{"id":239907,"date":"1968-05-17T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1968-05-16T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/goodyear-india-ltd-and-anr-vs-the-executive-officer-panchayat-on-17-may-1968"},"modified":"2017-03-25T20:02:54","modified_gmt":"2017-03-25T14:32:54","slug":"goodyear-india-ltd-and-anr-vs-the-executive-officer-panchayat-on-17-may-1968","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/goodyear-india-ltd-and-anr-vs-the-executive-officer-panchayat-on-17-may-1968","title":{"rendered":"Goodyear India Ltd. And Anr. vs The Executive Officer, Panchayat &#8230; on 17 May, 1968"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"docsource_main\">Punjab-Haryana High Court<\/div>\n<div class=\"doc_title\">Goodyear India Ltd. And Anr. vs The Executive Officer, Panchayat &#8230; on 17 May, 1968<\/div>\n<div class=\"doc_citations\">Equivalent citations: AIR 1969 P H 379<\/div>\n<div class=\"doc_author\">Author: S Bhadur<\/div>\n<div class=\"doc_bench\">Bench: S Bahadur, G Singh, R Narula<\/div>\n<\/p>\n<pre><\/pre>\n<p>JUDGMENT<\/p>\n<p> Shamsher Bhadur, J. <\/p>\n<p> 1. Whether the aggregate amount of taxes on professions, trades, callings and employments in respect of one person to be levied by the State or a Municipality or other local authority should be limited to a sum of Rs. 250 per annum or that a sum up to Rs. 250  may be levied by each one of these authorities  is the question that has to be resolved in this reference   to a Full Bench.  Tek Chand J.,  before  whom these petitions, Goodyear  India Limited v.  The Executive  Officer Panchayat Samiti, Bllabarh (Civil writ No. 354 of 1967) and Kamta Prasad Aggarwal v. The Executive officer, Panchayat Samiti, Ballabgarh, (Civil Writ No. 355 of 1967), came for disposal,  being of the view that  the attention of the Division Bench of Chief Justice Falshaw and Arbans Singh J., in Aruna  Rani v. District  Board, Amritsar,  AIR 1964 Punj 383,  Where  it was held  that &#8220;a tax up to Rs. 250 can be imposed by each one of the authorities mentioned in Article 276(2)  of the Constitution&#8221; not  having been brought to an earlier decision  of Mahajan j., in Lachhman Das  Makhan Lal v. State of Punjab , AIR 1960 Punj 394, where it was observed by way of an  obiter that the aggregate of profession tax cannot exceed  the sum of Rs. 250 per annum, a reconsideration by a Full Bench is necessary.\n<\/p>\n<p>      2. Before adverting to the facts giving rise to this question  of law, it may  be well  to reproduce  the provision  of Article 276  of the Constitution   which have been the  subject matter of controversy:&#8211;\n<\/p>\n<p>      &#8220;276(1)   Notwithstanding  anything in Article  246,  no law  of the legislative  of a State relating  to taxes for the benefit of the State  or of a municipality , district   board, local board  or other local  authority  therein   in respect  of professions, trades, callings or employments  shall be invalid  on the grounds  that it  relates  to a tax on income.\n<\/p>\n<p>     (2) The total amount  payable  in respect  of any  one person  to the State or to any one municipality,  district  board,  local  board or other local authority  in the State  by way of taxes on professions ,  trades callings and employments shall not exceed  two hundred and fifty rupees per annum.\n<\/p>\n<p>     (3)&#8230;&#8230;.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>It  may  be observed  that &#8220;taxes on professions, trades callings  and employments&#8221;are the subject-matter of Entry No. 60  in the State List (List II)  of  Seventh Schedule  to the Constitution .\n<\/p>\n<p>      3. The Goodyear India Limited, which is the petitioner in Civil Writ No. 354 of 1967, and Kamta Prasad, Manager , Labour  Department  of this Company , in Civil Writ  No. 355 of 1967 , have challenged  the imposition  by the respondent  Panchayat  Samiti,  Ballagarh,  of what may briefly be  called  &#8216;Professional Tax&#8217;  up to maximum  limit of Rs. 200  per annum  on a graced scale when a similar tax subject to a maximum of Rs. 250   per annum,  also on a graded scale,  has already been levied  and is being realized by a  State of Haryana, th second respondent  in these petitions.  It may be mentioned in passing that through  the State of Haryana  has not chosen  to be represented before us, we have heard  the arguments  of its Advocate -general  Mr. Anand Swaroop,  who has assisted this Court as amicus curiae.\n<\/p>\n<p>     4. The Punjab Professions, trades Callings and Employment Taxation Act, 1956  (hereinafter called the Act)  was enacted on 3rd May, 1956 , and had been in force till the reorganisation of the state of Punjab which took  place on 1st November,  1966.  Under Section 3 of the Act: &#8211;\n<\/p>\n<p>   &#8220;Every person who carries on trade, either by himself or by an agent or representative, or who follows a profession or calling,  or who is in employment , either wholly or in part within the State of Punjab, shall be liable to pay for each financial year or a part thereof a tx in respect of  such profession  , trade calling  or employment.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>      The tax was to be levied at rates  specified in the Schedule annexed to the Act.  Broadly speaking, incomes  below Rs. 600 were exempted from this tax.  While on the one  hand, income between Rs. 6000 and Rs. 8500 was subject to a tax of Rs. 120, the maximum  of Rs. 250  was levied   on  income  exceeding  Rs. 25,000.  A person under clause (d) of Section 2 of the Act includes &#8220;Hindu undivided family or an incorporated company&#8221; .  The petitioner in Civil Writ No. 354 for 1967 became liable as a person and had been paying the professional tax of Rs. 250 per annum under this Act.  The petitioner in Civil Writ NO. 355 of 1967 was likewise paying professional tax of the State Government and it was realised by the Treasury Officer, Gurgaon.\n<\/p>\n<p>     5. Under Section 5 of the Punjab Temporary Taxation Act, 1962 (Punjab Act No. 19 of 1962), the Schedule in the Act was altered to bring the scale on one end with an income between Rs. 1800 to Rupees 3000 leviable to a tax  of Rs. 28, and on the other an income exceeding Rs. 11,500  per annum  subject to a tax  of Rs. 250  per annum .  It maybe mentioned that by Punjab Act No. 6  of  1967 , the Act  has  been  repealed and there is not no professional   tax so far as the reorganised  State of Punjab  is concerned .  The provisions  of the Act, however, continue  to be applicable  to the State of Haryana and also  to the union  Territory   of Chandigarh  under the relevant  provisions  of law.  The Panchayat  Samiti,  Ballabarah , the first respondent   notified to  the petitioner  on 19th  September,  1962, that  it intended  to levy  professional  tax at the maximum  rate   of Rs. 200  per annum  according to the schedule  which in Annexure &#8216;O&#8217; .  Not , this schedule  has come into existence   in consequence  of a notification  of the Punjab  Government  of 16th  June, 1956, which is Annexure &#8216;M&#8217; .  It  was  mentioned  in this notification  that the District  Board, Gurgaon, with the sanction  of the Government  of Punjab had imposed a tax on professions, trade , callings and employments   the only  exemption  being  in the case of an income  not exceeding  Rs. 400 per annum.\n<\/p>\n<p>      The District Bards in the State of Punjab   were abolished  in consequence   for the Punjab Panchayat Samitis and Zila Parishads Act, 1961, and under  the saving  provision, which is Sec . 64 of this Act:-\n<\/p>\n<p>    &#8220;:A Panchayat  Samiti shall  be deemed to have imposed  any tax  at the rate at which   , immediately  before  the commencement  of this Act ,  any tax  was lawfully  levied by the District Board  of the district  board  of the district in which the Panchayat Samiti is situate, until  a provision to the contrary is made  by the   Panchayat Samiti  with  the previous  sanction of the Government&#8221;.\n<\/p>\n<p> The schedule of rates  which has been adopted by the Panchayat  Samiti as it prevails today  is Annexure  &#8216;O&#8217;.  The levy of professional tax is graded;  on the one end  there are incomes  between  Rs. 400 and Rs. 500  carrying  a tax of Rs. 7 while  the highest  grade is the income exceeding Rs. 10,000 on which a tax of Rs. 200 per annum is levied.  It is the levy of this additional professional  tax which the petitioners complain of.\n<\/p>\n<p>    6. It has not been  seriously disputed  that the first respondent is the successor-in-interest of the District Board  and the levy of professional tax if justified  in the case of the District Bard, would also be permissible  for the Panchayat Samiti, Ballabgarh.  The demand has been made by the first  respondent  for the professional   tax according to the amended schedule, Annexure &#8216;O&#8217;.\n<\/p>\n<p>     7. It may be mentioned  at this stage  that the limitation  of the levy  of tax on professions , trades, callings  and employment&#8217;s was similarly worded in Section 142A of the Government of India Act, 1935, as in Article 276 of the Constitution save with this difference that instead of Rs. 250 per annum the quantum limit in the Act of 1935  was Rs. 50 per annum.  The language of Section 142A is otherwise almost identical with that  of Art. 276 of the Constitution. The three sub-sections of Section 142A along with the proviso to sub-section (2) are the same as Clauses (1), (2) and (3) of Article 276.\n<\/p>\n<p>8. In his fair and able argument Mr. Brij Bans Kishore, the learned counsel for the petitioners, submits that the tax on profession, trade calling or employment  can be levied  only by one authority  mentioned  be levied only by one authority mentioned in Article 276 and when  the State Government has already exercised its power  of imposition, the Municipality , the Zila Parishad or the Panchayat Samiti are not left with any constitutional  authority to impose a similar  tax.  Clause (1) of Article 276 has declared that such  a tax cannot be invalid on the ground that  it relates  to a tax  on income.  The schedules, both of the State and the first respondent, have imposed graded professional  tax on  different ranges on income .  The schedule , both of the  State  and the first respondent, have imposed graded professional tax on different ranges of income and there  is nothing  in the language  of the three clauses of Article 276 to suggest  tat the tax can be imposed either by the State or the Municipality or any other local authority.  That the same tax can be imposed by different  bodies if permissible  by statute admits of no doubt.  The power is derived from entry 60 where it is mentioned  that the  subject-matter of tax on professions, trades, callings and employment  is a matter of State legislation and Art. 276, subject of course to the overriding powers of the parliament, also gives a similar  charter or authority  to the states, Municipalities and other local authorities .  As observed by a Division Bench  of this Court  of Khosla C. J. and Mahajan  J.  in Waliati Ram v. Rupar Municipality, Air 1960 Punj 669.\n<\/p>\n<p>   &#8220;The items in th Legislative  List have to be given  most liberal  interpretation  and  have to be construed in the  rule  of interpretation   that the  words should  be  read  in their ordinary , natural and grammatical  meaning  has no applicability to constitutional enactment  conferring  legislative powers.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>      9. The learned  counsel for the petitioners has argued   that the taxation   both by the State and any  of the local  authorities would amount  to double  taxation.  There is  nothing  in any state  and   any of the local authorities would amount to double taxation . There is nothing  in any statute  or constitutional provision to double taxation.   The Division Bench of Mehar Singh J. ( as  the Chief Justice then was) and Grover J. (now Mr. Justice Grover of the Supreme Court) in Ram Partap v. State of Punjab, 1963-65 Pun LR 197 = (AIR 1963 Punj 354),  observed at page 203  (of Pun LR)= (at p. 357 of AIR ) that:-\n<\/p>\n<p>        &#8220;There is no limitation that tax cannot be charged twice on the same property.  In fact and in substance it is one tax on buildings and lands which is divided between the local  authority  and the State Government , though this is brought  about not  by one statute but by two separate  statutes.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>     The Principle  which was enunciated by the Division  Bench related to the imposition of the property tax and there is no reason to exclude  its applicability to professional  tax.  In a Bench decision of th Bombay High Court of Bavdekar and Chainani  JJ. in Cantonment  Board Poona v. Western  India Theatres Ltd. , AIR 1954 Bom  261, where the entertainment tax has been levied by two different authorities,  it was observed that:-\n<\/p>\n<p>      &#8220;There is nothing  in the constitution  which prevents double taxation being  levied .  Instances are not wanting  in this country in which taxes are levied  twice  upon the same thing.  Once for the benefit of the State Government and in the second  instance for the benefit  of the Local Self- Government  bodies , for example, the District Board or the Municipality.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>        The same principle  was enunciated by the Court of Andhra Pradesh by a Division Bench  of Satyanarayana Raju J. (Later a Judge of the Supreme Court)  and Basi  Reddy  J. in  Garimell Satyanarayana and Appana Venkataraju, Firm v. East Godavar Coconut  and Tobacco Market Committee, AIR 1959 Andh Pra  398, Raju  J., speaking  for the Court, observed at page 404  that:\n<\/p>\n<p>   &#8220;It is necessary to refer to another  contention  raised  by the petitioners , which  was not ultimately  persisted in and that is that the levy amounts to a double  taxation and is therefore   prohibited  under Art . 265 of the  Constitution.  A similar  contention  was raised in AIR 1954  Bom  261 , where it has been held that there is nothing in the Constitution  . A similar   contention  was raised   in AIR 1954   Bom 261 , where it has been held  that   there is nothing  in the Constitution  which prevents     double  taxation being levied and that instances are not wanting  in this country in which taxes are  levied twice upon the same  thing,    once for the benefit  of the State Government and in the second instance for the benefit of the Local  Self &#8211; Government  bodies, for example,   the District Local Board or the Municipality&#8230;.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>     10.  The Second argument  of Mr. Brij  Bans Kishore relates to the construction of clause (2) if Article 276.  It is submitted  by him in the first instance that the word &#8216;or&#8217; occurring twice should be read as &#8216;and&#8217; in a conjunctive sense and so read it would mean that the totality of th taxes imposed on professions, trades, callings and employments by the state, the Municipality or any other local authority should not exceed the sum of Rs. 250 per annum  . In support of this submission  it is submitted that the words &#8220;total&#8221; and taxes imply the element  of plurality and being relatable to e limit of Rs,. 250 must encompass all th levying authority mentioned therein.  It is undeniable that the word  &#8220;or&#8221; can sometime be read as &#8220;and&#8221; and  vice versa if it is found necessary to do so to effectuate the legislative intent.  Can it be said that Legislature intended to put a ceiling on the profession tax at Rs. 250 per annum?  As far as the word &#8220;taxes&#8221;  used  in plural , it is easily explainable.  The state Legislature has the power to impose taxes which are lumped in one head on &#8220;profession, trades, callings and employments&#8221;.  It may  be conceivable that two or more of these subject may be chosen as the object  of taxation. For instance, a doctor may be carrying on his professional practice and may also be in receipt of salary  as an employee of some organisation.  A person may be trading and at the same time be a part-time employee somewhere.  If levies are to be imposed on &#8220;professions&#8221; , trades, callings and employments&#8221; the appropriate  and apt word for the occasions would be &#8220;taxes&#8221;.  It may be tat the object contended for on behalf of the respondent, could also be achieved by the omission of the word &#8220;total&#8221; from the statute but the word by itself does not change the essential content and meaning of Clause (2) of Article 276.  It is very strongly contended by Mr. Brij  Bans Kishore that the deliberate use of the  word &#8220;total&#8221;  must of necessity mean that the limit of Rs. 250 is relatable to the taxes imposed by the State and the local authorities, but  the context does not justify the conclusion.\n<\/p>\n<p>      11. In Crawford  on Statutory Construction (1940)  Edition) it is stated at page 322 that :&#8212;\n<\/p>\n<p>           &#8220;In ordinary  use the word &#8216;or&#8217;  is a disjunctive that marks and alternative  which generally corresponds to the word &#8216;either&#8217;   In face of this meaning  however, the word &#8216;or&#8217; and the word &#8216;and&#8217; are often used interchangeably.  As a result of this common  and careless use of the two words in legislation, there are occasions ,  when the court, through construction, may change one to the other.  His cannot be done if the  statute&#8217;s  meaning is clear, or if the alteration operates to change the meaning of the law.  It is proper only in order to more accurately express, or to carry out the obvious intent of the legislature, when the statute itself furnishes cogent proof of the error of the legislature, and especially  where  it will avoid  absurd or impossible consequences   or operate  to harmonize th statute and give effect to all of its provisions.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>     Sutherland , statutory  construction (3rd Edition) Volume 2,  also refers to the subject of conjunctive and disjunctive  words at page 450:&#8212;\n<\/p>\n<p>     &#8220;Where two or more requirements are provided in a section and it is the legislative  intent that all of the requirement  must be fulfilled in order to comply with the statute, the conjunctive  &#8216;and&#8217; should be used.  Where a failure to comply with any requirement imposes liability , the injunctive &#8216;or&#8217; should be used.  There has been, however, so great laxity in the use of the set terms that  Courts have generally said that the words are interchangeable and that one any be substituted for t e other, if to do so is consistent with the legislative intent&#8221;.\n<\/p>\n<p>     12.  In the last  analysis,  therefore, the word &#8216;or&#8217; can be sued in a conjunctive sense as a substitute for &#8216;and&#8217; if the compelling  context  so requires  to carry out legislative intent which is otherwise obvious.  There are two indications in the provisions of Article 276 itself to suggest that the word &#8216;or&#8217; was used deliberately in a disjunctive  sense and consequently the limit of Rs. 250  relates  to the taxing power of each of the authorities empowered to do so. L In the proviso to Clause (2) of Article 276 it is mentioned  that if before  the commencement  of the Constitution any state or any Municipality, board or authority had imposed a tax exceeding the limit  of Rs. 250  such tax may continue.  Again , when the proviso speaks of &#8220;any state or any such municipality&#8221;  there  is an obvious inference that both    could have taxed separately  to the limit imposed by statute.\n<\/p>\n<p>     13.  So far  as the language  of Clause (2) of Article 276 is concerned , the words &#8220;in respect of any person one person to the State  or to anyone municipality, district  boarded local board or the local authority&#8221; are employed.  Why should the words &#8220;any one appear in juxtaposition  with &#8220;municipality , district  board ,  local  board or other local authority&#8221; ?   It is to be emphasised  that the words  in respect  of any person  to the State&#8221;  have already been used before &#8220;any one municipality,  district board, local board or other local authority&#8221;  .  I think the plain grammatical meaning  in such a situation should be preferred as in the case  of fiscal and taxing statutes the matter of consideration  of fairness and equity  is hardly of any  consequence.  Nor is it necessary  to read &#8220;and&#8221;  for &#8220;or&#8221; in the paramount  interests of harmonious  construction  and the effectuation  of legislative  intent.\n<\/p>\n<p>    14.  There is one further difficulty  in accepting  the  interpretation contended  for by Mr. Brij Bans Kishore and may possibly work into an injustice.  As the limit  of Rs. 250  has been reached  in the case of incomes  above Rs. 11, 500  with regard to imposition of professional tax by the State it would meant  that on persons  with those  incomes, no more of this tax can be imposed by a municipality  or other  local  authority.  It, however, has to be admitted and has been conceded  by the learned  counsel,  that if that limit<br \/>\n is not reached in the case of other incomes , the professional tax being graded, the municipality  or the other  local authority can be permitted to impose such a tax  to the extent that it is less than Rupees 250 Per annum.  By way of illustration, if a person is paying professional  tax of Rs. 150  to  the state, the local authority  can impose on him a similar tax up to the balance of Rs. 100 which is   the amount short  of the permissible  aggregate  of Rs. 250  per annum .  Such  a Course  may be open  to objection   on more than one ground.  It may be said   that while persons with lower income  ar taxed  those with higher incomes are permitted to escape .  The local authorities would be  obliged to have their requirements made up by taxing persons of lower  incomes only.\n<\/p>\n<p>     15.  It is further to be  borne in mind that besides the state  there is  only  one possible local authority which can levy  the professional  tax.   If an area  falls in a Municipality  there can be no Zila Parishad or Panchayat  Samiti  and consequently it would only be the Municipality which besides the State can levy  this tax.  If, on the other hand, the area falls under a Zila Parishad or  a Panchayat  Samiti,    then the Municipality  does not come into picture and consequently one of these two bodies besides the State will be able to levy the tax.  In the result, only two bodies, including the State, can levy the professional tax up to a maximum of Rs. 250 per annum.\n<\/p>\n<p>      16.  Looked from all possible perspectives, we, therefore, consider that each of the authorities mentioned in Article 276 can levy the tax up to maximum of Rs. 250 per year. This conclusion having been reached independently, we may now examine the Bench decision  of Chief Justice  Falshaw and Harbans Singh J. in AIR 1964 Punj 383.  In that case, Ashok Textile and Twisting Mills of Verka in the district of Amritsar came within the jurisdiction of the District Board of Amritsar which subsequently under the Punjab Panchayat Samitis and Zila Parishads Act, 1961, became the Zila Parishad.  The District Board had made a demand of Rs. 200 from the assessee as professional tax.  This being in addition to the State tax an objection was raised and this was repelled by the Division Bench.  In speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Falshaw observed at page 384 that:\n<\/p>\n<p>     &#8220;Neither  party was able to cite any authority in which Article 276(2) of the Constitution  has been interpreted in a matter of this kind&#8230;. And the question is whether the State and the other bodies can in appropriate cases each impose a tax of up to Rs. 250 per annum or whether the total sum payable by  any  individual on account of taxes of this kind levied by the State and local bodies cannot exceed  Rs. 250.  In my opinion there can be little doubt from the wording that the first of these interpretations is correct.  It seems to me that the words &#8216;the total amount payable in respect of any one person to the State or to any one municipality, district board, local board or other local authority&#8217; must mean that  a tax  of up to Rs. 250 can be imposed by any one of the authorities mentioned and if the intention had been on the lines supported by the learned counsel for the petitioner the wording would have been something like this, &#8216;the total amount payable in respect of any one person by way of tax on professions,  trades, callings  or employments shall  not exceed Rs. 250 per annum  whether imposed  by the State, a municipality , district board, local board or other local authority.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>      The chief Justice then went  on to consider the question of hardship and in his opinion the provision was &#8220;hardly likely to be applied  in more than one locality  to a professional man or an employee , and in case of businesses carried  on by one person in different  localities  it is to be presumed that  where  the tax is imposed by a local body it will be one the income of the person earned  in the area of the particular  local body imposing the tax. Such  being the case there will not be many persons who will  find themselves  liable for the maximum  in each place where they are taxed.&#8221;  As observed before, we have to go strictly by the language employed  in the statute  and the question of fairness or otherwise is hardly of much significance.  The learned counsel for the petitioners, as also Tek Chand,  J.,  considered that the Division Bench in disposing of Aruna Rani&#8217;s case, AIR 1964 Punj  383. Before whom admittedly no case was cited, could not have taken account of the other view which was taken by Mahajan J., was disposing of a writ petition  which was directed against a resolution passed by a Gram Panchayat imposing  a tax on commission agents at 5 percents  on their income derived  from their business as commission agents.  The Panchayat had not fixed  the maximum limit up to which the tax had to be levied , and on basis of the percentage fixed the amount of tax may be far in excess of Rs. 250 , the maximum  limit  fixed by Article 276,  In this situation,  the learned Judge allowed the petition and in doing so, observed in a last paragraph of the judgment by way of an obiter thus:\n<\/p>\n<p>     &#8220;It will be open to the Panchayat to pass a proper resolution keeping in view  the  provisions of Article 276 of the Constitution, and other state Legislative enactments  where under profession tax is imposed   with  in the State  inasmuch as the imposed   as the aggregate  of profession tax cannot  exceed the sum of Rs. 250  per annum.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>    Now, the learned Judge took a prima facie  view  presumably   as a  first  impression    and I must  confess  speaking    for  myself that I also  thought similarly at the start for arguments and before a close and analytical examination  of the problem  that the aggregate of professional   tax cannot exceed the sum of Rs. 250 per annum.  Concededly, the observation was made by Mahajan J.,  as an   obiter and unsupported  as it is by an reasoning  this cannot be said to constitute  a view which could  be said to have been ignored by the Division Bench in Aruna   Rani&#8217;s  case, AIR  1964  Punj  383.  It  is  possible  that no reflection  and further scrutiny` the learned Judge  himself may have taken a different  view as we have in these cases.\n<\/p>\n<p>     17.  We would, therefore,  hold  in agreement  with the Division Bench  in AIR 1964  Punj   383  , that  the aggregate   limit of Rs. 250  per annum  fixed in Article  276  relates to the taxes  on professions, trades, callings  and employments which can each be imposed by the State or the other local authority.  Both  these petitions  will stand  dismissed but as a question of law of some  complexity  had been canvassed we make no order  as to costs.\n<\/p>\n<p> 18.  Narula, J.\n<\/p>\n<p>  All  the relevant facts have been set out in the judgment  prepared  by my Lord  Shamsher Bahadur  J.:  and none of them  need be reiterated,  Both  the taxes in question   i.e.,  the one imposed by the State Legislature  under Section 3  of the Punjab Professions,  Trades , Callings and Employment&#8217;s  Taxation   Act 7 of 1956 as well as the other  which  was originally   imposed  by the District Board , Gurgaon, under section 31 of the Punjab  Professions  , Trades   Callings,  and Employments  Taxation Act 7  fo 1956 as well as the other  which was  originally  imposed by the District Board, Gurgoan, under section 31 of th Punjab District Boards Act,  1883,  and then continued by the Panchayat Samiti,  Ballabagarh (respondent No. 2)  under Section 64  of the Punjab Panchayat Samitis and Zila  Parishads Act,   1961, are admittedly  covered and  authorised by entry  No. 60  of List II,  of seventh Schedule  of the Constitution .  Mr. Brij Bans Kishore conceded  that in view of the law  laid down in Hirabhai Ashabhai v. State of Bombay  , AIR  1955 Bom  185, AIR 1960  Punj  669  and Kishan Supdu  Ingale v. Bhusawal Borough Municipality  , Bhusawal,  AIR 1966 Bom 15,  it is undoubtedly permissible to the State Legislature not only to legislate  itself  but also to confer  powers  upon a local  authority with regard  to any subject of local  Government  and that the power to impose a tax on professions,  trades, callings or employments  is for  the purpose of local Government.  On the question of double taxation on the same person or the same property being permissible within the relevant statutory and constitutional limits, I have nothing to add to what has fallen from by learned brother.\n<\/p>\n<p>     19.  The learned Counsel for the petitioners argued that as soon as the state Legislature had passed Punjab Act 7  of 1956 and particularly  after it came into force on and with effect from October 20, 1956  the power of the State Legislature to delegate its authority to a Local Body or a Zila Parishad to impose the tax stood exhausted because the State had under the Schedule to the Act imposed the tax  on the highest income group to the maximum permissible limit i.e., a tax of Rs. 250 per annum.  In substance, the argument was that the whole of the field  of legislation  permitted by Entry No. 60 read with Clause  (2) of Article 276 was occupied by the Punjab Act 7 of 1956 and no part of the field was left uncovered so as to permit a local authority to impose the same tax.  The Punjab District Boards Act was passed in 1883.  As already stated the tax by the local authority was imposed by the District Board, Gurgaon long before 1956.\n<\/p>\n<p>     Though originally the maximum limit of the tax imposed by the District Board is alleged to have been Rs. 50 only; and that must be so on account of th limit imposed under Section 142A, of the Government of India Act,  1935, the learned counsel for the petitioners was not able to deny that the maximum limit of th said tax had been raised by the District Board sometime after the 26th day of January, 1950, and before the 20th  of October, 1950 to Rs. 250 as permitted by the Constitution.  The fact, therefore remains that the ceiling for taxation under Entry No. 60 read with Art\/ 276(2) had been reached in respect of areas within the jurisdication of District Boards before Punjab Act 7 of 1956 was passed.  It is significant that the petitioners has no impugned the validity of the said Punjab Act in either of the writ petitions, nor has he questioned the constitutionality of the said Act at the hearing  before us.  The second respondent has merely continued  the tax originally  imposed by the District Board by virtue  of powers vested in it under section 64 of the Samitis Act.\n<\/p>\n<p>      Though the State Legislature itself as well as a local authority to which the relevant powers of the State Legislature have been delegated can impose the relevant tax, the objection of the petitioners is that once the tax is imposed to the maximum permissible limit by either one of them, the power of the other to impose any such further tax transgresses the constitutional limit imposed by Article 276(2) .  Since  it is the common case of all the parties that tax imposed by the State as well as the tax imposed by the District Board and continued by the Panchayat Samiti does not individually exceed  Rs. 250 it would be wholly unnecessary to consider this aspect of the case if we come to the conclusion that the limit of Rs. 250 per annum on the quantum  of tax in question is not for the State and the local authority combined but for each of the two sets of taxing authorities.  I do not, therefore, proceed to examine any further this argument of Mr. Brij Bans Kishore because I am in full agreement with my learned  brother that the limit of Rs. 250 per annum imposed by Clause (2) of Article 276 is for the State Legislature and for  the local authority separately i.e., each one of them   can  tax  upto  the maximum limit of Rs. 250 per annum and not jointly.\n<\/p>\n<p>20. On  the main question  about the ceiling of th tax in dispute I agree entirely with the meaning assigned to the three crucial words i.e.,  &#8220;total&#8221;, &#8220;or&#8221;, and &#8220;taxes&#8221; in the judgment prepared by my esteemed  brother and with the reasoning  adopted by my Lord for construing the said expression  in the manner his Lordship has done, In order to put the same thing in another way I  may  take the liberty of rewriting Article 276(2) of the Constitution almost upside down:&#8212;-\n<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>      &#8220;In respect of any one person the total amount payable to  <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>        (i)  The State<br \/>\n            or  <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>      (ii) Any one local authority  (which may be a Municipality ,  a District Board or other local authority)  <\/p>\n<p>           by way of taxes on professions trades callings and employments shall not exceed Rs. 250 .&#8221;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Rewriting  of the relevant clause  of Art. 276 in the above  manner clearly  demonstrates  that the limit of Rs. 250  has been imposed  separately   for the State  as well as the local  authority and not conjunctively.  If the word &#8220;total&#8221;  was not prefixed to the expression &#8220;amount payable to the State  or any one  local authority&#8221;  it was possible to construe that the limit of Rs. 250  was for  each one of the taxes enumerated  in the Clause  i.e.,  for a tax  on profession,   a tax on trade, a tax on  calling or a tax on employment.  Similarly if for the word &#8220;taxes &#8221; the word used by the Constituent Assembly had been &#8220;tax&#8221;  it might not have been possible to prevent the same mischief which was obviously  never intended.  I am, therefore, inclined to think that the word &#8220;total&#8221;  and the choice to express the relevant tax in the plural is deliberate and meaningful and is wholly consistent with the interpretation  sought to be placed on Clause (2) of Article 276 on behalf  of the Panchayat Samiti and by the amicus curiae.  My learned brother has also given an illustration   in the judgment prepared by him which supports this view.  The relevant passage  in the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court  in AIR 1959 Andh Pra 398 (Paragraph 40 on page 404 of the AIR report ), which has also been referred to by Shamsher Bahadur J.,  insignificantly helpful  in arriving at the same conclusion.\n<\/p>\n<p>     21. Being fully conscious of the fact  that the legislative  intent is not relevant  in considering a plain statutory provision  and the same must  be interpreted   according to its plain language  even if it is not in consonance with the possible  intention of the legislature  and also being aware of the fact that  legislative  debates cannot be referred to for construing  a statutory provision, I may  take notice at this stage briefly  of the historical  background of the relevant provision  in order to appreciate  the circumstances  in which the clause in question  was enacted.  My learned  brother  has already referred  to section  142A  inserted by  the India  and Burma (Miscellaneous Amendments)  Act, 1940 (3 and 4 Geo 6, Chapter 5 ) in the Government of India Act, 1935.  Though  in the purview  of sub-section  (2)  of Section 142A the imposition of the relevant  tax exceeding Rs. 50  per annum  prior to 31st March , 1939 , was absolutely prohibited , the proviso  to that  sub-section continued the right of provisions to impose  a tax  on professions  etc., which had been levied at higher rate than Rs. 50 per annum  prior to 31st March , 1939.  In such cases exemption  was granted from the operation  of the limit  of Rs. 50  by the proviso to sub-section (2)  of Section 142A .  Though in most of the  provinces, the taxes that had been imposed under the relevant entry were upto Rs. 50  in respect of and one person, the maximum  rate in Madras Presidency  was a high  as Rs. 1000 per annum, in the city  of Madras and Rs. 550  per annum  in the districts  outside the city.\n<\/p>\n<p>     There was a widespread demand in the Madras Presidency  that the Maximum limit of the tax in question  in that province  should  also be brought  down to Rs. 50 per annum.  This demand was met by  the passing  of the Professions  Tax   Limitations  Act XX of 1941 by the Federal Legislative on 26th November, 1941 by the Federal  Legislature  on 26th November , 1941 . The  Act  provided that  whereas  it was   expedient  that provision  should be made  whereby  the total  amount  payable  in respect  of any one person  by the way of relevant tax shall not  exceed Rs. 50  per annum, it was enacted that notwithstanding the provisions  of any law for the time being in force any taxes payable in respect of any one person to a province or to any one local authority  in any province  by way   of the relevant tax shall  from and after the commencement  of the 1942 Act cease to be levied  to the extent  to which such taxes exceed Rs\/. 50  per annum .  In the draft Constitution  prepared by the Drafting Committee  of the Constitution Assembly  of India  Article 256 n which corresponded to what is now Article  276, the limit   of Rs. 50  was raised to Rs. 250 per annum.  The discussion  of the relevant  Article took place in the Constituent  Assembly  of India on October 9,  1949.  Various  amendments  to the Article  were moved.  Professor Shibben Lal Saksena  suggested   that the limit of Rs. 250 should not be laid down in the Constitution  and that if a limit must be laid down, so far as the local bodies  were concerned  the limit  should be raised  to one per cent of the annual income of Rs. 1,000 per annum .  Out  of the Assembly  which spoke on the proposed amendment Shri Prabhudayal Himatsingka (page 298 of Volume IX  1949, the Constituent Assembly  Debates)  stated inter alia as follows:-\n<\/p>\n<p>     &#8220;(after referrign to the relevant  provisions of the Government  of India  Act).\n<\/p>\n<p>The result is that a person who has to pay Rs. 30 as income-tax  has to pay a like sum to  the Provisional  Government .  On the basis of this article he can be made to pay Rs. 250  to the municipality  and Rs. 250   to the Provisional Government  apart  form what he has to pay to the Centre in the shape of Income -tax.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>     In the various speeches made thereafter including  that of the  Hon&#8217;ble  B. R.  Ambedkar,  it was not suggested that  the impression  of Mr. Himatsingka was in any manner  erroneous.  Dr. Ambedkar  in his speech  (at page 301) observed in this behalf  as below:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>      &#8220;This article, which I am  proposing, is  really an exception  to the general rule that there ought   to be no  provisions   in a constitution  dealing with the financial resources  of what  are called local authorities  which are subordinate to the State .  But having regard  to the fact  that there are at present  certain local  authorities  and their  administration  is dependent  upon certain taxes which they have been levying and although those  taxes have  been contrary to the spirit  of the Income-tax law, the Drafting  Committee, having taken into  consideration  the existing  circumstances, is prepared  to allow  the existing state  of affairs  to continue.  In fact exception was taken to the limit  fixed  by the Expert Committee which was Rs. 250 .  The  proposal  was that  it ought  to be  brought  down to Rs. 150 .  The drafting  Committee on reconsideration  decided  that that need  not be done and under the present state of affairs it may be continued up 56o the limit and within the scope that it occupies  today.  I therefore say that this is a pure  exception ,  and on principle I am definitely  opposed  to it and I am  therefore no prepared to accept any amendment that may  have been moved by any honorable  Friend.&#8221;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>    To complete the history, it may be mentioned that the amendment was negatived  and the  ceiling of Rs. 250  for the State as well as the local authorities was maintained  while passing Clause 256 of the Draft Constitution into Article 276  of the  constitution.  I have, therefore no hesitation agreeing  with my learned  brother  and holding  that it is not the aggregate liability of a person to pay the tax in question  to the Stated and the local authority taken together which  has been fixed at Rs. 250 by Article 276(2)  of the Constitution  but that the limit is disjunctive i.e., the State  on the one hand as well as the relevant  local authority on the  other may impose a tax  under Entry No. 60  of List  II  upto  a maximum  of Rs. 250  in respect of any one person.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>     22.  I also  agree that in view  of the question of interpretation  of an article of the Constitution  being  involved in these  cases,  which question is res integra we should  leave the parties  to bear their  costs as incurred by them.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>      23. Gurudev Singh J.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p> I agree  with my learned brother  Shamsher Bahadur J.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Punjab-Haryana High Court Goodyear India Ltd. And Anr. vs The Executive Officer, Panchayat &#8230; on 17 May, 1968 Equivalent citations: AIR 1969 P H 379 Author: S Bhadur Bench: S Bahadur, G Singh, R Narula JUDGMENT Shamsher Bhadur, J. 1. Whether the aggregate amount of taxes on professions, trades, callings and employments in respect of [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[8,28],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-239907","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-high-court","category-punjab-haryana-high-court"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.3 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Goodyear India Ltd. 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