{"id":243939,"date":"1992-07-22T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1992-07-21T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/life-insurance-corpn-of-india-and-vs-prof-manubhai-d-shah-etc-etc-on-22-july-1992"},"modified":"2015-12-04T22:55:23","modified_gmt":"2015-12-04T17:25:23","slug":"life-insurance-corpn-of-india-and-vs-prof-manubhai-d-shah-etc-etc-on-22-july-1992","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/life-insurance-corpn-of-india-and-vs-prof-manubhai-d-shah-etc-etc-on-22-july-1992","title":{"rendered":"Life Insurance Corpn. Of India And … vs Prof. Manubhai D. Shah Etc. Etc on 22 July, 1992"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Life Insurance Corpn. Of India And … vs Prof. Manubhai D. Shah Etc. Etc on 22 July, 1992<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1993 AIR 171, \t\t 1992 SCR (3) 595<\/div>\n
Author: Ahmadi<\/div>\n
Bench: Ahmadi, A.M. (J)<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nLIFE INSURANCE CORPN. OF INDIA AND ORS. ETC.\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nPROF. MANUBHAI D. SHAH ETC. ETC.\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT22\/07\/1992\n\nBENCH:\nAHMADI, A.M. (J)\nBENCH:\nAHMADI, A.M. (J)\nPUNCHHI, M.M.\n\nCITATION:\n 1993 AIR  171\t\t  1992 SCR  (3) 595\n 1992 SCC  (3) 637\t  JT 1992 (4)\t181\n 1992 SCALE  (2)60\n\n\nACT:\n     Constitution  of  India: Part  III-Fundamental  Rights-\nArticle 19(1)(a) & 19(2).\n     Freedom  of  Speech  and  Expression-Scope\t of-Includes\nfreedom to circulate and propagate views through electronics\nmedia  subject to reasonable restrictions-Right\t extends  to\nuse  the media to answer the criticism levelled against\t the\npropagated view.\n     Publication of a research paper by Executive Trustee of\nConsumer  Education  and Research  Centre-Paper\t criticising\npremium policy adopted by Life Insurance Corporation-Counter\nprepared by a member of LIC as well as rejoinder prepared by\nExecutive   Trustee  Published\tin  a\tnewspaper-LIC\talso\npublishing  its\t counter  in  its  own\tmagazine-Refusal  to\npublish Executive Trustee's rejoinder in its mazazine on the\nground\tthat it was In - House magazine-Held refusal by\t LIC\nto  publish  rejoinder\tin its magazine\t was  arbitrary\t and\nviolative of Article 14 and 19(1)(a).\n     Freedom  of  expression  through  movies-Film-Right  to\ntelecast  on television-Guidelines for\tfilm  certification-\nDocumentary   film  on\tBhopal\tGas  Disaster-Film   awarded\nnational  award\t and  granted  `U'  Certificate-Refusal\t  by\nDoordarshan to telecast the film-Held film maker has a right\nto  take  cast\tthe  bilm-Refusal  to  telecast\t should\t  be\njustified by law under Article 19(2)-Onus lies on the  party\nwho  refuses  to  telecast to show that the  film  does\t not\nconform\t to requirements of law-Grounds of refusal held\t not\njustified-Doordarshan  being State controlled agency  cannot\nrefuse telecast of film except on valid grounds.\n     Article 12-State-Life Insurance Corporation in State.\n     Constitution-Interpretation  of-Provisions\t should\t  be\nconstrued  broadly  unless the context\totherwise  requires-\nScope of provisions, particularly Fundamental Rights  should\nnot be cut down by restricted approach.\n\t\t\t\t\t\t       596\n     Doctrine of Fairness.\n     Doctrine of Prior Restraint.\n     Cinematograph Act, 1952: Sections 5A-5B.\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\n     The  respondent, the executive trustee of the  Consumer\nEducation  &  Research Centre Ahmedabad,  after\t undertaking\nresearch into the working of the Life Insurance\t Corporation\n(LIC) published and circulated a study paper titled \"A fraud\non   policy   holders-a\t shocking  story\"   portraying\t the\ndiscriminatory\tpractice adopted by the LIC which  adversely\naffected  the  interest\t of  a\tlarge  number  holders.\t The\nunderlying  idea was to point out that unduly high  premiums\nwere charged by the LIC from those taking out life insurance\npolicies  thereby denying access to insurance coverage to  a\nvast  majority of people who cannot afford to pay  the\thigh\npremiums.  A  member of the LIC prepared a  counter  to\t the\nrespondent's  study  paper  and published  the\tsame  as  an\narticle titled `LIC and its policy holders' in the  \"Hindu\",\na  daily newspaper, challenging the conclusions\t reached  by\nthe respondent in his study paper. The respondent prepared a\nrejoinder  `Raw\t deal  for policy  Holders'  which  too\t was\npublished in the same newspaper.\n     Thereafter,  the  LIC published  its  member's  article\nwhich  was  in the nature of a counter to  the\trespondent's\nstudy paper in its magazine `Yogakshema'. On the  respondent\nlearning  about the same, he requested that in fairness\t his\nrejoinder  which was already published in the  Hindu  should\nalso be published in the said magazine to present a complete\npicture\t to the reader. The LIC refused his request  on\t the\nground\t that  their  magazine\twas  an\t in-house   magazine\ncirculated  amongst  subscribers who  were  policy  holders,\nofficers, employees and agents of the Corporation and it  is\nnot put up in the market for sale to the general public.\n     The  respondent  filed a writ petition in\tthe  Gujarat\nHigh Court which came to the conclusion that the LIC's stand\nthat  the  magazine was an in-house magazine  was  untenable\nbecause\t  it   was  available  to  anyone  on\tpayment\t  of\nsubscription;  and  it\tinvited\t articles  for\t publication\ntherein\t from  members\tof the\tpublic.\t Assuming  that\t the\nmagazine was an in-house magazine the corporation, which was\na  State within the meaning of Article 12, cannot under\t the\nguise  of  publication of an in-house magazine\tviolate\t the\nfundamental  right of the respondent. Accordingly, the\tHigh\nCourt held\n\t\t\t\t\t\t       597\nthe  refusal  by LIC to publish respondent's  rejoinder\t was\narbitrary and violative of Article 14 and 19(1)(a).  Against\nthe decision of the High Court this appeal is filed.\n     In\t the  connected\t appeal the  respondent\t produced  a\ndocumentary  film on the Bhopal Gas Disaster titled  \"Beyond\nGenocide\"  which  was  awarded the Golden Lotus,  being\t the\nbest   non-feature  film  of  1987.  At\t the  time  of\t the\npresentation of awards the Central Minister for\t Information\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
short\tfilms  would  be  telecast  on\t Doordarshan.\t The
\nrespondent  submitted his film to Doordarshan  for  telecast
\nbut Doordarshan refused to telecast the same on the  grounds
\nthat  (i)  the\tfilm  was out dated (ii)  it  had  lost\t its
\nrelevance  (iii) it lacked moderation and restraint (iv)  it
\nwas not fair and balanced (v) political parties have  raised
\nvarious\t issues concerning the tragedy and (vi)\t claims\t for
\ncompensation by victims were sub-judice.\n<\/p>\n
     The  respondent filed a writ petition  challenging\t the
\nrefusal\t to telecast his film on the ground of violation  of
\nhis   fundamental  right  under\t Article  19(1)(a)  of\t the
\nConstitution  and for a mandamus to Doordarshan to  telecast
\nthe  same.  The\t Union of India contested  the\tpetition  by
\nstating\t that  although a decision was taken  to  arrange  a
\nfixed fortnigtly telecast of award winning documentaries, no
\ndecision  was taken to telecast all national  award  winning
\ndocumentaries; that the parameters applied for selection  of
\na  film for national award were not the same as\t applied  by
\nthe Film Selection Committee of Doordarshan for selection of
\na  film\t for telecast; and the respondent’s film  which\t was
\npreviewed by a duly constituted Screening Committee was\t not
\nfound to meet the requirements for telecast on\tDoordarshan.
\nThe  High Court held that no restriction could be placed  on
\nthe fundamental right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of\t the
\nConstitution  save  and except by law permitted\t by  Article
\n19(2);\tthat the respondent’s right  under Article  19(1)(a)
\nof  the Constitution obligated Doordarshan to  telecast\t the
\nfilm since the guidelines or norms on which the refusal\t was
\nbased executive in character and not law within the  meaning
\nof  Article  19(2)  of\tthe  Constitution.  Accordingly,  it
\ndirected Doordarshan to telecast the film, “Beyond Genocide”
\nat  a  time and date convenient to it keeping  in  view\t the
\npublic interest and on such terms and conditions as it would
\nlike to impose in accordance with law.\n<\/p>\n
     In\t  appeal  to  this  Court  it  was   contended\t for
\nDoordarshan, (i) that
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t       598<\/span>
\nsub-section (2) of Section 5B of the Cinematograph Act, 1952
\nempowers the Central Government to issue directions  setting
\nout the principles which shall guide the authority competent
\nto grant certificates under the Act in sanctioning films for
\npublic\texhibition  and\t since\tthe  exemption\tgranted\t  to
\nDoordarshan  under Section 9 of the Act from the  provisions
\nrelating to certification of films in Part II of the Act and
\nRules  made thereunder by notification dated  16th  October,
\n1984  is  subject  to  the  condition  that  while  clearing
\nprogrammes  for telecast Doordarshan shall keep in view\t the
\nfilm   certification  guidelines  issued  by   the   Central
\nGovernment  under  Section  5B of the  Act,  the  guidelines
\nclearly\t have  statutory favour and would,  therefore,\tfall
\nwithin\tthe  protective umbrella of Article  19(2);(ii)\t the
\nHigh Court completely misdirected itself in not appreciating
\nthat these norms were fixed keeping  in mind the requirement
\nof  Section 5B of the Act which section was consistent\twith
\nArticle\t 19(2),\t therefore  the\t High  Court  was  wrong  in
\nbrushing   them\t  aside\t as  mere   departmental   executive
\ndirections.\n<\/p>\n
     Dismissing the appeals, this Court
\n     HELD: 1. A constitutional Provision is never static, it
\nis ever evolving and ever changing and, therefore, does\t not
\nadmit  of  a narrow, pedantic or syllogistic  approach.\t The
\nConstitution  makers  employed a  broad\t pharaseology  while
\ndrafting the fundamental rights so that they may be able  to
\ncater  to  the\tneeds  of  a  changing\tsociety.  Therefore,
\nconstitutional provisions in general and fundamental  rights
\nin  particular must be broadly construed unless the  context
\notherwise requires. The scope and ambit of such\t provisions,
\nin particular the fundamental rights, should not be cut down
\nby too astute or too restricted an approach. [606E, 607E-F]
\n     Sakal Paper (P) (Ltd. v. Union of India<\/a> [1962] 3 S.C.R.
\n842 A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 305, referred to.\n<\/p>\n
     Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494; Joseph  Burstyn,
\nInc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 and Mutual Film Corporation  v.
\nIndustrial Commission of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230; referred to.\n<\/p>\n
     2.\t   The\twords  `freedom of speech and  expression  ‘
\nmust  be  broadly  construed  to  include  the\tfreedom\t  to
\ncirculate  one’s  views by words of mouth or in\t writing  or
\nthrough audio-visual instrumentalities. therefore,  includes
\nit  the\t right propagati one’s the views through  the  print
\nmedia or
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t       599<\/span>
\nthrough\t any other communication channel e.g. the radio\t and
\nthe  television.  The print media, the radio  and  the\ttiny
\nscreen\tplay the role of public educators, so vital  to\t the
\ngrowth\tof a healthy democracy. Every citizen of  this\tfree
\ncountry,  therefore, has the right to air his or  her  views
\nthrough the printing and\/or the electronic media subject  of
\ncourse\tto  permissible restrictions imposed  under  Article
\n19(2) of the Constitution. The right extends to the  citizen
\nbeing  permitted  to use the media to answer  the  criticism
\nlevelled  against the view propagated by him. [607 G-H,\t 608
\nA,E]
\n     Romesh  Tappar  v. The State of Madras,<\/a>  [1950]  S.C.R.
\n495;  Sakal  Papers  (P) Ltd. v. Union of  India,<\/a>  [1962]  3
\nS.C.R.\t842-A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 305; Indian Express  Newspapers
\n(Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. etc. etc. v. Union of India & Ors.
\netc. etc., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 287; Odyssey Communications\tPvt.
\nLtd.  v. Lokvidayan Sanghatana & Ors.,<\/a> [1988] 3\t S.C.C.\t 410
\nand  S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram,<\/a> [1989] 2\t S.C.C.\t 574,
\nreferred to.\n<\/p>\n
     3.\t No serious exception can be taken to  the  approach
\nwhich  commended  to  the High Court.  The LIC\tis  a  State
\nwithin the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution.  It is
\ncreated under an Act, namely, the Life Insurance Corporation
\nAct,  1956,  which requires that it should function  in\t the
\nbest   interest\t of  the  community.   The   community\t is,
\ntherefore, entitled to know whether or not this\t requirement
\nof the Statute is being satisfied in the functioning of\t the
\nLIC.   The respondent’s effort in preparing the study  paper
\nwas to bring to the notice of the community that the LIC had
\nstrayed from its path by pointing out that its premium rates
\nwere  unduly high when they could be low if the LIC  avoided
\nwasteful  indulgences.\t The endeavor was to  enlighten\t the
\ncommunity   of\tthe  drawbacks\tand  shortcomings   of\t the
\ncorporation and to pin-point the areas where improvement was
\nneeded\tand  was possible.  By denying\tinformation  to\t the
\nconsumers  as well as other subscribers that LIC  cannot  be
\nsaid  to  be acting in the best interest of  the  community.
\n[612A, E-H, 613 A,D]
\n     Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh,  [1975]
\n1 S.C.C. 421, relied on.\n<\/p>\n
     4.\t By refusing to print and publish the rejoinder\t the
\nLIC  had violated the respondent’s fundamental\tright.\t The
\nrejoinder to their acticle is not in any manner\t prejudicial
\nto the members of the community nor it is based on imaginery
\nor  concocted  material.  It does not contain  any  material
\nwhich  can  be branded as offensive, in the  sense  that  it
\nwould fall within anyone
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t       600<\/span>
\nof the restrictive clauses of Article 19(2).  That being  so
\non the fairness doctrine the LIC was under an obligation  to
\npublish the rejoinder since it had published its counter  to
\nthe study paper. [614-C, 613-D, 612A, 613-E]\n<\/p>\n
     5.\t The LIC’ s refusal to publish the rejoinder in\t its
\nmagazine financed from public funds is an attitude which can
\nbe described as both unfair and unreasonable; unfair because
\nfairness  demanded that both view points were placed  before
\nthe  readers,  however, limited be their number,  to  enable
\nthem to draw their own conclusions and unreasonable  because
\nthere  was  no logic or proper\tjustification  for  refusing
\npublication.   A  monopolistic state  instrumentality  which
\nsurvives  on public funds cannot act in an arbitrary  manner
\non  the specious plea that the magazine is an in- house\t one
\nand  it is a matter of its exclusive privilege to  print  or
\nrefuse to print the rejoinder. [613 B-D]\n<\/p>\n
     6.\t A  wrong  doer\t cannot be heard  to  say  that\t its
\npersistent  refusal  to print and publish the  article\tmust
\nyield\tthe   desired  result,\tnamely\tto   frustrate\t the
\nrespondent.   The Court must be careful to see that it\tdoes
\nnot,  even unwittingly, aid the effort to defeat  a  party’s
\nright.\t However,  in  order  that  the\t reader\t knows\t and
\nappreciates  why the rejoinder has appeared after such\tlong
\nyears it is directed that the LIC will, while publishing the
\nrejoinder print an explanation and an apology for the delay.
\n[614 C-D]\n<\/p>\n
     7.\t Speech is God’s gift to mankind.  Through Speech  a
\nhuman being conveys his thoughts, sentiments and feeling  to
\nothers.\t Freedom of speech and expression is thus a  natural
\nright  which  a\t human\tbeing acquires\ton  birth.   It\t is,
\ntherefore,  a basic human right.  Thus freedom to air  one’s
\nviews is the life line of any democratic institution and any
\nattempt to stifle, suffocate or gag this right would sound a
\ndeath-knell  to democracy and would help usher in  autocracy
\nor dictatorship.  Efforts by intolerant authorities to\tcurb
\nor suffocate this freedom have always been firmly  repelled.
\nMore  so  when public authorities have\tbetrayed  autocratic
\ntendencies. [605G, 608-B, 611E]
\n     Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948),  referred
\nto.\n<\/p>\n
     8.\t The  feedom  conferred\t on  a\tcitizen\t by  Article
\n19(1)(a) includes the freedom to communicate one’s ideas  or
\nthoughts  through  a  newspaper,  a  magazine  or  a  movie.
\nAlthough  movie\t enjoys that freedom it must  be  remembered
\nthat movie is a powerful mode of communication and has the
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t       601<\/span>
\ncapacity  to  make  a profound impact on the  minds  of\t the
\nviewers\t and it is, therefore, essential to ensure that\t the
\nmeassage it conveys is not harmful to the society or even  a
\nsection\t of  the society.  Censorship  by  prior  restraint,
\ntherefore, seems justified for the protection of the society
\nfrom  the ill-effects that a motion picture may\t produce  if
\nunrestricted  exhibition  is allowed.\tCensorship  is\tthus
\npermitted to protect social interests enumerated in  Article
\n19(2)  and  section 5B of the cinematograph Act.   But\tsuch
\ncensorship  must be reasonable and must answer the  test  of
\nArticle 14 of the Constitution. [623 E-G]\n<\/p>\n
     9.\t Once  it  is recognised that  a  film-maker  has  a
\nfundamental  right  under Article 19(1)(a)  to\texhibit\t his
\nfilm, the party which claims that it was entitled to  refuse
\nenforcement  of\t this  right by virtue\tof  law\t made  under
\nArticle 19(2), the onus lies on that party to show that\t the
\nfilm did not conform to the requirements of that law, in the
\npresent case the guidelines relied upon. [620 D-E]\n<\/p>\n
     10. The respondent had a right to convey his perception
\nof  the gas disaster in Bhopal through the documentary\tfilm
\nprepared  by  him.  The film not only won the  Golden  Lotus
\naward  but  was\t also granted the  ‘U’\tCertificate  by\t the
\ncensor.\t  It is an appraisal of what exactly  transpired  in
\nBhopal\ton the date the gas leak occurred.   Therefore,\t the
\nrespondent cannot be accused of having distorted the  events
\nsubsequent to the disaster. [624 E-F]
\n     Merely  because it is critical of the State  Government
\nis  no reason to deny selection and exhibition of the  film.
\nSo also pendency of claims for compensation does not  render
\nthe matter sub-judice so as to shut out the entire film form
\nthe community.\tIn fact the community was keen to know\twhat
\nactually  had  happened, what is  happening,  what  remedial
\nmeasures  the State authorities are taking an what  are\t the
\nlikely\tconsequences  of  the gas leak.\t To  bring  out\t the
\ninadequacy  of the State effort or the indifference  of\t the
\nofficer,  etc,. cannot amount to an attack on any  political
\nparty its the criticism is genuine and objective and made in
\ngood  faith.   If  the norm for appraisal was  the  same  as
\napplied\t by the censors while granting the ‘U’\tCertificate,
\nit  is difficult to understand how Doordarshan could  refuse
\nto  exhibit  it.  It is not that it was not sent  for  being
\ntelecast soon after the disaster that one could say that  it
\nis outdated or has lost relevance. [624 G-H, 625 A-B]
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t       602<\/span>
\n     In\t the circumstances it cannot be said that  the\tfilm
\nwas  not  consistent with the accepted\tnorms.\t Doordarshan
\nbeing a State controlled agency funded by public funds could
\nnot  have  denied  access to the screen\t to  the  respondent
\nexcept on valid grounds. [625-C]
\n     K.A. Abbas v. The Union of India,<\/a> [1971] 2 S.C.R.\t446;
\nRamesh\tv.  The Union of India, [1988] 1 S.C.C. 668  and  S.
\nRangarajan  v. P. Jagivan Ram,<\/a> [1989] 2 S.C.C.\t574,  relied
\non.\n<\/p>\n
     New  York Times Company v. The Union States,<\/a>  403\tU.S.
\n713, referred to.\n<\/p>\n
&
\n     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1254 of
\n1990.\n<\/p>\n
     From  the\tJudgment  and Order  dated  17.6.80  of\t the
\nGujarat High Court in Special Civil Application No. 2711  of
\n1979.\n<\/p>\n
\t       WITH
\n     Civil Appeal No. 2643 of 1992.\n<\/p>\n
     From the Judgment and Order dated 27.9.90 of the  Delhi
\nHigh Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 212 of 1989.\n<\/p>\n
     K.T.S.  Tulsi, Additional Solicitor General, P.P.\tRao,
\nKailash\t Vasdev,  Ms. Alpana Kirpal, A.\t Subba\tRao,  Hemant
\nSharma and C.V.S. Rao for the Appellants.\n<\/p>\n
     P.H. Parekh, B.K. Brar, Ashok Aggarwal and P.D.  Sharma
\nfor the Respondent.\n<\/p>\n
     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
\n     AHMADI,  J. Special leave granted in SLP(C) No. 339  of
\n1991.\n<\/p>\n
     These  two\t appeals  though arising  out  of  different
\ncircumstances  and concerning different parties,  relate  to
\nthe scope of our constitutional policy of freedom if  speech
\nand  expression\t guaranteed  by\t Article  19(1)(a)  of\t the
\nConstitution.  The importance of the constitutional question
\nprompted  this Court to grant special leave to appeal  under
\nArticle 136 of the Constitution.  We may properly begin\t the
\ndiscussion of this judgment by stating the
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t       603<\/span>
\nfactual background of the two cases in the light of which we
\nare  required  to examine the scope  of\t the  constitutional
\nliberty of speech and expression.\n<\/p>\n
     Civil  Appeal No.1254\/80 arises out of the decision  of
\nthe Gujarat High Court in Special Civil Application No. 2711
\nof 1979 decided by a Division Bench on 17th June, 1980.\t The
\nrespondent, the executive trustee of the Consumer  Education
\n&  Research  Centre  (CERC),  Ahmedabad,  after\t undertaking
\nresearch into the working of the Life Insurance\t Corporation
\n(LIC)  published on 10th July, 1978 a study paper titled  “A
\nfraud  on  policy holder – a shocking  story”.\t This  study
\npaper  portrayed the discriminatory practice adopted by\t the
\nLIC which adversely affected the interest of a large  number
\nof policy holder.  This study paper was widely circulated by
\nthe  respondent.   Mr. N.C. Krishnan, a member\tof  the\t LIC
\nprepared  a  counter  of the respondent’s  study  paper\t and
\npublished  the\tsame as an article in the “Hindu”,  a  daily
\nnewspaper,  challenging\t the  conclusions  reached  by\t the
\nrespondent  in his study paper.\t The respondent\t prepared  a
\nrejoinder  which was published in the same  newspaper.\t The
\nLIC  publishes\ta  magazine  called  the  ‘Yogakshema’\t for
\ninforming   its\t  members,  staff  and\tagents\t about\t its
\nactivities.  It is contention of the LIC that this  magazine
\nis  an\tin-house magazine and is not put in the\t market\t for
\nsale  to the general public.  Mr. Krishnan’s  article  which
\nwas  in\t the nature of a counter to the\t respondent’s  study
\npaper  was  published  in this\tmagazine.    The  respondent
\nthereupon requested the LIC to publish his rejoinder to\t the
\nsaid  article  in  the said magazine  but  his\trequest\t was
\nspurned.  The respondent thereafter met the Chairman of\t the
\nLIC and requested him to revise the decision and to  publish
\nthe  article in the magazine but to no avail.  Thereupon  he
\nfiled  the petition contending that the refusal\t to  publish
\nhis rejoinder in the magazine violated his fundamental right
\nunder Article 14 and 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.  The High
\nCourt  came to the conclusion that the LIC’s stand that\t the
\nmagazine  was  an in-house magazine was\t untenable  for\t two
\nreasons, namely (1) it was available to anyone on payment of
\nsubscription;  and (2) in invited articles  for\t publication
\ntherein from members of the public.  The High Court took the
\nview  that merely because the magazine finds it\t circulation
\namong officers, employees and agents of the Corporation,  it
\ndoes not acquire the character of an in-house magazine since
\nthe  same  can be purchased by any member of the  public  on
\npayment\t of  subscription  and members\tof  the\t public\t are
\ninvited\t to contribute articles for publication in the\tsaid
\nmagazine.   It further held that assuming that the  magazine
\nwas an in-house magazine as contended by the
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t       604<\/span>
\nLIC,  the Corporation cannot under the guise to\t publication
\nof an in-house magazine violate the fundamental right of the
\nrespondent.   Taking  note of the fact that the\t LIC  was  a
\nState  within the meaning of Article 12 of the\tConstitution
\nand  the  in-house magazine was published with\tthe  aid  of
\npublic\tfunds and public money, the High Court held that  in
\nthe  interest  of democracy and free  society  the  magazine
\nshould\tbe available to both, an admirer and a\tcritic,\t for
\ndissemination  of information.\tIn this view of\t the  matter
\nthe  High  Court  concluded that the LIC  had  violated\t the
\nrespondent’s fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) of the
\nConstitution  by  refusing to publish his rejoinder  to\t Mr.
\nKrishnan’s  counter to his study paper.\t It  also  concluded
\nthat  the refusal of the LIC was arbitrary and violative  of
\nArticle\t 14  of the Constitution as well.  The\tHigh  Court,
\ntherefore, directed the LIC to publish in the immediate next
\nissue  of  Yogakshema  the  respondents’  rejoinder  to\t Mr.
\nkrishnan’s reply to his study paper of 10th July, 1978. This
\nview of the Gujarat High Court is assailed by the LIC in the
\nfirst appeal.\n<\/p>\n
     In\t the order appeal the facts reveal that\t Shri  Tapan
\nBose, Managing Trustee of the respondent trust, had produced
\na documentary film on the Bhopal Gas Disaster title  “Beyond
\nGenocide”.   This film was awarded the Golden  Lotus,  being
\nthe best non-feature film of 1987.  The respondent contended
\nthat  at the time of the presentation of awards the  Central
\nMinister   for\tInformation  &\tBroadcasting  had   made   a
\ndeclaration  that  the\taward winning short  films  will  be
\ntelecast  on  Doordarshan.   The  respondent  submitted\t for
\ntelecast his film to Doordarshan but Doordarshan refused  to
\ntelecast  the  same  on the ground  :  “the  contents  being
\nupdated\t do not have relevance now for the  telecast”.\t The
\nrespondent  represented\t to the Minister for  Information  &
\nbroadcasting,  but  to no avail.  He, therefore,  filed\t the
\nwrit petition, being Civil Writ No. 212 of 1989, challenging
\nthe  refusal on the ground of violation of  his\t fundamental
\nright  under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution and for  a
\nmandamus to Doordarshan to telecast the same. In the counter
\nfiled to the writ petition it was contended that although  a
\ndecision  was taken to arrange a fixed fortnightly  telecast
\nof  award winning documentaries.  It was emphasied that\t the
\nparameters   applied  for selection of a film  for  national
\naward  winning\tdocumentaries.\tIt was emphasised  that\t the
\nparameters  applied  for selection of a\t film  for  national
\naward  were  not the same as applied by the  Film  Selection
\nCommittee  of  Doordarshan  for\t selection  of\ta  film\t for
\ntelecast.   Emphasis  was laid by  Doordarshan\ton  socially
\nrelevant  films\t which\twere  fair  and\t balanced  and\t the
\nrespondent’s film which was
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t       605<\/span>
\npreviewed by a duly constituted Screening Committee was\t not
\nfound to meet that requirement for telecast on\tDoordarshan.
\nThe Ministry of Information & Broadcasting had\treconsidered
\nthe  matter in the light of the respondent’s  representation
\nbut did not see any reason to depart from the view taken  by
\nthe  Screening\tCommittee.   The  Screening  Committee\t had
\nfounded\t its decision on the accepted norms for\t display  of
\nthe   documentary  films  on  Doordarshan  and\t since\t the
\nrespondent’s  film did not satisfy the norms for the  reason
\nthat  it lacked moderation and restraint in  judging  things
\nand  expressing\t opinions,  it was found  not  suitable\t for
\ntelecast.   It\talso took into consideration the  fact\tthat
\nwhile most of the claims for compensation for the victims of
\nBhopal\tDisaster were sub-judice and political parties\twere
\nraising\t certain  issue, it was inexpedient  and  unwise  to
\ntelecast  the film.  It was also feared that it\t would\tonly
\nend  in further vitiating the atmosphere and will  serve  no
\nsocial purpose.\t The High Court came to the conclusion\tthat
\nthe   repondent’s  right  under\t Article  19(1)(a)  of\t the
\nConstitution  obligated\t Doordarshan to\t telecast  the\tfilm
\nsince the guidelines or norms on which the refusal was based
\nwere  purely executive in character and not law\t within\t the
\nmeaning\t  of  Article  19(2)  of  the\tConstitution.\t It,
\ntherefore, came to the conclusion that no restriction  could
\nbe  placed  on the fundamental right guaranteed\t by  Article
\n19(1)(a)  of  the  Constitution\t save  and  except  by\t law
\npermitted  by  Article 19(2) and not by\t executive  or\tnon-
\nstatutory  guidelines on the basis of which Doordarshan\t had
\nrefused\t to telecast the film.\tIt took the view that  these
\nnorms  were for internal guidance and cannot interfere\twith
\nthe fundamental right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of\t the
\nconstitution.\t It,  therefore,  directed  Doordarshan\t  to
\ntelecast  the  film  “Beyond Genocide” at a  time  and\tdate
\nconvenient to it keeping in view the public interest and  on
\nsuch  terms  and conditions as it would like  to  impose  in
\naccordance  with law.  It is against this direction  of\t the
\nHigh Court that the second the second appeal is preferred.\n<\/p>\n
     Speech is God’s gift to mankind. Through speech a human
\nbeing  conveys\this  thoughts, sentiments  and\tfeelings  to
\nothers.\t Freedom of speech and expression is thus a  natural
\nright  which  a\t human\tbeing acquires\ton  birth.   It\t is,
\ntherefore, a basic human right.\t “Everyone has the right  to
\nfreedom\t of  opinion  and  expression;\tthe  right  includes
\nfreedom\t to hold opinions without interference and  to\tseek
\nand  receive  and impart information and ideas\tthrough\t any
\nmedia  and regardless of frontiers” proclaims the  Universal
\nDeclaration  of\t Human Rights (1948).  The People  of  India
\ndeclared in the Preamble of the Constitution which they gave
\ninto them-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t\t       606<\/span><\/p>\n
selves\ttheir resolve to secure to all citizens\t liberty  of
\nthought\t and  expression.   This  resolve  is  reflected  in
\nArticle 19(1)(a) which is one of the articles found in\tPart
\nIII  of\t the Constitution which enumerates  the\t Fundamental
\nRights.\t That article reads as under :\n<\/p>\n
\t “19(1).  All citizens shall have the right-\n<\/p>\n
\t (a) to freedom of speech and expression;”\n<\/p>\n
     Article   19(2)  which  has  relevance  may   also\t  be
\nreproduced:\n<\/p>\n
\t “19(2).  Nothing sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall
\n\t affect\t the  operation\t of  any  existing  law,  or
\n\t prevent  the State from making any law, insofar  as
\n\t such  law  impose reasonable  restrictions  on\t the
\n\t exercise  of the right conferred by the  said\tsub-
\n\t clause\t in  the interests of [the  sovereignty\t and
\n\t integrity  of\tIndia,] the security of\t the  State,
\n\t friendly  relations  with  foreign  States,  public
\n\t order,\t decency  or  morality\tor  in\trelation  to
\n\t contempt  of court, defamation or incitement to  an
\n\t offence.”\n<\/p>\n
     A constitutional provision is never static, it is\tover
\nevolving and ever changing and, therefore, does not admit of
\na  narrow,  pedantic or syllogistic approach.  If  such\t ;an
\napproach had been adopted by the American Courts, the  First
\nAmendment-(1791)- “Congress shall make no law abridging\t the
\nfreedom\t of  speech,  or of the press”\t–  would  have\tbeen
\nrestricted   in\t its  application  to  the  situation\tthen
\nobtaining  and\twould  not  have  catered  to  the   changed
\nsituation  arising on account of the transformation  of\t the
\nprint media.  It was the broad approach adopted by the court
\nwhich  enabled\tthem  to  chart out  the  contours  of\tever
\nexpanding  notions  of press freedom.  In Dennis  v.  United
\nStates, 341 U.S. 494, Justice Frankfurtur observed :
\n\t “…The  language of the First Amendment is  to  be
\n\t read not as barren words found in a dictionary\t but
\n\t as  symbols of historic experience  illuminated  by
\n\t the presuppositions of those who employed them.”
\n     Adopting  this  approach  in Joseph  Burstyn.  Inc.  v.
\nWilson\t 343  U.S.  495\t the  Court  rejected  its   earlier
\ndetermination to the contrary in Mutual Film Corporation  v.
\nIndustrial  Commission of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230  and  concluded
\nthat  expression through motion pictures is included  within
\nthe  protection\t of  the First Amendment.   The\t Court\tthus
\nexpanded the reach of the First
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t       607<\/span>
\nAmendment by placing a liberal construction on the  language
\nof  that provision.  It will thus be seen that the  American
\nSupreme\t Court has always placed a broad  interpretation  on
\nthe  constitutional provisions for the obvious\treason\tthat
\nthe constitution has to serve the needs of an ever  changing
\nsociety.\n<\/p>\n
     The same trend is discernible from the decisions of the
\nIndian Courts also.  It must be appreciated that the  Indian
\nConstitution has separately enshrined the fundamental rights
\nin  Part  III of the Constitution since they  represent\t the
\nbasic  values which the People of India cherished when\tthey
\ngave unto themselves the constitution for free India.\tThat
\nwas  with a view to ensuring that their honour, dignity\t and
\nself  respect  will be protected in free  India.   They\t had
\nlearnt\ta  bitter  lesson from the  behaviour  of  those  in
\nauthority  during the colonial rule.  They were,  therefore,
\nnot prepared to leave anything to chance.  They,  therefore,
\nconsidered it of importance to protect specific basic  human
\nrights by incorporating a Bill of Rights in the Constitution
\nin the form of Fundamental Rights.  These fundamental rights
\nwere  intended to serve generation after  generation.\tThey
\nhad to be stated in broad terms leaving scope for  expansion
\nby  courts.   Such  an intention must  be  ascribed  to\t the
\nConstitution   makers\tsince  they  had   themselves\tmade
\nprovisions  in\tthe  Constitution to bring  about  a  socio-
\neconomic transformation.  That being so, it is reasonable to
\ninfer\tthat  the  Constitution\t makers\t employed  a   broad
\nphraseology  while drafting the fundamental rights  so\tthat
\nthey  may  be  able  to cater to the  needs  of\t a  changing
\nsociety.   It,\ttherefore,  does  not  need  any   elaborate
\nargument  to  uphold  the  contention  that   constitutional
\nprovisions in general and fundamental rights in\t  particular
\nmust  be  broadly  construed unless  the  context  otherwise
\nrequires.  It seems well settled from the decisions referred
\nto at the Bar that constitutional provisions must receive  a
\nbroad  interpretation  and  the\t scope\tand  ambit  of\tsuch
\nprovisions in particular the fundamental rights, should\t not
\nbe  cut\t down by too astute or too restricted  an  approach.
\nSee  Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India,<\/a> [1962]  3\t SCR
\n842 = AIR 1962 SC 305.\n<\/p>\n
     The  words\t ‘freedom of speech  and  expression’  must,
\ntherefore,  be broadly construed to include the\t freedom  to
\ncirculate  one’s  views by words of mouth or in\t writing  or
\nthrough\t  audio-visual\tinstrumentalities.  It,\t  therefore,
\nincludes  the  right to propagate one’s\t views\tthrough\t the
\nprint media or through any other communication channel\te.g.
\nthe  radio and the television.\tEvery citizen of  this\tfree
\ncountry, therefore, has the right to air
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t       608<\/span>
\nhis or her views through the printing and\/or the  electronic
\nmedia subject of course to permissible restrictions  imposed
\nunder  Article 19(2) of the Constitution.  The print  media,
\nthe  radio  and\t the tiny screen play  the  role  of  public
\neducators,  so vital to the growth of a\t healthy  democracy.
\nFreedom to air one’s view is the life line of any democratic
\ninstitution and any attempt to stifle, suffocate or gag this
\nright would sound a death-knell to democracy and would\thelp
\nusher  in autocracy or dictatorship.  It cannot be  gainsaid
\nthat modern communication mediums advance public interest by
\ninforming  the\tpublic of the events and  developments\tthat
\nhave  taken place and thereby educating the voters,  a\trole
\nconsidered  significant\t for the vibrant  functioning  of  a
\ndemocracy.   Therefore,\t in  any  set  up,  more  so  in   a
\ndemocratic set up like ours, dissemination of news and views
\nfor  popular consumption is a must and any attempt  to\tdeny
\nthe  same  must be frowned upon unless it falls\t within\t the
\nmischief  of Article 19(2) of the Constitution.\t It  follows
\nthat  a\t citizen for propagation of his or her ideas  has  a
\nright  to publish for circulation his views in\tperiodicals,
\nmagazines and journals or through the electronic media since
\nit is well known that these communication channels are great
\npurveyors of news and views and make considerable impact  on
\nthe minds of the readers and viewers and are known to  mould
\npublic opinion on vital issues of national importance.\tOnce
\nit  is\tconceded,  and it cannot indeed\t be  disputed,\tthat
\nfreedom\t of  speech  and  expression  includes\tfreedom\t  of
\ncirculation and propagations of ideas, there can be no doubt
\nthat the right extends to the citizen being permitted to use
\nthe media to answer the criticism levelled against the\tview
\npropagated  by\thim.  Every free citizen  has  an  undoubted
\nright  to lay what sentiments he pleases before the  public;
\nto  forbit this, except to the extent permitted\t by  Article
\n19(2),\twould  be an inroad on his  freedom.   This  freedom
\nmust,  however,\t be exercised with circumspection  and\tcare
\nmust be taken not to trench on the rights of other  citizens
\nor  to\tjeopardise  public interest.  It  is  manifest\tfrom
\nArticle\t 19(2) that the right conferred by Article  19(1)(a)
\nis  subject to imposition of reasonable restrictions in\t the
\ninterest  of,  amongst\tothers,\t public\t order,\t decency  or
\nmorality  or in relation to defamation or incitement  to  an
\noffence.    It\tis,  therefore,\t obvious  that\tsubject\t  to
\nreasonable restrictions placed under Article 19(2) a citizen
\nhas  a right a publish, circulate and disseminate his  views
\nand  any  attempt to thwart or deny the\t same  would  offend
\nArticle 19(1)(a).\n<\/p>\n
     We\t may now refer to the case law on the  subject.\t  In
\nRomesh\tTappar v. The State of Madras,<\/a> [1950] SCR  495\tthis
\nCourt held that the freedom
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t       609<\/span>
\nof speech and expression includes freedom of propagation  of
\nideas  and  this  freedom  is  ensured\tby  the\t freedom  of
\ncirculation.   It  pointed out that freedom  of\t speech\t and
\nexpression   are   the\t foundation   of   all\t  democratic
\norganisations  and are essential for the proper\t functioning
\nof the processes of democracy.\tThis view was reiterated  in
\nSakal  Papers Pvt. Ltd. (supra) wherein this Court  observed
\nthat  the  freedom of speech and  expression  guaranteed  by
\nArticle\t 19(1)(a)  includes the freedom of the\tPress.\t For
\npropagating  his  ideas a citizen had the right\t to  publish
\nthem,  to disseminate them and to circulate them, either  by
\nword  of mouth or by writing.  In Indian Express  Newspapers
\n(Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. etc. etc. v. Union of India & Ors.
\netc.  etc., [1985] 2 SCR 287 this Court after  pointing\t out
\nthat  communication needs in a democratic society should  be
\nmet  be the extention of specific rights e.g., the right  to
\nbe informed, the right to inform, the right to privacy,\t the
\nright to participate in public communications, the right  to
\ncommunicate,  etc.,  proceeded\tto observe at  page  316  as
\nfollow :\n<\/p>\n
\t “In  today’s  free world freedom of  Press  is\t the
\n\t heart\tof  social and\tpolitical  intercourse.\t The
\n\t press\thas  now  assumed the  role  of\t the  public
\n\t educator  making  formal and non  formal  education
\n\t possible   in\tlarge  scale  particularly  in\t the
\n\t developing  world where television and other  kinds
\n\t of modern communication are not still available for
\n\t all sections of society.  The purpose of the  press
\n\t is  to\t advance the public interest  by  publishing
\n\t facts\tand  opinions  without\twhich  a  democratic
\n\t electorate   cannot  make  responsible\t  judgments.
\n\t Newspaper being surveyors of news and views  having
\n\t a bearing on public administration very often carry
\n\t material   which   would  not\t be   palatable\t  to
\n\t Governments and other authorities.  The authors  of
\n\t the  article which are published in the  newspapers
\n\t have to be critical of the action of the Government
\n\t in  order to expose its weaknesses.  Such  articles
\n\t tend  to  become an irritant or even  a  threat  to
\n\t power.”\n<\/p>\n
     This Court pointed out that the constitutions guarantee
\nof  the freedom of speech and expression is not so much\t for
\nthe  benefit  of the press as it is for the benefit  of\t the
\npublic.\t  The  people  have a right to be  informed  of\t the
\ndevelopments that take place in a democratic process and the
\npress plays a vital role in disseminating this\tinformation.
\nNeither\t the  Government  nor  any  instrumentality  of\t the
\nGovernment  or\tany public sector undertaking run  with\t the
\nhelp of public funds can shy away from
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t       610<\/span>
\narticles  which\t expose weaknesses in  its  functioning\t and
\nwhich  is  given  cases\t pose a threat\tto  their  power  by
\nattempting   to\t  create  obstacles   in   the\t information
\npercolating  to\t the members of the community.\t In  Odyssey
\nCommunications\tPvt.  Ltd. v. Lokvidayan  Sanghtana &  Ors.,<\/a>
\n[1988] 3 SCC 410 a public interest litigation was  commenced
\nunder  Article\t226  of the  constitution  to  restrain\t the
\nauthorities from telecasting the serial ‘Honi Anhony’ on the
\nplea  that it was likely to spread false and  blind  beliefs
\nand  superstition  amongst the members of the  public.\t The
\nhigh   Court  by  an  interim  injunction   restrained\t the
\nauthorities  from  telecasting\tthe  serial  which  led\t the
\nproducer thereof to approach this Court under Article 136 of
\nthe Constitution.  This Court while allowing the appeal held
\nthat  the  right  of  a citizen\t to  exhibit  films  on\t the
\nDoordarshan  subject  to  the  conditions  imposed  by\t the
\nDoordarshan being a part of the fundamental right of freedom
\nof  expression could be curtailed only\tunder  circumstances
\nset out in Article 19(2) and in no other manner.  The  right
\nto exhibit the film was similar to the right of a citizen to
\npublish\t  his  views  through  any  other  media   such\t  as
\nnewspapers,  magazines, advertisement hoardings, etc.\tMore
\nrecently  in S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram,<\/a> [1989] 2\t SCC
\n574  this Court was required to consider if the Madras\tHigh
\nCourt  was justified in revoking the ‘U’ certificate  issued
\nto a Tamil Film “Ore Oru Gramathile” for public\t exhibition.
\nThe  fundamental point urged before this Court was based  on
\nthe freedom enshrined in Article 19(1)(a).  This court after
\npointing  out  the difference in language between  the\tU.S.
\nFirst  Amendment clause and Article 19(1)(a),  proceeded  to
\nobserve in paragraph 10 as under :\n<\/p>\n
\t “Movie doubtless enjoys the guarantee under Article
\n\t 19(1)(a)  but there is one  significant  difference
\n\t between the movie and other modes of communication.
\n\t The  movie cannot function in a free  market  place
\n\t like  the  newspaper,\tmagazine  or  advertisement.
\n\t Movie\tmotivates thought and action and  assures  a
\n\t high  degree of attention and retention.  It  makes
\n\t its  impact simultaneously arousing the visual\t and
\n\t aerial\t senses.  The focussing of an intense  light
\n\t on  a\tscreen\twith the dramatizing  of  facts\t and
\n\t opinion  makes\t the  ideas  more  effective.\t The
\n\t combination  of act and speech, sight and sound  in
\n\t semi-darkness\tof the theatre with  elimination  of
\n\t all  distracting ideas will have an impact  in\t the
\n\t minds of spectators.  In some cases, it will have a
\n\t complete and immediate influence on, and appeal for
\n\t everyone  who sees it.\t In view of  the  scientific
\n\t improvements in photography and
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t       611<\/span>
\n\t production the present movie is a powerful means of
\n\t communication.”\n<\/p>\n
     This  Court emphasised that the freedom  of  expression
\nmeans the right to express one’s opinion by words of  mouth,
\nwriting, printing, picture or in any other manner.  It would
\nthus  include the freedom of communication and the right  to
\npropagate  or  publish opinion.\t Concluding  the  discussion
\nthis Court observed in paragraph 53 as under :
\n\t “We end here as we began on this topic.  Freedom of
\n\t expression which is legitimate and constitutionally
\n\t protected,   cannot  be  held\tto  ransom   by\t  an
\n\t intolerant   group  of\t people.   The\t fundamental
\n\t freedom  under Article 19(1)(a) can  be  reasonably
\n\t restricted  only  for\tthe  purposes  mentioned  in
\n\t Article 19(2) and the restriction must be justified
\n\t on the anvil of necessity and not the quicksand  of
\n\t convenience  or  expediency.\tOpen  criticism\t  of
\n\t government policies and operations is not a  ground
\n\t for  restricting  expression.\t We  must   practice
\n\t tolerance  to the views of others.  Intolerance  is
\n\t as  much  dangerous to democracy as to\t the  person
\n\t himself.”\n<\/p>\n
     From  the\tabove resume of the case law it\t is  evident
\nthat this Court has always placed a broad interpretation  on
\nthe value and content of Article 19(1)(a), making it subject
\nonly  to the restrictions permissible under  Article  19(2).
\nEfforts by intolerant authorities to curb or suffocate\tthis
\nfreedom\t have  always been firmly repelled.   More  so\twhen
\npublic authorities have betrayed autocratic tendencies.\n<\/p>\n
     The  question  then is whether the\t respondent  of\t the
\nfirst appeal could as a matter of right insist that the\t LIC
\nprint his rejoinder in their magazine.\tThe LIC denied\tthis
\nright  on  the ground that their magazine  was\tan  in-house
\nmagazine  circulated  amongst subscribers  who\twere  policy
\nholders,  officer, employees and agents of the\tcorporation.
\nThe  High Court rejected this contention on two\t grounds  in
\nthe main, viz., (i) it is available to anyone on payment  of
\nsubscription  and (ii) members of the public are invited  to
\ncontribute articles for publication.  Even on the assumption
\nthat  it is an in-housing magazine the High  Court  observed
\n‘under the pretext and guise of publishing a house magazine,
\nthe Corporation cannot violate the fundamental rights of the
\npetitioner  if he has any’.  According to the High  Court  a
\nhouse  magazine\t cannot\t claim\tany  privilege\tagainst\t the
\nfundamental
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t       612<\/span>
\nrights\tof a citizen.  No serious exception can be taken  to
\nthis  approach\twhich commended to the High  Court.  In\t the
\nfirst place it must be remembered that it is not the case of
\nthe  LIC  that\tthe respondent’s study\tpaper  contains\t any
\nmaterial  which\t can be branded as offensive, in  the  sense
\nthat it would fall within anyone of the restrictive  clauses
\nof  Article 19(2).  The study paper is a  research  document
\ncontaining   statistical   information\t to   support\t the
\nconclusions  reached by the author.  The underlying idea  is
\nto  point out that unduly high premiums are charged  by\t the
\nLIC  from those taking out life insurance  policies  thereby
\ndenying\t access to insurance coverage to a vast majority  of
\npeople\twho  cannot afford to pay the  high  premiums.\t The
\nforwarding letter of 10th July, 1978 would show that  copies
\nof  the\t study\tpaper  were circulated\tto  a  few  informed
\ncitizens with a request to disseminate the contents  thereof
\nthrough\t articles, speeches, etc, Mr. N.C. Krishnan wrote  a
\ncounter\t ‘LIC and its policy holders’ which appeared in\t the
\nHindu  of  6th\tNovember,  1978.   This\t article  begins  by
\nadverting  to the study paper circulated by the\t respondent.
\nThe  respondent\t prepared a rejoinder ‘Raw deal\t for  Policy
\nholders’  which\t too  was  published in\t the  Hindu  of\t 4th
\nDecember,  1978.   The LIC then printed\t and  published\t the
\narticle of Mr. Krishnan in its magazine Yogakshema (December
\n1978 issue).  On the respondent learning about the same,  he
\nrequested  that in fairness his rejoinder which was  already
\npublished in the Hindu should also be published in the\tsaid
\nmagazine  to present a complete picture to the reader.\t The
\nLIC  refused  to  accede  to this  request  and\t hence\tthis
\nlitigation.\n<\/p>\n
     There is no dispute that the LIC is a State within\t the
\nmeaning\t of  Article 12 of the\tConstitution,  vide  Sukhdev
\nSingh & others v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh, [1975] 1 SCC\t421.
\nIt  is\tcreated\t under an Act, namely,\tthe  Life  Insurance
\nCorporation  Act,  1956, and is charged with  the  duty\t ‘to
\ncarry  on  Life Insurance business, whether  in\t or  outside
\nIndia’.\t It is further charged with the duty to so  exercise
\nits  powers under the Act as ‘to secure that life  insurance
\nbusiness   is  developed  to  the  best\t advantage  of\t the
\ncommunity’  [Section 6(1)].  It is, therefore, obvious\tthat
\nthe LIC must function in the best interest of the community.
\nThe community is, therefore, entitled to know whether or not
\nthis  requirement of the statute is being satisfied  in\t the
\nfunctioning   of  the  LIC.   The  respondent’s\t effort\t  in
\npreparing the study paper was to bring to the notice of\t the
\ncommunity that the LIC had strayed from its path by pointing
\nout  that premium rates were unduly high when they could  be
\nlow if the LIC avoided wasteful indulgences.  The  endeavour
\nwas  to\t enlighten  the\t community  of\tthe  drawbacks\t and
\nshortcomings
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t       613<\/span>
\nof  the\t corporation  and  to  pin-point  the  areas   where
\nimprovement  was  needed and was possible.  With a  view  to
\nstimulating  a\tdebate\ta  study  paper\t was  prepared\t and
\ncirculated   to\t which\tMr.  Krishnan,\ta  member  of\tLIC,
\ncountered. Since Mr. Krishnan had tried to demolish some  of
\nthe points raised by the respondent in his study paper,\t the
\nrespondent  had publish a rejoinder in the Hindu.   However,
\nthe  LIC  refused to publish it in their  magazine  financed
\nfrom public funds.  Such an attitude on the part of the\t LIC
\ncan  be\t described as both unfair and  unreasonable;  unfair
\nbecause fairness demanded that both view points were  placed
\nbefore\tthe  readers, however limited be  their\t number,  to
\nenable\tthem to draw their own conclusions and\tunreasonable
\nbecause\t there\twas  no logic or  proper  justification\t for
\nrefusing  publication. A monopolistic state  instrumentality
\nwhich  survives on public funds cannot act in  an  arbitrary
\nmanner on the specious plea that the magazine is an in-house
\none  and it is a matter of its exclusive privilege to  print
\nor  refuse  to\tprint the rejoinder.   It  is  difficult  to
\nunderstand  why\t the  LIC should feel shy  of  printing\t the
\nrejoinder if it has nothing to fear.  By denying information
\nto the consumers as well as other subscribers the LIC cannot
\nbe said to be acting in the best interest of the  community.
\nIt  is\tnot  the  case of LIC  that  the  rejoinder  to\t Mr.
\nKrishnan’s  article  is\t in any manner\tprejudicial  to\t the
\nmembers of the community or that it is based on imaginery or
\nconcocted material.  That being so on the fairness  doctrine
\nthe  LIC  was under an obligation to publish  the  rejoinder
\nsince it had published\tMr. Krishnan’s counter to the  study
\npaper.\t The  respondent’s fundamental right of\t speech\t and
\nexpression clearly entitled him to insist that his views  on
\nthe subject should reach those who read the magazine so that
\nthey have a complete picture before them and not a one sided
\nor distorted one.\n<\/p>\n
     For  the above reasons we do not find any infirmity  in
\nthe view taken by the High Court on the LIC’s obligation  to
\nprint  the rejoinder in its magazine.  We must clarify\tthat
\nwe  should  not\t be understood as laying  down\tan  absolute
\nproposition  that merely because the LIC is a State  and  is
\nrunning\t a  magazine  with  public  funds  it  is  under  an
\nobligation to print any matter that any informed citizen may
\nforward for publication.  The view that we are taking is  in
\nthe peculiar facts of the case.\n<\/p>\n
     It\t was  contended by the learned counsel for  the\t LIC
\nthat  since  the  rejoinder  of the  respondent\t is  to\t Mr.
\nKrishnan’s  article printed in December 1978, the  same\t has
\nbecome stale by passage of time and has lost its
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t       614<\/span>
\nrelevance and hence this Court should annul the High Court’s
\ndirective  to the LIC to print and publish the\tsame in\t its
\nmagazine.   Counsel  for the respondent submitted  that\t the
\nissued raised by the respondent regarding high premium rates
\nis still live as the situation has not improved from what it
\nwas in 1978.  It may be that the statistical information  in
\nthe  rejoinder\tmay be outdated but,  contends\tthe  learned
\ncounsel,  the  issue that the LIC is  charging\tunduly\thigh
\npremium\t rates by refusing to prune its avoidable  expenses,
\nis  still relevant.  He submits that if the court acedes  to
\nthe  submission of the learned counsel for the LIC it  would
\nresult in placing a premium on the recalcitrant attitude  of
\nthe  LIC.  We see force in this submission. By\trefusing  to
\nprint  and  publish the rejoinder the LIC had  violated\t the
\nrespondent’s  fundamental  right.  A wrong  doer  cannot  be
\nheard  to  say\tthat its persistent  refusal  to  print\t and
\npublish the article must yield the desired result, namely to
\nfrustrate the respondent.  The Court must be careful to\t see
\nthat it does not, even unwittingly, aid the effort to defeat
\na  party’s right Besides, if the respondent thinks that\t the
\nissued is live and relevant and desires its publication,  we
\nthing we must accept his assessment.  However, in order that
\nthe  reader  known  and appreciates why\t the  rejoinder\t has
\nappeared after such long years we direct that the LIC  will,
\nwhile  publishing  the\trejoinder as directed  by  the\tHigh
\nCourt,\tprint an explanation and an apology for\t the  delay.
\nWith this modification, the LIC’s appeal must fail.\n<\/p>\n
     That  takes  us to the appeal  involving  Doordarshan’s
\nrefusal to telecast the documentary “Beyond Genocide”  based
\non  the Bhopal Gas Disaster.  There is no dispute that\tthis
\nfilm own the Golden Lotus award as the best non-feature film
\nof  1987.  Yet, as the judgment of the High  Court  reveals,
\nDoordarshan  refused to telecast it on the ground that\t“the
\ncontents  being outdated do not have relevance now  for\t the
\ntelecast”.   It\t was emphasised that  since  the  parameters
\napplied\t for  selection of a film for  national\t award\twere
\ndifferent from those applied by the Film Selection Committee
\nof  Doordarshan\t when  it  comes to  selecting\ta  film\t for
\ntelecast, the mere fact that a film has won a national award
\nis  not sufficient for all national award winning films\t are
\nnot ipso facto fit for telecast on television.\tIt was\tsaid
\nthat  unless  a\t film  is socially  relevant  and  fair\t and
\nbalanced  it  is  not cleared for  telecast.   The  film  in
\nquestion did not satisfy this broad norm since it was  found
\nlacking\t in  moderation and restraint and hence it  was\t not
\ncleared for telecast.  Lastly it was said that since  claims
\nfor compensation of the victims of the tragedy were  pending
\nand political parties were raising
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t       615<\/span>
\nvarious\t issues,  it was though inexpedient  to\t screen\t the
\nfilm.\tIt  is,\t however, admitted in  paragraph  2  of\t the
\nSpecial Leave Petition:\t “The documentary is an appraisal of
\nwhat  exactly transpired in Bhopal on the date the gas\tleak
\noccurred”.   Admittedly\t the  said film was  granted  a\t ‘U’
\ncertificate by the Central Board of Film Certification under
\nsection\t 5A  of\t the Cinematograph  Act,  1952\t(hereinafter
\ncalled ‘the Act’)
\n     In\t the  High  Court  Doordarshan\thad  by\t way  of  an
\nadditional  affidavit  contended  that\tbefore\trefusing  to
\ntelecast the film, its selection committee had examined\t the
\nfilm with a view to finding out if it conformed to the norms
\nlaid down for selection of a documentary film for  telecast.
\nThese norms on which reliance was placed have been extracted
\nin the judgment of the High Court and read as under:
\n\t “(i) Criticism of friendly countries;\n<\/p>\n
\t (ii) Attack on religions and communities;\n<\/p>\n
\t (iii) Anything obscene and defamatory;\n<\/p>\n
\t (iv)Incitement\t of  violence  of  anything  against
\n\t maintenance of law and order;\n<\/p>\n
\t (v) Anything amounting to contempt of court;\n<\/p>\n
\t (vi) Attack on a political party by name;\n<\/p>\n
\t (vii) Hostial criticism of any State or Centre.”\n<\/p>\n
       The  High Court observes that these  guidelines\twere
\npurely departmental\/executive instructions or notings on the
\nfile for internal guidance which cannot curtail the  freedom
\nconferred by Article 19(1)(a) and not being ‘law’ could\t not
\nclaim  the protection of Article 19(2) of the  Constitution.
\nThe learned Additional Solicitor General submitted that\t the
\nHigh   Court  had  completely  misdirected  itself  in\t not
\napprediating that these norms were fixed keeping in mind the
\nrequirement  of Section 5B of the Act which section was\t was
\nconsistent with Article 19(2) extracted earlier.  We may now
\nexamine the scheme of the Act.\n<\/p>\n
      The  Act was enacted to provide for the  certification
\nof  cinematograph  films for exhibition and  for  regulating
\ntheir exhibition.  Section 3 of
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t       616<\/span>
\nthe  Act  empowers the Central Government  to  constitute  a
\nBoard consisting of a Chairman, five whole time members\t and
\nsix honorary members, three of whom must be persons  engaged
\nor  employed  in  the  film industry,  for  the\t purpose  of
\nsanctioning   films  for  public  exhibition.\tSection\t  3B
\nempowers  the Board so constituted to constitute by  special
\nor general order an Examining Committee for the\t examination
\nof  any film or class of films and a Revising Committee\t for
\nreconsidering,\tif  necessary, the  recommendations  of\t the
\nExamining  Committee.\tAny person desiring to\texhibit\t any
\nfilm has to make an application as provided by Section 4  to
\nthe Board in the prescribed manner for a certificate and the
\nBoard may after examination of the film section the film for
\nunrestricted  public  exhibition or sanction  the  film\t for
\npublic\texhibition  restricted to adults or  to\t direct\t the
\napplicant to carry out\tsuch excisions and modifications  in
\nthe  film as it thinks necessary before sanctioning  it\t for
\nunrestricted  public  exhibition or  for  public  exhibition
\nrestricted  to\tadults or refuse to sanction  the  film\t for
\npublic exhibition.  Section 4A provides for the\t examination
\nof  films  by  the Examining Committee and in  the  case  of
\ndifference  of opinions amongst the member of the  Examining
\nCommittee for further examination by the Revising Committee.
\nSection\t 5A provides for certification of films.   If  after
\nexamination the Board consider that the film is suitable for
\nunrestricted public examination the Board consider that\t the
\nfilm is suitable for unrestricted public exhibition or\tthat
\nalthough  not suitable for such exhibition, it\tis  suitable
\nfor  public exhibition restricted to adults, it is  required
\nto issue a ‘U’ certificate in the case of the former and  an
\n‘A’  certificate  in  the case of the  latter.\t Section  5B
\nprovides  for  laying down principles for  guidance  in\t the
\nmatter\tof  certification  of films.  This  section  to\t the
\nextent relevant for our purpose reads as under :
\n\t “5B. Principles for guidance in certifying films  –
\n\t (1)  a\t film  shall not  be  certified\t for  public
\n\t exhibition  if,  in the opinion  of  the  authority
\n\t competent to grant the certificate, the film or any
\n\t part  of  it  is  against  the\t interests  of\t the
\n\t sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of
\n\t the State, friendly relations with foreign  States,
\n\t public\t order,\t decency or  morality,\tor  involves
\n\t defamation  or\t contempt of court or is  likely  to
\n\t incite the commission of any offence.\n<\/p>\n
\t  (2)  Subject to the provisions contained  in\tsub-
\n\t Section  (1)…. the Central Government  may  issue
\n\t such directions as it may think fit setting out the
\n\t principles which shall guide the
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t       617<\/span>
\n\t authority  competent  to grant\t certificates  under
\n\t this\tAct   in  sanctioning\tfilms\tfor   public
\n\t exhibition……”\n<\/p>\n
Section\t 5C  provides  for  the\t constitution  of  appellate
\ntribunals,  whereas Section 5D provides for appeals  against
\nthe  Board’s decision refusing to grant the  certificate  or
\ngranting only ‘A’ Certificate or directing the applicant  to
\ncarry  out  any\t excisions or  modifications.\tIn  addition
\nthereto revisional powers have been conferred on the Central
\nGovernment  to\tcall  for the record of\t any  proceeding  in
\nrelation  to any film at any stage where it is not made\t the
\nsubject\t matter\t of appeal, to enquire into the\t matter\t and
\nmake  such  order in relation thereto as it thinks  fit\t and
\nwhere necessary give a direction that the exhibition of\t the
\nfilm should suspended for a period not exceeding two months.
\nSub-section  (5)  of section 6 lays down  that\tthe  Central
\nGovernment  may,  if satisfied in relation to  any  film  in
\nrespect\t of  which an order has been made  by  an  appellate
\ntribunal  under Section 5B that it is necessary so to do  in
\nthe interests of (i) the sovereignty and integrity of  India
\nor  (ii)  the  security\t of  the  State\t or  (iii)  friendly
\nrelations with foreign State or (iv) public order or decency
\nor  morality, make such enquiry into the matter as it  deems
\nnecessary  and\tpass such order in relation  thereto  as  it
\nthinks fit.  Thereupon the Board must dispose of the  matter
\nin  conformity\twith such order.  Section 7  lays  down\t the
\npenalties  for contravention of the requirements of Part  II
\nof  the\t Act.\tSection 8 confers power to  make  rules\t and
\nSection\t 9  empowers the Central Government  to\t exempt\t the
\nexhibition or export of any film or class of films from\t any
\nof  the\t provisions of the said part or of  any\t rules\tmade
\nthereunder  subject to such conditions and restrictions,  if
\nany,  as it may impose.\t Part III of the Act deals with\t the
\nregulation  of\texhibitions by means of\t Cinematograph\twith
\nwhich we are not concerned.  This in brief is the scheme  of
\nthe statute.\n<\/p>\n
     In\t exercise of power conferred by sub-section  (2)  of
\nSection\t 5D  of\t the Act the  Central  Government  issued  a
\nnotification  dated  7th  January,  1978  laying  down\t the
\nprinciples which should guide the authorities in sanctioning
\nthe  films for public exhibition.  These guidelines came  to
\nbe enlarged by a subsequent notification dated 11th  August,
\n1989.\tThe guidelines laid down by these two  notifications
\nrequire the Board of Film Certification to ensure that :
\n\t “(i)  Anti-social activities such as  violence\t are
\n\t not glorified or
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t       618<\/span>
\n\t justified:\n<\/p>\n
\t (ii)  The  modus-operandi  of\tcriminals  or  other
\n\t visual or words likely to incite the commission  of
\n\t any offence are not depicted:\n<\/p>\n
\t (iia)Scenes  showing  involvement  of\tchildren  in
\n\t violence, either as victims or as perpetrators,  or
\n\t showing  child\t abuse or abuse\t of  physically\t and
\n\t mentally handicapped persons are not presented in a
\n\t manner\t   which   is\tneedlessly   prolonged\t  or
\n\t exploitative in nature;\n<\/p>\n
\t (iii)\tPointless or avoidable scenes  of  violence,
\n\t cruelty and horror are not shown;\n<\/p>\n
\t (iiia)\t Scenes which have the effect of  justifying
\n\t or  glorifying drinking and drug addiction are\t not
\n\t shown;\n<\/p>\n
\t (iv)  Human  sensibilities  are  not  offended\t  by
\n\t vulgarity, obscenity and depravity;\n<\/p>\n
\t (iva)\tVisuals\t or  words depicting  women  in\t any
\n\t ignorable  servility  to  man\tor  glorifying\tsuch
\n\t servility  as a praiseworthy quality in  women\t are
\n\t not presented;\n<\/p>\n
\t (ivb)\tScenes\tinvolving  sexual  violence  against
\n\t women like attempt to rape, gangrape, murder or any
\n\t other\tform of molestation or scences of a  similar
\n\t nature shall be avoided and if for any reason\tsuch
\n\t things are found to be inevitable for the  sequence
\n\t of a theme, they shall be properly scruitinised  so
\n\t as  to ensure that they do not create\tany  adverse
\n\t impression  on\t viewers  and the  duration  of\t the
\n\t scenes shall be reduced to the shortest span;\n<\/p>\n
\t (v)  Visuals  or  words  contemptuous\tof   racial,
\n\t religious or other groups are not presented;
\n\t (va)  Visuals\tor  words  which  promote   communal
\n\t obscurantist,\t antiscientific\t and   anti-national
\n\t attitudes are not presented;\n<\/p>\n
\t (vi) The sovereignty and integrity of India is\t not
\n\t called in question;\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t\t       619<\/span><\/p>\n
\t (vii) The security of the State is not\t jeopardised
\n\t or endangered;\n<\/p>\n
\t (viii)\t Friendly relations with foreign States\t are
\n\t not strained;\n<\/p>\n
\t (ix) Public order is not endangered;\n<\/p>\n
\t (x)  Visuals  or  words  involving  defamation\t  or
\n\t contempt of court are not presented.”\n<\/p>\n
In  following  these guidelines or principles the  Board  of
\nFilm  Certification  has been cautioned to ensure  that\t the
\nfilm is judged in its entirely from the point of view of its
\noverall\t impact and is judged in the light  of\tcontemporary
\nstandards  of the country and the people to which  the\tfilm
\nrelates.   Pursuant to the issuance of these guidelines\t the
\nCentral Government issued a further notification dated\t16th
\nOctober,  1984 in exercise of power under Section 9  of\t the
\nAct  exempting all Doordarshan programs from the  provisions
\nrelating to certification of films in Part II of the Act and
\nthe  Rules  made thereunder subject to\tthe  condition\tthat
\nwhile  clearing\t programmers  for  telecast,  the   Director
\nGeneral,  Doordarshan or the condition that  while  clearing
\nprograms for telecast, the Director General, Doordarshan  or
\nthe  concerned\tdirector, Doordarshan Kendra shall  Keep  in
\nview the film certification guidelines issued by the Central
\nGovernment  to\tthe Board of Film Certification\t under\tsub-
\nsection (2) of Section 5B of the Act.\n<\/p>\n
     It\t may  be stated at the outset that  the\t refusal  to
\ntelecast was not based on the ground that the list of  award
\nwinning films was long and on the basis of inter-se priority
\namongst\t such films and the time allocated  for\t telecasting
\nsuch  films, it was not possible to telecast the film.\t The
\ngrounds\t for  refusal  that  can  be  culled  out  from\t the
\npleadings  were (i) the film is out dated (ii) it  has\tlost
\nits relevance (iii) it lacks moderation and restrainst\t(iv)
\nit is not fair and balanced (v) political parties have\tbeen
\nraising\t various  issues  concerning the  tragedy  and\t(vi)
\nclaims\tfor  compensation  by  victims\tare  sub-judice.  In
\naddition  to these grounds which can be culled out from\t the
\njudgment  of the High Court, it is found from the  affidavit
\nfiled in the present proceedings that the film was not found
\nfit for telecast as it was likely to create commotion to the
\nalready\t charged atmosphere and because the film  criticised
\nthe   action  of  the  State  Government,  which   was\t not
\npermissible under the Guidelines.  The last two grounds were
\nnot  before  the  High\tCourt  giving  the  impression\tthat
\nDoordarshan  is\t shifting its stand.  We  will\thowever\t not
\nbrush  them aside on such technical considerations.  We\t may
\nhowever\t point\tout  that Doordarshan  had  not\t placed\t any
\nmaterial
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t       620<\/span>
\nsuggesting  why it things that the film does not conform  to
\nthe above stated norms.\n<\/p>\n
     Mr.   Tulsi,  the\tlearned\t counsel  for\tDoordarshan,
\nsubmitted  that sub-section (2) of section 5B  empowers\t the
\nCentral\t Government  to\t issue directions  setting  out\t the
\nprinciples  which  shall guide the  authority  competent  to
\ngrant  certificates under the Act in sanctioning  films\t for
\npublic\texhibition  and\t since\tthe  exemption\tgranted\t  to
\nDoordarshan  under Section 9 of the Act from the  provisions
\nrelating to certification of films in Part II of the Act and
\nRules  made thereunder by notification dated  16th  October,
\n1984  is  subject  to  the  condition  that  while  clearing
\nprograms  for  telecast Doordarshan shall keep in  view\t the
\nfilm   certification  guidelines  issued  by   the   Central
\nGovernment  under  Section  5B of the  Act,  the  guidelines
\nclearly\t have statutory flavour and would,  therefore,\tfall
\nwithin the protective umbrella of Article 19(2) and the High
\nCourt\twas   wrong   in  brushing  them   aside   as\tmere
\ndepartmental\/executive\tdirections or notings on a file\t not
\nhaving the force of law.  We will so assume for the  purpose
\nof this appeal.\t However, once it is recognised that a film-
\nmaker  has  a fundamental right under  Article\t19(1)(a)  to
\nexhibit\t his  film,  the  party which  claims  that  it\t was
\nentitled  to refuse enforcement of this right by  virtue  of
\nlaw made under Article 19(2), the onus lies on that party to
\nshow  that the film did not conform to the  requirements  of
\nthat  law, in the present case the guidelines  relied  upon.
\nTwo  question, therefore, arise (i) whether  the  film-maker
\nhad  a\tfundamental  right  to have  his  film\ttelecast  on
\nDoordarshan  and  (ii)\tif  yes,  whether  Doordarshan\t has
\nsuccessfully  shown that it was entitled to refuse  telecast
\nas the guidelines were breached?\n<\/p>\n
     In\t th  United  States  prior  restraint  is  generally
\nregarded to be at serious odds with the First Amendment\t and
\ncarries\t a heavy presumption against  its  constitutionality
\nand  the authorities imposing the same have to\tdischarge  a
\nheavy  burden  on demonstrating its justification  (See\t New
\nYork  Times  Company  v. The United States,  403  U.S.\t713.
\nTraditionally  prior restraints. regardless of\ttheir  from,
\nare  frowned upon as threats to freedom of expression  since
\nthey contain within themselves forces which if released have
\nthe potential for imposing arbitrary and at times irrational
\ndecisions.  Since the function of any Board of Film  Censors
\nis  to censor it, it immediately conflicts with the  Article
\n19(1)  (a)  and\t has  to  be  justified\t as  falling  within
\npermissible   restraint\t  under\t  Article   19(2)   of\t the
\nConstitution.  A similar question came up before this  Court
\nin K.A. Abbas v. The Union of<\/a>
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t       621<\/span>
\nIndia,\t[1971] 2 SCR 446 wherein Chief Justice\tHidayatullah
\nexhaustively  dealt with the question of prior restraint  in
\nthe  context of the provisions of the Constitution  and\t the
\nAct.   The  learned  Chief Justice  after  setting  out\t the
\nvarious\t provisions to which we have already adverted  posed
\nthe  questions; `How far can these restrictions go  and\t how
\nare these to be imposed’?  The documentary film ` A tale  of
\nfour  cities’  made  by K.A. Abbas  portrayed  the  contrast
\nbetween\t the luxuious life of the rich and the\tsqualor\t and
\npoverty\t of  the poor in the four principal  cities  of\t the
\ncountry\t and  included\ttherein shots  from  the  red  light
\ndistrict of Bombay showing scantily dressed women soliciting
\ncustomers by standing near the doors and windows.  The Board
\nof  Film  Censors granted `A’ certificate to  the  film\t and
\nrefused\t the `U’ certificate sought by Abbas.  This  was  on
\nthe ground that the film dealt with relations between  sexes
\nin  such a manner as to depict immoral traffic in women\t and
\nbecause\t the film contained incidents unsuitable  for  young
\npersons.   Abbas  challenged  the Board’s  decision  on\t the
\nground (i) that pre-censorship cannot be tolerated as it was
\nin  violation  of the freedom of speech and  expression\t and\n<\/p>\n
(ii)  even  if\tit  is\tconsidered  legitimate\tit  must  be
\nexercised  on  well-defined principles leaving no  room\t for
\narbitrary  decisions.\tThis Court held that  censorship  in
\nIndian had full justification in the field of exhibition  of
\nfilms  since  it was in the interest of society and  if\t the
\nlegitimate  power  in abused it can be struck  down.   While
\ndealing\t with the grounds on which the `U’  certificate\t was
\nrefused, the learned Chief Justice observed:
\n\t “The  task of the censor is extremely delicate\t and
\n\t his  duties cannot be the subject of an  exhaustive
\n\t set of commands established by prior ratiocination.
\n\t But  direction is necessary of him so that he\tdoes
\n\t not  sweep within the terms of the directions\tvast
\n\t areas of thought, speech and expression of artistic
\n\t quality  and  social  purpose\tand  interest.\t Our
\n\t standards must be so framed that we are not reduced
\n\t to  a\tlevel  where the  protection  of  the  least
\n\t capable and the most depraved amongst us determines
\n\t what the morally healthy cannot view or read.\t The
\n\t standards that\t we set for our censors must make  a
\n\t substantial  allowance\t in favour of  freedom\tthus
\n\t leaving  a vast area for creative art to  interpret
\n\t life  and  society with some of its  foibles  along
\n\t with  what  is good.  We must not  look  upon\tsuch
\n\t human relationships as banned in toto and for\tever
\n\t from  human thought and must give scope for  talent
\n\t to put them before
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t       622<\/span>
\n\t society.   The requirements of art  and  literature
\n\t include  within themselves a comprehensive view  of
\n\t social life and not only in its ideal from and\t the
\n\t line is to be drawn where the average man moral man
\n\t begins to feel embarrassed or disgusted at a  naked
\n\t portrayal  of life without the redeeming  touch  of
\n\t art  or  genius or social value.  If  the  depraved
\n\t begins\t to  see in these things more than  what  an
\n\t average  person would, in much the same way, as  it
\n\t is wrongly said, a Frenchman sees a woman’s legs in
\n\t everything, it cannot be helped.  In our scheme  of
\n\t things\t ideas having redeeming social\tor  artistic
\n\t value must also have importance and protection\t for
\n\t their growth.”\n<\/p>\n
     In\t Ramesh\t v.  The union of India, [1988]\t 1  SCC\t 668
\npetition  was filed to restrain the screening of the  serial
\n`Tamas’ on the ground that it violated Articles 21 and 25 of
\nthe  Constitution and Section 5B of the Act.  Based  on\t the
\nnovel  of Bhisma Sahni this serial depicted the events\tthat
\ntook place in Lahore immediately before the partition of the
\ncountry.  Two Judges of the Bombay High Court saw the serial
\nand  rejected the contention that it propagates the cult  of
\nviolence.  This Court after referring to the observations of
\nHidayatullah, CJ. in K.A. Abbas proceeded to state as under:
\n\t “It  is no doubt true that the motion picture is  a
\n\t powerful instrument with a much stronger impact  on
\n\t the  visual and aural sense of the spectators\tthan
\n\t any other medium of communication; likewise, it  is
\n\t also  true that the television, the range of  which
\n\t has vastly developed in our country in the past few
\n\t years,\t now reaches out to the remotest corners  of
\n\t the  country catering to the not so  sophisticated,
\n\t literary  or  educated masses of people  living  in
\n\t distant villages.  But the argument overlooks\tthat
\n\t the  potency of the motion picture is as  much\t for
\n\t good as for evil.  If some scenes of violence, some
\n\t nuances  of expression or some events in  the\tfilm
\n\t can  stir up certain feelings in the spectator,  an
\n\t equally   deep\t strong,  lasting   and\t  beneficial
\n\t impression can be conveyed by scenes revealing\t the
\n\t machinations of selfish interest, scenes  depicting
\n\t mutual\t  respect  and\ttolerance,  scenes   showing
\n\t comradeship, help and kindness which transcend\t the
\n\t barriers   of\treligion.    Unfortunately,   modern
\n\t developments both in the field of cinema as well as
\n\t in the field of national and international politics
\n\t have rendered it inevitable for people
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t       623<\/span>
\n\t  to face realities of internecine conflicts,  inter
\n\t alia,\tin the name of religion.  Even\tcontemporary
\n\t news  bulletins very often carry scenes of  pitched
\n\t battle or violence.  What is necessary sometimes is
\n\t to  penetrate\tbehind the scenes  and\tanalyse\t the
\n\t causes\t of  such  conflicts.  The  attempt  of\t the
\n\t author\t in this film is to draw a lesson  from\t our
\n\t country’s  past  history,  expose  the\t motives  of
\n\t persons  who operate behind the scenes to  generate
\n\t and foment conflicts and to emphasise the desire of
\n\t persons to live in amity  and the need for them  to
\n\t rise above religious barriers and treat one another
\n\t with  kindness,  sympathy  and\t affection.   It  is
\n\t possible only for a motion picture to convey such a
\n\t message  in depth and if it is able to do this,  it
\n\t will be an achievement of great social value.”
\n     This Court upheld the finding of the Bombay high  Court
\nthat  the  serial  viewed  in its  entirety  is\t capable  of
\ncreating  a lasting impression of this massage of peace\t and
\nco-existence  and  there  is no fear  of  the  people  being
\nobsessed, overwhelmed or carried away by scenes of  violence
\nof fanaticism shown in the film.\n<\/p>\n
     As\t already  pointed  out\tearlier\t this  Court  in  S.
\nRangarajan’s  case  (supra)  emphasised\t that  the   freedom
\nconferred  on  a citizen by Article  19(1)(a)  includes\t the
\nfreedom\t to  communicate one’s ideas or thoughts  through  a
\nnewspaper,  a  magazine or a movie.  Although  movie  enjoys
\nthat freedom it must be remembered that movie is a  powerful
\nmode  of  communication\t and  has the  capacity\t to  make  a
\nprofound  impact  on  the minds of the viewers\tand  it\t is,
\ntherefore,  essential to ensure that the message it  conveys
\nis  not\t harmful  to the society or even a  section  of\t the
\nsociety.   Censorship by prior restraint,  therefore,  seems
\njustified  for the protection of the society from  the\till-
\neffects\t that a motion picture may produce  if\tunrestricted
\nexhibition  is\tallowed.  Censorship is\t thus  permitted  to
\nprotect\t social\t interests enumerated in Article  19(2)\t and
\nsection\t 5B  of\t the  Act.   But  such\tcensorship  must  be
\nreasonable  and\t must answer the test of Article 14  of\t the
\nConstitution.\tIn this decision the fundamental  difference
\nbetween\t the U.S. First Amendment and the freedom  conferred
\nby  19(1)(a), subject to Article 19(2) has been\t highlighted
\nand we need not dwell on the same.\n<\/p>\n
     Every right has a corresponding duty or obligation\t and
\nso has the fundamental right of speech and expression.\t The
\nfreedom conferred by
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t       624<\/span>
\nArticle\t 19(1)(a) is, therefore, not absolute as perhaps  in
\nthe  case  of the U.S. First Amendment; it carries  with  it
\ncertain responsibilities towards fellow citizens and society
\nat  large.  A citizen who exercises this right\tmust  remain
\nconscious  that his fellow citizen too has a similar  right.
\nTherefore, the right must be so exercised as not to come  to
\ndirect conflict with the right of another citizen.  It must,
\ntherefore, be so exercised as not to jeopardise the right of
\nanother or clash with the paramount interest of the State or
\nthe   community\t  at  large.   In  India,   therefore,\t our
\nConstitution   recognises  the\tneed  to  place\t  reasonable
\nrestrictions  on  grounds  specified by\t Article  19(2)\t and
\nsection 5B of the Act on the exercise of the right of speech
\nand  expression.  It is for this reason that this Court\t has
\nrecognised  the need for prior restraint and our  laws\thave
\nassigned a specific role to the censors as such is the\tneed
\nin  a  rapidly\tchanging  societal  structure.\t But   since
\npermissible  restrictions,  albeit reasonable, are  all\t the
\nsame  restrictions on the exercise of the fundamental  right
\nunder  Article 19(1)(a), such restrictions are bound  to  be
\nviewed as anathema, in that, they are in the nature of curbs
\nor limitations on the exercise of right and are,  therefore,
\nbound to be viewed with suspicion, thereby throwing a  heavy
\nburden\ton  the authorities that seek to impose\t them.\t The
\nburden would therefore, heavily lie on the authorities\tthat
\nseek  to  impose  them to show\tthat  the  restrictions\t are
\nreasonable are permissible in law.\n<\/p>\n
     From    the   above   discussion\tit   follows\tthat
\nunquestionably\tthe  respondent has a right  to\t convey\t his
\nperception  of\tthe  gas  disaster  in\tBhopal\tthrough\t the
\ndocumentary  film prepared by him.  This film not  only\t won
\nthe  Golden  Lotus  award  but\twas  also  granted  the\t `U’
\ncertificate   by  the  censors.\t  Even\taccording   to\t the
\npetitioners `the documentary is an appraisal of what exactly
\ntranspired in Bhopal on the date the gas leak occurred.\t The
\npetitioners,  therefore,  concede that the  film  faithfully
\nbrings\tout  the events that took place at  Bhopal  on\tthat
\nfateful night.\tTherefore, the respondent cannot be  accused
\nof  having distorted the events subsequent to the  disaster.
\nHow than can it be alleged that it is not fair and  balanced
\nor lacks in moderation and restraint?  It is nowhere  stated
\nwhich part of the film lacks moderation and\/or restraint nor
\nis  it shown how the film can be described as not  fair\t and
\nbalanced.   Merely  because  it is  critical  of  the  State
\nGovernment,  perhaps because of its incapacity to cope\twith
\nunprecedented situation, is no reason to deny selection\t and
\npublication  of\t the film.  So also pendency of\t claims\t for
\ncompensation does not render the matter subjudice  so as  to
\nshut out the entire film from the community.  In fact the
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t       625<\/span>
\ncommunity was keen to know what actually has happened,\twhat
\nis  happening, what remedial measures the State\t Authorities
\nare  taking and what are the likely consequences of the\t gas
\nleak.\tTo bring out the inadequacy of the State  effort  or
\nthe indifference of the officers, etc., cannot amount to  an
\nattack\ton any political party if the criticism\t is  genuine
\nand  objective\tand made in good faith.\t If  the  norms\t for
\nappraisal  was\tthe  same as applied  by  the censors  while
\ngranting the `U’ certificate, it is difficult to  understand
\nhow Doordarshan could refuse to exhibit it.  It is not\tthat
\nit  was not sent for being telecast soon after the  disaster
\nthat  one  could  say  that  it\t is  outdated  or  has\tlost
\nrelevance.  It is even today of relevance and the press\t has
\nbeen writing about it periodically.  The learned  Additional
\nSolicitor General was not able to point out how it could  be
\nsaid  that the film was not consistent with  accepted  norms
\nsetout earlier.\t Doordarshan being a State controlled agency
\nfunded\tby public funds could not have denied access to\t the
\nscreen\tto  the\t respondent except on  valid  grounds.\t We,
\ntherefore,  see no reason to interfere with the\t High  Court
\norder.\n<\/p>\n
     In\t the result both the appeals fail and are  dismissed
\nwith costs.\n<\/p>\n
T.N.A\t\t\t\t\t Appeals dismissed.\n\t\t\t\t\t\t       626<\/span>\n\n\n\n<\/pre>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Life Insurance Corpn. Of India And … vs Prof. Manubhai D. Shah Etc. Etc on 22 July, 1992 Equivalent citations: 1993 AIR 171, 1992 SCR (3) 595 Author: Ahmadi Bench: Ahmadi, A.M. (J) PETITIONER: LIFE INSURANCE CORPN. OF INDIA AND ORS. ETC. Vs. RESPONDENT: PROF. MANUBHAI D. SHAH ETC. ETC. DATE […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-243939","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nLife Insurance Corpn. Of India And ... vs Prof. Manubhai D. Shah Etc. 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