  of all Courts  in  the  district
\nexcept\tthat of the District Judge’s Court and the Court  of
\nthe Judge, Small Causes, Lahore, Amritsar and Delhi.\n<\/p>\n
\t      (d)  Any\tSubordinate Judge may  fine,  in  an
\n\t      amount  not exceeding one month’s salary,\t any
\n\t      ministerial  officer  of\this  own  Court\t for
\n\t      misconduct  or neglect in the  performance  of
\n\t      his duties.\n<\/p>\n
\t      (e)  The Senior Subordinate Judge may  inflict
\n\t      any  of the above penalties on menials of\t his
\n\t      own  Court or the Courts of other\t Subordinate
\n\t      Judges in the same district.”\n<\/p>\n
    In\tSub-Rule (1), eight penalties are categorised.\tSub-
\nRule  (2) enables the District Judge to inflict any  of\t the
\npenalties  mentioned in Sub-Rule (1). Rule IX(2)(c)  enables
\nthe  District Judge, with the previous sanction of the\tHigh
\nCourt, to delegate to any Subordinate Judge
\n1015<\/span>
\nthe  power  to inflict penalties given in clause  (a).\tThen
\ncomes  the  important section that deals with  appeals\ti.e.
\nRule X. We think it useful to extract the Rule in full.\n<\/p>\n
\t      “X.  Appeals.–(1) The District Judge  may  on
\n\t      appeal  or  otherwise reverse  or\t modify\t any
\n\t      order made under rule IX(2) by any Court under
\n\t      his control including a Court of Small Causes,
\n\t      and his order shall be final:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t       Provided\t that nothing in  this\trule
\n\t      shall  preclude the High Court  from  altering
\n\t      where it deems fit any such appellate order of
\n\t      a\t District Judge on petition by an  aggrieved
\n\t      person or otherwise:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t       Provided\t further that  the  District
\n\t      Judge  shall  not enhance any  punishment\t but
\n\t      should, if he considers enhancement desirable,
\n\t      refer the case to the High Court for orders.
\n\t\t       (2)  Appeals  against  penalties\t in-
\n\t      flicted  by a District Judge shall lie to\t the
\n\t      High Court in the following cases only:-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t      (a)   Penalties  mentioned   in\tRule
\n\t      IX(iii)  to (viii) in respect  of\t ministerial
\n\t      servants,\t holding permanent  and\t pensionable
\n\t      posts;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t      (b) Orders of substantive\t appointment
\n\t      by  promotion or otherwise to a permanent\t and
\n\t      pensionable  post the maximum pay of which  is
\n\t      Rs.75 or more per mensem;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t      (c)  Orders of  temporary\t appointment
\n\t      which is to last more than three months or has
\n\t      in  fact\tlasted\tmore than  three  months  in
\n\t      respect  of posts the maximum pay of which  is
\n\t      Rs.75 or more per mensem.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t       (3)  Persons  appealing to  the\tHigh
\n\t      Court under this rule shall do so by petition.
\n\t      Such  petition, accompanied by a copy  of\t the
\n\t      order  complained against, shall be  presented
\n\t      to  the  District Judge who passed  the  order
\n\t      within  one  month of the date of\t such  order
\n\t      (the period between the
\n\t      1016<\/span>
\n\t      date of application for the copy and the\tdate
\n\t      on  which it is supplied being excluded).\t The
\n\t      District\tJudge will forward the\tpetition  to
\n\t      the Registrar of the High Court without unnec-
\n\t      essary  delay, and in forwarding the  same  he
\n\t      will be at liberty to record any remarks which
\n\t      he  may  wish to make  concerning\t any  matter
\n\t      stated in the petition.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t       After reading the petition, the\tHigh
\n\t      Court may either–\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t      (a) Summarily reject it without  hear-
\n\t      ing the petitioner;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t      (b) refer it to the District Judge for
\n\t      report  and on receipt of such  report  reject
\n\t      the  petition without hearing the\t petitioner;
\n\t      or\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t      (c) hear the petitioner, and in  cases
\n\t      where  other persons are held to be  concerned
\n\t      in  the  subject of the petition,\t such  other
\n\t      person in open Court.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t       Nothing\tin these rules\tshall  debar
\n\t      the  High\t Court\tor a  District\tJudge,\tfrom
\n\t      altering, if deemed fit, any order of  punish-
\n\t      ment  or\tappointment not provided  for  above
\n\t      which  may  be  passed by\t a  District  Judge,
\n\t      Senior  Subordinate  Judge OF the Judge  of  a
\n\t      Small  Causes Court in respect of\t ministerial
\n\t      or  menial  establishment\t when  an  aggrieved
\n\t      person  petitions or otherwise.  District\t and
\n\t      Sessions\tJudges should not, therefore,  with-
\n\t      hold any petition addressed to the High  Court
\n\t      whether  an appeal lies to it in the  case  or
\n\t      not  under these rules. In a case in which  no
\n\t      appeal  lies the District and  Sessions  Judge
\n\t      should  forward  it without any  comments\t and
\n\t      relevant\tdocuments unless he wishes to do  so
\n\t      or is so required by the High Court.
\n\t\t       (4)  Petitioners\t are  forbidden\t  to
\n\t      attend  personally  at the High  Court  unless
\n\t      summoned\tto do So. Orders on their  petitions
\n\t      will  be\tcommunicated  to  them\tthrough\t the
\n\t      District Judge concerned.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t       (5)  In order that a dismissed  offi-
\n\t      cial  may\t be able to exercise  his  right  of
\n\t      appeal,  the  charge  against  him  should  be
\n\t      reduced to writing, his defence should  either
\n\t      be  taken\t in, or reduced to writing  and\t the
\n\t      decision on such defence
\n\t      1017<\/span>
\n\t      should  also be in writing. The record of\t the
\n\t      charge,  defence\tand decision should  in\t all
\n\t      cases be such as to furnish sufficient  infor-
\n\t      mation to the appellate authority to whom\t the
\n\t      dismissed official may prefer an appeal.
\n\t\t\t(6)  Establishment orders, in  which
\n\t      an  appeal lies to the High Court as a  matter
\n\t      of  right, should state briefly the claims  of
\n\t      the  persons  appointed as well  as  those  of
\n\t      their  seniors,  if any,\twho  are  considered
\n\t      unfit  for the appointments in  question,\t and
\n\t      where  the  order of seniority  has  not\tbeen
\n\t      followed\tthe  reasons for departure  from  it
\n\t      should be stated.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    8. Rule X(1) deals with the powers of the District Judge
\nto reverse or modify any order made under Rule IX(2)  passed
\nby  any Court under his control. This  sub-section  contains
\ntwo  provisos.\tThe first proviso gives the  High  Court  an
\nabsolute  power to alter when it deems fit any order  passed
\nby  the\t District Judge in appeal when an  aggrieved  person
\nmoves  the High Court or even suo moto. The  second  proviso
\nrestricts  the powers of the District Judge to\tenhance\t any
\npunishment imposed and makes it subject to the orders of the
\nHigh  Court when such a case is referred to the\t High  Court
\nfor  orders. Rule X(2) deals with appeals against  penalties
\ninflicted  by  District Judge as in the case on\t hand.\tThis
\nsection\t provides that appeals shall lie to the\t High  Court
\nfrom  orders imposing penalties by the District\t Judge,\t but
\nnot  in all cases. Appeals lie only against orders  imposing
\npenalties  mentioned in Rule IX(iii) to IX(viii).  In  other
\nwords, an appeal does not lie when the District Judge passes
\nan  order  imposing a penalty of censure or of fine  of\t not
\nmore  than one month’s salary for misconduct or\t neglect  in
\nthe performance of duties.\n<\/p>\n
    9.\tWe are not concerned here with the orders  mentioned
\nin  Rule X(2)(b) and (c). Sub-rule (3) of Rule X deals\twith
\nthe procedure in filing appeals to the High Court. It states
\nthat appeals shall be by a petition. It obligates  presenta-
\ntion  of the petition to the District Judge who\t passed\t the
\norder within the time prescribed therein. The District Judge
\nis directed to forward the petition to the Registrar of\t the
\nHigh Court without unnecessary delay. The District Judge  is
\ngiven powers to record his remarks which he may wish to make
\nconcerning any matter stated in the petition.\n<\/p>\n
    10. A reading of this sub-rule makes it abundantly clear
\nthat  the appeal to be heard by the High Court is  something
\nwhich it has to do in
\n1018<\/span>
\nexercise  of  its  powers of control  over  the\t subordinate
\ncourts on the administrative side. The appeal has to be by a
\npetition. It is to be routed through the District Judge\t who
\nsends  it to the Registrar of the High Court. These are\t the
\nprocedural  formalities which normally govern  appeals\tpre-
\nferred\tbefore the High Court, on the  administrative  side.
\nThe permission given to the authority who imposes penalty to
\nrecord\this own remarks which he wishes to  make  concerning
\nhis  own  order is further proof of the fact that  what\t the
\nHigh  Court has to consider is not a matter on the  judicial
\nside  but  one in its power of control\tand  superintendence
\nover  the subordinate courts. Appeals under the general\t law
\nhave their own procedure, which is different from the proce-
\ndure  detailed\tfor  the appeals under these  rules  of\t the
\ndeciding authority forwarding the appeal through the  proper
\nchannel\t to the controlling authority and of the freedom  of
\nthe  deciding  authority to give its own  remarks  over\t and
\nabove  the  order already passed. This\tprocedure  robs\t the
\nappeal\tto  the\t High Court of the  characteristics  of\t the
\nnormal\tappeal\tculminating in judicial orders.\t The  matter
\nwill be further clear when we look at the procedure that  is
\nto be followed by the High Court in disposing of the appeals
\ncontained in this subsection itself.\n<\/p>\n
    11. Rule X(3) enables the High Court to summarily reject
\nthe appeal without hearing the petitioner or refer it to the
\nDistrict  Judge\t for report and on receipt  of\tsuch  report
\nreject the petition without hearing the petitioner; secondly
\nto hear the petitioner, and in cases where other persons are
\nheld  to be concerned in the subject of the  petition,\tsuch
\nother person in open court. The procedure contained in\tthis
\nrule of hearing the petition is not similar to the procedure
\nfollowed in regular judicial proceedings. Under these  rules
\nit  is not obligatory for the High Court to hear  the  peti-
\ntioner.\t It can go into the papers and reject  it  summarily
\nwithout giving the petitioner an opportunity to be heard. It
\ncan  also  refer it to the District Judge  for\treport.\t The
\nsecond\tmethod\tof  disposal of this petition is  to  get  a
\nreport\tfrom  the District Judge and on receipt\t of  such  a
\nreport\tto  dismiss it without hearing\tthe  petitioner\t and
\nthirdly\t to give a hearing to the petitioner and also  those
\nwho  will be affected by the disposal of the  petition.\t The
\nmanner of disposal of the petition under this rule makes  it
\nabundantly  clear  that this petition which  the  appellants
\ncall an appeal is not strictly a judicial proceeding involv-
\ning  a lis between two adversaries and the decision  thereon
\nis  not a judicial decision. It has all the trappings of  an
\nadministrative proceeding and an administrative decision.\n<\/p>\n
1019<\/span><\/p>\n
    Sub-clause\t(4)gives further insight into the nature  of
\nthe appeal. It reads:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “(4)  Petitioners\t are  forbidden\t to   attend
\n\t      personally  at the High Court unless  summoned
\n\t      to  do so. Orders on their petitions  will  be
\n\t      communicated  to\tthem  through  the  District
\n\t      Judge concerned.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
This again marks a complete departure from the normal  judi-
\ncial proceeding before a court. The petitioners are  forbid-
\nden  to attend personally at the High Court. They can do  so
\nonly  when summoned to do so. In a judicial proceeding,\t the
\nparty has a right to appear personally or through his  coun-
\nsel. Here that right is denied to him. This denial also robs
\nthe appeal of its character of a judicial proceeding. Orders
\npassed by the High Court on such petitions will be  communi-
\ncated to the parties through the District Judge concerned.\n<\/p>\n
    12. A close study of these rules leaves no doubt in\t our
\nmind  that  in deciding the appeal under Rule  X,  the\tHigh
\nCourt  exercises only a supervisory  administrative  control
\nand  does not act as a Tribunal disposing of an\t appeal\t in-
\nvolving\t a lis between two rival parties and arriving  at  a
\njudicial  decision. As indicated above Rule X is in  Chapter
\n18-A which deals with control. This gives the administrative
\nshade  to  the\tproceeding under this  rule.  Section  35(3)
\ncontains  the  rule making power. Section  35(4)  stipulates
\nthat  any  order  passed by the District  Judge\t under\tthis
\nsection\t shall be subject to the control of the High  Court,
\nthus  fortifying our conclusion that the  proceedings  under
\nthis  section  and  the decisions made\tthereunder  are\t not
\njudicial in nature. This appeal can be disposed of with this
\nconclusion  and it is not necessary to refer to the  various
\nauthorities  cited before us. However, for the\tcompleteness
\nof the judgment, we think it proper to briefly refer to\t the
\nvarious\t authorities  cited before us, for and\tagainst\t the
\nposition  that the High Court, while deciding  this  appeal,
\nacted  as  a Tribunal whose order can be  challenged  before
\nthis Court under Article 136 of the Constitution, though  in
\nour view the decisions cited dealt with situations different
\nfrom the one we are dealing here.\n<\/p>\n
    13. In Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh\t and
\nOthers,<\/a> [1955] 1 SCR 267 a Constitution Bench of this  Court
\nwas considering the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court  under
\nArticle\t 136 of the Constitution in an election case. It  is
\nnot necessary for our purpose to state the facts of the case
\nhere.  It was contended that the special  jurisdiction\tthat
\nwas conferred in the Election Tribunal could be in-\n<\/p>\n
1020<\/span><\/p>\n
voked  by  an aggrieved party only by means of\tan  election
\npetition,  whose decision was final and conclUsiVe and\tthat
\ntherefore  a  challenge to the order of the  Tribunal  under
\nArticle\t 136  of the Constitution was not  maintainable.  To
\nsupport\t this  contention Article 329  and  the\t nonobstante
\nclause\ttherein were called in to aid. This  Court  repelled
\nthat  contention as untenable though apparently\t attractive.
\nThis  Court held that the expression ‘Tribunal’ as  used  in
\nArticle 136 did not mean samething as ‘Court’, but  included
\nin  its\t ambit all adjudicating bodies\tprovided  they\twere
\nconstituted by the State and were invested with the judicial
\nas  distinguished  from purely administrative  or  executive
\nfunctions.  This decision has been pressed into\t service  by
\nthe  appellants’ counsel to contend that the High  Court  in
\nthe  case on hand having been constituted by the  State\t and
\ninvested  with judicial power was a Tribunal and  therefore,
\nits  decision could be examined by this Court under  Article\n<\/p>\n
136.  In our view, this decision cannot help the  appellants
\nbecause\t this decision clearly held that if the power  exer-
\ncised  was administrative in nature it would exclude such  a
\nTribunal from the ambit of Article 136.\n<\/p>\n
    14.\t In Bachhittar Singh v. The State of Punjab,<\/a>  [1962]
\nSuppl. 3 SCR 7 13, an employee in PEPSU was dismissed by the
\nRevenue Secretary. Against this order he preferred an appeal
\nto  the State Government. The Revenue Minister,\t PEPSU\tfelt
\nthat  the order of dismissal was too harsh and\tinstead,  he
\nshould be reverted and made an endorsement to that effect on
\nthe  file, but no written order was served on the  employee.
\nAfter the merger of PEPSU with Punjab, the Revenue Minister,
\nPunjab, sent the file to the Chief Minister for his  advice.
\nThe  Chief Minister passed an order confirming the order  of
\ndismissal and the order was duly communicated to the employ-
\nee. This order was challenged by him before the High  Court.
\nIt  was\t contended  before the High Court by  the  State  of
\nPunjab,\t with success, that the order of  dismissal  started
\nwith proceedings beginning with the enquiry and\t culminating
\nin punishment and that the first part involved a decision on
\nevidence while the second part of taking action an  adminis-
\ntrative\t one.  This dichotomy was  ingeniously\tput  forward
\nbefore\tthis Court to render the appeal not maintainable  by
\ncontending  that the order of dismissal was not\t a  judicial
\norder. This Court repelled that contention. This Court\theld
\nthat  departmental  proceedings taken against  a  Government
\nservant\t were not divisible in the sense in which  the\tHigh
\nCourt understood it. There is just one continuous proceeding
\nthough\tthere are two stages in it. Mudholkar,\tJ.  speaking
\nfor  the Constitution Bench observed thus in repelling\tthis
\ncontention:\n<\/p>\n
1021<\/span><\/p>\n
\t      ”\t  …..\t There is just one  continuous\tpro-
\n\t      ceedings\tthough there are two stages  in\t it.
\n\t      The  first  is coming to a conclusion  on\t the
\n\t      evidence\tas  to whether the  charges  alleged
\n\t      against the Government servant are established
\n\t      or not and the second is reached only if it is
\n\t      found that they are so established. That stage
\n\t      deals with the action to be taken against\t the
\n\t      Government  servant concerned. The High  Court
\n\t      accepts  that  the first stage is\t a  judicial
\n\t      proceeding  and indeed it must be\t so  because
\n\t      charges  have to be framed, notice has  to  be
\n\t      given and the person concerned has to be given
\n\t      an opportunity of being heard. Even so far  as
\n\t      the second stage is concerned, Article  311(2)
\n\t      of  the Constitution requires a notice  to  be
\n\t      given  to\t the  person concerned\tas  also  an
\n\t      opportunity  of being heard.  Therefore,\tthis
\n\t      stage  of the proceeding is no  less  judicial
\n\t      than the earlier one. Consequently any  action
\n\t      decided  to  be  taken  against  a  Government
\n\t      servant found guilty of misconduct is a  judi-
\n\t      cial order and as such it cannot be varied  at
\n\t      the will of the authority who is empowered  to
\n\t      impose the punishment. Indeed, the very object
\n\t      with  which notice is required to be given  on
\n\t      the  question of punishment is to ensure\tthat
\n\t      it will be such as would be justified upon the
\n\t      charges established and upon the other attend-
\n\t      ant  circumstances  of the case.\tIt  is\tthus
\n\t      wholly erroneous to characterise the taking of
\n\t      action  against a person found guilty  of\t any
\n\t      charge at a departmental enquiry as an  admin-
\n\t      istrative order.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
This  judgment will not help us in this case. It  only\tlays
\ndown  a general principle that a departmental enquiry and  a
\ndecision is one continuous process consisting of the enquiry
\npart and the decision making part, both the aspects of which
\nare judicial in nature, and the decisions taken therein\t are
\nin exercise of judicial power.\n<\/p>\n
   15. The counsel for the appellants placed strong reliance
\non the decision of a Constitution Bench in the case of Asso-
\nciated\tCement\tCompanies Ltd. v. P.N. Sharma  and<\/a>  another,
\n[1965]\t2 SCR 366, to contend that the decision of the\tHigh
\nCourt  in this case was a judicial  decision of\t a  Tribunal
\nwithin the scope of Article 136. In that judgment this Court
\nconsidered  most of its previous decisions relating  to\t the
\nscope  of Article 136. What fell to be decided in that\tcase
\nwas  whether  the State Government was a  Tribunal  when  it
\nexercised  its\tauthority under Rule 6(5) and  6(6)  of\t the
\nPunjab Welfare Officers Recruitment and Conditions of  Serv-
\nice Rules, 1952. It is necessary to
\n1022<\/span>
\nbriefly\t state the facts of the case.  The  employer-company
\nappointed  the first respondent as a Welfare Officer as\t re-
\nquired by the Factories Act. 1984 and as per the rules\tmen-
\ntioned\tabove.\tThe letter of appointment  stated  that\t the
\nfirst respondent was liable to be transferred from one\tunit
\nof  the company to another and that his services  could\t bet
\nterminated by one month’s notice or with one month’s pay  in
\nlieu thereof. The Welfare Officer was not prepared to go  10
\na  place to which he was transferred. Thereupon the  company
\nterminated  the\t services  of the 1st  respondent  with\t one
\nmonth’s\t salary.  He appealed to the State of  Punjab  under
\nRule 6(6). The State of Punjab ordered his reinstatement. As
\nthe  previous  concurrence of the  Labour  Commissioner,  as
\nrequired  by  rule 6(3), proviso (2) was not  obtained,\t the
\ncompany\t brought  the  matter to this  Court  under  Article
\n136(1)\tof  the Constitution. A\t preliminary  objection\t was
\nraised\tbefore this Court that the appeal to this Court\t was
\nincompetent because the second respondent was not a Tribunal
\nwhen  it  decided the appeaL.within the meaning\t of  Article
\n136(1) of the Constitution. Rule 6(6) read as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “6(6) A welfare officer upon whom the  punish-
\n\t      ment  mentioned in clause (v) of sub-rule\t (3)
\n\t      is imposed may appeal to the State  Government
\n\t      against the order of punishment within  thirty
\n\t      days from the date of receipt of the order  by
\n\t      him.  The\t decision of  the  State  Government
\n\t      shall be final and binding.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
It was by virtue of this rule that the State Government\t got
\nthe powers of appeal. Dealing with the preliminary objection
\nthe  Constitution Bench speaking through Gajendragadkar,  CJ
\nreferred  to  this Court’s  earlier  decision  in  Harinagar
\nSugar  Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sundar Jhun<\/a>\t  jhunwala and\toth-
\ners, [1962] 2 SCR 339, and observed as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t      ”\t  …..\t On the preliminary question  as  to
\n\t      whether\tthe  appeals  were  competent,\t the
\n\t      learned  Judge agreed with the majority  deci-
\n\t      sion that the Central Government was a  tribu-
\n\t      nal  within  the meaning\tof  Article  136(1).
\n\t      Construing  Article 136(1), the learned  Judge
\n\t      observed\tthat courts and tribunals act  judi-
\n\t      cially  in  both senses which he\thad  earlier
\n\t      discussed\t and  in  the  term  ‘tribunal’\t are
\n\t      included all others, which are not so  includ-
\n\t      ed.  Among the powers of the State,  said\t Hi-
\n\t      dayatullah, J. is included the power to decide
\n\t      controversies  between  parties. This  is\t un-
\n\t      doubtedly\t one of the attributes of the  State
\n\t      and is aptly called the judicial power
\n\t      1023<\/span>
\n\t      Of  the State. Broadly speaking, certain\tspe-
\n\t      cial  matters  go before\ttribunals,  and\t the
\n\t      residue  goes  before the ordinary  courts  of
\n\t      civil  judicature. Their procedure’, may\tdif-
\n\t      fer,  but\t the functions are  not\t essentially
\n\t      different\t (pp.  362-63). Thus,  it  would  be
\n\t      noticed that all the learned Judges who  heard
\n\t      this case, were agreed in taking the view that
\n\t      the essential power which was exercised by the
\n\t      courts  and tribunals alike was  the  judicial
\n\t      power of the State.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    16. This Court then referred to its decision in  Jaswant
\nSugar Mills Ltd. v. Lakshmichand and Others,<\/a> [1963] Suppl. 1
\nSCR  242 in which the finding that an appeal  under  Article
\n136(1)\tagainst\t the  order of a  Conciliation\tOfficer\t was
\nincompetent,  was considered. Under clause 29 of  the  order
\npromulgated in 1954 under the U.P. Industrial Disputes\tAct.
\n1947, the Conciliation Officer could grant or refuse permis-
\nsion  to  alter the terms of employment of  workmen  at\t the
\ninstance  of  the employer. This Section did  not  suit\t the
\nemployer. That was challenged before this Court. This  Court
\nheld  that the Conciliation Officer was not a  Tribunal\t be-
\ncause  he  was not invested with the judicial power  of\t the
\nState as he was empowered merely to lift the ban statutorily
\nimposed\t on the employers’ rights and was not authorised  to
\npronounce  a  final  and binding decision  in  any  dispute.
\nRegarding the conclusion in that case this Court observed as
\nfollows:\n<\/p>\n
\t      ”\t …..\tThe condition precedent for bringing
\n\t      a\t tribunal within the ambit of  Article\t136,
\n\t      observed\tShah, J., who spoke for\t the  Court,
\n\t      ‘is  that\t it  should be\tconstituted  by\t the
\n\t      State’  and he added that a tribunal would  be
\n\t      outside the ambit of Article 136 if it is\t not
\n\t      invested\twith any part of the judicial  func-
\n\t      tions  of\t the  State  but  discharges  purely
\n\t      administrative  or  executive  duties.   After
\n\t      examining\t the scheme of the  relevant  provi-
\n\t      sion, it was observed that ‘in deciding wheth-
\n\t      er  an  authority required to  act  judicially
\n\t      when dealing with matters effecting rights  of
\n\t      citizens may be regarded as a tribunal’ though
\n\t      not  a  court, the principal incident  is\t the
\n\t      investiture of the ‘trappings of a  court’such
\n\t      as  authority  to determine matters  in  cases
\n\t      initiated by parties. sitting in public, power
\n\t      to  compel  attendance  of  witnesses  and  to
\n\t      examine them on oath, and others\t…….
\n\t      Some,  though not necessarily all\t such  trap-
\n\t      pings,  will  ordinarily\tmake  the  authority
\n\t      which  is\t under a duty to act  judicially,  a
\n\t      ‘tribunal’.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
1024<\/span><\/p>\n
    17.\t Then  dealing with the question whether  the  State
\nGovernment  when it exercised its authority under rule\t6(5)
\nand rule 6(6) was a tribunal or not, this Court observed  as
\nfollows:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “The  question which we have to decide in\t the
\n\t      present appeal is whether the State Government
\n\t      is a tribunal when it exercises its  authority
\n\t      under  Rule 6(5) or Rule 6(6). No\t rules\thave
\n\t      been made prescribing the procedure which\t the
\n\t      State Government should follow in dealing with
\n\t      appeals  under these two sub-rules, and  there
\n\t      is  no statutory provision conferring  on\t the
\n\t      State Government any specific powers which are
\n\t      usually  associated with the trial  in  courts
\n\t      and  which are intended to help the  court  in
\n\t      reaching\tits decisions. The  requirements  of
\n\t      procedure which is followed in courts and\t the
\n\t      possession  of  subsidiary  powers  which\t are
\n\t      given to courts to try. the cases before them,
\n\t      are described as trappings of the courts,\t and
\n\t      so,  it may be conceded that  these  trappings
\n\t      are  not\tshown to exist in the  case  of\t the
\n\t      State  Government\t which hears  appeals  under
\n\t      Rule  6(5)  and Rule 6(6). But as\t we  already
\n\t      stated,  the consideration about the  presence
\n\t      of all or some of the trappings of a court  is
\n\t      really  not decisive. The presence of some  of
\n\t      the trappings may assist the determination  of
\n\t      the question as to whether the power exercised
\n\t      by  the  authority which\tpossesses  the\tsaid
\n\t      trappings, is the judicial power of the  State
\n\t      or  not. The main and the basic test  however,
\n\t      is  whether  the adjudicating  power  which  a
\n\t      particular authority is empowered to exercise,
\n\t      has been conferred on it by a statute and\t can
\n\t      be  described as part of the State’s  inherent
\n\t      power  exercised in discharging  its  judicial
\n\t      functions. Applying this test, there can be no
\n\t      doubt  that the power which the State  Govern-
\n\t      ment exercises under Rule 6(5) and Rule  6(6),
\n\t      is  a part of the State’s judicial  power.  It
\n\t      has been conferred on the State Government  by
\n\t      a\t statutory Rule and it can be  exercised  in
\n\t      respect of disputes between the management and
\n\t      its Welfare Officers. There is, in that sense,
\n\t      a\t lis; there is affirmation by one party\t and
\n\t      denial by another, and the dispute necessarily
\n\t      involves\tthe  rights and obligations  of\t the
\n\t      parties  to  it.\tThe order  which  the  State
\n\t      Government  ultimately passes is described  as
\n\t      its decision and it is made final and binding.
\n\t      Besides,\tit  is an order\t passed\t on  appeal.
\n\t      Having regard to these distinctive features of
\n\t      the power conferred on the State Government by
\n\t      Rule 6(5) and Rule
\n\t      1025<\/span>
\n\t      6(6), we feel no hesitation in holding that it
\n\t      is  a Tribunal within the meaning\t of  Article
\n\t      136( 1).”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
What  follows  from this case and the  authorities  referred
\ntherein is this: The State is invested in Some cases with  a
\npower to decide controversies between parties. This power is
\nundoubtedly  one of the attributes of the State and that  is
\ncalled\tthe  judicial  power of the State. What\t has  to  be
\nremembered  is that this power is exercised to resolve\tcon-
\ntroversies between parties. In Associated Cement’s case also
\nthis  Court took notice of the fact that a  dispute  existed
\nbetween the management and its welfare officer. It was\theld
\nthat  there  existed  a lis the decision of  which  lis\t was
\nrendered  by  the State in exercise of its  judicial  power.
\nThis was the test that has to be applied to find out whether
\nan order is a judicial order or not.\n<\/p>\n
    18. In Engineering Mazdoor Sabha v. Hind Cycles Limited,
\nBombay,<\/a> [1963] Suppl. 1 SCR 625 the question considered by a
\nConstitution Bench was whether the decision of an arbitrator
\nto whom industrial disputes were voluntarily referred  under
\nSection\t 10-A  of  the Industrial Disputes  Act,  1947.\t was
\nquasi-judicial\tin character and his decision amounted to  a
\ndetermination or order under Article 136(1) of the Constitu-
\ntion  of  India. This Court held that for  invoking  Article
\n136(1),\t two conditions must be satisfied–(1) The  proposed
\nappeal\tmust  be from any judgment,  decree,  determination,
\nsentence or order, that is to say, it must not be against  a
\npurely executive or administrative order. If the  determina-
\ntion  or  order giving rise to the appeal is a\tjudicial  or
\nquasi-judicial\tdetermination or order, the first  condition
\nis satisfied. (2) The second condition imposed by the  Arti-
\ncle  is that the said determination or order must have\tbeen
\nmade or passed by any Court or Tribunal in the territory  of
\nIndia.\tThese conditions, therefore, require that the  order
\ncomplained  against must have a judicial  or  quasi-judicial
\ncharacter  and\tthe  authority\twhose  order  is  complained
\nagainst\t must  be  a Court or a Tribunal.  Unless  both\t the
\nconditions are satisfied, Article 136(1) cannot be  invoked.
\nThe  decision of the arbitrator, it was held, could be\tcha-
\nracterised  as\tquasi-judicial\tone, but the  power  of\t the
\narbitrator is not in exercise of the sovereign power or\t one
\nby conferment of a statutory power by the State. He gets the
\npower to adjudicate by virtue of the authority given by\t the
\nparties.  It was held that an appeal from the order  of\t the
\narbitrator did not lie under article 136(1) of the Constitu-
\ntion.\n<\/p>\n
    19.\t In Indo-China Steam Navigation Co. Ltd.  v.  Jasjit
\nSingh, Additional Collector of Customs and Others,<\/a> [1964]  6
\nSCR 594 the question
\n1026<\/span>
\ndebated was whether the Central Board of Revenue  exercising
\nits appellate power under Section 190 of the Sea Customs Act
\nor the Central Government exercising its revision  jurisdic-
\ntion under Section 191 could be held to be a Tribunal  under
\nArticle 136. This Court repeated the principle laid down  in
\nthe earlier decisions that two conditions have to be  satis-
\nfied  before  an appeal could be entertained in\t this  Court
\nunder Article 136: the order impugned must be an order of  a
\njudicial  or  quasi-judicial  character and  should  not  be
\npurely\tan administrative or executive order; and  that\t the
\nsaid  order should have been passed either by a Court  or  a
\nTribunal  in  the territory of India.  After  examining\t the
\nearlier\t decisions and the tests laid down therein and\talso
\nafter  examining  the  procedure prescribed in\tthe  Act  in
\nrelation  to the adjudication of disputes under\t these\tsec-
\ntions, it was held that the Central Board of Revenue and the
\nrevisional authority, the Central Government, had the  char-
\nacter  of a Tribunal under Article 136 of  the\tConstitution
\nand  thus the preliminary objection that the appeal was\t not
\nmaintainable  was overruled. Since great stress was laid  by
\nthe learned counsel for the appellants on this authority, we
\nwould  like  to extract the relevant portion on\t which\tsuch
\nreliance was placed to distinguish it from the facts of\t our
\ncase.\n<\/p>\n
\t      ”\t  ……   The fact that the status  of\t the
\n\t      Customs Officer who adjudicates under  Section
\n\t      167  (12A) and section 183 of the Act  is\t not
\n\t      that of a Tribunal, does not make any  differ-
\n\t      ence  when  we reach the stage  of  appeal  or
\n\t      revision. A period of limitation is prescribed
\n\t      for  the appeal, a procedure is prescribed  by
\n\t      Rule  49 that the appeal or revision  must  be
\n\t      accompanied by a copy of the decision or order
\n\t      complained against, and the obvious scheme  is
\n\t      that  both  the appellate and  the  revisional
\n\t      authorities must consider the matter judicial-
\n\t      ly on the evidence and determine it in accord-
\n\t      ance with law. It is obvious that heavy  fines
\n\t      are  imposed  in\tthese  proceedings  and\t the
\n\t      confiscation orders passed may affect ships of
\n\t      very large value. By his appeal or  revisional
\n\t      application the ship owner naturally  contends
\n\t      that the order of confiscation is improper  or
\n\t      invalid  and he sometimes urges that the\tfine
\n\t      imposed  is unreasonable and excessive.  Where
\n\t      disputes\tof this character are raised  before
\n\t      the appellate or the revisional authority,  it
\n\t      would  be difficult to accede to the  argument
\n\t      that  the\t authority which  deals\t with  these
\n\t      disputes in its appellate or revisional juris-
\n\t      diction  is not a tribunal under Article\t136.
\n\t      These  authorities  are  constituted  by\t the
\n\t      legislature  and\tthey are empowered  to\tdeal
\n\t      with the
\n\t      1027<\/span>
\n\t      disputes\tbrought\t before\t them  by  aggrieved
\n\t      persons.\tThus,  the scheme  of  the-Act,\t the
\n\t      nature  of the proceedings brought before\t the
\n\t      appellate and the revisional authorities,\t the
\n\t      extent  of the claim involved, the  nature  of
\n\t      the penalties imposed ‘and the kind of enquiry
\n\t      which the Act contemplates, all indicate\tthat
\n\t      both the appellate and the revisional authori-
\n\t      ties  acting under the relevant provisions  of
\n\t      the Act constitute Tribunals under Article 136
\n\t      of the Constitution, because they are invested
\n\t      with the judicial power of the State, and\t are
\n\t      required to act judicially. Therefore, we must
\n\t      over-rule the preliminary objection raised  by
\n\t      the  Additional Solicitor General and  proceed
\n\t      to deal with the appeal on the merits.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
This  judgment can be easily distinguished from the case  on
\nhand  on  the finding that the High Court in this  case,  as
\nalready indicated by us, was acting purely  administratively
\nand  was  not making a judicial decision and  the  procedure
\nadopted was totally different from the procedure in a Court.
\nThis  decision, therefore, cannot create any hurdle for\t our
\nconclusion against the appellants.\n<\/p>\n
    20. In APHLC v. M.A. Sangma, [1978] 1 SCR 393 this Court
\nwas dealing with the jurisdiction of the Election Commission
\nto decide the question of a symbol to the parties contesting
\nthe  election. It was held that the decision from the  Elec-
\ntion Commission was amenable to appeal under Article 136  of
\nthe Constitution of India since the powers were conferred on
\nthe Election Commission by rules, that the Election  Commis-
\nsion  was dealing with the matter between two rival  parties
\nand  that the decision taken was a judicial  decision.\tHere
\nagain,\tthe Court reiterated the several tests to  determine
\nwhether a particular body or authority was a Tribunal within
\nthe ambit of Article 136 or not. These tests are not exhaus-
\ntive. The two necessary pre-requisites for that authority to
\ncome  within Article 136(1) are that it must be\t constituted
\nby  the State and invested with some judicial power  of\t the
\nState.\tThese  two tests, it was held, were  unfailing\tone,
\nwhile some of the other test or tests may not be present. At
\npages 409 and 410 the matter is made abundantly clear in the
\nfollowing statement of law by the Court:\n<\/p>\n
\t      ”\t  ……   There is thus a lis\tbetween\t two
\n\t      groups  of the Conference. The  Commission  is
\n\t      undoubtedly the specified and exclusive  adju-
\n\t      dicating authority of this lis. The Commission
\n\t      is  created by the Constitution and the  power
\n\t      to  adjudicate the dispute flows from  Article
\n\t      324 as well as
\n\t      1028<\/span>
\n\t      from  Rule 5 and is thus conferred  under\t the
\n\t      law  as  a fraction of judicial power  of\t the
\n\t      State.  The Commission has prescribed its\t own
\n\t      procedure\t in  the Symbols Order,\t namely,  to
\n\t      give a hearing to the parties when there is  a
\n\t      dispute with regard to recognition or  regard-
\n\t      ing choice of symbols  …..  ”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t       ”   …….  To repeat, the power  to
\n\t      decide  this particular dispute is a  part  of
\n\t      the  State’s judicial power and that power  is
\n\t      conferred on the Election Commission by  Arti-
\n\t      cle 324 of the Constitution as also by rule  5
\n\t      of  the rules. The principal  and\t non-failing
\n\t      test which must be present in order to  deter-
\n\t      mine whether a body or authority is a tribunal
\n\t      within  the ambit of Article 136(1),  is\tful-
\n\t      filled in this case when the Election  Commis-
\n\t      sion  is\trequired  to  adjudicate  a  dispute
\n\t      between two parties, one group asserting to be
\n\t      recognised  political party of the  State\t and
\n\t      the other group controverting the\t proposition
\n\t      before it, but at the same time not laying any
\n\t      claim to be that party  …….\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t  21. We have considered the above decisions
\n\t      carefully.  In our view, the  principles\tlaid
\n\t      down in these cases cannot help the appellants
\n\t      in  support  of the plea that the\t High  Court
\n\t      While disposing of the appeal was acting as  a
\n\t      tribunal.\t The relevant provisions  quoted  in
\n\t      the  earlier part of the judgment relating  to
\n\t      the  appeal  in  question,  in  our  judgment,
\n\t      clearly establish that the High Court acted on
\n\t      the  administrative side in deciding  the\t ap-
\n\t      peal.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t  22.  There is a clear distinction  between
\n\t      courts  of law exercising judicial powers\t and
\n\t      other bodies. Decisions by courts are  clearly
\n\t      judicial.\t That  is not the case\twith  bodies
\n\t      exercising administrative or executive powers.
\n\t      In  certain  matters even Judges have  to\t act
\n\t      administratively\tand in so doing may have  to
\n\t      act  quasi-judicially  in\t dealing  with\t the
\n\t      matters  entrusted to them. It is\t only  where
\n\t      the authorities are required to act judicially
\n\t      either by express provisions of the statute or
\n\t      by necessary implication that the decisions of
\n\t      such  an\tauthority would amount to  a  quasi-
\n\t      judicial\tproceeding. When Judges in  exercise
\n\t      of their administrative functions decide cases
\n\t      it  cannot  be said that their  decisions\t are
\n\t      either judicial or quasi-judicial decisions.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t  23. Every decision or order by an authori-
\n\t      ty  which has a duty to act judicially is\t not
\n\t      subject  to appeal to this Court. Article\t 136
\n\t      contemplates  appeals to this Court only\tfrom
\n\t      adjudications of courts and tri-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      1029<\/span><\/p>\n
\t      bunals.  Such adjudication must  doubtless  be
\n\t      judicial.\t This does not mean that  every\t au-
\n\t      thority  which is required to act\t judicially,
\n\t      either by its constitution or by virtue of the
\n\t      authority conferred upon it, is necessarily  a
\n\t      tribunal\tfor  the purpose  of  Article  136-A
\n\t      tribunal,\t whose\tadjudication is\t subject  to
\n\t      appeal, must besides being under a duty to act
\n\t      judicially, be a body invested with the  judi-
\n\t      cial power of the State.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t  24.  In the appeal before the High  Court,
\n\t      the  High Court was following its\t own  proce-
\n\t      dure,  a\tprocedure not normally\tfollowed  in
\n\t      judicial\tmatters.  The  High  Court  was\t not
\n\t      resolving\t any dispute or controversy  between
\n\t      two adversaries. In other words, while  decid-
\n\t      ing  this appeal there was no |is\t before\t the
\n\t      High Court. The High Court was only exercising
\n\t      its  power  of  control  while  deciding\tthis
\n\t      appeal.  We have. therefore, no hesitation  to
\n\t      hold  that  the appeal  is  not  maintainable.
\n\t      However,\twe  do\tnot propose  to\t dismiss  it
\n\t      without leaving any remedy to the\t appellants.
\n\t      We  direct the Registrar to transfer  the\t re-
\n\t      cords  of the case to the Punjab\tand  Haryana
\n\t      High  Court requesting the High Court to\ttake
\n\t      this petition on its file as a petition  under
\n\t      Article  226  and\t dispose of  the  matter  as
\n\t      expeditiously  as\t possible on  the  available
\n\t      pleadings\t and  documents. There\twill  be  no
\n\t      order as to costs.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      P.S.S.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      Appeal dismissed.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      1030<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Dev Singh & Ors vs Registrar, Punjab & Haryana High … on 15 April, 1987 Equivalent citations: 1987 AIR 1629, 1987 SCR (2)1005 Author: V Khalid Bench: Khalid, V. (J) PETITIONER: DEV SINGH & ORS. Vs. RESPONDENT: REGISTRAR, PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT & ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT15\/04\/1987 BENCH: KHALID, V. […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-237063","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nDev Singh & Ors vs Registrar, Punjab & Haryana High ... on 15 April, 1987 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/dev-singh-ors-vs-registrar-punjab-haryana-high-on-15-april-1987\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Dev Singh & Ors vs Registrar, Punjab & Haryana High ... on 15 April, 1987 - 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