{"id":24103,"date":"2004-09-06T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2004-09-05T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/mukesh-k-tripathi-vs-sr-divn-manager-l-i-c-ors-on-6-september-2004"},"modified":"2016-02-16T12:12:27","modified_gmt":"2016-02-16T06:42:27","slug":"mukesh-k-tripathi-vs-sr-divn-manager-l-i-c-ors-on-6-september-2004","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/mukesh-k-tripathi-vs-sr-divn-manager-l-i-c-ors-on-6-september-2004","title":{"rendered":"Mukesh K. Tripathi vs Sr. Divn. Manager, L.I.C. & Ors on 6 September, 2004"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Mukesh K. Tripathi vs Sr. Divn. Manager, L.I.C. & Ors on 6 September, 2004<\/div>\n
Author: S.B. Sinha<\/div>\n
Bench: N. Santosh Hegde, S.B. Sinha, A.K. Mathur<\/div>\n
           CASE NO.:\nAppeal (civil)  1208-1209 of 2001\n\nPETITIONER:\nMukesh K. Tripathi\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\nRESPONDENT:\nSr. Divn. Manager, L.I.C. & Ors.\t\t\t\t\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT: 06\/09\/2004\n\nBENCH:\nN. Santosh Hegde,S.B. Sinha & A.K. Mathur\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
J U D G M E N T<\/p>\n
S.B. SINHA, J:\n<\/p>\n
 \tThese appeals are directed against a judgment and order dated
\n8.1.1999 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc.
\nWrit Petitions No. 30393 of 1996 and 28474 of 1998 whereby and
\nwhereunder the writ petitions filed by the Respondent herein were allowed
\nsetting aside an award dated 28.5.1996 passed by the Central Government
\nIndustrial Tribunal cum Labour Court, Kanpur.\n<\/p>\n
 \tThe basic fact of the matter is not in dispute.
\n \tThe Appellant was appointed by the Life Insurance Corporation of
\nIndia (hereinafter called and referred to for the sake of brevity as “the
\nCorporation”) on or about 16.7.1987 as Apprentice Development Officer.
\nThe relevant terms and conditions contained in the offer of appointment are
\nas under:\n<\/p>\n
“2. You will be taken, at the outset, as an
\nApprentice for a period of one year commencing
\nfrom 16.7.1987 on a stipend of Rs. 1250\/- per
\nmonth, and will be given two months theoretical
\ntraining at Divisional Office, Kanpur and
\nthereafter the (sic) months Branch training
\nfollowed by Field Training in a Branch as may be
\ndecided to us.  You will faithfully and diligently
\napply yourself to the course of training fixed for
\nyou and carry out all orders and directions given to
\nyou.\n<\/p>\n
3. On completion of the apprenticeship period, if
\nyour work and conduct are found satisfactory, you
\nwill be appointed as a Development Officer on
\nprobation on a monthly basic pay of Rs. 700\/- and
\nsuch other allowances as are admissible in
\naccordance with staff Regulations.\n<\/p>\n
4. During the period of apprenticeship, you shall
\nbe liable to be discharged from service without any
\nnotice.\n<\/p>\n
7. You are not entitled to any travelling allowance
\nfor joining the Training Centre at Division Office,
\nLife Insurance Corporation of India, Kanpur.”\n<\/p>\n
 \tThe services of the Respondent were terminated purported to be in
\nterms of para 4 of the said offer of appointment by a letter dated 14.7.1988.
\nContending that he has been retrenched in contravention of Section 25F of
\nthe Industrial Disputes Act,  the Appellant herein raised an industrial dispute
\nwhereupon the Central Government by a notification dated 23rd August,
\n1991 referred the following dispute for adjudication of the Central
\nGovernment Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court, Pandu Nagar, Kanpur
\n(for short “the Tribunal”):\n<\/p>\n
“Whether the action of the Divisional Manager,
\nLIC of India, Kanpur, in discharging Sri Mukesh
\nKumar Tripathi from service w.e.f. 14.7.88 is legal
\nand justified?  If not to what relief the concerned
\nworkman is entitled?”\n<\/p>\n
 \tBefore the Tribunal a contention was raised by the Respondent No. 1
\nherein that the Appellant is not a workman within the meaning of Section
\n2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act.\n<\/p>\n
By reason o f its award dated 28.5.1996, the Tribunal held that in view
\nof the fact that the Appellant was discharged after the completion of the
\napprenticeship period, he must be held to be a workman within the meaning
\nof Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act.\n<\/p>\n
 \tThe Respondent No. 1 filed a writ petition before the Allahabad High
\nCourt questioning the said award.  Before the High Court, the Appellant
\nherein relied upon a decision of this Court in S.K. Verma Vs. Mahesh
\nChandra and Another [(1983) 3 SCR 799 : (1983) 4 SCC 214] in support of
\nits contention that a Development Officer of the Corporation is a workman.\n<\/p>\n
 \tThe High Court, however, relying on or on the basis of a Constitution
\nBench decision of this Court in H.R. Adyanthaya and Others Vs. Sandoz
\n(India) Ltd. and Others [(1994) 5 SCC 737] held that as therein S.K. Verma
\n(supra) was  held to have been rendered per incuriam, it was no longer a
\ngood law.  The writ petition was allowed on that premise.\n<\/p>\n
 \tMs. Indira Jaisingh, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
\nAppellant would contend that in S.K. Verma (supra) this Court upon taking
\ninto consideration the works performed by a Development Officer came to
\nthe conclusion that as neither the same are managerial or supervisory in
\nnature, he would be deemed to be a workman and, furthermore, in view of
\nthe fact that the said decision has not been overruled by this Court in H.R.
\nAdyanthaya (supra), the High Court has committed a manifest error in
\npassing the impugned judgment.\n<\/p>\n
Mr. K. Ramamoorthy, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of
\nthe Respondents, on the other hand, would submit that in H.R. Adyanthaya
\n(supra) a Constitution Bench of this Court has clearly laid down the law that
\neven if a person does not perform managerial or supervisory duties, with a
\nview to hold that he is a workman, it must be established that he performs
\nskilled or unskilled, manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work for hire
\nor reward and as it has not been established that the Appellant herein
\nperformed  any of the jobs enumerated in Section 2(s) of the Act, he is not a
\nworkman.\n<\/p>\n
The learned counsel has also drawn our attention to a Scheme known
\nas the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Apprentice Development
\nOfficers) Recruitment Scheme, 1980 (for short “the Scheme”) for the
\npurpose of showing that an Apprentice Development Officer is a person
\nrecruited for training and subsequent appointment to the cadre of
\nDevelopment Officers. It was  submitted that as the Appellant was appointed
\nin terms thereof, unless he was appointed and confirmed as a Development
\nOfficer the question of his becoming a workman would not arise.\n<\/p>\n
The Scheme framed by the Corporation although is not a statutory one
\nbut the same governs the terms and conditions of appointment of Apprentice
\nDevelopment Officer.  An Apprentice Development Officer is a person
\nrecruited for training and subsequent appointment to the cadre of
\nDevelopment Officer.  Clause 4 of the Scheme lays down the eligibility
\ncriteria for recruitment as also the recruitment procedure.  Clause 5 of the
\nsaid Scheme provides for apprenticeship and training.  The period of
\napprenticeship is one year.  During the said period, the Apprentice is
\nrequired to undergo theoretical training at training centre for two months,
\ntraining in a selected rural branch for one month and a field training for a
\nperiod of nine months.  An Apprentice Development Officer is paid a
\nmonthly stipend.  The period of apprenticeship is not counted as service for
\nany purpose including seniority, increments, gratuity, etc.<\/p>\n
 \tClause 6.1 of the Scheme provides that an Apprentice Development
\nOfficer may be discharged at any time without any notice or without
\nassigning any reason whatsoever.  Only upon satisfactory completion of the
\napprenticeship period, an Apprentice Development Officer is appointed as a
\nDevelopment Officer on probation, the period wherefor is also one year.
\nThe terms and conditions of service of a Development Officer are governed
\nby the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960.\n<\/p>\n
The question as to whether a sale representative is a workman within
\nthe meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act came up for
\nconsideration before a 3-Judge Bench of this Court in Management of M\/s.
\nMay and Baker (India) Ltd. Vs. Their Workmen [AIR 1967 SC 678]
\nwherein upon considering the definition of workman, as it then stood, it was
\nheld:\n<\/p>\n
 “9At that time the definition of the word
\n“workman” under S. 2 (s) of the Industrial
\nDisputes Act did not include employees like
\nMukerjee who was a representative. A “workman”
\nwas then defined as any person employed in any
\nindustry to do any skilled or unskilled manual or
\nclerical work for hire or reward. Therefore, doing
\nmanual or clerical work was necessary before a
\nperson could be called a workman. This definition
\ncame for consideration before industrial tribunals
\nand it was consistently held that the designation of
\nthe employee was not of great moment and what
\nwas of importance was the nature of his duties. If
\nthe nature of the duties is manual or clerical then
\nthe person must be held to be a workman. On the
\nother hand if manual or clerical work is only a
\nsmall part of the duties of the person concerned
\nand incidental to his main work which is not
\nmanual or clerical, then such a person would not
\nbe a workman. It has, therefore, to be seen in each
\ncase from the nature of the duties whether a person
\nemployed is a workman or not, under the
\ndefinition of that word as it existed before the
\namendment of 1956. The nature of the duties of
\nMukerjee is not in dispute in this case and the only
\nquestion, therefore, is whether looking to the
\nnature of the duties it can be said that Mukerjee
\nwas a workman within the meaning of S. 2 (s) as it
\nstood at the relevant time. We find from the nature
\nof the duties assigned to Mukerjee that his main
\nwork was that of canvassing and any clerical or
\nmanual work that he had to do was incidental to
\nhis main work of canvassing and could not take
\nmore than a small fraction of the time for which he
\nhad to work. In the circumstances the tribunal’s
\nconclusion that Mukerjee was a workman is
\nincorrect. The tribunal seems to have been led
\naway by the fact that Mukherjee had no
\nsupervisory duties and had to work under the
\ndirections of his superior officers. That, however,
\nwould not necessarily mean that Mukerjee’s duties
\nwere mainly manual or clerical. From what the
\ntribunal itself has found it is clear that Mukerjee’s
\nduties were mainly neither clerical nor manual.
\nTherefore, as Mukerjee was not a workman his
\ncase would not be covered by the Industrial
\nDisputes Act and the tribunal would have no
\njurisdiction to order his reinstatement”\n<\/p>\n
 \tA similar view was taken by this Court in Western India Match Co.
\nLtd. Vs. Workmen [(1964) 3 SCR 560], Burmah Shell Oil Storage &
\nDistribution Co. of India Ltd. Vs. Burmah Shell Management Staff Assn.
\n[(1970) 3 SCC 378] and in other cases.\n<\/p>\n
 \tA Division Bench of this Court, however, without noticing the
\naforementioned binding precedent, in S.K. Verma (supra) held that the
\nduties and obligations of a Development Officer of Life Insurance
\nCorporation of India  being neither managerial nor supervisory in nature, he
\nmust be held to be a workman.  Correctness  of S.K. Verma (supra) came up
\nfor consideration before a Constitution Bench of this Court in H.R.
\nAdyanthaya (supra).  Referring to this Court’s earlier decisions in May and
\nBaker (supra), Western India Match Co. (supra) and Burmah Shell Oil
\nStorage (supra), it was observed that as in S.K. Verma (supra) the binding
\nprecedents were not noticed and furthermore in view of the fact that no
\nfinding was given by the court as to whether the Development Officer was
\ndoing clerical or technical work and admittedly not doing any manual work,
\nthe same had been rendered per incuriam.\n<\/p>\n
 \tThe Constitution Bench summarized the legal position that arose from
\nthe statutory provisions and from the decisions rendered by this Court,
\nstating :\n<\/p>\n
“Till 29-8-1956 the definition of workman under
\nthe ID Act was confined to skilled and unskilled
\nmanual or clerical work and did not include the
\ncategories of persons who were employed to do
\n‘supervisory’ and ‘technical’ work. The said
\ncategories came to be included in the definition
\nw.e.f. 29-8-1956 by virtue of the Amending Act 36
\nof 1956. It is, further, for the first time that by
\nvirtue of the Amending Act 46 of 1982, the
\ncategories of workmen employed to do
\n‘operational’ work came to be included in the
\ndefinition. What is more, it is by virtue of this
\namendment that for the first time those doing non-
\nmanual unskilled and skilled work also came to be
\nincluded in the definition with the result that the
\npersons doing skilled and unskilled work whether
\nmanual or otherwise, qualified to become
\nworkmen under the ID Act.”\n<\/p>\n
 \tConsidering the decisions in May and Baker (supra), Western India
\nMatch Co. (supra), Burmah Shell Oil Storage (supra) as also S.K. Verma
\n(supra) and other decisions following the same, this Court  in H.R.
\nAdyanthaya (supra) observed:\n<\/p>\n
“However, the decisions in the later cases, viz., S.
\nK. Verma ((1983) 4 SCC 214 : 1983 SCC (L&S)
\n510 : (1983) 3 SCR 799), Delton cable ((1984) 2
\nSCC 569 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 281 : (1984) 3 SCR\n<\/p>\n
169), and Ciba Geigy (1985) 3 SCC 371 : 1985
\nSCC (L&S) 808 : 1985 Supp (1) SCR 282) cases
\ndid not notice the earlier decisions in May & Baker
\n((1961) 2 LLJ 94 : AIR 1967 SC 678 : (1961) 2
\nFLR 594) WIMCO ((1964) 3 SCR 560 : AIR 1964
\nSC 472 : (1963) 2 LLJ 459), and Burmah Shell
\n((1970) 3 SCC 378 : (1971) 2 SCR 758 : AIR 1971
\nSC 922 : (1970) 2 LLJ 590) cases and the very
\nsame contention, viz., if a person did not fall
\nwithin any of the categories of manual, clerical,
\nsupervisory or technical, he would qualify to be
\nworkman merely because he is not covered by
\neither of the four exceptions to the definition, was
\ncanvassed and though negatived in earlier
\ndecisions, was accepted. Further, in those cases the
\nDevelopment Officer of the LIC, the Security
\nInspector at the gate of the factory and
\nStenographer-cum-Accountant respectively, were
\nheld to be workmen on the facts of those cases. It
\nis the decision of this Court in A. Sundarambal
\ncase ((1988) 4 SCC 42 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 892)
\nwhich pointed out that the law laid down in May
\nand Baker case ((1961) 2 LLJ 94 : AIR 1967 SC
\n678 : (1961) 2 FLR 594) was still good and was
\nnot in terms disowned.”\n<\/p>\n
 \tThe Constitution Bench although noticed the distinct cleavage of
\nopinion in two lines of cases but held:\n<\/p>\n
“These decisions are also based on the facts
\nfound in those cases. They have, therefore, to be
\nconfined to those facts. Hence the position in law
\nas it obtains today is that a person to be a workman
\nunder the ID Act must be employed to do the work
\nof any of the categories, viz., manual, unskilled,
\nskilled, technical, operational, clerical or
\nsupervisory. It is not enough that he is not covered
\nby either of the four exceptions to the definition.
\nWe reiterate the said interpretation.”\n<\/p>\n
\tThe said reasonings are, therefore, supplemental to the ones recorded
\nearlier viz.: (i) They were rendered  per incurium; and (ii) May and Baker
\n(supra) is still a good law.\n<\/p>\n
 \tOnce the ratio of May and Baker (supra) and other decisions
\nfollowing the same had been reiterated despite  observations made to the
\neffect that S.K. Verma (supra) and other decisions following the same were
\nrendered on the facts of that case, we are of the opinion that this Court had
\napproved the reasonings of May and Baker (supra) and subsequent decisions
\nin preference to S.K. Verma (supra).\n<\/p>\n
 \tThe Constitution Bench further took notice of the subsequent
\namendment in the definition of ‘workman’ and held that even the Legislature
\nimpliedly did not accept the said interpretation of this Court in S.K. Verma
\n(supra) and other decisions.\n<\/p>\n
 \tIt may be true, as has been submitted by Ms. Jaisingh, that S.K.
\nVerma (supra) has not been expressly overruled in H.R. Adyanthaya (supra)
\nbut once the said decision has been held to have been rendered per incuriam,
\nit cannot be said to have laid down a good law.  This Court is bound by the
\ndecision of the Constitution Bench.\n<\/p>\n
 \tFrom a perusal of the award dated 28.5.1996 of the Tribunal, it does
\nnot appear that the Appellant herein had adduced any evidence whatsoever
\nas regard the  nature of his duties so as to establish that he had performed
\nany skilled, unskilled, manual, technical or operational duties.  The offer of
\nappointment dated 16.7.1987 read with the Scheme clearly proved that he
\nwas appointed as an apprentice and not to do any skilled, unskilled, manual,
\ntechnical or operational job.   The onus was on the Appellant to prove that
\nhe is a workman.  He failed to prove  the same.  Furthermore, the duties and
\nobligations of a Development Officer of the Corporation by no stretch of
\nimagination can be held to be performed by an apprentice.\n<\/p>\n
\tEven assuming that the duties and obligations of a Development
\nOfficer, as noticed in paragraph 8 of S.K. Verma (supra), are applicable in
\nthe instant case, it would be evident that the Appellant herein could not have
\norganized or developed the business of the Corporation without becoming a
\nfull-fledged officer of the Corporation.  Only an officer of the Corporation
\nduly appointed can perform the functions of  recruiting agents and take steps
\nfor organizing and developing the business of the Corporation   No area
\nfurthermore could be allotted to him for the purpose of recruiting active and
\nreliable agents drawn from different communities and walks of life in view
\nof the categorical findings of the Tribunal that he had been  working as an
\napprentice.  If organizing and developing the business of the Corporation
\nand to act as a friend, philosopher and guide of the agents working within his
\njurisdiction were the primary duties and obligations of a Development
\nOfficer, an apprentice evidently cannot perform the same.\n<\/p>\n
 \tWe may consider the matter from another angle, viz., the appointment
\nof the Appellant as an apprentice under the Scheme vis-`-vis the Apprentices
\nAct, 1961.\n<\/p>\n
 \tThe expression ‘Apprentice’ has been included in the definition of
\n‘workman’ contained in Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 but
\nby reason of a subsequent Parliamentary legislation, namely, Apprentices
\nAct, 1961 (the 1961 Act),  the term ‘apprentice’ has been defined in Section
\n2(aa) to mean “a person who is undergoing apprenticeship training in a
\ndesignated trade in pursuance of a contract of apprenticeship.  Section 18 of
\nthe 1961 Act provides that apprentices are trainees and not workers save as
\notherwise provided in the Act.  Clauses (a) and (b) of  Section 18 of the 1961
\nAct read thus :\n<\/p>\n
“(a) every apprentice undergoing apprenticeship
\ntraining in a designated trade in an establishment
\nshall be a trainee and not a worker; and<\/p>\n
(b) the provisions of any law with respect to labour
\nshall not apply to or in relation to such apprentice.”\n<\/p>\n
The term  ’employee’ under various labour laws has been defined by
\ndifferent expressions but Section 18 of the 1961 Act carves out an exception
\nto the applicability of labour laws in the event the concerned person is an
\napprentice as contra-distinguished from the expressions ‘worker’,
\n’employee’ and ‘workman’,  used in different statutes.\n<\/p>\n
‘Apprentice’ under the general law means a person who is bound by a
\nlegal agreement to serve an employer for an  agreed period and the employer
\nis bound to instruct him.  In Halsbury’s Laws of  England, 4th Edn. Volume
\n16, it is stated :\n<\/p>\n
“586. Form and parties.  A contract of
\napprenticeship is unenforceable if it is not in
\nwriting.  Usually the contract is effected by deed
\nunder which the apprentice is bound to serve a
\nmaster faithfully in a trade of business for an
\nagreed period and the master undertakes to give
\nthe apprentice instruction in it and either to
\nmaintain him or pay his wages.  Technical words
\nare not necessary.\n<\/p>\n
An apprentice cannot be bound without his
\nown consent, and consent without  execution of the
\ninstrument is insufficient.  The instrument must be
\nexecuted by the apprentice himself, for no one else
\nhas a right to bind him.  In the case of a minor his
\nfather or mother or other guardian, although not
\nnecessary parties to the contract, usually execute it
\ntoo in order to covenant for the apprentice’s due
\nperformance of the contract since, in the absence
\nof a local custom, an apprentice who is a minor
\ncannot be sued on his own covenant. A contract of
\napprenticeship is binding on a  minor only if it is
\non the whole beneficial to him.\n<\/p>\n
\tIt is not essential that the master should
\nexecute a deed of apprenticeship, but where a
\nmaster had in fact executed one part of an
\ninstrument of apprenticeship, a recital in that part
\nof the instrument that the apprentice had bound
\nhimself apprentice to the master is evidence
\nagainst the master that the apprentice had executed
\nthe other part of the instrument.  A corporation
\nmay take an apprentice.”\n<\/p>\n
‘Apprentice’, as noticed hereinbefore, is defined to mean a person
\nwho is undergoing apprenticeship training pursuant to a contract of
\napprenticeship.  How a contract of apprenticeship would be entered into is to
\nbe found in sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the 1961 Act.   The embargos
\nplaced in this regard are: (i) entering into a contract of apprenticeship with a
\nminor in which event the contract must be executed by his guardian; and (ii)
\non such terms or conditions which shall not be inconsistent with any
\nprovision of the Act or any rule framed thereunder.\n<\/p>\n
Furthermore, the apprentice must satisfy the statutory requirements as
\nregard qualification to be appointed as an apprentice.\n<\/p>\n
Training of apprenticeship by reason of sub-section (2) of Section 4
\nshall be deemed to have commenced on the date on which the contract of
\napprenticeship has been entered into under sub-section (1) thereof.\n<\/p>\n
 \tThe provisions of the Scheme framed by the Corporation conform to
\nthe provisions of the Apprentices Act and Rules framed thereunder.  It is
\nworth noticing that Provident funds and insurance have been specified to be
\na ‘designated trade’ within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Apprentices
\nAct, 1961 by a notification No. G.S.R. 463(E) dated 23rd August, 1975.\n<\/p>\n
The definition of ‘workman’ as contained in Section 2(s) of the
\nIndustrial Disputes Act, 1947 includes an apprentice, but a ‘workman’
\ndefined under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 must conform to the
\nrequirements laid down therein meaning thereby, inter alia, that he must be
\nworking in  one or the other capacities mentioned therein and not otherwise.\n<\/p>\n
We may further notice before the Tribunal a contention was raised by
\nthe Appellant that upon expiry of the period of one year he was  appointed as
\na probationary officer but the said plea was categorically rejected by the
\nTribunal holding :\n<\/p>\n
“7. The concerned workman has also pleaded that
\nafter expiry of one year he was appointed as
\nProbationary Development Officer.  No date of
\nissuance of such order has been filed.  In its
\nabsence the version of the concerned workman is
\ndisbelieved and it is held that concerned workman
\nafter expiry of apprenticeship was not appointed as
\nProbationary Development Officer.  Instead he
\ncontinued to work as Apprentice.”\n<\/p>\n
 A ‘workman’ within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial
\nDisputes Act, 1947 must not only establish that he is not covered by the
\nprovisions of the Apprenticeship Act but must further establish that he is
\nemployed in the establishment for the purpose of doing any work
\ncontemplated in the definition.  Even in a case where a period of
\napprenticeship is extended, a further written contract carrying out such
\nintention need not be executed.  But in a case where a person is allowed to
\ncontinue without extending the period of apprenticeship either expressly or
\nby necessary implication and regular work is taken from him, he may
\nbecome a workman.  A person who claims himself to be an apprentice has
\ncertain rights and obligations under the statute.\n<\/p>\n
In case any person raises a contention that his status has been changed
\nfrom apprentice to a workman, he must plead and prove the requisite facts.
\nIn absence of any pleading or proof that either by novation of the contract or
\nby reason of the conduct of the parties, such a change has been brought
\nabout,  an apprentice  cannot be held to be workman.\n<\/p>\n
 \tIt is true that the definition of ‘workman’ as contained in Section 2(s)
\nof the Industrial Disputes Act is exhaustive.\n<\/p>\n
The interpretation clause contained in a statute although may deserve
\na broader meaning having employed the word ‘includes’ but therefor also it
\nis necessary to keep in view the scheme of the object and purport of the
\nstatute which takes him out of the said definition.  Furthermore, the
\ninterpretation section begins with the words “unless the context otherwise
\nrequires”.\n<\/p>\n
In Ramesh Mehta Vs. Sanwal Chand Singhvi & Ors. reported in 2004
\n(5) SCC 409, it was noticed :\n<\/p>\n
\t“A definition is not to be read in isolation.
\nIt must be read in the context of the phrase which
\nwould define it.  It should not be vague or
\nambiguous.  The definition of words must be given
\na meaningful application; where the context makes
\nthe definition given in the interpretation clause
\ninapplicable, the same meaning cannot be
\nassigned.\n<\/p>\n
In State of Maharashtra v. Indian Medical
\nAssn.<\/a> one of us (V.N. Khare, C.J.) stated that the
\ndefinition given in the interpretation clause having
\nregard to the contents would not be applicable.  It
\nwas stated : (SCC p.598, para 8)<\/p>\n
“8.\tA bare perusal of Section 2 of
\nthe Act shows that it starts with the words
\n‘in this Act, unless the context otherwise
\nrequires’.  Let us find out whether in the
\ncontext of the provisions of Section 64 of
\nthe Act the defined meaning of the
\nexpression ‘management’ can be assigned to
\nthe word ‘management’ in Section 64 of the
\nAct.  In para 3 of the Regulation, the
\nEssentiality Certificate is required to be
\ngiven by the State Government and
\npermission to establish a new medical
\ncollege is to be given by the State
\nGovernment under Section 64 of the Act.  If
\nwe give the defined meaning to the
\nexpression ‘management’ occurring in
\nSection 64 of the Act, it would mean the
\nState Government is required to apply to
\nitself for grant of permission to set up a
\ngovernment medical college through the
\nUniversity.  Similarly it would also mean the
\nState Government applying to itself for grant
\nof Essentiality Certificate under para 3 of
\nthe Regulation.  We are afraid the defined
\nmeaning of the expression ‘management’
\ncannot be assigned to the expression
\n‘management’ occurring in Section 64 of the
\nAct.  In the present case, the context does
\nnot permit or requires to apply the defined
\nmeaning to the word ‘management’
\noccurring in Section 64 of the Act.””\n<\/p>\n
In Sri Chittaranjan Das vs. Durgapore Project Limited & Ors. [1995
\n(2) CLJ 388], it was opined:\n<\/p>\n
“In my opinion, it is not difficult to resolve the
\napparent conflict.  Both in the Industrial
\nEmployment (Standing Order) Act, 1946 as also
\nthe certified Standing Order of the company the
\nword “including an apprentice” occurs after the
\nword ‘person’.  In that view of the matter in place
\nof the word ‘person’, the word ‘apprentice’ can be
\nsubstituted in a given situation but for the purpose
\nof becoming a workman either within the meaning
\nof the 1946 Act or the standing order framed
\nthereunder, he is required to fulfil the other
\nconditions laid down therein meaning thereby he is
\nrequired to be employed in an industry to do the
\nworks enumerated in the said definition for hire or
\nreward, whether the terms of employment be
\nexpress or implied.”\n<\/p>\n
\tThe question as to who would answer the description of the term
\n‘workman’ fell for consideration before this Court in Dharangadhra
\nChemical Works Ltd. vs. State of Saurashtra and Others<\/a> [AIR 1957 SC 264],
\nwherein this Court held :\n<\/p>\n
“The essential condition of a person being a
\nworkman within the terms of this definition is that
\nhe should be employed to do the work in that
\nindustry, that there should be,  in other words, an
\nemployment of his by the employer and that there
\nshould be the relationship between the employer and
\nhim as between the employer and employee or
\nmaster and servant.  Unless a person is thus
\nemployed there can be no question of his being a
\nworkman within the definition of the term as
\ncontained in the Act.”\n<\/p>\n
Yet again in Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate vs. Management of
\nDimakuchi Tea Estate<\/a> [AIR 1958 SC 353], this Court held :\n<\/p>\n
“A little careful consideration will show, however,
\nthat the expression ‘any person’ occurring in the
\nthird part of the definition clause cannot mean
\nanybody and everybody in this wide world.  First
\nof all, the subject matter of dispute must relate to\n<\/p>\n
(i) employment or non-employment or (ii) terms of
\nemployment or conditions of labour of any person;
\nthese necessarily import a limitation in the sense
\nthat a person in respect of whom the employer-
\nemployee relation never existed or can never
\npossibly exist cannot be the subject matter of a
\ndispute between employers and workman.\n<\/p>\n
Secondly, the definition clause must be read in the
\ncontext of the subject matter and scheme of the
\nAct, and consistently with the objects and other
\nprovisions of the Act.  It is well settled that <\/p>\n
\t“the words of a statute , when there is a
\ndoubt about their meaning are to be understood in
\nthe sense in which they best harmonise with the
\nsubject of the enactment and the object which the
\nlegislature has in view.  Their meaning is found
\nnot so much in a strictly grammatical or
\netymological propriety of language, nor even in its
\npopular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on
\nwhich they are used, and the object to be attained.”\n<\/p>\n
(Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes, 9th Edition,
\np.55).\n<\/p>\n
 \tFor the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that no case has
\nbeen made out for interference with the impugned judgment.  There is no
\nmerit in these appeals which are dismissed accordingly.  No costs.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Mukesh K. Tripathi vs Sr. Divn. Manager, L.I.C. & Ors on 6 September, 2004 Author: S.B. Sinha Bench: N. Santosh Hegde, S.B. Sinha, A.K. Mathur CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 1208-1209 of 2001 PETITIONER: Mukesh K. Tripathi RESPONDENT: Sr. Divn. Manager, L.I.C. & Ors. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06\/09\/2004 BENCH: N. Santosh Hegde,S.B. […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-24103","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nMukesh K. Tripathi vs Sr. Divn. 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