{"id":245960,"date":"1979-03-23T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1979-03-22T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/jayarama-reddy-anr-vs-revenue-divisional-officer-land-on-23-march-1979"},"modified":"2018-01-23T11:18:43","modified_gmt":"2018-01-23T05:48:43","slug":"jayarama-reddy-anr-vs-revenue-divisional-officer-land-on-23-march-1979","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/jayarama-reddy-anr-vs-revenue-divisional-officer-land-on-23-march-1979","title":{"rendered":"Jayarama Reddy & Anr vs Revenue Divisional Officer & Land … on 23 March, 1979"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Jayarama Reddy & Anr vs Revenue Divisional Officer & Land … on 23 March, 1979<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1979 AIR 1393, \t\t 1979 SCR (3) 599<\/div>\n
Author: P Shingal<\/div>\n
Bench: Shingal, P.N.<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nJAYARAMA REDDY & ANR.\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nREVENUE DIVISIONAL OFFICER & LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER,KURNOO\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT23\/03\/1979\n\nBENCH:\nSHINGAL, P.N.\nBENCH:\nSHINGAL, P.N.\nDESAI, D.A.\n\nCITATION:\n 1979 AIR 1393\t\t  1979 SCR  (3) 599\n 1979 SCC  (3) 578\n\n\nACT:\n     Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Order XXII r. 4-Scope of-\nCross appeals-Legal  representatives of\t deceased  appellant\nbrought on  record-Appellant in cross-appeal failed to bring\nthem on\t record of  cross appeal-Cross\tappeal-If  abates-No\nobjection raised before the High Court-If could be raised in\nfurther appeal.\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\n     Order XXII\t Rule 4\t (1) CPC  provides that where one of\ntwo or\tmore defendants\t dies and  the right to sue does not\nsurvive against the surviving defendant or defendants alone,\nthe court,  on an  application made  in that  behalf,  shall\ncause the  legal representative of the deceased defendant to\nbe made\t a party  and shall  proceed with the suit. Sub-rule\n(3) of the Rule provides that where, within the time limited\nby law,\t no application\t is made under sub-rule (1) the suit\nshall abate as against the deceased defendant.\n     The land  in dispute,  which belonged to three persons,\nwas acquired  by the  State Government\tfor a public purpose\nand the\t market value  was fixed at Rs. 2\/- per square yard.\nOn appeal  by the  claimants, it  was raised  to Rs. 12\/-per\nsquare yard.  Against the  order of  Subordinate Judge, both\nthe State  and the  claimants filed  appeals before the High\nCourt.\n     While the\tappeals were  pending before the High Court,\none of\tthe claimants died. The legal representatives of the\ndeceased claimant  were brought\t on record in the claimant's\nappeal, but  the Government took no steps to bring the legal\nrepresentatives of  the deceased  claimant on  record in the\nappeal filed by it.\n     Dismissing\t the  claimant's  appeal  and  allowing\t the\nGovernment appeal  the High  Court reduced  the price of the\nacquired land to Rs. 4\/- per square yard.\n     In appeal\tbefore this  Court the\tclaimants  contended\nthat  since   the  legal  representatives  of  the  deceased\nclaimant were  not brought  on record  within the  period of\nlimitation,  the   Government  appeal\tabated\t and   stood\ndismissed.\n     Dismissing the appeal,\n^\n     HELD: (per\t Shinghal, J.)\t1. It  is not correct to say\nthat the  Government  appeal  stood  dismissed\tagainst\t the\nsurviving respondents because the Government failed to bring\nthe legal representatives of the deceased claimant on record\nwithin the  specified time  limit. The\tquestion whether the\nright to  sue survived\tagainst\t the  surviving\t respondents\nalone, was  a matter  for the appellate court to examine and\ndecide after hearing the parties with regard to the question\nof jointness  or otherwise  of the  decree and\tthe  further\nquestion  whether   there  was\t any  possibility   of\t two\ncontradictory decrees. [605 F-G]\n600\n     2. There  is no justification for the argument that the\nHigh Court's  decree was  a nullity  because it\t was  passed\nagainst a  dead person.\t A decree against a dead person is a\nnullity because\t it cannot be allowed to operate against his\nlegal representatives  when they  were never  brought on the\nrecord to  defend the  case. It is held a nullity because it\ncannot be executed against his legal representatives who had\nnot had\t the full  opportunity of  being heard in respect of\nit. If\tthe respondent\tto an  appeal dies and the appellate\ncourt loses sight of that development or ignores it, it will\nstill be  permissible for  the court  hearing the  appeal to\nbring  his   legal  representatives  on\t the  record  on  an\napplication to\tthat effect  and to consider any application\nfor  condonation   of  delay.  It  is  permissible  for\t the\nappellate court to remand the case for disposal according to\nlaw to\tthe court in which it was pending at the time of the\ndeath of the deceased party. [606 B-D]\n     3. While  the law\ttreats such  decree as a nullity qua\nthe  legal  representative  of\tthe  deceased  defendant  or\nrespondent, there  is nothing  to prevent  him from deciding\nthat he\t would not  treat the  decree as a nullity but would\nabide by  it as it stood or as it may be modified on appeal.\nIf a legal representative adopts that alternative, it cannot\nbe said\t that his  option to  be governed  by the  decree is\nagainst the  law or  any concept  of public policy or public\nmorality. It  is a  matter entirely at the discretion of the\nlegal representative  to decide\t whether he  would raise the\nquestion that  the decree  had\tbecome\ta  nullity,  at\t the\nappropriate time,  or to  abandon that\tobviously  technical\nobjection and fight the appeal on the merits. [606 F-H]\n     4. Nor  can it  be said  that the\tappellate  court  is\ndenuded of  its jurisdiction  to hear an appeal in which one\nof the\trespondents had\t died and  the right  to sue did not\nsurvive against\t the surviving defendant or defendants alone\nmerely because\tno application\thad been  made to  bring his\nlegal representative  on the record when no objection to the\neffect was raised by any one of them. [607 B]\n     5. At the same time, an inference as to the abandonment\nof such\t plea of  abatement cannot  be drawn unless there is\nclear, sufficient  and satisfactory  evidence to  prove that\nthe legal  representative of  the  deceased  respondent\t was\naware of it and abandoned it wilfully. [607 D]\n     In the  instant case,  on the death of one of the three\nclaimants the  other two  surviving  claimants\tbrought\t the\nlegal representatives  of the  deceased on  the record. They\nknew that the legal representatives of the deceased claimant\nhad not\t been brought on the record of the Government appeal\nwithin the  time prescribed  by law and that, therefore, the\nappeal stood  abated. Even  so, they  made no application to\nthe High  Court seeking\t dismissal of the Government appeal.\nThis position  continued for  as long  as  five\t years.\t Two\ncourses were  open to  the claimants  : (i) to move the High\nCourt for the dismissal of the Government appeal, or (ii) to\nallow that  appeal to  be heard\t and decided  on merits. The\nclaimants chose\t the second course. When the appeals came up\nfor hearing  before the High Court, the appeal was argued on\nmerits without raising an objection on this point. After the\nHigh Court  had pronounced  its judgment,  the claimants had\nasked for  a certificate  for leave to appeal without asking\nfor a  review of  its judgment\ton the ground that the legal\nrepresentatives were  not  brought  on\tthe  record  of\t the\nGovernment appeal.  So a point of defence which was wilfully\nand deliberately abandoned by a party in a civil\n601\ncase at\t a crucial  stage, cannot  be allowed to be taken up\nlater at the will of the party which had abandoned the point\nor as a last resort, or as an after thought.\n\t  Gaekwar Baroda State Railway v. Hafiz Habib-ul-Haq\n     & Ors.,  65 Indian\t Appeals 182:  Thakore Saheb  Khanji\n     Kashari Khanji  v. Gulam Rosul Chandbhai, AIR 1955 Bom.\n     449; Punjab  State v.  Sardar Atma Singh, AIR<\/a> 1963 Pub.\n     113, State\t of Rajasthan  & Ors. v. Raghuraj Singh, AIR\n     1968 Raj. 14; held inapplicable.\n     6. The  High Court had rightly taken into consideration\nall factors necessary for coming to the right conclusion for\nfixing the  rate of  compensation payable  to  the  climants\nnamely that  a few months before the date of acquisition the\nclimants themselves purchased the land at Rs. 2\/- per square\nyard, that  they did  not make\tany improvements  after\t its\npurehase and  that the previous owners had not sold the land\nfor any compelling reason. [611 B-D]\n     Desai,  J.\t  (concurring)\t1.   The   basic   principle\nunderlying o.  XXII rr.\t 3 and\t4 CPC  is a facet of natural\njustice. It  is a fundamental rule of natural justice that a\nman has\t a right  to be heard where a decision affecting him\nor his\tinterest is  to be  recorded. As  a corollary to the\nrule of\t audi altrem  partem it\t is provided  in the Code of\nCivil Procedure\t that where  a party  to a  proceeding\tdies\npending the proceeding and the cause of action survives, the\nlegal  representatives\tof  the\t deceased  party  should  be\nbrought\t on   record,\twhich\tmeans.\t that\tsuch   legal\nrepresentative must  be afforded  an  opportunity  of  being\nheard before any liability is fastened on them. Although the\nlegal representatives  of a  deceased plaintiff or defendant\nmust be\t substituted on the pain of the action abating, with\nutmost diligence, from a multitude someone may escape notice\nand the\t consequent hardship in abatement of action led this\nCourt  to   assert  the\t principle  that  where\t some  legal\nrepresentatives\t were\tbrought\t on   record  permitting  an\ninference that\tthe estate  was adequately  represented, the\naction would  not abate\t though it  would be the duty of the\nother side  to bring  on record\t even at  a later date those\nlegal representatives who were overlooked or missed. [614 E-\nH]\n     2. The principle deducible from decisions of this Court\nis that\t if the\t deceased had,\tas a  party, a\tright to put\nforth his case, those likely to be affected by the decision,\non death  of the  deceased, had\t the same opportunity to put\nforth their  case and  even if\tfrom a\tlarge number  having\nidentical interest  some are not brought on record those who\nare brought  on record\twould adequately  take care of their\ninterest and  the cause,  in the absence of some such, would\nnot abate. [615 F-G]\n\t  Daya Ram  & Ors.  v. Shyam  Sundari,<\/a> [1965]  1 SCR\n     231; N. K. Mohammad Sulaiman v. N. C. Mohammad Ismail &\n     Ors,<\/a> [1966]  1 SCR\t 937; Harihar Prasad Singh & Ors. v.\n     Balmiki Prasad Singh & Ors.,<\/a> [1975] 2 SCR 932; referred\n     to.\n     3.\t Yet   another\tprinciple   is\tthat  if  the  legal\nrepresentatives of  the deceased party were before the court\nin the\tsame action  even if in another capacity, failure to\nbring them  on record in a specific legal position would not\nresult in abatement of the action. [615 H]\n     Mahabir Prasad  v. Jage  Ram &  Ors.<\/a> [1971]  3 SCR 301;\n     referred to.\n602\n     4. Where  a. decree  partly satisfies  each of  the two\nparties in  a  suit,  both  parties  may  prefer  an  appeal\nchallenging only that part of the decree by which each party\nis dissatisfied.  But where  one of  the two parties appeals\nand  a\tnoticd\tof  appeal  is\tserved\ton  the\t other,\t the\nrespondents receiving the notice may prefer cross-objections\nunder O.  XLI, r.  22  CPC.  In\t such  a  case,\t though\t the\nrespondent may\tnot have  appealed  from  any  part  of\t the\ndecree, he  may take cross objections to the decree which he\ncould have  taken by way of appeal. The parameters of cross-\nobjections  are\t  limited  to  the  contention\twhich  could\nproperly be taken in an appeal against a decree or part of a\ndecree. [617 B-D]\n     5. When  legal representatives  of a deceased appellant\nare substituted\t and those  very  legal\t representatives  as\nlegal representatives  of  the\tsame  person  occupying\t the\nposition of  respondent in cross-appeal are not substituted,\nits outcome  would be  that  they  were\t on  record  in\t the\nconnected proceeding  before the same court hearing both the\nmatters, in  one capacity  though they were lot described as\nsuch in\t their capacity, namely, as legal representatives of\nthe deceased  respondent. To  ignore this  obvious  position\nwould  be  giving  undue  importance  to  form\trather\tthan\nsubstance. The\tanxiety of the court should be whether those\nlikely to be affected by the decision in the proceeding were\nbefore the  court having  full opportunity  to canvass their\ncase. Once  that is  satisfied\tit  can\t be  said  that\t the\nprovisions contained  in rr. 3 and 4 of O.XXII are satisfied\nin a  given case.  To take  another view would be to give an\nopportunity to the legal representatives of a deceased party\nin an  appeal having  had the fullest opportunity to canvass\ntheir case  through the advocate of teir choice appearing in\ncross-appeals for  them and  having canvassed their case and\nlost, to  turn round  and contend  that they were not before\nthe court as legal representatives of the same person in his\nother capacity,\t namely, respondent  in the cross-appeal. In\nother words,  those legal  representatives were\t before\t the\ncourt all throughout the hearing of the appeal as parties to\nthe appeal  and canvassed  their case and were heard through\ntheir advocates\t and they  had the  full opportunity  to put\nforth whatever\tcontentions were open to them in the appeals\nand to\tcontest the contentions advanced against them by the\nopposite side  and yet\tif the\tother view  is taken that as\nthey were not formally impleaded as legal representatives of\nthe deceased  respondent in the cross-appeal that appeal has\nabated, it  would be  wholly unjust. It is very difficult to\ndistinguish on\tprinciple  the\tapproach  of  the  court  in\nappeals and  cross-objections and  in cross-appeals  in this\nbehalf. The  cases which  have taken the view that in cross-\nappeals the position is different from the one in appeal and\ncross-objections do  not proceed  on any  discernible  legal\nprinciple. Nor\tcan they  be explained\tby any\tdemonstrable\nlegal  principle  but  in  fact\t they  run  counter  to\t the\nestablished legal principle. [623 G-H; 624 A-C]\n\t  Brij Inder  Singh v.\tLala Kanshi  Ram &  Ors. AIR\n     1917 PC  156; Rangubai Kom Shanker Jagtap v. Sunderabai\n     Bhratar Sakharam Jedhe & Ors.,<\/a> [1965] 3 SCR 211 at 216-\n     217; applied.\n\t  Sankaranaraina Saralya v. Laxmi Hengsu & Ors., AIR\n     1931 Mad.\t277; State  of Rajasthan  & Ors, v. Raghuraj\n     Singh, AIR 1968 Raj. 14; not approved.\n     In the  instant case  the legal  representatives of the\ndeceased  claimant   were  brought  on\tthe  record  of\t the\nclaimant's appeal.  Both the  appeals were  heard  together.\nTheir counsel  argued their case in both appeals. Therefore,\nthey were\n603\nbefore the  court all  through. The  fact that\tthey had not\nbeen described\tas legal  representatives of the deceased in\nthe Government\tappeal could  not make\tany  difference\t and\ntheir appeal has not abated.\n     On the  question of  compensation no case had been made\nout for interfering with the view of the High Court.\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2314 of
\n1969.\n<\/p>\n
     From the  Judgment and  Decree dated  4-2-1969  of\t the
\nAndhra Pradesh High Court in Appeal No. 180\/64.\n<\/p>\n
     A. K. Sen and A. Subba Rao for the Appellant.\n<\/p>\n
     T. V. S. N. Chari for the Respondent.\n<\/p>\n
     The following Judgments were delivered:\n<\/p>\n
     SHINGHAL, J.-This\tappeal is  by a\t certificate of\t the
\nHigh Court of Andhra Pradesh on the valuation of the subject
\nmatter and  is directed\t against its judgment dated February
\n4, 1969.\n<\/p>\n
     The State\tGovernment acquired  2 acres and 79 cents of
\nthe land  of the  appellants in Kurnool town, for locating a
\nbus depot of the Andhra Pradesh State Transport Corporation.
\nIt was\tarable land within the municipal limits of the town,
\nwith two  trees and an old compound wall. Its possession was
\ntaken by  the State  Government on  May 25, 1962. The market
\nvalue of  the land was fixed at Rs. 27,042.53 at the rate of
\nRs. 2\/-\t per square  yard. The\tcompound wall  and the trees
\nwere valued at Rs. 930\/- and after allowing a solatium of 15
\nper cent  and interest\tat 4  per cent\tper annum, the total
\ncompensation was  worked out  to Rs.  33,069.12. N. Jayarama
\nReddy, Y. Prabhakar Reddy and C. Manikya Reddy, who were the
\nthree owners  of the  land, accepted that compensation under
\nprotest and  applied for a reference under section 18 of the
\nLand  Acquisition   Act.  After\t  recording   evidence\t and
\ninspecting the\tsite, the  Subordinate Judge  held that\t the
\nclaimants were\tentitled to  payment at the rate of Rs. 12\/-
\nper square  yard for the value of land, a solatium of 15 per
\ncent and interest at 4 per cent. Both parties felt aggrieved
\nagainst that  order dated July 30, 1963. While appeal No. AS
\n180 of\t1964, hereinafter  referred  to\t as  the  government
\nappeal, was  filed by the Revenue Divisional Officer and the
\nLand Acquisition  Officer, Kurnool,  appeal No.\t AS  296  of
\n1964, hereinafter  referred to as the claimants’ appeal, was
\nfiled by the claimants. There were thus cross-appeals in the
\nHigh Court  against a common order of the Subordinate Judge.
\nThe  memorandum\t of  the  government  appeal  was  filed  on
\nDecember 7, 1963. I do not
\n604<\/span>
\nhave the date of the claimants’ appeal on the record, but it
\nis not\tdisputed that  it was  filed before  April 3,  1964.
\nWhile the  two appeals\twere pending  in the  High Court, Y.
\nPrabhakar  Reddy,   one\t of   the  three  claimants  of\t the
\ncompensation for  the acquired\tland, died on April 3, 1964.
\nAn application\twas made  in the  claimants’ appeal to bring
\nhis legal  representatives on the record, and the High Court
\npassed an  order on  July 14,  1964 (in\t C.M.P. No.  7284 of
\n1964) bringing\tappellants 4  to 9  on record  as the  legal
\nrepresentatives of Y. Prabhakar Reddy. It is admitted before
\nme that\t was done  before the  abatement of  that appeal. It
\nseems that  no application was made in the government appeal
\nto  bring   the\t legal\t representatives  of   the  deceased
\nrespondent Y.  Prabhakar Reddy on the record of that appeal.
\nBoth  the  appeals  were,  however,  taken  up\tfor  hearing
\ntogether and  were disposed  of by  a common judgment of the
\nHigh Court  dated February 4, 1969. The High Court dismissed
\nthe claimants’ appeal, but allowed the government appeal and
\nreduced the  price of the acquired land from Rs. 12\/- to Rs.
\n4\/- per square yard “with the usual solatium and interest at
\n4 per  cent as\tallowed\t by  the  lower\t court.”  While\t the
\ngovernment felt\t satisfied with that judgment, the claimants
\napplied for  a certificate  which was  granted on the ground
\nthat the  value of  the subject\t matter of  the suit  in the
\ncourt of  first instance was upwards of Rs. 20,000\/- and the
\nvalue of  the subject  matter in  dispute on  appeal to this
\nCourt was  also\t upwards  of  that  amount  and\t the  decree
\nappealed from  did not\taffirm the  decision  of  the  lower
\ncourt. On  the strength\t of that  certificate the appellants
\nhave come up to this Court in appeal.\n<\/p>\n
     It has  been  argued  by  Mr.  Sen\t on  behalf  of\t the
\nappellants that\t as Y.\tPrabhakar Reddy, respondent No. 2 in
\nthe government\tappeal died  on April 3, 1964, and his legal
\nrepresentatives were  not brought  on the  record within the
\nperiod of  90 days  provided  by  law,\tthat  appeal  abated
\nthereafter and\tstood dismissed\t automatically and could not
\nbe resurrected and heard by the High Court as a cross-appeal
\nto the\tclaimants’ appeal.  The learned\t counsel has  placed
\nreliance on  the decisions  of this  Court in  The State  of
\nPunjab v.  Nathu Ram,<\/a>(1)  Rameshwar Prasad and others v. M\/s
\nShyam Beharilal\t Jagannath  and\t others<\/a>,(2)  Ramagya  Prasad
\nGupta and others v. Murli Prasad<\/a>(3) and Harihar Prasad Singh
\nand others v. Balmiki Prasad Singh and others<\/a>.(4) to support
\nhis argument. In particular, he has placed
\n605<\/span>
\nreliance on Nathu Ram’s case(1) to fortify his argument that
\nthe specification  of the  shares or  of the interest of the
\ndeceased Y. Prabhakar Reddy did not affect the nature of the
\ndecree and  the capacity  of the  joint\t decree\t holders  to
\nexecute the  entire decree  or to  resist the attempt of the
\nother party  to interfere  with the  joint right  decreed in
\ntheir favour.  In particular,  he has relied on that portion
\nof that\t decision where\t it has\t been  stated  that  as\t the
\nsubject\t matter\t  for  which   the  compensation  is  to  be
\ncalculated in  such cases  is one and the same, there cannot
\nbe different  assessments of the amounts of compensation for
\nthe same  parcel of  land. So, as the appeal before the High
\nCourt  was   directed  against\tthe  joint  decree  and\t the
\nappellate court\t could not  take a  decision on the basis of
\nthe separate  shares of\t the claimants,\t it has\t been argued
\nthat the  whole of  the government  appeal should  have been
\ndismissed because  of its  abatement  against  the  deceased
\nrespondent.\n<\/p>\n
     Now what  Order XXII  r. 4\t (1) C.P.C. provides is that
\nwhere one  of two  or more  defendants dies and the right to
\nsue does  not survive  against the  surviving  defendant  or
\ndefendants alone,  the Court, on an application made in that
\nbehalf, shall cause the legal representative of the deceased
\ndefendant to  be made  a party\tand shall  proceed with\t the
\nsuit. Sub-rule\t(3) provides  further that  where within the
\ntime limited  by law  no application  is made under sub-rule
\n(1),  “the   suit  shall   abate  as  against  the  deceased
\ndefendant.” So\tas Y.  Prabhakar Reddy,\t respondent No. 2 in
\nthe government\tappeal,\t died  on  April  3,  1964,  and  an
\napplication was\t not made to bring his legal representatives
\non the\trecord within  the specified  time limit, the appeal
\nautomatically abated as against the deceased respondent, and
\nit is not correct to say that the appeal automatically stood
\ndismissed against  the surviving respondents because of that
\ndefault. The  question whether\tthe “right  to sue” survived
\nagainst the  surviving respondents  alone, was\ta matter for
\nthe appellate  court to examine and decide after hearing the
\nparties, with  due regard  to the  question of\tjointness or
\notherwise of  the decree  and the  further question  whether
\nthere was  any possibility of two contradictory decrees etc.
\nAs that\t was not done by the High Court where the government
\nappeal was  pending,  there  is\t no  justification  for\t the
\nargument that the appeal automatically stood dismissed after
\nthe expiry  of the  period of  90 days\tfrom  the  death  of
\nrespondent Y.  Prabhakar Reddy\ton April  3, 1964 because of
\nthe abatement of the appeal against him.\n<\/p>\n
     But even  if it were assumed that the government appeal
\ndeserved to be dismissed as a whole because of its abatement
\nagainst the
\n606<\/span>
\ndeceased respondent, there is no justification for Mr. Sen’s
\nfurther argument that the High Court’s decree dated February
\n4, 1969,  was a nullity merely because it was passed against
\na dead\tperson, namely,\t Y. Prabhakar  Reddy. It  has to  be
\nappreciated that  a decree  against a  dead  person  is\t not
\nnecessarily  a\t nullity  for\tall  purposes.\tIt  will  be
\nsufficient to  say that\t such a decree has been held to be a
\nnullity because\t it cannot  be executed\t against  his  legal
\nrepresentative for  the simple reason that he did not have a
\nfull opportunity  of being  heard in  respect of it, and the
\nlegal representative  can not  be condemned unheard. So if a
\nrespondent to  an appeal dies, and the appeal abates because
\nof the\tfailure to  bring his  legal representative  on\t the
\nrecord within  the time\t limited by  law, and  the appellate
\ncourt loses sight of that development or ignores it, it will
\nstill be  permissible for  the court  hearing the  appeal to
\nbring  his   legal  representative   on\t the  record  on  an
\napplication to\tthat effect  and to  examine any application
\nthat may  be made  for condonation  of the delay. It is also
\npermissible, and  is in\t fact the common practice, to remand
\nthe case for disposal according to law to the court in which
\nit was\tpending at  the time  of the  death of\tthe deceased
\nparty. The  law has  therefore provided, and accepted, modes
\nfor reopening and hearing the appeal in such cases.\n<\/p>\n
     The basic\tfact remains  that a  decree against  a dead
\nperson is  treated as a nullity because it cannot be allowed
\nto operate  against his\t legal representative  when  he\t was
\nnever brought  on the  record to  defend the case. Any other
\nview would  not be  possible or\t permissible  for  it  would
\nfasten on  him a  liability for\t which he  did not  have any
\nhearing. So  while the\tlaw treat such a decree as a nullity
\nqua the\t legal representative  of the  deceased defendant or
\nrespondent, there  is nothing  to prevent  him from deciding
\nthat he\t will not  treat the  decree as\t a nullity, but will
\nabide by  it  as  it  stands,  or  as  it  may\tbe  modilied
\nthereafter on  appeal. If a legal representative adopts that
\nalternative or\tcourse of action, it cannot possibly be said
\nthat his  option to be governed by the decree is against the
\nlaw or\tany concept  of public\tpolicy or  purpose,  or\t the
\npublic morality.  It  is  thus\ta  matter  entirely  at\t the
\ndiscretion  of\t the  legal  representative  of\t a  deceased
\nrespondent against  whom a  decree has been passed after his
\ndeath to  decide whether he will raise the question that the
\ndecree has  become a  nullity, at  appropriate time, namely,
\nduring the  corse of  the hearing of any appeal may be filed
\nby the\tother party,  or to  abandon that  obvious technical
\nobjection and  fight the appeal on the merits. He may do so,
\neither because\tof his\tfaith in the strength of his case on
\nthe merits, or because of incorrect legal advice, or for the
\nreason that  he may  not like  to rely\ton a  mere technical
\nplea, or because in the case of
\n607<\/span>
\ncross-appeals, he  may have the impression that bringing the
\nlegal representative of the deceased respondent on record in
\nan appeal  by a coappellant will enure for the benefit of or
\nbe  sufficient\t for  purposes\t of  the   cross-appeal.  An
\nabandonment  of\t a  technical  plea  of\t abatement  and\t the
\nconsequential dismissal of the appeal, is therefore a matter
\nat  the\t discretion  of\t the  legal  representative  of\t the
\ndeceased respondent  and there\tis no  justification for the
\nargument to the contrary. It is equally futile to argue that
\nan appellate court is denuded of its jurisdiction to hear an
\nappeal in  which one  of the  respondents has  died and\t the
\nright  to   sue\t does  not  survive  against  the  surviving
\ndefendant or  defendants alone merely because no application
\nhas been  made to  bring his  legal  representative  on\t the
\nrecord when  no objection  to that  effect is  raised by any
\none.\n<\/p>\n
     But, as is equally obvious, it will not be fair to draw
\nan inference  as to  the  abandonment  of  such\t a  plea  of
\nabatement unless there is clear, sufficient and satisfactory
\nevidence to  prove that\t the  legal  representative  of\t the
\ndeceased  respondent  was  aware  of  it  and  abandoned  it
\nwilfully. The  following facts have been well established in
\nthis respect in the present case.\n<\/p>\n
     It will be recalled that the Subordinate Judge made his
\norder  in  the\treference  under  section  18  of  the\tLand
\nAcquisition Act\t on July 30, 1963, and the memorandum of the
\ngovernment appeal was filed in the High Court on December 7,
\n1963. The  claimants filed  their cross-appeal No. AS 296 of
\n1964 soon  after and,  at any rate, before April 3, 1964. It
\nwill also be re-called that Y. Prabhakar Reddy died on April
\n3, 1964.  While he  was respondent  No. 2  in the government
\nappeal, he  was a  co-appellant in the claimants’ appeal. As
\nhas been  stated, the claimants brought Y. Prabhakar Reddy’s
\nlegal representatives on the record in their appeal under an
\norder of  the High  Court dated July 14, 1964, and they were
\narrayed as  appellants Nos. 4 to 9. It is admitted that that
\nappeal therefore  never abated\tand the array of the parties
\nwas full  and complete.\t As has\t been pointed out, the legal
\nrepresentatives of  Y. Prabhakar  Reddy were  not brought on
\nrecord in  the\tgovernment  appeal.  It\t cannot\t be  denied,
\nhowever, that  they knew  of Y.\t Prabhakar Reddy’s  death on
\nApril 3,  1964, for  he was  their ancestor.  They also knew
\nthat  they   had  been\t brought  on  record  as  his  legal
\nrepresentatives in the claimants’ appeal because of the High
\nCourt’s specific order to that effect dated July 14, 1964 in
\nC.M.P. No.  7282 of  1964 where\t they  were  represented  by
\ncounsel. They  thus knew  that Y.  Prabhakar  Reddy’s  legal
\nrepresentatives were not brought on record in the government
\nappeal, and that it stood abated against them because of the
\nexpiry of the time limited by law
\n608<\/span>
\nin that\t respect. Even\tso, they did not make an application
\nto the\tHigh Court  for the  dismissal of  the appeal on the
\nground that  it could  not  survive  against  the  surviving
\nrespondents because  of that  basie defect, in the facts and
\ncircumstances of that case. That in fact continued to be the
\nposition for  a long  period of\t some five  years. It is not
\ndisputed that  the appeals  came up  for hearing in the High
\nCourt on  or about  February 4,\t 1969, but,  even then,\t no-
\nobjection was  taken to the hearing of the government appeal
\nin spite  of the  fatal defect\tin its\tconsitution. On\t the
\nother hand,  when the two appeals were taken up for hearing,
\nthe High  Court heard,\twithout any  objection, not only the
\ncounsel for  the appellants  in the  government appeal,\t but
\nalso  C.   Padmanabha  Reddy,\twho  was   counsel  for\t the
\nrespondents in\tthat appeal  and for the reconstituted array
\nof  appellants\t in  the   claimants’  appeal.\t The   legal
\nrepresentatives of Y. Prabhakar Reddy and their counsel were
\nthus aware of the fact that the government appeal had abated
\nagainst respondent  Y. Prabhakar  Reddy, and  it will not be
\nunfair to  assume that\tthey, or, at any rate, their counsel
\nknew that  it was  open for  them to contend that the appeal
\nwas liable  to dismissal  for that  reason. Two\t courses  of
\naction were  therefore open  to them:  (i) to  move the High
\nCourt for the dismissal of the government appeal, or (ii) to
\nallow that  appeal to be heard and decided on the merits and
\nto abide  by any  decree which\tthe High Court might pass in
\nthe two appeals. The legal representatives and their counsel
\ndid not\t choose to  adopt the first course of action, and it
\nwill be fair and reasonable to hold that they wilfully chose
\nthe second  course of  action. That was why their counsel C.
\nPadmanabha Reddy, who was counsel for all the respondents in
\nthe government\tappeal, and  for all  the appellants  in the
\nclaimants’ appeal,  argued both\t the appeals  on the merits.
\nThe High  Court heard  and decid  the cross-appeals  by\t its
\nimpugned judgment  dated February  4, 1969, and it will be a
\nproper\tconclusion   for  me   to  reach   that\t the   legal
\nrepresentatives of Y. Prabhakar Reddy wilfully abandoned any
\nplea that  might have been available to them on the basis of
\nthe abatement  of the government appeal against the deceased
\nrespondent.\n<\/p>\n
     It was  only after\t the judgment of the High Court went
\nagainst them, that the legal representatives of Y. Prabhakar
\nReddy decided  to take up the question of abatement, for the
\nfirst time,  in\t the  petition\twhich  they  and  the  other
\nclaimants’ filed  under section 104-110 and order 45 rules 2
\nand 3  C.P.C. It  is significant that they did not even then
\nask the\t High Court  to review\tits judgment  and grant them
\nrelief on  the ground  that Y.\tPrabhakar Reddy had died and
\nthe decree  against him was a nullity in so far as they were
\nconcerned. The High Court was
\n609<\/span>
\nsimply asked  to allow the application for the certification
\nof the\tappeal on  the ground  that the value of the subject
\nmatter was  upwards of\tRs. 20,000\/- and it made an order to
\nthat effect.\n<\/p>\n
     In all  these facts  and circumstances, I have no doubt
\nthat any  plea that  may have  been available  to the  legal
\nrepresentatives of  the deceased  Y. Prabhakar\tReddy in the
\ngovernment appeal  because of  its abatement,  was  wilfully
\nabandoned by  them. Any\t other view  of the  matter will  be
\nunfair to  the present\trespondents,  because  if  any\tsuch
\nobjection had  been taken in the High Court, they would have
\nmade an\t application for  the setting aside of the abatement
\nand condoning  the delay,  for whatever it was worth. It has
\nto be  appreciated that\t a point  of defence  which has been
\nwilfully or  deliberately abandoned  by a  party in  a civil
\ncase, at  a crucial  stage when\t it  was  most\trelevant  or
\nmaterial, cannot  be allowed  to be  taken up  later, at the
\nsweet will of the party which had abandoned the point, or as
\na last\tresort, or  as an  after thought.  In fact in a case
\nwhere a\t point has  been wilfully abandoned by a party, even
\nif, in\ta given case, such a conclusion is arrived at on the
\nbasis of  his conduct,\tit will\t not be permissible to allow
\nthat party  to\trevoke\tthe  abandonment  if  that  will  be
\ndisadvantageous to the other party.\n<\/p>\n
     Mr. Sen  has however made a reference to Gaekwar Baroda
\nState  Railway\tv.  Hafiz  Habib-ul-haq\t and  others(1)\t and
\nThakore Saheb Khanji Kashari Khanji v. Gulam Rasul Chandbhai
\n(2) for\t the purpose  of showing  that the government appeal
\nwas not at all maintainable in the High Court because of its
\nabatement against  respondent Y. Prabhakar Reddy as that was
\na matter  relating to  the jurisdiction\t of the\t High  Court
\nwhich could  not have  been  abandoned.\t The  provisions  of
\nsection 86  C.P.C. came\t up for\t consideration in both those
\ncases and  it was  held that  as the  section was based upon
\npublic policy  or purpose, it was not open to a ruling chief
\nto waive  its provisions.  Those  were\ttherefore  different
\nobservations  which   have  no\t bearing  on   the   present
\ncontroversy for,  as has  been stated,\tthe decision  of the
\nlegal representative of a deceased respondent to be bound by
\na decree  in spite  of its  abatement does  not involve\t any
\nquestion of public policy.\n<\/p>\n
     Mr.  Sen’s\t reference  to\tMaharana  Shri\tDavlatinghji
\nThjakore Saheb\tof  Limit  v.  Khachar\tHamir  Mon,(3)\tTown
\nMunicipal Council, Athani
\n610<\/span>
\nv. Presiding  Officer, Labour  Court, Hubli  and others, (1)
\nSimpson and another v. Crowle and others(2) Chief Justice of
\nAndhra Pradesh\tand another  v.\t L.  V.\t A.  Dikshitula\t and
\nothers(3) and  P. Dasa\tMuni Reddy  v.\tP.  Appa  Rao<\/a>(4)  is
\nequally futile\tbecause they  were cases of inherent lack of
\njurisdiction in\t the court  concerned or raised the question
\nof the bar of limitation.\n<\/p>\n
     Mr. Sen  has placed  reliance on Punjab State v. Sardar
\nAtma Singh<\/a>(5)  and State of Rajasthan and others v. Raghuraj
\nSingh(6) to  show that\twhere an  application is not made to
\nbring the legal representative of the deceased respondent on
\nthe record of a cross-appeal, that appeal will abate, and it
\nwill not  be permissible  for the  appellant  to  claim\t the
\nbenefit of  the fact  that the\tlegal representative  of the
\ndeceased respondent  had been  brought on  the record in the
\ncross-appeal filed  by him.  I have  gone through the cases,
\nbut they are clearly distinguishable. The respondent in both
\ncases died  during the\tpendency of  the firs appeal, and an
\nobjection as to abatement was taken during the course of the
\nhearing, so  that there\t was no\t question of  abandoning the
\nobjection in either of these cases and it was permissible to
\napply to  the court  for the usual consequences which follow
\nfor non-compliance with the provisions of order XXII rules 3
\nand 4 C.P.C. Those decisions cannot therefore be of any help
\nin a case like this.\n<\/p>\n
     It would  thus follow  that as the plea of abatement of
\nthe government\tappeal against respondent Y. Prabhakar Reddy
\nand its\t dismissals a  whole for  that reason,\twas wilfully
\nabandoned by  the present  respondents in the High Court, it
\nwill not  be fair and reasonable to allow them to take it up
\nthe facts  and circumstances of this case merely because the
\ndecision of the High Court has gone against them.\n<\/p>\n
     That leaves  for consideration the question whether the
\nfinding\t of   fact  of\tthe  High  Court  that\tthe  present
\nappellants were\t entitled to  compensation at  Rs.  4\/-\t per
\nsquare yard  suffers from  any\tsuch  error  as\t to  require
\ninterference by this court. Mr. Sen has argued that the High
\nCourt went  wrong in  interfering with\tthe finding  of\t the
\nSubordinate Judge  and in  excluding the sale deeds Exs. A 1
\nand A  2 altogether  from    consideration  when  they\twere
\nimportant and  were by\tthemselves sufficient  to uphold the
\nfinding of  the Subordinate  Judge that\t the market value of
\nthe land was Rs. 12\/- per square yard.\n<\/p>\n
611<\/span><\/p>\n
     I find  from the  impugned judgment that the High Court
\nfirst took  into consideration\tall those factors which were
\nin favour  of the  claimants, namely, the fact that the land
\nwas situated within the municipal limits of Kurnool town, it
\nwas within  easy reach\tof  the\t government  hospitals,\t the
\nrailway station,  the Medical  College and  the\t State\tBank
\netc., it was suitable as a building site etc. The High Court
\nalso took  due notice  of the fact that although Kurnool was
\nnot made  the capital  of Andhra  Pradesh, it  was a growing
\ntown and  had an  importance of\t its own.  It then  examined
\nthose facts  which persuaded  it to reduce the market value.
\nIn doing  so, it  took note  of the fact that the land under
\nacquisition had\t been bought by the Claimants themselves for
\nRs. 26,000\/-  on October  30, 1961, just eight months before
\nthe issue of the notification for its acquisition. That rate
\nworked out  to Rs.  2\/- per square yard. Then the High Court
\ntook into  consideration the  other facts that the claimants
\ndid not\t effect\t any  improvement  in  the  land  after\t its
\npurchase, it  was not their case that the previous owner had
\nsold it\t for any  compelling reason,  the claimants were not
\neven responsible  for preparing\t the lay  out plan  for\t the
\nlocality (which\t had been  accepted by the municipality even
\nbefore they  had purchased  the land)  and that\t they merely
\nobtained the sanction of the Town Planning department to the
\nlay out\t which had  already been  sanctioned. The High Court
\ncarefully examined  the various sale agreements Exs. A3, A5,
\nA7, A10,  A12 and  A14, and rejected them on the ground that
\nthey did  not appear  to be  genuine  and  had\tmostly\tbeen
\nexecuted on the same date. That left the two registered sale
\ndeeds Exs.  A1 and A2 for consideration on which Mr. Sen has
\nplaced considerable  reliance. The  High Court\tnoticed that
\nthey were  for the  sale of  very small\t portions  of  land,
\nnamely, 3  cents and 5 cents, and did not think it proper to
\nmake them  the basis  for determining  the value  of  a\t far
\nlarger piece  of land.\tIt cannot therefore be said that the
\nHigh Court  ignored  or\t misread  any  important  piece\t for
\nevidence in arriving at its finding. As has been stated, the
\nappellants bought  the land  for Rs.  26,000\/-, which worked
\nout to\tRs. 2\/-\t per square yard, and the High Court doubled
\nthat rate,  and raised\tit to  Rs. 4\/-\tper square yard even
\nthough the  acquisition took  place within  a matter  of the
\nnext eight  months and the appellants did nothing to improve
\nits value.  To say  the least, such a finding cannot be said
\nto have\t been vitiated\tfor any\t reason whatsoever  so as to
\nrequire reconsideration here.\n<\/p>\n
     As I  find\t no  merit  in\tthe  appeal,  it  is  hereby
\ndismissed with no order as to costs.\n<\/p>\n
     DESAI, J.-I  have carefully  gone through\tthe judgment
\nprepared by my learned brother Shinghal, J. and I am in full
\nagreement with\thim  that  the\tappeal\tbe  dismissed.\tThis
\nseparate opinion becomes necessary be-\n<\/p>\n
612<\/span><\/p>\n
cause in  my opinion  in the facts and circumstances of this
\ncase the Government appeal had not abated at all.\n<\/p>\n
     All the relevant facts have been extensively set out by
\nmy learned  brother and\t it is\tnot necessary to repeat them
\nhere. Even the nomenclature in respect of the two appeals as
\ngiven by him may be adopted for facility of appreciating the
\npoint under discussion
\n     After the\taward by  the Subordinate Judge, two appeals
\ncame to\t be preferred, one by the Revenue Divisional officer
\nstyled as  ‘Government appeal’, and another by the claimants
\nstyled as ‘claimants appeal’. Both these appeals were cross-
\nappeals arising\t from the  Award of  the Subordinate  Judge.
\nDuring the  pendency of\t the appeals  in the  High Court, Y.
\nPrabhakar Reddy,  one  of  the\tthree  claimants,  being  an
\nappellant  in\tthe  claimants’\t appeal\t and  respondent  in
\nGovernment appeal,  died  on  April  3,\t 1964  and  upon  an
\napplication made  to the  Court in the claimants’ appeal his
\nlegal representatives appellants 4-9 were brought on record.
\nAdmittedly,  the   legal  representatives   of\tdeceased  Y.
\nPrabhakar Reddy\t one of the respondents in Government appeal
\nwere not  brought on  record  till  both  the  appeals\twere
\ndisposed of  by\t a  common  judgment  rendered\ton  February
\n4,1969.\t The  High  Court  by  its  judgment  dismissed\t the
\nclaimants’ appeal  and partly  allowed the Government appeal
\nreducing the compensation payable in respect of the acquired
\nland from  Rs. 12\/-  to Rs.  4\/- per  sq. yd.  Original\t two
\nclaimants and  heirs of deceased claimant Y. Prabhakar Reddy
\npreferred the  present appeal  to this\tCourt by certificate
\ngranted\t by   the  High\t Court\tunder  Article\t133  of\t the
\nConstitution.\n<\/p>\n
     Mr. A.  K. Sen  contended that  as heirs  of one of the
\nclaimants  Y.  Prabhakar  Reddy,  respondent  in  Government
\nappeal, were  not brought  on record  within the  prescribed
\nperiod of limitation after his death pending the appeal, not
\nonly the Government appeal abated against Y. Prabhakar Reddy
\nbut in view of the decision of this Court in State of Punjab
\nv.  Nathu   Ram,<\/a>(1)  the  appeal  abated  as  a\t whole\tand,
\ntherefore, the\tjudgment of  the High  Court partly allowing
\nthe Government appeal and reducing the compensation from Rs.
\n12\/- to Rs. 4\/- per sq. yd. of the acquired land must be set
\naside on this short ground alone.\n<\/p>\n
     In view  of  the  decision\t in  Nathu  Ram’s  case,  if
\nGovernment appeal  had abated in the facts and circumstances
\nof the case, indisputably the appeal would abate as a whole.
\nThe substance  of the  matter is  whether in  the facts\t and
\ncircumstances of  this case and keeping in view the relevant
\nprovisions of law the Government appeal had at all abated.\n<\/p>\n
     There were\t cross appeals\tarising from  the same Award
\nbefore the  High Court.\t The record  does not  show that any
\norder was made for
\n613<\/span>
\nconsolidating these appeals as is usually done when both the
\nparties to  a decree  prefer appeals and which are styled as
\ncross-appeals. Both  the parties  to the original proceeding
\nadopt rival  positions in  cross appeals.  The claimants  in
\ntheir  appeal\tmoved  the   High  Court   to  enhance\t the
\ncompensation from  Rs. 12\/-  per  sq.  yd.  awarded  by\t the
\nSubordinate Judge to a higher amount as claimed by them. The
\nGovernment in  its appeal  against the\tsame Award moved the
\nHigh Court  to reduce  the compensation from Rs. 12\/- to Rs.
\n2\/- per\t sq. yd.  The contest  between the parties would be,
\nwhat in\t the circumstances  of the  case should\t be adequate
\ncompensation being  the market value of the land acquired by
\nthe Government on the relevant date (see Nathuram’s case).\n<\/p>\n
     Undoubtedly, one of the original claimants Y. Prabhakar
\nReddy being  one of  the appellants in the claimants’ appeal
\ndied and specifically his legal representatives were brought
\non record  within the  prescribed period  of limitation\t and
\nthat was  done much  prior to  the date\t of hearing  of\t the
\nappeals\t by   the  High\t  Court.  As   is   notorious,\t the
\ninadvertence, if  not  down  right  indifference,  of  those
\nincharge  of   the   Government\t  appeal   is\tdemonstrably
\nestablished because  the counsel  incharge of the Government
\nappeal must  have received the notice moved on behalf of the
\nappellants-claimants   seeking\t  to   bring\tthe    legal
\nrepresentatives of deceased Y. Parbhakar Reddy on record and
\namending  the\tcause  title   of  the\t claimants’   appeal
\naccordingly. This  was\tsufficient  notice  to\tthe  counsel
\nincharge of  the Government  appeal that  the same gentleman
\nwas one\t of the\t respondents in\t Government appeal  and\t his
\ndeath having  been notified,  as a  necessary corollary\t his
\nheirs will  have to  be\t brought  on  record  in  Government
\nappeal. Nothing\t more was required to be done by the counsel
\nincharge of  Government appeal\texcept to bodily adopt those
\nwho applied  to come  on record\t in  place  of\tdeceased  Y.
\nPrabhakar Reddy\t as his\t legal representatives in claimants’
\nappeal\tto   be\t substituted  as  legal\t representatives  of
\ndeceased respondent Y. Prabhakar Reddy in Government appeal.
\nThis was  not done.  It may  also be mentioned that both the
\nappeals were heard together and were disposed of by a common
\njudgment. As  has been\tpointed\t out  by  Shinghal,  J.,  no
\ncontention  was\t taken\ton  behalf  of\tthe  respondents  in
\nGovernment  appeal   that  on  account\tof  the\t failure  of
\nGovernment to bring the heirs of deceased Y. Prabhakar Reddy
\non record  within the time prescribed, the appeal has abated
\nbut on\tthe contrary  Government appeal\t was allowed  to  be
\nproceeded in  the presence  of all  parties including  legal
\nrepresentatives of Y. Prabhakar Reddy who were appellants in
\nclaimants’ appeal  and ended  in a judgment adverse to them.
\nWhat is\t the consequence of failure to raise this contention
\nhas been  examined by  my learned brother in detail and I am
\nin agreement with his conclusion.\n<\/p>\n
614<\/span><\/p>\n
     Now, Order\t 22, Rule  4 read  with Order 22, Rule 11 of
\nthe Code  of Civil  Procedure require  that the appellant in
\nGovernment   appeal    should\thave   brought\t the   legal
\nrepresentatives of  respondent deceased\t Y. Prabhakar Reddy,
\non record.  There is  no controversy that rule 4 of Order 22
\nread with  rule 11  would be  attracted in this case, and as
\nadmittedly  the\t  legal\t representatives   of  deceased\t  Y.
\nPrabhakar Reddy,  the respondent  in Government appeal, were
\nnot brought  on record\ttill the  appeal  was  disposed\t of,
\nordinarily the appeal would abate.\n<\/p>\n
     The substantial  question is:  where cross\t appeals are
\npreferred against  a common  decree or\tan Award  and in the
\ncross appeals the parties are arrayed in rival positions and
\nwhere  one   party  as\t appellant  dies   and\t his   legal
\nrepresentatives are  brought on\t record\t though\t those\tvery
\nlegal representatives are not substituted in his place which
\nhe adopted  as respondent  in the  cross appeal,  would\t the
\ncross appeal abate ?\n<\/p>\n
     This question  may be  examined first on principle. The
\nbasic principle\t underlying order 22, rules 3 and 4 which on
\naccount of  the provision  contained in\t order 22,  rule  11
\napply to appeals, is indisputably a facet of natural justice
\nor a  limb of  audi altrem  partem rule. It is a fundamental
\nrule of\t natural justice that a man has a right to be heard-
\naudi altrem  partem-where a  decision affecting\t him or\t his
\ninterest is to be recorded. It hurts one’s sense of justice,
\nfairness and  reason that a decision one way or the other is
\nrecorded affecting  a party  without giving  that  party  an
\nopportunity of\tbeing heard.  This rule\t embraces the  whole
\nnotion of fair procedure and the rule requiring a hearing is
\nof almost  universal validity.\tIt has made a serious inroad
\nin administrative  decisions. It should enjoy a top place in
\na judicial proceeding.\n<\/p>\n
     The first\tlimb of this rule audi altrem partem is that
\na person  must be given an opportunity of being heard before
\na decision  one way  or the other affecting him is recorded.
\nAs a  corollary to  this rule  it is provided in the Code of
\nCivil Procedure\t that where  a party  to the proceeding dies
\npending the proceeding and the cause of action survives, the
\nlegal  representatives\tof  the\t deceased  party  should  be
\nbrought\t on   record  which   only  means  that\t such  legal
\nrepresentatives must  be afforded  an opportunity  of  being
\nheard before  any liability is fastened upon them. It may be
\nthat the  legal representatives\t in a given situation may be
\npersonally liable  or the  estate of  the deceased  in their
\nhands would  be liable and in either case a decision one way
\nor the\tother, adverse\tor favourable  to  them,  cannot  be
\nrecorded unless\t they are  given  an  opportunity  of  being
\nheard. Order  22, rules\t 3 and\t4  codify  these  procedural
\nsafeguards translating into statutory requirement one of the
\nprinciples of natural justice.\n<\/p>\n
615<\/span><\/p>\n
     If this  is the  discernible principle underlying order
\n22, rules  3 and  4 it\thas been demonstrably established by
\ninterpretation put  on these  two rules.  Original view\t was
\nthat all  legal representatives\t of a  deceased plaintiff or
\ndefendant must\tbe substituted\ton the\tpain of\t the  action
\nabating. With utmost diligence from a multitude some one may
\nescape notice  and the\tconsequent hardship  in abatement of
\naction led  this Court\tto assert  the principle  that where
\nsome legal  representatives are brought on record permitting
\nan inference  that the estate is adequately represented, the
\naction would  not abate\t though it  would be the duty of the
\nother side  to bring  those legal  representatives on record
\nwho are\t overlooked or missed even at a later date. When the
\naforementioned two provisions speak of legal representatives
\nit only\t means that  if after diligent and bona fide enquiry
\nthe party  liable to  bring  the  legal\t representatives  on
\nrecord ascertains  who are  the legal  representatives of  a
\ndeceased party\tand brings  them on  record within  the time
\nlimited by  law, there is no abatement of the suit or appeal
\non the ground that some other legal representatives have not
\nbeen  brought\ton  record,   because  the  impleaded  legal
\nrepresentatives sufficiently  represent the  estate  of\t the
\ndeceased  and\tthe  decision  would  bind  not\t only  those
\nimpleaded but  the entire  estate including  the interest of
\nthose not brought on record. This view has been consistently
\nadopted by  this Court\tin Daya\t Ram & Ors. v. Shyam Sundari<\/a>
\n(1) N.\tK. Mohammad  Sulaiman v.  N. C.\t Mohammad  Ismail  &
\nOrs.<\/a>;(2) and  Harihar Prasad  Singh & Ors. v. Balmiki Prasad
\nSingh & Ors.<\/a>(3) The principle deducible from these decisions
\nis that not only the interest of the deceased was adequately
\ntaken care  of by  those who were on record but they had the
\nopportunity to\tput  forth  their  case\t within\t permissible
\nlimits.\t Neither  the  case  of\t the  deceased\tnor  of\t his
\nsuccessors in-interest\thas gone by default. In other words,
\nthe principle is that if thd deceased had as a party a right
\nto put\tforth his  case, those\tlikely to be affected by the
\ndecision on  death of  the deceased had the same opportunity
\nto put\tforth their  case and  even if\tfrom a\tlarge number
\nhaving identical  interest some\t are not  brought on  record
\nthose who  are brought\ton record would adequately take care
\nof their  interest and the cause in the absence of some such
\nwould not abate. In legal parlance this procedure affords an
\nopportunity of\tbeing heard in all its ramification before a
\ndecision on the pending list is taken.\n<\/p>\n
     Another  principle\t in  this  behalf  which  has  found
\nrecognition  of\t  the  Courts\tis   that   if\t the   legal
\nrepresentatives of  the deceased  party are before the Court
\nin the same action even if in another capacity, failure to
\n616<\/span>
\nbring them  on record in a specific legal position would not
\nresult in abatement of the action. In Mahabir Prasad v. Jage
\nRam &  Ors.,<\/a>(1) this  Court  was  called  upon\tto  consider
\nwhether where  a legal representative of a deceased party is
\non record  in another  capacity, failure  to implead  him as
\nlegal representative  of the  deceased party would result in
\nabatement of  the action  ? In that case Mahabir Prasad, his
\nwife Saroj  Devi and  his mother  Gunwanti Devi filed a suit
\nagainst Jaga Ram and two others for recovering rent then due
\nin the aggregate amount of Rs. 61,750\/-. The suit ended in a
\ndecree. The  execution of  the decree  was resisted  by\t the
\ndefendants on  the plea\t inter\talia  that  the\t decree\t was
\ninexecutable because of the provisions of Delhi Land Reforms
\nAct, 1954.  This contention  found favour with the executing
\ncourt and  the\tapplication  for  execution  was  dismissed.
\nMahabir Prasad,\t one of\t the decree  holders alone  appealed
\nagainst that order and impleaded Gunwati Devi and Saroj Devi
\nas party  respondents  along  with  the\t original  judgment-
\ndebtors. Saroj Devi died in November 1962 and Mahabir Prasad
\napplied that  the name\tof Saroj  Devi be struck of from the
\narray of  respondents. The High Court made an order granting
\nthe  application   “subject   to   all\t just\texceptions”.
\nSubsequently the  High Court  dismissed the  appeal  holding
\nthat because  the heirs\t and legal  representatives of Saroj
\nDevi were  not\tbrought\t on  record  within  the  period  of
\nlimitation, the\t appeal abated\tin its entirety. This Court,
\nwhile setting aside the order made by the High Court holding
\nthat the appeal abated, observed as under:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “Even\t on  the  alternative  ground  that  Mahabir
\n     Prasad being  one of  the heirs of Saroj Devi there can
\n     be no  abatement merely  because no  formal application
\n     for  showing  Mahabir  Prasad  as\tan  heir  and  legal
\n     representative of\tSaroj Devi  was\t made.\tWhere  in  a
\n     proceeding\t a   party  dies   and\tone   of  the  legal
\n     representatives is\t already on  the record\t in  another
\n     capacity, it  is  only  necessary\tthat  he  should  be
\n     described by  an appropriate  application made  in that
\n     behalf that  he is also on record, as an heir and legal
\n     representative. Even if there are other heirs and legal
\n     representatives and  no application for impleading them
\n     is made  within the  period of limitation prescribed by
\n     the Limitation Act the proceeding will not abate”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     The principle  deducible from  this decision  of  their
\nCourt is  that where one of the legal representatives of the
\ndeceased party\tis before  the Court  at the  time when\t the
\nproceeding  is\t heard\tbut   in  another  capacity,  it  is
\nimmaterial whether  he is  described as such or not and even
\nif there are other legal representatives, the cause will not
\nabate.\n<\/p>\n
617<\/span><\/p>\n
     Now, when\ta proceeding such as a suit ends in a decree
\nit may\tbe that\t decree may  partly satisfy both the parties
\nwith the  result that  with regard to that part of decree by
\nwhich each  party is  dissatisfied that\t party may prefer an
\nappeal challenging  only that part of the decree by which it
\nis dissatisfied.  When one  such party to the decree appeals
\nand a  notice of  the appeal is served on the other side the
\nrespondent receiving  the notice may prefer cross-objections
\nunder Order  41, Rule  22, but\twhat is important to note is
\nthat such  respondent though  he may  not have appealed from
\nany part of the decree, may take any cross-objections to the
\ndecree which  he could have taken by way of appeal. In other
\nwords, the  respondent could  have as  well filed  an appeal
\nagainst that  part of the decree by which he is dissatisfied
\nbut if\the has\tnot filed an appeal he can as well put forth
\ncross-objections as  contemplated  by  Order  41,  rule\t 22.
\nParameters of  cross-objections by the language of Order 41,
\nrule  22,   are\t limited  to  the  contentions\twhich  could
\nappropriately be  taken in  an appeal  against a decree or a
\npart  of   a  decree.  For  all\t practical  purposes  cross-
\nobjections  and\t cross-appeals\thave  the  same\t purpose  to
\nachieve and  cover the\tsame ground.  Would they  stand on a
\ndifferent footing  in respect  of death of a party either in
\ncross-appeals or in cross-objections ?\n<\/p>\n
     There is  a conflict  of judicial opinion on the effect
\nof substitution of legal representatives of a deceased party
\nin cross-objections  and in  cross appeals.  Mulla has noted
\nthis cleavage  of opinion  in his  Code of  Civil Procedure,
\n13th Edition, Volume II, P. 1237, as under:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “Where both the parties to a suit file independent
\n     appeals against  the decree  passed therein, and one of
\n     them dies\tpending the  appeal, the substitution of his
\n     legal representatives  in one appeal does not enure for
\n     the benefit  of the  other\t appeal\t which\tconsequently
\n     abates. But where one party to a suit prefers an appeal
\n     against the decree passed therein and the other files a
\n     memorandum of cross-objections under O. 41, r. 22, What
\n     is\t the  effect  of  the  legal  representatives  of  a
\n     deceased party  to the proceedings being substituted in
\n     the memorandum  of cross-objections,  and\tnot  in\t the
\n     appeal ?  There is\t a conflict  of judicial  opinion on
\n     this question.  Where the respondent died and his legal
\n     representative  was   brought  on\trecord\ton  his\t own
\n     application in  the cross-objections  and the appellant
\n     had not  applied to  bring him  on record,\t it was held
\n     that the  substitution of\tthe legal  representative in
\n     the cross-objection  enured  for  the  benefit  of\t the
\n     appeal also  as both  the appeal  and the\tcross appeal
\n     (sic) were part of the same proceedings. And where
\n618<\/span>
\n     the appellant  died, and his legal representatives were
\n     brought on record in the cross-objection but not in the
\n     appeal, it was held that the substitution in the cross-
\n     appeal (sic)  did not  enure for  the  benefit  of\t the
\n     appeal and that the latter abated”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     Decisions on  which the  commentary is based may now be
\nexamined in  depth to  sort out\t principle, if any, to which
\nthe cleavage of opinion is referable.\n<\/p>\n
     In a  very early  decision in  Brij Indar Singh v. Lala
\nKanshi Ram  & Ors.,(1)\tthe  Judicial  Committee  held\tthat
\nsubstitution of\t a deceased party’s legal representatives in
\nan interlocutory appeal arising from an order made in a suit
\nwould enure  for the  benefit of  the suit  and no  separate
\napplication for\t substitution in  the suit  need be made. It
\nwas in\tterms held that the introduction of a plaintiff or a
\ndefendant at  one stage\t of the\t suit is an introduction for
\nall stages,  and that though it was done in the course of an
\ninterlocutory application  as to the production of books the
\nsame  would  enure  for\t the  benefit  of  the\tsuit.  While
\naffirming the  ratio of this decision this Court in Rangubai
\nKom Shankar  Jagtap v.\tSunderabai Bharatar Sakharam Jedhe &
\nOrs.,<\/a>(2) analysed  the principle  underlying Order 22, rules
\n3, 4 and 11 as under:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “Let us  now consider the question on principle. A
\n     combined reading of Order XXII, rr. 3, 4 and 11, of the
\n     Code of  Civil Procedure  shows that  the\tdoctrine  of
\n     abatement applies\tequally to  a suit  as well as to an
\n     appeal. In\t the application  of the said rr. 3 and 4 to
\n     an\t appeal\t instead  of  “plaintiff”  and\t“defendant”,
\n     “appellant” and  “respondent” have\t to be read in those
\n     rules. Prima facie, therefore, if a respondent dies and
\n     his legal\trepresentatives are  not brought  on  record
\n     within  the  prescribed  time,  the  appeal  abates  as
\n     against the  respondent under r. 4, read with r. 11, of
\n     O. XXII  of the  Code of  Civil Procedure. But there is
\n     another principle\trecognised by the Judicial Committee
\n     in the  aforesaid decision\t which softens the rigour of
\n     this rule.\t The said  principle is\t that if  the  legal
\n     representatives  are   brought  on\t record\t within\t the
\n     prescribed time at one stage of the suit, it will enure
\n     for the  benefit of  all the  subsequent stages  of the
\n     suit. The\tapplication of\tthis principle\tto different
\n     situations will help to answer the problem presented in
\n     the present  case. (1) A filed a suit against B for the
\n     recovery of  possession and  mesne profits.  After\t the
\n     issues were framed, B
\n619<\/span>
\n     died. At  the stage of an interlocutory application for
\n     production of documents, the legal representatives of B
\n     were brought  on record within the time prescribed. The
\n     order brought  them  on  record  would  enure  for\t the
\n     benefit of\t the entire  suit. (2)\tThe suit was decreed
\n     and an  appeal was\t filed in  the High  Court  and\t was
\n     pending therein.  The  defendant  died  and  his  legal
\n     representatives were  brought on  record. The  suit was
\n     subsequently remanded  to the  trial Court.  The  order
\n     bringing the  legal representatives  on record  in\t the
\n     appeal would  enure for the further stages of the suit.
\n     (3) An  appeal was filed against an interlocutory order
\n     made in  a suit.  Pending the appeal the defendant died
\n     and his  legal representatives  were brought on record.
\n     The  appeal   was\tdismissed.   The  appeal   being   a
\n     continuation or a stage of the suit, the order bringing
\n     the legal representatives on record would enure for the
\n     subsequent stages of the suit. This would be so whether
\n     in the  appeal the\t trial Court’s\torder was confirmed,
\n     modified or  reversed. In the above 3 illustrations one
\n     fact is  common, namely,  the order  bringing on record
\n     the legal\trepresentatives was made at one stage of the
\n     suit, be  it in  the suit\tor in  an appeal against the
\n     interlocutory order  or final  order made\tin the suit,
\n     for an  appeal is\tonly a\tcontinuation  of  the  suit.
\n     Whether the  appellate order confirms that of the first
\n     Court,  modifies\tor  reverses   it,  it\treplaces  or
\n     substitutes the  order appealed  against. It  takes its
\n     place in  the suit\t and becomes a part of it. It is, as
\n     it were, the suit was brought to the appellate Court at
\n     one stage\tand the orders made therein were made in the
\n     suit itself.  Therefore,  that  order  enures  for\t the
\n     subsequent stages of the suit.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  But the  same legal  position cannot be invoked in
\n     the reverse  or converse  situation. A  suit is  not  a
\n     continuation of  an appeal.  An order  made in  a\tsuit
\n     subsequent to  the filing\tof an  appeal at  an earlier
\n     stage will\t move forward  with the subsequent stages of
\n     the suit  or appeals  taken therefrom; but it cannot be
\n     projected backwards  into the  appeal that\t has already
\n     been filed.  It cannot  possibly become an order in the
\n     appeal.  Therefore,   the\torder\tbringing  the  legal
\n     representatives of\t the 7th respondent on record in the
\n     final decree  proceedings cannot  enure for the benefit
\n     of the appeal filed against the preliminary decree. We,
\n     therefore, hold  that the\tappeal abated  so far as the
\n     7th respondent was concerned.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
620<\/span><\/p>\n
     In Sankaranaraina\tSaralaya v.  Laxmi Hengsu & Ors.,(1)
\ntwo independent appeals were filed against the decree of the
\ntrial court  in the  suit, one appeal being by the plaintiff
\nand the\t other appeal by defendant 2. In the appeal filed by
\ndefendant 2  the legal\trepresentatives of  the\t respondent,
\nviz., the plaintiff not having been brought on record within
\nthe time prescribed by law, the appeal abated, and when that
\nabatement was  sought to  be set aside, the Court found that
\nthere was  no ground  for allowing  the application.  It was
\nthen contended that because the legal representatives of the
\nappellant in other appeal (who was undoubtedly the plaintiff
\nin the\tsuit) have  been added\twithin the  time allowed, it
\nshould be  taken that  those legal representatives have also
\nbeen added  in place of the deceased respondent by defendant\n<\/p>\n
2. Negativing  this contention a learned single Judge of the
\nMadras High  Court held\t that there  is\t no  interdependence
\nbetween the  two appeals  and the analogy of an appeal and a
\nmemorandum of  cross-objection in  the same  appeal does not
\nhold good in case of two independent appeals where the Court
\nhas to deal with two separate and independent appeals though
\narising from  the same\tsuit and  the  parties\tadopt  rival
\npositions. The\tCourt distinguished  the  decision  in\tBrij
\nIndar Singh’s  case (supra)  by posing a question to itself:
\n‘Can it\t be said  in the  present case that what was done in
\none appeal  could enure\t for the  benefit of  another appeal
\nunless the  latter appeal can be deemed to be a continuation
\nor a  further  stage  of  the  appeal  in  which  the  legal
\nrepresentatives were  brought on  record’ and answered it in
\nthe negative observing that it is not possible to extend the
\nprinciple laid\tdown by\t Judicial Committee  in\t Brij  Indar
\nSingh’s case (supra)
\n     In Dasondha  Singh v.  Shadi Ram  Sardha Ram  & Ors.(2)
\nthere were cross appeals arising from the same decree before
\nthe Court  and the  plaintiff Shadi  Ram was an appellant in
\nthe appeal  preferred by  him and  when he  died  his  legal
\nrepresentatives were  impleaded within\tthe prescribed time.
\nIn the appeal preferred by the defendant the application for
\nimpleading Shadi  Ram’s legal representatives which was made
\nbeyond the  prescribed period  of limitation  and the  Court
\nhaving declined\t to condone the delay, the appeal abated. It
\nwas contended that as the legal representatives of Shadi Ram
\nwere impleaded in his appeal and as both these appeals arose
\nout of the same judgment, the legal representatives of Shadi
\nRam being  before the  Court it\t is a mere formality to make
\nnecessary endorsement  on record  and, therefore, the appeal
\npreferred  by\tdefendant  2  would  not  abate.  The  Court
\nnegatived  the\t argument  relying  upon  a  Division  Bench
\ndecision in Punjab State v. Atma Singh.<\/a>(2).\n<\/p>\n
621<\/span><\/p>\n
     In State  of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Raghuraj Singh,(1) two
\ncross-appeals came  to be  filed against the decision of the
\ntrial court to the Rajasthan High Court. During the pendency
\nof these  appeals the  plaintiff who  was appellant  in\t his
\nappeal died  and his  legal representatives  were  impleaded
\nwithin time.  It appears  that the  legal representatives of
\nthe plaintiff  who was respondent in defendant’s appeal were
\nnot substituted\t and a\tpreliminary objection was taken that
\nthe defendant’s\t appeal abates\tor has abated. The defendant
\ncountered this\tsubmission by  saying  that  as\t plaintiff’s
\nlegal representatives  were before  the Court  as brought on
\nrecord and  substituted in  the plaintiff’s appeal, it would
\nbe permitting  a technicality  to hold\tthat the defendant’s
\nappeal has  abated. The Court examined two separate limbs of
\nthe submission:\t (1) what  is the  effect of substitution of
\ndeceased party’s  legal representatives\t in cross-objections
\nthough no such substitution was made in the main appeal; and
\n(2) would  the effect  be different  if\t instead  of  cross-
\nobjections there were cross-appeals. A Division Bench of the
\nRajasthan High\tCourt held  that cross-objections being part
\nof the\tsame proceedings  and form  part of the same record,
\nsubstitution  of   legal  representatives   in\tthe   cross-
\nobjections would  enure for  the benefit of the main appeal.
\nBut  in\t the  case  of\tcross-appeals,\tafter  referring  to
\nSankaranaraina Saralaya’s  case, (supra) the High Court held
\nthat substitution  of legal  representatives of\t a  deceased
\nparty in  one appeal  cannot enure  for the  benefit of\t the
\ncross-appeal and,  therefore, defendant’s appeal was held to
\nhave abated.\n<\/p>\n
     An analysis  of the  aforementioned decisions in search
\nof a  common thread  or a deducible principle has not proved
\nhelpful.\n<\/p>\n
     The following conclusions emerge from these decisions:
\n     (1) If  all legal\trepresentatives\t are  not  impleaded
\nafter diligent\tsearch and some are brought on record and if
\nthe  Court  is\tsatisfied  that\t the  estate  is  adequately
\nrepresented  meaning  thereby  that  the  interests  of\t the
\ndeceased party are properly represented before the Court, an
\naction would not abate.\n<\/p>\n
     (2) If  the legal\trepresentative is  on  record  in  a
\ndifferent capacity,  the failure to describe him also in his
\nother capacity as legal representative of the deceased party
\nwould not abate the proceeding.\n<\/p>\n
     (3) If  an appeal\tand cross-objections  in the  appeal
\narising from a decree are before the appellate court and the
\nrespondent dies,  substitution of  his legal representatives
\nin the cross-objections being part of the same record, would
\nenure for  the benefit\tof the appeal and the failure of the
\nappellant to implead the legal representatives of the
\n622<\/span>
\ndeceased respondent would not have the effect of abating the
\nappeal but not vice versa.\n<\/p>\n
     (4) A  substitution of  legal  representatives  of\t the
\ndeceased party\tin an  appeal or  revision even\t against  an
\ninterlocutory order would enure for the subsequent stages of
\nthe suit  on the  footing that appeal is a continuation of a
\nsuit and  introduction of  a party  at one  stage of  a suit
\nwould enure for all subsequent stages of the suit.\n<\/p>\n
     (5) In cross-appeals arising from the same decree where
\nparties to  a suit  adopt rival positions, on the death of a
\nparty if  his legal  representatives are  impleaded  in\t one
\nappeal it will not enure for the benefit of cross-appeal and
\nthe same would abate.\n<\/p>\n
     Is\t it   possible\tto  ratiocinate\t these\tdecisions  ?
\nApparently the\ttask is\t difficult. Now,  if the  object and
\npurpose behind\tenacting Order 22, rules 3 and 4 are kept in
\nforefront conclusions Nos. 1 to 4 would more or less fall in
\nline with the object and purpose, namely, no decision can be
\nrecorded in  a judicial\t proceeding concerning the interests
\nof a  party to a proceeding without giving such party or his
\nlegal  representatives\t an  opportunity  of  putting  forth
\nits\/their case.\t To translate  this  principle\tinto  action
\ndenuding it of its ultra technical or harsh application, the
\nCourts held  that if  some legal  representatives are before
\nthe Court, or they are before the Court in another, capacity
\nor are\tbrought on  record at  some stage  of the  suit, the
\naction will  not abate even if there is no strict compliance
\nwith the  requirements of  rules 3 and 4. The distinction in
\nthe  process   drawn  between\tthe  substitution  of  legal
\nrepresentatives in  cross-objections and cross-appeal defies
\nratiocination. Cross-appeal and cross-objections provide two
\ndifferent remedies  for the  same purpose  and that  is\t why
\nunder Order  41, rule  22, cross-objections can be preferred
\nin respect  of such  points on\twhich that  party could have
\npreferred an  appeal. If  such be  the\tposition  of  cross-
\nobjections and\tcross-appeal a differentiation in the matter
\nof their  treatment under  rules 3 and 4 cannot be justified
\nmerely on  the ground  that in case of cross-objections they
\nform part  of the  same record\twhile cross-appeals  are two
\nindependent proceedings.\n<\/p>\n
     Now, if  the discernible  principle underlying  rules 3
\nand 4  of Order\t 22 is that the legal representatives of the
\ndeceased likely\t to be\taffected one way or the other by the
\ndecision in  appeal must  be before  the Court\tand must  be
\nheard  before\ta  decision  affecting\ttheir  interests  is
\nrecorded it  would stand  fully vindicated  when  in  cross-
\nappeals a  party occupying  the position  of an appellant in
\none appeal  and respondent  in the other appeal dies and his
\nlegal representatives are brought on record in the appeal in
\nwhich he  is the  appellant and\t not  in  the  other  appeal
\nwherein he  is a  respondent because  the subject-matter  of
\nboth the
\n623<\/span>
\nappeals\t being\t the  decree  under  attack,  they  have  an
\nopportunity to\tsupport\t the  decree  in  their\t favour\t and
\nquestion the correctness of the decree adverse to them. Even
\nif they\t were brought  on record as legal representatives of
\nthe deceased  in his  capacity as  respondent in  the cross-
\nappeal, they  could not have further advanced their case nor
\ncould they  have done  anything more than what they would do
\nin their  capacity as  legal representatives of the deceased
\nappellant unless  they were  precluded from  contending that
\nthey being  not on  record cannot  support or controvert the
\ndecree. They  have thus\t the fullest  opportunity of putting
\nforth their  grievance against and in support of the decree.
\nTheir position\twas not\t the least likely to be affected one
\nway or the other even if they were not formally impleaded as
\nlegal representatives  of the  deceased in  his capacity  as
\nrespondent. To\tsay that  cross-appeals are  independent  of
\neach other is to overlook the obvious position which parties
\nadopt in  cross-appeals. Interdependence of cross-appeals is
\nthe same  as interdependence  of appeal and cross-objections
\nbecause as  in the  case of  appeal and\t cross-objections  a
\ndecision With  regard to  appeal would directly impinge upon
\nthe decision in cross-objections and vice versa. Indubitably
\nthe decision  in one  of the  cross-appeals  would  directly
\nimpinge\t upon\tthe  decision  in  the\tother  because\tboth
\nultimately arise  from the  same decree.  This is really the
\ninterdependence of  cross-appeals and  it is  impossible  to
\ndistinguish cross-appeals  from appeal and cross-objections.
\nUnfortunately this  interdependence was\t overlooked  by\t the
\nMadras High  Court when\t the scope  of cross-appeals arising
\nfrom the  same decree  and approach  is cross-objections  in
\nrespect of  the same  decree were  not examined\t in depth in
\nSankaranaraina Saralaya’s  case (supra).  This\tapproach  is
\nmerely an  extension of\t the principle\twell  recognised  by
\nCourts that if legal representatives are before the Court in
\nthe given  proceeding in  one capacity\tit is immaterial and
\nirrelevant if  they are\t not  formally\timpleaded  as  legal
\nrepresentatives of  the deceased  party in another capacity.
\nShorn of  embellishment, when  legal  representatives  of  a
\ndeceased appellant  are substituted  and  those\t very  legal
\nrepresentatives as of the same person occupying the position
\nof  respondent\tin  cross-appeal  are  not  substituted\t the
\nindisputable outcome  would be\tthat they  were on record in
\nthe connected  proceeding before the same Court hearing both
\nthe matters,  in one capacity though they were not described
\nas  such   in  their   other  capacity,\t  namely,  as  legal
\nrepresentatives of  the deceased  respondent. To ignore this
\nobvious position  would be  giving undue  importance to form
\nrather than  substance. The  anxiety of\t the Court should be
\nwhether those  likely to  be affected by the decision in the
\nproceeding were\t before the Court having full opportunity to
\ncanvass their case. Once that is satisfied it can be
\n624<\/span>
\nsafely said  that the  provisions contained in rules 3 and 4
\nof Order  22 are  satisfied in a given case. To take another
\nview  would   be  to   give  an\t opportunity  to  the  legal
\nrepresentatives of  a deceased party in an appeal having had
\nthe fullest  opportunity to  canvass their  case through the
\nadvocate of their choice appearing in cross-appeals for them
\nand having  canvassed their case and lost, to turn round and
\ncontend that  they  were  not  before  the  Court  as  legal
\nrepresentatives of  the same  person in\t his other capacity,
\nnamely, respondent  in the  cross appeal.  In  other  words,
\nthose  legal  representatives  were  before  the  Court\t all
\nthroughout the\thearing of  the appeal\tas  parties  to\t the
\nappeal and canvassed their case and were heard through their
\nadvocate and  they had\tthe full  opportunity to  put  forth
\nwhatever contentions were open to them in the appeals and to
\ncontest\t the   contentions  advanced  against  them  by\t the
\nopposite side  and yet\tif the\tother view  is taken that as
\nthey were not formally impleaded as legal representatives of
\nthe deceased  respondent in the cross-appeal that appeal has
\nabated, it  would be  wholly unjust. It is very difficult to
\ndistinguish on\tprinciple  the\tapproach  of  the  Court  in
\nappeals and  cross-objections and  in cross  appeals in this
\nbehalf.\t No   principle\t of   law   can\t  distinguish\tthis
\ndevigational approach.\tThe cases  which have taken the view
\nthat in cross-appeals the position is different than the one
\nin appeal  and\tcross  objections  do  not  proceed  on\t any
\ndiscernible legal  principle. Nor  can they  be explained by
\nany demonstrable  legal\t principle  but\t in  fact  they\t run
\ncounter to the established legal principle.\n<\/p>\n
     In\t the  present  case  the  legal\t representatives  of
\ndeceased Y.  Prabrakar Reddy  were brought  on record in the
\nclaimants’  appeal.   Through  their   advocate\t they\twere
\ncontending  before   the  High\t Court\tthat  not  only\t the
\ncompensation  should   be  enhanced  but  in  reply  to\t the
\nsubmissions of\tthe counsel  for the  State in\ttheir appeal
\nthey contended\tthat no\t case was  made out for reducing the
\ncompensation. Both  the appeals\t were heard together and not
\none after the other. Therefore, the legal representatives of
\nthe deceased  Y. Prakhakar  Reddy were all throughout before
\nthe Court,  of\tcourse\tin  one\t capacity,  viz.,  as  legal
\nrepresentatives of  deceased appellant, but not so described
\nas legal  representatives of  the deceased  respondent. That
\ncannot make  any difference.  Therefore, the  appeal has not
\nabated.\n<\/p>\n
     On merits, I agree with my learned brother Shinghal, J.
\nthat  the   compensation  as   awarded\tby  the\t High  Court
\nrepresents the\tmarket value  of the land on the date of the
\nNotification under  s. 4  of the Land Acquisition Act and no
\ncase is made out for interfering with the same. Accordingly,
\nI agree\t with the  final order\tthat the appeal be dismissed
\nwith no order as to costs.\n<\/p>\n
P.B.R.\t\t\t\t\t   Appeal dismissed.\n625<\/span>\n\n\n\n<\/pre>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Jayarama Reddy & Anr vs Revenue Divisional Officer & Land … on 23 March, 1979 Equivalent citations: 1979 AIR 1393, 1979 SCR (3) 599 Author: P Shingal Bench: Shingal, P.N. PETITIONER: JAYARAMA REDDY & ANR. Vs. RESPONDENT: REVENUE DIVISIONAL OFFICER & LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER,KURNOO DATE OF JUDGMENT23\/03\/1979 BENCH: SHINGAL, P.N. BENCH: […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-245960","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nJayarama Reddy & Anr vs Revenue Divisional Officer & Land ... on 23 March, 1979 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/jayarama-reddy-anr-vs-revenue-divisional-officer-land-on-23-march-1979\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Jayarama Reddy & Anr vs Revenue Divisional Officer & Land ... on 23 March, 1979 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/jayarama-reddy-anr-vs-revenue-divisional-officer-land-on-23-march-1979\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"1979-03-22T18:30:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2018-01-23T05:48:43+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@legaliadmin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@Legal_india\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"61 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/jayarama-reddy-anr-vs-revenue-divisional-officer-land-on-23-march-1979#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/jayarama-reddy-anr-vs-revenue-divisional-officer-land-on-23-march-1979\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\"},\"headline\":\"Jayarama Reddy & Anr vs Revenue Divisional Officer & Land … on 23 March, 1979\",\"datePublished\":\"1979-03-22T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2018-01-23T05:48:43+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/jayarama-reddy-anr-vs-revenue-divisional-officer-land-on-23-march-1979\"},\"wordCount\":10054,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"articleSection\":[\"Supreme Court of India\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/jayarama-reddy-anr-vs-revenue-divisional-officer-land-on-23-march-1979#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/jayarama-reddy-anr-vs-revenue-divisional-officer-land-on-23-march-1979\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/jayarama-reddy-anr-vs-revenue-divisional-officer-land-on-23-march-1979\",\"name\":\"Jayarama Reddy & Anr vs Revenue Divisional Officer & Land ... on 23 March, 1979 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"1979-03-22T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2018-01-23T05:48:43+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/jayarama-reddy-anr-vs-revenue-divisional-officer-land-on-23-march-1979#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/jayarama-reddy-anr-vs-revenue-divisional-officer-land-on-23-march-1979\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/jayarama-reddy-anr-vs-revenue-divisional-officer-land-on-23-march-1979#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Jayarama Reddy & Anr vs Revenue Divisional Officer & Land … on 23 March, 1979\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"name\":\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"description\":\"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"alternateName\":\"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"alternateName\":\"Legal India\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"width\":512,\"height\":512,\"caption\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.facebook.com\\\/LegalindiaCom\\\/\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/Legal_india\"]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\",\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Legal India Admin\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/legaliadmin\"],\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/author\\\/legal-india-admin\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Jayarama Reddy & Anr vs Revenue Divisional Officer & Land ... on 23 March, 1979 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/jayarama-reddy-anr-vs-revenue-divisional-officer-land-on-23-march-1979","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Jayarama Reddy & Anr vs Revenue Divisional Officer & Land ... on 23 March, 1979 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","og_url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/jayarama-reddy-anr-vs-revenue-divisional-officer-land-on-23-march-1979","og_site_name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","article_published_time":"1979-03-22T18:30:00+00:00","article_modified_time":"2018-01-23T05:48:43+00:00","og_image":[{"width":512,"height":512,"url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Legal India Admin","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@legaliadmin","twitter_site":"@Legal_india","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Legal India Admin","Est. reading time":"61 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/jayarama-reddy-anr-vs-revenue-divisional-officer-land-on-23-march-1979#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/jayarama-reddy-anr-vs-revenue-divisional-officer-land-on-23-march-1979"},"author":{"name":"Legal India Admin","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea"},"headline":"Jayarama Reddy & Anr vs Revenue Divisional Officer & Land … on 23 March, 1979","datePublished":"1979-03-22T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2018-01-23T05:48:43+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/jayarama-reddy-anr-vs-revenue-divisional-officer-land-on-23-march-1979"},"wordCount":10054,"commentCount":0,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"articleSection":["Supreme Court of India"],"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/jayarama-reddy-anr-vs-revenue-divisional-officer-land-on-23-march-1979#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/jayarama-reddy-anr-vs-revenue-divisional-officer-land-on-23-march-1979","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/jayarama-reddy-anr-vs-revenue-divisional-officer-land-on-23-march-1979","name":"Jayarama Reddy & Anr vs Revenue Divisional Officer & Land ... on 23 March, 1979 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website"},"datePublished":"1979-03-22T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2018-01-23T05:48:43+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/jayarama-reddy-anr-vs-revenue-divisional-officer-land-on-23-march-1979#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/jayarama-reddy-anr-vs-revenue-divisional-officer-land-on-23-march-1979"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/jayarama-reddy-anr-vs-revenue-divisional-officer-land-on-23-march-1979#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Jayarama Reddy & Anr vs Revenue Divisional Officer & Land … on 23 March, 1979"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","description":"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"alternateName":"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization","name":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","alternateName":"Legal India","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","width":512,"height":512,"caption":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","https:\/\/x.com\/Legal_india"]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea","name":"Legal India Admin","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Legal India Admin"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com","https:\/\/x.com\/legaliadmin"],"url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/author\/legal-india-admin"}]}},"modified_by":null,"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/245960","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=245960"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/245960\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=245960"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=245960"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=245960"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}