{"id":243064,"date":"1989-12-22T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1989-12-21T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/charan-lal-sahu-etc-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-22-december-1989"},"modified":"2019-01-21T06:32:03","modified_gmt":"2019-01-21T01:02:03","slug":"charan-lal-sahu-etc-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-22-december-1989","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/charan-lal-sahu-etc-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-22-december-1989","title":{"rendered":"Charan Lal Sahu Etc. Etc vs Union Of India And Ors on 22 December, 1989"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Charan Lal Sahu Etc. Etc vs Union Of India And Ors on 22 December, 1989<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1990 AIR 1480, \t\t 1989 SCR Supl. (2) 597<\/div>\n
Author: S Mukharji<\/div>\n
Bench: Mukharji, Sabyasachi (Cj), Singh, K.N. (J), Rangnathan, S., Ahmadi, A.M. (J), Saikia, K.N. (J)<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nCHARAN LAL SAHU ETC. ETC.\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nUNION OF INDIA AND ORS.\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT22\/12\/1989\n\nBENCH:\nMUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (CJ)\nBENCH:\nMUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (CJ)\nSINGH, K.N. (J)\nRANGNATHAN, S.\nAHMADI, A.M. (J)\nSAIKIA, K.N. (J)\n\nCITATION:\n 1990 AIR 1480\t\t  1989 SCR  Supl. (2) 597\n 1990 SCC  (1) 613\t  JT 1989 (4)\t582\n CITATOR INFO :\n E\t    1991 SC 101\t (30,278)\n E\t    1992 SC 248\t (31,33,35,36,44,70,71,79,80,81\n\n\nACT:\n    Constitution  of  India,  1950:  Articles  14,  19\t and\n21--Bhopal  Gas\t Leak Disaster (Processing of  claims)\tAct,\n1985--Whether constitutionally valid.\n    Preamble  and  Articles  38,  39  and  39A--Doctrine  of\n'parens\t patriae'--Applicability  of Exercise  of  sovereign\npower--Limitations.   Articles\t21,  48A  and\t51(g)--Human\nrights--State's obligation to protect--Need for enacting law\nprotecting  the constitutional rights of  citizens--Evolving\nstandards  highlighted by clauses 9 and 13 of U.N.  Code  of\nConduct on transnational corporations.\n    Bhopal  Gas\t Leak Disaster (Processing of  claims)\tAct,\n1985:  Sections 3, 4, 5, 9 and\t11--Constitutional  validity\nof.  Central  Govt.  representing victims  in  suit  against\nmultinational company--Govt. holding share in company--Govt.\nalleged to be joint tort feasor--Whether competent to repre-\nsent victims--Whether principles of natural justice  violat-\ned.\n    Settlement\tof claims before  court--Pre-decisional\t and\npost  decisional notice--Need for----Effect of non-issue  of\nnotice.\n    Power conferred on Central Govt. to represent victims in\nsuit-Divesting individual rights to legal  remedy--Procedure\nfollowed-Whether consistent with the Code of Civil Procedure\n1908.\n    Interim  Compensation--Payment of.\tPrecautionary  meas-\nures-Need  for--Guidelines for the future--Immediate  relief\nto victims-Setting up of a Tribunal--Creation of  Industrial\nDisaster Fund-Mooted.\n    Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Order I Rule 8 and  Order\n23  Rule  3B--Procedure followed under the Bhopal  Gas\tLeak\nDisaster  (Processing  of claims) Act,\t1985--Central  Govt.\nrepresenting victims in suit-Divesting individual rights  to\nlegal remedy--Whether procedure\n598\nstandard and fair--Whether violative of principles of  natu-\nral justice.\n    Administrative Law--Principles of Natural Justice.'\t Act\nof  Parliament within legislative  competence--applicability\nof the principles.\n    Pre-decisional  notice  not\t given--Effect\tof.  Central\nGovernment representing victims in a suit against a multina-\ntional\tcompany--Govt.\thaving\tshares\tin  company--Alleged\ntort-feasor--Whether  competent to  represent  victims--Doc-\ntrine that no man shall be judge of his own  cause--Doctrine\nof necessity----Doctrine of 'defacto validity'--Doctrine  of\nbona fide representation--Applicability of.\n    Statutory\tconstruction:  Constructive  intuition\t ap-\nproach--statute\t    to\t  be\tread\tpurposefully\t and\nmeaningfully--Regard to be had to the spirit of the  statute\nand the mischief intended to be cured by it.\n    Law\t of Torts: Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster  (Processing  of\nclaims)\t  Act,\t 1985--Grant  of  interim  relief   to\t the\nvictims--Whether  inherent in the Act and the Scheme  framed\nthereunder--Liability  of  tort-feasor-Whether\tlimited\t  to\ncivil  liability to compensation-whether  includes  criminal\nliability to punitive damages also.\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\n    Union  Carbide  (India) Ltd. (UCIL) is a  subsidiary  of\nUnion  Carbide\tCorporation (UCC), a New  York\tCorporation.\nUCIL was incorporated in India in 1954. 50.99% of its  share\nholding was with UCC and 22% of the shares were held by Life\nInsurance Corporation of India and Unit Trust of India. UCIL\nowned  a  chemical plant in Bhopal for\tthe  manufacture  of\npesticides using Methyl Isocyanate (MIC) a highly toxic gas.\n    On\tthe night between 2nd and 3rd December, 1984,  there\nwas a massive escape of lethal gas from the MIC Storage tank\nat  the Bhopal plant resulting in the tragic death of  about\n3,000  people.\tThousands of people suffered  injuries.\t The\nenvironment also got polluted, badly affecting the flora and\nthe fauna.\n    On\tbehalf\tof  the victims, many suits  were  filed  in\nvarious District Courts in the United States of America. All\nsuch  suits  were  consolidated by  the\t Judicial  Panel  on\nMulti-District\tLitigation  and were assigned  to  the\tU.S.\nDistrict  Court,  Southern District of New  York  and  Judge\nKeenan was the Presiding Judge throughout. Later, the  legal\nbattle shifted to Indian Courts, as it could not proceed  in\nthe U.S. Courts, on the ground of forum non conveniens.\n599\n    Meanwhile,\tthe Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing  of\nclaims)\t 1985 was passed by the Government of India  with  a\nview  to secure that the claims arising out of or  connected\nwith the Bhopal gas leak disaster were dealt with  speedily,\neffectively and equitably.\n    Union of India filed a suit for damages in the  District\nCourt of Bhopal on 5.9.86. However, there were\tnegotiations\nfor  a settlement; hut ultimately the settlement  talks\t had\nfailed.\n    On 17.12.1987, the District Judge ordered interim relief\nof  Rs.350  crores.  On appeal, the High  Court,  on  4.4.88\nmodified  the  order of the District Judge  and\t ordered  an\ninterim relief of Rs.250 crores.\n    Aggrieved,\tthe  UCC as also the Union  of\tIndia  filed\npetitions  for\tspecial leave before this Court.  Leave\t was\ngranted.  By  its  orders dated 14.2.89\t and  15.2.89,\tthis\nCourt,\ton the basis of a settlement arrived at between\t the\nparties,  directed  UCC\t to pay a sum of  470  million\tU.S.\nDollars\t to  the Union of India in full\t settlement  of\t all\nclaims, rights and liabilities related to and arising out of\nthe Bhopal gas disaster.\n    The\t said orders were passed keeping in view the  Bhopal\nGas Disaster (Processing of claims) Act, 1985.\n    The present Writ Petitions challenge the  constitutional\nvalidity of the said Act inter alia on the grounds that\t the\nAct is violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed  under\nArticles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution: that the Act  is\nviolative of the Principles of Natural Justice mainly on the\nground\tthat Union of India, being a joint  tort-feasor,  in\nthat it has permitted establishment of such factories  with-\nout necessary safeguards, has no locus standi to  compromise\non  behalf of the victims; that the victims and their  legal\nheirs were not given the opportunity of being heard,  before\nthe  Act  was passed; that in the guise of giving  aid,\t the\nState could not destroy the rights inherent in its citizens;\nnor  could it demand the citizens to surrender their  rights\nto the State; that vesting of the rights in Central  Govern-\nment was bad and unreasonable because there was conflict  of\ninterest  between  the Central Government and  the  victims.\nsince  the Central Government owned 22% share in  UCIL,\t and\nthat  would make the Central Government a Judge in  its\t own\ncause.\nDisposing of the Writ Petitions, this Court,\n600\nHELD: Sabyasachi Mukharji, CJ and K.N. Saikia, J.--Per C J:\n    1.1\t The Act is constitutionally valid. It\tproceeds  on\nthe  hypothesis\t that until the claims of  the\tvictims\t are\nrealised  or obtained from the delinquents, namely, UCC\t and\nUCIL by settlement or by adjudication and until the proceed-\nings  in  respect thereof continue, the\t Central  Government\nmust  pay interim compensation or maintenance for  the\tvic-\ntims. In entering upon the settlement in view of s. 4 of the\nAct, regard must be had to the views of the victims and\t for\nthe  purpose of giving regard to these, appropriate  notices\nbefore\tarriving at any settlement, was necessary.  In\tsome\ncases,\thowever, post-decisional notice might be  sufficient\nbut in the facts and the circumstances of the present  case,\nno useful purpose would be served by giving a post-decision-\nal  hearing having regard to the circumstances mentioned  in\nthe  order  of\tthis Court dated 4th May,  1989\t and  having\nregard to the fact that there are no further additional data\nand facts available with the victims which can be profitably\nand  meaningfully presented to controvert the basis  of\t the\nsettlement  and further having regard to the fact  that\t the\nvictims\t had their say, or on their behalf their  views\t had\nbeen  agitated in these proceedings, and will  have  further\nopportunity  in\t the pending  review  proceedings.  [703E-H;\n704A]\n    1.2 Though settlement without notice is not quite  prop-\ner,  on\t the  materials so far available, it  is  seen\tthat\nJustice\t has  been done to the victims but justice  has\t not\nappeared to have been done. In view of the magnitude of\t the\nmisery\tinvolved and the problems in this case, the  setting\naside of the settlement on this ground in view of the  facts\nand the circumstances of this case keeping the settlement in\nabeyance  and giving notice to the victims for a  post-deci-\nsional\thearing\t would not be in the  ultimate\tinterest  of\njustice.  It is true that not giving notice was\t not  proper\nbecause principles of natural justice are fundamental in the\nconstitutional\tset up of this country. No man or  no  man's\nright should be affected without an opportunity to ventilate\nhis views. Justice is a psychological yearning, in which men\nseek acceptance of their view point by having an opportunity\nof vindication before the forum or the authority enjoined or\nobliged to take a decision affecting their right. Yet in the\nparticular  situations, one has to bear in mind how  an\t in-\nfraction  of that should be sought to be removed in  accord-\nance  with justice. \"To do a great right\" after all.  it  is\npermissible  sometimes \"to do a little wrong\". In the  facts\nand  circumstances  of the case, this is one of\t those\trare\noccasions. [701G-H; 702A-C]\n     2.1  The constitutional validity of the  statute  would\nhave to be determined on the basis of its provisions and  on\nthe  ambit of its operation as reasonably construed. It\t has\nto be borne in mind that if so\n601\njudged it passed the test of reasonableness, then the possi-\nbility\tof the power conferred being improperly used  is  no\nground for pronouncing the law itself invalid. [659E-G]\n    2.2\t Conceptually and from the jurisprudential point  of\nview,  especially in the background of the Preamble  to\t the\nConstitution  of  India\t and the mandate  of  the  Directive\nPrinciples, it was possible to authorise the Central Govern-\nment to take over the claims of the Victims to fight against\nthe  multinational  corporation in respect  of\tthe  claims.\nBecause\t of the situation the victims were under  disability\nin pursuing their claims in the circumstances of the  situa-\ntion  fully  and properly. But there is\t no  prohibition  or\ninhibition,  for Indian State taking over the claims of\t the\nvictims\t or for the State acting for the victims as the\t Act\nhas sought to provide. [640E-H]\n    2.3 The Act does provide a special procedure in  respect\nof  rights  of the victims and to that\textent\tthe  Central\nGovt. takes upon itself the rights of  the victims. It is  a\nspecial\t Act  providing a special procedure for\t a  kind  of\nspecial\t class\tof victims. In view of the enormity  of\t the\ndisaster  the  victims of the Bhopal gas leak  disaster,  as\nthey were placed against the multi-national and a big Indian\nCorporation  and in view of the presence of foreign  contin-\ngency  lawyers to whom the victims were exposed, the  claim-\nants and victims can legitimately be described as a class by\nthemselves different and distinct, sufficiently separate and\nidentifiable to be entitled to special treatment for  effec-\ntive, speedy, equitable and best advantageous settlement  of\ntheir claims. There indubitably is differentiation. But this\ndifferentiation\t is based on a principle which has  rational\nnexus with the aim intended to be achieved by this differen-\ntiation.  The disaster being unique in its character and  in\nthe recorded history of industrial disaster, situated as the\nvictims\t were  against\ta  mighty  multinational  with\t the\npresence  of  foreign  contingency lawyers  looming  on\t the\nscene,\tthere were sufficient grounds for such\tdifferentia-\ntion and different treatment. In treating the victims of the\ngas  leak disaster differently and providing them  a  proce-\ndure,  which  was just, fair, reasonable and which  was\t not\nunwarranted or unauthorised by the Constitution, Article  14\nis not breached. [683E-H; 684A-B]\n    Collector of Customs, Madras v. Nathella Sampathu  Chet-<\/a>\nty, [1962] 3 SCR 786; P.J. Irani v. State of Madras,<\/a>  [1962]\n1  SCR 169; D.K. Trivedi v. State of Gujarat, [1986]  Suppl.\nSCC 20, relied on.\n    Ballast  Corporation v. O.D. Commission, [1960] AC\t490,\nreferred to-\n602\n    3.1\t The  present case is one where the Govt.  of  India\nonly represented the victims as a party' and did not adjudi-\ncate between the victims and the UCC. It is the court  which\nwould adjudicate the rights of the victims. The\t representa-\ntion  of  the victims by the Government of India  cannot  be\nheld  to  be  bad, and there is and there was  no  scope  of\nviolation of any principle of natural justice. [670B]\n    3.2 The connotation of the term \"parens patria\"  differs\nfrom country to country, for instance, in England it is\t the\nKing, in America it is the people, etc. According to  Indian\nconcept\t parens patria doctrine recognised King as the\tpro-\ntector\tof all citizens as parent. The Government is  within\nits duty to protect and to control persons under disability.\nConceptually, the parens patriae theory is the obligation of\nthe  State to protect and take into custody the\t rights\t and\nprivileges of its citizens for discharging its\tobligations.\nOur Constitution makes it imperative for the State to secure\nto  all its citizens the rights guaranteed by the  Constitu-\ntion and where the citizens are not in a position to  assert\nand  secure their rights, the State must come  into  picture\nand  protect  and fight for the right of the  citizens.\t The\nPreamble to the Constitution, read with the Directive  Prin-\nciples\tcontained  in Articles 38, 39 and  39A\tenjoins\t the\nState  to take up these responsibilities. It is the  protec-\ntive measure to which the social welfare state is committed.\nIt  is\tnecessary for the State to  ensure  the\t fundamental\nrights in conjunction with the Directive Principles of State\nPolicy to effectively discharge its obligation and for\tthis\npurpose, if necessary, to deprive some rights and privileges\nof  the individual victims or their heirs to  protect  their\nrights better and secure these further. [638E-H; 639A]\n    3.3\t The UCC had to be sued before the American  courts.\nThe tragedy was treated as a national calamity and the Govt.\nof India had the right, and indeed the duty, to take care of\nits  citizens, in the exercise of its parens patriae  juris-\ndiction\t or  on principles analogous thereto.  After  having\nstatutorily  armed  itself  in recognition  of\tsuch  parens\npatriae right or on principles analogous thereto, it went to\nthe  American Courts. No other person was properly  designed\nfor  representing  the victims, as a foreign  court  had  to\nrecognise a right of representation. The Govt. of India\t was\npermitted  to represent was permitted to represent the\tvic-\ntims  before  the American courts. Private  plaintiffs\twere\nalso  represented  by their attorneys. The  order  of  Judge\nKeenan\tpermitted the Govt. of India to represent  the\tvic-\ntims. If there was any remote conflict of interests  between\nthe  Union  of India and the victims  from  the\t theoretical\npoint  of view the doctrine of necessity would override\t the\npossible   violation   of   the\t  principles   of    natural\njustice--that  no  man\tshould be Judge\t in  his  own  case.\n[669C-F]\n603\n    3.4\t The Act in question has been passed in\t recognition\nof the right of the sovereign to act as parens patriae.\t The\nGovernment  of India in order to effectively  safeguard\t the\nrights\tof the victims in the matter of the conduct  of\t the\ncase  was entitled to act as parens patriae, which  position\nwas reinforced by the statutory provisions, namely the\tAct.\nIt  has to be borne in mind that conceptually and  jurispru-\ndentially, the doctrine of parens patriae is not limited  to\nrepresentation\tof some of the victims outside the  territo-\nries  of the country. It is true that the doctrine has\tbeen\nso  utilised in America so far. Where citizens of a  country\nare  victims of a tragedy because of the negligence  of\t any\nmultinational  in peculiar situation arises which calls\t for\nsuitable  effective machinery to articulate  and  effectuate\nthe  grievance\tand demands of the victims,  for  which\t the\nconventional  adversary system would be totally\t inadequate.\nThe State in discharge of its sovereign obligation must come\nforward.  The  Indian State because  of\t its  constitutional\ncommitment  is obliged to take upon itself the claim of\t the\nvictims and to protect them in their hour of need. [658B-F]\n    3.5 There is no bar on the State to assume responsibili-\nties  analogous to parens patriae to discharge\tthe  State's\nobligations under the Constitution. What the Central Govern-\nment has done in the instant case seems to be an  expression\nof  its sovereign power. This power is plenary and  inherent\nin every sovereign state to do all things which promote\t the\nhealth, peace, moral, education and good order of the people\nand tend to increase the wealth and prosperity of the State.\nSovereignty is difficult to define. By the nature of things,\nthe State Sovereignty in these matters cannot be limited. It\nhas  to\t be adjusted to the conditions touching\t the  common\nwelfare\t when covered by legislative enactments. This  power\nis  to the public what the law of necessity is to the  indi-\nvidual. It is comprehended in the maxim salus populi suprema\nlex--regard for public welfare is the highest law. It is not\na  rule, it is an evolution. This power has always  been  as\nbroad  as  public welfare and as strong as the\tarm  of\t the\nstate, this can only be measured by the legislative will  of\nthe people, subject to the fundamental rights and  constitu-\ntional limitations. This is an emanation of sovereignty\t and\nit  is the obligation of the State to assume such  responsi-\nbilities and protect its citizens. [658G-H; 659A-C]\n    3.6\t In the instant case, the victims cannot be  consid-\nered  to be any match to the multinational companies or\t the\nGovernment  with whom in the conditions that the victims  or\ntheir  representatives were after the  disaster\t physically,\nmentally, financially, economically and also because of\t the\nposition  of  litigation would have to contend.\t In  such  a\nsituation of\n604\npredicament the victims can legitimately be considered to be\ndisabled.  They\t were in no position by themselves  to\tlook\nafter  their  own interest effectively or  purposefully.  In\nthat  background,  they are people who\tneeded\tthe  State's\nprotection  and should come within the umbrella\t of  State's\nsovereignty  to assert, establish and maintain their  rights\nagainst\t the  wrong  doers in this mass\t disaster.  In\tthat\nperspective,  it is jurisprudentially possible to apply\t the\nprinciple  of  parens patriae doctrine to the  victims.\t But\nquite  apart from that, it has to be borne in mind  that  in\nthis  case the State is acting on the basis of\tthe  Statute\nitself.\t For the authority of the Central Government to\t sue\nfor and on behalf of or instead in place of the victims,  no\nother  theory, concept, or any jurisprudential principle  is\nrequired  than the Act itself. The Act empowers and  substi-\ntutes the Central Government. The victims have been divested\nof their rights to sue and such claims and such rights\thave\nbeen vested in the Central Government. The victims have been\ndivested because the victims were disabled. The\t disablement\nof the victims vis-a-vis their adversaries in this matter is\na self evident factor. Even if the strict application of the\n'parens\t patriae' doctrine is not in order, as a concept  it\nis a guide. The jurisdiction of the State's power cannot  be\ncircumscribed by the limitations of the traditional  concept\nof parens patriae. Jurisprudentially it could be utilised to\nsuit or alter or adapt itself to the changed  circumstances.\nIn the situation in which the victims were, the State had to\nassume\tthe  role of a parent protecting the rights  of\t the\nvictims who must come within the protective umbrella of\t the\nState  and the common sovereignty of the Indian people.\t The\nact  is an exercise of the sovereign power of the State.  It\nis an appropriate evolution of the expression of sovereignty\nin  the situation that had arisen. It has to be accepted  as\nsuch. [685C-H]\n    3.7\t The  concept  of parens patriae can  be  varied  to\nenable\tthe Government to represent the victims\t effectively\nin domestic forum if the situation so warrants. There is  no\nreason\tto  confine the 'parens patriae'  doctrine  to\tonly\nquasi-sovereign right of the State independent of and behind\nthe title of the citizen. [692B-C]\n    3.8 The power to compromise and to conduct the  proceed-\nings  are not uncanalised or arbitrary. These  were  clearly\nexercisable  only in the ultimate interests of the  victims.\nThe possibility of abuse of a statute does not impart to  it\nany element of invalidity. [659C-D]\n    E.P.  Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu,<\/a> [1974] 2 SCR\t348;\nMenaka\tGandhi\tv. Union of India, [1978] 2  SCR  621;\tR.D.\nShetty v. International Airport Authority of India,<\/a> [1979] 3\nSCR 1014 followed.\n605\nRam Saroop v. S.P. Sahi, [1969] 2 Suppl. SCR 583 relied on.\n    Budhkaran Chankhani v. Thakur Prasad Shah, AIR 1942\t Col\n311; Banku Behari Mondal v. Banku Behari Hazra, AIR 1943 Cal\n203; Medai Dalavoi T. Kumaraswamy Mudaliar v. Medai  Dalavoi\nRajammal, AIR 1957 Mad. 563 approved.\n    State of U.P. v. Poosu,<\/a> [1978] 3 SCR 1005; K.M. Nanavati\nv.  State of Bombay,<\/a> [1961] 1 SCR 497; Ram Gopal Sarubai  v.\nSmt. Sarubhai & Ors., [1981] 4 SCC 505; India Mica &  Mican-\nite  Industries Ltd. v. State of Bihar & Ors. [1982]  3\t SCC\n182; Alfred L Snapp & SonInc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 US 592 73,\nEd.  2d 995, 102 s. ct. 3260; State of Georgia v.  Tennessee\nCopper\tCo.,  206 US 230, 51 L.Ed. 1038 27 s. et.  618,\t re-\nferred to.\n    B.K. Mukherjea on Hindu Religious and Charitable Trusts,\nTagore\tLaw  Lectures,\t5th Edn. p. 404;  Words\t &  Phrases,\npermanent Edn.\nvol.  33  p. 99; Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edn.  1979,  p.\n1003; Weaver's Constitutional Law, p. 490; American  Consti-\ntutional  Law  by  Lawrence H. Tribe 1978  Edn.\t para  3.24,\nreferred to.\n    4.1\t Section  3  provides for the  substitution  of\t the\nCentral\t Government with the right to represent and  act  in\nplace of (whether within or outside India) every person\t who\nhas  made or is entitled to make, a claim in respect of\t the\ndisaster. The State has taken over the rights and claims  of\nthe  victims  in  the exercise of sovereignty  in  order  to\ndischarge  the constitutional obligations as the parent\t and\nguardian  of  the  victims who in the  situation  as  placed\nneeded\tthe umbrella of protection. Thus, the State has\t the\npower  and jurisdiction and for this purpose unless the\t Act\nis otherwise unreasonable or violative of the constitutional\nprovisions  no question of giving a hearing to\tthe  parties\nfor taking over these rights by the State arises. For legis-\nlation by the Parliament, no principle of natural justice is\nattracted provided such legislation is within the competence\nof  the\t legislature. Indeed the present Act is\t within\t the\ncompetence  of the Parliament. Section 3 makes\tthe  Central\nGovernment the dominoes litis and it has the carriage of the\nproceedings, but that does not solve the problem of by\twhat\nprocedure the proceedings should be carried. [692A-D]\n    4.2\t Section  4 means and entails that  before  entering\ninto  any settlement affecting the rights and claims of\t the\nvictims\t some kind of notice or information should be  given\nto the victims. [699D]\n606\n    4.3 Sections 3 and 4 are categorical and clear. When the\nexpression is explicit, the expression is conclusive,  alike\nin what it says and in what it does not say. These give\t the\nCentral Government an exclusive right to act in place of the\npersons who are entitled to make claim or have already\tmade\nclaim.\tThe expression 'exclusive' is explicit and  signifi-\ncant.  The  exclusively cannot be wittled  down\t or  watered\ndown. The said expression must be given its full meaning and\nextent.\t This is corroborated by the use of  the  expression\n'claim'\t for  all purposes. If such duality  of\t rights\t are\ngiven  to. the Central Government alongwith the\t victims  in\ninstituting  or\t proceeding for the realisation or  the\t en-\nforcement  of  the  claims arising out of  Bhopal  gas\tleak\ndisaster, then that would be so cumbersome that it would not\nbe speedy, effective or equitable and would not be the\tbest\nor  more  advantageous\tprocedure for  securing\t the  claims\narising out of the leakage. [683A-C]\n    4.4 Sections 3 and 4 of the Act should be read  together\nalongwith  other  provisions of the Act\t and  in  particular\nsections 9 and 11 of the Act. These should be appreciated in\nthe  context of the object sought to be achieved by the\t Act\nas indicated in the Statement of objects and Reasons and the\nPreamble  to the act. The Act was so designed that the\tvic-\ntims  of the disaster are fully protected and the claims  of\ncompensation  or  damages for loss of life or  personal\t in-\njuries\tor  in respect of other matters arising\t out  of  or\nconnected  with the disaster are processed speedily,  effec-\ntively,\t equitably and to the best advantage of\t the  claim-\nants. Section 3 of the Act is subject to other provisions of\nthe  Act which includes Sections 4 and 11. Section 4 of\t the\nAct  opens  with non-obstante clause, vis-a-vis,  section  3\nand, therefore overrides section 3. [659G-H; 660A-B]\n    4.5 In the instant case, the Government of India is only\ncapable\t to represent the victims as a party. The  adjudica-\ntion of the claims would be done by the Court. The  doctrine\nof 'Bona fide Representation' as also 'defacto validity' are\nnot applicable to the present case. [690F]\nBasheshar v. Income Tax Commissioner, AIR<\/a> 1959 SC 149; In re\nSpecial Courts Bill, [1979] 2 SCR 476; A.R. Antulay v.\tR.S.\nNayak  & Anr.,<\/a> [1988] 2 SCC 602; Ram Krishna Dalmia v.\tTen-\ndulkar,\t [1955]\t SCR 279; Ambika Prasad Mishra v.  State  of\nU.P.  &\t Ors. etc. [1980] 3 SCR 1159;  Bodhan  Chowdhary  v.\nState  of Bihar, [1955] 1 SCR 1045; Lakshmi Kant  Pandey  v.\nUnion of India,<\/a> [1984] 2 SCR 795; M\/s Mackinnon Mackenzie  &\nCo.  Ltd.  v. Audrey D' Costa and Anr.,<\/a> [1987]\t2  SCC\t469;\nSheela\tBarse  v. Secretary, Children Aid  Society  &  Ors.,<\/a>\n[1987]\t1  SCR\t870; Gokaraju Rangaraju v.  State  of  A.P.,\n[1981]\t3  SCR\t474; Pushpadevi M. Jatia  v.  M.L.  Wadhwan.<\/a>\n[1987] 3 SCC 367;\n607\nM\/s  Beopar  Sahayak (P) Ltd. & Ors. v. Vishwanath  &  Ors.,\n[1987]\t3  SCC\t693; Dharampal Singh v.\t Director  of  Small\nIndustries Services & Ors., AIR<\/a> 1980 SC 1888; N.K.  Mohammed\nSulaiman  v. N.C. Mohammed<\/a> lsmail & Ors., [1966] 1 SCR\t937;\nMalkariun Bin Shidrammappa Pasare v. Narhari Bin Shivappa  &\nAnr., 271 A 216, referred to.\nBlack's Law Dictionary 5th Edn. p. 437, referred to.\n    5.\tThe restrictions or limitations on  the\t substantive\nand procedural rights in the Act will have to be judged from\nthe point of view of the particular Statute in question.  No\nabstract rule or standard of reasonableness can be  applied.\nThat  question has to be judged having regard to the  nature\nof  the rights alleged to have been infringed in this  case,\nthe  extent and urgency of the evil sought to  be  remedied,\ndisproportionate  imposition, prevailing conditions  at\t the\ntime, all these facts will have to be taken into  considera-\ntion.  Having considered the background, the plight  of\t the\nimpoverished, the urgency of the victims' need, the presence\nof the foreign contingency lawyers, the procedure of settle-\nment  in  USA in mass action, the strength  of\tthe  foreign\nmultinationals, the nature of injuries and damages, and\t the\nlimited\t but significant right of participation of the\tvic-\ntims  as contemplated by s. 4 of the Act, the Act cannot  be\ncondemned as unreasonable. [684C-E]\nState of Madras v. V.G. Row,<\/a> [1952] SCR 597, referred to.\n    6.1 In view of the principles settled by this Court\t and\naccepted all over the world in a case of this magnitude\t and\nnature, when the victims have been given some say by Section\n4 of the Act, in order to make that opportunity contemplated\nby section 4 of the Act, meaningful and effective, it should\nbe so read that the victims have to be given an\t opportunity\nof making their representation before the court comes to any\nconclusion in respect of any settlement. How that opportuni-\nty should be given, would depend upon the particular  situa-\ntion. Fair procedure should be followed in a  representative\nmass tort action. [696E-F]\n    6.2\t One assumption under which the Act is justified  is\nthat  the victims were disabled to defend themselves  in  an\naction\tof this type. If that is so, then the  Court  cannot\npresume that the victims were a lot, capable and informed to\nbe able to have comprehended or contemplated the settlement.\nIn  the aforesaid view of the matter notice  was  necessary.\nThe  victims at large did not have the notice.\tThe  Central\nGovernment  as the representative of the victims  must\thave\nthe  views  of the victims and place such  view\t before\t the\ncourt in such manner it considers neces-\n608\nsary  before  a settlement is entered into. If\tthe  victims\nwant  to advert to certain aspect of the matter\t during\t the\nproceedings under the Act and settlement indeed is an impor-\ntant  stage in the proceedings, opportunities must be  given\nto the victims. Individual notices may not be necessary. The\nCourt can, and should in such situation formulate modalities\nof giving notice and public notice can also be given  invit-\ning views of the victims by tile help of mass media.  Howev-\ner,  it is not necessary that such views would\trequire\t the\nconsent of all the victims. [698B-C; 698G-H; 699A]\n    6.3 One of the important requirements of justice is that\npeople affected by an action or inaction should have  oppor-\ntunity to have their say. That opportunity the victims\thave\ngot  when these applications were heard and they were  heard\nafter utmost publicity and they would have further  opportu-\nnity when review application against the settlement would be\nheard. 1700G-H; 701A]\n    7.1\t The Act does not expressly exclude the\t application\nof  the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 11 of the Act\tpro-\nvides the overriding effect indicating that anything  incon-\nsistent\t with  the provisions of the Act or  in\t other\tlaws\nincluding the Civil Procedure Code should be ignored and the\nAct  should prevail. Strictly speaking, Order 1 Rule 8\twill\nnot apply to a suit or a proceeding under the Act. It is not\na  case of one having common interest with others. Here\t the\nplaintiff, the Central Government has replaced and  divested\nthe victims. 1696H; 697A-B]\n    7.2\t In the instant case, there is no question of  aban-\ndonment as such of the suit or part of the suit, the  provi-\nsions  of order XXIII Rule 1 would also not strictly  apply.\nHowever, Order XXIH Rule 3B of the Code is an important\t and\nsignificant  pointer  and  the principles  behind  the\tsaid\nprovision  would apply to this case. The said rule  3B\tpro-\nvides  that no agreement of compromise in  a  representative\nsuit  shall be entered into without the leave of  the  Court\nexpressly  recorded in the proceedings; and sub-rule (2)  of\nrule  3B enjoins that before granting such leave  the  court\nshall  give notice in such manner as it may think fit  in  a\nrepresentative action. Representative suit has been  defined\nunder  Explanation to the said rule vide clause (d)  as\t any\nother suit in which the decree passed may, by virtue of\t the\nprovisions this Code or of any other law for the time  being\nin  force, bind any person who is not named as party to\t the\nsuit. Indubitably the victims would be bound by the  Settle-\nment  though  not  named in the suit. 11his  is\t a  position\nconceded by all. If that is so, it would be a representative\nsuit  in terms of and for the purpose of Rule 315  of  Order\nXXIII  of the Code. If the principles of this rule  are\t the\nprinciples  of\tnatural justice then we are of\tthe  opinion\nthat\n609\nthe principles behind it would be applicable; and also\tthat\nsection 4 of the Act should be so construed in spite of\t the\ndifficulties of the process of notice and other difficulties\nof  making  \"informed decision making  process\tcumbersome\".\n[697C-G]\n    7.3\t In  as\t much as section 4 of the Act  had  given  a\nqualified  right  of  participation to\tthe  victims,  there\ncannot\tbe  any question of violation of the  principles  of\nnatural justice. The scope of the application of the princi-\nples  of  natural  justice cannot be judged  by\t any  strait\njacket formula. [662G-H]\nR. Viswanathan v. Rukn-ul-Mulk Syed Abdul Wajid,<\/a> [1963] 3\nSCR  22;  M. Narayanan Nambiar v. State\t of  Kerala,<\/a>  [1963]\nSupp. (2) 724; Chintaharan Ghose & Ors. v. Gujaraddi Sheik &\nOrs.,  AIR 1951 Cal. 456; Ram 'Sarup v. Nanak Ram, AIR\t1952\nAll. 275; referred to.\n    8. The Act has to be understood that it is in respect of\nthe  person responsible, being the person  in-charge-of\t the\nUCIL and the parent company UCC. This interpretation of\t the\nAct  is further strengthened by the fact that  a  'claimant\"\nhas been defined in clause (c) of Section 2 as a person\t who\nis  entitled to make a claim and the expression \"person\"  in\nSection\t 2(e)  includes the Government. Therefore,  the\t Act\nproceeded  on the assumption that the Government could be  a\nclaimant being a person as such. [690A-B]\n    9.1\t The fact that the provisions of the  principles  of\nnatural\t justice  have to be complied with,  is\t undisputed.\nThis is well-settled by the various decisions of the  Court.\nThe Indian Constitution mandates that clearly, otherwise the\nAct and the actions would be violative of Article 14 of\t the\nConstitution  and  would  also\tbe  destructive\t of  Article\n19(1)(g) and negate Article 21 of the Constitution by  deny-\ning a procedure which is just, fair and reasonable. [693D-E]\n    9.2\t Rules\tof natural justice are not  embodied  rules.\nHence,\tit was not possible to make an exhaustive  catalogue\nof  such  rules. Audi alteram partem is a  highly  effective\nrule  devised by the Courts to ensure that a  statutory\t au-\nthority\t arrives at a just decision and it is calculated  to\nact as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power.\t The\nrules  of  natural  justice can operate only  in  areas\t not\ncovered\t by any law validly made. The general  principle  as\ndistinguished  from an absolute rule of uniform\t application\nis  that where a statute does not in terms exclude the\trule\nof prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing\n610\namounting  to a full review of the original order on  merits\nthen such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi\nalteram\t partem\t rule at the pre-decisional  stage.  If\t the\nstatute\t conferring the power is silent with regard  to\t the\ngiving\tof a pre-decisional hearing to the  person  affected\nthe  administrative decision after  post-decisional  hearing\nwas good. [694A-D]\n    9.3 In the instant case, no question of violation of the\nprinciple  of natural justice arises, and there is no  scope\nfor the application of the principle that no man should be a\nJudge  in  his\town cause. The Central\tGovernment  was\t not\njudging any claim, but was fighting and advancing the claims\nof  the\t victims.  The adjudication would  be  done  by\t the\ncourts, and therefore, there is no scope of the violation of\nany principle of natural justice. [688G-H; 689A-B]\n    Menaka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 SCR 621;\tOlga\nTellis\tv. Bombay Municipal Corporation,<\/a> [1985] Supp. 2\t SCR\n51;  Union of India v. Tulsi Ram Patel,<\/a> [1985] Supp.  2\t SCR\n131;  Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India,<\/a> [1981] 2\t SCR\n533, relied on.\n    Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar,<\/a> [1974] 3 SCR 882; S.L.  Kapoor\nv.  Jagmohan,<\/a> [1981] 1 SCR 745; Sangram v. Election  Commis-\nsion, [1955] 2 SCR 1, referred to.\n    10.\t Though\t not expressly stated, the Act\tproceeds  on\n'the  major inarticulate premise'. It is on this promise  or\npremise\t that  the State would be justified in\ttaking\tupon\nitself the right and obligation to proceed and prosecute the\nclaim and deny access to the courts of law to the victims on\ntheir own. If it is only so read, it can only be held to  be\nconstitutionally valid. It has to be borne in mind that\t the\nlanguage of the Act does not militate against this construc-\ntion  but on the Contrary. Sections 9, 10 and the scheme  of\nthe Act suggest that the Act contains such an obligation. If\nit  is so read, then only meat can be put into the  skeleton\nof  the\t Act making it meaningful and  purposeful.  The\t Act\nmust, therefore, be so read. This approach to the  interpre-\ntation of the Act can legitimately be called the  'construc-\ntive  intuition' which is a permissible mode of viewing\t the\nActs of Parliament. The freedom to search for 'the spirit of\nthe  Act'  or the quantity of the mischief at  which  it  is\naimed (both synonymous for the intention of the\t parliament)\nopens  up  the possibility of liberal  interpretation  \"that\ndelicate and important branch of judicial power, the conces-\nsion of which is dangerous, the denial ruinous\". Given\tthis\nfreedom it is a rare opportunity though never to be  misused\nand challenge for the Judges to adopt and give meaning to\n611\nthe act, articulate and inarticulate and thus translate\t the\nintention  of  the Parliament and fulfil the object  of\t the\nAct.  After  all, the Act was passed to give relief  to\t the\nvictims, who, it was thought, were unable to establish their\nown rights and fight for themselves. [687E-H; 688A]\n    11.1 The circumstances that financial institutions\theld\nshares\tin the UCIL would not disqualify the  Government  of\nIndia  from acting as parens patriae and in discharging\t its\nstatutory  duties  under the Act. The suit  was\t filed\tonly\nagainst\t the UCC and not against UCIL. On the basis  of\t the\nclaim made by the Government of India, UCIL was not a neces-\nsary  party.  It was suing only the multinational  based  on\nseveral\t legal grounds of liability of the UCC, inter  alia,\non  the basis of enterprise liability. If the Government  of\nIndia had instituted a suit against UCIL to a certain extent\nit  would have weakened its case against UCC in view of\t the\njudgment of this Court in M.C. Mehta's case. [668H; 669A-B]\nM.C. Mehta v. Union of India,<\/a> [1987] 1 SCR 819, referred to.\n    11.2 Even if there was any remote conflict of  interests\nbetween the Union of India and the victims on account of the\nsharesholding,\tdoctrine  of necessity\twould  override\t the\npossible  violation  of the principles of  natural  justice.\n[669F]\n    Kasturilal\tRalia Ram Jain v. State of UP, [1965] 1\t SCR\n375;  State  of Rajasthan v. Vidyawati, [1962] 2  Supp.\t SCR\n989;  J. Mohapatra & Co. & Anr. v. State of Orissa  &  Anr.,<\/a>\n[1984] 4 SCC 103, referred to.\n    Halsbury's\tLaws  of England, Vol. 1, 4th Edn.  para  73\nSmith's\t Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 4th\tEdn.\npp. 276-277; Natural Justice by G.A. Flick, [1979] Edn.\t pp.\n138-141, referred to.\n    12.\t The  Act does not create new causes  of  action  or\ncreate\tspecial courts. The jurisdiction of the civil  court\nto entertain suit would still arise out of section 9 of\t the\nCPC  and the substantive cause of action and the  nature  of\nthe  reliefs  available would also continue  to\t remain\t un-\nchanged.  The only difference produced by the provisions  of\nthe Act would be that instead of the suit being filed by the\nvictims\t themselves the suit would be filed by\tthe  Central\nGovernment on their behalf. [655F]\n    13. Normally, in measuring civil liability, the law\t has\nattached  more importance to the principle  of\tcompensation\nthan  that of punishment. Penal redress,  however,  involves\nboth compensation to the\n612\nperson\tinjured\t and punishment as deterrence. The  Act,  as\nsuch does not abridge or curtail damage or liability whatev-\ner that might be. So the challenge to the Act on the  ground\nthat there has been curtailment or deprivation of the rights\nof  the\t victims which is unreasonable in the  situation  is\nunwarranted and cannot be sustained. [680G-H; 681A-F]\n    Roshanlal  Kuthiala & Ors. v. R.B. Mohan  Singh,  Oberoi<\/a>\n(1975) 2 SCR 491; Nandram Heeralal v. Union of India & Anr.,\nAIR 1978 M.P. 209; Ryland v. Flatcher, (1868) Vol 3 LR E&  I\nAppeal\tCases  330; Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] AC  1129,\t re-\nferred to.\nSalmond's Law of Torts, 15th Edn. p. 30, referred to.\n    14.\t The Act in question does not purport to  deal\twith\nthe  criminal liability, if any, of the parties\t or  persons\nconcerned nor it deals with any of the consequences  flowing\nfrom  those. This position is clear from the provisions\t and\nthe preamble to the Act. [636F]\n    15. The major inarticulate premise apparent from the Act\nand the scheme and the spirit of the Act is that so long  as\nthe  rights  of the victims are prosecuted  the\t state\tmust\nprotect\t the victims. Otherwise the object of the Act  would\nbe  defeated its purpose frustrated. Therefore,\t continuance\nof the payments of the interim maintenance for the continued\nsustenance  of the victims is an obligation arising  out  of\nState's assumption of the power and temporary deprivation of\nthe  rights of the victims and divestiture of the  right  of\nthe victims to fight for their own rights. This is the\tonly\nreasonable  interpretation which is just, fair\tand  proper.\n[686B-C]\n    16. The promises made to the victims and hopes raised in\ntheir hearts and minds can only be redeemed in some  measure\nif  attempts  are made vigorously to distribute\t the  amount\nrealised to the victims in accordance with the scheme.\tThat\nwould be redemption to a certain extent. The law relating to\ndamages\t and payment of interim damages or  compensation  to\nthe victims of this nature should be seriously and scientif-\nically examined by the appropriate agencies. [704F-H; 705A]\n    17.\t The  Bhopal  Gas Leak disaster\t and  its  aftermath\nemphasise the need for laying down certain norms and  stand-\nards that the Government may follow before granting  permis-\nsion or licences for the running of industries dealing\twith\nmaterials which are of dangerous potentialities. The Govern-\nment,  should, therefore, examine or have the problem  exam-\nined by an expert committee as to what should be the  condi-\ntions on\n613\nwhich  future licences and\/or permission for running  indus-\ntries  on  Indian  soil would be granted  and  for  ensuring\nenforcement of those conditions, sufficient safety  measures\nshould\tbe formulated and scheme of  enforcement  indicated.\nThe Government should insist as a condition precedent to the\ngrant of such licences or permission, creation of a fund  in\nanticipation  by the industries to be available for  payment\nof  damages  out  of the said fund in case  of\tleakages  or\ndamages in case of accident or disaster flowing from  negli-\ngent  working  of such industrial operations or\t failure  to\nensure\tmeasures preventing such occurrence. The  Government\nshould\talso ensure that the parties must agree to abide  to\npay such damages out of the said Fund by procedure separate-\nly  evolved for computation and payment of  damages  without\nexposing  the victims or sufferers of the negligent  act  to\nthe  long and delayed procedure. Special procedure  must  be\nprovided  for and the industries must agree as\ta  condition\nfor  the grant of licence to abide by such procedure  or  to\nabide  by  statutory arbitration. The basis for\t damages  in\ncase  of  leakages and accident should also  be\t statutorily\nfixed  taking into consideration the nature of\tdamages\t in-\nflicted, the consequences thereof and the ability and capac-\nity  of\t the parties to pay. Such should  also\tprovide\t for\ndeterrant or punitive damages, the basis for which should be\nformulated  by a proper expert committee or by\tthe  Govern-\nment.  For  this  purpose, the Government  should  have\t the\nmatter\texamined by such body as it considers necessary\t and\nproper\tlike the Law Commission or other  competent  bodies.\nThis is vital for the future. [705B-F]\n    18.\t That people are born free, the dignity of the\tper-\nsons  must be recognised, and competent tribunal is  one  of\nthe surest methods of effective remedy. If, therefore, as  a\nresult\tof this tragedy new consciousness and  awareness  on\nthe  part of the people of this country to be more  vigilant\nabout  measures\t and the necessity of ensuring\tmore  strict\nvigilance  for permitting the operations of  such  dangerous\nand poisonous gases dawn, then perhaps the tragic experience\nof Bhopal would not go in vain. [682D-E]\nPer Singh, J. (concurring):\n    1.1\t In India, the need for industrial  development\t has\nled to the establishment of a number of plants and factories\nby  the domestic companies and under-takings as well  as  by\nTransnational  Corporations.  Many of these  industries\t are\nengaged\t in  hazardous or  inherently  dangerous  activities\nwhich  pose potential threat to life, health and  safety  of\npersons working in the factory, or residing in the surround-\ning  areas. Though working of such factories and  plants  is\nregulated by a\n614\nnumber of laws of our country, there is no special  legisla-\ntion providing for compensation and damages to outsiders who\nmay suffer on account of any industrial accident. As the law\nstands today, affected persons have to approach civil courts\nfor obtaining compensation and damages. In civil courts, the\ndetermination  of amount of compensation or damages as\twell\nthe liability of the enterprise has been bound by the shack-\nles of conservative principles. [707D-G]\n    1.2 The principles laid down in Ryland v. Fletcher\tmade\nit difficult to obtain adequate damages from the  enterprise\nand  that  too only after the negligence of  enterprise\t was\nproved. [707G-H]\n    1.3\t The  law laid down in Oleum Gas Leak  case  made  a\nland-mark  departure from the conservative  principles\twith\nregard to the liability of an enterprise carrying on hazard-\nous or inherently dangerous activities. [709C]\n    1.4 In the instant case, there is no scope for any doubt\nregarding the liability of the UCC for the damage caused  to\nthe human beings and nature in and around Bhopal. [709E]\n    Ryland  v. Fletcher, [1868] LR 3 HL 330; M.C.  Mehta  v.\nUnion of India,<\/a> [1987] 1 SCR 819, referred to.\n    2.\tIn the context of our national dimensions  of  human\nrights, right to life, liberty, pollution free air and water\nis guaranteed by the Constitution under Articles 21, 48A and\n51(g),\tit is the duty of the State to take effective  steps\nto  protect  the  constitutional  rights  guaranteed.  These\nrights must be integrated and illumined by evolving interna-\ntional dimensions and standards, having regard to our sover-\neignty\tas highlighted by Clauses 9 and 13 of U.N.  Code  of\nConduct\t on Transnational Corporations. Such a law may\tpro-\nvide  for conditions for granting licence  to  Transnational\nCorporations,  prescribing norms and standards\tfor  running\nindustries on Indian soil ensuring the above said  constitu-\ntional\trights\tof our people. A  Transnational\t Corporation\nshould be made liable and subservient to laws of our country\nand  the  liability should not be  restricted  to  affiliate\ncompany only but the parent corporations should also be made\nliable for any damage caused to the human beings or ecology.\nThe law must require transnational Corporations to agree  to\npay  such  damages  as may be determined  by  the  statutory\nagencies and forum constituted under it without exposing the\nvictims\t to  long  drawn litigation. In order  to  meet\t the\nsituation, to avoid delay and to ensure immediate relief  to\nthe victims, the law should\n615\nprovide\t for constitution of tribunals regulated by  special\nprocedure for determining compensation to victims of  indus-\ntrial disaster or accident, appeal against which may lie  to\nthis  Court on the limited ground of questions of  law\tonly\nafter depositing the amount determined by the Tribunal.\t The\nlaw should also provide for interim relief to victims during\nthe pendency of proceedings. These steps would minimise\t the\nmisery and agony of victims of hazardous enterprises. [710H;\n711A-F]\n    3. Industrial development in our country and the hazards\ninvolved  therein,  pose a mandatory need  to  constitute  a\nstatutory \"Industrial Disaster Fund\", contributions to which\nmay  be made by the Government, the industries whether\tthey\nare  transnational  corporations or  domestic  undertakings,\npublic or private. The extent of contribution may be  worked\nout  having regard to the extent of hazardous nature of\t the\nenterprise  and\t other allied matters. The  fund  should  be\npermanent in nature. so that money is readily available\t for\nproviding immediate effective relief to the victims. [711  G\n-H; 712A]\nRanganathan and Ahmadi, J J----Per Ranganathan, J.  (Concur-\nring).'\n    1. The provisions of the Act, read by themselves,  guar-\nantee  a complete and full protection to the rights  of\t the\nclaimants in every respect. Save only that they cannot\tfile\na  suit themselves, their right to acquire redress  has\t not\nreally been abridged by the provisions of the Act.  Sections\n3  and\t4 of the Act completely vindicate  the\tobjects\t and\nreasons\t which compelled Parliament to enact this  piece  of\nlegislation. Far from abridging the rights of the  claimants\nin  any manner, these provisions are so worded as to  enable\nthe Government to prosecute the litigation with the  maximum\namount\tof resources, efficiency and competence at its\tcom-\nmand.  as well as with all the assistance and help that\t can\nbe  extended to it by such of those litigants and  claimants\nas  are capable of playing more than a mere passive role  in\nthe litigation. [720G-H; 721A-B]\n    2. Even if the provisions of s. 3 had been\tscrupulously\nobserved  and the names of all parties, other than the\tCen-\ntral  Government,  had been got deleted from  the  array  of\nparties\t in the suits and proceedings pending in this  coun-\ntry,  the result would not have been fatal to the  interests\nof the litigants. On the contrary, it enabled the  litigants\nto obtain the benefit of all legal expertise at the  command\nof  the\t Government  of India  in  exercising  their  rights\nagainst\t the Union Carbide Corporation. Such  representation\ncan well be justified by resort to a principle analogous to,\nif not precisely the same, as that of, \"parens\n616\npatriae\". A victim of the tragedy is compelled to part\twith\na  valuable  right  of his in order that it  might  be\tmore\nefficiently  and  satisfactorily exploited for\this  benefit\nthan he himself is capable of. It is of course possible that\nthere may be an affluent claimant or lawyer engaged by\thim,\nwho may be capable of fighting the litigation better. It  is\npossible  that the Government of India as a litigant may  or\nmay not be able to pursue the litigation with as much deter-\nmination or capability as such a litigant. But in a case  of\nthe  present  type one should not be confounded\t by  such  a\npossibility. There are more indigent litigants than affluent\nones.  There  are more illiterates  than  enlightened  ones.\nThere are very few of the claimants, capable of finding\t the\nfinancial wherewithal required for fighting the\t litigation.\nVery  few of them are capable or prosecuting such a  litiga-\ntion in this country not to speak of the necessity to run to\na foreign country. The financial position of UCIL was negli-\ngible  compared\t to the magnitude of the  claim\t that  could\narise and, though eventually the battle had to be pitched on\nour own soil, an initial as well as final recourse to  legal\nproceedings in the United States was very much on the cards,\nindeed\tinevitable. In this situation, the  legislature\t was\nperfectly justified in coming to the aid of the victims with\nthis piece of legislation and in asking the Central  Govern-\nment  to shoulder the responsibility by substituting  itself\nin place of the victims for all purposes connected with\t the\nclaims. [716C-H; 717A]\n    3.\tSection\t 4  adequately safeguards  the\tinterest  of\nindividual victims. It enables each one of them to bring  to\nthe  notice  of the Union any special  features\t or  circum-\nstances which he would like to urge in respect of any matter\nand if any such features are brought to its notice the Union\nis obliged to take it into account. The individual claimants\nare also at liberty to engage their own counsel to associate\nwith the State counsel in conducting the proceedings. If the\nsuits  in  this case had proceeded, in\tthe  normal  course,\neither to the stage of a decree or even to one of settlement\nthe  claimants\tcould have kept themselves  abreast  of\t the\ndevelopments  and the statutory provisions would  have\tbeen\nmore than adequate to ensure that the points of view of\t all\nthe victims are presented to the court. Even a settlement or\ncompromise could not have been arrived at without the  court\nbeing  apprised of the views of any of them who chose to  do\nso. The statute has provided that though the Union of  India\nwill  be the dominus litis in the suit, the interest of\t all\nthe victims and their claims should be safeguarded by giving\nthem  a\t voice in the proceedings to  the  extent  indicated\nabove. This provision of the statute is an adaptation of the\nprinciple  of Order 1 Rule 8 and of order XXIII Rule  38  of\nthe Code of Civil Procedure in its application to the  suits\ngoverned  by it and, though the extent of participation\t al-\nlowed to\n617\nthe victims is somewhat differently enunciated in the legis-\nlation,\t substantially\tspeaking, it  does  incorporate\t the\nprinciples of natural justice to the extent possible in\t the\ncircumstances. The statute cannot, therefore, be faulted  on\nthe  ground  that it denies the victims\t an  opportunity  to\npresent\t their views or places them at any  disadvantage  in\nthe matter of having an effective voice in settling the suit\nby way of compromise. [724G-H; 725A-D]\n    4. Sections 3 and 4 combine together the interest of the\nweak,  illiterate, helpless and poor victims as well as\t the\ninterest  of  those who could have managed  for\t themselves,\neven  without  the help of this enactment.  The\t combination\nthus  envisaged enables the Government to fight\t the  battle\nwith the foreign adversary with the full aid and  assistance\nof  such of the victims or their legal advisers as are in  a\nposition  to  offer any such assistance.  Though  section  3\ndenies the climants the benefit of being eo nominee  parties\nin  such suits or proceedings, section 4 preserves  to\tthem\nsubstantially  all  that they can achieve by  proceeding  on\ntheir  own.  In other words, while seeming  to\tdeprive\t the\nclaimants of their right to take legal action on their\town,\nit has preserved those rights, to be exercised indirectly. A\nconjoint  reading of sections 3 and 4 would show that  there\nhas  been  no  real total deprivation of the  right  of\t the\nclaimants  to enforce their claim for damage in\t appropriate\nproceedings  before any appropriate forum. There is  only  a\nrestriction  of this right which, in the  circumstances,  is\ntotally reasonable and justified. [718D-G ]\n    5.\tIt is not possible to bring the suits brought  under\nthe  Act  within  the categories  of  representative  action\nenvisaged in the Code of Civil Procedure. The Act deals with\na  class  of  action which is sui generis and  for  which  a\nspecial\t formula has been found and encapsuled in s. 4.\t The\nAct  divests the individual claimants of their right to\t sue\nand vests it in the Union. In relation to the suit in India,\nthe  Union  is the sole Plaintiff. none of  the\t others\t are\nenvisaged  as plaintiffs or respondents. The victims of\t the\ntragedy were so numerous that they were never defined at the\nstage of filing the plaint nor do they need to be defined at\nthe stage of settlement. The litigation is carried on by the\nState in its capacity not exactly the same as, but  somewhat\nanalogous  to  that of \"parens patriae\". In the\t case  of  a\nlitigation  by a Karta of a Hindu undivided family or  by  a\nguardian  on  behalf of a ward, who is\tnon-sui\t juris,\t the\njunior\tmembers\t of the family or the wards, are not  to  be\nconsulted before entering into a settlement. In such  cases,\ncourt  acts  as guardian of such persons to  scrutinise\t the\nsettlement and satisfy itself that it is in the best  inter-\nest  of all concerned. If it is later discovered that  there\nhas  been  any\tfraud or collusion, it may be  open  to\t the\njunior members of the\n618\nfamily or the wards to call the Karta or guardian to account\nbut,  barring  such a contingency, the settlement  would  be\neffective and binding. In the same way, the Union as \"parens\npatriae'  would\t have  been at liberty to  enter  into\tsuch\nsettlement  as\tit considered best on its own and  seek\t the\nCourt's approval therefore. [723G-H; 724A-D]\n    6.\tIt is common knowledge that any authority  given  to\nconduct a litigation cannot be effective unless it is accom-\npanied by an authority to withdraw or settle the same if the\ncircumstances  call for it. The vagaries of a litigation  of\nthis magnitude and intricacy could not be fully anticipated.\nThere were possibilities that the litigation may have to  be\nfought\tout to the bitter finish. There\t were  possibilities\nthat  the UCC might be willing to adequately compensate\t the\nvictims\t either\t on their own or at the\t insistence  of\t the\nGovernment concerned. There was also the possibility,  which\nhad  already been in evidence before Judge Keenan, that\t the\nproceedings  might  ultimately\thave to\t end  in  negotiated\nsettlement.  In\t most of the mass disaster  cases  reported,\nproceedings finally end in a compromise, if only to avoid an\nindefinite prolongation of the agonies caused by such  liti-\ngation. The legislation, therefore, cannot be considered  to\nbe  unreasonable merely because in addition to the right  to\ninstitute  a suit or other proceedings it also empowers\t the\nGovernment  to\twithdraw  the proceedings or  enter  into  a\ncompromise. [719B-E]\nM.C. Mehta v. Union of India,<\/a> [1987] 1 SCR 819, referred to.\n    7.\tThe Act has provided an adequate opportunity to\t the\nvictims\t to speak out and if they or the counsel engaged  by\nsome  of them in the trial court had kept in touch with\t the\nproceedings  in this court, they could have  most  certainly\nmade  themselves heard. If a feeling has gained ground\tthat\ntheir voice has not been fully heard, the fault was not with\nthe statute but was rather due to the development leading to\nthe  finalisation of the settlement when the appeal  against\nthe interim order was being heard in this Court. [726B-D]\n    8.\tIn the field of torts, under the common law of\tEng-\nland, no action could be laid by the dependants or heirs  of\na  person whose death was brought about by the tortious\t act\nof another on the maxim actio personalis maritur cum persona\nalthough  a  person  injured by a similar  act\tcould  claim\ndamages for the wrong done to him. In England this situation\nwas  remedied by the passing of Fatal Accidents\t Act,  1846,\npopularly  known  as  Lord Compbell's  Act.  Thereafter\t the\nIndian\tLegislature enacted the Fatal Accidents\t Act,  1855.\nThis Act is fashioned on the\n619\nlines  of the English Act of 1840. Even though\tthe  English\nAct has undergone a substantial change, our law has remained\nstatic and seems a trifle archaic. The magnitude of the\t gas\nleak  disaster in which hundreds lost their lives and  thou-\nsands were maimed, not to speak of the damage to  livestock,\nflora  and fauna, business and property, is an\teye  opener.\nThe  nation must learn a lesson from this traumatic  experi-\nence and evolve safeguards atleast for the future. The\ttime\nis  ripe  to take a fresh look at the outdated\tcentury\t old\nlegislation  which  is\tout of tune  with  modern  concepts.\n[728F-H; 729A-B]\n    9. The Central Government will be well advised to insist\non  certain  safeguards before\tpermitting  a  transnational\ncompany\t to do business in the country. It is  necessary  to\ninsist on a right to be informed of the nature of the  proc-\nesses  involved so as to take prompt action in the event  of\nan accident. The victims in this case have been considerably\nhandicapped on account of the fact that the immediate  tort-\nfeasor\twas  the  subsidiary of a  multi-national  with\t its\nIndian\tassets\ttotally\t inadequate to\tsatisfy\t the  claims\narising out of the disaster. It is, therefore, necessary  to\nevolve,\t either by international consensus or by  unilateral\nlegislation, steps to overcome these handicaps and to ensure\nthat  foreign corporations seeking to establish an  industry\nhere,  agree to submit to the jurisdiction of the Courts  in\nIndia in respect of actions for tortious acts in this  coun-\ntry; that the liability of such a corporation is not limited\nto  such of its assets (or the assets of its affiliates)  as\nmay be found in this country, but that the victims are\table\nto reach out to the assets of such concerns anywhere in\t the\nworld;\tand  that any decree obtained in  Indian  Courts  in\ncompliance  with  due  process of law is  capable  of  being\nexecuted against the foreign corporation, its affiliates and\ntheir  assets without further procedural hurdles.  in  those\nother countries. [729G-H; 730A-E]\n    10. It is hoped that calamities like the one which\tthis\ncountry has suffered will serve as catalyst to expedite\t the\nacceptance  of an international code on such matters in\t the\nnear future. [730F-G]\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 268 of 1989
\netc. etc.
\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).
\n    K.\tParasaran, Attorney General, R.K. Garg,\t Ms.  Indira
\nJaising, L.N. Sinha, Dr. V. Gauri Shankar, Vepa P.  Sarathi,
\nShanti\tBhushan,  Rakesh   Luthra,   C.L.   Sahu,   Indeevar
\nGoodwill, N.S.\tMalik, N.S. Pundir, R.C, Kaushik, D.K. Garg,
\nRajeev Dhawan, Miss Kamini
\n620<\/span>
\nJaiswal,  Anip\tSachthey, R.C. Pathak, H.D.  Pathak,  Harish
\nUppal,\tS.K. Gambhir, Gopal Subramanium, D.S. Shastri,\tArun
\nSharma, Miss A. Subhashini, C.V.S. Rao, Satish K. Agnihotri,
\nAshok  Kumar Singh, R.K. Jain, Kailash Vasdev  and  Prashant
\nBhushan for the appearing parties.\n<\/p>\n
The Judgments of the Court were delivered by
\n    SABYASACHI\tMUKHARJI,  CJ.\t1. Is the  Bhopal  Gas\tLeak
\nDisaster  (Processing  of  Claims)  Act,  1985\t(hereinafter
\nreferred to as ‘the Act’) is constitutionally valid? That is
\nthe question.\n<\/p>\n
    2. The Act was passed as a sequel to a grim tragedy.  On
\nthe  night  of 2nd December, 1984 occurred the\tmost  tragic
\nindustrial disaster in recorded human history in the city of
\nBhopal\tin  the State of Madhya Pradesh in  India.  On\tthat
\nnight  there was massive escape of lethal gas from  the\t MIC
\nstorage\t tank at Bhopal Plant of the Union Carbide (I)\tLtd.
\n(hereinafter referred to as ‘UCIL’) resulting in large scale
\ndeath and untold disaster. A chemical plant owned and  oper-
\nated by UCIL was situated in the northern sector of the city
\nof  Bhopal. There were numerous hutments adjacent to  it  on
\nits  southern  side,  which were  occupied  by\timpoverished
\nsquatters.  UCIL  manufactured\tthe  pesticides,  Sevin\t and
\nTamik, at the Bhopal plant, at the request of, it is  stated
\nby Judge John F. Keenan of the United States District  Court
\nin  his judgment, and indubitably with the approval  of\t the
\nGovt.  of  India. UCIL was incorporated in  1984  under\t the
\nappropriate  Indian  law: 50.99% of its\t shareholdings\twere
\nowned  by  the Union Carbide Corporation (UCC), a  New\tYork
\nCorporation,  L.I.C. and the Unit Trust of India own 22%  of
\nthe shares of U.C.I.L., a subsidiary of U.C.C.\n<\/p>\n
    3.\tMethyl Isocyanate (MIC), a highly toxic gas,  is  an
\ningredient in the production of both Sevin and Temik. On the
\nnight  of the tragedy MIC leaked from the plant in  substan-
\ntial quantities. the exact reasons for and circumstances  of
\nsuch leakage have not yet been ascertained or clearly estab-
\nlished. The results of the disaster were horrendous.  Though
\nno  one is yet certain as to how many actually died  as\t the
\nimmediate  and direct result of the leakage,  estimates\t at-
\ntribute\t it to about 3,000. Some suffered injuries  the\t ef-
\nfects  of which are described as Carcinogenic and  ontogenic
\nby  Ms.\t Indira\t Jaisingh, learned  counsel;  some  suffered
\ninjuries serious and permanent and some mild and  temporary.
\nLivestock was killed, damaged and infected. Businesses\twere
\ninterrupted.  Environment was polluted and the\tecology\t af-
\nfected, flora and fauna disturbed.\n<\/p>\n
621<\/span><\/p>\n
    4.\tOn  7th December, 1984, Chairman of UCC\t Mr.  Warren
\nAnderson  came\tto  Bhopal and was arrested.  He  was  later
\nreleased  on  bail. Between December 1984 and  January\t1985
\nsuits  were filed by several American lawyers in the  courts
\nin America on behalf of several victims. It has been  stated
\nthat  within a week after the disaster, many  American\tlaw-
\nyers,  described by some as ‘ambulance chasers’, whose\tfees
\nwere  stated to be based on a percentage of the\t contingency
\nof  obtaining  damages or not, flew over to Bhopal  and\t ob-
\ntained\tPowers of Attorney to bring actions against UCC\t and
\nUCIL.  Some suits were also filed before the District  Court
\nof Bhopal by individual claimants against UCC (the  American
\nCompany) and the UCIL.\n<\/p>\n
    5.\tOn  or about 6th February, 1985, all  the  suits  in
\nvarious U.S. Distt. Courts were consolidated by the Judicial
\nPanel  on  Multi-District Litigation and  assigned  to\tU.S.
\nDistt. Court, Southern Distt. of New York. Judge Keenan\t was
\nat all material times the Presiding Judge there.\n<\/p>\n
    6. On 29th March, 1985, the Act in question was  passed.
\nThe Act was passed to secure that the claims arising out  of
\nor  connected with the Bhopal gas leak disaster\t were  dealt
\nwith speedily, effectively and equitably. On 8th April, 1985
\nby  virtue of the Act the Union of India filed\ta  complaint
\nbefore\tthe U.S. Distt. Court, Southern Distt. of New  York.
\nOn 16th April, 1985 at the first pre-trial conference in the
\nconsolidated  action  transferred and assigned to  the\tU.S.
\nDistt.\tCourt, Southern Distt., New York, Judge Keenan\tgave
\nthe following directions:\n<\/p>\n
\t      (i) that a three member Executive Committee be
\n\t      formed to frame and develop issues in the case
\n\t      and prepare expeditiously for trial or settle-
\n\t      ment  negotiations. The Committee was to\tcom-
\n\t      prise  of\t one  lawyer selected  by  the\tfirm
\n\t      retained\tby the Union of India and two  other
\n\t      lawyers  chosen  by lawyers  retained  by\t the
\n\t      individual plaintiffs.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (ii)  that  as a matter of  fundamental  human
\n\t      decency,\ttemporary relief was  necessary\t for
\n\t      the-victims  and\tshould\tbe  furnished  in  a
\n\t      systematic  and  coordinated  fashion  without
\n\t      unnecessary delay regardless of the posture of
\n\t      the litigation then pending.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     7.\t On 24th September, 1985 in exercise of powers\tcon-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
ferred\tby section 9 of the Act, the Govt. of  India  framed
\nthe Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Registration and Processing of
\nClaims) Scheme, 1985 (hereinafter called the Scheme).\n<\/p>\n
622<\/span><\/p>\n
    8. On 12th May, 1986 an order was passed by Judge Keenan
\nallowing the application of UCC on forum non convenience  as
\nindicated hereinafter. On 21st May, 1986 there was a  motion
\nfor fairness hearing on behalf of the private plaintiffs. On
\n26th  June, 1986 individual plaintiffs filed  appeal  before
\nthe  US Court of Appeal for the second\tcircuit\t challenging
\nthe order of Judge Keenan. By an order dated 28th May,\t1986
\nJudge Keenan declined the motion for a fairness hearing. The
\nrequest for fairness hearing was rejected at the instance of
\nUnion  of India in view of the meagerness of the  amount  of
\nproposed settlement. On 10th July, 1986 UCC filed an  appeal
\nbefore\tthe  US Court of Appeal for the Second\tCircuit.  It
\nchallenged Union of India being entitled to American mode of
\ndiscovery,  but did not challenge the other  two  conditions
\nimposed\t by Judge Keenan, it is stated. On 28th\t July,\t1986
\nthe Union of India filed cross-appeal before the US Court of
\nAppeal praying that none of the conditions imposed by  Judge
\nKeenan\tshould be disturbed. In this connection it would  be
\npertinent  to  set out the conditions  incorporated  in\t the
\norder  of Judge Keenan, dated 12th May, 1986 whereby he\t had
\ndismissed  the\tcase before him on the ground of  forum\t non
\nconvenience,  as mentioned before. The conditions were\tfol-
\nlowing:\n<\/p>\n
\t      1. That UCC shall consent to the\tjurisdiction
\n\t      of  the courts of India and shall continue  to
\n\t      waive defenses based on the statute of limita-
\n\t      tion,\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      2.  That UCC shall agree to satisfy any  judg-
\n\t      ment  rendered by an Indian court\t against  it
\n\t      and if applicable, upheld on appeal,  provided
\n\t      the  judgment  and-affirmance  “comport\twith
\n\t      minimal requirements of due process”; and\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      3. That UCC shah be subject to discovery under
\n\t      the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of the US
\n\t      after appropriate demand by the plaintiffs.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    9.\tOn  5th September, 1986 the Union of India  filed  a
\nsuit for damages in the Distt. Court of Bhopal, being  regu-
\nlar  suit No. H 13\/86. It is this suit, inter alia, and\t the
\norders\tpassed therein which were settled by the  orders  of
\nthis  Court dated 14th & 15th February, 1989, which will  be
\nreferred to later. On 17th November, 1986 upon the  applica-
\ntion of the Union of India, the Distt. Court, Bhopal, grant-
\ned  a temporary injunction restraining the UCC from  selling
\nassets,\t paying\t dividends  or buying back  debts.  On\t27th
\nNovember,  1986 the UCC gave an undertaking to preserve\t and
\nmaintain  unencumbered assets to the extent of 3 billion  US
\ndollars.\n<\/p>\n
623<\/span><\/p>\n
    10.\t On  30th November, 1986 the  Distt.  Court,  Bhopal
\nlifted the injunction against the Carbide selling assets  on
\nthe  strength of the written undertaking by UCC to  maintain
\nunencumbered assets of 3 billion US dollars. On 16th  Decem-
\nber, 1986 UCC filed a written statement contending that they
\nwere  not liable on the ground that they had nothing  to  do
\nwith  the  Indian Company; and that they  were\ta  different
\nlegal entity; and that they never exercised any control\t and
\nthat  they were not liable in the suit. Thereafter, on\t14th
\nJanuary,  1987\tthe Court of Appeal for the  Second  Circuit
\naffirmed the decision of Judge Keenan but deleted the condi-
\ntion  regarding the discovery under the\t American  procedure
\ngranted\t in favour of the Union of India. It also  suo\tmotu
\nset  aside the condition that on the judgment of the  Indian
\ncourt  complying  with\tdue process and\t the  decree  issued
\nshould\tbe satisfied by UCC. 1t ruled that such a  condition
\ncannot be imposed as the situation was covered by the provi-
\nsions of the Recognition of Foreign Country Money  Judgments
\nAct.\n<\/p>\n
    11. On 2nd April, 1987, the court made a written propos-
\nal  to\tall parties for considering  reconciliatory  interim
\nrelief\tto the gas victims. In September, 1987, UCC and\t the
\nGovt.  of India sought time from the Court of Distt.  Judge,
\nBhopal,\t to  explore  avenues for settlement.  It  has\tbeen
\nasserted by the learned Attorney General that the possibili-
\nty  of settlement was there long before the full  and  final
\nsettlement was effected. He sought to draw our attention  to
\nthe  assertion\tthat the persons concerned were\t aware\tthat
\nefforts\t were being made from time to time  for\t settlement.
\nHowever, in November’87 both the Indian Govt. and the  Union
\nCarbide announced that settlement talks had failed and Judge
\nDeo extended the time.\n<\/p>\n
    12.\t The Distt. Judge of Bhopal on 17th  December,\t1987
\nordered\t interim  relief amounting to Rs.350  crores.  Being
\naggrieved  thereby the UCC filed a Civil Revision which\t was
\nregistered as Civil Revision Petition No. 26\/88 and the same
\nwas  heard. On or about 4th February, 1988, the Chief  Judi-
\ncial  Magistrate  of Bhopal ordered notice  for\t warrant  on
\nUnion Carbide, Hong Kong for the criminal case filed by\t CBI
\nagainst\t Union\tCarbide. The charge sheet  there  was  under
\nsections  304, 324, 326, 429 of the Indian Penal  Code\tread
\nwith section 35 IPC and the charge was against S\/Shri Warren
\nAnderson,  Keshub  Mahindra. Vijay Gokhale, J.\tMukund,\t Dr.
\nR.B. Roy Chowdhay. S.P. Chowdhary, K.V. Shetty, S.1. Qureshi
\nand Union Carbide of U.S.A., Union Carbide of Hong Kong\t and
\nUnion Carbide having Calcutta address. It charged the  Union
\nCarbide by saying that MIC gas was stored and it was further
\nstated that MIC had to be stored and handled
\n624<\/span>
\nin  stainless  steel which was not done. The  charge  sheet,
\ninter  alia,  stated that a Scientific Team  headed  by\t Dr.
\nVaradarajan had concluded that the factors which had led  to
\nthe toxic gas leakage causing its heavy toll existed in\t the
\nunique\tproperties of very high reactivity,  volatility\t and
\ninhalation  toxicity  of MIC. It was further stated  in\t the
\ncharge\tsheet that the needless storage of large  quantities
\nof  the material in very large size containers\tfor  inordi-
\nnately\tlong  periods  as well as  insufficient\t caution  in
\ndesign, in choice of materials of construction and in provi-
\nsion  of measuring and alarm instruments, together with\t the
\ninadequate controls on systems of storage and on quality  of
\nstored materials as well as lack of necessary facilities for
\nquick effective disposal of material exhibiting instability,
\nled to the accident. It also charged that MIC was stored  in
\na  negligent  manner and the local  administration  was\t not
\ninformed,  inter alia, of the dangerous effect of the  expo-
\nsure  of MIC or the gases produced by its reaction  and\t the
\nmedical steps to be taken immediately. It was further stated
\nthat apart from the design defects the UCC did not take\t any
\nadequate  remedial action to prevent back flow\tof  solution
\nfrom  VGS into RVVH and PVH lines. There were various  other
\nacts  of criminal negligence alleged. The High Court  passed
\nan  order staying the operation of the order dated  17.12.87
\ndirecting  the defendant-applicant to deposit Rs.3,500\tmil-
\nlions within two months from the date of the said order.  On
\n4th  April, 1988 the judgment and order were passed  by\t the
\nHigh  Court  modifying the order of the\t Distt.\t Judge,\t and
\ngranting  interim  relief of Rs.250 crores. The\t High  Court
\nheld that under the substantive law of torts, the Court\t has
\njurisdiction to grant interim relief under Section 9 of\t the
\nCPC. On 30th June, 1988 Judge Deo passed an order  restrain-
\ning the Union Carbide from settling with any individual\t gas
\nleak  plaintiffs. On 6th September, 1988 special  leave\t was
\ngranted\t by this Court in the petition filed by UCC  against
\nthe  grant  of interim relief and Union of  India  was\talso
\ngranted special leave in the petition challenging the reduc-
\ntion of quantum of compensation from Rs.350 crores to Rs.250
\ncrores.\t Thereafter, these matters were heard  in  November-
\nDecember’88 by the bench presided over by the learned  Chief
\nJustice Of India and hearing, continued also in January Feb-
\nruary’89 and ultimately on 14-15th February, 1989 the  order
\nculminating in the settlement was passed.\n<\/p>\n
    13.\t In judging the constitutional validity of the\tAct,
\nthe subsequent events, namely, how the Act has worked itself
\nout, have to be looked into. It is, therefore, necessary  to
\nrefer to the two orders of this Court. The proof of the cake
\nis in its eating, it is said, and it is perhaps not possible
\nto ignore the terms of the settlement reached on 14th and
\n625<\/span>
\n15th  February, 1989 in considering the effect of  the\tlan-
\nguage used in the Act. Is that valid’ or proper–or has\t the
\nAct  been  worked in any improper way?\tThese  questions  do
\narise.\n<\/p>\n
    14.\t On 14th February, 1989 an order was passed in\tC.A.
\nNos.  3187-88\/88 with S.L.P. (C) No. 13080\/88.\tThe  parties
\nthereto\t were  UCC and the Union of India as  well  as\tJana
\nSwasthya Kendra, Bhopal, Zehraeli Gas Kand Sangharsh Morcha,
\nBhopal.\t MP. That order recited that having  considered\t all
\nthe  facts and the circumstances of the case  placed  before
\nthe  Court, the material relating to the proceedings in\t the
\nCourts\tin  the\t United States of America,  the\t offers\t and
\ncounter-offers made between the parties at different  stages
\nduring\tthe  various  proceedings, as well  as\tthe  complex
\nissues\tof  law\t and fact raised and  the  submissions\tmade
\nthereon,  and in particular the enormity of human  suffering
\noccasioned  by\tthe  Bhopal Gas disaster  and  the  pressing
\nurgency\t to  provide  immediate and  substantial  relief  to
\nvictims of the disaster, the ‘Court found that the case\t was
\npreeminently  fit  for\tan overall  settlement\tbetween\t the
\nparties covering all litigations, claims, rights and liabil-
\nities relating to and arising out of the disaster and it was
\nfound  just, equitable and reasonable to pass,\tinter  alia,
\nthe following orders:\n<\/p>\n
.lm
\n“(1)  The Union Carbide Corporation shall pay a sum of\tU.S.
\nDollars\t 470 million (Four hundred and seventy millions)  to
\nthe Union of India in full settlement of all claims,  fights
\nand  liabilities  related to and arising out of\t Bhopal\t Gas
\ndisaster.\n<\/p>\n
(2)  The  aforesaid sum shall be paid by the  Union  Carbide
\nCorporation  to the Union of India on or before 31st  March,
\n1989.\n<\/p>\n
(3) To enable the effectuation of the settlement, all  civil
\nproceedings  related  to and arising out of the\t Bhopal\t Gas
\ndisaster  shall hereby stand transferred to this  Court\t and
\nshall  stand concluded in terms of the settlement,  and\t all
\ncriminal  proceedings  related\tto and arising\tout  of\t the
\ndisaster shall stand quashed wherever these may be pending\n<\/p>\n
    15.\t A written memorandum was filed thereafter  and\t the
\nCourt  on 15th February, 1989 passed an order  after  giving
\ndue  consideration thereto. The terms of settlement were  as
\nfollows:\n<\/p>\n
626<\/span><\/p>\n
\t      “1. The  parties\tacknowledge  that the  order
\n\t      dated  February  14, 1989 disposes of  in\t its
\n\t      entirety\tall proceedings in Suit No. 1113  of
\n\t      1986. This settlement shall finally dispose of
\n\t      all past, present and future claims, causes of
\n\t      action and civil and criminal proceedings\t (of
\n\t      any nature whatsoever wherever pending) by all
\n\t      Indian  citizens\tand all public\tand  private
\n\t      entities with respect to all past, present  or
\n\t      future   deaths,\tpersonal  injuries,   health
\n\t      effects,\tcompensation,  losses,\tdamages\t and
\n\t      civil  and criminal complaints of\t any  nature
\n\t      whatsoever  against UCC, Union  Carbide  India
\n\t      Limited,\tUnion  Carbide Eastern, and  all  of
\n\t      their  subsidiaries and affiliates as well  as
\n\t      each  of their present and  former  directors,
\n\t      officers, employees, agents,  representatives,
\n\t      attorneys,  advocates and\t solicitors  arising
\n\t      out  of,\trelating to or\tconnected  with\t the
\n\t      Bhopal  gas  leak\t disaster,  including  past,
\n\t      present  and future claims, causes  of  action
\n\t      and  proceedings against each other. All\tsuch
\n\t      claims and causes of action whether within  or
\n\t      outside  India of Indian citizens,  public  or
\n\t      private  entities\t are  hereby   extinguished,
\n\t      including\t without  limitation  each  of\t the
\n\t      claims  filed or to be filed under the  Bhopal
\n\t      Gas Leak Disaster (Registration and Processing
\n\t      of  Claims)  Scheme 1985, and all\t such  civil
\n\t      proceedings in India are hereby transferred to
\n\t      this  Court and are dismissed  without  preju-
\n\t      dice,  and all such criminal  proceedings\t in-
\n\t      cluding contempt proceedings stand quashed and
\n\t      accused deemed to be acquitted.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      2.  Upon full payment in accordance  with\t the
\n\t      Court’s  directions the undertaking  given  by
\n\t      UCC  pursuant to the order dated November\t 30,
\n\t      1986  in\tthe District  Court,  Bhopal  stands
\n\t      discharged, and all orders passed in Suit\t No.
\n\t      1113 of 1986 and or in any Revision therefrom,
\n\t      also stand discharged.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    16.\t It appears from the statement of objects &  reasons
\nof the Act that the Parliament recognized that the gas\tleak
\ndisaster  involving  the release, on 2nd and  3rd  December,
\n1984  of highly noxious and abnormally dangerous gas from  a
\nplant of UCIL, a subsidiary of UCC, was of an  unprecedented
\nnature, which resulted in loss of life and damage to proper-
\nty on an extensive scale, as mentioned before. It was stated
\nthat  the  victims  who had managed to\tsurvive\t were  still
\nsuffering from the adverse effects and the further complica-
\ntions which might arise in their cases, of course, could not
\nbe fully visualised. It was asserted by
\n627<\/span>
\nMs.  Indira Jaising that in case of some of the victims\t the
\ninjuries  were\tcarcinogenic and ontogenic and\tthese  might
\nlead  to  further  genetic complications  and  damages.\t The
\nCentral\t Govt. and the Govt. of Madhya Pradesh\tand  various
\nagencies  had  to  incur expenditure on a  large  scale\t for
\ncontaining  the disaster and mitigating or otherwise  coping
\nwith  the effects thereto. Accordingly, the Bhopal Gas\tLeak
\nDisaster (Processing of Claims) Ordinance, 1985 was  promul-
\ngated, which provided for the appointment of a\tCommissioner
\nfor  the welfare of the victims of the disaster and for\t the
\nformulation  of\t the Scheme to provide for  various  matters
\nnecessary for processing of the claims and for the  utilisa-
\ntion by way of disbursal or otherwise of amounts received in
\nsatisfaction of the claims.\n<\/p>\n
    17.\t Thereafter, the Act was passed which  received\t the
\nassent of the President on 29th March, 1985. Section 2(b) of
\nthe Act defines ‘claim’. It says that “claims” means–(i)  a
\nclaim, arising out of, or connected with, the disaster,\t for
\ncompensation  or  damages for any loss of life\tor  personal
\ninjury\twhich has been, or is likely to be suffered; (ii)  a
\nclaim, arising out of, or connected with, the disaster,\t for
\nany  damage to property which has been, or is likely to\t be,
\nsustained;  (iii) a claim for expenses incurred or  required
\nto be incurred for containing the disaster or mitigating  or
\notherwise coping with the effects of the disaster; (iv)\t any
\nother claim (including any claim by way of loss of  business
\nor employment) arising out of, or connected with, the disas-
\nter. A “claimant” is defined as a person entitled to make  a
\nclaim. It has been provided in the Explanation to Section  2
\nthat for the purpose of clauses (b) and (c), where the death
\nof a person has taken place as a result of the disaster, the
\nclaim  for  compensation or damages for the  death  of\tsuch
\nperson\tshall  be for the benefit of  the  spouse,  children
\n(including  a  child  in the womb) and other  heirs  of\t the
\ndeceased  and  they shall be deemed to be the  claimants  in
\nrespect thereof.\n<\/p>\n
    18.\t Section  3  is headed “Power of  Central  Govt.  to
\nrepresent claimants”. It provides as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “3(1) Subject to the other provisions of\tthis
\n\t      Act,  the Central Government shall, and  shall
\n\t      have  the exclusive right to,  represent,\t and
\n\t      act  in  place of (whether within\t or  outside
\n\t      India) every person who has made, or is  enti-
\n\t      tled  to make, a claim for all  purposes\tcon-
\n\t      nected with such claim in the same manner\t and
\n\t      to the same effect as such persons.
\n\t      (2) In particular and without prejudice to the
\n\t      generality of
\n\t      628<\/span>
\n\t      the  provisions of sub-section (1),  the\tpur-
\n\t      poses referred to therein include–\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (a) Institution of any suit or other  proceed-
\n\t      ing in or before any court or other  authority
\n\t      (whether within or outside India) or withdraw-
\n\t      al  of any such suit or other proceeding,\t and\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (b) entering into a compromise.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (3)  The provisions of sub-section  (1)  shall
\n\t      apply also in relation to claims in respect of
\n\t      which  suits  or other proceedings  have\tbeen
\n\t      instituted  in  or before any court  or  other
\n\t      authority\t (whether within or  outside  India)
\n\t      before the commencement of this Act:
\n\t      Provided that in the case of any such suit  or
\n\t      other  proceeding\t with respect to  any  claim
\n\t      pending immediately before the commencement of
\n\t      this  Act\t in  or before any  court  or  other
\n\t      authority\t outside  India, the  Central  Govt.
\n\t      shall represent, and act in place of, or along
\n\t      with,  such claimant, if such court  or  other
\n\t      authority so permits.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    19. Section 4 of the Act is headed as “Claimant’s  right
\nto  be represented by a legal practitioner”. It provides  as
\nfollows:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “Notwithstanding anything contained in section
\n\t      3,  in representing, and acting in  place\t of,
\n\t      any  person  in  relation to  any\t claim,\t the
\n\t      Central  Government shall have due  regard  to
\n\t      any  matters which such person may require  to
\n\t      be urged with respect to his claim and  shall,
\n\t      if  such\tperson\tso desires,  permit  at\t the
\n\t      expense  of such person, a legal\tpractitioner
\n\t      of his choice to be associated in the  conduct
\n\t      of  any suit or other proceeding\trelating  to
\n\t      his claim.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    20. Section 5 deals with the powers of the Central Govt.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
and  enjoins that for the purpose of discharging  its  func-
\ntions  under  this  Act, the Central Govt.  shall  have\t the
\npowers\tof a civil court while trying a suit under the\tCode
\nof  Civil  Procedure, 1908. Section 6 provides for  the\t ap-
\npointment  of a Commissioner and other officers and  employ-
\nees.  Section  7 deals with powers to  delegate.  Section  8
\ndeals with limitation, while section 9 deals with the  power
\nto  frame Scheme. The Central Govt. was enjoined to frame  a
\nscheme\twhich  was  to take into account,  inter  alia,\t the
\nprocessing  of\tthe claims for securing\t their\tenforcement,
\ncreation of a fund for meeting expenses in connection
\n629<\/span>
\nwith the administration of the Scheme and of the  provisions
\nof  this Act and the amounts which the Central Govt.  might,
\nafter  due  appropriation made by the Parliament by  law  in
\nthat behalf, credit to the fund referred to in clauses above
\nand any other amounts which might be credited to such  fund.
\nSuch  Scheme  was  enjoined, as soon as after  it  had\tbeen
\nframed, to be laid before each House of Parliament.  Section
\n10  deals with removal of doubts. Section 11 deals with\t the
\noverriding  effect and provides that the provisions  of\t the
\nAct  and of any Scheme framed thereunder shall\thave  effect
\nnotwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in
\nany  enactment other than the Act or any  instrument  having
\neffect by virtue of any enactment other than the Act.\n<\/p>\n
    21.\t A Scheme has been framed and was published on\t24th
\nSeptember,  1985. Clause 3 of the said Scheme provides\tthat
\nthe  Deputy Commissioners appointed under Section 6  of\t the
\nAct  shall  be the authorities for  registration  of  Claims
\n(including  the receipt, scrutiny and proper  categorisation
\nof  such  claims under paragraph 5 of  the  Scheme)  arising
\nwithin\tthe areas of their respective jurisdiction and\tthey
\nshall be assisted by such other officers as may be appointed
\nby the Central Govt. under Section 6 of the Act for scrutiny
\nand  verification of the claims and other  related  matters.
\nThe Scheme also provides for the manner of filing claims. It
\nenjoins that the Dy. Commissioner shall provide the required
\nforms  for  filing the applications. It\t also  provides\t for
\ncategorisation and registration of claims. Sub-clause (2) of
\nClause\t5 enjoins that the claims received for\tregistration
\nshall be placed under different heads.\n<\/p>\n
    22.\t Sub-clause  (3)  of clause 5 enjoins  that  on\t the
\nconsideration  of  claims  made under  paragraph  4  of\t the
\nScheme,\t if the Dy. Commissioner is of the opinion that\t the
\nclaims\tfall  in any category different\t from  the  category
\nmentioned  by  the claimant, he may decide  the\t appropriate
\ncategory  after giving an opportunity to the claimant to  be
\nheard  and  also after taking into consideration  any  facts
\nmade  available\t to him in this behalf.\t Sub-clause  (6)  of
\nClause 5 enjoins that if the claimant is not satisfied\twith
\nthe  order of the Dy. Commissioner, he may prefer an  appeal
\nagainst such order to the Commissioner, who shall decide the
\nsame.\n<\/p>\n
    23.\t Clause 9 of the Scheme provides for  processing  of
\nClaims Account Fund, which the Central Govt. may, after\t due
\nappropriation  made by Parliament, credit to the said  Fund.
\nIt  provides  that there shall also be a Claims\t and  Relief
\nFund, which will include the amounts
\n630<\/span>
\nreceived in satisfaction of the claims and any other amounts
\nmade available to the Commissioner as donation or for relief
\npurposes.  Subclause  (3)  of clause 10\t provides  that\t the
\namount in the said Fund shall be applied by the Commissioner
\nfor,  disbursal\t of amounts in settlement of claims,  or  as
\nrelief,\t or apportionment of part of the Fund for  disbursal
\nof amounts in settlement of claims arising in future or\t for
\ndisbursal of amounts to the Govt. of Madhya Pradesh for\t the
\nsocial\tand economic rehabilitation of the persons  affected
\nby the Bhopal gas leak disaster.\n<\/p>\n
    24.\t Clause 11 of the Scheme deals with  the  disbursal,
\napportionment of certain amounts, and sub-clause (2) thereof
\nenjoins\t that  the  Central Govt. may  determine  the  total
\namount\tof compensation to be apportioned for each  category
\nof claims and the quantum of compensation payable, in gener-
\nal,  in relation to each type of injury or loss.  Sub-clause
\n(5) thereto provides that in case of a dispute as to disbur-
\nsal  of the amounts received in satisfaction of\t claims,  an
\nappeal\tshall lie against the order of the Dy.\tCommissioner
\nto  the Additional Commissioner, who may decide\t the  matter
\nand make such disbursal as he may, for reasons to be record-
\ned in writing, think fit. The other clauses are not relevant
\nfor our present purposes.\n<\/p>\n
    25.\t Counsel for different parties in all these  matters
\nhave  canvassed\t their\tsubmissions before us  for  the\t gas
\nvictims. Mr. R.K. Garg, Ms. Indira Jaising, and Mr.  Kailash
\nVasudev have made various submissions challenging the valid-
\nity  of the Act on various grounds. They all have  submitted
\nthat the Act should be read in the way they suggested and as
\na  whole. Mr. Shanti Bhushan, appearing for  interveners  on
\nbehalf\tof  Bhopal  Gas Peedit Mahila  Udyog  Sangathan\t and
\nfollowing  him Mr. Prashant Bhushan have urged that the\t Act
\nshould\tbe read in the manner canvassed by them and  if\t the
\nsame is not so read then the same would be violative of\t the
\nfundamental  rights of the victims, and as such\t unconstitu-
\ntional.\t The learned Attorney General assisted by Mr.  Gopal
\nSubramanium  has  on the other hand urged that\tthe  Act  is
\nvalid and constitutional and that the settlement arrived  at
\non 14th\/15th February is proper and valid.\n<\/p>\n
    26.\t In  order to appreciate the background\t Ms.  Indira
\nJaising\t placed before us the proceedings of the  Lok  Sabha
\nwherein Mr. Veerendra Patil, the Hon’ble Minister, stated on
\nMarch 27, 1985 that the tragedy that had occurred in  Bhopal
\non  2nd and 3rd December, 1984 was unique and  unprecedented
\nin character and magnitude not only for our country but\t for
\nthe entire world. It was stated that one of
\n631<\/span>
\nthe  options  available\t was to settle the  case  in  Indian
\ncourts.\t The  second one was to file the cases\tin  American
\ncourts.\t Mr. Patil reiterated that the Govt. wanted to\tpro-
\nceed  against the parent company and also to appoint a\tCom-
\nmission of Inquiry.\n<\/p>\n
    27. Mr. Garg in support of the proposition that the\t Act
\nwas  unconstitutional, submitted that the Act must be  exam-
\nined  on  the touchstone of the fundamental  rights  on\t the
\nbasis of the test laid down by this court in state of Madras
\nv. V.G, Row, [1952] SCR 597, There at page 607 of the report
\nthis  Court has reiterated that in considering the  reasona-
\nbleness of the law imposing restrictions on the\t fundamental
\nrights,\t both the substantive and the procedural aspects  of
\nthe  impugned  restrictive law should be examined  from\t the
\npoint of view of reasonableness. And the test of reasonable-
\nness,  wherever prescribed, should be applied to each  indi-
\nvidual Statute impugned, and no abstract standard or general
\npattern of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable  to
\nall  cases.  The nature of the right alleged  to  have\tbeen
\ninfringed,  the underlying purpose of the  restrictions\t im-
\nposed,\tthe  extent  and urgency of the evil  sought  to  be
\nremedied  thereby, the disproportion of the imposition,\t the
\nprevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the
\njudicial  verdict.  (The emphasis supplied).  Chief  Justice
\nPatanjali Sastri reiterated that in evaluating such  elusive
\nfactors and forming their own conception of what is reasona-
\nble, in the circumstances of a given case, it is  inevitable
\nthat  the social philosophy and the scale of values  of\t the
\njudges participating in the decision would play an important
\nrole.\n<\/p>\n
    28. Hence, whether by sections, 3, 4 & 11 the rights  of
\nthe  victims and the citizens to fight for their own  causes
\nand  to\t assert their own grievances have  been\t taken\taway
\nvalidly\t and  properly, must be judged in the light  of\t the
\nprevailing  conditions at the time, the nature of the  right
\nof  the\t citizen, the purpose of the restrictions  on  their
\nrights\tto sue for enforcement in the courts of law  or\t for
\npunishment for offences against his person or property,\t the
\nurgency and extent of the evils sought to be remedied by the
\nAct,  and the proportion of the impairment of the rights  of
\nthe  citizen  with  reference to the  intended\tremedy\tpre-
\nscribed. According to Mr. Garg, the present position  called
\nfor a comprehensive appreciation of the national and  inter-
\nnational  background  in which precious rights to  life\t and
\nliberty were enshrined as fundamental rights and remedy\t for
\nthem  was also guaranteed under Article 32 of the  Constitu-
\ntion. He sought to urge that multinational corporations have
\nassumed\t powers or potencies to override the  political\t and
\neconomic independence of the sovereign nations which have
\n632<\/span>
\nbeen used to take away in the last four decades, much wealth
\nout  of the Third World. Now these are plundered  much\tmore
\nthan what was done to the erstwhile colonies by\t imperialist
\nnations\t in  the last three centuries of foreign  rule.\t The
\nrole of courts in cases of conflict between rights of  citi-
\nzens  and the vast economic powers claimed by  multinational
\ncorporations  to deny moral and legal liabilities for  their
\ncorporate  criminal activities should not be lost sight\t of.
\nHe,  in\t this background, urged\t that  these  considerations
\nassume\timmense importance to shape human  fights  jurispru-
\ndence  under  the Constitution, and for the Third  World  to
\nregulate  and  control the power and economic  interests  of
\nmultinational corporations and the power of exploitation and
\ndomination  by developed nations without submitting  to\t due
\nobservance  of\tthe  laws of the  developing  countries.  It
\ntherefore  appears  that the production of, or\tcarrying  on
\ntrade in dangerous chemicals by multinational industries  on
\nthe  soil  of Third World countries call for  strictest\t en-
\nforcement  of constitutional guarantees for  enjoying  human
\nfights\tin free India, urged Mr. Garg. In  this\t connection,
\nour attention was drawn to the Charter of Universal Declara-
\ntion of Human Rights. Article 1 of the Universal Declaration
\nof  Human Rights, 1948 reiterates that all human-beings\t are
\nborn free and equal in dignity and rights. Article 3  states
\nthat  everyone\thas right to life, liberty and\tsecurity  of
\nperson.\t Article 6 of the Declaration states  that  everyone
\nhas  the right to recognition everywhere as a person  before
\nthe law. Article 7 states that all are equal before the\t law
\nand are entitled without any discrimination to equal protec-
\ntion  of  the  law. All are  entitled  to  equal  protection
\nagainst\t any discrimination in violation of the\t Declaration
\nof Human Rights and against any incitement to such discrimi-
\nnation.\t Article 8 states that everyone has the right to  an
\neffective  remedy  by competent National Tribunal  for\tacts
\nviolating  fundamental rights guaranteed to him by the\tCon-
\nstitution or by the law. It is, therefore, necessary to bear
\nin  mind  that Indian citizens have a fight  to\t live  which
\ncannot be taken away by the Union of India or the Govt. of a
\nState, except by a procedure which is just, fair and reason-
\nable. The right to life includes the fight to protection  of
\nlimb against mutilation and physical injuries, and does\t not
\nmean merely the fight to breathe but also includes the fight
\nto livelihood. It was urged that this right is available  in
\nall its dimension till the last breath against all  injuries
\nto  head, heart and mind or the lungs affecting the  citizen
\nor his next generation or of genetic disorders. The enforce-
\nment  of  the right to life or limb calls for  adequate\t and
\nappropriate  reliefs  enforceable in courts of\tlaw  and  of
\nequity with sufficient power to offer adequate deterrence in
\nall  cases  of\tcorporate criminal  liability  under  strict
\nliability, absolute liability, punitive liability and crimi-
\nnal prosecution and
\n633<\/span>
\npunishment to the delinquents. The damages awarded in  civil
\njurisdiction  must  be\tcommensurate  to  meet\twell-defined
\ndemands\t of  evolved human rights  jurisprudence  in  modern
\nworld.\tIt  was,  therefore, submitted\tthat  punishment  in
\ncriminal jurisdiction for serious offences is independent of
\nthe  claims enforced in civil jurisdiction and\tno  immunity
\nagainst it can be granted as part of settlement in any civil
\nsuit.  If any Act authorises or permits doing of  the  same,
\nthe  same  will be unwarranted by law and as such  bad.\t The
\nConstitution of India does not permit the same.\n<\/p>\n
    29. Our attention was drawn to Article 21 of the Consti-
\ntution\tand  the principles of international law.  Right  to
\nequality is guaranteed to every person under Art. 14 in\t all
\nmatters\t like the laws of procedure for enforcement  of\t any
\nlegal  or constitutional right in every\t jurisdiction,\tsub-
\nstantive  law defining the rights expressly or by  necessary
\nimplications, denial of any of these rights to any class  of
\ncitizens in either field must have nexus with  constitution-
\nally  permissible object and can never be  arbitrary.  Arbi-
\ntrariness  is,\ttherefore,  anti-thetical to  the  right  of
\nequality.  In  this connection, reliance was placed  on\t the
\nobservations of this Court in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil
\nNadu & Anr.,<\/a> [1974] 2 SCR 348 and Maneka Gandhi v. Union  of
\nIndia,<\/a> [1978] 2 SCR 621 where it was held that the view that
\nArticles 19 & 21 constitute watertight compartments has been
\nrightly overruled. Articles dealing with different fundamen-
\ntal rights contained in Part III of the Constitution do\t not
\nrepresent  entirely separate streams of rights which do\t not
\nmingle\tat  any\t point of time. They. are all  parts  of  an
\nintegrated scheme in the Constitution and must be  preserved
\nand cannot be destroyed arbitrarily. Reliance was placed  on
\nthe  observations  in R.D. Shetty v. The I.A.A. of  India  &
\nOrs.,  [1979] 3 SCR 1014. Hence, the rights of the  citizens
\nto fight for remedies and enforce their rights flowing\tfrom
\nthe  breach  of\t obligation in respect of  crime  cannot  be
\nobliterated. The Act and Sections 3, 4 & 11 of the Act in so
\nfar  as\t these purport to do so and have  so  operated,\t are
\nviolative  of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the  Constitu-
\ntion. The procedure envisaged by the said Sections  deprives
\nthe just and legitimate rights of the victims to assert\t and
\nobtain\ttheir just dues. The rights cannot be so  destroyed.
\nIt was contended that under the law the victims had right to
\nventilate their rights.\n<\/p>\n
    30.\t It was further contended that Union of India was  a
\njoint tort-feasor along with UCC and UCIL. It had negligent-
\nly  permitted  the establishment of such a  factory  without
\nproper safeguards exposing the victims and citizens to great
\ndanger. Such a person or authority
\n634<\/span>
\ncannot be entrusted to represent the victims by denying\t the
\nvictims\t their rights to plead their own cases. It was\tsub-
\nmitted\tthat  the  object of the Act was  to  fully  protect
\npeople\tagainst\t the disaster of highly\t obnoxious  gas\t and
\ndisaster  of unprecedented nature. Such an object cannot  be
\nachieved  without enforcement of the criminal  liability  by
\ncriminal  prosecution.\tEntering  into\tsettlement   without
\nreference to the victims was, therefore, bad and unconstitu-
\ntional,\t it was urged. If an Act, it was submitted,  permits
\nsuch  a settlement or deprivation of the rights of the\tvic-
\ntims, then the same is bad.\n<\/p>\n
    31.\t Before we deal with the various  other\t contentions
\nraised in this case, it is necessary to deal with the appli-
\ncation for intervention and submission made on behalf of the
\nCoal  India  in Writ Petition No. 268\/89  wherein  Mr.\tL.N.
\nSinha in his written submission had urged for the intervener
\nthat  Article  21 of the Constitution  neither\tconfers\t nor
\ncreates\t nor determines the dimensions nor  the\t permissible
\nlimits\tof restrictions which appropriate legislation  might
\nimpose\ton the right to life or liberty. He  submitted\tthat
\nprovisions  for procedure are relevant in judicial or  quasi
\njudicial  proceedings for enforcement of rights\t or  obliga-
\ntions.\tWith  regard to alteration of rights,  procedure  is
\ngoverned  by the Constitution directly. He sought to  inter-
\nvene on behalf of Coal India and wanted these submissions to
\nbe  taken into consideration. However, when this  contention
\nwas  sought  to be urged before this Court  on\t25th  April,
\n1989, after hearing all the parties, it appeared that  there
\nwas  no\t dispute  between the parties in  the  instant\twrit
\npetitions  between the victims and the Government  of  India
\nthat  the  rights claimed in these cases are  referrable  to
\nArticle 21 of the Constitution. Therefore, no dispute really
\narises\twith regard to the contention of Coal India  and  we
\nneed  not  consider the submissions urged by Shri  Sinha  on
\nbehalf\tof the intervener in this case. It has been  so\t re-
\ncorded.\n<\/p>\n
    32.\t By the order dated 3rd March, 1989, Writ  Petitions
\nNos. 268\/89 and 164\/86 have been directed to be disposed  of
\nby this Bench.’ We have heard these two writ petitions along
\nwith the other writ petitions and other matters as indicated
\nhereinbefore.  The contentions are common. These writ  peti-
\ntions  question the validity of the Act and  the  settlement
\nentered\t into pursuant to the Act. Writ Petition No.  164\/86
\nis  by one Shri Rakesh Shrouti who is an Indian citizen\t and
\nclaims\tto be a practising advocate having his residence  at
\nBhopal.\t He  says  that he and his family  members  were  at
\nBhopal on 2nd\/3rd December, 1984 and suffered immensely as a
\nresult\tof the gas leak. He challenges the validity  of\t the
\nAct on various grounds. He contends that the Union of  India
\nshould not have the exclusive right to represent the
\n635<\/span>
\nvictims\t in  suits  against the Union  Carbide\tand  thereby
\ndeprive the victims of their right to sue and deny access to
\njustice.  He  further challenges the right of the  Union  of
\nIndia to represent the victims against Union Carbide because
\nof conflict of interests. The conduct of the Union of  India
\nwas  also  deprecated and it was further  stated  that\tsuch
\nconduct\t did  not inspire confidence. In the  premises,\t the
\nsaid petitioner sought a declaration under Article 32 of the
\nConstitution  that  the Act is void, inoperative  and  unen-
\nforceable  as violative of Articles 14, 19 & 21 of the\tCon-
\nstitution- Similarly, the second writ petition, namely, writ
\npetition  No. 268\/89 which is filed by Sh. Charan Lal  Sahu,
\nwho  is also a practising Advocate on behalf of the  victims
\nand  claims to have suffered damages as a result of the\t gas
\nleak. challenges the Act. He further challenges the  settle-
\nment  entered  into  under the Act. He says  that  the\tsaid
\nsettlement  was violative of principles of  natural  justice
\nand  the fundamental right of the said petitioner and  other
\nvictims.  It is his case that in so far as the\tAct  permits
\nsuch a course to be adopted, such a course was not permissi-
\nble  under  the Constitution. He further  asserts  that\t the
\nUnion of India was negligent and a joint tort-feasor. In the
\npremises,  according to him, the Act is bad, the  settlement
\nis bad and these should be set aside.\n<\/p>\n
    33.\t In order to determine the question whether the\t Act
\nin question is constitutionally valid or not in the light of
\nArticles  14,  19(l)(g) and 21 of the  Constitution,  it  is
\nnecessary  to find out what does the Act actually  mean\t and
\nprovide for. The Act in question, as the Preamble to the Act
\nstates, was passed in order to confer powers on the  Central
\nGovernment  to\tsecure that the claims arising\tout  of,  or
\nconnected with, the Bhopal gas leak disaster are dealt\twith
\nspeedily,  effectively, equitably and to the best  advantage
\nof the claimants and for matters incidental thereto.  There-
\nfore,  securing the claims arising out of or connected\twith
\nthe  Bhopal gas leak disaster is the object and\t purpose  of
\nthe Act. We have noticed the proceedings of the Lok Sabha in
\nconnection with the enactment of the Act. Our attention\t was
\nalso  drawn by the learned Attorney General to the  proceed-
\nings  of the Rajya Sabha wherein the Hon’ble Minister,\tShri
\nVirendra  Patil explained that the bill enabled the  Govern-
\nment to assume exclusive right to represent and act, whether
\nwithin\tor  outside India in place of every person  who\t had
\nmade or was entitled to make claim in relation to the disas-
\nter and to institute any suit or other proceedings or  enter
\ninto  any  compromise  as mentioned in the  Act.  The  whole
\nobject\tof  the Bill was to make procedural changes  to\t the
\nexisting  Indian law which would enable the Central  Govern-
\nment to take up the responsibility of fighting litigation on
\nbehalf of these victims. The first point was that it
\n636<\/span>
\nsought to create a locus standi in the Central Government to
\nfile  suits  on\t behalf of the victims. The  object  of\t the
\nStatute. it was highlighted, was that because of the  dimen-
\nsion  of  the tragedy covering thousands  of  people,  large
\nnumber\tof whom being poor, would not be able to go  to\t the
\ncourts,\t it was necessary to create the locus standi in\t the
\nCentral\t Government to start the litigation for\t payment  of
\ncompensation  in  the  courts on their\tbehalf.\t The  second
\naspect of the Bill was that by creating this locus standi in
\nthe Central Government, the Central Government became compe-
\ntent  to institute judicial proceedings for payment of\tcom-
\npensation  on behalf of the victims. The next aspect of\t the
\nBill was to make a distinction between those on whose behalf
\nsuits  had  already  been filed and those  on  whose  behalf
\nproceedings  had  not yet then been instituted. One  of\t the
\nMembers\t emphasised that under Article 21 of  the  Constitu-
\ntion,  the personal liberty of every citizen was  guaranteed
\nand it has been widely interpreted as to what was the  mean-
\ning of the expression ‘personal liberty’. It was  cmphasised
\nthat  one  could not take away the right of  a\tperson,\t the
\nliberty\t of a person, to institute proceedings for  his\t own
\nbenefit\t and  for his protection. It is from this  point  of
\nview that it was necessary, the member debated, to  preserve
\nthe right of a claimant to have his own lawyers to represent
\nhim  along  with the Central Government in  the\t proceedings
\nunder Section 4 of the Act, this made the Bill constitution-
\nally valid.\n<\/p>\n
    34. Before we deal with the question of constitutionali-
\nty,  it has to be emphasised that the Act in question  deals
\nwith  the  Bhopal gas leak disaster and it  deals  with\t the
\nclaims\tmeaning thereby claims arising out of  or  connected
\nwith  the disaster for compensation of damages for  loss  of
\nlife  or any personal injury which has been or is likely  to
\nbe  caused and also claims arising out of or connected\twith
\nthe  disaster  for  any damages to property  or\t claims\t for
\nexpenses incurred or required to be incurred for  containing
\nthe  disaster or making or otherwise coping with the  impact
\nof  the\t disaster and other incidental claims.\tThe  Act  in
\nquestion does not purport to deal with the criminal liabili-
\nty, if any, of the parties or persons concerned nor it deals
\nwith any of the consequences flowing from those. This  posi-
\ntion  is clear from the provisions and the Preamble  to\t the
\nAct.  Learned Attorney General also says that the  Act\tdoes
\nnot cover criminal liability. The power that has been  given
\nto  the\t Central Government is to  represent  the  ‘claims’,
\nmeaning thereby the monetary claims. The monetary claims, as
\nwas  argued  on behalf of the victims, are  damages  flowing
\nfrom the gas disaster. Such damages, Mr. Garg and Ms.  Jais-
\ning  submitted,\t are  based on\tstrict\tliability,  absolute
\nliability  and punitive liability. The Act does not,  either
\nexpressly or impliedly, deal with the extent of the  damages
\nor
\n637<\/span>
\nliability.  Neither  section 3 nor any other  section  deals
\nwith any consequences of criminal liability. The  expression
\n“the Central Government shall, and shall have the  exclusive
\nright to, represent, and act in place of (whether within  or
\noutside India) every person who has made, or is entitled  to
\nmake, a claim for all purposes connected with such claim  in
\nthe same manner and to the same effect as such person”, read
\nas  it is, means that Central Government is substituted\t and
\nvested\twith  the  exclusive right to act in  place  of\t the
\nvictims,  i.e.,\t eliminating the victims,  their  heirs\t and
\ntheir  legal representatives, in respect of all such  claims
\narising out of or connected with the Bhopal gas leak  disas-
\nter.  The  right,  therefore, embraces\tright  to  institute
\nproceedings  within  or outside India along  with  right  to
\ninstitute  any\tsuit or other proceedings or to\t enter\tinto
\ncompromise.  Sub-section 1 of section 3 of the\tAct,  there-
\nfore,  substitutes  the Central Government in place  of\t the
\nvictims.  The victims, or their heirs and legal\t representa-
\ntives,\tget their rights substituted in the Central  Govern-
\nment  along  with the concomitant right\t to  institute\tsuch
\nproceedings,  withdraw such proceedings or suit and also  to
\nenter into compromise.The victims or the heirs or the  legal
\nrepresentatives\t of the victims, are substituted  and  their
\nrights are vested in the Central Government. This happens by
\noperation of section 3 which is the legislation in question.
\nSub-section (3) of section 3 makes it clear that the  provi-
\nsions  of sub-section (1) of section 3 shall also  apply  in
\nrelation  to claims in respect of which suits or other\tpro-
\nceedings  have\tbeen instituted in or before  any  court  or
\nother authority (whether within or outside India) before the
\ncommencement  of  this Act, but makes a distinction  in\t the
\ncase  of any such suit or other proceeding with\t respect  to
\nany  claim  pending immediately before the  commencement  of
\nthis  Act in or before any court or other authority  outside
\nIndia, and provides that the Central Government shall repre-
\nsent, and act in place of, or along with, such claimant,  if
\nsuch  court  or other authority so  permits.  Therefore,  in
\ncases  where such suits or proceedings have been  instituted
\nbefore\tthe commencement of the Act in any court  or  before
\nany  authority outside India, the section by its  own  force
\nwill not come into force in substituting the Central Govern-
\nment  in  place of the victims or the heirs or\ttheir  legal
\nrepresentatives,  but the Central Government has been  given
\nthe right to act in place of, or along with, such  claimant,
\nprovided such court or other authority so permits. It is  to
\nhave  adherence\t and conformity with the  procedure  of\t the
\ncountries  or places outside India, where suits or  proceed-
\nings  are to be instituted or have been\t instituted.  There-
\nfore, the Central Government is authorised to act along with
\nthe  claimants in respect of proceedings instituted  outside
\nIndia  subject to the orders of such courts or the  authori-
\nties. Is such a right valid and proper?\n<\/p>\n
638<\/span><\/p>\n
    35. There is the concept known both in this country\t and
\nabroad,\t called “parens patriae. Dr. D.K. Mukherjea  in\t his
\n“Hindu\tLaw of Religious and Charitable Trusts”, Tagore\t Law
\nLectures,  Fifth  Edition,  at page 404,  referring  to\t the
\nconcept\t of parens patriae, has noted that in  English\tLaw,
\nthe Crown as parens patriae is the constitutional  protector
\nof  all property subject to charitable trusts,\tsuch  trusts
\nbeing essentially matters of public concern. Thus the  posi-
\ntion  is  that according to Indian  concept  parens  patriae
\ndoctrine  recognized King as the protector of  all  citizens
\nand  as\t parent. In Budhakaran Chankhani  v.  Thakur  Prasad
\nShah,  AIR 1942 Cal. 311 the position was explained  by\t the
\nCalcutta  High\tCourt at page 3 18 of the report.  The\tsame
\nposition  was reiterated by the said Court in  Banku  Behary
\nMondal\tv. Banku Behary Hazra & Anr., AIR 1943 Cal.  203  at
\npage 205 of the report. The position was further  elaborated
\nand  explained by the Madras High Court in Medai Dalavoi  T.
\nKumaraswami  Mudaliar  v. Medai Dalavoi Rajammal,  AIR\t1957
\nMad.  563 at page 567 of the report. This Court also  recog-
\nnized the concept of parens patriae relying on the  observa-
\ntions of Dr. Mukherjea aforesaid in Ram Saroop v. S.P. Sahi,
\n[1959] 2 Supp. SCR 583, at pages 598 and 599. In the  “Words
\nand  Phrases”  Permanent edition, Vol. 35 at p.\t 99,  it  is
\nstated that parens patriae is the inherent power and author-
\nity of a Legislature to provide protection to the person and
\nproperty of persons non suijuris, such as minor, insane, and
\nincompetent persons, but the words “parens patriae”  meaning
\nthereby ‘the father of the country’, were applied originally
\nto the King and are used to designate the State referring to
\nits  sovereign\tpower  of guardianship\tover  persons  under
\ndisability,  (Emphasis supplied). Parens  patriae  jurisdic-
\ntion,  it has been explained, is the right of the  sovereign
\nand  imposes  a duty on sovereign, in  public  interest,  to
\nprotect\t persons under disability who have no rightful\tpro-
\ntector. The connotation of the term “parens patriae” differs
\nfrom country to country, for instance, in England it is\t the
\nKing,  in America it is the people, etc. The  Government  is
\nwithin\tits  duty to protect and to  control  persons  under
\ndisability.  Conceptually, the parens patriae theory is\t the
\nobligation of the State to protect and take into custody the
\nrights\tand the privileges of its citizens  for\t discharging
\nits  obligations. Our Constitution makes it  imperative\t for
\nthe  State to secure to all its citizens the rights  guaran-
\nteed by the Constitution and where the citizens are not in a
\nposition  to assert and secure their rights, the State\tmust
\ncome  into picture and protect and fight for the  rights  of
\nthe  citizens. The Preamble to the Constitution,  read\twith
\nthe  Directive Principles, Articles 38, 39 and\t39A  enjoins
\nthe  State  to\ttake up these responsibilities.\t It  is\t the
\nprotective  measure  to which the social  welfare  state  is
\ncommitted.  It\tis  necessary for the State  to\t ensure\t the
\nfunda-\n<\/p>\n
639<\/span><\/p>\n
    mental rights in conjunction with the Directive  Princi-
\nples of State\tPolicy to effectively discharge its  obliga-
\ntion  and for this purpose, if\t necessary, to deprive\tsome
\nrights\tand  privileges of the individual victims  or  their
\nheirs  to  protect  their rights  better  and  secure  these
\nfurther.  Reference  may be made to Alfred L. Snapp  &\tSon,
\nInc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 US 592, 73 L. Ed. 2d 995, 1028. Ct,
\n3260  in this connection. There it was held by\tthe  Supreme
\nCourt  of the United States of America that Commonwealth  of
\nPuerto\thave  standing to sue as parens\t patriae  to  enjoin
\napple  growers’ discrimination against\tPuerto Rico  migrant
\nfarm workers. This case illustrates in some aspect the scope
\nof  ‘parens patriae’. The Commonwealth of Puerto  Rico\tsued
\nin the United States District Court for the Western District
\nof Virginia, as parens patriae for Puerto Rican migrant farm
\nworkers,  and  against\tVirginia apple\tgrowers,  to  enjoin
\ndiscrimination\tagainst Puerto Ricans in favour of  Jamaican
\nworkers\t in  violation\tof the Wagner-Peyser  Act,  and\t the
\nImmigration  and  Nationality Act. The District\t Court\tdis-
\nmissed\tthe  action  on the  ground  that  the\tCommonwealth
\nlacked\tstanding  to sue, but the Court of  Appeal  for\t the
\nFourth Circuit reversed it. On certiorari, the United States
\nSupreme\t Court affirmed. In the opinion by White, J.  joined
\nby  Burger, Chief Justice and Brennan,\tMarshall,  Blackman,
\nRennquist,  Stevens,  and O’Connor, JJ., it  was  held\tthat
\nPuerto\tRico  had a claim to represent its  quasi  sovereign
\ninterests  in federal court at least which was as strong  as
\nthat  of any State, and that it had parens patriae  standing
\nto sue to secure its   residents from the harmful effects of
\ndiscrimination\tand to obtain full  and equal  participation
\nin the federal employment service scheme established  pursu-
\nant to the Wagner-Peyser Act and the Immigration and Nation-
\nality Act of 1952. Justice White referred to the meaning  of
\nthe  expression “parens patriae”. According to\tBlack’s\t Law
\nDictionary, 5th Edition 1979, page 1003, it means  literally
\n‘parent of the country’ and refers traditionally to the role
\nof  the State as a sovereign and guardian of  persons  under
\nlegal disability. Justice White at page 1003  of the  report
\nemphasised  that the parens patriae action had its roots  in
\nthe common-law concept of the “royal prerogative”. The royal
\nprerogative  included  the right or responsibility  to\ttake
\ncare  of  persons  who were legally unable,  on\t account  of
\nmental incapacity, whether it  proceeds from nonage, idiocy,
\nor  lunacy  to\ttake proper care  of  themselves  and  their
\nproperty. This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent  in
\nthe  supreme  power of every state, whether  that  power  is
\nlodged in a royal person or m the legislature and is a\tmost
\nbeneficent function. After discussing several cases  Justice
\nWhite  observed at page 1007 of the report that in order  to
\nmaintain an action, in parens patriae, the state must artic-
\nulate an interest apart from the interests of
\n640<\/span>
\nparticular  parties,  i.e.  the State must be  more  than  a
\nnominal\t party.\t The State must\t express  a  quasi-sovereign
\ninterest. Again an instructive insight can be obtained\tfrom
\nthe  observations of Justice Holmes of the American  Supreme
\nCourt in the case of Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 US
\n230, 51 L.Ed. 1038, 27 S Ct 618, which was a case  involving
\nair pollution in Georgia caused by the discharge of  noxious
\ngases  from  the  defendant’s plant  in\t Tennessee.  Justice
\nHolmes\tat  page 1044 of the report  described\tthe  State’s
\ninterest as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “This is a suit by a State for an injury to it
\n\t      in  its capacity of quasi-sovereign.  In\tthat
\n\t      capacity the State has an interest independent
\n\t      of  and behind the titles of its citizens,  in
\n\t      all  the earth and air within its\t domain.  It
\n\t      has the last word as to whether its  mountains
\n\t      shall  be\t stripped of their forests  and\t its
\n\t      inhabitants  shall breathe pure air. It  might
\n\t      have to pay individuals before it could  utter
\n\t      that  word,  but\twith it\t remains  the  final
\n\t      power  ……\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t\t…..\tWhen  the  States  by  their
\n\t      union  made the forcible abatement of  outside
\n\t      nuisances\t impossible  to each, they  did\t not
\n\t      thereby  agree to submit to whatever might  be
\n\t      done. They did not renounce the possibility of
\n\t      making  reasonable  demands on the  ground  of
\n\t      their  still remaining quasi-sovereign  inter-
\n\t      ests”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    36. Therefore, conceptually and from the jurisprudential
\npoint of view, especially in the background of the  Preamble
\nto  the Constitution of India and the mandate of the  Direc-
\ntive  Principles, it was possible to authorise\tthe  Central
\nGovernment  to take over the claims of the victims to  tight
\nagainst\t the  multinational Corporation in  respect  of\t the
\nclaims.\t Because  of the situation the\tvictims\t were  under
\ndisability in pursuing their claims in the circumstances  of
\nthe  situation\tfully and properly. On its plain  terms\t the
\nState  has taken over the exclusive right to  represent\t and
\nact in place of every person who has made or is entitled  to
\nmake  a claim for all purposes connected with such claim  in
\nthe  same  manner  and to the same effect  as  such  person.
\nWhether such provision is valid or not in the background  of
\nthe  requirement of the Constitution and the Code  of  Civil
\nProcedure, is another debate. But there is no prohibition or
\ninhibition, in our opinion, conceptually or jurisprudential-
\nly for Indian State taking over the claims of the victims or
\nfor  the State acting for the victims as the Act has  sought
\nto provide. The actual meaning of what the Act has  provided
\nand the validity thereof, however, will have to be  examined
\nin  the light of the specific submissions advanced  in\tthis
\ncase.\n<\/p>\n
641<\/span><\/p>\n
    37.\t Ms.  Indira Jaising as\t mentioned  hereinbefore  on
\nbehalf\tof  some  other victims drew out  attention  to\t the
\nbackground  of the passing of the Act in question. She\tdrew
\nour attention to the fact that the Act was to meet a specif-
\nic  situation that had arisen after the tragic disaster\t and
\nthe  advent  of American lawyers seeking  to  represent\t the
\nvictims in American courts. The Government’s view, according
\nto  her, as was manifest from the Statement of\tObjects\t and
\nReasons, debates of the Parliament, etc. was that the inter-
\nests  of  the victims would be best served  if\tthe  Central
\nGovernment  was given the right to represent the victims  in
\nthe  courts  of\t United States as they\twould  otherwise  be
\nexploited  by  ‘ambulance-chasers’  working  on\t contingency
\nfees. The Government also proceeded initially on the hypoth-
\nesis  that US was the most convenient forum in which to\t sue
\nUCC.  The Government however feared that it might  not\thave
\nlocus  standi to represent the victims in the courts of\t the
\nUnited\tStates of America unless a law was passed to  enable
\nit  to sue on behalf of the victims. The dominant object  of
\nthe  Act,  therefore, according to her, was to give  to\t the
\nGovernment  of\tIndia locus Standi to sue on behalf  of\t the
\nvictims in foreign jurisdiction, a standing which it  other-
\nwise would not have had. According to her, the Act was never
\nintended to give exclusive rights to the Central  Government
\nto sue on behalf of the victims in India or abroad. She drew
\nour  attention\tto the parliamentary  debates  as  mentioned
\nhereinbefore.  She  drew  our attention\t to  the  expression
\n‘parens\t patriae’  as appearing in the\tWords  and  Phrases,
\nVolume\t31  p. 99. She contends that the Act was  passed  to
\nprovide locus standi only to represent in America. She\tdrew
\nour  attention to the “American Constitutional Law  by\tLau-
\nrence B. Trioe, 1978 Edition at paragraph 3.24, where it was
\nstated\tthat  in  its capacity as proprietor,  a  state\t may
\nsatisfy the requirement of injury to its own interests by an
\nassertion  of  harm  to the state as such.  It\twas  further
\nstated\tby the learned author there that the State  may\t sue
\nunder the federal anti-trust laws to redress wrongs suffered
\nby it as the owner of a railroad and as the owner and opera-
\ntor  of various public institutions. It was emphasised\tthat
\nin its quasi-sovereign capacity, the state has an  interest,
\nindependent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all
\nthe  earth  and air within its domain. It was sought  to  be
\nsuggested  that in the instant Act no such right was  either
\nasserted or mentioned. The State also in its quasi-sovereign
\ncapacity  is entitled to bring suit against a private  indi-
\nvidual\tto  enjoin a corporation not  to  discharge  noxious
\ngases  from  its out of state plant into the  suing  state’s
\nterritory. Finally, it was emphasised that as ‘parens  patr-
\niae’ on behalf of the citizens, where a state’s capacity  as
\nparens patriae is not negated by the federal structure,\t the
\nprotection  of the general health, comfort, and\t welfare  of
\nthe  state’s  inhabitants has been held to  give  the  state
\nitself a sufficient
\n642<\/span>
\ninterest.  Ms. Jaising sought to contend that to the  extent
\nthat  the Act was not confined to empowering the  Government
\nto  sue\t on  behalf of those who were not  sui\tgeneris\t but
\nextended  also to representing those who are, this  exercise
\nof the power cannot be referrable to the doctrine of ‘parens
\npatriae’. To the extent, it is not confined in enabling\t the
\nGovernment to represent its citizens in foreign jurisdiction
\nbut empowered it to sue in local courts to the exclusion  of
\nthe victims it cannot be said to be in exercise of  doctrine
\nof  ‘parens  patriae’, according to her. We  are  unable  to
\nagree.\tAs we have indicated before conceptually and  juris-
\nprudentially  there is no warrant in the background  of\t the
\npresent\t Act,  in the light of circumstances of the  Act  in
\nquestion to confine the concept into such narrow field.\t The
\nconcept can be varied to enable the Government to  represent
\nthe  victims effectively in domestic forum if.the  situation
\nso  warrants. We also do not find any reason to confine\t the
\n‘parens\t patriae’ doctrine to only quasisovereign  right  of
\nthe  State independent of and behind the title of the  citi-
\nzens, as we shall indicate later.\n<\/p>\n
    38.\t It  was further contended that deprivation  of\t the
\nrights\tof the victims and denial of the rights of the\tvic-
\ntims or the fights of the heirs of the victims to access  to
\njustice was unwarranted and unconstitutional. She  submitted
\nthat it has been asserted by the Government that the Act was
\npassed\tpursuant  to Entry 13 of the List I of\tthe  Seventh
\nSchedule  to  the Constitution. It was\ttherefore  submitted
\nthat to the extent it was a law relating to civil procedure,
\nit sets up a different procedure for the Bhopal gas  victims
\nand denies to them equality before law, violating Article 14
\nof the Constitution. Even assuming that due to the magnitude
\nof the disaster, the number of claimants and their disabili-
\nty they constituted a separate class and that it was permis-
\nsible  to enact a special legislation setting up  a  special
\nprocedure for them, the reasonableness of the procedure\t has
\nstill  to be tested. Its reasonableness, according  to\ther,
\nwill  have  to be judged on the touchstone of  the  existing
\nCivil Procedure Code of 1908 and when so tested, it is found
\nwanting\t in several respects. It was also contended  by\t the
\nGovernment that it was a legislation relating to “actionable
\nwrongs” under Entry 8 of the Concurrent List of the  Seventh
\nSchedule. But so read, she said, it could only deal with the
\nprocedural  aspects and not the substantive aspect  of\t“ac-
\ntionable  wrongs”. If it does, then the reasonableness of  a
\nlaw  must be judged with reference to the existing  substan-
\ntive law of actionable wrongs and so judged it is in  viola-
\ntion of many constitutional rights as it takes away from the
\nvictims the right to sue for actionable wrongs according  to
\ncounsel for the victims. According to her, it fails to\ttake
\ninto account the law of strict liability for ultra
\n643<\/span>
\nhazardous  activity as clarified by this Court in M.C.\tMeh-
\nta’s,  case (supra). She further submitted that it is a\t bad
\nAct as it fails to provide for the right to punitive damages
\nand destruction of environment.\n<\/p>\n
    39. It was contended on behalf of the Central Government
\nthat  the  Act was passed to give effect  to  the  Directive
\nPrinciple  as enshrined under Article 39-A of the  Constitu-
\ntion of India. It was, on the other side, submitted that  it
\nis not permissible for the State to grant legal aid on\tpain
\nof  destroying rights that inhere in citizens or on pain  of
\ndemanding  that the citizens surrender their rights  to\t the
\nState. The Act in fact demands a surrender of rights of\t the
\ncitizens to the State. On the interpretation of the Act, Ms.
\nIndira\tJaising\t submitted that sections 3 and\t4  as  noted
\nabove,\tgive exclusive power to the Government to  represent
\nthe  victims and there is deprivation of the victims’  right
\nto sue for the wrongs done to them which is uncanalised\t and
\nunguided and the expression “due regard” in section 4 of the
\nAct  does  not imply consent and as such  violative  of\t the
\nrights\tof the victims. The right to be associated with\t the
\nconduct\t of  the suit is hedged in with so  many  conditions
\nthat it is illusory. According to her, a combined reading of
\nsections 3 and 4 of the act lead to the conclusion that\t the
\nvictims\t are displaced by the Central Government  which\t has
\nconstituted itself as the “surrogate” of the claimants, that
\nthey have no control over the proceedings, that they have no
\nright  to decide whether or not to compromise and if  so  on
\nwhat  terms and they have no right to be heard by the  court
\nbefore any such compromise is effected. Therefore, section 3
\nread  with  section 4, according to her, hands over  to\t the
\nGovernment all effective rights of the victims to sue and is
\na  naked  usurption of power. It was submitted that  in\t any
\nevent  on  a plain reading of the Act, section 3  read\twith
\nsection\t 4 did not grant the Government immunity from  being
\nsued as a joint tort-feasor.\n<\/p>\n
    40.\t It was further urged that section 9 makes the\tGov-
\nernment the total arbitor in the matter of the registration,
\nprocessing  and recording of claims. Reference was  made  to
\nsection\t 9(2)(a), (b) and (c) and disbursal of claims  under
\nsections  9(2)(f) and 10. It was urged that the Deputy\tCom-
\nmissioner  and Commissioner appointed under the Act and\t the
\nScheme\tare subordinates and agents of the  Central  Govern-
\nment. They replace impartial and independent civil court  by
\nofficers and subordinates of the Central Government.  Clause
\n11 of the Scheme makes the Central Government, according  to
\ncounsel,  judge\t in its own cause inasmuch  as\tthe  Central
\nGovernment could be and was in fact a joint tort-feasor.  It
\nwas submitted that sections 5 to 9 of the Act read with\t the
\nScheme do not set up a machinery which is
\n644<\/span>
\nconstitutionally valid. The Act, it was urged, deprives\t the
\nvictims of their rights out of all proportion to the  object
\nsought\tto be achieved, namely, to sue in foreign  jurisdic-
\ntion  or to represent those incapable of representing  them-
\nselves.\t The  said object could be  achieved,  according  to
\ncounsel,  by limiting the right to sue in foreign  jurisdic-
\ntion alone and in any event representing only those  victims
\nincapable  of representing themselves. The victims who\twish
\nto  sue for and on their own behalf must have power to\tsue,
\nall  proper  and necessary parties including  Government  of
\nIndia,\tGovernment  of Madhya Pradesh, UCIL and\t Shri  Arjun
\nSingh to vindicate their right to life and liberty and their
\nrights cannot and should not be curtailed, it was submitted.
\nHence,\tthe  Act goes well beyond its  objects\tand  imposes
\nexcessive restriction amounting to destruction of the rights
\nof  the victims, according to. counsel. In deciding  whether
\nany  rights  are affected, it is not the object of  the\t Act
\nthat is relevant but its direct and inevitable effect on the
\nrights of the victims that is material. Hence no matter\t how
\nlaudable  the  object  of the Act is alleged to\t be  by\t the
\nGovernment  of\tIndia,\tnamely, that it is an  Act  to\tgive
\neffect to Directive Principles enshrined in Article 39-A  of
\nthe  Constitution, the direct and inevitable effect of\tsec-
\ntion  3 according to counsel for the victims is\t to  deprive
\nthe victims of the right to sue for and on their own  behalf
\nthrough\t counsel  of their choice and  instead\tempower\t the
\nCentral Government to sue for them.\n<\/p>\n
    41.\t The  Act  is, it  was\tcontended,  unconstitutional
\nbecause\t it deprives the victims of their right to life\t and
\npersonal liberty guaranteed by Article 21. The right to life
\nand liberty includes the right to sue for violations of\t the
\nright, it was urged. The right to life guaranteed by Article
\n21 must be interpreted to mean all that makes life  livable,
\nlife in all its fullness. According to counsel, it  includes
\nthe right to livelihood. Reference was made to the  decision
\nof Olga Tellis v. B.M.C., [1985] Supp. 2 SCR 51 at p. 78-83.
\nThis right, it was contended, is inseparable from the  reme-
\ndy. It was urged that personal liberty includes a wide range
\nof freedoms to decide how to order one’s affairs.  Reference
\nwas  made to Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,<\/a>  (supra),\t The
\nright to life and liberty also includes the right to healthy
\nenvironment  free  from hazardous pollutants. The  right  to
\nlife and liberty, it was submitted, is inseparable from\t the
\nremedy\tto  judicial vindication of the\t violation  of\tthat
\nright–the  right of access to justice must be deemed to  be
\npart  of that right. Therefore, the importance is  given  to
\nthe right to file a suit for an actionable wrong. See  Ganga
\nBai  v. Vijay Kumar,<\/a> [1974] 3 SCR 882 at 886.  According  to
\ncounsel\t appearing  for the victims, the Act  read  strictly
\ninfringes the right to life and personal liberty because the
\nright to sue by the affected person
\n645<\/span>
\nfor  damages  flowing from infringement of their  rights  is
\ntaken away. Thus, it was submitted that not just some  inci-
\ndents of the right to life, but the right itself in all\t its
\nfullness  is  taken  away. Such\t depravation,  according  to
\ncounsel,  of the right is not in accordance  with  procedure
\nestablished by law inasmuch as the law which takes away\t the
\nright,\ti.e.,  impugned\t Act is\t neither  substantively\t nor
\nprocedurally  just, fair or reasonable. A law which  divests
\nthe  victims of the right to sue to vindicate for  life\t and
\npersonal  liberty  and vests the said right in\tthe  Central
\nGovernment is not just, fair or reasonable. The victims\t are
\nsui generis and able to decide for themselves how to  vindi-
\ncate  their claims in accordance with law. There is,  there-
\nfore,  no reason shown to exist for divesting them  of\tthat
\nright and vesting that on the Central Government.\n<\/p>\n
    42. All the counsel for the victims have emphasised that
\nvesting of the right in Central Government is bad and unrea-
\nsonable\t because there is conflict of interests between\t the
\nCentral\t Government and the victims. It was emphasised\tthat
\nthe conflict of interest has already prejudiced the  victims
\nin  the conduct of the case inasmuch as a  compromise  unac-
\nceptable to the victims has been entered into in  accordance
\nwith  the  order of this Court of 14th\/15th  February,\t1989
\nwithout heating the victims. This conflict of interest\twill
\ncontinue, it was emphasised, to adversely affect the victims
\ninasmuch as section 9 of the Act read with clauses 5, 10 and
\n11  of the Scheme empower the Central Government to  process
\nclaims, determine the category into which these fall, deter-
\nmine  the  basis on which damages will be  payable  to\teach
\ncategory and determine the amount of compensation payable to
\neach  claimant.\t Learned counsel urged that the right  to  a
\njust, fair and reasonable procedure was itself a  guaranteed
\nfundamental right under Article 14 of the Constitution. This
\nincluded  right\t to natural justice. Reference was  made  to
\nOlga  Tellis’s.\t case (supra) and S.L. Kapoor  v.  Jagmohan,<\/a>
\n[1981]\t1 SCR 746 at 753, 766. The right to natural  justice
\nis  included  in  Article 14 Tulsi Ram v.  Union  of  India,
\n[1985]\tSupp. 2 SCR 131. Reference was also made  to  Maneka
\nGandhi’s, case (supra). It was contended by counsel that the
\nright  to natural justice is the right to be heard by  Court
\nat the pre-decisional stage, i.e., before any compromise  is
\neffected and accepted. Reference was made to the decision of
\nthis  Court in Swadeshi Cotton v. Union of India,<\/a>  [1981]  2
\nSCR  533. It was submitted that natural justice is a  highly
\neffective tool devised by the Courts to ensure that a statu-
\ntory authority arrives at a just decision. It is  calculated
\nto  act\t as a healthy check on the abuse of  power.  Natural
\njustice\t is  not dispensable nor is it an  empty  formality.
\nDenial of that right can and has led to the miscar-\n<\/p>\n
646<\/span><\/p>\n
riage of justice in this case. According to counsel, if\t the
\nvictims\t had  been given an opportunity to  be\theard,\tthey
\nwould,\tinter alia, have pointed out that the amount  agreed
\nto  be paid by UCC was hopelessly inadequate and  that\tUCC,
\nits officer and agents ought not to be absolved of  criminal
\nliability, that the Central Government itself was liable  to
\nhave  been  sued as a joint tort-feasor\t and,  according  to
\ncounsel,  had agreed to submit to a decree if  found  liable
\nunder  the order dated 31st December, 1985, that  suits\t had
\nbeen  filed against the State of Madhya Pradesh, Shri  Arjun
\nSingh  and  UCIL which said suits cannot be deemed  to\thave
\nbeen settled by the compromise\/order of 14th\/15th  February,
\n1989. It was also pointed out that Union of India was  under
\na duty to sue UCIL, which it had failed and neglected to do.
\nIt  was submitted that to the extent that the  statute\tdoes
\nnot provide for a pre-decisional hearing on the fairness  of
\nthe  proposed settlement or compromise by Court, it is\tvoid
\nas offending natural justice hence violative of Articles  14
\nand 21 of the Constitution. Alternatively, it was  contended
\nby the counsel that since the statute neither expressly\t nor
\nby necessary implication bars the right to be heard by Court
\nbefore\tany  compromise is effected such a right to  a\tpre-
\ndecisional  hearing  by\t Court must  be\t read  into  section
\n3(2)(b)\t of the Act. Admittedly, it does not  expressly\t ex-
\nclude  the right to a hearing by Court prior to any  settle-
\nment being entered into. Far from excluding such a right  by
\nnecessary  implication, having regard to the nature  of\t the
\nrights affected, i.e., the right to life and personal liber-
\nty,  such  a right to hearing must be read into the  Act  in
\norder to ensure that justice is done to the victims, accord-
\ning to all the counsel. The Act sets up a procedure  differ-
\nent from the ordinary procedure established by law,  namely,
\nCivil  Procedure  Code. But it was submitted  that  the\t Act
\nshould\tbe  harmoniously read with the provisions  of  Civil
\nProcedure  Code\t and if it is not so read, then the  Act  in
\nquestion  would be unreasonable and unfair. In this  connec-
\ntion, reliance was placed on the provisions of Order I, Rule
\n4,  Order 23, Rule 1 proviso, Order 23, Rule 3-9  and  Order
\n32,  Rule 7 of CPC and it was submitted that these  are\t not
\ninconsistent with the Act. On the contrary these are  neces-
\nsary and complementary, intended to ensure that there is  no
\nmiscarriage of justice. Hence these must be held to apply to
\nthe facts and circumstances of the case and the impugned Act
\nmust be read along with these provisions. Assuming that\t the
\nsaid  provisions  do  not directly  apply  then,  provisions
\nanalogous  to the said provisions must be read with  section
\n3(2)(b) to make the Act reasonable, it was submitted. It was
\nurged that if these are not so read then the absence of such
\nprovisions  would vest arbitrary and unguided powers in\t the
\nCentral Government making section 3(2)(b)  unconstitutional.
\nThe said provisions are intended to ensure the machinery of
\n647<\/span>
\naccountability\tto  the victims and to provide to  them,  an
\nopportunity  to be heard by court before any  compromise  is
\narrived\t at. In this connection, reference was made to\tRule
\n23(3)  of  the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure\t in  America
\nwhich provides for a hearing to the victims before a compro-
\nmise  is  effected. The victims as plaintiffs in  an  Indian
\ncourt cannot be subjected to a procedure which is less\tfair
\nthan  that  provided by a US forum initially chosen  by\t the
\nGovernment of India, it was urged.\n<\/p>\n
    43.\t Counsel  submitted  that Section 6 of\tthe  Act  is
\nunreasonable  because it replaces an independent and  impar-
\ntial  Civil  Court of competent jurisdiction by\t an  Officer
\nknown  as  the Commissioner to be appointed by\tthe  Central
\nGovernment. No qualification, according to counsel, had been
\nprescribed for the appointment of a Commissioner and  clause
\n5  of the Scheme framed under the Act vests in\tthe  Commis-
\nsioner the judicial function of deciding appeals against the
\norder of the Deputy Commissioner registering or refusing  to
\nregister a claim. It was further submitted that clause 11(2)
\nof  the Scheme is unreasonable because it replaces an  inde-
\npendent and impartial civil court of competent\tjurisdiction
\nwith  the Central Government, which is a  joint\t tort-feasor
\nfor the purpose of determining the total amount of compensa-
\ntion  to be apportioned for each category of claims and\t the
\nquantum\t of compensation payable for each type of injury  or
\nloss. It was submitted that the said function is a  judicial
\nfunction  and if there is any conflict of  interest  between
\nthe victims and Central Government, vesting such a power  in
\nthe  Central Government amounts to making it a judge in\t its
\nown cause. It was urged that having regard to the fact\tthat
\namount received in satisfaction of the claims is  ostensibly
\npre-determined, namely, 470 million dollars unless the order
\nof  14th\/15th February is set aside which ought to be  done,
\naccording  to counsel, the Central Government would  have  a
\nvested interest in ensuring that the amount of damages to be
\ndisbursed  does not exceed the said amount. Even  otherwise,
\naccording to counsel, the Government of India has been\tsued
\nas  a  joint tort-feasor, and as they would  have  a  vested
\ninterest  in depressing the quantum of damages,\t payable  to
\nthe  victims. This would, according to counsel, result in  a
\ndeliberate  under-estimation of the extent of  injuries\t and
\ncompensation payable.\n<\/p>\n
    44. Clause 11(4) of the Scheme, according to counsel, is
\nunreasonable  inasmuch as it does not take into account\t the
\nclaims of the victims to punitive and exemplary damages\t and
\ndamages\t for  loss and destruction of  environment.  Counsel
\nsubmitted  that\t in  any event the  expression\t“claims”  in
\nsection 2(b) cannot be interpreted to mean
\n648<\/span>
\nclaims\tagainst the Central Government, the State of  Madhya
\nPradesh,  UCIL, which was not sued in suit No.\t1113\/86\t and
\nShri  Arjun Singh, all of whom have been sued as joint\ttort
\nfeasors\t in  relation to the liability arising\tout  of\t the
\ndisaster. Counsel submitted that if section 3 is to be\theld
\nto  be intra vires, the word “exclusive” should\t be  severed
\nfrom  section 3 and on the other hand, if section 3 is\theld
\nultra  vires, then victims who have already filed  suits  or
\nthose  who had lodged claims should be entitled to  continue
\ntheir  own suits as well as Suit No. 1113\/86  as  plaintiffs
\nwith  leave  under Order 1 Rule 8.  Counsel  submitted\tthat
\ninterim\t relief as decided by this Court can be paid to\t the
\nvictims\t even  otherwise also, according to  counsel,  under
\nclause 10(2)(b) of the Scheme.\n<\/p>\n
    45. Counsel submitted that the balance of $ 470  million
\nafter  deducting interim relief as determined by this  Court
\nshould be attached. In any event, it was submitted that,  it
\nbe  declared  that the word “claim” in section\t2  does\t not
\ninclude\t claims\t against Central Govt. or  State  of  Madhya
\nPradesh or UCIL. Hence, it was urged that the rights of\t the
\nvictims to sue the Government of India, the State of  Madhya
\nPradesh or UCIL would remain unaffected by the Act or by the
\ncompromise effected under the Act. Machinery to decide\tsuit
\nexpeditiously  has  to be devised, it was  submitted.  Other
\nsuits  filed against UCC, UCIL, State of Madhya Pradesh\t and
\nArjun  Singh should to be transferred to the  Supreme  Court
\nfor trial and disposal, according to counsel. It was submit-
\nted  that the Court should fix the basis of damages  payable
\nto  different  categories,  namely,  death  and\t disablement
\nmentioned under clause 5(2) of the scheme. Counsel submitted
\nthat this Court should set up a procedure which would ensure
\nthat  an  impartial judge assisted by  medical\texperts\t and
\nassessors would adjudicate the basis on which an  individual
\nclaimant would fall into a particular category. It was\talso
\nurged that this Court should quantify the amount of  compen-
\nsation\tpayable to each category of claimant in clause\t5(2)
\nof  the Scheme. This decision cannot, it was  submitted,  be
\nleft to the Central Government as is purported to be done by
\nclause 11(2) of the Scheme.\n<\/p>\n
    This  Court\t must  set up, it was urged,  a\t trust\twith
\nindependent trustees to administer the trust and trustees to
\nbe  accountable to this Court. An independent census  should
\nbe carried out of number of claimants, nature and extent  of
\ninjury\tcaused to them, the category into which\t they  fall.
\nApportionment of amounts should be set aside or invested for
\nfuture claimants, that is the category in clause 5(2)(a)  of
\nthe Scheme, which is, according to counsel, of utmost impor-
\ntance
\n649<\/span>
\nsince the injuries are said to be. carcinogenic and ontogen-
\nic and wide affecting persons yet unborn.\n<\/p>\n
    47.\t Shri  Garg, further and on behalf of  some  of\t the
\nvictims\t counsel,  urged before us that deprivation  of\t the
\nrights\tof  the victims and vesting of those fights  in\t the
\nState is violative of the rights of the victims and  cannot.
\nbe  justified  or  warranted by\t the  Constitution.  Neither
\nsection\t 3 nor section 4 of the Act gives any right  to\t the
\nvictims;  on  the  other hand, it is a\tcomplete  denial  of
\naccess\tto justice for the victims, according to him.  This,
\naccording  to counsel, is arbitrary. He also submitted\tthat
\nsection\t 4 of the Act, as it stands, gives no right  to\t the
\nvictims and as such even assuming that in order to fight for
\nthe  rights of the victims, it was necessary  to  substitute
\nthe  victims  even then in so far as the victims  have\tbeen
\ndenied the right of say, in the conduct of the\tproceedings,
\nthis  is disproportionate to the benefit conferred upon\t the
\nvictims.  Denial  of rights to the victims is so  great\t and
\ndeprivation  of the right to natural justice and  access  to
\njustice\t is  so tremendous that judged by the  well  settled
\nprinciples by which yardsticks provisions like these  should
\nbe  judged in the constitutional framework of this  country,
\nthe  Act is violative of the fundamental rights of the\tvic-
\ntims. It was further submitted by him that all the rights of
\nthe  victims  by the process of this Act, the right  of\t the
\nvictims to enforce full liability against the multinationals
\nas well as against the Indian Companies, absolute  liability
\nand criminal liability have all been curtailed.\n<\/p>\n
    48.\t All  the counsel submitted that in any\t event,\t the
\ncriminal  liability  cannot be subject matter of  this\tAct.
\nTherefore,  the Government was not entitled to agree to\t any
\nsettlement on the ground that criminal prosecution would  be
\nwithdrawn  and\tthis being a part of  the  consideration  or
\ninducement  for settling the civil liability,  he  submitted
\nthat  the settlement arrived at on the\t14th\/l5th  February,
\n1989 as recorded in the order of this Court is wholly unwar-
\nranted, unconstitutional and illegal.\n<\/p>\n
    49.\t Mr.  Garg additionally further urged  that  by\t the
\nprocedure of the Act, each individual claim had to be  first
\ndetermined  and\t the  Government could only  take  over\t the
\naggregate  of all individual claims and that could  only  be
\ndone  by aggregating the individual claims of  the  victims.
\nThat  was not done, according to him. Read in that  fashion,
\naccording  to  Shri Garg, the conduct of the  Government  in
\nimplementing the Act is wholly improper and unwarranted.  It
\nwas  submitted by him that the enforcement of the  fight  of
\nthe victims
\n650<\/span>
\nwithout\t a  just,  fair and reasonable\tprocedure  which  is
\nvitally\t necessary for representing the citizens or  victims
\nwas  bad.  It was further urged by him that the\t Bhopal\t gas
\nvictims\t have  been singled out for  hostile  discrimination
\nresulting  in total denial of all procedures of approach  to
\ncompetent  courts and tribunals. It was submitted  that\t the
\nCentral Government was incompetent to represent the  victims
\nin the litigations or for enforcement of the claims. It\t was
\nthen submitted by him that the claims of the victims must be
\nenforced fully against the Union Carbide Corporation  carry-
\ning on commercial activities for profit resulting in unprec-
\nedented gas leak disaster responsible for a large number  of
\ndeaths and severe injuries to others. It was submitted\tthat
\nthe  liability\tof  each party\tresponsible,  including\t the
\nGovernment of India, which is a joint tort-feasor along with
\nthe  Union  Carbide, has to be\tascertained  in\t appropriate
\nproceedings. It was submitted on behalf of the victims\tthat
\nUnion of India owned 22% of the shares in Union Carbide\t and
\ntherefore,  it\twas incompetent to  represent  the  victims.
\nThere  was conflict of interest between the Union  of  India
\nand the Union Carbide and so Central Government was incompe-
\ntent.  It  is submitted that  pecuniary\t interest  howsoever
\nsmall disqualifies a person to be a judge in his own  cause.
\nThe settlement accepted by the Union of India, according  to
\nvarious counsel is vitiated by the pecuniary bias as holders
\nof its shares to the extent of 22%.\n<\/p>\n
    50. It was submitted that the pleadings in the court  of
\nthe United States and in the Bhopal court considered in\t the
\ncontext\t of the settlement order of this Court\taccepted  by
\nthe Union of India establish that the victims’ individuality
\nwere sacrificed wontedly and callously and, therefore, there
\nwas violation, according to some of the victims, both in the
\nAct  and in its implementation of Articles 14, 19(l)(g)\t and
\n21 of the Constitution.\n<\/p>\n
    51. The principles of the decision of this Court in M.C.
\nMehta & Anr. v. Union of India,<\/a> [1987] 1 SCR 819 must be  so
\ninterpreted  that complete justice is done and it in no\t way
\nexcludes the grant of punitive damages for wrongs justifying
\ndeterrents  to ensure the safety of citizens in free  India.
\nNo  multinational corporation, according to Shri  Garg,\t can
\nclaim the privilege of the protection of Indian law to\tearn
\nprofits\t without  meeting  fully the demands  of  civil\t and
\ncriminal  justice  administered\t in India  with\t this  Court
\nfunctioning  as\t the  custodian. Shri Garg  urged  that\t the
\nliability  for damages, in India and the Third\tWorld  Coun-
\ntries,\tof  the multinational companies cannot be  less\t but
\nmust be more because the persons affected are often  without
\nremedy for
\n651<\/span>
\nreasons of inadequate facilities for protection of health or
\nproperty.  Therefore,  the  damages  sustainable  by  Indian
\nvictims\t against the multinationals dealing  with  dangerous
\ngases  without\tproper security and other measures  are\t far
\ngreater\t than  damages\tsuffered by the\t citizens  of  other
\nadvanced  and developed countries. It is, therefore,  neces-
\nsary to ensure by damages and deterrent remedies that  these
\nmultinationals\tare not tempted to shift dangerous  manufac-
\nturing operations intended to advance their strategic objec-
\ntives  of profit and war to the Third World  Countries\twith
\nlittle\trespect\t for the right to life and  dignity  of\t the
\npeople\tof  sovereign third world countries.  The  strictest
\nenforcement  of punitive liability also serves the  interest
\nof  the\t American people. The Act, therefore,  according  to
\nShri Garg is clearly unconstitutional and therefore, void.\n<\/p>\n
    52.\t It was urged that the settlement is without  juris-
\ndiction.  This\tCourt  was  incompetent\t to  grant  immunity
\nagainst criminal liabilities in the manner it has  purported
\nto  do by its order dated 14th\/l5th February, 1989,  it\t was
\nstrenuously  suggested by counsel. It was further  submitted
\nthat to hold the Act to be valid, the victims must be  heard
\nbefore the settlement and the Act can only be valid if it is
\nso interpreted. This is necessary further, according to Shri
\nGarg, to lay down the scope of heating. Shri Garg also\tdrew
\nour attention to the scheme of disbursement of relief to the
\nvictims.  He  submitted that the scheme of  disbursement  is
\nunreasonable  and discriminatory because there is no  proce-
\ndure  which is just, fair and reasonable in accordance\twith
\nthe provisions of Civil Procedure Code. He further submitted
\nthat  the Act does not lay down any guidelines for the\tcon-
\nduct  of the Union of India in advancing the claims  of\t the
\nvictims. There were no essential legislative guidelines\t for
\ndetermining  the rights of the victims, the conduct  of\t the
\nproceedings  on\t behalf of the victims and for\tthe  relief-
\nclaimed. Denial of access to justice to the victims  through
\nan impartial judiciary is so great a denial that it can only
\nbe  consistent\twith the situation which calls\tfor  such  a
\ndrastic provision. The present circumstances were not  such.
\nHe  drew  our  attention to the decision of  this  Court  in
\nBasheshar v. Income Tax Commissioner, AIR<\/a> 1959 SC 149; in Re
\nSpecial Courts Bill, [1979] 2 SCR 476; A.R. Antulay v.\tR.S.
\nNayak  & Anr.,<\/a> [1988] 2 SCC 602; Ram Krishna Dalmia v.\tTen-
\ndulkar,\t [1955] SCR 279; Ambika Prasad Mishra etc. v.  State
\nof U.P. & Ors. etc., [1960] 3 SCR 1159 and Bodhan  Chowdhary
\nv.  State  of Bihar, [1955] 1 SCR 1045.\t Shri  Garg  further
\nsubmitted  that Article 21 must be read with Article  51  of
\nthe Constitution and other directive principles. He drew our
\nattention to Lakshmi Kant Pandey v. Union of India,<\/a> [1984] 2
\nSCR  795;  M\/s\tMackinnon Machkenzie & Co.  Ltd.  v.  Audrey
\nD’Costa<\/a>
\n652<\/span>
\nand  Anr.,  [1987]  2 SCC 469; Sheela  Barse  v.  Secretary,
\nChildren  Aid  Society & Ors.,<\/a> [1987] 1 SCR 870.  Shri\tGarg
\nsubmitted  that in india, the national dimensions  of  human
\nrights\tand the international dimensions are both  congruent
\nand  their enforcement is guaranteed under Articles  32\t and
\n226  to the extent these are enforceable against the  State,
\nthese  are also enforceable against  transnational  corpora-
\ntions inducted by the State on conditions of due  observance
\nof  the\t Constitution and all laws of the  land.  Shri\tGarg
\nsubmitted that in the background of an unprecedented  disas-
\nter  resulting in extensive damage to life and property\t and
\nthe destruction of the environment affecting large number of
\npeople\tand for the full protection of the interest  of\t the
\nvictims\t and  for complete satisfaction of  all\t claims\t for
\ncompensation,  the Act was passed empowering the  Government
\nof  India  to  take necessary steps for\t processing  of\t the
\nclaims\tand for utilisation of disbursal of the\t amount\t re-
\nceived in satisfaction of the claims. The Central Government
\nwas  given the exclusive right to represent the victims\t and
\nto  act\t in place of, in United States or  in  india,  every
\ncitizen entitled to make a claim. Shri Garg urged that on  a
\nproper reading of section 3(1) of the Act read with  section
\n4 exclusion of all victims for all purpose is incomplete and
\nthe  Act is bad. He submitted that the decree for  adjudica-
\ntion  of the Court must ascertain the magnitude of the\tdam-
\nages  and  should be able to grant reliefs required  by\t law
\nunder  heads  of strict liability,  absolute  liability\t and
\npunitive liability.\n<\/p>\n
    53. Shri Garg submitted that it is necessary to consider
\nthat the Union of India is liable for the torts. In  several
\ndecisions to which Shri Garg grew our attention, it has been
\nclarified that Government is not liable only if the tortious
\nact  complained has been committed by its servants in  exer-
\ncise  of  its sovereign powers bY which it is  meant  powers
\nthat  can be lawfully exercised under sovereign rights\tonly
\nvide  Nandram  Heeralal v. Union of India & Anr.,  AIR\t1978
\nM.P.  209 at p. 212. There is a real and marked\t distinction
\nbetween the sovereign functions of the government and  those
\nwhich are non-sovereign and some of the functions that\tfall
\nin  the\t latter\t category are those  connected\twith  trade,
\ncommerce,  business and industrial  undertakings.  Sovereign
\nfunctions are such acts which are of such a nature as cannot
\nbe  performed by a private individual or association  unless
\npowers are delegated by sovereign authority of state.\n<\/p>\n
    54.\t According  to Shri Garg, the Union  and  the  State
\nGovernments  under the Constitution and as per laws  of\t the
\nFactories,  Environment Control, etc. are bound to  exercise
\ncontrol\t on  the  factories in public  interest\t and  public
\npurpose. These functions are not sovereign func-\n<\/p>\n
653<\/span><\/p>\n
tions,\taccording to Shri Garg, and the Government  in\tthis
\ncase was guilty of negligence. In support of this, Shri Garg
\nsubmitted that the offence of negligence on the part of\t the
\nGovt. would be evident from the fact that–\n<\/p>\n
\t      (a)  the Government allowed the Union  Carbide
\n\t      factory  to be installed in the heart  of\t the
\n\t      city;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (b)  the Government allowed habitation in\t the
\n\t      front  of\t the factory knowing that  the\tmost
\n\t      dangerous and lethal gases were being used  in
\n\t      the manufacturing processes;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (c)  the gas leakage from this factory  was  a
\n\t      common affair and it was agitated continuously
\n\t      by the people journalists and it was  agitated
\n\t      in  the Vidhan Sabha right from 1980 to  1984.
\n\t      These  features  firmly proved,  according  to
\n\t      Shri  Garg,  the grossest\t negligence  of\t the
\n\t      governments. Shri Garg submitted that the\t gas
\n\t      victims  had legal and moral right to sue\t the
\n\t      governments  and so it had full right  to\t im-
\n\t      plead  all  the necessary and  proper  parties
\n\t      like  Union Carbide, UCIL, and also  the\tthen
\n\t      Chief Minister Shri Arjun Singh of the  State.
\n\t      He  drew our attention to Order 2, rule 3,  of
\n\t      the  Civil Procedure Code. In suits  on  joint
\n\t      torts,  according\t to Shri Garg, each  of\t the
\n\t      joint  tort  feasors is  responsible  for\t the
\n\t      injury sustained for the common acts and\tthey
\n\t      can  all\tbe sued together. Shri\tGarg’s\tmain
\n\t      criticism\t has  been  that  the  most  crucial
\n\t      question\tof corporate responsibility  of\t the
\n\t      people’s\tright  to life and  their  right  to
\n\t      guard  it\t as enshrined in Article 21  of\t the
\n\t      Constitution  were sought to be gagged by\t the
\n\t      Act.  Shri Garg tried to submit that this\t was
\n\t      an  enabling  Act only but not  an  Act  which
\n\t      deprived the victims of their right to sue. He
\n\t      submitted that in this Act, there is denial of
\n\t      natural justice both in the institution  under
\n\t      section 3 and in the conduct of the suit under
\n\t      section  4.  It must be seen that\t justice  is
\n\t      done  to all (R. Viswanathan  v.\tRukh-ul-Mulk
\n\t      Syed  Abdul  Wajid,<\/a> [1963] 3 SCR 22).  It\t was
\n\t      urged that it was necessary to give a reasona-
\n\t      ble  notice to the parties. He referred to  M.
\n\t      Narayanan\t Nambiar v. State of Kerala,<\/a>  [1963]
\n\t      Supp. 2 SCR 724.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    55. Shri Shanti Bhushan appearing for Bhopal Gas  Peedit
\nMahila\tUdyog Sangathan submitted that if the Act is  to  be
\nupheld,\t it has to be read down and construed in the  manner
\nurged  by  him. It was submitted that when  the\t Bhopal\t Gas
\ndisaster took place, which was the worst industrial disaster
\nin the world which resulted in the deaths
\n654<\/span>
\nof  several thousands of people and caused serious  injuries
\nto  lakhs others, there arose a right to the victims to\t get
\nnot merely damages under the law of the torts but also arose
\nclearly, by virtue of right to life guaranteed as  fundamen-
\ntal  right by Article 21 of the Constitution a right to\t get
\nfull  protection  of life and limb. This  fundamental  right
\nalso,  according  to Shri Shanti  Bhushan,  embodied  within
\nitself\ta right to have the claim adjudicated by the  estab-
\nlished\tcourts\tof  law. It is well settled  that  right  of
\naccess to courts in respect of violation of their  fundamen-
\ntal  rights  itself is a fundamental right which  cannot  be
\ndenied\tto  the people. Shri Shanti Bhushan  submitted\tthat
\nthere may be some justification for the Act being passed. He
\nsaid that the claim against the Union Carbide are covered by
\nthe  Act.  The\tclaims of the victims  against\tthe  Central
\nGovernment or any other party who is also liable under\ttort
\nto  the victims is not covered by the Act. The second  point
\nthat Shri Shanti Bhushan made was that the Act so far as  it
\nempowered  the\tCentral Government to represent and  act  in
\nplace  of the victims is in respect of the  civil  liability
\narising\t out of disaster and not in respect of any right  in
\nrespect of criminal liability. The Central Govt.,  according
\nto  Shri Shanti Bhushan, cannot have any right or  authority
\nin relation to any offences which arose out of the  disaster
\nand  which resulted in criminal liability. It was  submitted
\nthat  there cannot be any settlement or compromise in  rela-
\ntion  to non-compoundable criminal cases and in\t respect  of
\ncompoundable  criminal\tcases the legal\t right\tto  compound
\nthese  could only be possessed by the victims alone and\t the
\nCentral\t Government  could not compound\t those\toffences  on
\ntheir  behalf. It was submitted by Shri Shanti Bhushan\tthat
\neven  this Court has no jurisdiction whatsoever to  transfer
\nany  criminal proceedings to itself either under any  provi-
\nsion  of  the  Constitution or under any  provision  of\t the
\nCriminal Procedure Code or under any other provision of\t law
\nand,  therefore,  if the settlement in question\t was  to  be
\ntreated not as a compromise but as an order of the Court, it
\nwould  be without jurisdiction and liable to be declared  so
\non  the principles laid down, according to Shri Bhushan,  by
\nthis  Court in Antulay’s case (supra). Shri  Shanti  Bhushan
\nsubmitted that even if under the Act, the Central Government
\nis  considered\tto be able to represent the victims  and  to
\npursue the litigation on their behalf and even to enter into
\ncompromise on their behalf, it would be a gross violation of
\nthe  constitutional  rights of the victims to enter  into  a
\nsettlement with the Union Carbide without giving the victims
\nopportunities  to express their views about the fairness  or
\nadequacy  of  the settlement before any court  could  permit
\nsuch a settlement to be made.\n<\/p>\n
56. Mr. Shanti Bhushan submitted that the suit which may be
\n655<\/span>
\nbrought\t by  the Central Government  against  Union  Carbide
\nunder  section\t3  of the Act would be a suit  of  the\tkind
\ncontemplated  by the Explanation to Order 23, rule 3 of\t the
\nCode  of Civil Procedure since the victims are\tnot  parties
\nand yet the decree obtained in the suit would bind them.  It
\nwas, therefore, urged by Shri Shanti Bhushan that the provi-
\nsions of Section 3(1) of the Act merely empowers the Central
\nGovernment  to enter into a compromise but did not lay\tdown
\nthe procedure which was to be followed for entering into any
\ncompromise. Therefore, there is nothing which is  inconsist-
\nent  with the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3-B of the CPC  to
\nwhich  the provisions Section 11 of the Act be applied.\t If,
\nhowever,  by any stretch of argument the provisions  of\t the
\nAct  could be construed so as to override the provisions  of
\nOrder  23 Rule 3-B CPC, it was urged, the same would  render
\nthe  provisions of the Act violative of the victims’  funda-
\nmental rights and the actions would be rendered\t unconstitu-
\ntional. If it empowered the Central Government to compromise
\nthe victims’ rights, without even having to apply the  prin-
\nciples of natural justice, then it would be unconstitutional
\nand  as\t such bad. Mr. Shanti Bhushan, Ms. Jaising  and\t Mr.
\nGarg  submitted that these procedures must be  construed  in
\naccordance  with the provisions contained in Order  23\tRule
\n3-B  CPC  and an opportunity must be given  to\tthose  whose
\nclaims\tare being compromised to show to the court that\t the
\ncompromise is not fair and should not accordingly be permit-
\nted  by\t the court. Such a hearing in  terms,  according  to
\ncounsel,  of  Order  23 Rule 3-B CPC has to  be\t before\t the
\ncompromise  is\tentered\t into. It was  then  submitted\tthat
\nsection 3 of the Act only empowers the Central Government to
\nrepresent  and act in place of the victims and to  institute
\nsuits on behalf of the victims or even to enter into compro-
\nmise on behalf of the victims.\n<\/p>\n
    57. The Act does not create new causes of action  create
\nspecial\t courts.  The  jurisdiction of the  civil  court  to
\nentertain suit would still arise out of section 9 of the CPC
\nand  the substantive cause of action and the nature  of\t the
\nreliefs\t available would also continue to remain  unchanged.
\nThe  only difference produced by the provisions of  the\t Act
\nwould be that instead of the suit being filed by the victims
\nthemselves the suit would be filed by the Central Government
\non their behalf.\n<\/p>\n
    58.\t Shri Shanti Bhushan then argued that the  cause  of
\naction of each victim is separate and entitled him to  bring
\na suit for separate amount according to the damages suffered
\nby him. He submitted that even where the Central  Government
\nwas empowered to file suits on behalf of all the victims  it
\ncould  only ask for a decree of the same kind as could\thave
\nbeen asked for by the victims themselves, namely, a
\n656<\/span>
\ndecree\tawarding  various  specified  amounts  to  different
\nvictims\t whose names had to be disclosed. According to\tShri
\nShanti\tBhushan, even if all the details were not  available
\nat  the\t time when the suit was filed, the  details  of\t the
\nvictims’  damages  had to be procured and specified  in\t the
\nplaint\tbefore a proper decree could be passed in the  suit.
\neven if the subject matter of the suit had to be compromised
\nbetween\t the  Central Government and the Union\tCarbide\t the
\ncompromise  had to indicate as to what amount would be\tpay-
\nable  to each victim, in addition to the total amount  which
\nwas payable by Union Carbide, submitted Shri Shanti Bhushan.
\nIt  was\t submitted that there was nothing in the  Act  which
\npermitted  the Central Government to enter into any  general
\ncompromise  with  Union Carbide providing  for\tthe  lumpsum
\namount\twithout disclosure as to how much amount is  payable
\nto each victim.\n<\/p>\n
    59.\t If  the Act in question had not been  enacted,\t the
\nvictims\t would\thave  been entitled to not  only  sue  Union
\nCarbide themselves but also to enter into any compromise  or
\nsettlement of their claims with the Union Carbide immediate-
\nly.  The  provisions  of the Act, according  to\t Mr.  Shanti
\nBhushan,  deprive the victims of their legal right and\tsuch
\ndeprivation of their rights and creation of a  corresponding
\nright in the Central Government can be treated as reasonable
\nonly  if  the deprivation of their rights imposed  a  corre-
\nsponding liability on the Central Government to continue  to
\npay  such  interim relief to the victims as  they  might  be
\nentitled  to  till the time that the Central  Government  is
\nable  to  obtain the whole amount of compensation  from\t the
\nUnion  Carbide.\t He submitted that the\tdeprivation  of\t the
\nright  of the victims to sue for their claims and denial  of
\naccess to justice and to assert their claims and the substi-
\ntution of the Central Government to carry on the  litigation
\nfor or on their behalf can only be justified, if and only if
\nthe  Central  Government  is enjoined to  provide  for\tsuch
\ninterim relief or continue to provide in the words of  Judge
\nKeenan,\t as  a\tmatter of fundamental  human  decency,\tsuch
\ninterim relief, necessary to enable the victims to fight the
\nbattle. Counsel submitted that the Act must be so read. Shri
\nShanti Bhushan urged that if the Act is construed in such  a
\nmanner\tthat  it did not create such an\t obligation  on\t the
\nCentral Government, the Act cannot be upheld as a reasonable
\nprovision when it deprived the victims of their normal legal
\nrights\tof  immediately obtaining  compensation\t from  Union
\nCarbide. He referred to section 10(b) of the Act and  clause
\n10  and\t 11(1) of the Scheme to show  that  the\t legislative
\npolicy\tunderlying the Bhopal Act clearly contemplated\tpay-
\nment of interim relief to the victims from time to time till
\nsuch time as the Central Government was able to recover from
\nUnion Carbide
\n657<\/span>
\nfull  amount of compensation from which the interim  reliefs
\npaid by the Central Government were to be deducted from\t the
\namount\tpayable\t to them by way of final  disbursal  of\t the
\namounts recovered.\n<\/p>\n
    60.\t The  settlement is bad, according  to\tShri  Shanti
\nBhushan if part of the bargain was giving up of the criminal
\nliability against UCIL and UCC. Shri Shanti Bhushan  submit-
\nted that this Court should not hesitate to declare that\t the
\nsettlement  is\tbad  because the fight will go\ton  and\t the
\nvictims should be provided reliefs and interim\tcompensation
\nby  the Central Government to be reimbursed ultimately\tfrom
\nthe  amount to be realised by the Central  Government.\tThis
\nobligation  was over and above the liability of the  Central
\nGovernment as a joint tort-feasor, according to Shri  Shanti
\nBhushan.\n<\/p>\n
    61.\t Shri Kailash Vasdev, appearing for the\t petitioners
\nin  Writ Petition No. 155 1\/86 submitted that the  Act\tdis-
\nplaced\tthe claimants in the matter of their right  to\tseek
\nredressal and remedies of the actual injury and harm  caused
\nindividually  to the claimants. The Act in question  by\t re-
\nplacing\t the Central Government in place of the victims.  by
\nconferment  of exclusive right to sue in place\tof  victims,
\naccording  to him, contravened the procedure established  by
\nlaw.  The right to sue for the wrong done to  an  individual
\nwas exclusive to the individual. It was submitted that under
\nthe  civil  law of the country, individuals have  rights  to
\nenforce\t their claims and any deprivation would\t place\tthem
\ninto  a\t different category from the  other  litigants.\t The
\nright  to enter into compromise, it was\t further  submitted,
\nwithout\t consultation  of the victims, if that is  the\tcon-
\nstruction of section 3 read with section 4 of the Act,\tthen
\nit is violative of procedure established by law. The  proce-
\ndure  substituted, if that be the construction of  the\tAct,
\nwould  be in violation of the principles of natural  justice
\nand  as\t such  bad. It was submitted  that  the\t concept  of
\n‘parens patriae’ would not be applicable in these cases.  It
\nwas  submitted that traditionally, sovereigns can sue  under
\nthe  doctrine  of ‘parens patriae’ only\t for  violations  of
\ntheir  “quasi-sovereign”  interests. Such interests  do\t not
\ninclude the claims of individual citizens. It was  submitted
\nthat  the Act in question is different from the\t concept  of
\nparens\tpatriae\t because  there was no special\tneed  to  be
\nsatisfied  and\ta class action, according  to  Shri  Vasdev,
\nwould  have served the same purpose as a suit brought  under
\nthe  statute  and ought to have been  preferred\t because  it
\nsafeguarded  claimants’ right to procedural due process.  In
\naddition,  a suit brought under the statute  would  threaten
\nthe victims’ substantive due process rights. It was  further
\nsubmitted that in order to sustain an action, it was  neces-
\nsary for the Government of India to have standing
\n658<\/span>\n<\/p>\n
    62. Counsel submitted that ‘parens patriae’ has received
\nno  judicial  recognition  in this country as  a  basis\t for
\nrecovery of money damages for injuries suffered by individu-
\nals.  He  may be right to that extent but  the\tdoctrine  of
\nparens\tpatriae has been used in India in  varying  contexts
\nand contingencies.\n<\/p>\n
    63.\t We are of the opinion that the Act in question\t was
\npassed\tin recognition of the right of the sovereign to\t act
\nas  parens  patriae  as contended by  the  learned  Attorney
\nGeneral.  The  Government of India in order  to\t effectively
\nsafeguard  the\trights of the victims in the matter  of\t the
\nconduct\t of the case was entitled to act as parens  patriae,
\nwhich  position was reinforced by the statutory\t provisions,
\nnamely,\t the  Act. We have noted the several  decisions\t re-
\nferred\tto  hereinbefore, namely,  Bhudhkaran  Chankhani  v.
\nThakur\tPrasad Shad, (supra); Banku Behary Mondal  v.  Banku
\nBehari Hazra, (supra); Medai Dalavoi T. Kumaraswami Mudaliar
\nv.  Medai Dalavai Rajammal, (supra) and to the\tdecision  of
\nthis Court in Mahant Ram Saroop Dasji v. S.P. Sahi,<\/a>  (supra)
\nand  the  decision of the American Supreme Court  in  Alfred
\nSchnapp v. Puerto Rico, (supra). It has to be borne in\tmind
\nthat  conceptually  and jurisprudentially, the\tdoctrine  of
\nparens\tpatriae is not limited to representation of some  of
\nthe  victims outside the territories of the country.  It  is
\ntrue  that the doctrine has been so utilised in\t America  so
\nfar.  In our opinion, learned Attorney General was right  in
\ncontending that where citizens of a country are victims of a
\ntragedy\t because of the negligence of any  multinational,  a
\npeculiar situation arises which calls for suitable effective
\nmachinery  to articulate and effectuate the  grievances\t and
\ndemands of the victims, for which the conventional adversary
\nsystem\twould be totally inadequate. The State in  discharge
\nof  its sovereign obligation must come forward.\t The  Indian
\nstate because of its constitutional commitment is obliged to
\ntake  upon itself the claims of the victims and\t to  protect
\nthem  in  their hour of need. Learned Attorney\tGeneral\t was
\nalso right in submitting that the decisions of the Calcutta,
\nMadras\tand U.S. Supreme Court clearly indicate that  parens
\npatriae\t doctrine can be invoked by sovereign  state  within
\nIndia,\teven if it be contended that it has not so far\tbeen
\ninvoked\t inside\t India in respect of claims for\t damages  of
\nvictims\t suffered at the hands of the multinational. In\t our
\nopinion, conceptually and jurisprudentially, there is no bar
\non the State to assume responsibilities analogous to  parens
\npatriae\t to  discharge\tthe State’s  obligations  under\t the
\nConstitution.  What the Central Government has done  in\t the
\ninstant\t case seems to us to be an expression of its  sover-
\neign  power.  This power is plenary and\t inherent  in  every
\nsovereign  state to do all things which promote the  health,
\npeace,
\n659<\/span>
\nmorals,\t education and good order of the people and tend  to
\nincrease the wealth and prosperity of the state. Sovereignty
\nis  difficult to define. See in this connection,  Weaver  on
\nConstitional Law, p. 490. By the nature of things, the state
\nsovereignty in these matters cannot be limited. It has to be
\nadjusted to the conditions touching the common welfare\twhen
\ncovered\t by  legislative enactments. This power\t is  to\t the
\npublic what the law of necessity is to the individual. It is
\ncomprehended  in the maxim salus populi suprema\t lex–regard
\nfor public welfare is the highest law. It is not a rule,  it
\nis  an\tevolution. This power has always been  as  broad  as
\npublic\twelfare and as strong as the arm of the state,\tthis
\ncan only be measured by the legislative will of the  people,
\nsubject to the fundamental rights and constitutional limita-
\ntions.\tThis  is an emanation of sovereignty subject  to  as
\naforesaid.  Indeed,  it is the obligation of  the  State  to
\nassume such responsibility and protect its citizens. It\t has
\nto be borne in mind, as was stressed by the learned Attorney
\nGeneral,  that\tconferment of power and the  manner  of\t its
\nexercise  are two different matters. It was  submitted\tthat
\nthe  power to conduct the suit and to compromise, if  neces-
\nsary,  was vested in the Central Government for the  purpose
\nof  the\t Act.  The power to compromise and  to\tconduct\t the
\nproceedings  are  not uncanalised or arbitrary.\t These\twere
\nclearly\t exercisable only in the ultimate interests  of\t the
\nvictims.  The  possibility of abuse of a  statute  does\t not
\nimpart to it any element of invalidity. In this\t connection,
\nthe observations of Viscount Simonds in Belfast\t Corporation
\nv.  O.D.  Commission, [1950] AC 490 at 520-21  are  relevant
\nwhere it was emphasised that validity of a measure is not be
\ndetermined  by\tits application to  particular\tcases.\tThis
\nCourt  in Collector of Customs, Madras v. Nathella  Sampathu
\nChetty,<\/a> [1962] 3 SCR 786 at 825 emphasised that the  consti-
\ntutional validity of the statute would have to be determined
\non  the\t basis\tof its provisions and on the  ambit  of\t its
\noperation  as  reasonably construed. It has to be  borne  in
\nmind  that if upon so judged it passes the test of  reasona-
\nbleness, then the possibility of the powers conferred  being
\nimproperly used is no ground for pronouncing the law  itself
\ninvalid.  See  in this connection also the  observations  in
\nP.J.  Irani v. State of Madras,<\/a> [1962] 2 SCR 169 at  178  to
\n181  and D.K. Trivedi v. State of Gujarat, [1986] Supp.\t SCC
\n20 at 60-61\n<\/p>\n
     64. Sections 3 and 4 of the Act should be read together
\nas  contended  by the learned Attorney General,\t along\twith
\nother provisions of the Act and in particular sections 9 and
\n11 of the Act. These should be appreciated in the context of
\nthe object sought to be achieved by the Act as indicated  in
\nthe Statement of Objects and Reasons and the Preamble to the
\nAct. The Act was so designed that the victims of the
\n660<\/span>
\ndisaster are fully protected and the claims of\tcompensation
\nor  damages  for loss of life or personal  injuries  or\t in’
\nrespect\t of other matters arising out of or  connected\twith
\nthe disaster are processed speedily, effectively,  equitably
\nand to the best advantage of the claimants. Section 3 of the
\nAct is subject to other provisions of the Act which includes
\nsections  4  and 11. Section 4 of the Act  opens  with\tnon-
\nobstante  clause, vis-a-vis, section 3 and therefore,  over-
\nrides section 3. Learned Attorney General submitted that the
\nright  of the Central Government under section 3 of the\t Act
\nwas  to\t represent the victims exclusively and\tact  in\t the
\nplace of the victims. The Central Government, it was  urged,
\nin other words, is substituted in the place of ‘the  victims
\nand is the dominus litis. Learned Attorney General submitted
\nthat the dominus litis carries with it the right to  conduct
\nthe suit in the best manner as it deems fit, including,\t the
\nright  to withdraw and right to enter into  compromise.\t The
\nright  to withdraw and the right to compromise conferred  by
\nsection\t 3(2) of the Act cannot be exercised to\t defeat\t the
\nrights of the victims. As to how the rights should be  exer-
\ncised is guided by the objects and the reasons contained  in
\nthe  Preamble, namely, to speedily and\teffectively  process
\nthe  claims of the victims and to protect their claims.\t The
\nAct  was passed replacing the Ordinance at a time when\tmany
\nprivate\t plaintiffs had instituted complaints\/suits  in\t the
\nAmerican  Courts.  In such a situation,\t the  Government  of
\nIndia acting in place of the victims necessarily should have
\nright  under the statute to act in all situations  including
\nthe  position of withdrawing the suit or to enter into\tcom-
\npromise. Learned Attorney General submitted that if the\t UCC
\nwere to agree to pay a lump sum amount which would be  just,
\nfair  and  equitable, but insists on a\tcondition  that\t the
\nproceedings should be completely withdrawn, then necessarily
\nthere should be power under the Act to so withdraw.  Accord-
\ning to him, therefore, the Act engrafted a provision  empow-
\nring  the  Government to compromise.  The  provisions  under
\nsection\t 3(2)(b)  of the Act to enter  into  compromise\t was
\nconsistent with the powers of dominus litis. In this connec-
\ntion, our attention was drawn to the definition of  ‘Dominus
\nLitis’\tin  Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition,  P.\t437,
\nwhich states as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “‘Dominus litis’. The master of the suit; i.e.
\n\t      the person who was really and directly  inter-
\n\t      ested in the suit as a party, as distinguished
\n\t      from his attorney or advocate. But the term is
\n\t      also applied to one who, though not originally
\n\t      a\t party, has made himself such, by  interven-
\n\t      tion  or\totherwise, and\thas  assumed  entire
\n\t      control and responsibility for one side and is
\n\t      treated by the Court as liable for costs. Vir-
\n\t      ginia Electric & Power Co, v. Bowers, ISI Va.,
\n\t      542, 25 S.E. 2d 361,263”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
661<\/span><\/p>\n
    65. Learned Attorney General sought to contend that\t the
\nvictims had not been excluded entirely either in the conduct
\nof  proceedings or in entering into compromise, and  he\t re-
\nferred to the proceedings in detail emphasising the partici-
\npation\tof  some of the victims at some stage. He  drew\t our
\nattention  to the fact that the victims had  filed  separate
\nconsolidated  complaints in addition to the complaint  filed
\nby the Government of India. Judge Keenan of the Distt. Court
\nof  America had passed orders permitting the victims  to  be
\nrepresented  not only ‘by the private Attorneys but also  by
\nthe  Govt. of India. Hence, it was submitted that  it  could
\nnot be contended that the victims had been excluded. Learned
\nAttorney  General  further contended that  pursuant  to\t the
\norders\tpassed by Judge Keenan imposing\t certain  conditions
\nagainst the Union Carbide and allowing the motion for  forum
\nnon convenience of the UCC that the suit came back to  India
\nand  was  instituted before the Distt. Court of\t Bhopal.  In
\nthose  circumstances, it was urged by the  learned  Attorney
\nGeneral that the private plaintiffs who went to America\t and
\nwho  were represented by the contingency lawyers fully\tknew
\nthat  they could also have joined in the said suit  as\tthey
\nwere  before  the  American Court along with  the  Govt.  of
\nIndia. It was contended that in the proceedings at any point
\nof  time or stage including when the compromise was  entered
\ninto,  these private plaintiffs could have  participated  in
\nthe court proceedings and could have made their\t representa-
\ntion,  if they so desired. Even in the Indian  suits,  these
\nprivate\t parties have been permitted to continue as  parties
\nrepresented by separate counsel even though the Act empowers
\nthe Union to be the sole plaintiff. Learned Attorney General
\nsubmitted  that\t Section 4 of the Act  clearly\tenabled\t the
\nvictims\t to  exercise their right of  participation  in\t the
\nproceedings.  The  Central Govt. was enjoined  to  have\t due
\nregard\tto any matter which such person might require to  be
\nurged.\tIndeed,\t the  learned Attorney\tGeneral\t urged\tvery
\nstrenuously  that  in the instant case,\t Zehreeli  Gas\tKand
\nSangharsh Morcha and Jana Swasthya Kendra (Bhopal) had filed
\nbefore the Distt. Judge, Bhopal, an application under  Order
\nI  Rule 8 read with Order I Rule 10 and Section 15 1 of\t the
\nCPC  for their-intervention on behalf of the  victims.\tThey
\nhad  participated in the hearing before the  learned  Distt.
\nJudge,\twho referred to their intervention in the order.  It
\nwas further emphasised that when the UCC went up in revision
\nto the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur against\t the
\ninterim compensation ordered to be paid by the Distt. Court,
\nthe  intervener\t through its Advocate, Mr. Vibhuti  Jha\t had
\nparticipated  in the proceedings. The aforesaid\t Association
\nhad also intervened in the civil appeals preferred  pursuant
\nto  the special leave granted by this Court to the Union  of
\nIndia and Union Carbide against the judgment of the
\n662<\/span>
\nHigh Court for interim compensation. In those circumstances,
\nit  was\t submitted that there did not exist  any  other\t gas
\nvictim\tintervening in the proceedings, claiming  participa-
\ntion under Section 4. Hence, the right to compromise provid-
\ned for by the Act, could not be held to be violative of\t the
\nprinciples  of\tnatural justice. According  to\tthe  learned
\nAttorney  General,  this Court first proposed the  order  to
\ncounsel in court and after they agreed thereto, dictated the
\norder  on 14th February, 1989. On 15th February, 1989  after
\nthe  Memorandum\t of  Settlement was filed  pursuant  to\t the
\norders\tof the court, further orders were passed.  The\tsaid
\nAssociation, namely, Zehreeli Gas Kand Sangharsh Morcha\t was
\npresent, according to the records, in the Court on both\t the
\ndates  and did not apparently object to the compromise.\t Mr.
\nCharanlal Sahu, one of the petitioners in the writ petition,
\nhad  watched the proceedings and after the Court had  passed
\nthe order on 15th February, 1989 mentioned that he had filed
\na suit for Rs. 100 crores. Learned Attorney General  submit-
\nted  that Mr. Sahu neither protested against the  settlement
\nnor  did  he make any prayer to be heard.  Shri\t Charan\t Lal
\nSahu, in the petition of opposition in one of these  matters
\nhave  prayed  that a sum of Rs. 100 million should  be\tpaid
\nover  to him for himself as well as on behalf of those\tvic-
\ntims  whom he claimed to represent. In the  aforesaid  back-
\nground\ton the construction of the Section, it was urged  by
\nthe  learned  Attorney\tGeneral that Section 3\tof  the\t Act
\ncannot\tbe held to be unconstitutional. The same provided  a
\njust, fair and reasonable procedure and enabled the  victims
\nto participate\tin the proceedings at all stages–those\t who
\nwere  capable and willing to do so. Our attention was  drawn
\nto  the\t fact that Section 11 of the Act provides  that\t the
\nprovisions  of\tthe Act shall  have  effect  notwithstanding
\nanything  inconsistent\ttherewith  contained  in  any  other
\nenactment other than the Act. It was, therefore, urged\tthat
\nthe provisions of the Civil Procedure Code stood  overridden
\nin  respect  of the areas covered by the  Act,\tnamely,\t (a)
\nrepresentation,\t (b) powers of representation; and (c)\tcom-
\npromise.\n<\/p>\n
    66.\t According to the learned Attorney General, the\t Act
\ndid  not  violate  the principles of  natural  justice.\t The
\nprovisions  of\tthe CPC could not be read into the  Act\t for
\nSection\t 11 of the Act provides that the application of\t the
\nprovision  of  the Civil Procedure Code in so far  as  those
\nwere inconsistent with the Act should be construed as  over-
\nridden\tin  respect  of areas covered  by  it.\tFurthermore,
\ninasmuch as Section 4 had given a qualified right of partic-
\nipation\t to  the victims, there cannot be  any\tquestion  of
\nviolation of the principles of natural justice. The scope of
\nthe application of the principles of natural justice  cannot
\nbe  judged by any strait jacket formula. According  to\thim,
\nthe
\n663<\/span>
\nextension  of the principles of natural justice beyond\twhat
\nis  provided by the Act in Sections 3 & 4,  was\t unwarranted
\nand  would  deprive the provisions of the Statute  of  their
\nefficacy in relation to the achievement of ‘speedy  relief’,
\nwhich  is the object intended to be achieved. He  emphasised
\nthat  the  process of notice, consultation and\texchange  of
\ninformation,  informed decision-making process, the  modali-
\nties of assessing a consensus of opinion would involve\tsuch
\ntime  that the Govt. would be totally unable to act  in\t the
\nmatter\tefficiently, effectively and purposefully on  behalf
\nof  the\t victims  for realisation of the just  dues  of\t the
\nvictims.  He  further urged that the  Civil  Procedure\tCode
\nbefore its amendment in 1976 did not have the provisions  of
\nOrder  l  Rules 8(4), (5) & (6) and  Explanations  etc.\t nor
\nOrder  XXIII Rules 3A and 3B. Before the amendment the\tHigh
\nCourt  had taken a view against the requirement\t of  hearing
\nthe  parties represented in the suit under Order 1,  Rule  8
\nbefore\tit  before settling or disposing of  the  suit.\t Our
\nattention  was\tdrawn to the decision of the  Calcutta\tHigh
\nCourt in Chintaharan Ghose & Ors. v. Gujaraddi Sheik & Ors.,
\nAIR  1951  Cal. 456 at 457-459, wherein it was held  by\t the
\nlearned Single Judge that the plaintiff in a  representative
\nsuit had right to compromise subject to the conditions\tthat
\nthe  suit was properly filed in terms of the  provisions  of
\nthat  Rule and the settlement was agreed bona fide.  Learned
\nAttorney  General  in that context contended that  when\t the
\nsuit  was validly instituted, the plaintiff had a  right  to
\ncompromise the suit and there need not be any provision\t for
\nnotice\tto the parties represented before entering into\t any
\ncompromise.  Reliance  was  placed on the  decision  of\t the
\nAllahabad  High\t Court in Ram Sarup v. Nanak Ram,  AIR\t1952
\nAllahabad  275, where it was held that a compromise  entered
\ninto  in  a suit filed under Order 1 Rule 8 of the  CPC\t was
\nbinding on all persons as the plaintiffs who had  instituted
\nthe  suit  in representative capacity had the  authority  to
\ncompromise.  He further submitted that most, if not all,  of
\nthe  victims had given their powers of attorney\t which\twere
\nduly filed in favour of the Union of India. These powers  or
\nattorney  have neither been impeached nor revoked  or  with-
\ndrawn.\tBy  virtue of the powers of attorney  the  Union  of
\nIndia,\tit was stated, had the authority to file  the  suits
\nand  to\t compromise the interests of the victims if  so\t re-
\nquired.\t The Act in question itself contemplates  settlement
\nas  we\thave  noted, and a settlement would  need  a  common
\nspokesman.\n<\/p>\n
    67.\t It  was submitted that the Govt. of  India  as\t the
\nstatutory  representative  discharged its duty and is  in  a
\ncentralised position of assessing the merits and demerits of
\nany proposed course of action. So far as the act of  compro-
\nmise, abridging or curtailing the ambit of the
\n664<\/span>
\nrights\tof the victims, it was submitted that in respect  of
\nliabilities  of\t UCC & UCIL, be it  corporate,\tcriminal  or
\ntortious, it was open to an individual to take a decision of
\nenforcing  the liability to its logical extent\tor  stopping
\nshort  of it and acceding to a compromise. Just as an  indi-
\nvidual can make an election in the matter of adjudication of
\nliability  so can a statutory representative make  an  elec-
\ntion.  Therefore,  it  is wholly wrong to  contend,  it\t was
\nurged, that Section 3(ii)(b) is inconsistent with  individu-
\nal’s right of election and at the same time it provides\t the
\ncentralised decision-making processes to effectively adjudge
\nand  secure  the common good. It was only a  central  agency
\nlike the Govt. of India, who could have a perspective of the
\ntotality  of  the  claims and a vision of  the\tproblems  of
\nindividual  plaintiffs in enforcing these, it was urged.  It
\nwas  emphasised that it has to be borne in mind that a\tcom-
\npromise is a legal act. In the present case, it is a part of
\nthe  conduct of the suit. It is, therefore, imperative\tthat
\nthe  choice of compromise is made carefully, cautiously\t and
\nwith  a measure of discretion, it was submitted. But if\t any
\nclaimant  wished  to be associated with the conduct  of\t the
\nsuit, he would necessarily have been afforded an opportunity
\nfor that purpose, according to the learned Attorney General.
\nIn  this connection, reference was made to Section 4 of\t the
\nAct.  On the other hand, an individual who did not  partici-
\npate  in the conduct of the suit and who is unaware  of\t the
\nvarious intricacies of the case, could hardly be expected to
\nmeaningfully  partake in the legal act of settlement  either
\nin  conducting the proceedings or entering into\t compromise,
\nit  was urged. In those circumstances, the learned  Attorney
\nGeneral submitted that the orders of 14-15th February,\t1989
\nand  the Memorandum of Settlement were justified both  under
\nthe Act and the Constitution. According to him, the terms of
\nSettlement  might  be  envisaged  as  pursuant\tto   Section
\n3(ii)(b) of the Act, which was filed according to him pursu-
\nant to judical direction. He sought more than once to empha-
\nsise, that the order was passed by the highest Court of\t the
\nland in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction vested in  it
\nunder the Constitution.\n<\/p>\n
    68. Our attention was drawn to several decisions for the
\npower  of this Court under Articles 136 and 142 of the\tCon-
\nstitution.  Looked closely at the provisions of the Act,  it
\nwas  contended\tthat taking into   consideration   all\t the
\nfactors,   namely,  possibilities  of  champerty,  exploita-
\ntion,  unconscionable agreements and the need  to  represent
\nthe dead and the disabled, the course of events would reveal
\na  methodical and systematic protection and  vindication  of
\nrights to the largest possible extent. It was observed\tthat
\nthe  rights are indispensably valuable possessions, but\t the
\nrights is something which a
\n665<\/span>
\nman  can stand on, something which must be demanded  or\t in-
\nsisted upon without embarrassment or shame. When rights\t are
\ncurtailed, permissibility of such a measure can be  examined
\nonly  upon  the\t strength, urgency and\tthe  preeminence  of
\nrights and the largest good of the largest number sought  to
\nb,e  served  by curtailment. Under the\tcircumstances  which
\nwere faced by the victims of Bhopal gas tragedy, the  justi-
\nfying  basis, according to the learned Attorney General,  or
\nground of human rights is that every person morally ought to
\nhave something to which he or she is entitled. It was empha-
\nsised  that  the Statute aimed at it. The Act  provides\t for
\nassumption of rights to sue with the aim of securing speedy,
\neffective and equitable results to the best advantage of the
\nclaimants. The Act and the scheme, according to the  learned
\nAttorney General, sought to translate that profession into a
\nsystem\tof  faith and possible association  when  in  doubt.
\nUnless such a profession is shown to be unconscionable under
\nthe  circumstances or strikes judicial conscience as a\tsub-
\nversion\t of the objects of the Act, a declaredly fair,\tjust
\nand equitable exercise of a valid power would not be open to
\nchallenge.  He\tdisputed the submission that  the  right  to
\nrepresent  victims  postulated as contended  mainly  by\t the
\ncounsel on behalf of the petitioners, a pre-determination of
\neach individual claim as a sine qua non for proceeding\twith
\nthe  action. Such a construction would deplete the  case  of
\nits vigour, urgency and sense of purpose, he urged. In\tthis
\ncase, with the first of the cases having been filed in\tU.S.
\nFederal\t Court on December 7, 1984 a settlement\t would\thave
\nbeen reached for a much smaller sum to the detriment of\t the
\nvictims.  Learned  Attorney  General  emphasised  that\tthis
\nbackground has to be kept in mind while adjudging the valid-
\nity of the Act and the appropriateness of the conduct of the
\nsuit in the settlement entered into.\n<\/p>\n
    69. He submitted that it has to be borne in mind that if
\nthe  contentions  of the petitioners  are  entertained,\t the
\nrights theoretically might be upheld but the ends of justice
\nwould stand sacrificed. It is in those circumstances that it
\nwas emphasised that the claimant is an individual and is the
\nbest  person  to speak about his injury.  The  knowledge  in
\nrelation  to his injury is relevant for the purpose of\tcom-
\npensation,  whose distribution and disbursement is the\tsec-
\nondary\tstage. It is fallacious to suggest that\t the  plaint
\nwas  not  based upon necessary data. He\t insisted  that\t the
\nfigures mentioned in the plaint although tentative were\t not
\nmentioned without examination or analysis.\n<\/p>\n
70. It was further submitted by the learned Attorney General
\n666<\/span>
\nthat while the Govt. of India had proceeded against the UCC,
\nit  had to represent the victims as a class and it  was\t not
\npossible  to  define each individual’s right  after  careful
\nscrutiny,  nor\twas it necessary or possible to do so  in  a
\nmass  disaster\tcase. The settlement was  a  substitute\t for
\nadjudication  since it involved a process of reparation\t and
\nrelief.\t The  relief  and reparation cannot be\tsaid  to  be
\nirrelevant  for the purpose of the Act. It was\tstated\tthat
\nthe  alleged  liability of the Govt. of India or  any  claim
\nasserted against the alleged joint tort-feasor should not be
\nallowed to be a constraint on the Govt. of India to  protect
\nthe interests of its own citizens. Any counter-claim by\t UCC
\nor  any claim by a citizen against the Govt. cannot  vitiate
\nthe  action of the State in the collective interest  of\t the
\nvictims,  who  are the citizens.  Learned  Attorney  General
\nsubmitted that any industrial activity, normally, has to  be
\nlicensed. The mere regulation of any activity does not carry
\nwith it legally a presumption of liability for injury caused
\nby  the activity in the event of a mishap occurring  in\t the
\ncourse of such an activity. In any event, the learned Attor-
\nney  General submitted the Govt. of India  enjoys  sovereign
\nimmunity  in accordance with settled law. If this  were\t not
\nthe case, the Sovereign will have to abandon all  regulatory
\nfunctions including the licensing of drivers of automobiles.
\nHence,\twe have to examine the question whether even on\t the
\nassumption  that  there was negligence on the  part  of\t the
\nGovt.  of India in permitting\/licensing of the industry\t set
\nup by the Union Carbide in Bhopal or permitting the  factory
\nto grow up, such permission or conduct of the Union of India
\nwas responsible for the damage which has been suffered as  a
\nresult\tof Bhopal gas leakage. It is further to be  examined
\nwhether\t such  conduct\twas in discharge  of  the  sovereign
\nfunctions of the Govt., and as such damages, if any, result-
\ning  therefrom are liable to be proceeded against the  Govt.
\nas  a joint tort-feasor or not. In those  circumstances,  it
\nwas  further asserted on behalf of the Union of\t India\tthat
\nthough\tcalculation  of\t damages in a precise  manner  is  a
\nlogical consequence of a suit in progress it cannot be\tsaid
\nto be a condition precedent for the purpose of settling\t the
\nmatter. Learned Attorney General urged that the accountabil-
\nity  to\t the victims should be through the court.  He  urged
\nthat  the allegation that a large number of victims did\t not
\ngive consent to the settlement entered into, is really of no
\nrelevance  in  the  matter of a compromise in  a  mass\ttort
\naction.\t It was highlighted that it is possible\t that  those
\nwho  do\t not  need urgent relief or are\t uninformed  of\t the
\nissues in the case, may choose to deny consent and may place
\nthe  flow  of relief in jeopardy. Thus, consent\t based\tupon
\nindividual subjective opinion can never be correlated to the
\nproposal  of  an  overall settlement in\t an  urgent  matter.
\nLearned\t Attorney General urged further that if indeed\tcon-
\nsent were to be insisted upon as a mandatory
\n667<\/span>
\nrequirement  of a Statute, it would not necessarily lead  to
\nan  accurate reflection of the victims’ opinion as  opinions
\nmay  be\t diverse. No individual would be in  a\tposition  to
\nrelate himself to a lump sum figure and would not be able to
\ndefine\this expectations on a global criteria. In such\tcir-
\ncumstances the value of consent is very much diminished.  It
\nwas  urged  that  if at all consent was to  be\tinsisted  it
\nshould\tnot be an expression of the mind without  supporting
\ninformation  and response. To make consent meaningful it  is
\nnecessary  that it must be assertion of a fight to be  exer-
\ncised  in a meaningful manner based on information and\tcom-
\nprehension  of collective welfare and individual good. In  a
\nmatter\tof such dimensions the insistence upon consent\twill
\nlead  to  a process of enquiry which  might  make  effective
\nconsideration of any proposal impossible. For the purpose of
\naffording  consent,  it would also be  necessary  that\teach
\nindividual  not only assesses the damages to himself  objec-
\ntively and places his opinion in the realm of fair  expecta-
\ntion, but would also have to do so in respect of others. The
\nlearned Attorney General advanced various reasons why it  is
\ndifficult now or impossible to have the concurrence of all.\n<\/p>\n
    71.\t In answer to the criticism by the  petitioners,  it
\nwas explained on behalf of the Union of India that UCIL\t was
\nnot  impleaded as a party in the suit because it would\thave
\nmilitated  against  the\t plea  of  multinational  enterprise
\nliability  and the entire theory of the case in the  plaint.
\nIt was highlighted that the power to represent under the Act
\nwas  exclusive,\t the power to compromise for  the  Govt.  of
\nIndia is without reference to the victims, yet it is a power
\nguided by the sole object of the welfare of the victims. The
\npresence and ultimately the careful imprimatur of the  judi-
\ncial  process is the best safeguard to the victims.  Learned
\nAttorney General insisted that hearing the parties after the
\nsettlement  would also not serve any purpose. He urged\tthat
\nit  can\t never\tbe ascertained with  certainty\twhether\t the
\nvictims\t or groups have authorised what was being  allegedly
\nspoken on their behalf; and that the victims would be unable
\nto  judge a proposal of this nature. A method  of  consensus
\nneed  not be evolved like in America where every  settlement
\nmade  by contingency fee lawyers who are anxious  to  obtain
\ntheir share automatically become adversaries of the  victims
\nand the court should therefore be satisfied. Here the  Court
\narrived\t at  the figure and directed the parties to  file  a
\nsettlement  on the basis of its order of February  14,\t1985
\nand  the interveners were heard, it was urged. It  was\talso
\nurged  that  notice to the victims individually\t would\thave
\nbeen  a\t difficult exercise and analysis of  their  response
\ntime consuming.\n<\/p>\n
668<\/span><\/p>\n
    72. The learned Attorney General urged that neither\t the
\nCentral\t Govt.\tnor  the State Govt. of\t Madhya\t Pradesh  is
\nliable\tfor the claim of the victims. He asserted  that,  on
\nthe  facts of the present case, there is and can be  no\t li-
\nability on their part as joint tort-feasors. For the welfare
\nof the community several socio-economic activities will have
\nto  be permitted by the Govt. Many of these  activities\t may
\nhave  to be regulated by licensing provisions  contained  in
\nStatutes made either by Parliament or by State Legislatures.
\nAny injury caused to a person, to his life or liberty in the
\nconduct\t of  a\tlicensed authority so as to  make  the\tsaid
\nlicensing authority or the Govt. liable to damages would not
\nbe in conformity with jurisprudential principle. If in\tsuch
\ncircumstances  it  was\turged on behalf of  the\t Govt.,\t the
\npublic exchequer is made liable, it will cause great  public
\ninjury and may result in drainage of the treasury. It  would
\nterrorise  the welfare state from acting for development  of
\nthe  people,  and  will affect\tthe  sovereign\tgovernmental
\nactivities  which are beneficial to the community not  being
\nadequately licensed and would thereby lead to public injury.
\nIn any event, it was urged on behalf of the Govt., that such
\nlicensing authorities even assuming without admitting  could
\nbe  held to be liable as joint tort feasors, it could be  so
\nheld  only on adequate allegations of negligence  with\tfull
\nparticulars  and details of the alleged act or\tomission  of
\nthe licensing authority alleged and its direct nexus to\t the
\ninjury caused to the victims. It had to be proved by  cogent
\nand adequate evidence. On some conjecture or surmise without
\nany  foundation\t on  facts, Govt’s right  to  represent\t the
\nvictims\t cannot be challenged. It was asserted that even  if
\nthe Govt. is considered to be liable as a joint tort feasor,
\nit  will be entitled to claim sovereign immunity on the\t law
\nas it now stands.\n<\/p>\n
    73. Reference was made to the decision of this Court  in
\nKasturilal Kalia Ram Jain v. The State of U.P., [1965] 1 SCR
\n375  where  the conduct of some police officers\t in  seizing
\ngold in exercise of their statutory powers was held to be in
\ndischarge  of the sovereign functions of the State and\tsuch
\nactivities  enjoyed sovereign immunities. The  liability  of
\nthe Govt. of India under the Constitution has to be referred
\nto  Article 300, which takes us to Sections 15 & 18  of\t the
\nIndian\tIndependence  Act, 1947, and Section 176(1)  of\t the
\nGovt.  of  India Act, 1935. Reference was also made  to\t the
\nobservations of this Court in The State of Rajasthan v. Mst.
\nVidhyawati, & Anr.,<\/a> [1962] 2 Supp. SCR 989.\n<\/p>\n
    74.\t We have noted the shareholding of UCC. The  circum-
\nstances that financial institutions held shares in the\tUCIL
\nwould not disqualify
\n669<\/span>
\nthe  Govt.  of India from acting as patens  patriae  and  in
\ndischarging of its statutory duties under the Act. The\tsuit
\nwas filed only against the UCC and not against UCIL. On\t the
\nbasis of the claim made by the Govt. of India, UCIL was\t not
\na necessary party. It was suing only the multinational based
\non  several  legal grounds of liability of  the\t UCC,  inter
\nalia. on the basis of enterprise liability. If the Govt.  of
\nIndia had instituted a suit against UCIL to a certain extent
\nit  would have weakened its case against UCC in view of\t the
\njudgment of this Court in M.C. Mehta’s case (supra). Accord-
\ning  to learned Attorney General, the Union of India in\t the
\npresent\t case  was  not proceeding on the  basis  of  lesser
\nliability of UCC predicated in Mehta’s case but on a differ-
\nent  jurisprudential  principle\t to make  UCC  strictly\t and
\nabsolutely liable for the entire damages.\n<\/p>\n
    75.\t The  learned Attorney General submitted  that\teven
\nassuming for the purpose of argument without conceding\tthat
\nany  objection can be raised for the Govt. of  India  repre-
\nsenting\t the victims, to the present situation the  doctrine
\nof  necessity  applied. The UCC had to be  sued\t before\t the
\nAmerican  courts.  The\ttragedy was treated  as\t a  national
\ncalamity,  and the Govt. of India had the right, and  indeed
\nthe  duty, to take care of its citizens, in the exercise  of
\nits  parens patriae jurisdiction or on\tprinciple  analogous
\nthereto.  After having statutorily armed itself in  recogni-
\ntion of such parens patraie right or on principles analogous
\nthereto, it went to the American courts. No other person was
\nproperly designed for representing the victims as a  foreign
\ncourt had to recognise a right of representation. The  Govt.
\nof  India was permitted to represent the victims before\t the
\nAmerican courts. Private plaintiffs were also represented by
\ntheir  attorneys. A Committee of three attorneys was  formed
\nbefore the case proceeded before Judge Keenan. It was  high-
\nlighted\t that the order of Judge Keenan permitted the  Govt.
\nof  India to represent the victims. If there was any  remote
\nconflict  of  interests between the Union of India  and\t the
\nvictims\t from the theoretical point of view the doctrine  of
\nnecessity  would  override  the possible  violation  of\t the
\nprinciples  of natural justice–that no man should be  Judge
\nin his own case. Reference may be made to Halsbury’s Laws of
\nEngland,  Vol. 1, 4th Edn., page 89, para 73, where  it\t was
\npointed\t that that if all the members of the  only  tribunal
\ncompetent to determine a matter are subject to disqualifica-
\ntion, they may be authorised and obliged to hear that matter
\nby  virtue  of the operation of the common law\tdoctrine  of
\nnecessity.  Reference was also made to De  Smith’s  Judicial
\nReview of Administrative Action (4th Edn. pages 276-277. See
\nalso  G.A.  Flick–Natural Justice,  [1879]  pages  138-141.
\nReference was also made to the observations of this Court in
\nJ. Mohapatra & Co.\n<\/p>\n
670<\/span><\/p>\n
& Anr. v. State of Orissa & Anr., [1984] 4 SCC 103, where at
\npage 112 of the report, the Court recognised ‘the  principle
\nof  necessity. It was submitted that these  were  situations
\nwhere  on  the principle of doctrine of necessity  a  person
\ninterested  was held not disqualified to adjudicate  on\t his
\nrights. The present is a case where the Govt. of India\tonly
\nrepresented  the victims as a party and did  not  adjudicate
\nbetween the victims and the UCC. It is the Court which would
\nadjudicate the rights of the victims. The representation  of
\nthe victims by the Govt. of India cannot be held to be\tbad,
\nand  there  is and there was no scope of  violation  of\t any
\nprinciple  of natural justice. We are of the opinion in\t the
\nfacts and the circumstances of the case that this contention
\nurged  by  Union of India is right. There was  no  scope  of
\nviolation of the principle of natural justice on this score.\n<\/p>\n
    76.\t It  was also urged that the doctrine  of  de  facto
\nrepresentation will also apply to the facts and the  circum-
\nstances\t of  the present case. Reliance was  placed  on\t the
\ndecision  of this Court in Gokaraju Rangaraju etc. v.  State
\nof  A.P., [1981] 3 SCR 474, where it was held that the\tdoc-
\ntrine  of de facto representation envisages that  acts\tper-
\nformed within the scope of assumed official authority in the
\ninterest  of public or third persons and not for  one’s\t own
\nbenefit,  are generally to be treated as binding as if\tthey
\nwere the acts of officers de jure. This doctrine is  rounded
\non good sense, sound policy and practical expediency. It  is
\naimed  at the prevention of public and private mischief\t and
\nprotection  of public and private interest. It avoides\tend-
\nless confusion and needless chaos. Reference was made to the
\nobservations  of this Court in Pushpadevi M. Jatia  v.\tM.L.
\nWadhawan,<\/a> [1987] 3 SCC 367 at 389-390 and M\/s. Beopar Shayak
\n(P)  Ltd. & Ors. v. Vishwa Nath & Ors.,<\/a> [1987] 3 SCC 693  at
\n702  & 703. Apart from the aforesaid doctrine,\tdoctrine  of
\nbona fide representation was sought to be resorted to in the
\ncircumstances.\tIn  this connection, reference was  made  to
\nDharampal  Sing, v. Director of Small Industries Services  &
\nOrs.,  AIR<\/a>  1980  SC 1888; N.K. Mohammad  Sulaiman  v.\tN.C.
\nMohammad  Ismail & Ors.,<\/a> [1966] 1 SCR 937 and Malkarjun\t Bin
\nShigramappa  Pasara v. Narhari Bin Shivappa & Anr., 27 IA  2\n<\/p>\n
16.\n<\/p>\n
    77.\t It  was further submitted that\t the  initiation  of
\ncriminal  proceedings and then quashing thereof,  would\t not
\nmake  the  Act ultra vires so far as it\t concerned.  Learned
\nAttorney General submitted that the Act only authorised\t the
\nGovt.  of India to represent the victims to  enforce   their
\nclaims\tfor  damages under the Act. The Govt.  as  such\t had
\nnothing to do with the quashing of the criminal\t proceedings
\nand  it was not representing the victims in respect  of\t the
\ncriminal liability of
\n671<\/span>
\nthe  UCC or UCIL to the victims. He further  submitted\tthat
\nquashing  of criminal proceedings was done by the  Court  in
\nexercise of plenary powers under Articles 136 and 142 of the
\nConstitution.  In  this connection, reference  was  made  to
\nState  of  U.P.\t v. Poosu & Anr.,<\/a> [1976] 3  SCR\t 1005;\tK.M.
\nNanavati v. The State of Bombay,<\/a> [1961] 1 SCR 497. According
\nto the learned Attorney General, there is also power in\t the
\nSupreme Court to suggest a settlement and give relief as  in
\nRam  Gopal v. Smt. Sarubai & Ors.,<\/a> [1981] 4 SCC\t 505;  India
\nMica  & Micanite Industries Ltd. v. State of Bihar  &  Ors.,<\/a>
\n[1982] 3 SCC 182.\n<\/p>\n
    78.\t Learned  Attorney General urged  that\tthe  Supreme
\nCourt  is empowered to act even outside a Statute  and\tgive
\nrelief in addition to what is contemplated by the latter  in
\nexercise of its plenary power. This Court acts not only as a
\nCourt of Appeal but is also a Court of Equity. See Roshanlal
\nKuthiala & Ors. v. R.B. Mohan Singh Oberoi,<\/a> [1975] 2 SCR  49\n<\/p>\n
1.  During  the course of heating of the petitions,  he\t in-
\nformed\tthis  Court that the Govt. of India  and  the  State
\nGovt.  of Madhya Pradesh refuted and denied  any  liability,
\npartial or total, of any sort in the Bhopal gas Leak  disas-
\nter, and this position is supported by the present state  of
\nlaw.  It was, however, submitted that any claim against\t the
\nGovt.  of India for its alleged tortious liability was\tout-
\nside the purview of the Act and such claims, if any, are not
\nextinguished  by  reason  of the orders dated  14th  &\t15th
\nFebruary, 1989 of this Court.\n<\/p>\n
    79.\t Learned  Attorney General further stated  that\t the
\namount of $ 470 million which was secured as a result of the
\nmemorandum  of settlement and the said orders of this  Court
\nwould  be meant exclusively for the benefit of\tthe  victims
\nwho  have suffered on account of the Bhopal gas leak  disas-
\nter. The Govt. of India would not seek any reimbursement  on
\naccount of the expenditure incurred suo motu for relief\t and
\nrehabilitation\tof the Bhopal victims nor will the Govt.  or
\nits  instrumentality make any claim on its own arising\tfrom
\nthis  disaster.\t He further assured this Court that  in\t the
\nevent of disbursement of compensation being initiated either
\nunder the Act or under the orders of this Court, a notifica-
\ntion  would be instantaneously issued under Section 5(3)  of
\nthe  Act authorising the Commissioner or any other  officers
\nto discharge functions and exercise all or any powers  which
\nthe Central Govt. may exercise under Section 5 to enable the
\nvictims to place before the Commissioner or the Dy.  Commis-
\nsioner\tany additional evidence that they would like  to  be
\nconsidered.\n<\/p>\n
    80.\t The Constitution Bench of this Court presided\tover
\nby the learned Chief Justice has pronounced an order on\t 4th
\nMay, 1989 giving
\n672<\/span>
\nreasons for the orders passed on 14th– 15th February, 1989.
\nInasmuch as good deal of criticism was advanced before\tthis
\nCourt  during the hearing of the arguments on behalf of\t the
\npetitioners about the propriety and validity of the  settle-
\nment dated 14th-15th February, 1989 even though the same was
\nnot  directly in issue before us, it is necessary  to  refer
\nbriefly\t to  what the Constitution Bench has stated  in\t the
\nsaid order dated 4th May, 1989. After referring to the facts
\nleading\t to the settlement, the Court has set out the  brief
\nreason on the following points:\n<\/p>\n
\t      (a) How did the Court arrive at the sum of 470
\n\t      million US dollars for an overall\t settlement?\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (b) Why did the Court consider the sum-of\t 470
\n\t      millions\tUS dollars as ‘just,  equitable\t and
\n\t      reasonable’?  (c) Why did the Court  not\tpro-
\n\t      nounce on certain important legal questions of
\n\t      far-reaching  importance said to arise in\t the
\n\t      appeals  as to the principles of liability  of
\n\t      monolithic, economically\tentrenched  multina-
\n\t      tional  companies\t operating  with  inherently
\n\t      dangerous\t  technologies\tin  the\t  developing
\n\t      countries of the third world? These  questions
\n\t      were  said to be of great\t contemporary  rele-
\n\t      vance  to the democracies of the third  world.
\n\t      This  Court recognised that there was  another
\n\t      aspect of the review pertaining to the part of
\n\t      the  settlement which terminated the  criminal
\n\t      proceedings. The questions raised on the point
\n\t      in the review-petitions, the Court was of\t the
\n\t      view,  prima  facie  merit  consideration\t and
\n\t      therefore,  abstained  from  saying   anything
\n\t      which  might tend to prejudge this  issue\t one
\n\t      way or the other.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    81.\t The basic consideration, the Court recorded,  moti-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
vating\tthe conclusion of the settlement was the  compelling
\nneed  for  urgent relief, and the Court set  out  the  law’s
\ndelays\tduly  considering that there was a  compelling\tduty
\nboth judicial and humane, to secure immediate relief to\t the
\nvictims.  In  doing  so, the Court did not  enter  upon\t any
\nforbidden  ground,  the court stated. The Court\t noted\tthat
\nindeed\tefforts had already been made in this  direction  by
\nJudge Keenan and the learned District Judge of Bhopal.\tEven
\nat  the opening of the arguments in the appeals,  the  Court
\nhad  suggested to learned counsel to reach a just  and\tfair
\nsettlement.  And when counsel met for re-scheduling  of\t the
\nhearings the  suggestion was reiterated.  The Court recorded
\nthat  the  response of learned counsel was positive  in\t at-
\ntempting a settlement but they expressed a certain degree of
\nuneasiness  and\t skepticism at the prospects of\t success  in
\nview of their past experience of such negotiations when,  as
\nthey stated, there had been uninformed and even\t irresponsi-
\nble criticism of the attempts at settlement.\n<\/p>\n
673<\/span><\/p>\n
    82.\t Learned Attorney General had made available to\t the
\nCourt  the particulars of offers and counter-offers made  on
\nprevious  occasions and the history of settlement. In  those
\ncircumstances,\tthe Court examined the prima facie  material
\nas the basis of quantification of a sum which, having regard
\nto  all the circumstances including the prospect  of  delays
\ninherent in the judicial process in India and thereafter  in
\nthe  matter of domestication of the decree in the  U.S.\t for
\nthe  purpose of execution and directed that 470\t million  US
\ndollars,  which upon immediate payment with interest over  a
\nreasonable  period, pending actual distribution amongst\t the
\nclaimants, would aggregate to nearly 500 million US  dollars
\nor its rupee equivalent of approximately Rs.750 crores which
\nthe  learned  Attorney General had suggested,  be  made\t the
\nbasis  of  settlement, and both the  parties  accepted\tthis
\ndirection.\n<\/p>\n
    83.\t The Court reiterated that the settlement  proposals
\nwere considered on the premise that the Govt. had the exclu-
\nsive  statutory authority to represent and act on behalf  of
\nthe victims and neither counsel had any reservation on this.
\nThe  order was also made on the premise that the Act  was  a
\nvalid  law. The Court declared that in the event the Act  is
\ndeclared  void\tin the pending proceedings  challenging\t its
\nvalidity, the order dated 14th February, 1989 would  require
\nto be examined in the light of that decision. The Court also
\nreiterated  that if any material was placed before  it\tfrom
\nwhich a reasonable inference was possible that the UCC\thad,
\nat  any time earlier, offered to pay any sum higher than  an
\noutright down payment of US 470 million dollars, this  Court
\nwould  straightaway initiate suo motu action  requiring\t the
\nconcerned  parties  to show cause why the order\t dated\t14th
\nFebruary’89 should not be set aside and the parties relegat-
\ned  to their original positions. The Court  reiterated\tthat
\nthe  reasonableness of the sum was based not only  on  inde-
\npendent\t quantification but the idea of\t reasonableness\t for
\nthe  present  purpose was necessarily a\t broad\tand  general
\nestimate  in the context of a settlement of the dispute\t and
\nnot on the basis of an accurate assessment by  adjudication.
\nThe Court stated that the question was, how good or reasona-
\nble it was as a settlement, which would avoid delay,  uncer-
\ntainties  and assure immediate payment. An estimate  in\t the
\nvery  nature  of things, would not have the accuracy  of  an
\nadjudication. The Court recorded the offers, counter-offers,
\nreasons\t and  the  numbers of the persons  treated  and\t the
\nclaims already made. The Court found that from the order  of
\nthe High Court and the admitted position on the\t plaintiff’s
\nside,  a  reasonable prima facie estimate of the  number  of
\nfatal cases and serious personal injury cases, was  possible
\nto be made. The Court referred to the High Court’s
\n674<\/span>
\nassessment  and procedure to examine the task  of  assessing
\nthe  quantum of interim compensation. The Court referred  to
\nM.  C Mehta’s case reiterated by the High Court, bearing  in
\nmind  the  factors that if the suit proceeded to  trial\t the
\nplaintiff-Union of India would obtain judgment in respect of
\nthe  claims relating to deaths and personal injuries in\t the
\nfollowing manner:-\n<\/p>\n
(a) Rs.2 lakhs in each case of death; (b) Rs.2 lakh in\teach
\ncase  of total permanent disability; (c) Rs. 1 lakh in\teach
\ncase of permanent partial disablement; and (d) Rs.50,000  in
\neach case of temporary partial disablement.\n<\/p>\n
    84.\t Half of these amounts were awarded as interim\tcom-
\npensation by the High Court.\n<\/p>\n
    85.\t The figures adopted by the High Court in regard  to
\nthe  number  of fatal cases and cases  of  serious  personal
\ninjuries  did  not appear to have been disputed\t by  anybody
\nbefore\tthe  High  Court, this Court  observed.\t From  those
\nfigures, it came to the conclusion that the total number  of
\nfatal  cases  was about 3,000 and of  grievous\tand  serious
\npersonal  injuries,  as\t verifiable  from  the\trecords\t was
\n30,000. This Court also took into consideration that about 8
\nmonths after the occurrence a survey had been conducted\t for
\nthe purpose of identification of cases. These figures  indi-
\ncated  less than 10,000. In those circumstances, as a  rough
\nand  ready estimate, this Court took into consideration\t the
\nprima  facie  findings of the High Court and  estimated\t the
\nnumber\tof  fatal cases of 3,000  where\t compensation  could
\nrange from Rs. 1 lakh to Rs.3 lakhs. This would account\t for
\nRs.70  crores,\tnearly 3 times higher than what\t would\thave
\notherwise been awarded in comparable cases in motor vehicles
\naccident claims.\n<\/p>\n
    86. The Court recognised the effect of death and reiter-
\nated  that loss of precious human lives is irreparable.\t The
\nlaw can only hope to compensate the estate of a person whose
\nlife was lost by the wrongful act of another only in the way
\nthe law was equipped to compensate i.e. by monetary  compen-
\nsation\tcalculated  on certain\twell-recognised\t principles.
\n“Loss to the estate” which is the entitlement of the  estate
\nand  the  ‘loss\t of dependency’ estimated on  the  basis  of
\ncapitalised present value awardable to the heirs and depend-
\nants, this Court considered, were the main components in the
\ncomputation  of compensation in fatal accident actions,\t but
\nthe  High Court adopted a higher basis. The Court also\ttook
\ninto  account  the personal injury cases,  and\tstated\tthat
\nthese apportionments were merely broad considerations gener-
\nally guiding the idea of reasonableness of the overall basis
\nof
\n675<\/span>
\nsettlement,  and  reiterated that this exercise\t was  not  a
\npre-determination of the quantum of compensation amongst the
\nclaimants either individually or catagory-wise, and that the
\ndetermination of the actual quantum of compensation  payable
\nto the claimants has to be done by the authorities under the
\nAct. These were the broad assessments and on that basis\t the
\nCourt made the assessment. The Court believed that this\t was
\na  just\t and reasonable assessment based  on  the  materials
\navailable at that time. So far as the other question,  name-
\nly,  the  vital juristic principles  of\t great\tcontemporary
\nrelevance  to  the Third World generally, and  to  India  in
\nparticular,  touching problems emerging from the pursuit  of
\nsuch  dangerous\t technologies for economic gains  by  multi-
\nnationals in this case, the Court recognised that these were
\ngreat problems and reiterated that there was need to  evolve
\na  national policy to protect national interests  from\tsuch
\nultra-hazardous pursuits of economic gain; and that Jurists,
\ntechnologists  and other experts in economics.\t environmen-
\ntology,\t futurology,  sociology\t and  public  health  should
\nidentify  the areas of common concern and help\tin  evolving
\nproper criteria which might receive judicial recognition and
\nlegal  sanction.  The Court reiterated that  some  of  these
\nproblems were referred to in M.C. Mehta’s case (supra).\t But
\nin the present case, the compulsions of the need for immedi-
\nate  relief to tens of thousands of suffering victims  could
\nnot  wait till these questions vital though these  be,\twere
\nresolved  in  due course of judicial  proceedings;  and\t the
\ntremendous suffering of thousands of persons compelled\tthis
\nCourt to move into the direction of immediate relief  which,
\nthis Court thought, should not be subordinated to the uncer-
\ntain  promises of the law, and when the assessment of  fair-
\nness of the amount was based on certain factors and  assump-
\ntions not disputed even by the plaintiffs.\n<\/p>\n
    87.\t Before considering the question  of  constitutional
\nvalidity  of the Act, in the light of the background of\t the
\nfacts  and circumstances of this case and submissions  made,
\nit is necessary to refer to the order dated 3rd March,\t1989
\npassed\tby the Constitution Bench in respect of\t writ  peti-
\ntions Nos. 164\/86 and 268\/89, consisting of 5 learned Judges
\npresided over by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India. The
\norder  stated  that  these matters would be  listed  on\t 8th
\nMarch, 1989 before a Constitution Bench for decision “on the
\nsole question whether the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Process-
\ning of Claims) Act, 1985 is ultra vires”. This is a judicial
\norder passed by the said Constitution Bench. This is not  an
\nadministrative\torder. Thus, these matters are\tbefore\tthis
\nCourt.\tThe  question,\ttherefore, arises;  what  are  these
\nmatters? The aforesaid order specifically states that  these
\nmatters were placed before this Bench on the “sole question”
\nwhether the Act is ulta vires.\n<\/p>\n
676<\/span><\/p>\n
Hence, these matters are not before this Bench for  disposal
\nof  these writ petitions. If as a result of  the  determina-
\ntion,  one way or the other, it is held, good and  bad,\t and
\nthat some relief becomes necessary, the same cannot be given
\nor  an\torder cannot be passed in  respect  thereof,  except
\ndeclaring  the Act or any portion of the Act, valid  or\t in-
\nvalid constitutionally as the decision might be.\n<\/p>\n
    88.\t In writ petition No. 268\/89 there is  consequential
\nprayer to set aside the order dated 14\/15th February,  1989.
\nBut  since the order dated 3rd March, 1989 above  only\tsug-
\ngests that these matters have been placed before this  Bench
\n‘on the sole question’ whether the Bhopal Act is ultra vires
\nor  not,  it is not possible by virtue of that order  to  go
\ninto the question whether the settlement is valid or  liable
\nto be set aside as prayed for in the prayers in these appli-
\ncations.\n<\/p>\n
    89.\t The provisions of the Act have been noted  and\t the
\nrival  contentions of the parties have been set out  before.
\nIt is, however, necessary to reiterate that the Act does not
\nin  any way circumscribe the liability of the UCC,  UCIL  or
\neven  the Govt. of India or Govt. of Madhya Pradesh if\tthey
\nare  jointly  or  severally liable. This  follows  from\t the
\nconstruction of the Act, from the language that is apparent.
\nThe context and background do not indicate to the  contrary.
\nCounsel\t for the victims plead that that is so. The  learned
\nAttorney General accepts that position. The liability of the
\nGovernment  is,\t however, disputed. This Act also  does\t not
\ndeal  with any question of criminal liability of any of\t the
\nparties concerned. On an appropriate reading of the relevant
\nprovisions  of\tthe Act, it is apparent\t that  the  criminal
\nliability arising out of Bhopal gas leak disaster is not the
\nsubject-matter\tof this Act and cannot be said to have\tbeen
\nin any way affected, abridged or modified by virtue of\tthis
\nAct. This was the contention of learned counsel on behalf of
\nthe victims. It is also the contention of the learned Attor-
\nney General. In our opinion, it is the correct analysis\t and
\nconsequence  of the relevant provisions of the\tAct.  Hence,
\nthe  submissions made on behalf of some of the victims\tthat
\nthe  Act  was bad as it abridged or took away  the  victims’
\nright  to proceed criminally against the delinquent,  be  it
\nUCC  or\t UCIL or jointly or severally the  Govt.  of  India,
\nGovt.  of Madhya Pradesh or Mr. Arjun Singh,  the  erstwhile
\nChief Minister of Madhya Pradesh, is on a wrong basis. There
\nis no curtailment of any right with respect to any  criminal
\nliability.  Criminal liability is not the subject-matter  of
\nthe Act. By the terms of the Act and also on the concessions
\nmade  by the learned Attorney General, if that be  so,\tthen
\ncan non-prosecution in criminal liability be a consideration
\nor  valid consideration for settlement of claims  under\t the
\nAct?\n<\/p>\n
677<\/span><\/p>\n
This is a question which has been suggested and\t articulated
\nby  learned counsel appearing for the victims. On the  other
\nhand,  it has been asserted by the learned Attorney  General
\nthat  that  part of the order dated 14\/15th  February,\t1989
\ndealing with criminal prosecution or the order of this Court
\nwas  by\t virtue of the inherent power of  this\tCourt  under
\nArticles  136 & 142 of the Constitution. These, the  learned
\nAttorney  General  said,  were in the  exercise\t of  plenary
\npowers\tof  this Court. These are not  considerations  which
\ninduced\t the parties to enter into settlement. For the\tpur-
\npose of determination of constitutional validity of the Act,
\nit  is however necessary to say that criminal  liability  of
\nany  of\t the  delinquents  or of  the  parties\tis  not\t the
\nsubject-matter\tof this Act and the Act does not  deal\twith
\neither claims or rights arising out of such criminal liabil-
\nity. This aspect is necessary to be reiterated on the  ques-
\ntion of validity of the Act.\n<\/p>\n
    90. We have set out the language and the purpose of\t the
\nAct,  and also noted the meaning of the\t expression  ‘claim’
\nand  find  that the Act was to secure the  claims  connected
\nwith  or  arising out of the disaster so that  these  claims
\nmight be dealt with speedily, affectively, equitably and  to
\nthe best advantage of the claimants. In our opinion,  Clause\n<\/p>\n
(b) of Section 2 includes all claims of the victims  arising
\nout of and connected with the disaster for compensation\t and
\ndamages\t or loss of life or personal injury or loss  to\t the
\nbusiness  and flora and fauna. What, however, is the  extent
\nof liability, is another question. This Act does not purport
\nto or even to deal with the extent of liability arising\t out
\nof  the said gas leak disaster. Hence, it would be  improper
\nor  incorrect  to contend as did Ms. Jaising,  Mr  Garg\t and
\nother  learned counsel appearing for the victims,  that\t the
\nAct  circumscribed  the\t liability–criminal,  punitive\t  or
\nabsolute  of the parties in respect of the leakage. The\t Act
\nprovides for a method or procedure for the establishment and
\nenforcement  of\t that liability. Good deal of  argument\t was
\nadvanced before this Court on the question that the  settle-
\nment has abridged the liability and this Court has lost\t the
\nchance of laying down the extent of liability arising out of
\ndisaster like the Bhopal Gas Leak disaster. Submissions were
\nmade that we should lay down clearly the extent of liability
\narising\t out of these types of disasters and we should\tfur-
\nther  hold that the Act abridged such liability and as\tsuch
\ncurtailed  the\trights of the victims and was  bad  on\tthat
\nscore. As mentioned hereinbefore, this is an argument  under
\na  misconception. The Act does not in any way except to\t the
\nextent\tindicated  in  the relevant provisions\tof  the\t Act
\ncircumscribe  or  abridge the extent of the  rights  of\t the
\nvictims\t so  far  as the liability of  the  delinquents\t are
\nconcerned. Whatever are the rights of the victims and  what-
\never claims arise out of the
\n678<\/span>
\ngas leak disaster for compensation, personal injury, loss of
\nlife  and  property, suffered or likely to be  sustained  or
\nexpenses to be incurred or any other loss are covered by the
\nAct  and the Central Govt. by operation of Section 3 of\t the
\nAct  has  been given the exclusive right  to  represent\t the
\nvictims in their place and stead. By the Act, the extent  of
\nliability  is not in any way abridged and, therefore, if  in
\ncase  of  any industrial disaster like the Bhopal  Gas\tLeak
\ndisaster,  there is right in victims to recover\t damages  or
\ncompensation  on the basis of absolute liability,  then\t the
\nsame is not in any manner abridged or curtailed.\n<\/p>\n
    91. Over 120 years ago Rylands v. Fletcher, [1868]\tVol.
\n3 LR E & I Appeal Cases 330 was decided in England. There A,
\nwas the lessee of certain mines. B, was the owner of a\tmill
\nstanding  on land adjoining that under which the mines\twere
\nworked.\t B, desired to construct a reservoir,  and  employed
\ncompetent  persons, such as engineers and a  contractor,  to
\nconstruct  it.\tA, had worked his mines up to a\t spot  where
\nthere  were  certain old passages of  disused  mines;  these
\npassages were connected with vertical shafts which  communi-
\ncated  with the land above, and which had also been  out  of
\nuse for years, and were apparently filled with marl and\t the
\nearth of the surrounding land. No care had been taken by the
\nengineer  or  the contractor to block up these\tcrafts,\t and
\nshortly\t after water had been introduced into the  reservoir
\nit broke through some of the shafts, flowed through the\t old
\npassage\t and  flooded As mine. It was held by the  House  of
\nLords  in  England  that where the owner  of  land,  without
\nwilfulness  or\tnegligence, uses his land  in  the  ordinary
\nmanner\tof its use, though mischief should thereby be  occa-
\nsioned\tto his neighbour, he will not be liable in  damages.
\nBut  if\t he brings upon his land any thing which  would\t not
\nnaturally  come upon it, and which is in  itself  dangerous,
\nand may become mischievous if not kept under proper control,
\nthough in so doing he may act without personal wilfulness or
\nnegligence,  he will be liable in’ damages for any  mischief
\nthereby\t occasioned. In the background of the facts  it\t was
\nheld  that  A  was entitled to recover damages\tfrom  B,  in
\nrespect\t of the injury. The question of liability was  high-
\nlighted\t by this Court in M.C. Mehta’s case (supra) where  a
\nConstitution  Bench of this Court had to deal with the\trule
\nof  strict liability. This Court held that the rule  in\t Ry-
\nlands  v. Fletcher, (supra) laid down a principle that if  a
\nperson\twho brings on his land and collects and\t keep  there
\nanything  likely to do harm and such thing escapes and\tdoes
\ndamage to another, he is liable to compensate for the damage
\ncaused.\t This  rule applies only to nonnatural user  of\t the
\nland  and does not apply to things naturally on the land  or
\nwhere  the  escape is due to an act of God and an act  of  a
\nstranger  or the default of the person injured or where\t the
\nthings which escape
\n679<\/span>
\nare  present  by  the consent of the person  injured  or  in
\ncertain\t cases where there is a statutory authority.  There,
\nthis  Court observed that the rule in Rylands  v.  Fletcher,
\n(supra)\t evolved in the 19th century at a time when all\t the
\ndevelopments of science and technology had not taken  place,
\nand  the  same cannot afford any guidance  in  evolving\t any
\nstandard  of  liability consistent with\t the  constitutional
\nnorms  and the needs of the present day economy\t and  social
\nstructure.  In a modern industrial society with\t highly\t de-
\nveloped scientific knowledge and technology where  hazardous
\nor  inherently\tdangerous  industries are  necessary  to  be
\ncarried\t on  as part of the  developmental  process,  Courts
\nshould\tnot feel inhibited by this rule merely\tbecause\t the
\nnew  law does not recognise the rule of strict and  absolute
\nliability in case of an enterprise engaged in hazardous\t and
\ndangerous activity. This Court noted that law has to grow in
\norder to satisfy the needs of the fast changing society\t and
\nkeep abreast with the economic developments taking place  in
\nthe country. Law cannot afford to remain static. This  Court
\nreiterated there that if it is found necessary to  construct
\na new principle of liability to deal with an unusual  situa-
\ntion which has arisen and which is likely to arise in future
\non  account of hazardous or inherently dangerous  industries
\nwhich  are concomitant to an industrial economy,  the  Court
\nshould\tnot hesitate to evolve such principle  of  liability
\nmerely because it has not been so done in England. According
\nto this Court, an enterprise which is engaged in a hazardous
\nor  inherently\tdangerous  industry  which  poses  potential
\nthreat\tto the health and safety of the persons\t working  in
\nthe  factory and residing in the surrounding areas  owes  an
\nabsolute  and non-delegable duty to the community to  ensure
\nthat no harm results to anyone. The enterprise must be\theld
\nto  be under an obligation to provide that the hazardous  or
\ninherently dangerous activity in which it is engaged must be
\nconducted  with the highest standards of safety and  if\t any
\nharm  results  to anyone on account of an  accident  in\t the
\noperation  of  such  activity resulting,  for  instance,  in
\nescape of toxic gas the enterprise is strictly and absolute-
\nly  liable to compensate all those who were affected by\t the
\naccident  as  part of the social cost for carrying  on\tsuch
\nactivity,  regardless of whether it is carried on  carefully
\nor  not. Such liability is not subject to any of the  excep-
\ntions  which  operate vis-a-vis the  tortious  principle  of
\nstrict\tliability under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher.  If
\nthe  enterprise\t is  permitted to carry on  a  hazardous  or
\ndangerous activity for its profit, the law must presume that
\nsuch  permission is conditional on the enterprise  absorbing
\nthe cost of any accident arising on account of such activity
\nas  an\tappropriate item  of its overheads.  The  enterprise
\nalone  has the resources to discover and guard against\thaz-
\nards  or dangers and ‘to provide warning  against  potential
\nhazards.\n<\/p>\n
680<\/span><\/p>\n
This  Court reiterated that the measure of  compensation  in
\nthese kinds of cases must be correlated to the magnitude and
\ncapacity  of the enterprise because such  compensation\tmust
\nhave a deterrent effect. The larger and more prosperous\t the
\nenterprise,  the greater must be the amount of\tcompensation
\npayable by it for the harm caused on account of an  accident
\nin the carrying on of the hazardous or inherently  dangerous
\nactivity  by  the enterprise. The  determination  of  actual
\ndamages payable would depend upon various facts and  circum-
\nstances of the particular case.\n<\/p>\n
    92.\t It was urged before us that there was\tan  absolute
\nand strict liability for an enterprise which was carrying on
\ndangerous  operations  with gases in this  country.  It\t was
\nfurther\t submitted  that there was evidence on\trecord\tthat
\nsufficient  care and attention had not been given  to  safe-
\nguard against the dangers of leakage and protection in\tcase
\nof  leakage.  Indeed,  the  criminal  prosecution  that\t was
\nlaunched  against the Chairman of Union Carbide Shri  Warren
\nAnderson and others, as indicated before, charged them along
\nwith  the defendants in the suit with delinquency  in  these
\nmatters and criminal negligence in conducting the toxic\t gas
\noperations  in Bhopal. As in the instant adjudication,\tthis
\nCourt is not concerned with the determination of the  actual
\nextent\tof liability, we will proceed on the basis that\t the
\nlaw enunciated by this Court in M.C. Mehta’s case (supra) is
\nthe decision upon the basis of which damages will be payable
\nto the victims in this case. But then the practical question
\narises:\t what is the extent of actual damages  payable,\t and
\nhow  would  the quantum of damages be computed?\t Indeed,  in
\nthis connection, it may be appropriate to refer to the order
\npassed by this Court on 3rd May, 1989 giving reasons why the
\nsettlement  was\t arrived at at the  figure  indicated.\tThis
\nCourt had reiterated that it had proceeded on certain  prima
\nfacie undisputed figures of death and substantially  compen-
\nsating personal injury. This Court has referred to the\tfact
\nthat  the High Court had proceeded on the broader  principle
\nin M.C. Mehta’s case (supra) and on the basis of the capaci-
\nty  of\tthe enterprise because the  compensation  must\thave
\ndeterrent effect. On that basis the High Court had proceeded
\nto estimate the damages on the basis of Rs.2 lakhs for\teach
\ncase of death and of total permanent disability, Rs. 1\tlakh
\nfor each case of partial permanent disability and  Rs.50,000
\nfor  each  case or’ temporary partial  disability.  In\tthis
\nconnection,  the controversy as to what would have been\t the
\ndamages\t if  the action had proceeded,\tis  another  matter.
\nNormally, in measuring civil liability, the law has attached
\nmore  importance to the principle of compensation than\tthat
\nof punishment. Penal redress, however, involve both  compen-
\nsation to the person injured and punish-\n<\/p>\n
681<\/span><\/p>\n
ment  as deference. These problems were highlighted  by\t the
\nHouse  of  Lords in England in Rookes v.  Barnard,  [1964]AC
\n1129,  which indicate the difference between aggravated\t and
\nexemplary damages. Salmond on the Law of Torts, 15th Edition
\nat p. 30 emphasises that the function of damages is  compen-
\nsation rather than punishment, but punishment cannot  always
\nbe  ignored.  There are views which  are  against  exemplary
\ndamages\t on the ground that these infringe in principle\t the
\nobject of law of torts, namely, compensation and not punish-
\nment  and these tend to impose something equivalent to\tfine
\nin  criminal  law  without the safeguards  provided  by\t the
\ncriminal  law.\tIn Rookes v. Barnard (supra), the  House  of
\nLords in England recognised three classes of cases in  which
\nthe  award of exemplary damages was considered to be  justi-
\nfiable.\t Awards\t must not only, it is said,  compensate\t the
\nparties\t but  also  deter the wrong doers  and\tothers\tfrom
\nsimilar\t conduct in future. The question of  awarding  exem-
\nplary  or deterrent damages is said to have  often  confused
\ncivil and criminal functions of law. Though it is considered
\nby many that it is a legitimate. encroachment of  punishment
\nin  the\t realm of civil liability, as it operates as  a\t re-
\nstraint\t on the transgression of law which is for the  ulti-
\nmate benefit of the society. Perhaps, in this case, had\t the
\naction proceeded, one would have realised that the fall\t out
\nof  this gas disaster might have been formulation of a\tcon-
\ncept  of damages, blending both civil and criminal  liabili-
\nties.  There are, however, serious difficulties in  evolving
\nsuch  an actual concept of punitive damages in respect of  a
\ncivil  action  which can be integrated and enforced  by\t the
\njudicial  process. It would have raised serious problems  of
\npleading, proof and discovery, and interesting and challeng-
\ning as the task might have been, it is still very  uncertain
\nhow  far decision based on such a concept would have been  a
\ndecision  according  to ‘due process’ of law  acceptable  by
\ninternational  standards.  There were difficulties  in\tthat
\nattempt. But as the provisions stand these considerations do
\nnot make the Act constitutionally invalid. These are matters
\non  the\t validity of settlement. The Act, as such  does\t not
\nabridges or curtail damages or liability whatever that might
\nbe. So the challenge to the Act on the ground that there has
\nbeen curtailment or deprivation of the rights of the victims
\nwhich  is unreasonable in the situation is  unwarranted\t and
\ncannot be sustained.\n<\/p>\n
    93. Mr. Garg tried to canvass before us the expanding of
\nhorizons  of human rights. He contended that the conduct  of
\nthe multinational corporations dealing with dangerous  gases
\nfor  the purpose of development specially in the  conditions
\nprevailing  under the Third world countries requires  closer
\nscrutiny  and vigilance on the part of emerging nations.  He
\nsubmitted that unless courts are alert and active
\n682<\/span>
\nin preserving the rights of the individuals and in enforcing
\ncriminal  and strict liability and in setting up norms\tcom-
\npelling\t the  Govt. to be more vigilant\t and  enforcing\t the
\nsovereign  will of the people of India to oversee that\tsuch
\ncriminal  activities  which endanger even for  the  sake  of
\ndevelopmental work, economy and progress of the country, the
\nhealth\tand  happiness of the people and damage\t the  future
\nprospects  of  health,\tgrowth and affect  and\tpollute\t the
\nenvironment,  should be curbed and, according to him,  these
\ncould only be curbed by insisting through the legal  adjudi-
\ncation,\t punitive  and deterrent punishment in the  form  of
\ndamages.  He also pleaded that norms should be set up  indi-
\ncating\thow  these kinds of dangerous operations are  to  be
\npermitted  under  conditions of vigilance  and\tsurvillence.
\nWhile  we appreciate the force of these arguments,  and\t en-
\ndorse  his plea that norms and deterrence should be  aspired
\nfor,  it  is  difficult to correlate that  aspect  with\t the
\npresent problem in this decision.\n<\/p>\n
    94.\t We  do\t reiterate, as mentioned  in  the  Universal
\nDeclaration  of Human Rights that people are born  free\t and
\nthe dignity of the persons must be recognised and an  effec-
\ntive  remedy  by  competent tribunal is one  of\t the  surest
\nmethod\tof effective remedy. If, therefore, as a  result  of
\nthis tragedy new consciousness and awareness on the part  of
\nthe  people of this country to be more vigilant about  meas-
\nures and the necessity of ensuring more strict vigilance for
\npermitting  the operations of such dangerous  and  poisonous
\ngases  dawn,  then perhaps the tragic experience  of  Bhopal
\nwould not go in vain.\n<\/p>\n
    95. The main question, however, canvassed by all learned
\ncounsel\t for  the victims was that so far as the  Act  takes
\naway  the right of the victims to fight or  establish  their
\nown rights, it is a denial of access to justice, and it\t was
\ncontended that such denial is so great a deprivation of both
\nhuman dignity and right to equality that it cannot be justi-
\nfied  because  it would be affecting right  to\tlife,  which
\nagain cannot be deprived without a procedure established  by
\nlaw which is just, fair and reasonable.\n<\/p>\n
    96.\t On this aspect, Shri Shanti Bhushan tried  to\turge
\nbefore us that sections 3 & 4 of the Act. in so far as these
\nenjoin and empower the Central Govt. to institute or  prose-
\ncute  proceedings  was only an enabling\t provision  for\t the
\nCentral Govt. and not depriving or disabling provisions\t for
\nthe victim. Ms. Jaising sought to urge in addition, that  in
\norder  to  make the provisions\tconstitutionally  valid,  we
\nshould eliminate the concept of exclusiveness to the Central
\nGovt.  and  give  the victims right to sue  along  with\t the
\nCentral Govt. We are unable to accept these submissions.\n<\/p>\n
683<\/span><\/p>\n
    97.\t In our opinion, Sections 3 & 4 are categorical\t and
\nclear.\tWhen the expression is explicit, the  expression  is
\nconclusive,  alike in what it says and in what it  does\t not
\nsay. These give to the Central Government an exclusive right
\nto  act\t in place of the persons who are  entitled  to\tmake
\nclaim or have already made claim. The expression ‘exclusive’
\nis  explicit  and  significant. The  exclusivily  cannot  be
\nwhittled  down or watered down as suggested by counsel.\t The
\nsaid  expression must be given its full meaning and  extent.
\nThis  is corroborated by the use of the\t expression  ‘claim’
\nfor all purposes. If such duality of rights are given to the
\nCentral\t Govt.\talong  with the victims\t in  instituting  or
\nproceeding  for\t the realisation or the enforcement  of\t the
\nclaims\tarising out of Bhopal gas leak disaster,  then\tthat
\nwould  be so cumbersome that it would not be speedy,  effec-
\ntive or equitable and would not be the best or more advanta-
\ngeous  procedure for securing the claims arising out of\t the
\nleakage.  In  that  view of the matter and in  view  of\t the
\nlanguage  used and the purpose intended to be  achieved,  we
\nare  unable to accept this aspect of the arguments  advanced
\non behalf of the victims. It was then contended that by\t the
\nprocedure  envisaged by the Act, the victims have  been\t de-
\nprived\tand  denied.their rights and property to  fight\t for
\ncompensation.  The victims, it has been asserted, have\tbeen
\ndenied access to justice. It is a great deprivation, it\t was
\nurged. It was contended that the procedure evolved under the
\nAct  for  the victims is peculiar and having  good  deal  of
\ndisadvantages for the victims. Such special  disadvantageous
\nprocedure  and treatment is unequal treatment, it  was\tsug-
\ngested.\t It was, therefore, violative of Article 14  of\t the
\nConstitution, that is the argument advanced.\n<\/p>\n
    98. The Act does provide a special procedure in  respect
\nof the rights of the victims and to that extent the  Central
\nGovernment  takes upon itself the rights of the victims.  It
\nis a special Act providing a special procedure for a kind of
\nspecial\t class\tof victims. In view of the enormity  of\t the
\ndisaster  the  victims of the Bhopal gas leak  disaster,  as
\nthey were placed against the multinational and a big  Indian
\ncorporation  and in view of the presence of foreign  contin-
\ngency  lawyers to whom the victims were exposed, the  claim-
\nants and victims can legitimately be described as a class by
\nthemselves different and distinct, sufficiently separate and
\nindentifiable to be entitled to special treatment for effec-
\ntive, speedy, equitable and best advantageous settlement  of
\ntheir claims. There indubitably is differentiation. But this
\ndifferentiation\t is based on a principle which has  rational
\nnexus with the aim intended to be achieved by this differen-
\ntiation.  The disaster being unique in its character and  in
\nthe recorded history of industrial disasters situated as the
\nvictims were against a mighty multinational with
\n684<\/span>
\nthe presence of foreign contingency lawyers. looming on\t the
\nscene,\tin  our opinion, there were sufficient\tgrounds\t for
\nsuch  differentiation and different treatment.\tIn  treating
\nthe victims of the gas leak disaster differently and provid-
\ning  them a procedure, which was just, fair, reasonable\t and
\nwhich  was not unwarranted or unauthorised by the  Constitu-
\ntion, Article 14 is not breached. We are, therefore,  unable
\nto accept this criticism of the. Act.\n<\/p>\n
    99. The second aspect canvassed on behalf of the victims
\nis that the procedure envisaged is unreasonable and as\tsuch
\nnot  warranted by the situation and cannot be treated  as  a
\nprocedure  which is just, fair and reasonable. The  argument
\nhas  to be judged by the yardstick, as\tmentioned  hereinbe-
\nfore,  enunciated by this Court in State of Madras  v.\tV.G.
\nRao,<\/a> (supra). Hence, both the restrictions or limitations on
\nthe substantive and procedural rights in the impugned legis-
\nlation will have to be judged from the point of view of\t the
\nparticular Statute in question. No abstract rule or standard
\nof  reasonableness can be applied. That question has  to  be
\njudged having regard to the nature of the rights alleged  to
\nhave been infringed in this case, the extent and urgency  of
\nthe evil sought to be remedied, disproportionate imposition,
\nprevailing conditions at the time, all these facts will have
\nto be taken into consideration. Having considered the  back-
\nground,\t the plight of the impoverished, the urgency of\t the
\nvictims’  need,\t the  presence of  the\tforeign\t contingency
\nlawyers, the procedure of settlement in USA in mass  action,
\nthe  strength for the foreign multinationals, the nature  of
\ninjuries and damages, and the limited but significant  right
\nof  participation of the victims as contemplated by  s.4  of
\nthe Act, the Act cannot be condemned as unreasonable.\n<\/p>\n
    100. In this connection, the concept of ‘parens patriae’
\nin  jurisprudence may be examined. It was contended  by\t the
\nlearned\t Attorney  General  that the State  had\t taken\tupon
\nitself\tthis onus to effectively come in as parens  patriae,
\nwe  have  noted\t the long line of  Indian  decisions  where,
\nthough\tin different contexts, the concept of State  as\t the
\nparent\tof people who are not quite able to or competent  to
\nfight  for  their rights or assert their rights,  have\tbeen
\nutilised.  It  was  contended that the\tdoctrine  of  parens
\npatriae cannot be applicable to the victims. How the concept
\nhas  been understood in this country as well as\t in  America
\nhas been noted. Legal dictionaries have been referred to  as
\nnoted  before. It was asserted on behalf of the\t victims  by
\nlearned\t counsel  that the concept of ‘parens  patriae’\t can
\nnever be invoked for the purpose of suits in domestic juris-
\ndiction of any country. This can only be applied in  respect
\nof the claims out of the
\n685<\/span>
\ncountry\t in foreign jurisdiction. It was  further  contended
\nthat this concept of ‘parens patraie’ can only be applied in
\ncase  of persons who are under disability and would  not  be
\napplicable in respect of those who are able to assert  their
\nown rights. It is true that victims or their representatives
\nare sui generis and cannot as such due to age, mental capac-
\nity  or\t other\treason not legally incapable  for  suing  or
\npursuing  the  remedies\t for the rights yet they  are  at  a
\ntremendous  disadvantage  in the broader  and  comprehensive
\nsense of the term. These victims cannot be considered to  be
\nany  match to the multinational companies or the Govt.\twith
\nwhom in the conditions that the victims or their representa-
\ntives  were after the disaster physically, mentally,  finan-
\ncially,\t economically  and also because of the\tposition  of
\nlitigation  would  have to contend. In such a  situation  of
\npredicament the victims can legitimately be considered to be
\ndisabled.  They\t were in no position by themselves  to\tlook
\nafter  their own interests effectively or  purposefully.  In
\nthat  background,  they are people who\tneeded\tthe  State’s
\nprotection  and should come within the umbrella\t of  State’s
\nsovereignty  to assert, establish and maintain their  rights
\nagainst\t the  wrong  doers in this mass\t disaster.  In\tthat
\nperspective,  it is jurisprudentially possible to apply\t the
\nprinciple  of  parens patriae doctrine to the  victims.\t But
\nquite  apart from that, it has to be borne in mind  that  in
\nthis  case the State is acting on the basis of\tthe  Statute
\nitself.\t For the authority of the Central Govt. to  sue\t for
\nand  on\t behalf of or instead in place of  the\tvictims,  no
\nother  theory, concept or any jurisprudential  principle  is
\nrequired  than the Act itself. The Act empowers and  substi-
\ntutes  the Central Govt. It displaces the victims by  opera-
\ntion  of  Section 3 of the Act and substitutes\tthe  Central
\nGovt. in its place. The victims have been divested of  their
\nrights\tto  sue and such claims and such  rights  have\tbeen
\nvested\tin the Central Govt. The victims have been  divested
\nbecause\t the victims were disabled. The disablement  of\t the
\nvictims\t vis-a-vis  their adversaries in this  matter  is  a
\nself-evident  factor. If that is the position then,  in\t our
\nopinion,  even\tif  the strict application  of\tthe  ‘parens
\npatriae’  doctrine  is not in order, as a concept  it  is  a
\nguide.\tThe  jurisdiction  of the State’s  power  cannot  be
\ncircumscribed by the limitations of the traditional  concept
\nof  parens patriae. Jurisprudentially, it could be  utilised
\nto  suit  or alter or adapt itself in  the  changed  circum-
\nstances.  In  the situation in which the victims  were,\t the
\nState  had  to assume the role of a  parent  protecting\t the
\nrights\tof the victims who must come within  the  protective
\numbrella  of  the State and the common\tsovereignty  of\t the
\nIndian\tpeople. As we have noted the Act is an\texercise  of
\nthe  sovereign\tpower  of the State. It\t is  an\t appropriate
\nevolution of the expression of sovereignty in the  situation
\nthat had arisen. We must recognize and accept it as such.\n<\/p>\n
686<\/span><\/p>\n
    101.  But  this right and obligation of  the  State\t has
\nanother\t aspect.  Shri Shanti Bhushan has  argued  and\tthis
\nargument  has  also been adopted by  other  learned  counsel
\nappearing  for the victims that with the assumption  by\t the
\nState of the jurisdiction and power as a parent to fight for
\nthe  victims in the situation there is an imcumbent  obliga-
\ntion  on  the  State, in the words of Judge  Keenan,  ‘as  a
\nmatter of fundamental human decency’ to maintain the victims
\nuntil  the  claims  are established and\t realised  from\t the
\nforeign\t multinationals.  The  major  inarticulate   premise
\napparent  from the Act and the scheme and the spirit of\t the
\nAct is that so long as the rights of the victims are  prose-
\ncuted  the  State  must protect and  preserve  the  victims.
\nOtherwise  the\tobject\tof the Act would  be  defeated,\t its
\npurpose\t frustrated. Therefore, continuance of the  payments
\nof  the interim maintenance for the continued sustenance  of
\nthe victims is an obligation arising out of State’s  assump-
\ntion of the power and temporary deprivation of the rights of
\nthe victims and divestiture of the rights of the victims  to
\nfight  for  their own rights. This is  the  only  reasonable
\ninterpretation\twhich is just, fair and proper.\t Indeed,  in
\nthe language of the Act there is support for this  interpre-
\ntation.\t Section  9 of the Act gives power  to\tthe  Central
\nGovt.  to frame by notification, a scheme for carrying\tinto
\neffect the purposes of the Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 9
\nprovides  for the matters for which the scheme may  provide.
\nAmongst\t others,  clause (d) of Section\t 9(2)  provides\t for
\ncreation  of a fund for meeting expenses in connection\twith
\nthe  administration of the Scheme and of the  provisions  of
\nthe  Act; and clause (e) of Section 9(2) covers the  amounts
\nwhich the Central Govt. “may after due appropriation made by
\nParliament  by\tlaw in that behalf, credit to the  fund\t re-
\nferred\tto in clause (d) and any other amounts which may  be
\ncredited to such fund”. Clause (f) of Section 9(2) speaks of
\nthe  utilisation, by way of disbursal (including  apportion-
\nment) or otherwise, of any amounts received in\tsatisfaction
\nof  the\t claims.  These provisions are\tsuggestive  but\t not
\nexplicit.  Clause (b) of Section 10 which provides  that  in
\ndisbursing  under the scheme the amount received by  way  of
\ncompensation  or  damages in satisfaction of a\tclaim  as  a
\nresult\tof the adjudication or settlement of the claim by  a
\ncourt or other authority, deduction shall be made from\tsuch
\namount\tof  the sums, if any, paid to the  claimant  by\t the
\nGovt. before the disbursal of such amount. The Scheme framed
\nis  also significant. Clause 10 of the Scheme  provides\t for
\nthe  claims  and  relief funds\tand  includes  disbursal  of
\namounts\t as relief including interim relief to\tpersons\t af-
\nfected\tby  the Bhopal gas leak disaster  and  Clause  11(1)
\nstipulates  that disbursal of any amounts under\t the  scheme
\nshall  be made by the Deputy Commissioner to  each  claimant
\nthrough credit in a bank or postal saving account, stressing
\nthat the legislative policy underlined
\n687<\/span>
\nthe  Bhopal Act contemplated payment of interim relief\ttill
\nsuch time as the’ Central Govt. was able to recover from the
\nUnion  Carbide\tfull amount of compensation from  which\t the
\ninterim\t reliefs already paid were to be deducted  from\t the
\namount\tpayable\t to them for the final\tdisbursal.  The\t Act
\nshould be construed as creating an obligation oh the Central
\nGovt. to pay interim relief as the Act deprives the  victims
\nof normal and immediate right of obtaining compensation from
\nthe Union Carbide. Had the Act not been enacted, the victims
\ncould have and perhaps would have been entitled not only  to
\nsue  the  Union Carbide themselves, but also to\t enter\tinto
\nsettlement or compromise of some sort with them. The  provi-
\nsions  of the Act deprived the victims of that\tlegal  right
\nand opportunity, and that deprivation is substantial  depri-
\nvation\tbecause\t upon  immediate relief\t depends  often\t the
\nsurvival  of these victims. In that background, it  is\tjust
\nand proper that this deprivation is only to be justified  if
\nthe  Act  is read with the obligation  of  granting  interim
\nrelief\tor maintenance by the Central Government  until\t the
\nfull amount of the dues of the victims is realised from\t the
\nUnion  Carbide\tafter adjudication or  settlement  and\tthen
\ndeducting therefrom the interim relief paid to the  victims.
\nAs  submitted by learned Attorney General, it is  true\tthat
\nthere  is no actual expression used in the Act itself  which
\nexpressly postulates or indicates such a duty or  obligation
\nunder the Act. Such an obligation is, however, inherent\t and
\nmust  be the basis of properly construing the spirit of\t the
\nAct.  In our opinion, this is the true basis and will be  in
\nconsonance  with the spirit of the Act. It must be,  to\t use
\nthe well-known phrase ‘the major inarticulate premise’\tupon
\nwhich  though not expressly stated, the Act proceeds. It  is
\non this promise or premise that the State would be justified
\nin  taking upon itself the right and obligation\t to  proceed
\nand prosecute the claim and deny access to the courts of law
\nto  the victims on their own. If it is only so read, it\t can
\nonly  be  held to be constitutionally valid. It\t has  to  be
\nborne in mind that the language of the Act does not militate
\nagainst\t this construction but on the contrary, Sections  9,
\n10  and the scheme of the Act suggest that the Act  contains
\nsuch an obligation. If it is so read, then only meat can  be
\nput  into the skeleton of the Act making it  meaningful\t and
\npurposeful.  The Act must, therefore, be so read.  This\t ap-
\nproach to the interpretation of the Act can legitimately  be
\ncalled\tthe ‘constructive intuition’ which, in our  opinion,
\nis a permissible mode of viewing the Acts of Parliament. The
\nfreedom to search for ‘the spirit of the Act’ or the quanti-
\nty of the mischief at which it is aimed (both synonymous for
\nthe intention of the parliament) opens up the possibility of
\nliberal\t interpretation “that delicate and important  branch
\nof judicial power, the concession of which is dangerous, the
\ndenial ruinous”. Given this freedom it is a rare
\n688<\/span>
\nopportunity though never to be misused and challenge for the
\nJudges to adopt and give meaning to the Act, articulate\t and
\ninarticulate,  and thus translate the intention of the\tPar-
\nliament and fulfil the object of the Act. After all, the Act
\nwas  passed  to\t give  relief to the  victims  who,  it\t was
\nthought, were unable to establish their own rights and fight
\nfor themselves. it is common knowledge that the victims were
\npoor  and  impoverished.  How could they  survive  the\tlong
\nordeal of litigation and ultimate execution of the decree or
\nthe  orders unless provisions be made for  their  sustenance
\nand maintenance, especially when they have been deprived  of
\nthe  fight to fight for these claims themselves? We,  there-
\nfore, read the Act accordingly.\n<\/p>\n
    102. It was, then, contended that the Central Govt.\t was
\nnot  competent to represent the victims. This  argument\t has
\nbeen  canvassed on various grounds. It has been\t urged\tthat
\nthe  Central Govt. owns 22% share in UCIL and as such  there
\nis a conflict of interest between the Central Govt. and\t the
\nvictims,  and  on that ground the former is  disentitled  to
\nrepresent the latter in their battle against UCC and UCIL. A
\nlarge  number  of  authorities on this\taspect\twere  cited.
\nHowever,  it is not necessary in the view we have  taken  to
\ndeal with these because factually the Central Govt. does not
\nown  any share in UCIL. These are the statutory\t independent
\norganisations,\tnamely, Unit Trust of India and Life  Insur-
\nance Corporation, who own 20 to 22% share in UCIL. The Govt.
\nhas certain amount of say and control in LIC and UTI. Hence,
\nit  cannot be said, in our opinion, that there is  any\tcon-
\nflict of interest in the real sense of the matter in respect
\nof  the claims of Bhopal gas leak disaster between the\tCen-
\ntral Govt. and the victims. Secondly, in a situation of this
\nnature,\t the Central Govt. is the only authority  which\t can
\npursue\tand effectively represent the victims. There  is  no
\nother  organisation or Unit which can effectively  represent
\nthe  victims.  Perhaps, theoretically, it  might  have\tbeen
\npossible to constitute another independent statutory body by
\nthe  Govt.  under its control and supervision  in  whom\t the
\nclaim of the victims might have been vested and\t substituted
\nand  that  Body could have been entrusted with the  task  of
\nagitating or establishing the same claims in the same manner
\nas  the Central Govt. has done under the Act. But  the\tfact
\nthat that has not been done, in our opinion, does not in any
\nway  affect  the position. Apart from that, lastly,  in\t our
\nopinion,  this\tconcept that where there is  a\tconflict  of
\ninterest,  the\tperson\thaving the conflict  should  not  be
\nentrusted  with the task of this nature, does not  apply  in
\nthe  instant situation. In the instant case, no question  of
\nviolation  of the principle of natural justice\tarises,\t and
\nthere is no scope for the application of the principle\tthat
\nno man should be a Judge in his own cause. The Central
\n689<\/span>
\nGovt.  was not judging any claim, but was fighting  and\t ad-
\nvancing\t the claims-of the victims. In those  circumstances,
\nit cannot be said that there was any violation of the  prin-
\nciples\tof natural justice and such entrustment to the\tCen-
\ntral  Govt.  of the right to ventilate for the\tvictims\t was
\nimproper  or  bad.  The adjudication would be  done  by\t the
\ncourts, and therefore there is no scope of the violation  of
\nany principle of natural justice.\n<\/p>\n
    103.  Along with this submission, the argument was\tthat
\nthe power and the right given to the Central Govt. to  fight
\nfor the claims of the victims, is unguided and\tuncanalised.
\nThis submission cannot be accepted. Learned Attorney General
\nis  right that the power conferred on the Central  Govt.  is
\nnot  uncanalised. The power is circumscribed by the  purpose
\nof the Act. If there is any improper exercise or  transgres-
\nsion  of  the power then the exercise of that power  can  be
\ncalled in question and set aside, but the Act cannot be said
\nto be violative of the rights of the victims on that  score.
\nWe have noted the relevant authorities on the question\tthat
\nhow power should be exercised is different and separate from
\nthe  question  whether the power is valid or not.  The\tnext
\nargument  on behalf of the victims was that there  was\tcon-
\nflict  of interest between the victims and the Govt.  viewed
\nfrom  another aspect of the matter. It has been\t urged\tthat
\nthe  Central  Govt. as well as the Govt. of  Madhya  Pradesh
\nalong  with  the erstwhile Chief Minister of  the  State  of
\nMadhya\tPradesh Shri Arjun Singh were guilty of\t negligence,
\nmalfeasance  and non-feasance, and as such were\t liable\t for
\ndamages\t along with Union Carbide and UCIL. In other  words,
\nit  has been said that the Govt. of India and the  Govt.  of
\nMadhya\tPradesh along with Mr. Arjun Singh are\tjoint  tort-
\nfeasors and joint wrong doers. Therefore. it was urged\tthat
\nthere  is  conflict  of interest in respect  of\t the  claims
\narising\t out of the the gas leak disaster between the  Govt.
\nof  India  and\tthe victims and in such a  conflict,  it  is
\nimproper, rather illegal and unjust to vest in the Govt.  of
\nIndia the rights and claims of the victims. As noted before,
\nthe  Act was passed in a particular background and,  in\t our
\nopinion,  if  read in that background,\tonly  covers  claims
\nagainst Union Carbide or UCIL. “Bhopal gas leak disaster” or
\n“disaster” has been defined in clause (a) of Section (2)  as
\nthe  occurrence\t on the 2nd and 3rd days of  December,\t1984
\nwhich involved the release of highly noxious and  abnormally
\ndangerous  gas from a plant in Bhopal (being a plant of\t the
\nUCIL, a subsidiary of the UCC of U.S.A.) and which  resulted
\nin  loss  of  life and damage to property  on  an  extensive
\nscale.\n<\/p>\n
690<\/span><\/p>\n
    104. In this context, the Act has to be understood\tthat
\nit is in respect of the person responsible, being the person
\nin-charge-of  the  UCIL\t and the parent\t company  UCC.\tThis
\ninterpretation\tof  the Act is further strengthened  by\t the
\nfact  that  a “claimant” has been defined in clause  (c)  of
\nSection\t 2 as a person who is entitled to make a  claim\t and
\nthe  expression “person” in Section 2(e) includes the  Govt.
\nTherefore,  the\t Act proceeded on the  assumption  that\t the
\nGovt.  could be a claimant being a person as such.  Further-
\nmore,  this construction and the perspective of the  Act  is
\nstrengthened  if a reference is made to the debate  both  in
\nthe Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha to which references have\tbeen
\nmade.\n<\/p>\n
    105.  The question whether there is scope for the  Union
\nof India being responsible or liable as a joint tort  feasor
\nis  a  difficult and different question. But  even  assuming
\nthat  it was possible that the Central Government  might  be
\nliable in a case of this nature, the learned Attorney Gener-
\nal was right in contending that it was only proper that\t the
\nCentral\t Government should be able and authorised to  repre-
\nsent  the  victims. In such a situation, there\twill  be  no
\nscope of the violation of the principles of natural justice.
\nThe doctrine of necessity would be applicable in a situation
\nof  this nature. The doctrine has been elaborated, in  Hals-
\nbury’s\tLaws of England, 4th Edition, p, 89,  paragraph\t 73,
\nwhere it was reiterated that even if all the members of\t the
\nTribunal  competent  to determine a matter were\t subject  to
\ndisqualification,  they might be authorised and\t obliged  to
\nhear  that matter, by virtue of the operation of the  common
\nlaw doctrine of necessity,, An adjudicator who is subject to
\ndisqualification  on the ground of bias or interest  in\t the
\nmatter\twhich he has to decide may in certain  circumstances
\nbe required to adjudicate if there is no other person who is
\ncompetent  or  authorised to be adjudicator or if  a  quorum
\ncannot be formed without him or if no other competent tribu-
\nnal can be constituted. In the circumstances of the case, as
\nmentioned  hereinbefore,  the Government of  India  is\tonly
\ncapable\t to represent the victims as a party. The  adjudica-
\ntion, however, of the claims would be done by the Court.  In
\nthose  circumstances, we are unable to accept the  challenge
\non  the\t ground of the violation of  principles\t of  natural
\njustice on this score. The learned Attorney General,  howev-
\ner,  sought  to advance, as we have  indicated\tbefore,\t his
\ncontention  on the ground of de facto validity. He  referred
\nto certain decisions. We are of the opinion that this  prin-
\nciple  will not be applicable. We are also not impressed  by
\nthe plea of the doctrine of bona fide representation of\t the
\ninterests of victims in all these proceedings. We are of the
\nopinion\t that the doctrine of bonafide representation  would
\nnot be quite relevant and as
\n691<\/span>
\nsuch  the  decisions cited by the learned  Attorney  General
\nneed not be considered.\n<\/p>\n
    106.  There is, however, one other aspect of the  matter
\nwhich requires consideration. The victims can be divested of
\ntheir rights i.e. these can be taken away from them provided
\nthose  rights of the victims are ensured to  be\t established
\nand  agitated by the Central Govt. following  the  procedure
\nwhich  would be just, fair and reasonable.  Civil  Procedure
\nCode  is  the guide which guides civil proceedings  in\tthis
\ncountry\t and  in  other countries procedure  akin  to  Civil
\nProcedure  Code. Hence, these have been recognised  and\t ac-
\ncepted\tas  being  in consonance with the  fairness  of\t the
\nproceedings and in conformity with the principles of natural
\njustice.  Therefore, the procedure envisaged under  the\t Act
\nhas  to be judged whether it is so consistent. The  Act,  as
\nindicated before. has provided the procedure under  sections
\n3 and 4. Section 11 provides that the provisions of the\t Act
\nand  of any Scheme flamed thereunder shall have effect\tnot-
\nwithstanding  anything inconsistent therewith  contained  in
\nany  enactment other than the Act or any  instrument  having
\neffect by virtue of any enactment other than the Act. Hence,
\nif anything is inconsistent with the Act for the time being,
\nit  will  not  have force and the Act  will  override  those
\nprovisions  to the extent it does. The Act has not  specifi-
\ncally  contemplated  any  procedure to be  followed  in\t the
\naction\tto be taken pursuant to the powers  conferred  under
\nsection 3 except to the extent indicated in section 4 of the
\nAct.  Section 5, however, authorises the Central  Government
\nto  have  the  powers of a civil court for  the\t purpose  of
\ndischarging  the functions pursuant to the authority  vested
\nunder  sections 3 and 4 of the Act. There is no question  of
\nCentral\t Government  acting  as a court in  respect  of\t the
\nclaims\twhich it should enforce for or on behalf or  instead
\nof  the\t victims of the Bhopal gas leak\t disaster.  In\tthis
\nconnection,  it is necessary to note that it  was  submitted
\nthat  the  Act, so far as it deals with the  claims  of\t the
\nvictims,  should be read in conformity with Civil  Procedure
\nCode  and\/or  with the principles of  natural  justice;\t and
\nunless\tthe  provisions of\/the Act are so read it  would  be
\nviolative  of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution in\t the
\nsense  that there will be deprivation of rights to\/fife\t and
\nliberty\t without following a procedure which is\t just,\tfair
\nand  reasonable. That is the main submission and  contention
\nof the different counsel for the victims who have  appeared.
\nThe  different\tview points from which this  contention\t has
\nbeen canvassed have been noted before. On the other hand, on
\nbehalf\tof the Government, the learned Attorney General\t has
\ncanvassed  before us that there were  sufficient  safeguards
\nconsistent  with  the principles of natural  justice  within
\nthis Act and beyond what has been provided for
\n692<\/span>
\nin  a situation for which the Act was enacted, nothing\tmore
\ncould be provided and further reading down the provisions of
\nthe Act in the manner suggested would defeat the purpose  of
\nthe Act. The aforesaid section 3 provides for the  substitu-
\ntion of the Central Government with the’ right to  represent
\nand act in place of (whether within or outside India)  every
\nperson\twho  has made, or is entitled to make,\ta  claim  in
\nrespect of the disaster. The State has taken over the rights
\nand claims of the victims in the exercise of sovereignty  in
\norder  to  discharge the constitutional obligations  as\t the
\nparent\tand guardian of the victims who in the situation  as
\nplaced\tneeded the umbrella of protection. Thus,  the  State
\nhas  the power and jurisdiction and for this purpose  unless
\nthe  Act is otherwise unreasonable or violative of the\tcon-
\nstitutional  provisions, no question of giving a hearing  to
\nthe  parties  for  taking over these  fights  by  the  State
\narises.\t For legislation by the Parliament, no principle  of
\nnatural\t justice is attracted provided such  legislation  is
\nwithin\tthe competence of the legislature, which indeed\t the
\npresent\t Act is within the competence of the Parliament.  We
\nare in agreement with the submission of the learned Attorney
\nGeneral\t that  section 3 makes the  Central  Government\t the
\ndominus\t litis and it has the carriage of  the\tproceedings,
\nbut that does not solve the problem of by what procedure the
\nproceedings should be carried.\n<\/p>\n
    107.  The  next  aspect is that section 4  of  the\tAct,
\nwhich,\taccording  to  the learned  Attorney  General  gives
\nlimited\t rights to the victims in the sense that it  obliges
\nthe  Central  Government to have due regard to\tany  matters
\nwhich  such person may require to be urged with\t respect  to
\nhis  claim and shall, if such person so desires,  permit  at
\nthe  expense  of such person, a legal  practitioner  of\t his
\nchoice to be associated in the conduct of any suit or  other
\nproceeding relating to his claim”. Therefore, it obliges the
\nCentral Government to have ‘due regard’ to any matters,\t and
\nit  was urged on behalf of the victims that this  should  be
\nread in order to make the provisions constitutionally  valid
\nas providing that the victims will have a say in the conduct
\nof  the proceedings and as such must have an opportunity  of
\nknowing\t what is happening either by instructing  or  giving
\nOpinions to the Central Government and\/or providing for such
\ndirections  as\tto settlement and other\t matters.  In  other
\nwords,\tit was contended on behalf of the victims  that\t the
\nvictims should be given notice of the proceedings and there-
\nby an opportunity, if they so wanted, to advance their view:
\nand  that  to  make the provisions of s.  4  meaningful\t and
\neffective unless notice was given to the victim, disabled as
\nhe  is, the assumption upon which the Act has been  enacted,
\ncould  not come and make suggestion in the  proceedings.  If
\nthe  victims are not informed and given no opportunity,\t the
\npurpose of s. 4 cannot be attained.\n<\/p>\n
693<\/span><\/p>\n
    108.  On  the other hand, the learned  Attorney  General
\nsuggested  that s. 4 has been complied with,  and  contended
\nthat  the  victims had notice of the proceedings.  They\t had
\nknowledge of the suit in America, and of the order passed by
\nJudge Keenan. The private plaintiffs who had gone to America
\nwere  represented  by foreign contingency lawyers  who\tknew
\nfully well what they were doing and they had also joined the
\nsaid suit along with the Government of India. Learned Attor-
\nney  General submitted that s. 4 of the Act  clearly.enabled
\nthe victims to exercise their right of participation in\t the
\nproceedings.  According to him, there was exclusion of\tvic-
\ntims from the process of adjudication but a limited partici-
\npation was provided and beyond that participation no further
\nparticipation was warranted and no further notice was  just-
\nfied  either by the provisions of the Act as read  with\t the
\nconstitutional requirements or under the general  principles
\nof  natural  justice. He submitted that\t the  principles  of
\nnatural\t justice cannot be put into strait jacket and  their
\napplication  would depend upon the particular facts and\t the
\ncircumstances  of  a  situation. According  to\tthe  learned
\nAttorney  General, in the instant case, the legislature\t had
\nformulated the area where natural justice could be  applied,
\nand  upto what area or stage there would be  association  of
\nthe  victims with the suit, beyond that no further  applica-
\ntion of any principle of natural justice was contemplated.\n<\/p>\n
    109.  The fact that the provisions of the principles  of
\nnatural\t justice  have to be complied with,  is\t undisputed.
\nThis is well-settled by the various decisions of the  Court.
\nThe Indian Constitution mandates that clearly, otherwise the
\nAct and the actions would be violative of Article 14 of\t the
\nConstitution  and  would  also\tbe  destructive\t of  Article
\n19(1)(g) and negate Article 21 of the Constitution by  deny-
\ning  a procedure which is just, fair and reasonable. See  in
\nthis  connection, the observations of this Court  in  Maneka
\nGandhi’s  case (supra) and Olga Tellis’s case (supra).\tSome
\nof these aspects were noticed in the decision of this  Court
\nin Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India<\/a> (supra). That was
\na  decision which dealt with the question of taking over  of
\nthe industries under the Industries (Development and Regula-
\ntion) Act, 1951. The question that arose was whether it\t was
\nnecessary  to  observe the rules of natural  justice  before
\nissuing\t a notification under section 18A(1) of the Act.  It
\nwas held by the majority of Judges that in the facts of that
\ncase there had been non-compliance with the implied require-
\nment  of the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice  at
\nthe  pre-decisional stage. The order in that case  could  be
\nstruck\tdown  as invalid on that score but the\tcourt  found
\nthat  in view of the concession a heating would be  afforded
\nto the company, the case was remitted
\n694<\/span>
\nto the Central Government to give a full, fair and effective
\nhearing.  It was held that the phrase ‘natural\tjustice’  is
\nnot  capable of static and precise definition. It could\t not
\nbe imprisoned in the straight-jacket or a cast-iron formula.
\nRules  of natural justice are not embodied rules. Hence,  it
\nwas  not  possible to make an exhaustive catalogue  of\tsuch
\nrules.\tThis Court reiterated that audi ateram partem  is  a
\nhighly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a
\nstatutory  authority  arrives at a just decision and  it  is
\ncalculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or  misuse
\nof  power. The rules of natural justice can operate only  in
\nareas  not  covered  by any law validly\t made.\tThe  general
\nprinciple as distinguished from an absolute rule of  uniform
\napplication  seems  to be that where a statute does  not  in
\nterms exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates  a
\npost-decisional\t hearing amounting to a full review  of\t the
\noriginal  order on merits then such a statute would be\tcon-
\nstrued\tas  excluding the audi alteram partem  rule  at\t the
\npre-decisional stage. If the statute conferring the power is
\nsilent with regard to the giving of a pre-decisional hearing
\nto  the\t person affected the administrative  decision  after
\npost-decisional hearing was good.\n<\/p>\n
    110.  The principles of natural justice have been  exam-
\nined  by  this Court in Union of India & Anr. v.  Tulsi\t Ram
\nPatel  & Ors.,<\/a> (supra). It was reiterated, that the  princi-
\nples  of natural justice are not the creation of Article  14
\nof  the\t Constitution. Art. 14 is not the  begetter  of\t the
\nprinciples  of\tnatural\t justice  but  their  constitutional
\nguardian.  The principles of natural justice consist,  inter
\nalia,  of  the requirement that no man should  be  condemned
\nunheard.  If, however, a legislation or a Statute  expressly
\nor by necessary implication excludes the application of\t any
\nparticular  principle  of natural justice then\tit  requires
\nclose Scrutiny of the Court.\n<\/p>\n
    111. It has been canvassed on behalf of the victims that
\nthe Code of Civil Procedure is an instant example of what is
\na just, fair and reasonable procedure, at least the  princi-
\nples  embodied therein and the Act would be unreasonable  if
\nthere  is  exclusion of the victims  to\t vindicate  properly
\ntheir views and rights. This exclusion may amount to  denial
\nof  justice. In any case, it has been suggested and  in\t our
\nopinion,  there\t is good deal of force in  this\t contention,
\nthat  if  a part of the claim, for good reasons or  bad,  is
\nsought\tto be compromised or adjusted without at least\tcon-
\nsidering the views of the victims that would be unreasonable
\ndeprivation of the rights of the victims. After all, it\t has
\nto be borne in mind that injustice consists in the sense  in
\nthe  minds of the people affected by any act or\t inaction  a
\nfeeling\t that  their grievances. views or claims  have\tgone
\n‘unheeded or not considered. Such a
\n695<\/span>
\nfeeling\t is  in\t itself an injustice or\t a  wrong.  The\t law
\nmust,be\t so  construed and implemented that such  a  feeling
\ndoes not generate among the people for whose benefit the law
\nis made. Right to a hearing or representation before  enter-
\ning into a compromise seems to be embodied in the due  proc-
\ness of law understood in the sense the term has been used in
\nthe constitutional jargon of this country though perhaps not
\noriginally  intended. In this connection, reference  may  be
\nmade  to  the  decision of this Court in  Sangram  Singh  v.
\nElection Tribunal, Kotah,<\/a> [1955] 2 SCR 1. The Representation
\nof  the People Act, 1951 contains section 90 and the  proce-
\ndure of Election Tribunals under the Act was governed by the
\nsaid provision. Sub-section (2) of section 90 provides\tthat
\n“Subject to the provisions of this Act and of any rules made
\nthereunder,  every election petition shall be tried  by\t the
\nTribunal, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the proce-
\ndure  applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908  to
\nthe  trial  of suits”. Justice Bose speaking for  the  court
\nsaid that it is procedure, something designed to  facilitate
\njustice and further its ends, and cannot be considered as  a
\npenal  enactment  for punishment or penalties; not  a  thing
\ndesigned  to  trip people up rather then help them.  It\t was
\nreiterated  that our laws of procedure are grounded  on\t the
\nprinciple of natural justice which requires that men  should
\nnot  be\t condemned  unheard, that decisions  should  not  be
\nreached\t behind\t their backs, that proceedings\tthat  affect
\ntheir  lives and property should not continue in  their\t ab-
\nsence and that they should not be precluded from participat-
\ning  in them. Of course, there may be exceptions  and  where
\nthey are clearly defined these must be given effect to.\t But
\ntaking\tby and large, and subject to that proviso, our\tlaws
\nof procedure should be construed, wherever that is  reasona-
\nbly  possible, in the light of that principle. At page 9  of
\nthe report, Justice Bose observed as under:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “But  that a law of natural justice exists  in
\n\t      the  sense  that a party must be\theard  in  a
\n\t      Court  of laW, or at any rate be\tafforded  an
\n\t      opportunity  to  appear  and  defend  himself,
\n\t      unless  there  is\t express  provision  to\t the
\n\t      contrary,\t is, we think, beyond  dispute.\t See
\n\t      the  observations\t of  the  Privy\t Council  in
\n\t      Balakrishna Udayar v. Vasudeva Ayyar, (ILR  40
\n\t      Mad.  793, 800) and especially in T.M.  Barter
\n\t      v.  African Products Ltd., (AIR 1928  PC\t261)
\n\t      where Lord Buckmaster said “no forms or proce-
\n\t      dure  should ever be permitted to exclude\t the
\n\t      presentation  of a litigant’s  defence”.\tAlso
\n\t      Hari Vishnu’s case which we have just quoted.
\n\t      In our opinion, Wallace J. was right in Venka-
\n\t      tasubbiah v.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      696<\/span><\/p>\n
\t      Lakshminarasimham,  (AIR\t1925 Mad.  1274)  in
\n\t      holding  that  “One cardinal principle  to  be
\n\t      observed\tin  trials by a Court  obviously  is
\n\t      that  a party has a right to appear and  plead
\n\t      his  cause  on all occasions when\t that  cause
\n\t      comes  on for hearing”, and that\t“It  follows
\n\t      that  a party should not be deprived  of\tthat
\n\t      right  and in fact the Court has no option  to
\n\t      refuse  that right, unless the Code  of  Civil
\n\t      Procedure deprives him of it”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    112.  All  civilised countries accept the  right  to  be
\nheard  as  part of the due process of  law  where  questions
\naffecting their rights, privileges or claims are  considered
\nor adjudicated.\n<\/p>\n
    113. In S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors.,<\/a> [1981] 1 SCR 746
\nat 765, Chinnappa Reddy, J. speaking for this Court observed
\nthat the concept that justice must not only be done but must
\nmanifestly  be seen to be done, is basic to our\t system.  It
\nhas  been reiterated that the principles of natural  justice
\nknow  of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it  would
\nhave  made  any difference if natural justice had  been\t ob-
\nserved.\t The  non-observance of natural\t justice  is  itself
\nprejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of
\nproof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary and it has
\nbeen  said  that it will come from a person who\t has  denied
\njustice that the person who has been denied justice, is\t not
\nprejudiced.  Principles of natural justice must,  therefore,
\nbe followed. That is the normal requirement:\n<\/p>\n
    114. In view of the principles settled by this Court and
\naccepted  all over the world, we are of the opinion that  in
\ncase  of  this magnitude and nature, when the  victims\thave
\nbeen  given  some say by Section 4 of the Act, in  order  to
\nmake that opportunity contemplated by section 4 of the\tAct,
\nmeaningful  and\t effective, it should be so  read  that\t the
\nvictims\t have  to be given an opportunity  of  making  their
\nrepresentation\tbefore the court comes to any conclusion  in
\nrespect\t of any settlement. How that opportunity  should  be
\ngiven,\twould  depend upon the\tparticular  situation.\tFair
\nprocedure  should be followed in a representative mass\ttort
\naction.\t There\tare instances and some of  these  were\talso
\nplaced\tbefore us during the hearing of these matters  indi-
\ncating\thow  the  courts regulate giving of  the  notice  in
\nrespect\t of  a mass action where large\tnumber\tof  people’s
\nviews  have  to\t be ascertained. Such  procedure  should  be
\nevolved by the court when faced with such a situation.\n<\/p>\n
115.  The Act does not expressly exclude the application  of
\nthe
\n697<\/span>
\nCode of Civil Procedure. Section 11 of the Act provides\t the
\noverriding effect indicating that anything inconsistent with
\nthe  provisions of the Act in other law including the  Civil
\nProcedure Code should be ignored and the Act should prevail.
\nOur  attention was drawn to the provisions of Order  1\tRule
\n8(4) of the Code. Strictly speaking, Order 1 Rule 8 will not
\napply  to a suit or a proceeding under the Act. It is not  a
\ncase  of  one having common interest with others.  Here\t the
\nplaintiff,  the Central Govt. has replaced and divested\t the
\nvictims.\n<\/p>\n
    116.  Learned  Attorney General submitted  that  as\t the
\nprovisions of the Code stood before 1976 Amendment, the High
\nCourts had taken the view that hearing of the parties repre-
\nsented\tin the suit, was not necessary,\t before\t compromise.
\nFurther reference was made to proviso to Order XXIII Rule 1.
\nAs  in\tthis case there is no question, in our\topinion,  of
\nabandonment  as\t such of the suit or part of the  suit,\t the
\nprovisions  of\tthis  Rule would also  not  strictly  apply.
\nHowever, Order XXIII Rule 3B of the Code is an important and
\nsignificant  pointer  and  the principles  behind  the\tsaid
\nprovision  would apply to this case. The said rule  3B\tpro-
\nvides  that no agreement or compromise in  a  representative
\nsuit  shall be entered into without the leave of  the  court
\nexpressly  recorded in the proceedings; and sub-rule (2)  of
\nrule  3B enjoins that before granting such leave  the  court
\nshall  give notice in such manner as it may think fit  in  a
\nrepresentative action. Representative suit, again, has\tbeen
\ndefined\t under Explanation to the said rule vide clause\t (d)
\nas any other suit in which the decree passed may, by  virtue
\nof  the provisions of this Code or of any other law for\t the
\ntime  being  in force, bind any person who is not  named  as
\nparty  to  the suit. In this case, indubitably\tthe  victims
\nwould  be  bound by the settlement though not named  in\t the
\nsuit. This is a position conceded by all. If that is so,  it
\nwould  be  a  representative suit in terms of  and  for\t the
\npurpose of Rule 3B of Order XXIII of the Code. If the  prin-
\nciples\tof this rule are the principles of  natural  justice
\nthen  we  are of the opinion that the principles  behind  it
\nwould  be applicable; and also that section 4 should  be  so
\nconstrued  in  spite of the difficulties of the\t process  of
\nnotice\tand other difficulties of making “informed  decision
\nmaking\tprocess\t cumbersome”, as canvassed  by\tthe  learned
\nAttorney General.\n<\/p>\n
    117.  In our opinion, the  constitutional  requirements,
\nthe language of the Section, the purpose of the Act and\t the
\nprinciples of natural justice lead us to this interpretation
\nof  Section 4 of the Act that in case of a proposed or\tcon-
\ntemplated settlement, notice should be given to the  victims
\nwho  are  affected  or whose rights are to  be\taffected  to
\nascertain their views. Section 4 is significant. It  enjoins
\nthe Central
\n698<\/span>
\nGovt.  only  to have “due regard to any matters\t which\tsuch
\nperson\tmay require to be urged”. So, the obligation  is  on
\nthe Central Govt. in the situation contemplated by Section 4
\nto  have  due regard to the views of the  victims  and\tthat
\nobligation cannot be discharged by the Central Govt.  unless
\nthe victims are told that a settlement is proposed, intended
\nor  contemplated. It is not necessary that such views  would
\nrequire consent of all the victims. The Central Govt. as the
\nrepresentative\tof  the victims must have the views  of\t the
\nvictims and place such views before the court in such manner
\nit considers necessary before a settlement is entered  into.
\nIf  the\t victims  want to advert to certain  aspect  of\t the
\nmatter\tduring the proceedings under the Act and  settlement
\nindeed is an important stage in the proceedings,  opportuni-
\nties  must be given to the victims. Individual\tnotices\t may
\nnot be necessary. The Court can, and in our opinion,  should
\nin such situation formulate modalities of giving notice\t and
\npublic\tnotice can also be given inviting views of the\tvic-
\ntims by the help of mass media.\n<\/p>\n
118. Our attention was drawn to similar situations in  other
\nlands ,\t where in mass disaster actions of the present\ttype
\nor  mass calamity actions affecting large number of  people,
\nnotices\t have  been given in different forms and it  may  be
\npossible to invite the views of the victims by\tannouncement
\nin  the\t media,\t Press, Radro, and TV  etc.  intimating\t the
\nvictims that a certain settlement is proposed or contemplat-
\ned  and\t inviting views of the victims within  a  stipulated
\nperiod.\t And having regard to the views, the  Central  Govt.
\nmay  proceed with the settlement of the action.\t Consent  of
\nall is not a pre-condition as we read the Act under  Section\n<\/p>\n
4. Hence, the difficulties suggested by the learned Attorney
\nGeneral\t in having the consent of all and unanimity, do\t not
\nreally\tarise  and should not deter us from  construing\t the
\nsection as we have.\n<\/p>\n
     119.  The next aspect of the matter is, whether in\t the
\naforesaid  light Section 4 has been complied with. The\tfact
\nthat there was no
\nLearned Attorney General, however, sought to canvas the view
\nthat the victims had notice and some of them had participat-
\ned in the proceedings. We are, however, unable to accept the
\nposition  that the victims had notice of the nature  contem-
\nplated\tunder the Act upon the underling principle of  Order
\nXXIII Rule 3B of the Code. It is not enough to say that\t the
\nvictims\t must keep vigil and watch the proceeding.  One\t as-
\nsumption  under which the Act is justified is that the\tvic-
\ntims were disabled to defend themselves in an action of this
\ntype.  If that is   so, then the Court cannot  presume\tthat
\nthe victims were a lot, capable
\n699<\/span>
\nand informed to be able to have comprehended or contemplated
\nthe settlement. In the aforesaid view of the matter, in\t our
\nopinion, notice was necessary. The victims at large did\t not
\nhave the notice.\n<\/p>\n
    120.  The question, however, is that the settlement\t had
\nbeen arrived at after great deal of efforts to give  immedi-
\nate  relief to the victims. We have noticed the order  dated
\n4th  May, 1989 passed by this Court indicating\tthe  reasons
\nwhich  impelled\t the  Court to pass the\t orders\t on  14\/15th
\nFebruary,  1989 in terms and manner as it did. It  has\tbeen
\nurged  before us on behalf of some of the victims that\tjus-
\ntice has not been done to their views and claims in  respect
\nof the damages suffered by them. It appears to us by reading
\nthe  reasons given by this Court on 4th May, 1989 that\tjus-
\ntice perhaps has been done but the question is, has  justice
\nappeared to have been done and more precisely, the  question
\nbefore\tthis Court is: does the Act envisage a procedure  or
\ncontemplate a procedure which ensures not only that  justice
\nis done but justice appears to have been done. If the proce-
\ndure does not ensure that justice appears to have been done,
\nis it valid? Therefore, in our opinion, in the background of
\nthis question we must hold that Section 4 means and  entails
\nthat  before  entering\tinto any  settlement  affecting\t the
\nrights\tand  claims of the victims some kind  of  notice  or
\ninformation should be given to the victims; we need not\t now
\nspell out the actual notice and the manner of its giving  to
\nbe  consistent with the mandate and purpose of section 4  of
\nthe Act.\n<\/p>\n
    121.  This\tCourt in its order dated 4th May,  1989\t had
\nstated\tthat in passing orders on 14th\/15th February,  1989,
\nthis Court was impelled by the necessity of urgent relief to
\nthe victims rather than to depend upon the uncertain promise
\nof law. The Act, as we have construed, requires notice to be
\ngiven  in  what\t form and in what manner,  it  need  not  be
\nspelled out, before entering into any settlement of the type
\nwith  which we are concerned. It further appears  that\tthat
\ntype  of notice which is required to be given had  not\tbeen
\ngiven.\tThe question, therefore, is what is to be  done\t and
\nwhat  is the consequence? The Act would be bad if it is\t not
\nconstrued  in  the light that notice before  any  settlement
\nunder S. 4 of the Act was required to be given. Then  arises
\nthe  question of consequences of not giving the\t notice.  In
\nthis  adjudication, we are not strictly concerned  with\t the
\nvalidity or otherwise of the settlement, as we have indicat-
\ned  hereinbefore. But constitutional adjudication cannot  be
\ndivorced  from the reality of a situation, or the impact  of
\nan adjudication. Constitutional deductions are never made in
\nthe  vacuum. These deal with life’s problems in the  reality
\nof a given situation. And no constitutional adjudication  is
\nalso possible unless
\n700<\/span>
\none  is aware of the consequences of such  an  adjudication.
\nOne  hesitates\tin matters of this type where  large  conse-
\nquences\t follow\t one way or the other to put as\t under\twhat
\nothers\thave  put together. It is well to remember,  as\t did
\nJustice Holmes, that time has upset many fighting faiths and
\none  must  always wagar one’s salvation upon  some  prophecy
\nbased  upon imperfect knowledge. Our knowledge changes;\t our
\nperception of truth also changes. It is true that notice was
\nrequired  to  be given and notice has not  been\t given.\t The
\nnotice\twhich  we have contemplated is a notice\t before\t the
\nsettlement  or what is known in legal terminology  as  ‘pre-
\ndecisional notice’. But having regard to the urgency of\t the
\nsituation and having regard to the need for the victims\t for
\nrelief\tand help and having regard to the fact that so\tmuch
\neffort\thas gone in finding a basis for the settlement,\t we,
\nat one point of time, thought that a post-decisional hearing
\nin the facts and circumstances of this case might be consid-
\nered  to be sufficient compliance with the  requirements  of
\nprinciples of natural justice as embodied under s. 4 of\t the
\nAct. The reasons that impelled this Court to pass the orders
\nof 14th\/15th February, 1989 are significant and\t compelling.
\nIf  notice was given, then what would have happened? It\t has
\nbeen  suggested on behalf of the victims by counsel that  if
\nthe victims had been given an opportunity to be heard,\tthen
\nthey  would have perhaps pointed out, inter alia,  that\t the
\namount\tagreed to be paid through the settlement  was  hope-
\nlessly\tinadequate. We have noted the evidence available  to
\nthis Court which this Court has recorded in its order  dated
\n4th  May, 1989 to be the basis for the figure at  which\t the
\nsettlement  was arrived at. It is further suggested that  if
\nan  opportunity had been given before the  settlement,\tthen
\nthe victims would have perhaps again pointed out that crimi-
\nnal  liability could not be absolved in the manner in  which
\nthis Court has done on the 14th\/l5th February, 1989. It\t was
\nthen  contended that the Central Government was itself\tsued
\nas  a joint tort feasor. The Central Government would  still
\nbe liable to be proceeded in respect of any liability to the
\nvictims\t if such a liability is established; that  liability
\nis in no way abridged or affected by the Act or the  settle-
\nment entered into. It was submitted on behalf of the victims
\nthat  if  an  opportunity had been given,  they\t would\thave
\nperhaps\t pointed out that the suit against the Central\tGov-
\nernment,  Government  of Madhya Pradesh and UCIL  could\t not
\nhave been settled by the compromise. It is further-suggested
\nthat if given an opportunity, it would have been pointed out
\nthat the UCIL should have also been sued. One of the  impor-
\ntant  requirements of justice is that people affected by  an
\naction\tor  inaction should have opportunity to\t have  their
\nsay. That opportunity the victims have got when these appli-
\ncations were heard and they were heard after utmost publici-
\nty and they would have further
\n701<\/span>
\nopportunity  when review application against the  settlement
\nwould be heard.\n<\/p>\n
    122. On behalf of the victims, it was suggested that the
\nbasis  of damages in view of the observations made  by\tthis
\nCourt  in M.C. Mehta’s case (supra) against the\t victims  of
\nUCC or UCIL would be much more than normal damages  suffered
\nin similar case against any other company or party which  is
\nfinancially not so solvent or capable. It was urged that  it
\nis time in order to make damages deterrent the damages\tmust
\nbe  computed  on the basis of the capacity of  a  delinquent
\nmade liable to pay such damages and on the monitory capacity
\nof  the delinquent the quantum of the damages awarded  would
\nvary and not on the basis of actual consequences suffered by
\nthe  victims.  This is an uncertain promise of law.  On\t the
\nbasis of evidence available and on the basis of the  princi-
\nples  so  far established, it is difficult  to\tforesee\t any
\nreasonable possibility of acceptance of this yardstick.\t And
\neven  if it is accepted, there are numerous difficulties  of
\ngetting\t that view accepted internationally as a just  basis
\nin accordance with law. These, however, are within the realm
\nof possibility.\n<\/p>\n
    123. It was contended further by Shri Garg, Shri  Shanti
\nBhushan\t and  Ms. Jaising that all the\tfurther\t particulars
\nupon which the settlement had been entered into should\thave
\nbeen  given  in the’ notice which was required to  be  given
\nbefore\ta  settlement  was sanctified or  accepted.  We\t are
\nunable to accept this position. It is not necessary that all
\nother  particulars for the basis of the proposed  settlement
\nshould\tbe  disclosed in a suit of this\t nature\t before\t the
\nfinal  decision. Whatever data was already there  have\tbeen
\ndisclosed, that, in our opinion, would have been  sufficient
\nfor the victims to be able to give their views, if they want
\nto.  Disclosure of further particulars are not warranted  by
\nthe  requirement of principles of natural  justice.  Indeed,
\nsuch  disclosure in this case before finality might  jeopar-
\ndise  luther  action, if any, necessary so  consistent\twith
\njustice of the case.\n<\/p>\n
    124.  So on the materials available, the  victims  would
\nhave to express their views. The victims have not been\table
\nto show at all any other point or material which would go to
\nimpeach\t the validity of the settlement. Therefore,  in\t our
\nopinion,  though  settlement  without notice  is  not  quite
\nproper,\t on  the materials so far available, we are  of\t the
\nopinion\t that justice has been done to the victims but\tjus-
\ntice  has  not appeared to have been done. In  view  of\t the
\nmagnitude  of the misery involved and the problems  in\tthis
\ncase,  we are also of the opinion that the setting aside  of
\nthe settlement on this ground in view of the facts
\n702<\/span>
\nand the circumstances of this case keeping the settlement in
\nabeyance  and giving notice to the victims for a  post-deci-
\nsional\thearing\t would not be in the  ultimate\tinterest  of
\njustice.  It is true that not giving notice, was not  proper
\nbecause principles of natural justice are fundamental in the
\nconstitutional\tset up of this country. No man or  no  man’s
\nright should be affected without an opportunity to ventilate
\nhis  views. We are also conscious that justice is a  psycho-
\nlogical yearning, in which men seek acceptance of their view
\npoint by having an opportunity of vindication of their\tview
\npoint before the forum or the authority enjoined or  obliged
\nto  take a decision affecting their right. Yet, in the\tpar-
\nticular\t situations, one has to bear in mind how an  infrac-
\ntion  of that should be sought to be removed  is  accordance
\nwith  justice.\tIn the facts and the circumstances  of\tthis
\ncase  where sufficient opportunity is available when  review
\napplication  is\t heard on notice, as directed by  Court,  no
\nfurther opportunity is necessary and it cannot be said\tthat
\ninjustice has been done. “To do a great right” after all, it
\nis  permissible\t sometimes “to do a little  wrong”.  In\t the
\nfacts  and circumstances of the case, this is one  of  those
\nrare  occasions. Though entering into a\t settlement  without
\nthe  required notice is wrong, in the facts and the  circum-
\nstances\t of this case, therefore, we are of the opinion,  to
\ndirect that notice should be given now, would not result  in
\ndain  justice in the situation. In the premises, no  further
\nconsequential order is necessary by this Court. Had it\tbeen
\nnecessary for this Bench to have passed such a consequential
\norder, we would not have passed any such consequential order
\nin respect of the same.\n<\/p>\n
    125. The sections and the scheme dealing with the deter-
\nmination of damages and distribution of the amount have also
\nbeen  assailed as indicated before. Our attention was  drawn
\nto  the\t provisions of the Act dealing with the\t payment  of
\ncompensation and the scheme framed therefore. It was submit-
\nted  that  section 6 of the Act enjoins appointment  by\t the
\nCentral\t Government of an officer known as the\tCommissioner
\nfor  the welfare of the victims. It was submitted that\tthis
\ndoes  not give sufficient judicial authority to the  officer
\nand  would  be\treally leaving the  adjudication  under\t the
\nscheme by an officer of the executive nature. Learned Attor-
\nney General has, however, submitted that for disbursement of
\nthe  compensation  contemplated under the Act or  under\t the
\norders\tof this Court, a notification would be issued  under
\nsection\t 6(3)  of the Act authorising  the  Commissioner  or
\nother  officers to exercise all or any of the  powers  which
\nthe  Central  Government  may exercise under  section  6  to
\nenable\tthe  victims  to place before  the  Commissioner  or
\nDeputy Commissioner any additional evidence that they  would
\nlike to adduce. We direct so, and such appropriate notifica-\n<\/p>\n
703<\/span><\/p>\n
tion  be  issued. We further direct that in  the  scheme  of
\ncategorisation to be done by the Deputy Commissioner  should
\nbe  appealable to an appropriate judicial authority and\t the
\nScheme should be modified accordingly. We reiterate that the
\nbasis of categorisation and the actual categorisation should
\nbe  justifiable and judicially reviewable-the provisions  in
\nthe  Act and the Scheme should be so read. There were  large
\nnumber\tof submissions made on behalf of the  victims  about
\namending the scheme. Apart from and to the extent  indicated
\nabove, in our opinion, it would be unsafe to tinker with the
\nscheme\tpiecemeal. The scheme is an integrated whole and  it
\nwould not be proper to amend it piecemeal. We, however, make
\nit  clear that in respect of categorisation and\t claim,\t the
\nauthorites must act on principles of natural justice and act
\nquasi-judicially.\n<\/p>\n
    126.  As mentioned hereinbefore, good deal of  arguments
\nwere  advanced\tbefore us as to whether the  clause  in\t the
\nsettlement that criminal proceedings would not be  proceeded
\nwith  and the same will remain quashed is valid or  invalid.
\nWe  have  held that these are not part\tof  the\t proceedings
\nunder the Act. So the orders on this aspect in the order  of
\n14th\/15th  February,  1989  are not orders  under  the\tAct.
\nTherefore, on the question of the validity of the Act,\tthis
\naspect\tdoes  not arise whether the settlement\tof  criminal
\nproceedings or quashing the criminal proceedings could be  a
\nvalid consideration for settlement or whether if it was such
\na consideration or not is a matter which the court reviewing
\nthe settlement has to decide.\n<\/p>\n
    127.  In the premise, we hold that the Act is  constitu-
\ntionally valid in the manner we read it. It proceeds on\t the
\nhypothesis that until the claims of the victims are realised
\nor  obtained. from the delinquents, namely, UCC and UCIL  by
\nsettlement  or by adjudication and until the proceedings  in
\nrespect\t thereof  continue the Central Government  must\t pay
\ninterim\t compensation  or maintenance for  the\tvictims.  In
\nentering  upon\tthe settlement in view of s. 4 of  the\tAct,
\nregard\tmust be had to the views of the victims and for\t the
\npurpose\t of  giving  regard to\tthese,\tappropriate  notices
\nbefore\tarriving at any settlement, was necessary.  In\tsome
\ncases,\thowever, post-decisional notice might be  sufficient
\nbut  in\t the facts and the circumstances of  this  case,  no
\nuseful\tpurpose would be served by giving a  post-decisional
\nhearing having regard to the circumstances mentioned in\t the
\norder of this Court dated 4th May, 1989 and having regard to
\nthe fact that there are no further additional data and facts
\navailable  with\t the  victims which can\t be  profitably\t and
\nmeaningfully  presented to controvert the basis of the\tset-
\ntlement\t and  further  having regard to the  fact  that\t the
\nvictims had their say or on
\n704<\/span>
\ntheir behalf their views had been agitated in these proceed-
\nings and will have further opportunity in the pending review
\nproceedings.  No further order on this aspect is  necessary.
\nThe  sections dealing with the payment of  compensation\t and
\ncategorisation should be implemented in the manner indicated
\nbefore.\n<\/p>\n
    128.  The  Act  was conceived on the  noble\t promise  of
\ngiving\trelief\tand  succour to the  dumb,  pale,  meek\t and
\nimpoverished victims of a tragic industrial gas leak  disas-
\nter, a concomitant evil in this industrial age of technolog-
\nical  advancement and development. The Act had kindled\thigh
\nhopes in the hearts of the. weak and worn, wary and forlorn.
\nThe  Act generated hope of humanity. The  implementation  of
\nthe Act must be with justice. Justice perhaps has been\tdone
\nto  the victims situated as they were, but it is  also\ttrue
\nthat  justice has not appeared to have been done. That is  a
\ngreat infirmity. That is due partly to the fact that  proce-
\ndure was not strictly followed as we have understood it\t and
\nalso  partly because of the atmosphere that was\t created  in
\nthe  country, attempts were made to shake the confidence  of
\nthe people in the judicial process and also to undermine the
\ncredibility  of this Court. This was unfortunate.  This\t was
\nperhaps\t due to misinformed public opinion and also  due  to
\nthe  fact that victims were not initially taken into  confi-
\ndence  in  reaching the settlement. This is a  factor  which
\nemphasises  the\t need  for adherence to\t the  principles  of
\nnatural\t justice. The credibility of judiciary is as  impor-
\ntant  as  the alleviation of the suffering of  the  victims,
\ngreat  as these were. We hope these adjudications  will\t re-
\nstore  that credibility. Principles of natural\tjustice\t are
\nintegrally  embedded  in our  constitutional  framework\t and
\ntheir  pristine glory and primacy cannot and should  not  be
\nallowed\t to  be submerged by the  exigencies  of  particular
\nsituations  or cases. This Court must always assert  primacy
\nof  adherence  to the principles of natural justice  in\t all
\nadjudications.\tBut at the same time, these must be  applied
\nin a particular manner in particular cases having regard  to
\nthe particular circumstances. It is, therefore, necessary to
\nreiterate  that the promises made to the victims  and  hopes
\nraised\tin  their hearts and minds can only be\tredeemed  in
\nsome  measure if attempts are made vigorously to  distribute
\nthe  amount realised to the victims in accordance  with\t the
\nscheme\tas indicated above. That would be a redemption to  a
\ncertain extent. It will also be necessary to reiterate\tthat
\nattempts  should be made to formulate the principles of\t law
\nguiding the Government and the authorities to permit  carry-
\ning on of trade dealing with materials and things which have
\ndengerous consequences within sufficient specific safeguards
\nespecially in case of multinational corporations trading  in
\nIndia. An awareness on these lines has dawned. Let
\n705<\/span>
\naction follow that awareness. It is also necessary to  reit-
\nerate that the law relating to damages and payment of inter-
\nim  damages  or compensation to the victims of\tthis  nature
\nshould\tbe  seriously  and scientifically  examined  by\t the
\nappropriate agencies.\n<\/p>\n
    129.  The Bhopal Gas Leak disaster and its aftermath  of
\nthat  emphasise the need for laying down certain  norms\t and
\nstandards  the Government to follow before granting  permis-
\nsions or licences for the running of industries dealing with
\nmaterials which are of dangerous potentialities. The Govern-
\nment should, therefore, examine or have the problem examined
\nby  an expert committee as to what should be the  conditions
\non  which  future  licences and\/or  permission\tfor  running
\nindustries on Indian soil would be granted and for  ensuring
\nenforcement of those conditions, sufficient safety  measures
\nshould\tbe formulated and scheme of  enforcement  indicated.
\nThe Government should insist as a condition precedent to the
\ngrant of such licences or permissions, creation of a fund in
\nanticipation  by the industries to be available for  payment
\nof  damages  out of the said found in case  of\tleakages  or
\ndamages in case of accident or disaster flowing from  negli-
\ngent  working  of such industrial operations or\t failure  to
\nensure\tmeasures preventing such occurrence. The  Government
\nshould\talso ensure that the parties must agree to abide  to
\npay such damages out of the said damages by procedure  sepa-
\nrately evolved for computation and payment of damages  with-
\nout  exposing the victims or sufferers of the negligent\t act
\nto the long and delayed procedure. Special procedure must be
\nprovided  for and the industries must agree as\ta  condition
\nfor  the grant of licence to abide by such procedure  or  to
\nabide  by  statutory arbitration. The basis for\t damages  in
\ncase  of  leakages and accident should also  be\t statutorily
\nfixed  taking into consideration the nature of\tdamages\t in-
\nflicted, the consequences thereof and the ability and capac-
\nity  of\t the parties to pay. Such should  also\tprovide\t for
\ndeterrent or punitive damages, the basis for which should be
\nformulated  by a proper expert committee or by\tthe  Govern-
\nment.  For  this  purpose, the Government  should  have\t the
\nmatter\texamined by such body as it considers necessary\t and
\nproper\tlike the Law Commission or other  competent  bodies.
\nThis is vital for the future.\n<\/p>\n
    130. This case has taken some time. It was argued exten-
\nsively. We are grateful to counsel who have assisted in\t all
\nthese matters. We have reflected. We have taken some time in
\npronouncing  our decision. We wanted time to lapse  so\tthat
\nthe  heat of the moment may calm down and proper  atmosphere
\nrestored.  Justice,  it has been said, is the  constant\t and
\nperpetual disposition to render every man his due. But what
\n706<\/span>
\nis a man’s due in a particular situation and in a particular
\ncircumstances  is a matter for appraisement and\t adjustment.
\nIt  has\t been said that justice is balancing.  The  balances
\nhave  always been the symbol of even-handed justice. But  as
\nsaid  Lord  Denning in Jones v. National  Coal\tBoard  Ltd.,
\n[1957] 2 QB 55, at 64-let the advocates one after the  other
\nput the weights into the scales–the ‘nicely calculated less
\nor  more’–but\tthe judge at the end decides which  way\t the
\nbalance\t tilts, be it ever so slightly. This is so in  every
\ncase and every situation.\n<\/p>\n
    13 1. The applications are disposed of in the manner and
\nwith the direction, we have indicated above.
\n    SINGH,  J. 1 have gone through the proposed judgment  of
\nmy  learned brother, Sabyasachi Mukharji, CJI. I agree\twith
\nthe  same but I consider it necessary to express my  opinion
\non certain aspects.\n<\/p>\n
   Five\t years ago between the night of December  2-3,\t1984
\none of the most tragic industrial disasters in the  recorded
\nhistory\t of mankind occurred in the city of Bhopal,  in\t the
\nState  of Madhya Pradesh, as a result of which several\tper-
\nsons  died and thousands were disabled and physically  inca-
\npacitated  for\tlife. The ecology in and around\t Bhopal\t was
\nadversely affected and air, water and the atmosphere waspol-
\nluted,\tits full extent has yet to be determined.  UnionCar-
\nbide  India  Limited (UCIL) a subsidiary  of  Union  Carbide
\nCorporation  (a Transnational Corporation of United  States)
\nhas  been manufacturing pesticides at its plant\t located  in
\nthe city of Bhopal. In the process of manufacture of  pesti-
\ncide the UCIL had stored stock of Methyl Isocyanate commonly
\nknown as MlC a highly toxic gas. On the night of the  trage-
\ndy,  the MIC leaked from the plant in  substantial  quantity
\ncausing death and misery to the people working in the  plant
\nand those residing around it. The unprecedented\t catastrophe
\ndemonstrated the dangers inherent in the production of\thaz-
\nardous\tchemicals even though for the purpose of  industrial
\ndevelopment. A number of civil suits for damages against the
\nUCC  were filed in the United States of America and also  in
\nthis  Country. The cases filed in USA were referred back  to
\nthe  Indian  courts  by Judge Keenan details  of  which\t are
\ncontained  in the judgment of my learned  brother  Mukharji,
\nCJI. Since those who suffered in the catastrophe were mostly
\npoor, ignorant, illiterate and ill-equipped to pursue  their
\nclaims\tfor  damages either before the courts in USA  or  in
\nIndian\tcourts, the Parliament enacted the Bhopal  Gas\tLeak
\nDisaster  (Processing of Claims) Act 1985  (hereinafter\t re-
\nferred\tto  as ‘the Act’) conferring power on the  Union  of
\nIndia to take over the conduct of litigation in this  regard
\nin place of the
\n707<\/span>
\nindividual claimants. The facts and circumstances which\t led
\nto  the\t settlement  of the claims before  this\t Court\thave
\nalready\t been stated in detail in the judgment of  Mukharji,
\nCJI,  and  therefore, I need not refer to  those  facts\t and
\ncircumstances.\tThe constitutional validity of the  Act\t has
\nbeen assailed before us in the present petitions. If the Act
\nis  declared  unconstitutional,\t the  settlement  which\t was
\nrecorded  in  this Court, under which the  UCC\thas  already
\ndeposited  a sum of Rs.750 crores for meeting the claims  of
\nBhopal Gas victims, would fall and the amount of money which
\nis already in deposit with the Registry of this Court  would
\nnot  be\t available for relief to the victims. Long  and\t de-
\ntailed\targuments  were advanced before us for a  number  of
\ndays  and on an anxious consideration and having  regard  to
\nthe legal and constitutional aspects and especially the need
\nfor  immediate\thelp and relief to the victims\tof  the\t gas
\ndisaster,  which  is  already delayed, we  have\t upheld\t the
\nconstitutional\tvalidity of the Act. Mukharji, CJI has\tren-
\ndered  a  detailed and elaborate judgment with which  I\t re-
\nspectfully  agree. However, I consider it necessary  to\t say
\nfew words with regard to the steps which should be taken  by
\nthe Executive and the Legislature to prevent such tragedy in
\nfuture\tand to avoid the prolonged misery of victims  of  in
\nindustrial disaster.\n<\/p>\n
    We are a developing country, our national resources\t are
\nto be developed in the field of science, technology,  indus-
\ntry and agriculture. The need for industrial development has
\nled to the establishment of a number of plants and factories
\nby  the domestic companies and under industries are  engaged
\nin  hazardous or inherently dangerous activities which\tpose
\npotential  threat  to  life, health and\t safety\t of  persons
\nworking\t in  the  factory, or residing\tin  the\t surrounding
\nareas. Though working of such factories and plants is  regu-
\nlated by a number of laws of our country, i.e. the Factories
\nAct, Industrial Development and Regulation Act and Workmen’s
\nCompensation  Act etc. there is no special legislation\tpro-
\nviding\tfor  compensation and damages to outsiders  who\t may
\nsuffer\ton  account of any industrial accident. As  the\t law
\nstands\tto-day,\t affected  persons have\t to  approach  civil
\ncourts\tfor  obtaining compensation and\t damages.  In  civil
\ncourts,\t the  determination  of amount\tof  compensation  or
\ndamages as well as the liability of the enterprise has\tbeen
\nbound  by the shackles of conservative principles laid\tdown
\nby the House of Lords in Ryland v. Herchief, [1868] LR 3  HL
\npage  330. The principles laid therein made it difficult  to
\nobtain\tadequate  damages from the enterprise and  that\t too
\nonly after the negligence of the enterprise was proved. This
\ncontinued  to  be the position of law, till  a\tConstitution
\nBench of this Court in M.C. Mehta
\n708<\/span>
\nv.  Union  of  India, [1987] 1 SCC 420,\t commonly  known  as
\nSriram Oleum Gas Leak case evolved principles and laid\tdown
\nnew  norms to deal adequately with the new problems  arising
\nin a highly industrialised economy. This Court made judicial
\ninnovation in laying down principles with regard to liabili-
\nty of enterprises carrying hazardous or inherently dangerous
\nactivities  departing from the rule laid down in  Ryland  v.
\nFletcher. The Court held as under:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “We  are of the view that an enterprise  which
\n\t      is  engaged in a hazardous or inherently\tdan-
\n\t      gerous industry which poses a potential threat
\n\t      to  the”\thealth\tand safety  of\tthe  persons
\n\t      working  in  the factory and residing  in\t the
\n\t      surrounding  areas owes an absolute  and\tnon-
\n\t      delegiable  duty\tto the community  to  ensure
\n\t      that no harm results to any one on account  of
\n\t      hazardous\t or inherently dangerous  nature  of
\n\t      the  activity  which it  has  undertaken.\t The
\n\t      enterprise must be held to be under an obliga-
\n\t      tion  to provide that the hazardous or  inher-
\n\t      ently  dangerous activity in which it  is\t en-
\n\t      gaged  must  be  conducted  with\tthe  highest
\n\t      standards of safety and if any harm results on
\n\t      account of such activity, the enterprise\tmust
\n\t      be  absolutely liable to compensate  for\tsuch
\n\t      harm and it should be no answer to the  enter-
\n\t      prise to say that it had taken all  reasonable
\n\t      care  and that the harm occurred\twithout\t any
\n\t      negligence  on  its part.\t Since\tthe  persons
\n\t      harmed  on account of the hazardous or  inher-
\n\t      ently  dangerous\tactivity carried on  by\t the
\n\t      enterprise  would\t not  be in  a\tposition  to
\n\t      isolate  the  process of\toperation  from\t the
\n\t      hazardous\t preparation  of  substance  or\t any
\n\t      other related element that caused the harm the
\n\t      enterprise  must be held strictly\t liable\t for
\n\t      causing such harm as a part of the social cost
\n\t      of  carrying  on the hazardous  or  inherently
\n\t      dangerous\t activity.  If\tthe  enterprise\t  is
\n\t      permitted\t to carry on an hazardous or  inher-
\n\t      ently  dangerous activity for its profit,\t the
\n\t      law  must\t presume  that\tsuch  permission  is
\n\t      conditional  on the enterprise  absorbing\t the
\n\t      cost  of\tany accident arising on\t account  of
\n\t      such hazardous or inherently dangerous activi-
\n\t      ty  as an appropriate item of  its  overheads.
\n\t      Such hazardous or inherently dangerous activi-
\n\t      ty for private profit can be tolerated only on
\n\t      condition that the enterprise engaged in\tsuch
\n\t      hazardous\t or  inherently\t dangerous  activity
\n\t      indemnifies all those who suffer on account of
\n\t      the carrying on of such hazardous or inherent-
\n\t      ly dangerous activity regardless of whether it
\n\t      is carried on carefully or not. This
\n\t      709<\/span>
\n\t      principle\t is also sustainable on\t the  ground
\n\t      that the enterprise alone has the resource  to
\n\t      discover and guard against hazards or  dangers
\n\t      and  to  provide\twarning\t against   potential
\n\t      hazards. We would therefore hold that where an
\n\t      enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or inher-
\n\t      ently  dangerous activity and harm results  to
\n\t      anyone on account of an accident in the opera-
\n\t      tion of such hazardous or inherently dangerous
\n\t      activity resulting, for example, in escape  of
\n\t      toxic  gas  the  enterprise  is  strictly\t and
\n\t      absolutely liable to compensate all those\t who
\n\t      are affected by the accident and such liabili-
\n\t      ty  is  not subject to any of  the  exceptions
\n\t      which operate vis-a-vis the tortious principle
\n\t      of strict liability under the rule in  Rylands
\n\t      v. Fletcher.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
The  law  so laid down made a land-mark departure  from\t the
\nconservative  principles with regard to the liability of  an
\nenterprise  carrying  on hazardous or  inherently  dangerous
\nactivities.\n<\/p>\n
    In\tthe  instant cases there is no dispute that  UCIL  a
\nsubsidiary of UCC was carrying on activity of  manufacturing
\npesticide  and\tin that process it had stored MIC  a  highly
\ntoxic and dangerous gas which leaked causing vast damage not
\nonly  to  human\t life but also to the flora  and  fauna\t and
\necology in and around Bhopal. In view of this Court’s  deci-
\nsion  in M.C. Mehta’s case there is no scope for  any  doubt
\nregarding the liability of the UCC for the damage caused  to
\nthe  human  beings and nature in and  around  Bhopal.  While
\nentering  into the settlement the UCC has accepted  its\t li-
\nability and for that reason it has deposited a sum of Rs.750
\ncrores\tin this Court. The inadequacy of the amount of\tcom-
\npensation  under the settlement was assailed by the  counsel
\nfor  the petitioners but it is not necessary for us  to\t ex-
\npress  any opinion on that question as review petitions\t are
\npending before another Constitution Bench and more so as  in
\nthe  present cases we are concerned only with the  constitu-
\ntional validity of the Act.\n<\/p>\n
    The\t Bhopal\t Gas tragedy has  raised  several  important
\nquestions  regarding the functioning of\t multi-nationals  in
\nthird  world countries.After the Second world  war  colonial
\nrule came to end in several parts of the globe, as a  number
\nof  natives  secured  independence from\t foreign  rule.\t The
\npolitical  domination  was over but the newly  born  nations
\nwere  beset  with  various problems on account\tof  lack  of
\nfinances  and development. A number of\tmulti-nationals\t and
\ntransnational  corporations  offered their services  to\t the
\nunder-developed and developing countries to provide finances
\nand technical know-how by
\n710<\/span>
\nsetting up their own industries in those countries on  their
\nown  terms that brought problems with regard to the  control
\nover  the  functioning of  the\ttransnational  corporations.
\nMulti-national companies in many cases exploited the  under-
\ndeveloped nations and in some cases they influenced  politi-
\ncal and economic policies of host countries which  subverted
\nthe  sovereignty  of those countries. There  has  been\tcom-
\nplaints against the multi-nationals for adopting unfair\t and
\ncorrupt\t means to advance their interests in the host  coun-
\ntries.\tSince  this  was a worldwide  phenomena\t the  United
\nNations\t took up the matter for consideration. The  Economic
\nand  Social  Council  of the United  Nations  established  a
\nCommission on Transnational Corporations to conduct research
\non  various political, economic and social aspects  relating
\nto  transnational  corporations. On a careful  and  detailed
\nstudy the Commission submitted its Report in 1985 for evolv-
\ning  a Code of Conduct for Transnational  Corporations.\t The
\nCode was adopted in 1986 to which large number of  countries
\nof the world are signatories. Although it has not been fully
\nfinalised as yet, the Code presents a comprehensive  instru-
\nment  formulating  the\tprinciples of Code  of\tConduct\t for
\ntransnational corporations carrying on their enterprises in
\nunder developed and developing countries. The Code  contains
\nprovisions  regarding  ownership  and  control\tdesigned  to
\nstrike balance between the competing interests of the Trans-
\nnational Corporation and the host countries. It\t extensively
\ndeals  with the political, economic, financial,\t social\t and
\nlegal questions. The Code provides for disclosure of  infor-
\nmation to the host countries and it also provides guidelines
\nfor nationalisation and compensation, obligations to  inter-
\nnational law and jurisdiction of courts. The Code lays\tdown
\nprovisions  for\t settlement  of disputes  between  the\thost
\nStates\tand an affiliate of a Transnational Corporation.  It
\nsuggests  that\tsuch  disputes should be  submitted  to\t the
\nnational  courts  or authorities of  host  countries  unless
\namicably  settled between the parties. It provides  for\t the
\nchoice\tof law and means for dispute settlement arising\t out
\nof contracts. The Code has also laid down guidelines for the
\ndetermination  of  settlement  of disputes  arising  out  of
\naccident and disaster and also for liability of Transnation-
\nal Corporations and the jurisdiction of the courts. The Code
\nis binding on the countries which formally accept it. It was
\nstated\tbefore us that India has accepted the Code. If\tthat
\nbe  so,\t it  is necessary that the  Government\tshould\ttake
\neffective  measures to translate the provisions of the\tCode
\ninto  specific\tactions and policies backed  by\t appropriate
\nlegislation and enforcing machinery to prevent any  accident
\nor disaster and to secure the welfare of the victims of\t any
\nindustrial disaster.\n<\/p>\n
In  the context of our national dimensions of human  rights,
\nright
\n711<\/span>
\nto life, liberty, pollution free air and water is guaranteed
\nby the Constitution under Articles 21, 48A and 5l(g), it  is
\nthe duty of the State to take effective steps to protect the
\nguaranteed  constitutional  rights.  These  rights  must  be
\nintegrated  and\t illumined  by\tthe  evolving  international
\ndimensions and standards, having regard to our\tsovereignty,
\nas  highlighted by Clauses 9 and 13 of U.N. Code of  conduct
\non  Transnational  Corporations. The evolving  standards  of
\ninternational obligations need to be respected,\t maintaining
\ndignity\t and sovereignty of our people, the State must\ttake
\neffective  steps to safeguard the constitutional  rights  of
\ncitizens by enacting laws. The laws so made may provide\t for
\nconditions  for granting licence to  Transnational  Corpora-
\ntions,\tprescribing norms and standards for  running  indus-
\ntries  on Indian soil ensuring the constitutional rights  of
\nour  people relating to life, liberty, as well as safety  to
\nenvironment  and  ecology  to enable the people\t to  lead  a
\nhealthy\t and clean life. A Transnational Corporation  should
\nbe  made liable and subservient to laws of our\tcountry\t and
\nthe liability should not be restricted to affiliate  company
\nonly  but the parent corporation should also be made  liable
\nfor any damage caused to the human being or ecology. The law
\nmust require transnational corporations to agree to pay such
\ndamages as may be determined. by the statutory agencies\t and
\nforum  constituted under it without exposing the victims  to
\nlong drawn litigation. Under the existing civil law  damages
\nare  determined\t by  the Civil Courts, after  a\t long  drawn
\nlitigation,  which  destroys the very  purpose\tof  awarding
\ndamages. In order to meet the situation, to avoid delay\t and
\nto  ensure immediate relief to the victims we would  suggest
\nthat  the law made by the Parliament should provide\t for
\nconstitution of tribunals regulated by special procedure for
\ndetermining  compensation to victims of industrial  disaster
\nor  accident, appeal against which may lie to this Court  on
\nlimited ground of questions of law only after depositing the
\namount\tdetermined  by\tthe Tribunal. The  law\tshould\talso
\nprovide for interim relief to victims during the pendency of
\nproceedings. These steps would minimise the misery and agony
\nof victims of hazardous enterprises.\n<\/p>\n
     There  is yet another aspect which needs  consideration
\nby the Government and the Parliament. Industrial development
\nin  our\t country and the hazards involved  therein,  pose  a
\nmandatory need to constitute a statutory “Industrial  Disas-
\nter  Fund”, contributions to which may be made by, the\tGov-
\nernment,  the  industries  whether  they  are  transnational
\ncorporations or domestic undertakings public or private. The
\nextent\tof contribution may be worked out having  regard  to
\nthe  extent of hazardous nature of the enterprise and  other
\nallied\tmatters. The Fund should be permanent in nature,  so
\nthat money is
\n712<\/span>
\nreadily\t available for providing immediate effective  relief
\nto the victims. This may avoid delay, as has happened in the
\ninstant\t case in providing effective relief to the  victims.
\nThe  Government\t and the Parliament  should  therefore\ttake
\nimmediate  steps for enacting laws, having regard  to  these
\nsuggestions,  consistent  with the international  norms\t and
\nguidelines  as contained in the United Nations Code of\tCon-
\nduct on Transnational Corporations.\n<\/p>\n
    With these observations, I agree with the order proposed
\nby my learned brother, Sabyasachi Mukharji, CJI.
\n    RANGANATHAN, J. Five years ago, this country was  shaken
\nto  its core by a national catastrophe, second in  magnitude
\nand  disastrous\t effects only to  the havoc wrought  by\t the
\natomic\texplosions in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Multitudes  of
\nilliterate and poverty-stricken people in and around  Bhopal
\nsuffered  damage to life and limb due to the escape of\tpoi-
\nsonous\tMethyl Isocyanate (MIC) gas from one of the  storage
\ntanks  at the factory of the Union Carbide  (India)  Limited
\n(UCIL) in Bhopal, a wholly owned subsidiary of the  multina-
\ntional giant, the Union Carbide Corporation (UCC). A  number
\nof  civil suits claiming damages from the UCC were filed  in
\nthe  United  States of America and similar  litigation\talso
\nfollowed in Indian courts. Fearing the possibilities of\t the
\nexploitation  of  the  situation by  vested  interests,\t the
\nGovernment  of India enacted, the Bhopal Gas  Leak  Disaster
\n(Processing of Claims) Act, 1985 (‘the Act’) to regulate the
\ncourse\tof such litigation. Briefly speaking,  it  empowered
\nthe  Union of India to take over the conduct of all  litiga-
\ntion in this regard and conduct it in place of, or in  asso-
\nciation with, the individual claimants. It also enabled\t the
\nUnion  to enter into a compromise with the UCC and UCIL\t and
\narrive\tat a settlement. The writ petitions before  us\thave
\nbeen  filed challenging the constitutional validity of\tthis
\nstatute on the ground that the divestiture of the claimants’
\nindividual rights to legal remedy against the  multinational
\nfor the consequences of carrying on dangerous and  hazardous
\nactivities  on\tour  soil violates  the\t fundamental  rights
\nguaranteed under article 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution.
\n    In\tconsequence  of\t certain  proceedings  before  Judge
\nKeenan of the U.S. District Courts, the venue of the litiga-
\ntion shifted to India. In the principal suit filed in  India
\nby the Union (Civil Suit No. 1113\/86) orders were passed  by
\nthe  trial  court  in Bhopal directing the  UCC\t to  deposit
\nRs.370\tcrores (reduced to Rs.250 crores by the Madhya\tPra-
\ndesh  High  Court)  as interim payment to  the\tgas  victims
\npending\t disposal  of the suit. There were appeals  to\tthis
\nCourt in which the
\n713<\/span>
\nUCC contested the Court’s jurisdiction to pass an order\t for
\nan  interim  payment in a suit for money,  while  the  Union
\npleaded that a much higher interim payment should have\tbeen
\ngranted.  When the matter was being argued in this Court,  a
\nsettlement  was\t arrived at between the Union  and  the\t UCC
\nunder which a sum of Rs.750 crores has been received by\t the
\nUnion in full settlement of all the claims of all victims of
\nthe  gas  leak\tagainst the UCC. The Union  also  agreed  to
\nwithdraw  certain  prosecutions\t that  had  been   initiated
\nagainst\t the officials of the UCC and UCIL in  this  connec-
\ntion. This settlement received the imprimatur of this  Court
\nin its orders dated 14th & 15th February, 1989.
\n    It is unfortunate that, though the writ petitions before
\nus  were pending in this Court at that time,  neither  their
\ncontents nor the need for considering first the issue of the
\nvalidity  of  the  Act before thinking of  a  settlement  in
\npursuance  of its provisions seem to have  been\t effectively
\nbrought\t to the notice of the Bench which put an end to\t all
\nthe litigation on this topic in terms of the settlement. The
\nsettlement  thus stood approved while the issue of  validity
\nof the Act under which it was effected stood undecided. When
\nthis  was brought to the notice of the above Bench,  it\t di-
\nrected these writ petitions to be listed before a  different
\nBench ‘to avoid any possible feeling that the same Bench may
\nbe  coloured  in  its views on the issue by  reason  of\t the
\napproval it had given to the fait accompli viz. the  settle-
\nment. That is now these matters came before us.
\n    The petitioners, claiming to represent a section of\t the
\nvictims\t are, firstly, against any settlement at  all  being
\narrived\t at  with  the UCC. According to them,\tit  is\tmore
\nimportant  to  ensure  by penal\t action\t that  multinational
\ncorporations  do  not play with the lives of people  in\t de-
\nveloping and under developed countries than to be  satisfied
\nwith  mere  compensation for injury and\t that  the  criminal
\nprosecutions  initiated in this case should have  been\tpur-
\nsued.  Secondly,  they are of the view that the\t amount\t for
\nwhich the claims have been settled is a pittance, far  below
\nthe  amount of damages they would have been entitled to,  on
\nthe  principles of strict, absolute and\t punitive  liability
\nenunciated  by\tthis Court in Mehta’s case [1987]  1  S.C.R.\n<\/p>\n
819.  Thirdly, their grievance is that no publicity  at\t all
\nwas  given,  before this court passed its order,  to  enable
\nindividual claimants or groups of them to put forward  their
\nsuggestions or objections to the settlement proposed.  Their
\ninterests  were\t sealed, they say,  without  complying\twith
\nelementary principles of natural justice. They contend\tthat
\nthe  provisions of an Act which has made such  a  settlement
\npossible cannot be constitutionally valid.\n<\/p>\n
714<\/span><\/p>\n
    The arguments before us ranged over a very wide  ground,
\ncovered\t several issues and extended to several\t days.\tThis
\nBench has been placed in somewhat of a predicament as it has
\nto pronounce on the validity of the provisions of the Act in
\nthe  context  of an implementation of its  provisions  in  a
\nparticular manner and, though we cannot (and do not) express
\nany  views  regarding the merits of the settlement,  we\t are
\nasked to consider whether such settlement can be  consistent
\nwith  a correct and proper interpretation of the Act  tested
\non the touchstone of the fundamental rights guaranteed under
\nthe  Constitution. Mukharji, C.J., has outlined the  issues,
\ndealt  elaborately  with the contentions  urged,  and  given
\nexpression  to his conclusions in a learned,  elaborate\t and
\ndetailed judgment which we have had the advantage of  perus-
\ning  in draft. Our learned brother K.N. Singh, J., has\talso
\nhighlighted  certain  aspects in his separate  judgment.  We
\nare,  in large measure, in agreement with them,\t but  should
\nlike to say a few words on some of the issues in this  case,
\nparticularly those in regard to which our approach has\tbeen
\nsomewhat different:\n<\/p>\n
    1.\tThe  issue regarding the validity of the  Act  turns
\nprincipally  on the construction of sections 3 and 4 of\t the
\nAct. We are inclined to hold that the fact that a settlement
\nhas  been  effected, or the circumstances in  which  or\t the
\namount\tfor which the claims of the victims have  been\tset-
\ntled, do not have a bearing on this question of\t interpreta-
\ntion and have to be left out of account altogether except as
\nproviding  a  contextual background in\twhich  the  question
\narises.\t Turning therefore to the statute and  its  implica-
\ntions, the position is this. Every person who suffered as  a
\nconsequence  of the gas leak had a right to claim  compensa-
\ntion from the persons who, according to him, were liable  in
\nlaw for the injury caused to him and also a fight to  insti-
\ntute a suit or proceeding before any court or authority with
\na view to enforce his right to claim damages. In the  normal
\ncourse\tof events, such a claimant who institute a  suit  or
\nproceeding  would have been at complete liberty to  withdraw
\nthe said suit or proceeding or enter into any compromise  he
\nmay choose in that regard. Section 3 undoubtedly takes\taway
\nthis  fight  of the claimant altogether: (a) except  to\t the
\nlimited\t extent specified in the proviso to S. 3(3) and\t (b)
\nsubject to the provisions of S. 4, for this section  clearly
\nstates\tthat  it is the Central Government and\tthe  Central
\nGovernment alone which has the right to represent and act in
\nplace of the claimants, whether within or outside India, for
\nall purposes in
\n715<\/span>
\nconnection with the enforcement of his claims. We may  first
\nconsider how far the main provision in S. 3 (leaving out  of
\naccount the proviso as well as section 4) is compatible with
\nthe Constitution
\n    The\t first question that arises is whether the  legisla-
\nture  is justified in depriving the claimants of  the  right
\nand privilege of enforcing their claims and prosecuting them
\nin  such manner as they deem fit and in compulsorily  inter-
\nposing\tor  substituting the Government in their  place.  We
\nthink that, to this question, there can be only one  answer.
\nAs  pointed  out by our learned brother, the  situation\t was
\nsuch that the victims of the tragedy needed to be  protected
\nagainst\t themselves as their adversery was a  mighty  multi-
\nnational  corporation  and  proceedings\t to  a\tconsiderable
\nextent\thad been initiated in a foreign country,  where\t the
\nconduct of the cases was entrusted to foreign lawyers  under
\na  system of litigation which is unfamiliar to us  here.  In
\nthe stark reality of the situation, it cannot even be  plau-
\nsibly contended that the large number of victims of the\t gas
\nleak  disaster should have been left to fend for itself\t and
\nmerely provided with some legal aid of one type or  another.
\nIt  is\tnecessary  to remember that, having  regard  to\t the
\nidentity  of the principal ground of claim of all  the\tvic-
\ntims, even if a single victim was not diligent in conducting
\nhis  suit  or entered into a compromise or  submitted  to  a
\ndecree\tjudging the issues purely from his individual  point
\nof  view, such a decision or decree could  adversely  affect
\nthe  interests of the innumerable other victims as well.  In
\nfact, it appears that a settlement between one set of claim-
\nants  and the adversary corporation was almost imminent\t and
\nwould perhaps have been through out for the timely interven-
\ntion of the Government of India. The battle for the enforce-
\nment of one’s rights was bound to be not only prolonged\t but
\nalso  very  arduous and expensive and the  decision  of\t the
\nlegislature  that the fight against the adversary should  be
\nconsolidated  and its conduct handed over to the  Government
\nof  India–it  may perhaps have been better if it  had\tbeen
\nhanded over to an autonomous body independent of the Govern-
\nment but, as pointed out by our learned brother, the  course
\nadopted\t was  also not objectionable–was perhaps  the\tonly
\ndecision  that could have been taken in\t the  circumstances.
\nThis  is indeed a unique situation in which the victims,  in
\norder to realise to the best advantage their rights  against
\nUCC,  had to be helped out by transposing that right  to  be
\nenforced by the Government.\n<\/p>\n
    We did not indeed understand any learned counsel  before
\nus  to\tsay  that the legislature erred\t in  entrusting\t the
\nGovernment of India
\n716<\/span>
\nwith  the  responsibility of fighting for the  victims.\t The
\nonly  grievance is that in the process their right  to\ttake
\nlegal proceedings should not have been completely taken away
\nand  that they should also have had the liberty of  partici-
\npating in the proceedings right through. In fact, though the
\nAct contemplates the Central Government to completely act in
\nplace  of  the victims, the Government of India has  not  in
\nfact  displaced\t them  altogether. In  all  the\t proceedings
\npending\t in  this  country, as well as\tthose  before  Judge
\nKeenan,\t the Government of India has conducted the  proceed-
\nings  but  the\tother victims or such of them  as  chose  to
\nassociate  themselves in these proceedings by becoming\tpar-
\nties were not shut out from taking part in the\tproceedings.
\nIn fact, as the learned Attorney General pointed out, one of
\nthe  groups  of litigants did give great assistance  to\t the
\ntrial  judge at Bhopal. But even if the provisions of  S.  3
\nhad been scrupulously observed and the names of all parties,
\nother than the Central Government, had been got deleted from
\nthe array of parties in the suits and proceedings pending in
\nthis  country,\twe do not think that the result\t would\thave
\nbeen  fatal to the interests of the litigants. On  the\tcon-
\ntrary, it enabled the litigants to obtain the benefit of all
\nlegal expertise at the command of the Government of India in
\nexercising  their rights against the Union Carbide  Corpora-
\ntion. Such representation can well be justified by resort to
\na principle analogous to, if not precisely the same as\tthat
\nof,  “parens patriae”. A victim of the tragedy is  compelled
\nto part with a valuable right of his in order that it  might
\nbe  more  efficiently and satisfactory\t‘exploited  for\t his
\nbenefit\t than  he  himself is capable of. It  is  of  course
\npossible  that there may be an affluent claimant  or  lawyer
\nengaged\t by him, who may be capable of fighting the  litiga-
\ntion better. It is possible that the Government of India  as
\na  litigant may or may not be able to pursue the  litigation
\nwith as much determination or capability as such a litigant.
\nBut  in\t a case of the present type one should not  be\tcon-
\nfounded\t by  such  a possibility. There\t are  more  indigent
\nlitigants  than\t affluent ones. There are  more\t illiterates
\nthan enlightened ones. There are very few of the  claimants,
\ncapable\t of finding the financial wherewithal  required\t for
\nfighting  the  litigation. Very few of them are\t capable  of
\nprosecuting  such a litigation in this country not to  speak
\nof the necessity to run to a foreign country. The  financial
\nposition of UCIL was negligible compared to the magnitude of
\nthe claim that could arise and, though eventually the battle
\nhad  to\t be pitched on our own soil, an initial as  well  as
\nfinal recourse to legal proceedings in the United States was
\nvery  much on the cards, indeed inevitable. In\tthis  situa-
\ntion,  the legislature was perfectly justified in coming  to
\nthe aid of the victims with this piece of legislation and in
\nasking the Central Government to shoulder the responsibility
\nby substituting itself in place of the victims
\n717<\/span>
\nfor all purposes connected with the claims. Even if the\t Act
\nhad  provided for a total substitution of the Government  of
\nIndia  in place of the victims and had completely  precluded
\nthem  from exercising their rights in any manner,  it  could
\nperhaps have still been contended that such deprivation\t was
\nnecessary in larger public interest.\n<\/p>\n
    But the Act is not so draconian in its content.  Actual-
\nly,  as we have said a little earlier, the grievance of\t the
\npetitioners is not so much that the Government was entrusted
\nwith  the functions. of a dominus litis in this\t litigation.
\nTheir contention is that the whole object and purpose of the
\nlitigation is to promote the interests of the claimants,  to
\nenable\tthem  to  fight the UCC with  greater  strength\t and
\ndetermination,\tto help them overcome limitations  of  time,
\nmoney and legal assistance and to realise the best compensa-
\ntion  possible consistent not only with the damage  suffered
\nby  them but also consistent with national honour and  pres-
\ntige.  It is suggested that the power conferred on the\tGov-
\nernment\t should be construed as one hedged in by this  domi-
\nnant  object. A divestiture of the claimant’s right in\tthis
\nsituation  would  be  reasonable, it is said,  only  if\t the
\nclaimant’s rights are supplemented by the Government and not
\nsupplanted by it.\n<\/p>\n
    Assuming the correctness of the argument, the provisions
\nof the proviso to S. 3(3) and of section 4 furnish an answer
\nto  this  contention. While the provision contained  in\t the
\nmain  part  of\tsection 3 may be sufficient  to\t enable\t the
\nGovernment of India to claim to represent the claimants\t and
\ninitiate  and conduct suits or proceeding on  their  behalf,
\nthe  locus standi of the Government of India in suits  filed
\nby  other claimants before the commencement of the Act\tout-
\nside India would naturally depend upon the discretion of the
\ncourt enquiring into the matter. That is why the proviso  to
\nsection\t 3  makes the right of the Government  of  India  to
\nrepresent  and act in place of the victims in such  proceed-
\nings  subject  to the permission of the court  or  authority
\nwhere  the proceedings are pending. It is of course open  to
\nsuch court to permit the Central Government even to displace
\nthe  claimants if it is satisfied that the authority of\t the
\nAct is sufficient to enable it to do so. In the present case
\nit is common ground that the proceedings before Judge Keenan
\nwere  being prosecuted by the Central Government along\twith
\nvarious\t individual  claimants. Not only  did  Judge  Keenan
\npermit\tthe association of the Government of India in  these
\nproceedings but the Government of India did have a  substan-
\ntial voice in the course of those proceedings as well.
\nAgain section 4 mandates that, notwithstanding anything
\n718<\/span>
\ncontained  in section 3, the Central Government,  in  repre-
\nsenting and acting in place of any person in relation to any
\nclaim,\tshall  have  due regard to any\tmatters\t which\tsuch
\nperson may require to be urged with respect to his claim. It
\nalso stipulates that if such person so desires, the  Central
\nGovernment  shall permit, at the expense of such  person,  a
\nlegal  practitioner  of his choice to be associated  in\t the
\nconduct\t of  any suit or other proceeding  relating  to\t his
\nclaim.\tIn other words, though, perhaps, strictly  speaking,
\nunder  section 3 the Central Government can totally  exclude
\nthe  victim  himself or his legal practitioner\tfrom  taking
\npart  in  the proceedings (except in pending  suits  outside
\nIndia),\t section 4 keeps the substance of the rights of\t the
\nvictims in tact. It enables, and indeed obliges, the Govern-
\nment to receive assistance from individual claimants to\t the
\nextent\tthey are able to offer the same. If any of the\tvic-
\ntims or their legal advisers have any specific aspect  which
\nthey  would like to urge, the Central Government shall\ttake
\nit into account. Again if any individual claimant at his own
\nexpense retains a legal practitioner of his own choice, such
\nlegal  practitioner  will  have to be  associated  with\t the
\nGovernment in the conduct of any suit or proceeding relating
\nto  his\t claim. Sections 3 and 4 thus combine  together\t the
\ninterests of the weak, illiterate, helpless and poor victims
\nas well as the interests of those who could have managed for
\nthemselves,  even  without the help of this  enactment.\t The
\ncombination  thus envisaged enables the Government to  fight
\nthe battle with the foreign adversary with the full aid\t and
\nassistance of such of the victims or their legal advisers as
\nare  in\t a  position to offer any  such\t assistance.  Though
\nsection\t 3  denies  the claimants the benefit  of  being  eo
\nnominee\t parties  in such suits or  proceedings,  section  4
\npreserves to them substantially all that they can achieve by
\nproceeding  on their own. In other words, while\t seeming  to
\ndeprive the claimants of their right to take legal action on
\ntheir  own, it has preserved those rights, to  be  exercised
\nindirectly. A conjoint reading of sections 3 and 4 would, in
\nour  opinion,  therefore show that there has  been  no\treal
\ntotal  deprivation of the right of the claimants to  enforce
\ntheir  claim for damages in appropriate\t proceedings  before
\nany  appropriate forum. There is only a restriction of\tthis
\nright which, in the circumstances, is totally reasonable and
\njustified. The validity of the Act is, therefore, not liable
\nto be challenged on this ground.\n<\/p>\n
    The next angle from which the validity of the  provision
\nis attacked is that the provision enabling the Government to
\nenter into a compromise is bad. The argument runs thus:\t The
\nobject\tof the legislation can be furthered only if it\tper-
\nmits the Government to prosecute the litigation more  effec-
\ntively and not if it enables the Government to
\n719<\/span>
\nwithdraw  it or enter into a compromise. According to  them,
\nthe Act fails the impecunious victims in this vital  aspect.
\nThe  authority\tconferred by the Act on\t the  Government  to
\nenter  into a settlement or compromise, it is said,  amounts
\nto  an absolute negation of the rights of the  claimants  to
\ncompensation and is capable of being so exercised to  render
\nsuch  rights totally valueless, as in fact, it is said,\t has
\nhappened.\n<\/p>\n
    It\tappears\t to us that this contention  proceeds  on  a
\nmisapprehension.  It is common knowledge that any  authority
\ngiven to conduct a litigation cannot be effective unless  it
\nis  accompanied\t by an authority to withdraw or\t settle\t the
\nsame  if  the circumstances call for it. The vagaries  of  a
\nlitigation  of\tthis magnitude and intricacy  could  not  be
\nfully anticipated. There were possibilities that the litiga-
\ntion  may have to be fought out to the bitter finish.  There
\nwere  possibilities  that the UCC might be willing  to\tade-
\nquately\t compensate the victims either on their own’  or  at
\nthe  insistence of the Government concerned. There was\talso
\nthe  possibility, which had already been in evidence  before
\nJudge Keenan, that the proceedings might ultimately have  to
\nend in a negotiated settlement. One notices that in most  of
\nthe mass disaster cases reported, proceedings finally end in
\na compromise if only to avoid an indefinite prolongation  of
\nthe  agonies  caused by such  litigation.  The\tlegislation,
\ntherefore,  cannot be considered to be\tunreasonable  merely
\nbecause\t in  addition to the right to institute\t a  suit  or
\nother  proceedings it also empowers the Government to  with-
\ndraw the proceedings or enter into a compromise.
\n    Some  misgivings  were expressed, in the course  of\t the
\nhearing, of the legislative wisdom (and, hence the validity)
\nof  entrusting\tthe carriage of these  proceedings  and,  in
\nparticular,  the power of settling it out of Court,  to\t the
\nUnion of India. It was contended that the union is itself  a
\njoint tort-feasor (sued as such by some of the victims) with
\nan  interest  (adverse to the victims) in keeping  down\t the
\namount\tof  compensation  payable to the minimum  so  as  to
\nreduce its own liability as a joint tort-feasor. It seems to
\nus  that this contention in misconceived. As pointed out  by
\nMukharji,  C.J.,  the Union of India itself is\tone  of\t the
\nentities  affected by the gas leak and has a claim for\tcom-
\npensation  from the UCC quite independent of the other\tvic-
\ntims. From this point of view, it is in the same position as
\nthe  other victims and, in the litigation with the  UCC,  it
\nhas every interest in securing the maximum amount of compen-
\nsation\tpossible  for itself and the other victims.  It\t is,
\ntherefore,  the best agency in the circumstances that  could
\nbe  looked up to for fighting the UCC on its own as well  as
\non behalf of the victims. The suggestion that the Union is a
\njoint tort-lessor has been
\n720<\/span>
\nstoutly resisted by the learned Attorney General. But,\teven
\nassuming that the Union has some liability in the matter, we
\nfail  to see-how it can derive any benefit or  advantage  by
\nentering  into a low settlement with the UCC. as is  pointed
\nout  later in this judgment and by Mukharji, C.J.,  the\t Act
\nand  Scheme  thereunder have provided for an  objective\t and
\nquasi-judicial\tdetermination of the amount of damages\tpay-
\nable  to the victims of the tragedy. There is no  basis\t for
\nthe  fear expressed during the hearing that the officers  of
\nthe Government may not be objective and may try to cut\tdown
\nthe amounts of compensation, so as not to exceed the  amount
\nreceived from the UCC. It is common ground and, indeed,\t the
\nlearned\t Attorney General fairly conceded, that the  settle-
\nment with the UCC only puts an end to the claims against the
\nUCC  and  UCIL and does not in any way affect  the  victims’
\nrights,\t if any, to proceed against the Union, the State  of
\nMadhya Pradesh or the ministers and officers thereof, if  so
\nadvised.  If  the Union and these officers are\tjoint  tort-
\nlessors,  as  alleged, the Union will not stand to  gain  by
\nallowing the claims against the UCC to be settled for a\t low
\nfigure.\t On the contrary it will be interested\tin  settling
\nthe  claims against the UCC at as high a figure as  possible
\nso  that its own liability as a joint tort-feasor  (if\tmade
\nout)  can  be correspondingly reduced.\tWe  are,  therefore,
\nunable\tto  see\t any vitiating element\tin  the\t legislation
\ninsofar\t as it has entrusted the responsibility not only  of
\ncarrying  on  but  also of entering into  a  settlement,  if
\nthought fit.\n<\/p>\n
    Nor\t is  there  basis for the contention  that  the\t Act
\nenables\t a  settlement\tto be arrived at  without  a  proper
\nopportunity  to the claimants to express their views on\t any
\nproposals  for settlement that may be mooted. The  right  of
\nthe claimant under section 4 to put forward his\t suggestions
\nor  to be represented by a legal practitioner to  put  forth
\nhis own views in the conduct of the suit or other proceeding
\ncertainly  extends to everything connected with the suit  or
\nother proceeding. If, in the course of the proceedings there
\nshould arise any question of compromise or settlement, it is
\nopen  to  the claimants to oppose the same and to  urge\t the
\nCentral\t Government  to have regard to\tspecific  aspects  m
\narriving at a settlement. Equally it is open to any claimant
\nto employ a legal practitioner to ventilate his opinions  in
\nregard\tto such proposals for settlement. The provisions  of
\nthe Act, read by themselves, therefore, guarantee a complete
\nand full protection to the rights of the claimants in  every
\nrespect. Save only that they cannot file a suit\t themselves,
\ntheir right to acquire redress has not really been  abridged
\nby  the provisions of the Act. Sections 3 and 4 of  the\t Act
\nproperly  read,\t in our opinion,  completely  vindicate\t the
\nobjects and reasons which compelled Parliament to enact this
\npiece of legislation.\n<\/p>\n
721<\/span><\/p>\n
Far  from abridging the rights of the claimants in any\tman-
\nner, these provisions are so worded as to enable the Govern-
\nment to prosecute the litigation with the maximum amount  of
\nresources, efficiency and competence at its command as\twell
\nas with all the assistance and help that can be extended  to
\nit  by such of those litigants and claimants as are  capable
\nof playing more than a mere passive rule in the litigations
\n    But\t then,\tit  is contended, the victims  have  had  no
\nopportunity  of considering the settlement proposals  mooted
\nin  this case before they were approved by the\tCourt.\tThis
\naspect is dealt with later.\n<\/p>\n
    2. One of the contentions before us was that the UCC and
\nUCIL are accountable to the public for the damages caused by
\ntheir  industrial activities not only on a basis  of  strict
\nliability  but\talso  on the basis that the  damages  to  be
\nawarded\t against them should include an element of  punitive
\nliability and that this has been lost sight of while approv-
\ning  of the proposed settlement. Reference was made in\tthis
\ncontext to M.C. Mehta’s case (supra). Whether the settlement
\nshould have taken into account this factor is, in the  first
\nplace, a moot question. Mukharji, C.J. has pointed  out–and
\nwe are inclined to agree-that this is an “uncertain province
\nof  the law” and it is premature to say whether\t this  yard-
\nstick has been, or will be, accepted in this country, not to
\nspeak of its international acceptance which may be necessary
\nshould occasion arise for executing a decree based on such a
\nyardstick in another country. Secondly, whether the  settle-
\nment  took this into account and, if not, whether it is\t bad
\nfor  not having kept this basis in view are  questions\tthat
\ntouch  the  merits of the settlement with which we  are\t not
\nconcerned.  So we feel we should express no opinion here  on
\nthis  issue. It is too far-fetched, it seems to us, to\tcon-
\ntend that the provisions of the Act permitting the Union  of
\nIndia  to enter into a compromise should be struck  down  as
\nunconstitutional  because  they have been construed  by\t the
\nUnion  of India as enabling it to arrive at such  a  settle-
\nment.\n<\/p>\n
    The argument is that the Act confers a discretionary and
\nenabling  power in the Union to arrive at a  settlement\t but
\nlays  down no guidelines or indications as to the  stage  at
\nwhich,\tor  circumstances  in which,  a\t settlement  can  be
\nreached\t or the type of settlement that can be\tarrived\t at;
\nthe  power  conferred should, therefore, be struck  down  as
\nunguided,  arbitrary  and uncanalised. It  is  difficult  to
\naccept\tthis contention. The power to conduct a\t litigation,
\nparticularly in a case of this type, must, to be  effective,
\nnecessarily carry with it a power to settle it at any stage.
\nIt is impossible to provide statutorily any detailed
\n722<\/span>
\ncatalogue of the situations that would justify a  settlement
\nor  the basis or terms on which a settlement can be  arrived
\nat. The Act. moreover, cannot be said to have conferred\t any
\nunguided or arbitrary discretion to the Union in  conducting
\nproceedings under the Act. Sufficient guidelines emerge from
\nthe Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act which  makes
\nit  clear that the aim and purpose of the Act is  to  secure
\nspeedy and effective redress to the victims of the gas\tleak
\nand  that all steps taken in pursuance of the Act should  be
\nfor  the implementation of the object. Whether\tthis  object
\nhas  been  achieved  by a particular settlement\t will  be  a
\ndifferent  question but it is altogether impossible  to\t say
\nthat  the  Act\titself is bad for the  reason  alleged.\t We,
\ntherefore, think it necessary to clarify, for our part, that
\nwe  are not called upon to express any view on the  observa-
\ntions in Mehta’s case and should not be understood as having
\ndone so.\n<\/p>\n
    3. Shri Shanti Bhushan, who supported the Union’s  stand
\nas  to\tthe validity of the Act, however, made\this  support
\nconditional on reading into its provisions an obligation  on
\nthe part of the Union to make interim payments towards their
\nmaintenance and other needs consequent on the tragedy, until
\nthe  suits filed on their behalf ultimately  yield  tangible
\nresults. That a modern welfare State is under an  obligation
\nto  give  succour and all kinds of assistance to  people  in
\ndistress  cannot at all be gainsaid. In point of fact  also,
\nas pointed out by the learned Chief Justice, the  provisions
\nof  the Act and scheme thereunder envisage interim  payments
\nto  the victims; so, there is nothing objectionable in\tthis
\nAct on this aspect. However, our learned brother has accept-
\ned the argument addressed by Shri Shanti Bhushan which\tgoes
\none step further viz. that the Act would be unconstitutional
\nunless this is read as “a major inarticulate promise” under-
\nlying  the  Act. We doubt whether this\textension  would  be
\njustified for the hypothesis underlying the argument is,  in
\nthe  words of Sri Shanti Bhushan, that had the victims\tbeen
\nleft to fend for themselves, they would have had an “immedi-
\nate  and  normal right of obtaining  compensation  from\t the
\nUnion  Carbide”\t and, as the legislation  has  vested  their
\nrights\tin this regard in the Union, the Act should be\tcon-
\nstrued\tas creating an obligation on the Central  Government
\nto  provide  interim relief. Though  we\t would\temphatically
\nreiterate  that\t grant of interim relief to  ameliorate\t the
\nplight\tof its subjects in such a situation is a  matter  of
\nimperative  obligation\ton  the part of the  State  and\t not
\nmerely\t‘a  matter of fundamental human\t decency’  as  Judge
\nKeenan put it, we think that such obligation flows from\t its
\ncharacter as a welfare State and would exist irrespective of
\nwhat  the  statute may or may not provide. In our  view\t the
\nvalidity of the Act does not depend upon its
\n723<\/span>
\nexplicitly or implicitly providing for interim payments.  We
\nsay  this for two reasons. In the first place, it  was,\t and
\nperhaps still is, a moot question whether a plaintiff  suing
\nfor damages in tort would be entitled to advance or  interim
\npayments in anticipation of a decree. That was, indeed,\t the
\nmain  point  on which the interim orders in this  case\twere
\nchallenged  before  this Court and, in the  context  of\t the
\nevents\tthat took place, remains undecided. It may  be\tmen-
\ntioned\there that no decided case was brought to our  notice
\nin which interim payment was ordered pending disposal of  an
\naction\tin  tort in this country. May be there is  a  strong
\ncase  for ordering interim payments in such a case  but,  in
\nthe absence of full and detailed consideration, it cannot be
\nassumed\t that,\tleft to themselves, the victims\t would\thave
\nbeen  entitled\tto a “normal and immediate”  right  to\tsuch
\npayment. Secondly, even assuming such right exists, all that
\ncan be said is that the State, which put itself in the place
\nof the victims, should have raised in the suit a demand\t for
\nsuch interim compensation–which it did–and that it  should
\ndistribute among the victims such interim compensation as it
\nmay  receive from the defendants. To say that the Act  would
\nbe bad if it does not provide for payment of such  compensa-
\ntion  by the Government irrespective of what may  happen  in
\nthe suit is to impose on the State an obligation higher than
\nwhat  flows from its being subrogated to the rights  of\t the
\nvictims. As we agree that the Act and the scheme  thereunder
\nenvisage interim relief to the victims, the point is perhaps
\nonly academic. But we felt that we should mention this as we
\nare  not  in  full agreement with Mukharji,  C.J.,  on\tthis
\naspect on the case.\n<\/p>\n
    4.\tThe next important aspect on which much debate\ttook
\nplace  before us was regarding the validity of the  Act\t qua
\nthe  procedure envisaged by it for a compromise\t or  settle-
\nment.  It  was argued that if the suit is  considered  as  a
\nrepresentative\tsuit  no compromise or settlement  would  be
\npossible  without notice in some appropriate manner  to\t all
\nthe victims of the proposed settlement and an opportunity to
\nthem to ventilate their views thereon (vide Order XXIII,  r.
\n3B, C.P.C.). The argument runs thus: S. 4 of the Act  either
\nincorporates  the  safeguards of these provisions  in  which
\nevent  any settlement effected without compliance  with\t the
\nspirit,\t if  not the letter, of these  provisions  would  be
\nultra  vires  the Act. Or it does not, in which\t event,\t the
\nprovisions of S. 4 would be bad as making possible an  arbi-
\ntrary deprivation of the victims’ rights being\tinconsistent
\nwith, and derogatory of, the basic rules established by\t the
\nordinary  Law of the land viz. the Code of Civil  Procedure.
\nWe are inclined to take the view that it is not possible  to
\nbring the suits brought under the Act within the  categories
\nof  representative  action envisaged in the  Code  of  Civil
\nprocedure. The Act
\n724<\/span>
\ndeals  with a class of action which is sui generis  and\t for
\nwhich a special formula has been found and encapsuled in  S.\n<\/p>\n
4.  The Act divests the individual claimants of their  right
\nto  sue and vests it in the Union. In relation to  suits  in
\nIndia,\tthe Union is the sole plaintiff, none of the  others
\nare  envisaged as plaintiffs or respondents. The victims  of
\nthe tragedy were so numerous that they were never defined at
\nthe  stage of filing the plaint nor do they need to  be\t de-
\nfined  at the stage of a settlement. The litigation is\tcar-
\nried  on by the State in its capacity, not exactly the\tsame
\nas but somewhat analogous to that of a “parens patriae”.  In
\nthe  case  of  a litigation by karta of\t a  Hindu  Undivided
\nFamily or by a guardian on behalf of a ward, who is  non-sui
\njuris, for example, the junior members of the family or\t the
\nwards,\tare not to be consulted before entering into a\tset-
\ntlement.  In such cases, the Court acts as guardian of\tsuch
\npersons to scrutinise the settlement and satisfy itself that
\nit  is\tin the best interest of all concerned. It  is  later
\ndiscovered  that there has been any fraud or  collusion,  it
\nmay be open to the junior members of the family or the wards
\nto call the karta or guardian to account but, barring such a
\ncontingency, the settlement would be effective and  binding.
\nIn  the same way, the Union as “parens patriae”\t would\thave
\nbeen at liberty to enter into such settlement as it  consid-
\nered  best on its own and seek the Court’s  approval  there-
\nfore.\n<\/p>\n
    However,  realising that the litigation is truly  fought
\non  behalf  and for the benefit of innumerable,\t though\t not
\nfully identified victims the Act has considered it necessary
\nto  assign a definite role to the individual  claimants\t and
\nthis is spelt out in S. 4. This section directs:\n<\/p>\n
\t      (i)  that the union shall have due  regard  to
\n\t      any  matters which such person may require  to
\n\t      be urged with respect to his claim; and\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (ii)  that the Union shaH, if such  person  so
\n\t      desires, permit at the expense of such person,
\n\t      a\t legal\tpractitioner  of his  choice  to  be
\n\t      associated in the conduct of any suit or other
\n\t      proceeding relating to his claim.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
This provision adequately safeguards the interests of  indi-
\nvidual victims. It enables each one of them to bring to\t the
\nnotice\tof the Union any special features  or  circumstances
\nwhich he would like to urge in respect of any matter and  if
\nany  such  features are brought to its notice the  Union  is
\nobliged\t to  take  it into account.  Again,  the  individual
\nclaimants are also at liberty to engage their own counsel to
\nassociate with the State counsel in conducting the  proceed-
\nings. If the suits in this
\n725<\/span>
\ncase  had  proceeded, in the normal course,  either  to\t the
\nstage of a decree or even to one of settlement the claimants
\ncould  have kept themselves abreast of the developments\t and
\nthe statutory provisions would have been more than  adequate
\nto  ensure  that the points of view of all the\tvictims\t are
\npresented  to  the court. Even a  settlement  or  compromise
\ncould  not  have  been arrived at without  the\tcourt  being
\napprised  of  the views or any of them who chose to  do\t so.
\nAdvisedly, the statute has provided that though the Union of
\nIndia  will be the dominus litis in the suit, the  interests
\nof all the victims and their claims should be safeguarded by
\ngiving\tthem a voice in the proceedings to the extent  indi-
\ncated above. This provision of the statute is an  adaptation
\nof  the principle of O.I.r. 8 and of Or. XXIII r. 3  of\t the
\nCode  of  Civil Procedure in its application  to  the  suits
\ngoverned  by  it  and, though the  extent  of  participation
\nallowed to the victims is somewhat differently enunciated in
\nthe legislation, substantially speaking, it does incorporate
\nthe principles of natural justice to the extent possible  in
\nthe circumstances. The statute cannot, therefore, be  fault-
\ned, as has been pointed out earlier also, on the ground that
\nit denies the victims an opportunity to present their  views
\nor  places them at any disadvantage in the matter of  having
\nan effective voice in the matter of settling the suit by way
\nof compromise.\n<\/p>\n
    The\t difficulty in this case has arisen, as we  see\t it,
\nbecause of a fortuitous circumstance viz. that the talks  of
\ncompromise  were  mooted and approved in the course  of\t the
\nhearing\t of  an appeal from an order for  interim  payments.
\nThough\tcompromise talks had been in the air right from\t the
\nbeginning  of  this episode, it is said that  there  was  an
\nelement\t of surprise when they were put forward in Court  in
\nFebruary,  1989.  This\tis not quite correct.  It  has\tbeen
\npointed\t out that even when the issue regarding the  interim
\nrelief\twas debated in the courts below, attempts were\tmade
\nto settle the whole litigation. The claimants were aware  of
\nthis  and they could–perhaps should–have anticipated\tthat
\nsimilar\t attempts would be made in this Court  also.  Though
\ncertain parties had been associated with the conduct of\t the
\nproceedings  in\t the trial court–and the  trial  judge\t did
\nhandsomely  acknowledge their contribution to  the  proceed-
\nings–they were apparently not alert enough to keep a watch-
\ning brief in the Supreme Court, may be under the  impression
\nthat the appeal here was concerned only with the quantum  of
\ninterim relief. One set of parties was present in the  Court
\nbut,  apart from praying that he should be forthwith paid  a
\nshare in the amount that would be deposited in Court by\t the
\nUCC  in pursuance of the settlement, no attempt\t appears  to
\nhave  been made to put forward a contention that the  amount
\nof settlement was inade-\n<\/p>\n
726<\/span><\/p>\n
quate or had not taken into account certain relevant consid-
\nerations. The Union also appears to have been acting on\t the
\nview  that  it could proceed ahead on its own  both  in\t its
\ncapacity  as  “parens  patraie” as well as in  view  of\t the
\npowers\tof attorney held by it from a very large  number  of
\nthe  victims  though the genuineness of this  claim  is\t now
\ncontested before us. There was a day’s interval between\t the
\nenunciation of the terms of the settlement and their approv-
\nal  by\tthe Court. Perhaps the Court could have\t given\tsome
\nmore publicity to the proposed settlement in the newspapers,
\nradio  and television and also permitted some time to  lapse
\nbefore\tapproving it, if only to see whether there were\t any
\nother  points of view likely to emerge. Basically  speaking,
\nhowever, the Act has provided an adequate opportunity to the
\nvictims\t to speak out and if they or the counsel engaged  by
\nsome  of them in the trial court had kept in touch with\t the
\nproceedings  in this court, they could have  most  certainly
\nmade  themselves heard. If a feeling has gained ground\tthat
\ntheir voice has not been fully heard, the fault was not with
\nthe  statute but was rather due to the developments  leading
\nto  the\t finalisation  of the  settlement  when\t the  appeal
\nagainst the interim order was being heard in this Court.
\n    One of the points of view on which considerable emphasis
\nwas  laid in the course of the arguments was that in a\tcase
\nof  this  type the offending parties should  be\t dealt\twith
\nstrictly  under\t the criminal law of the Land and  that\t the
\ninclusion,  as part of the settlement, of a  term  requiring
\nthe  withdrawal\t of the criminal prosecutions  launched\t was
\ntotally unwarranted and vitiates the settlement. It has been
\npointed out by Mukharji, C.J. ,–and we agree–that the\t Act
\ntalks  only of the civil liability of, and  the\t proceedings
\nagainst, the UCC or UCIL or others for damages caused by the
\ngas leak. It has nothing to say about the criminal liability
\nof  any\t of the parties involved. Clearly,  therefore,\tthis
\npart of the settlement comprises a term which is outside the
\npurview\t of the Act. The validity of the Act cannot,  there-
\nfore, be impugned on the ground that it permits–and  should
\nnot  have permitted-the withdrawal of  criminal\t proceedings
\nagainst the delinquents. Whether in arriving at the  settle-
\nment,  this aspect could also have been taken  into  account
\nand  this term included in it, is a question concerning\t the
\nvalidity  of the settlement. This is a question outside\t the
\nterms  of  reference  to us and we,  therefore,\t express  no
\nopinion in regard thereto.\n<\/p>\n
    5.\tA  question was mooted before us as to\twhether\t the
\nactual settlement–if not the statutory provision–is liable
\nto be set aside on the grounds that the principles of  natu-
\nral justice have been flagrantly
\n727<\/span>
\nviolated.  The merits of the settlement as such are  not  in
\nissue before us and nothing we say can or should fetter\t the
\nhands  of  the\tBench hearing a review\tpetition  which\t has
\nalready\t been filed, from passing such orders thereon as  it
\nconsiders appropriate.\n<\/p>\n
    Our learned brother, however, has, while observing\tthat
\nthe  question referred to us is limited to the\tvalidity  of
\nthe Act alone and not the settlement, incidentally discussed
\nthis aspect of the case too. He has pointed out that justice
\nhas  in fact been done and that all facts and aspects  rele-
\nvant  for a settlement have been considered. He has  pointed
\nout that the grievance of the petitioners that the order  of
\nthis  Court  did not give any basis for the  settlement\t has
\nsince been sought to be met by the order passed on 4th\tMay,
\n1989 giving detailed reasons, This shows that the Court\t had
\napplied its mind fully to the terms of the settlement in the
\nlight  of the data as well as all the  circumstances  placed
\nbefore\tit and had been satisfied that the  settlement\tpro-
\nposed was a fair and reasonable one that could be  approved.
\nIn  actions of this type, the Court’s approval is  the\ttrue
\nsafety\tvalve to prevent unfair settlements and the fact  is
\nthat the highest Court of the land has given thought to\t the
\nmatter and seen it fit to place its seal of approval to\t the
\nsettlement.  He has also pointed out that a  post-decisional
\nhearing in a matter like this will not be of much avail.  He
\nhas  further pointed out that a review petition has  already
\nbeen filed in the case and is listed for hearing. The  Court
\nhas already given an assurance in its order of May 4,  1989,
\nthat  it will only be too glad to consider any aspects\tthat
\nmay  have  been overlooked in considering the terms  of\t the
\nsettlement. Can it be said, in the circumstances, that there
\nhas been a failure of justice which compels us to set  aside
\nthe  settlement as totally violative of fundamental  rights?
\nMukharji,  C.J.,  has pointed out that the  answer  to\tthis
\nquestion should be in the negative. It was urged that  there
\nis a feeling that the maxim: “Justice must not only be\tdone
\nbut must also appear to be done” has not been fully complied
\nwith and that perhaps, if greater publicity had attended the
\nhearing, many other facts and aspects could have been  high-
\nlighted resulting in a higher settlement or no settlement at
\nall. That feeling can be fully ventilated and that deficien-
\ncy  can be adequately repaired, it has been pointed  out  by
\nMukharji, C.J., in the hearing on the review petition  pend-
\ning before this Court. Though we are prima facie inclined to
\nagree  with him that there are good reasons why the  settle-
\nment should not be set aside on the ground that the  princi-
\nples of natural justice have been violated, quite apart from
\nthe practical complications that may arise as the result  of
\nsuch an order, we would not express any final opinion on the
\nvalidity  of  the settlement but would leave it open  to  be
\nagitated, to the
\n728<\/span>
\nextent\tpermissible in law, in the review  petition  pending
\nbefore this Court.\n<\/p>\n
    There  is one more aspect which we may perhaps  usefully
\nrefer  to in this context. The scheme of the Act is that  on
\nthe  one  hand the Union of India  pursues  the\t litigiation
\nagainst\t the UCC and the UCIL; on the other all the  victims
\nof the tragedy are expected to file their claims before\t the
\nprescribed authority and have their claims for\tcompensation
\ndetermined  by\tsuch  authority.  Certain  infirmities\twere
\npointed\t out on behalf of the petitioners in  the  statutory
\nprovisions  enacted in this regard. Our learned brother\t has
\ndealt with these aspects and given appropriate directions to
\nensure that the claims will be gone into by a quasi judicial
\nauthority  (unfettered\tby executive  prescriptions  of\t the
\namounts\t of compensation by categorising the nature  of\t in-
\njuries) with an appeal to an officer who has judicial quali-
\nfications. In this manner the scheme under the Act  provides
\nfor  a proper determination of the compensation\t payable  to
\nthe  various claimants. Claims have already been  filed\t and
\nthese are being scrutinised and processed. A correct picture
\nas  to\twhether\t the amount of compensation  for  which\t the
\nclaims\thave  ben settled is meagre, adequate  or  excessive
\nwill emerge only at that stage when all the claims have been
\nprocessed  and their aggregate is determined. In these\tcir-
\ncumstances, we feel that no useful purpose will be served by
\na post-decisional hearing on the quantum of compensation  to
\nbe considered adequate for settlement.\n<\/p>\n
    For these reasons, it would seem more correct and proper
\nnot  to\t disturb the orders of 14-15 February, 1989  on\t the
\nground\tthat  the  rules of natural justice  have  not\tbeen
\ncomplied  with, particularly in view of the pendency of\t the
\nreview petition.\n<\/p>\n
    6. Before we conclude, we would like to add a few  words
\non the state of the law of torts in this country. Before  we
\ngained\tindependence,  on account of our  close\t association
\nwith  Great  Britain,  we were governed by  the\t common\t law
\nprinciples.  In the field of torts, under the common law  of
\nEngland, no action could be laid by the dependants or  heirs
\nof  a person whose death was brought about by  the  tortious
\nact  of\t another on the maxim actio personalis\tmoritur\t cum
\npersona,  although a person injured by a similar  act  could
\nclaim  damages\tfor the wrong done to him. In  England\tthis
\nsituation was remedied by the passing of the Fatal Accidents
\nAct,  1846,  popularly\tknown as Lord  Campell’s  Act.\tSoon
\nthereafter  the Indian Legislature enacted the\tFatal  acci-
\ndents  Act, 1855. This Act is fashioned on the lines of\t the
\nEnglish Act
\n729<\/span>
\nof  1846. Even though the English Act has undergone  a\tsub-
\nstantial  change,  our law has remained static and  seems  a
\ntrifle\tarchaic. The magnitude of the gas leak\tdisaster  in
\nwhich  hundreds lost their lives and thousands were  maimed,
\nnot  to speak of the damage to livestock, flora\t and  fauna,
\nbusiness  and  property, is an eye opener. The\tnation\tmust
\nlearn  a  lesson from this traumatic experience\t and  evolve
\nsafeguards  atleast for the future. We are of the view\tthat
\nthe  time is ripe to take a fresh look at the outdated\tcen-
\ntury  old legislation which is out of tune with modern\tcon-
\ncepts.\n<\/p>\n
    While it may be a matter for scientists and\t technicians
\nto  find solutions to avoid such large scale disasters,\t the
\nlaw  must  provide  an effective and speedy  remedy  to\t the
\nvictims\t of such torts. The Fatal Accidents Act, on  account
\nof its limited and restrictive application, is hardly suited
\nto meet such a challenge. We are, therefore, of the  opinion
\nthat the old antiquated Act should be drastically amended or
\nfresh  legislation  should be enacted  which  should,  inter
\nalia,  contain appropriate provisions in regard to the\tfol-
\nlowing matters:\n<\/p>\n
\t      (i)  The payment of a fixed minimum  compensa-
\n\t      tion on a “no-fault liability” basis (as under
\n\t      the Motor Vehicles Act), pending final adjudi-
\n\t      cation of the claims by a prescribed forum;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (ii)  The\t creation of a\tspecial\t forum\twith
\n\t      specific\tpower  to grant\t interim  relief  in
\n\t      appropriate cases;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (iii)  The  evolution  of a  procedure  to  be
\n\t      followed by such forum which will be conducive
\n\t      to the expeditious determination of claims and
\n\t      avoid  the high degree of formalism  that\t at-
\n\t      taches to proceedings in regular courts; and\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (iv)  A  provision  requiring  industries\t and
\n\t      concerns\tengaged in hazardous  activities  to
\n\t      take  out compulsory insurance  against  third
\n\t      party risks.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    In\taddition to what we have said above, we should\tlike
\nto say that the suggestion made by our learned brother, K.N.
\nSingh  J., for the creation of an Industrial  Disaster\tFund
\n(by whatever name called) deserves serious consideration. We
\nwould  also endorse his suggestion that the Central  Govern-
\nment  will  be\twell advised if, in future,  it\t insists  on
\ncertain safeguards before permitting a transnational company
\nto do business in this country. The necessity of such  safe-
\nguards,\t atleast in the following two directions,  is  high-
\nlighted in the present case:\n<\/p>\n
730<\/span><\/p>\n
\t      (a)  Shri Garg has alleged that the  processes
\n\t      in the Bhopal Gas Plant were so much  shrouded
\n\t      in secrecy that neither the composition of the
\n\t      deadly  gas that escaped nor the proper  anti-
\n\t      dote  therefore were known to anyone  in\tthis
\n\t      country  with the result that the steps  taken
\n\t      to  combat its effects were not  only  delayed
\n\t      but  also totally inadequate and\tineffective.
\n\t      It  is necessary that this type  of  situation
\n\t      should  be  avoided.  The\t Government   should
\n\t      therefore\t insist, when granting licence to  a
\n\t      transnational company to establish its  indus-
\n\t      try  here,  on a right to be informed  of\t the
\n\t      nature  of the processes involved so as to  be
\n\t      able to take prompt action in the event of  an
\n\t      accident.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (b) We have seen how the victims in this\tcase
\n\t      have been considerably handicapped on  account
\n\t      of the fact that the immediate tort-feasor was
\n\t      the  subsidiary of a multi-national  with\t its
\n\t      Indian  assets totally inadequate\t to  satisfy
\n\t      the claims arising out of the disaster. It is,
\n\t      therefore,  necessary  to\t evolve,  either  by
\n\t      international   consensus\t or  by\t  unilateral
\n\t      legislation, steps to overcome these handicaps
\n\t      and  to ensure (i) that  foreign\tcorporations
\n\t      seeking  to establish an industry here,  agree
\n\t      to submit to the jurisdiction of the Courts in
\n\t      India in respect of actions for tortious\tacts
\n\t      in  this country; (ii) that the  liability  of
\n\t      such  a corporation is not limited to such  of
\n\t      its  assets (or the assets of its\t affiliates)
\n\t      as may be found in this country, but that\t the
\n\t      victims are able to reach out to the assets of
\n\t      such  concerns  anywhere in the  world;  (iii)
\n\t      that  any decree obtained in Indian Courts  in
\n\t      compliance with due process of law is  capable
\n\t      of being executed against the foreign corpora-
\n\t      tion, its affiliates and their assets  without
\n\t      further  procedural  hurdles, in\tthose  other
\n\t      countries.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    Our\t brother, K.N. Singh, J., has in this context  dealt
\nat  some length with the United Nations Code of Conduct\t for
\nmulti-national Corporations which awaits approval of various
\ncountries.  We hope that calamities like the one which\tthis
\ncountry has suffered will serve as catalysts to expedite the
\nacceptance  of an international code on such matters in\t the
\nnear future.\n<\/p>\n
    With  these observations, we agree with the\t order\tpro-
\nposed by the learned Chief Justice.\n<\/p>\n
G.N.\t\t\t\t\t     Petitions\tdis-\nposed of.\n731<\/span>\n\n\n\n<\/pre>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Charan Lal Sahu Etc. Etc vs Union Of India And Ors on 22 December, 1989 Equivalent citations: 1990 AIR 1480, 1989 SCR Supl. (2) 597 Author: S Mukharji Bench: Mukharji, Sabyasachi (Cj), Singh, K.N. (J), Rangnathan, S., Ahmadi, A.M. (J), Saikia, K.N. (J) PETITIONER: CHARAN LAL SAHU ETC. ETC. Vs. RESPONDENT: […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-243064","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nCharan Lal Sahu Etc. Etc vs Union Of India And Ors on 22 December, 1989 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/charan-lal-sahu-etc-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-22-december-1989\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Charan Lal Sahu Etc. Etc vs Union Of India And Ors on 22 December, 1989 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/charan-lal-sahu-etc-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-22-december-1989\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"1989-12-21T18:30:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2019-01-21T01:02:03+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@legaliadmin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@Legal_india\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"311 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/charan-lal-sahu-etc-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-22-december-1989#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/charan-lal-sahu-etc-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-22-december-1989\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\"},\"headline\":\"Charan Lal Sahu Etc. Etc vs Union Of India And Ors on 22 December, 1989\",\"datePublished\":\"1989-12-21T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2019-01-21T01:02:03+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/charan-lal-sahu-etc-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-22-december-1989\"},\"wordCount\":52386,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"articleSection\":[\"Supreme Court of India\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/charan-lal-sahu-etc-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-22-december-1989#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/charan-lal-sahu-etc-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-22-december-1989\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/charan-lal-sahu-etc-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-22-december-1989\",\"name\":\"Charan Lal Sahu Etc. Etc vs Union Of India And Ors on 22 December, 1989 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"1989-12-21T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2019-01-21T01:02:03+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/charan-lal-sahu-etc-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-22-december-1989#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/charan-lal-sahu-etc-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-22-december-1989\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/charan-lal-sahu-etc-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-22-december-1989#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Charan Lal Sahu Etc. Etc vs Union Of India And Ors on 22 December, 1989\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"name\":\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"description\":\"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"alternateName\":\"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"alternateName\":\"Legal India\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"width\":512,\"height\":512,\"caption\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.facebook.com\\\/LegalindiaCom\\\/\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/Legal_india\"]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\",\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Legal India Admin\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/legaliadmin\"],\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/author\\\/legal-india-admin\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Charan Lal Sahu Etc. Etc vs Union Of India And Ors on 22 December, 1989 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/charan-lal-sahu-etc-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-22-december-1989","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Charan Lal Sahu Etc. Etc vs Union Of India And Ors on 22 December, 1989 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","og_url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/charan-lal-sahu-etc-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-22-december-1989","og_site_name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","article_published_time":"1989-12-21T18:30:00+00:00","article_modified_time":"2019-01-21T01:02:03+00:00","og_image":[{"width":512,"height":512,"url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Legal India Admin","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@legaliadmin","twitter_site":"@Legal_india","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Legal India Admin","Est. reading time":"311 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/charan-lal-sahu-etc-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-22-december-1989#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/charan-lal-sahu-etc-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-22-december-1989"},"author":{"name":"Legal India Admin","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea"},"headline":"Charan Lal Sahu Etc. Etc vs Union Of India And Ors on 22 December, 1989","datePublished":"1989-12-21T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2019-01-21T01:02:03+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/charan-lal-sahu-etc-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-22-december-1989"},"wordCount":52386,"commentCount":0,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"articleSection":["Supreme Court of India"],"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/charan-lal-sahu-etc-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-22-december-1989#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/charan-lal-sahu-etc-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-22-december-1989","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/charan-lal-sahu-etc-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-22-december-1989","name":"Charan Lal Sahu Etc. Etc vs Union Of India And Ors on 22 December, 1989 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website"},"datePublished":"1989-12-21T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2019-01-21T01:02:03+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/charan-lal-sahu-etc-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-22-december-1989#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/charan-lal-sahu-etc-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-22-december-1989"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/charan-lal-sahu-etc-etc-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-on-22-december-1989#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Charan Lal Sahu Etc. Etc vs Union Of India And Ors on 22 December, 1989"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","description":"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"alternateName":"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization","name":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","alternateName":"Legal India","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","width":512,"height":512,"caption":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","https:\/\/x.com\/Legal_india"]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea","name":"Legal India Admin","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Legal India Admin"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com","https:\/\/x.com\/legaliadmin"],"url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/author\/legal-india-admin"}]}},"modified_by":null,"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/243064","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=243064"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/243064\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=243064"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=243064"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=243064"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}