{"id":247227,"date":"2010-09-09T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2010-09-08T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/glanrock-estate-p-ltd-vs-the-state-of-tamil-nadu-on-9-september-2010"},"modified":"2018-07-26T06:28:53","modified_gmt":"2018-07-26T00:58:53","slug":"glanrock-estate-p-ltd-vs-the-state-of-tamil-nadu-on-9-september-2010","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/glanrock-estate-p-ltd-vs-the-state-of-tamil-nadu-on-9-september-2010","title":{"rendered":"Glanrock Estate (P) Ltd vs The State Of Tamil Nadu on 9 September, 2010"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Glanrock Estate (P) Ltd vs The State Of Tamil Nadu on 9 September, 2010<\/div>\n
Author: …………………….<\/div>\n
Bench: S.H. Kapadia, K.S. Radhakrishnan, Swatanter Kumar<\/div>\n
                             IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA\n              CIVIL ORIGINAL\/APPELLATE JURISDICTION\n              WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 242 OF 1988\n\n    Glanrock Estate (P) Ltd.               .... Petitioner(s)\n\n                     Versus\n\n    The State of Tamil Nadu                ....Respondent(s)\n\n                                 with\n     Writ Petition (C) No. 408 of 2003 and Civil Appeal Nos.\n                       1344-1345 of 1976.\n\n\n                            J U D G M E N T\n<\/pre>\n
    S. H. KAPADIA, CJI<\/p>\n
            Some doctrines die hard.       That certainly is<\/p>\n
    true of the doctrine of basic structure of the<\/p>\n
    Constitution.\n<\/p>\n
    2.      Against this backdrop, we need to examine the<\/p>\n
    constitutional validity of the Constitution (Thirty-<\/p>\n
    fourth Amendment) Act, 1974.          By the said Amendment<\/p>\n
    Act,    the   Gudalur    Janmam     Estates   (Abolition    and<\/p>\n
    Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1969 [for short “the<\/p>\n
    Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969)”] stood inserted in the<\/p>\n
    Ninth Schedule to the Constitution as Item No. 80.<\/p>\n
    Facts<\/p>\n
1<\/span>\n<\/p>\n
    3.       In 1961, the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation<\/p>\n
    of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961 [for short “the 1961<\/p>\n
    Act”] was enacted.            However, by virtue of Section<\/p>\n
    73(v), the said Act was made inapplicable to Hill<\/p>\n
    Areas.     On 6.12.1969, the Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969)<\/p>\n
    was enacted but not notified till 27.11.1974.                    The<\/p>\n
    Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969) was enacted inter alia to<\/p>\n
    provide for acquisition of the rights of janmis in<\/p>\n
    Janmam estates in the Gudalur taluk of the Nilgiris<\/p>\n
    district      and     for    the     introduction      of   ryotwari<\/p>\n
    settlement       in   such   estates.       On   26.10.1970,     the<\/p>\n
    Madras High Court dismissed nine writ petitions filed<\/p>\n
    by the janmis challenging the constitutional validity<\/p>\n
    of the Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969).                   By a judgment<\/p>\n
    dated 19.4.1972 delivered by a Constitution Bench of<\/p>\n
    this Court in the case of Balmadies Plantations Ltd.<\/p>\n
    v. State of Tamil Nadu<\/a> [(1972) 2 SCC 133], it was<\/p>\n
    held that the Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969) was immune<\/p>\n
    to challenge from Articles 14, 19 and 31 as it was an<\/p>\n
    Act for acquisition of an estate under Article 31A<\/p>\n
    with    one   exception      of    acquisition   of   forest   lands<\/p>\n
    which    could    not   be   considered    as    agrarian   reforms<\/p>\n
2<\/span>
\n    under Article 31A in the absence of anything in the<\/p>\n
    Act to show the purpose for which the forest land<\/p>\n
    stood      acquired              (see   para      18).         Consequently,<\/p>\n
    acquisition of forest lands was held to be violative<\/p>\n
    of   the    Constitution.               Meanwhile       on    29.6.1972,        the<\/p>\n
    Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land)<\/p>\n
    Second      Amendment            Act,   1972    (Act     20   of       1972)    [for<\/p>\n
    short “the Ceiling Act (Act 20 of 1972)”] was passed<\/p>\n
    so as to extend the provisions of the principal Act.<\/p>\n
    Proceedings were initiated under the Ceiling Act (Act<\/p>\n
    20 of 1972) in regard to non-plantation lands of the<\/p>\n
    petitioner(s)              (plantations        being    exempted         from    the<\/p>\n
    purview of the Ceiling Act (Act 20 of 1972)).                                  Under<\/p>\n
    the Ceiling Act (Act 20 of 1972), a family was not<\/p>\n
    entitled to hold lands in excess of the ceiling area,<\/p>\n
    i.e.,      15       standard      acres   [see       Section       5    read    with<\/p>\n
    Section         7    of    the    Ceiling      Act     (Act   20       of   1972)].<\/p>\n
    Hence, under the Ceiling Act (Act 20 of 1972), the<\/p>\n
    petitioner(s) was entitled to hold 15 standard acres<\/p>\n
    per family.               On 1.7.1972, the Ceiling Act (Act 20 of<\/p>\n
    1972) was notified and made applicable to Hill Areas.<\/p>\n
    Thus, 1.7.1972 became the notified date under Section<\/p>\n
3<\/span>
\n    3(31) of the Ceiling Act (Act 20 of 1972).                        By the<\/p>\n
    Ceiling    Act       (Act    20   of   1972),     it    was   inter   alia<\/p>\n
    provided that if by virtue of the Ceiling Act (Act 20<\/p>\n
    of 1972) the total extent of the land held by any<\/p>\n
    person exceeded the ceiling area then in relation to<\/p>\n
    such person the date of commencement of the Ceiling<\/p>\n
    Act     (Act    20    of     1972)     will   mean      1.3.1972.        On<\/p>\n
    20.11.1972, the petitioner(s) herein submitted their<\/p>\n
    returns under the Ceiling Act (Act 20 of 1972).                          On<\/p>\n
    24.7.1973,       the        authorized     officer      wrote    to     the<\/p>\n
    petitioner(s) that he would inspect their estates on<\/p>\n
    4.8.1973.        On 24.4.1973 came the decision of this<\/p>\n
    Court      in        His       Holiness       Kesavananda        Bharati<\/p>\n
    Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala<\/a> [(1973) 4 SCC 225].<\/p>\n
    This date, namely, 24.4.1973 is crucial as it is the<\/p>\n
    cut-off    date      under     the     judgment    of    this   Court    in<\/p>\n
    Waman Rao v. Union of India<\/a> [(1981) 2 SCC 362].                          It<\/p>\n
    was held in Waman Rao (supra) that all amendments to<\/p>\n
    the Constitution made on or after 24.4.1973 and by<\/p>\n
    which the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution stood<\/p>\n
    amended from time to time by inclusion of various<\/p>\n
    Acts and Regulations therein were open to challenge<\/p>\n
4<\/span>
\n    on the ground that they, or anyone or more of them,<\/p>\n
    are beyond the constituent power of the Parliament<\/p>\n
    since they damage the basic or essential features of<\/p>\n
    the      Constitution             or      its        basic          structure.\n<\/p>\n
    Consequently, all such amendments to the Constitution<\/p>\n
    made    on    or    before       24.4.1973,        by     which     the    Ninth<\/p>\n
    Schedule stood amended from time to time, were held<\/p>\n
    to be valid and constitutional.                         On 17.8.1973, the<\/p>\n
    authorized officer under the Ceiling Act (Act 20 of<\/p>\n
    1972)    informed         the    petitioner(s)            that     the    action<\/p>\n
    under    the       Ceiling       Act    (Act       20        of   1972)    stood<\/p>\n
    temporarily deferred.                 Soon thereafter on 7.9.1974,<\/p>\n
    the Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969) was inserted as Item<\/p>\n
    No. 80 in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution by<\/p>\n
    the Constitution (Thirty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1974.<\/p>\n
    On    25.11.1974,     the       Collector       of      Nilgiris       issued    a<\/p>\n
    notice   to     the   petitioner(s)           herein          asking     them   to<\/p>\n
    hand over the possession of their lands under the<\/p>\n
    Janmam    Act      (Act    24    of    1969).           On    27.11.1974,       as<\/p>\n
    stated above, the Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969) stood<\/p>\n
    notified.       Till this date, no proceedings were taken<\/p>\n
    under    the    Ceiling         Act    (Act   20     of      1972).       Hence,<\/p>\n
5<\/span>
\n    ceiling was not determined till that date.                       In fact<\/p>\n
    on   16.12.1974,       writ    petitions        were    filed    by   the<\/p>\n
    petitioner(s) herein seeking a direction to the State<\/p>\n
    to complete proceedings under the Ceiling Act (Act 20<\/p>\n
    of 1972) and to refrain from proceeding under the<\/p>\n
    Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969).              On 23.9.1976, the writ<\/p>\n
    petitions   were       dismissed     by   the    Madras    High    Court<\/p>\n
    against which Special Leave Petition No. 8994 of 1976<\/p>\n
    was filed in this Court; leave was granted by this<\/p>\n
    Court as Civil Appeal No. 1345 of 1976.                         In 1988,<\/p>\n
    writ petition No. 242 of 1988 was also filed by the<\/p>\n
    petitioner(s) under Article 32 of the Constitution in<\/p>\n
    which vide order dated 17.2.1989, a Division Bench of<\/p>\n
    this    Court   referred       the   case   to     the    Constitution<\/p>\n
    Bench    [see   (1989)     3   SCC    282].        On    14.9.1999,    a<\/p>\n
    Constitution Bench of this Court referred the matters<\/p>\n
    to a larger Bench of 9-Judges [see (1999) 7 SCC 580].<\/p>\n
    Finally, by a judgment of 9-Judge Constitution Bench<\/p>\n
    dated 11.1.2007 in Civil Appeal Nos. 1344-45 of 1976<\/p>\n
    etc. etc. reported as I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil<\/p>\n
    Nadu<\/a>    [(2007)    2    SCC    1],   this       Court    answered     the<\/p>\n
    reference by holding Article 31B as introduced by the<\/p>\n
6<\/span>
\n    Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 to be valid.<\/p>\n
    Applying the tests laid down in I.R. Coelho’s case,<\/p>\n
    the   9-Judge       Constitution    Bench      directed      the    Civil<\/p>\n
    Appeal Nos. 1344-45 of 1976 with Writ Petition Nos.<\/p>\n
    242 of 1988 and 408 of 2003 to be placed for hearing<\/p>\n
    before    a    3-Judge   Bench     for   decision      in    accordance<\/p>\n
    with the principles laid down therein.                  Accordingly,<\/p>\n
    these matters have now come before us.                        In these<\/p>\n
    matters, we are required to apply the principles laid<\/p>\n
    down in I.R. Coelho’s case in the matter of challenge<\/p>\n
    to the Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969) on the ground that<\/p>\n
    the said Act is beyond the constituent power of the<\/p>\n
    Parliament      since    the   Janmam    Act    (Act    24    of    1969)<\/p>\n
    damages       the   basic   or   essential       features      of    the<\/p>\n
    Constitution.<\/p>\n
\n\n    Points for Consideration\n\n    4.        (A)       What is the scope of immunity to laws\n\n<\/pre>\n
    inserted in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution<\/p>\n
    read with Article 31B?\n<\/p>\n
    (B)      Whether the Tamil Nadu State Legislature lacked<\/p>\n
    legislative competence to enact Janmam Act (Act 24 of<\/p>\n
    1969)?\n<\/p>\n
7<\/span>
\n    (C)      Whether the Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969) could<\/p>\n
    not be applied because of the Ceiling Act (Act 20 of<\/p>\n
    1972)?\n<\/p>\n
\n    Scope of immunity to laws inserted                    in    the     Ninth
\n    Schedule read with Article 31B<\/p>\n
    5.       Shri K.V. Viswanathan, learned senior counsel<\/p>\n
    appearing on behalf of the petitioner(s), submitted<\/p>\n
    that “separation of powers” and “rule of law” are<\/p>\n
    basic features of the Constitution of India.                      In the<\/p>\n
    context    of    separation       of    powers,    learned     counsel<\/p>\n
    submitted that on 19.4.1972 the Constitution Bench of<\/p>\n
    this Court in Balmadies case held that Section 3 of<\/p>\n
    the Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969) insofar as it related<\/p>\n
    to    transfer     of    forests        in   Janmam        estate      was<\/p>\n
    unconstitutional as it was not a measure of agrarian<\/p>\n
    reform protected by Article 31A of the Constitution.<\/p>\n
    According to the learned counsel, inclusion of the<\/p>\n
    Janmam    Act    (Act   24   of    1969)     on   7.9.1974     by      the<\/p>\n
    Constitution (Thirty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1974 in<\/p>\n
    the Ninth Schedule (Item No. 80) amounted to direct<\/p>\n
    negation   and    abrogation       of   judicial    review        as   the<\/p>\n
    impugned Constitution (Thirty-fourth Amendment) Act,<\/p>\n
8<\/span>
\n    1974    confers     naked      power         on    the    Parliament         to<\/p>\n
    obliterate the judicial decision in Balmadies case<\/p>\n
    which became final, without changing the basis of the<\/p>\n
    decision or the law and, therefore, the said impugned<\/p>\n
    Constitutional       Amendment          Act       destroys       the    basic<\/p>\n
    feature of the Constitution, namely, judicial review.<\/p>\n
    Similarly,       according       to    the    learned         counsel,       the<\/p>\n
    Constitution       (Thirty-fourth             Amendment)         Act,       1974<\/p>\n
    violated     the    basic     structure           of   rule     of    law    and<\/p>\n
    equality.     In this connection, it was submitted that<\/p>\n
    in Tamil Nadu in respect of lands held in excess of<\/p>\n
    the ceiling limits there is an Act called the Tamil<\/p>\n
    Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act,<\/p>\n
    1961 which came into force on 6.4.1960.                         The said Act<\/p>\n
    stands inserted in the Ninth Schedule as Item No. 46<\/p>\n
    on 20.6.1964.        At this stage, it may be noted that<\/p>\n
    the forest lands fell outside the said 1961 Act prior<\/p>\n
    to 1.3.1972.        By Ceiling Act (Act 20 of 1972), hilly<\/p>\n
    areas    stood     included      in    the    said       1961    Act.        The<\/p>\n
    Ceiling Act (Act 20 of 1972) also stood inserted in<\/p>\n
    the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution as Item No.<\/p>\n
    169     on   27.5.1976      by        the    Constitution            (Fortieth<\/p>\n
9<\/span>
\n     Amendment) Act, 1976.           Consequently, the provisions<\/p>\n
     of the Ceiling Act (Act 20 of 1972), according to the<\/p>\n
     learned counsel, became applicable to 20,000 acres of<\/p>\n
     forest lands which came to be included in the ceiling<\/p>\n
     area by reason of the Ceiling Act (Act 20 of 1972) by<\/p>\n
     which exemption of forest land from the ceiling area<\/p>\n
     stood withdrawn.          That, the Janmam Act (Act 24 of<\/p>\n
     1969)   came    into    force   from   27.11.1974    whereas    the<\/p>\n
     Ceiling Act (Act 20 of 1972) came into force from<\/p>\n
     1.3.1972,      though     it    was    notified   on    1.7.1972.<\/p>\n
     According      to   the    learned     counsel,     principle    of<\/p>\n
     equality is the basic feature of the Constitution;<\/p>\n
     that the Amending Act 20 of 1972 which brought in the<\/p>\n
     “forests” within the purview of the 1961 Act and the<\/p>\n
     Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969) operated in the same<\/p>\n
     field and yet under the ceiling law the compensation<\/p>\n
     provided for was at a higher rate as compared to the<\/p>\n
     rate mentioned in the Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969)<\/p>\n
     being Rs. 50 per acre (maximum); that whereas forests<\/p>\n
     in Janmam estate stood automatically vested in the<\/p>\n
     State under the Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969), under<\/p>\n
     the Amending Act 20 of 1972, the petitioner (s) was<\/p>\n
10<\/span>
\n     permitted to hold the ceiling area including forests<\/p>\n
     upto    the    prescribed         ceiling      limit;     that    under    the<\/p>\n
     Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969) not only forests in the<\/p>\n
     Janmam estate stood vested in the Government but also<\/p>\n
     the occupants were not given pattas for such lands<\/p>\n
     which    pattas       were   given       for     cultivable      lands    only<\/p>\n
     under the Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969) whereas under<\/p>\n
     the Amending Act 20 of 1972 forests could form part<\/p>\n
     of the holding of the petitioner (s) subject to the<\/p>\n
     ceiling limit of 15 standard acres.                      According to the<\/p>\n
     learned       counsel,       the    above        invidious       distinction<\/p>\n
     violated      the     rule   of    equality        in    law    without    any<\/p>\n
     avowed       public      purpose    and     in    the     absence    of    any<\/p>\n
     provisions for distribution of lands having vested in<\/p>\n
     the State, the impugned Section 3 of the Janmam Act<\/p>\n
     (Act    24    of    1969)    and    its     insertion       in    the    Ninth<\/p>\n
     Schedule       to     the     Constitution          as     Item     80     was<\/p>\n
     arbitrary,         discriminatory         and      not     only     violated<\/p>\n
     Article       14    but    also    the     basic        structure    of    the<\/p>\n
     Constitution        in    terms     of    separation       of    powers    and<\/p>\n
     rule of law.          According to the learned counsel, the<\/p>\n
     impugned legislation inter alia violated the rule of<\/p>\n
11<\/span>
\n     law which is a facet of the doctrine of equality and,<\/p>\n
     therefore, it is not validated under Article 31B of<\/p>\n
     the Constitution.\n<\/p>\n
     6.      We find no merit in the above submissions for<\/p>\n
     the following reasons:\n<\/p>\n
             At the outset, we may state that in this case<\/p>\n
     the    essence       of    the    challenge       to    the    Constitution<\/p>\n
     (Thirty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1974, in our view, is<\/p>\n
     in    the    context      of     “right   to      property”.          In        this<\/p>\n
     connection,         we     must    bear      in     mind      that        by     the<\/p>\n
     Constitution         (Forty-fourth           Amendment)            Act,        1978,<\/p>\n
     “right to property” has ceased to be a fundamental<\/p>\n
     right       under    Article      19(1)(f).            If    one     sees        the<\/p>\n
     history of amendments to the Indian Constitution, one<\/p>\n
     finds that the Constitution (First Amendment) Act,<\/p>\n
     1951, the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act,<\/p>\n
     1964, the Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act,<\/p>\n
     1971, the Constitution (Twenty-sixth Amendment) Act,<\/p>\n
     1971    and    the       Constitution     (Twenty-ninth             Amendment)<\/p>\n
     Act,    1972    were       all    in   the     context        of    “right       to<\/p>\n
     property”.            The      challenge       to      the     Constitution<\/p>\n
     (Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1971 on the ground of<\/p>\n
12<\/span>
\n     unlimited power to amend the Constitution was also in<\/p>\n
     the     same      context          of      right     to        property.        The<\/p>\n
     challenges         to        all    these     Constitutional            Amendment<\/p>\n
     Acts, referred to hereinabove, have been negatived.<\/p>\n
     This aspect is important because in the present case<\/p>\n
     in    the    garb       of    “rule     of    law”    and       “separation      of<\/p>\n
     powers”          the      challenge           is      laid        against       the<\/p>\n
     Constitution            (Thirty-fourth             Amendment)       Act,    1974,<\/p>\n
     which, as stated above, is in essence the challenge<\/p>\n
     in the context of “right to property”.                                  The basic<\/p>\n
     contention        of     the       petitioner(s)       in       these   cases   is<\/p>\n
     that the Constitution (Thirty-fourth Amendment) Act,<\/p>\n
     1974 by which the Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969) has<\/p>\n
     been inserted in the Ninth Schedule as Item No. 80<\/p>\n
     seeks       to    confer           naked     power        on     Parliament     to<\/p>\n
     obliterate        the        judicial      decision       of     this   Court   in<\/p>\n
     Balmadies case which became final without changing<\/p>\n
     the basis of the decision or the law and, therefore,<\/p>\n
     the said Constitution (Thirty-fourth Amendment) Act,<\/p>\n
     1974 destroys the basic feature of the Constitution,<\/p>\n
     namely, judicial review and separation of powers as<\/p>\n
     well as rule of law.                 To answer this point, one needs<\/p>\n
13<\/span>
\n     to consider the judgment of the Constitution Bench of<\/p>\n
     this    Court    in    Balmadies        case.       It   is    vehemently<\/p>\n
     submitted     on     behalf       of   the   petitioner(s)         that   in<\/p>\n
     Balmadies case, this Court has held Section 3 of the<\/p>\n
     Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969) to be unconstitutional,<\/p>\n
     as violative of Articles 14, 19 and 31.                    In our view,<\/p>\n
     it is not so.          One of the questions which arose for<\/p>\n
     consideration        by    this    Court     in    Balmadies       case   was<\/p>\n
     whether acquisition of the lands under the Janmam Act<\/p>\n
     (Act 24 of 1969) was for agrarian reform?                      This Court<\/p>\n
     observed that in order to invoke Article 31A, it has<\/p>\n
     to be shown that acquisition of the “estate” was with<\/p>\n
     the    view     to    implement        agrarian     reform.         It    was<\/p>\n
     further observed that Article 31A is confined only to<\/p>\n
     agrarian reform and its provisions would apply only<\/p>\n
     to a law made for acquisition by the State of any<\/p>\n
     rights therein if such acquisition is connected with<\/p>\n
     the agrarian reform.               On examination of the Janmam<\/p>\n
     Act (Act 24 of 1969), this Court held that it was<\/p>\n
     manifest from the perusal of the Objects and Reasons<\/p>\n
     and the general scheme of the Janmam Act (Act 24 of<\/p>\n
     1969)    that        the   enactment         was    made      to    abolish<\/p>\n
14<\/span>
\n     intermediaries between the State and the cultivators;<\/p>\n
     that the Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969) in its broad<\/p>\n
     outlines should be held to be a measure of agrarian<\/p>\n
     reform        and,    consequently,            it        stood    protected      by<\/p>\n
     Article 31A of the Constitution.                          However, this Court<\/p>\n
     held that so far as forests in Janmam estates are<\/p>\n
     concerned the acquisition of those forests cannot be<\/p>\n
     said     to     be    in       furtherance          of     the    objective      of<\/p>\n
     agrarian reform because in the absence of anything in<\/p>\n
     the Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969) to show the purpose<\/p>\n
     for    which         the       forests       are    to     be     used   by     the<\/p>\n
     Government,          it    cannot       be   said    that        acquisition     of<\/p>\n
     forests in Janmam estate is for a purpose related to<\/p>\n
     agrarian         reform.                 Therefore,              although       the<\/p>\n
     constitutional validity of the Janmam Act (Act 24 of<\/p>\n
     1969) by and large stood upheld by this Court, it was<\/p>\n
     held in Balmadies case that Section 3 of the Janmam<\/p>\n
     Act    (Act     24        of    1969)    insofar          as     it   related    to<\/p>\n
     transfer of forests in Janmam estates was violative<\/p>\n
     of the Constitution and as such Section 3 to that<\/p>\n
     extent was struck down.                  It was held that invalidity<\/p>\n
     of Section 3 to the above extent would not affect the<\/p>\n
15<\/span>
\n     validity of the other provisions of the Act as the<\/p>\n
     two were distinct and severable.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     7.      On      reading    the     judgment      of    the    Constitution<\/p>\n
     Bench      of   this      Court     in    Balmadies      case,    in     its<\/p>\n
     entirety, we find that although the Janmam Act (Act<\/p>\n
     24 of 1969) was challenged on the ground of the Act<\/p>\n
     being violative of Articles 14, 19 and 31, this Court<\/p>\n
     in Balmadies case struck down Section 3 to the extent<\/p>\n
     of acquisition of forests in the Janmam estate only<\/p>\n
     on the ground that there was nothing in the Janmam<\/p>\n
     Act (Act 24 of 1969) to show the purpose for which<\/p>\n
     the forest lands stood acquired and, therefore, this<\/p>\n
     Court   gave      a    declaration        that    in    the    absence    of<\/p>\n
     anything in the Act to show the purpose for which<\/p>\n
     forest lands stood acquired, protection under Article<\/p>\n
     31A was not available. (see para 18 of the judgment)<\/p>\n
     From    this     it    cannot      be    said    that   this     Court   in<\/p>\n
     Balmadies case has held that Section 3 insofar as<\/p>\n
     forests are concerned violated Articles 14, 19 and 31<\/p>\n
     of the Constitution.              Be that as it may, the judgment<\/p>\n
     of   the     Constitution         Bench    in    Balmadies       case    was<\/p>\n
     delivered on 19.4.1972.                 Even assuming for the sake<\/p>\n
16<\/span>
\n     of argument that the Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969), so<\/p>\n
     far as the forests are concerned, was held to be<\/p>\n
     violative of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution<\/p>\n
     in    Balmadies      case   as     contended           on     behalf    of      the<\/p>\n
     petitioner(s),        still      it     cannot         be    said     that      the<\/p>\n
     Constitution        (Thirty-fourth             Amendment)           Act,     1974<\/p>\n
     conferred naked power on the Parliament to obliterate<\/p>\n
     the     judicial      decision        in      Balmadies        case     without<\/p>\n
     changing      the   basis     of    the       decision        because      it    is<\/p>\n
     pursuant      to    such    declaration           by    the     Constitution<\/p>\n
     Bench    of    this    Court       in      Balmadies         case     that      the<\/p>\n
     Parliament inserted the Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969)<\/p>\n
     into    the   Ninth     Schedule         by    invoking        Article       31A.<\/p>\n
     Therefore,     one     cannot      say     that    the        Parliament        has<\/p>\n
     obliterated the judicial decision of this Court in<\/p>\n
     Balmadies      case    without          changing        its    basis.           The<\/p>\n
     challenge to Article 329A(4) succeeded in Election<\/p>\n
     Case [Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Shri Raj Narain<\/a><\/p>\n
     1975 (Supp.) SCC 1] because the impugned Amendment<\/p>\n
     was held to be Legislative Judgment being validated<\/p>\n
     which    is   not     the   case      herein.           On    the     contrary,<\/p>\n
     pursuant to the declaration in Balmadies case, the<\/p>\n
17<\/span>
\n     Parliament inserted the Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969)<\/p>\n
     in    the   Ninth    Schedule       which     would     mean        that    the<\/p>\n
     Parliament has implemented in a way the decision of<\/p>\n
     this Court in Balmadies case by validating the law.<\/p>\n
     8.       Coming to the applicability of the judgment of<\/p>\n
     the    9-Judge     Bench   decision      of      this   Court        in    I.R.<\/p>\n
     Coelho      (supra),   time     has     come     for    us     to     explain<\/p>\n
     certain concepts in that judgment like egalitarian<\/p>\n
     equality,        over-arching       principles         and    reading        of<\/p>\n
     Article 21 with Article 14.              In this connection, one<\/p>\n
     needs to keep in mind what is called as the “degree<\/p>\n
     test”.        Ultimately,      in     applying        the     above       three<\/p>\n
     concepts     enumerated       herein,    one      has    to    go     by    the<\/p>\n
     degree      of    abrogation     as     well     as     the    degree        of<\/p>\n
     elevation of an ordinary principle of equality to the<\/p>\n
     level of over-arching principle (s).                        One must keep<\/p>\n
     in mind that in this case the challenge is not to the<\/p>\n
     ordinary law of the land.               The challenge is to the<\/p>\n
     constitutional amendment.               In a rigid Constitution<\/p>\n
     [See Article 368] power to amend the Constitution is<\/p>\n
     a     derivative     power,     which       is   an     aspect       of     the<\/p>\n
     constituent power.         The challenge is to the exercise<\/p>\n
18<\/span>
\n     of derivative power by the Parliament in the matter<\/p>\n
     of inclusion of the Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969) as<\/p>\n
     Item No. 80 in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution<\/p>\n
     vide the Constitution (Thirty-fourth Amendment) Act,<\/p>\n
     1974.     Since the power to amend the Constitution is a<\/p>\n
     derivative power, the exercise of such power to amend<\/p>\n
     the     Constitution    is     subject         to   two     limitations,<\/p>\n
     namely, the doctrine of basic structure and lack of<\/p>\n
     legislative       competence.            The    doctrine       of    basic<\/p>\n
     structure is brought in as a window to keep the power<\/p>\n
     of judicial review intact as abrogation of such a<\/p>\n
     power would result in violation of basic structure.<\/p>\n
     When     we   speak     of     discrimination             or   arbitrary<\/p>\n
     classification,       the    same    constitutes           violation    of<\/p>\n
     Article 14 of the Constitution.                 In this connection,<\/p>\n
     the     distinction     between          constitutional        law     and<\/p>\n
     ordinary law in a rigid Constitution like ours is to<\/p>\n
     be kept in mind.            The said distinction proceeds on<\/p>\n
     the assumption that ordinary law can be challenged on<\/p>\n
     the touchstone of the Constitution.                     Therefore, when<\/p>\n
     an     ordinary   law   seeks       to    make      a     classification<\/p>\n
     without any rational basis and without any nexus with<\/p>\n
19<\/span>
\n     the object sought to be achieved, such ordinary law<\/p>\n
     could be challenged on the touchstone of Article 14<\/p>\n
     of the Constitution.              However, when it comes to the<\/p>\n
     validity of a constitutional amendment, one has to<\/p>\n
     examine the validity of such amendment by asking the<\/p>\n
     question as to whether such an amendment violates any<\/p>\n
     over-arching principle in the Constitution.                        What is<\/p>\n
     over-arching          principle?           Concepts   like    secularism,<\/p>\n
     democracy, separation of powers, power of judicial<\/p>\n
     review fall outside the scope of amendatory powers of<\/p>\n
     the Parliament under Article 368.                     If any of these<\/p>\n
     were to be deleted it would require changes to be<\/p>\n
     made not only in Part III of the Constitution but<\/p>\n
     also   in    Articles      245     and      the   three    Lists    of    the<\/p>\n
     Constitution          resulting       in    the   change     of   the    very<\/p>\n
     structure or framework of the Constitution.                        When an<\/p>\n
     impugned     Act      creates     a    classification        without      any<\/p>\n
     rational basis and having no nexus with the objects<\/p>\n
     sought      to   be    achieved,       the    principle      of    equality<\/p>\n
     before law is violated undoubtedly.                    Such an Act can<\/p>\n
     be declared to be violative of Article 14.                          Such a<\/p>\n
     violation        does     not      require        re-writing       of     the<\/p>\n
20<\/span>
\n     Constitution.       This would be a case of violation of<\/p>\n
     ordinary      principle        of      equality            before        law.<\/p>\n
     Similarly,     “egalitarian       equality”          is    a     much    wider<\/p>\n
     concept.     It is an over-arching principle.                      Take the<\/p>\n
     case of acquisition of forests.                Forests in India are<\/p>\n
     an important part of environment.                     They constitute<\/p>\n
     national asset.        In various judgments of this Court<\/p>\n
     delivered by the Forest Bench of this Court in the<\/p>\n
     case    of   T.N.   Godavarman      v.       Union    of        India<\/a>    [Writ<\/p>\n
     Petition No. 202 of 1995], it has been held that<\/p>\n
     “inter-generational equity” is part of Article 21 of<\/p>\n
     the Constitution.         What is inter-generational equity?<\/p>\n
     The    present   generation       is    answerable          to     the   next<\/p>\n
     generation by giving to the next generation a good<\/p>\n
     environment.         We     are     answerable             to     the    next<\/p>\n
     generation and if deforestation takes place rampantly<\/p>\n
     then inter-generational equity would stand violated.<\/p>\n
     The doctrine of sustainable development also forms<\/p>\n
     part    of   Article      21   of      the     Constitution.               The<\/p>\n
     “precautionary      principle”         and     the        “polluter       pays<\/p>\n
     principle” flow from the core value in Article 21.<\/p>\n
     The important point to be noted is that in this case<\/p>\n
21<\/span>
\n     we    are   concerned      with     vesting     of   forests      in   the<\/p>\n
     State.      When we talk about inter-generational equity<\/p>\n
     and    sustainable        development,     we      are   elevating      an<\/p>\n
     ordinary principle of equality to the level of over-<\/p>\n
     arching     principle.        Equality      doctrine       has    various<\/p>\n
     facets.      It is in this sense that in I.R. Coelho’s<\/p>\n
     case this Court has read Article 21 with Article 14.<\/p>\n
     The above example indicates that when it comes to<\/p>\n
     preservation of forests as well as environment vis-`-<\/p>\n
     vis      development,        one     has      to     look        at    the<\/p>\n
     constitutional amendment not from the point of view<\/p>\n
     of formal equality or equality enshrined in Article<\/p>\n
     14 but on a much wider platform of an egalitarian<\/p>\n
     equality     which    includes       the   concept       of    “inclusive<\/p>\n
     growth”.         It is in that sense that this Court has<\/p>\n
     used the expression Article 21 read with Article 14<\/p>\n
     in I.R. Coelho’s case.              Therefore, it is only that<\/p>\n
     breach of the principle of equality which is of the<\/p>\n
     character of destroying the basic framework of the<\/p>\n
     Constitution which will not be protected by Article<\/p>\n
     31B.        If    every    breach     of   Article       14,     however,<\/p>\n
     egregious, is held to be unprotected by Article 31B,<\/p>\n
22<\/span>
\n     there would be no purpose in protection by Article<\/p>\n
     31B.     The question can be looked at from yet another<\/p>\n
     angle.     Can Parliament increase its amending power by<\/p>\n
     amendment of Article 368 so as to confer on itself<\/p>\n
     the    unlimited     power    of    amendment            and   destroy       and<\/p>\n
     damage    the     fundamentals      of    the    Constitution?               The<\/p>\n
     answer is obvious.           Article 368 does not vest such a<\/p>\n
     power in Parliament.          It cannot lift all limitations\/<\/p>\n
     restrictions placed on the amending power or free the<\/p>\n
     amending power from all limitations.                           This is the<\/p>\n
     effect     of     the     decision       in     Kesavananda            Bharati<\/p>\n
     (supra).        The point to be noted, therefore, is that<\/p>\n
     when   constitutional        law    is    challenged,            one   has    to<\/p>\n
     apply the “effect test” to find out the degree of<\/p>\n
     abrogation.       This is the “degree test” which has been<\/p>\n
     referred     to     earlier.         If       one        finds     that      the<\/p>\n
     constitutional          amendment    seeks          to     abrogate       core<\/p>\n
     values\/     over-arching         principles          like        secularism,<\/p>\n
     egalitarian equality, etc. and which would warrant<\/p>\n
     re-writing         of      the      Constitution               then       such<\/p>\n
     constitutional law would certainly violate the basic<\/p>\n
     structure.          In     other     words,         such       over-arching<\/p>\n
23<\/span>
\n     principles would fall outside the amendatory power<\/p>\n
     under Article 368 in the sense that the said power<\/p>\n
     cannot     be     exercised         even      by    the     Parliament    to<\/p>\n
     abrogate        such     over-arching            principles.         It    is<\/p>\n
     important to bear in mind that according to Justice<\/p>\n
     Mathew’s    observations            in    Smt.     Indira    Nehru    Gandhi<\/p>\n
     (supra), equality is a feature of rule of law and not<\/p>\n
     vice-versa, as submitted by Mr. Viswanathan, learned<\/p>\n
     counsel     for        the     petitioner(s).         Very       often    the<\/p>\n
     expression “Rule of Law” is used to convey the idea<\/p>\n
     of   a    Government          that       is    limited      by     law.   The<\/p>\n
     expression “Rule of Law” describes a society in which<\/p>\n
     Government must act in accordance with law. A society<\/p>\n
     governed    by         law    is    the       foundation      of    personal<\/p>\n
     liberty.    It     is        also    the      foundation      of    economic<\/p>\n
     development since investment will not take place in a<\/p>\n
     country where rights are not respected. It is in that<\/p>\n
     sense that the expression “Rule of Law” constitutes<\/p>\n
     an overarching principle embodied in Article 21, one<\/p>\n
     aspect of which is equality.                     It is in that context<\/p>\n
     that this Court has used the phrase “Article 21 read<\/p>\n
     with Article 14” in the judgment in the case of I.R.<\/p>\n
24<\/span>
\n     Coelho (supra) to which one of us Kapadia, J. was a<\/p>\n
     party.\n<\/p>\n
     9.         Applying the above tests to the present case,<\/p>\n
     we find no merit in the submissions advanced by Shri<\/p>\n
     Viswanathan,             learned       senior         counsel        for      the<\/p>\n
     petitioner (s) that inclusion of the Janmam Act (Act<\/p>\n
     24    of   1969)        in   the   Ninth     Schedule        (Item    No.     80)<\/p>\n
     amounted         to     direct      negation          and    abrogation        of<\/p>\n
     judicial review as the impugned Constitution (Thirty-<\/p>\n
     fourth Amendment) Act, 1974 confers naked power on<\/p>\n
     the Parliament to obliterate the judicial decision in<\/p>\n
     Balmadies case which became final, without changing<\/p>\n
     the basis of the decision or the law and, therefore,<\/p>\n
     the       said        impugned     Constitutional            Amendment        Act<\/p>\n
     destroys         the     basic     feature       of    the     Constitution,<\/p>\n
     namely,      judicial         review.        As       stated       above,    the<\/p>\n
     amending power under Article 368 of the Constitution<\/p>\n
     is    a    derivative         power.         The      doctrine       of     basic<\/p>\n
     structure provides a touchstone on which the validity<\/p>\n
     of the Constitutional Amendment Act could be judged.<\/p>\n
     While applying this doctrine, one need not go by the<\/p>\n
     content          of     a    “right”       but        by     the     test      of<\/p>\n
25<\/span>
\n     justifiability under which one has to see the scope<\/p>\n
     and the object of the Constitutional Amendment.                  In<\/p>\n
     the present case, we are concerned with the validity<\/p>\n
     of    the   Constitution      (Thirty-fourth     Amendment)    Act,<\/p>\n
     1974.       It is true that all lands including forests<\/p>\n
     falling in the janmam estate vest in the State under<\/p>\n
     Section 3 of the Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969).                 Under<\/p>\n
     that Act, the State gave pattas for cultivable lands<\/p>\n
     though such pattas were not given for forests which<\/p>\n
     vested in the State.          It is also true that after Act<\/p>\n
     20 of 1972 forests which earlier stood exempted from<\/p>\n
     the provisions of the Ceiling Act, 1961 got included<\/p>\n
     in the Ceiling Act (Act 20 of 1972).               Therefore, on<\/p>\n
     and after 1.3.1972, the holder was entitled to hold<\/p>\n
     the lands subject to ceiling including forests under<\/p>\n
     the   Ceiling    Act   (Act    20   of   1972)   whereas   forests<\/p>\n
     falling in Janmam estate vested in the State.                 It is<\/p>\n
     the case of the petitioners that by reason of the<\/p>\n
     forests vesting in the State under the Janmam Act<\/p>\n
     (Act 24 of 1969) “the rule of equality in law” stood<\/p>\n
     violated which violation amounted to abrogation of<\/p>\n
     Article 14.      One of the reasons for deletion of the<\/p>\n
26<\/span>
\n     “right to property” from Part III of the Constitution<\/p>\n
     vide the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act,<\/p>\n
     1978 was that the economic liberties of freedom of<\/p>\n
     property     came       in   direct      conflict    with       egalitarian<\/p>\n
     values      including        inter-generational        equity.            This<\/p>\n
     aspect needs to be kept in mind as in this case the<\/p>\n
     substantive       challenge        to    the    Constitution         (Thirty-<\/p>\n
     fourth Amendment) Act, 1974 is based on the right to<\/p>\n
     property in the garb of over-arching principles like<\/p>\n
     separation of powers, rule of law and abrogation of<\/p>\n
     the   power       of    judicial        review.      The    doctrine         of<\/p>\n
     classification under Article 14 has several facets<\/p>\n
     and none of those facets have been abrogated by the<\/p>\n
     Constitution           (Thirty-fourth          Amendment)       Act,     1974.<\/p>\n
     Equality     is    a     comparative       concept.         A    person      is<\/p>\n
     treated     unequally        only     if   that    person       is     treated<\/p>\n
     worse than others, and those others (the comparison<\/p>\n
     group) must be those who are “similarly situated” to<\/p>\n
     the complainant.             The “similarly situated test” is<\/p>\n
     not attracted in this case for the simple reason that<\/p>\n
     the   two    Acts,       namely,    the    Janmam     Act       (Act    24   of<\/p>\n
     1969), which seeks to abolish a tenure, is distinct<\/p>\n
27<\/span>
\n     and separate from the Ceiling Act (Act 20 of 1972).<\/p>\n
     Therefore, in the present case, not even an ordinary<\/p>\n
     principle of equality under Article 14, leave aside<\/p>\n
     the   egalitarian         equality     as        an     over-arching<\/p>\n
     principle, is violated.           Even assuming for the sake<\/p>\n
     of argument that Article 14 stood violated, even then<\/p>\n
     the Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969) in any event stood<\/p>\n
     validated by its insertion in the Ninth Schedule vide<\/p>\n
     Constitution (Thirty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1974.<\/p>\n
     Legislative   competence    of   Tamil   Nadu    State
\n     Legislature to enact the Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969)<\/p>\n
     10.   Mr.    P.H.     Parekh,        learned      senior     counsel<\/p>\n
     appearing   on     behalf    of      one    of    the     appellants<\/p>\n
     submitted   that    the   Tamil    Nadu    Legislature      did   not<\/p>\n
     have legislative competence to enact Section 3 of the<\/p>\n
     Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969) insofar as the said Act<\/p>\n
     related to transfer of forests in Janmam estates to<\/p>\n
     the State without any public purpose.                   According to<\/p>\n
     the learned counsel, the Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969)<\/p>\n
     providing for vesting of Janmam estates in the State<\/p>\n
     stood enacted under Entry 42, List III of the Seventh<\/p>\n
     Schedule of the Constitution.\n<\/p>\n
     11.   Before us it was submitted that the right to<\/p>\n
28<\/span>
\n     legislate under Entry 42 of List III postulates the<\/p>\n
     existence       of    a     public     purpose.          According      to   the<\/p>\n
     learned counsel, in the present case, Entry 42 of<\/p>\n
     List III was required to be read with Article 31(2),<\/p>\n
     as it then stood, on the day the Janmam Act (Act 24<\/p>\n
     of 1969) was enacted, and if so read, the requirement<\/p>\n
     of public purpose must be read into Entry 42 of List<\/p>\n
     III    and      since      in    the   present      case        the   impugned<\/p>\n
     enactment stood unprotected by Article 31A as held in<\/p>\n
     Balmadies case, the Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969) was<\/p>\n
     liable     to    be       struck    down    for    want    of    legislative<\/p>\n
     competence.          In reply, Mr. T.R. Andhyarujina, learned<\/p>\n
     senior     counsel         appearing       on   behalf     of     the   State,<\/p>\n
     submitted        that      in    Balmadies        case    the    legislative<\/p>\n
     competence of the Tamil Nadu Legislature to enact the<\/p>\n
     Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969) was never doubted.                                It<\/p>\n
     was further submitted that even assuming for the sake<\/p>\n
     of argument that there was no public purpose in the<\/p>\n
     acquisition          of     forest     lands,      the     requirement        of<\/p>\n
     public     purpose         and     compensation      are    conditions        or<\/p>\n
     requirements under Article 31(2) of the Constitution,<\/p>\n
     as    it   stood      in    1969     and    that    the    requirement        of<\/p>\n
29<\/span>
\n     public purpose and compensation was not a legislative<\/p>\n
     requirement.      Therefore, even assuming for the sake<\/p>\n
     of argument that the Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969)<\/p>\n
     violated   the    requirement        of   public   purpose     and<\/p>\n
     compensation,     the   said   Act    got   validated   when   it<\/p>\n
     stood incorporated in the Ninth Schedule in 1974.<\/p>\n
     12.    To answer the contentions raised hereinabove,<\/p>\n
     we are required to quote Entry 18, List II, Entry 42,<\/p>\n
     List III and Entry 19, List II, as it stood then:<\/p>\n
     “18.   Land, that is to say, rights in or over land,
\n     land tenures including the relation of landlord and
\n     tenant, and the collection of rents; transfer and
\n     alienation of agricultural land; land improvement and
\n     agricultural loans; colonization.”\n<\/p>\n
      “42. Acquisition and requisitioning of property”<\/p>\n
     “19.   Forests”\n<\/p>\n
     13.    We find no merit in the arguments advanced on<\/p>\n
     behalf of the petitioners.           At the outset, it may be<\/p>\n
     noted that the legislative competence of the Tamil<\/p>\n
     Nadu Legislature to enact the Janmam Act (Act 24 of<\/p>\n
     1969) was not in issue in Balmadies case.               Further,<\/p>\n
     Balmadies case did not hold that there was no public<\/p>\n
     purpose in acquisition of forests.           It only held that<\/p>\n
     there was nothing in the Act to show that acquisition<\/p>\n
30<\/span>
\n     of      forests        would         be         for      agrarian          reform.\n<\/p>\n
     Consequently,          it    was     held       in    Balmadies         case     that<\/p>\n
     acquisition       could       not     get       protected         under    Article<\/p>\n
     31A.     In contrast, a Constitution Bench of this Court<\/p>\n
     in     State     of        Kerala    v.     The       Gwalior          Rayon     Silk<\/p>\n
     Manufacturing (WVG.) Co. Ltd. Etc.<\/a> [(1973) 2 SCC 713]<\/p>\n
     held    that    the        Kerala    Private          Forests         (Vesting   and<\/p>\n
     Assignment) Act 26 of 1971 was enacted to provide for<\/p>\n
     the    vesting        in    the     Government         of     private      forests<\/p>\n
     including those in the Janmam estates and for the<\/p>\n
     assignment thereof to agriculturists and agricultural<\/p>\n
     labourers for cultivation.                      This Court examined the<\/p>\n
     preamble of the Act and held that the Legislature<\/p>\n
     thought        that         private        forests           be       treated      as<\/p>\n
     agricultural lands in the sense that they should be<\/p>\n
     utilized to increase agricultural production in the<\/p>\n
     State.         Consequently,          it    was       held    that      since     the<\/p>\n
     purpose was clearly spelt out in the impugned Kerala<\/p>\n
     Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act 26 of<\/p>\n
     1971,     the    Act        stood     protected          as       a    measure     of<\/p>\n
     agrarian reform under Article 31A.                           Further, we find<\/p>\n
     merit     in    the        argument        of    Mr.     T.R.         Andharujina,<\/p>\n
31<\/span>
\n     learned    senior   counsel       appearing      on   behalf    of   the<\/p>\n
     State of Tamil Nadu that the Janmam Act (Act 24 of<\/p>\n
     1969) is a piece of legislation for abolishing feudal<\/p>\n
     tenure and is a measure of land reform in pursuance<\/p>\n
     of   Directed    Principles       of   State     Policy.     [See    The<\/p>\n
     State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh<\/p>\n
     of Darbhanga and Others,<\/a> 1952 SCR 889 at pages 941,<\/p>\n
     942, 997 and 1014]         Assuming for the sake of argument<\/p>\n
     that there was no public purpose in the acquisition<\/p>\n
     of   forests,       as     contended        on    behalf       of    the<\/p>\n
     petitioners, we are of the view that the requirement<\/p>\n
     of    public      purpose     and       compensation         are     not<\/p>\n
     legislative      requirements          of   the       competence      of<\/p>\n
     Legislature to make laws under Entry 18, List II or<\/p>\n
     Entry     42,    List      III,     but     are       conditions      or<\/p>\n
     restrictions under Article 31(2) of the Constitution<\/p>\n
     as the said Article stood in 1969.                    Breach of such<\/p>\n
     conditions      would    attract    only    Part      III   challenge.<\/p>\n
     Therefore, when the Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969) was<\/p>\n
     put in the Ninth Schedule in 1974, the Act received<\/p>\n
     immunity     from       Article    31(2)      with     retrospective<\/p>\n
     effect.    Lastly, in pith and substance, we are of the<\/p>\n
32<\/span>
\n     view that the Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969) was in<\/p>\n
     respect of “land” and “land tenure” under Entry 18,<\/p>\n
     List II of the Constitution.                     For the afore-stated<\/p>\n
     reasons, we find no merit in the contention of the<\/p>\n
     learned counsel for the petitioners that the Tamil<\/p>\n
     Nadu    Legislature         had    no    legislative      competence    to<\/p>\n
     enact the Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969).\n<\/p>\n
     Whether the Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969) could not be
\n     applied because of the Ceiling Act (Act 20 of 1972)?<\/p>\n
     14.     One    of     the    main       contentions    raised    in   this<\/p>\n
     batch    of    cases    is        whether    the    Government     is   at<\/p>\n
     liberty to apply the Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969)<\/p>\n
     after    it     stood        notified       on     27.11.1974,     though<\/p>\n
     proceedings were taken by the Government under the<\/p>\n
     Ceiling Act (Act 20 of 1972) prior to 27.11.1974.                       We<\/p>\n
     find    no    merit    in     this      argument    for   two    reasons.<\/p>\n
     Firstly, the Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969) was enacted<\/p>\n
     to provide for acquisition of the rights of janmis in<\/p>\n
     Janmam estate in the Gudalur taluk of the Nilgiris<\/p>\n
     district and for introduction of ryotwari settlement<\/p>\n
     in such estates.            We agree with the view expressed by<\/p>\n
     the Madras High Court in the impugned judgment that<\/p>\n
     the scope of the Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969) was<\/p>\n
33<\/span>
\n     entirely different from the Ceiling Act (Act 20 of<\/p>\n
     1972) for the simple reason that the Janmam Act (Act<\/p>\n
     24 of 1969) was enacted to acquire the rights of<\/p>\n
     janmis   in    Janmam     estates    in    Gudalur      taluk      and    to<\/p>\n
     introduce      ryotwari     settlement,         whereas      the   object<\/p>\n
     behind enactment of the Ceiling Act (Act 20 of 1972)<\/p>\n
     was to fix a ceiling on the land holdings and to<\/p>\n
     distribute     the     excess   lands      to    the    landless         and<\/p>\n
     agricultural population.            Therefore, in our view, the<\/p>\n
     scope    and   ambit    of    the    two    Acts       are   completely<\/p>\n
     different      and   they    operate      in    different       spheres.<\/p>\n
     Secondly, the Ceiling Act (Act 20 of 1972) came into<\/p>\n
     force from 1.3.1972.            Prior to that date, forests<\/p>\n
     stood exempted from the provisions of the 1961 Act.<\/p>\n
     It is only on and after 1.3.1972 that forests stood<\/p>\n
     included in the 1961 Act by virtue of the Ceiling Act<\/p>\n
     (Act 20 of 1972).           The important point to be noted<\/p>\n
     that before ceiling could be determined and before<\/p>\n
     compensation to be paid for excess lands which vested<\/p>\n
     in the State under the Ceiling Act (Act 20 of 1972),<\/p>\n
     the Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969) came into force on<\/p>\n
     27.11.1974     under    which   the       forests      vested      in    the<\/p>\n
34<\/span>
\n     State.     The main focus of the Ceiling Act (Act 20 of<\/p>\n
     1972)    was    to    fix    a    ceiling   of   agricultural   land<\/p>\n
     holding and to distribute the excess lands to the<\/p>\n
     landless       and   other       agricultural    population.        The<\/p>\n
     scope of the Ceiling Act (Act 20 of 1972) was made<\/p>\n
     wide enough to cover the lands in the hilly areas.<\/p>\n
     In short, before the excess lands could be determined<\/p>\n
     for vesting in the State under the Ceiling Act (Act<\/p>\n
     20 of 1972), the Janmam Act (Act 24 of 1969) came<\/p>\n
     into    force    which,      as    stated   above,   operated   in    a<\/p>\n
     different sphere vis-`-vis the Ceiling Act (Act 20 of<\/p>\n
     1972).      For      the    afore-stated     reasons,   we   find    no<\/p>\n
     merit in the argument on behalf of the petitioners<\/p>\n
     that both the Acts operated in the same field and,<\/p>\n
     consequently, it was not open to the State Government<\/p>\n
     to act according to the provisions of the Janmam Act<\/p>\n
     (Act 24 of 1969).\n<\/p>\n
     Conclusion<\/p>\n
     15.      For the afore-stated reasons, we see no merit<\/p>\n
     in this batch of cases.               Accordingly, the same are<\/p>\n
     dismissed with no order as to costs.\n<\/p>\n
35<\/span>
\n                                  …………………….CJI
\n                               (S. H. Kapadia)<\/p>\n
                                ………………………..J.\n<\/p>\n
                           (Swatanter Kumar)
\n     New Delhi;\n<\/p>\n
     September 9,   2010<\/p>\n
36<\/span>
\n                                                                  Reportable<\/p>\n
                      IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA<\/p>\n
                       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION<\/p>\n
                    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.242 OF 1988<\/p>\n
                                      WITH<\/p>\n
                   WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.408 OF 2003<\/p>\n
                                       And<\/p>\n
                     CIVIL APPEAL NOs.1344-1345 of 1976<\/p>\n
     GLANROCK ESTATE (P) LETD.                               …Petitioner(s)<\/p>\n
     Versus<\/p>\n
     THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU                          ..Respondent(s)<\/p>\n
                                 JUDGMENT<\/p>\n
     K. S. Radhakrishnan, J.\n<\/p>\n
     1.               We are in these cases concerned with the validity of<\/p>\n
     the Constitution (Thirty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1974 by which the<\/p>\n
     Gudalur Janmam Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act,<\/p>\n
     1969, (in short `the Janmam Act’) was included in the 9th Schedule under<\/p>\n
     Article 31-B of the Constitution. These petitions earlier came up for<\/p>\n
     consideration before a Bench of two Judges of this Court and the Bench<\/p>\n
     felt that matter should be heard by a larger Bench since the case<\/p>\n
     involved substantial questions of law pertaining to the interpretation of<\/p>\n
     the Constitution. The order is reported in Manjushree Plantation Ltd.<\/p>\n
     and others v. State of Tamil Nadu and others<\/a> 1989 (3) SCC 282.<\/p>\n
37<\/span>
\n     Consequently, the matter came up before a Constitution Bench of five<\/p>\n
     Judges on 14th September, 1999, and the Court felt that the impact of the<\/p>\n
     judgment in Waman Rao and others etc. v. Union of India and others<\/p>\n
     1981 (2) SCC 362 be considered by a larger Bench so that apparent<\/p>\n
     inconsistencies therein could be reconciled and the question whether an<\/p>\n
     Act or Regulation which, or a part of which, was or had been found by<\/p>\n
     this Court to be violative of one or more of the fundamental rights<\/p>\n
     conferred by Articles 14, 19 and 31 would be included in the Ninth<\/p>\n
     Schedule or whether it was only a constitutional amendment amending<\/p>\n
     the Ninth Schedule that damaged or destroyed the basic structure of the<\/p>\n
     Constitution that could be struck down.   The order is reported in (1999)<\/p>\n
     7 SCC 580.     The matter was then placed before a Constitution Bench<\/p>\n
     of nine Judges.       The fundamental question which came up for<\/p>\n
     consideration was whether on and after 24th April, 1973, when the basic<\/p>\n
     structure doctrine was propounded, was it permissible for the Parliament<\/p>\n
     under Article 31-B to immunize legislations from fundamental rights by<\/p>\n
     inserting them into the Ninth Schedule and also its effect on the power of<\/p>\n
     judicial review of the Court.   The Bench laid down certain parameters<\/p>\n
     for the application of the basic structure doctrine propounded in His<\/p>\n
     Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru etc. v. State of<\/p>\n
     Kerala and another (1973) 4 SCC 225 and later explained in M. Nagraj<\/p>\n
     & Others v. Union of India & Others (2006) 8 SCC 212. The Court<\/p>\n
     set at rest some of the inconsistencies which were brought in by Waman<\/p>\n
38<\/span>
\n     Rao’s Case by analyzing the judgment from Sri Sankari Prasad Singh<\/p>\n
     Deo v. Union of India and State of Bihar              (1952) SCR 89 to<\/p>\n
     Kesavananda Bharati (supra) and then to Waman Rao’s case (supra).<\/p>\n
     The Court held that the theory of basic structure is applicable to the laws<\/p>\n
     included in the Ninth Schedule also. The Court declared Article 31-B<\/p>\n
     valid and held if there is any violation, restriction or encroachment upon<\/p>\n
     the fundamental rights, guaranteed under Articles 14, 15, 19 and 21, the<\/p>\n
     State must justify its action on the touch stone of the doctrine of basic<\/p>\n
     structure of the Constitution. The judgment is reported in I.R. Coelho<\/p>\n
     (Dead) by L.Rs. v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007) 2 SCC 1.<\/p>\n
     Coelho Principle:\n<\/p>\n
     Coelho held that the object behind Article 31B is to validate certain<\/p>\n
     legislations, which otherwise may be invalid and not to obliterate Part III<\/p>\n
     in its entirety or to dispense with judicial review of those legislations.<\/p>\n
     The Court held that Article 21 confers right to life, which is the heart of<\/p>\n
     the Constitution and when Article 21 read with Articles 14, 15 and 19 is<\/p>\n
     sought to be eliminated not only the “essence of right” test but also the<\/p>\n
     “right test” has to be applied, particularly when cases in Kesavananda<\/p>\n
     Bharati (supra) and Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain<\/a> (1975) Supp<\/p>\n
     SCC 1, have expanded the scope of the basic structure to cover even<\/p>\n
     some of the fundamental rights. Further, it was also pointed out by the<\/p>\n
     Court that there are certain parts or aspects of the Constitution including<\/p>\n
39<\/span>
\n     Article 15, Article 21 read with Articles 14 and 19 which constitute the<\/p>\n
     core values which if allowed to be abrogated would change completely<\/p>\n
     the nature of the Constitution. The exclusion of the fundamental rights<\/p>\n
     would result in nullification of the basic structure doctrine, the object of<\/p>\n
     which is to protect the basic features of the Constitution. Referring to the<\/p>\n
     “rights test” and the “essence of right” test, the Court held that there is a<\/p>\n
     difference between both the tests and both form part of application of the<\/p>\n
     basic structure doctrine. The Court pointed out that the power to grant<\/p>\n
     absolute immunity at will is not compatible with basic structure doctrine<\/p>\n
     and after 24.4.1973 the laws included in the Ninth Schedule would not<\/p>\n
     have absolute immunity and thus validity of such laws could be<\/p>\n
     challenged on the touchstone of basic structure as reflected in Article 21<\/p>\n
     read with Article 14, 15 and 19 and the principles underlying in those<\/p>\n
     articles.\n<\/p>\n
     2.                Coelho (supra) expressed in clear terms that the<\/p>\n
     functional validity based on the power of immunity exercised by the<\/p>\n
     Parliament under Article 368 is not compatible with the basic structure<\/p>\n
     doctrine and, therefore, laws that are included in the Ninth Schedule<\/p>\n
     have to be examined individually for determining whether the<\/p>\n
     constitutional amendments by which they are put in the Ninth Schedule<\/p>\n
     damage or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution and, in that<\/p>\n
     process, the Court has to examine the terms of the statute, the nature of<\/p>\n
     the rights involved and in substance the statute violates the special<\/p>\n
40<\/span>
\n     features of the Constitution and, for doing so, it has first to find whether<\/p>\n
     the Ninth Schedule law is violative of Part III. If, on such examination,<\/p>\n
     the answer is in the affirmative, the further examination is to be<\/p>\n
     undertaken whether the violation found is destructive of the basic<\/p>\n
     structure doctrine and if, on such further examination, the answer is<\/p>\n
     again in affirmative, the result would be invalidation of the Ninth<\/p>\n
     Schedule law.\n<\/p>\n
     Facts of the present case<\/p>\n
     Janmam Act, 1969, enacted by the Legislature of the State of Tamil<\/p>\n
     Nadu, received the assent of the President on December 6, 1969. The<\/p>\n
     Act was enacted to provide for the acquisition of the rights of the janmies<\/p>\n
     in Janmam Estate in Gudalur Taluk and for the introduction of the<\/p>\n
     ryotwari rights in the State. Chapter 2 of the Act deals with the vesting of<\/p>\n
     Janmam estates in the State. Petitioner submits that, by virtue of the<\/p>\n
     Janmam Act, janmies are being deprived of their rights over their forest<\/p>\n
     land on which they have full proprietorship. According to the petitioner,<\/p>\n
     the whole purpose of the vesting of the forest under Section 3 of the<\/p>\n
     Janmam Act is to acquire the forest for the Government on payment of<\/p>\n
     nominal compensation which would amount to confiscation of property.<\/p>\n
     Petitioner also stated that acquisition of property without resorting to the<\/p>\n
     provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is violative of Articles 14 and<\/p>\n
     300A of the Constitution and equality clause enshrined in the<\/p>\n
     Constitution. Petitioner further submitted that the petitioner should have<\/p>\n
41<\/span>
\n     been subjected to the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms<\/p>\n
     (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961 (in short `the Ceiling Act’) rather<\/p>\n
     than the Janmam Act, in which case, petitioner could have retained at<\/p>\n
     least a portion of forest land exercising the right of option and would<\/p>\n
     have got more amount of compensation for the lands vested in the State.<\/p>\n
     Petitioner was, therefore, treated unequally violating the petitioner’s<\/p>\n
     fundamental right guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution.<\/p>\n
     3.                Petitioner has also submitted that the rule of law, rule<\/p>\n
     of equality and separation of powers have been held to be part of the<\/p>\n
     basic structure of the Constitution and by the inclusion of the Janmam<\/p>\n
     Act in the Ninth Schedule those rights have been abrogated violating the<\/p>\n
     basic structure of the Constitution.\n<\/p>\n
     4.                The Constitutional validity of the Act has already been<\/p>\n
     upheld by this Court in Balmadies Plantations Ltd. and another etc. v.<\/p>\n
     State of Tamil Nadu (1972) 2 SCC 133, except that the provisions of<\/p>\n
     Section 3 (Vesting Section) in so far as it relates to the transfer of forest<\/p>\n
     area, in Janmam Estate, was held to be not a measure of agrarian<\/p>\n
     reforms and hence would not get the protection of Article 31-A of the<\/p>\n
     Constitution of India. In that connection, reference may also be made to<\/p>\n
     the Ceiling Act which was also included in the Ninth Schedule. The<\/p>\n
     Ceiling Act, however, was not earlier made applicable to the Janmam<\/p>\n
     Estate in the Gudalur Taluk, but was later made applicable and certain<\/p>\n
     proceedings had started in respect of determination of ceiling of land<\/p>\n
42<\/span>
\n     held by either the janmies or the lessees.      The stand of the State of<\/p>\n
     Tamil Nadu is that those janmies who have been given ryotwari pattas<\/p>\n
     under the Janmam Act became pattadars\/land owners and the<\/p>\n
     provisions of the Ceiling Act have also been made applicable.<\/p>\n
     5.                We are, in this case, concerned only with the question<\/p>\n
     whether the vesting of forest land, included in the Janmam Estate, in the<\/p>\n
     State would abrogate or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution.<\/p>\n
     A Five Judges Constitution Bench of this Court in State of Kerala and<\/p>\n
     another v. The Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing (Wvg.) Co. Ltd.<\/p>\n
     etc. (1973) 2 SCC 713 had occasion to examine the nature of private<\/p>\n
     forest situated in the old State of Madras and Kerala. In that case the<\/p>\n
     Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971 (Act No.26)<\/p>\n
     was challenged on the ground that it had violated the petitioner’s<\/p>\n
     fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 19(1)(f),(g) and was<\/p>\n
     not immunized by Articles 31 and 31-A of the Constitution.            While<\/p>\n
     examining the Constitutional validity of the said Act, the scope of Article<\/p>\n
     31-A(2)(a) of the Constitution and the meaning of the word `estate’ also<\/p>\n
     fell for consideration. The Court noticed that the Janmam rights in the<\/p>\n
     States of Madras and Kerala are, as explained by Subba Rao, J. in<\/p>\n
     Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochuni and Others vs. State of Madras<\/p>\n
     and others<\/a> (1960) 3 SCR 887, are rights of hereditary proprietorship in<\/p>\n
     land. The Court held those rights, like the rights created by grant of jagir<\/p>\n
     or inam relating to land, which included agricultural land or waste lands<\/p>\n
43<\/span>
\n     or forests and hills are brought within the definition of Estates and,<\/p>\n
     therefore, have to be acquired by the State under Article 31-A(1)(a) of<\/p>\n
     the Constitution. Reference was also made to the decision of this Court<\/p>\n
     in State of U.P. v. Raja Anand Brahma Shah<\/a> (1967) 1 SCR 362,<\/p>\n
     wherein the Court pointed out that the elimination of ancient Janmam<\/p>\n
     rights may per se be regarded as possessing the attributability of<\/p>\n
     agrarian reforms because to wipe out feudal vestiges from our country<\/p>\n
     side and to streamline land ownership are preliminaries in the projection<\/p>\n
     of a Socialistic order which Part IV and Article 31-A of the Constitution<\/p>\n
     strive to achieve.    Referring to Balmadies Plantations (supra), this<\/p>\n
     Court in Gwalior Rayon (supra) case stated as follows:<\/p>\n
     “33.       It is not disputed that all the private forests with which we are now
\n     concerned are held in Janman right – Janman rights being an `estate’ are
\n     liable to be acquired by the State under Article 31-A(1)(a) as a necessary step
\n     to the implementation of agrarian reform. Section 3 of the impugned Act vests
\n     the ownership and possession of all private forests in the State. Therefore
\n     they would attract the protection of Article 31-A(1). It would not be, in such a
\n     case, necessary to further examine if the lands so vested in the Government
\n     are agricultural lands falling within sub-clause (iii).<\/p>\n
     34.                 Indeed this does not mean that the State is absolved from
\n     showing that the acquisition is for the purpose of agrarian reform. In fact in
\n     Balmadies case (supra), referred to above, the acquisition of forests owned
\n     by janmies was set aside on the sole ground that the impugned law on the
\n     material on record did not indicate that the transfer of forests from the janmies
\n     to the Government was linked in any way with a scheme of agrarian reform or
\n     betterment of village economy.”\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
     6.                 The Constitution Bench noticed that in Balmadies<\/p>\n
     case (supra) acquisition of forest by janmies was set aside on the sole<\/p>\n
     ground that the impugned law, on the material on record, did not indicate<\/p>\n
44<\/span>
\n     that the transfer of forest from janmies land to the government was<\/p>\n
     linked in any way with the agrarian reforms or betterment of the village<\/p>\n
     economy. The Court, however, recognized the fact that the elimination<\/p>\n
     of ancient janmies had the effect of wiping out feudal vestiges from<\/p>\n
     countryside and to streamline land ownership was preliminaries of the<\/p>\n
     projection of a Socialistic order which Part IV of the Constitution strive to<\/p>\n
     create. Further, let me indicate, that for understanding the real scope of<\/p>\n
     Articles 14, 19 and 21, the impact of Articles 48A and 51A must also be<\/p>\n
     taken into consideration.    It is with this in mind, the Parliament has<\/p>\n
     enacted the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, the Wild Life (Protection)<\/p>\n
     Act, 1972 as amended by Act 28 of 1986, the Environment (Protection)<\/p>\n
     Act, 1986 and so on.      With this background, we have to examine the<\/p>\n
     challenge against vesting of forest, held in janmam in the State of Tamil<\/p>\n
     Nadu under the Janmam Act.\n<\/p>\n
     7.                Janmam Act provides for the vesting of forest and<\/p>\n
     certain other categories of land under Section 3 of the Janmam Act for<\/p>\n
     which provision for payment of compensation is also provided in the Act.<\/p>\n
     Section 8 of the Act says that janmi would also be entitled to a ryotwari<\/p>\n
     patta in respect of all lands proved to have been cultivated by the janmi<\/p>\n
     himself, except the forest land which would vest in the State. Section 9<\/p>\n
     also entitles a tenant to a ryotwari patta in respect of the lands in his<\/p>\n
     occupation.   Section 10 states that where no person is entitled to a<\/p>\n
     ryotwari patta in respect of a land in a janman estate under Sections 8 or<\/p>\n
45<\/span>
\n     9 and the land vests in the Government, a person who had been<\/p>\n
     personally cultivating such land for a continuous period of three years<\/p>\n
     immediately before the 1st day of June, 1969 shall be entitled to a<\/p>\n
     ryotwari patta in respect of that land.\n<\/p>\n
     8.                 Section 11 stipulates that no ryotwari patta shall be<\/p>\n
     granted in respect of forests, which stood vested in the State. Such a<\/p>\n
     provision was introduced in the Act so as to preserve forest wealth, its<\/p>\n
     flora and fauna and to maintain ecological balance in tune with Article<\/p>\n
     48A and 51A(g) of the Constitution. For understanding the real scope of<\/p>\n
     Article 14, 19 and 21 the impact of the above mentioned provisions has<\/p>\n
     to be kept in mind.\n<\/p>\n
     9.                 The only question is, in such a situation, whether the<\/p>\n
     vesting of private forest in the State, by virtue of Section 3 of the Act, in<\/p>\n
     any way, violates any of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the<\/p>\n
     petitioner under Part III of the Constitution and, if that be so, whether that<\/p>\n
     provision abrogates or destroys the basic structure of the Constitution,<\/p>\n
     which exercise has to be undertaken in the light of the principles laid<\/p>\n
     down by the Constitution Bench in Coelho’s case (supra).<\/p>\n
     Application of the Coelhos’s principle:\n<\/p>\n
     First stage:       We have to first examine whether the provisions of<\/p>\n
     Janmam Act included in the Ninth Schedule by the Constitution (34th<\/p>\n
     Amendment Act 1974) is violating any of the rights guaranteed under<\/p>\n
     Part III of the Constitution, and if our answer is in the affirmative, our<\/p>\n
46<\/span>
\n     further enquiry would be whether the violation so found has abrogated or<\/p>\n
     destroyed the basic structure of the Constitution. On such examination,<\/p>\n
     if our answer is in the affirmative, the result would be invalidation of the<\/p>\n
     Act to the extent of its violation. Petitioner, therefore, cannot succeed<\/p>\n
     merely by establishing that any of his fundamental rights have been<\/p>\n
     violated but he has to further show that the violation has the effect of<\/p>\n
     abrogating the basic structure of the Constitution. Once it is established,<\/p>\n
     the onus shift to the State to justify the infraction of the fundamental<\/p>\n
     right, and if they fail, still State can show, that such infraction has not<\/p>\n
     abrogated or destroyed the basic structure of the Constitution. Violation<\/p>\n
     of fundamental right, may not, therefore, ipso facto, violate the basic<\/p>\n
     structure doctrine, but a law which violates the basic structure invariably<\/p>\n
     violates some of the rights guaranteed under Part III, but not vice versa.<\/p>\n
     A law which infringes a basic feature of the Constitution cannot be<\/p>\n
     validated under Article 31B, by inserting it in the 9th Schedule of the<\/p>\n
     Constitution.\n<\/p>\n
     10.               Let us now examine whether any of the fundamental<\/p>\n
     rights guaranteed to the petitioner has been violated by any of the<\/p>\n
     provisions of the Janmam Act, which has been included in the Ninth<\/p>\n
     Schedule. The main plank of attack is on Section 3(b) of the Janmam<\/p>\n
     Act by which, forest, which formed the part of the Janmam estate of the<\/p>\n
     petitioner stood vested in the State free from all encumbrances which<\/p>\n
     according to the petitioner has violated Article 14, 19 and 300A of the<\/p>\n
47<\/span>
\n     Constitution of India. Article 14 of the Constitution states that the State<\/p>\n
     shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal<\/p>\n
     protection of the laws within the territory of India. Plea of inequality was<\/p>\n
     raised on the ground that if ceiling Act was made applicable to the<\/p>\n
     petitioner, it could have got the benefit of ceiling provision, consequently<\/p>\n
     a portion of forest land could have been retained, and for the rest the<\/p>\n
     petitioners would have got enhanced compensation.            Further it was<\/p>\n
     pointed out that there was obvious inconsistency between various<\/p>\n
     clauses of the Ceiling Act and the Janmam Act and the petitioner was<\/p>\n
     discriminated in their application violating Article 14 of the Constitution of<\/p>\n
     India. Further it was contended that when the forest land was acquired<\/p>\n
     applying the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the petitioner<\/p>\n
     would have got market value, for the forest land acquired and the<\/p>\n
     inadequacy of compensation would amount to deprivation of property,<\/p>\n
     violating Article 300A of the Constitution. In my considered view, the<\/p>\n
     plea raised alleging violation of Articles 14 and 300A cannot stand, since<\/p>\n
     the petitioner is holding private forest in the Gudalur Taluk by way of<\/p>\n
     janmam, which are rights of hereditary proprietorship and those rights<\/p>\n
     are like the rights created by grant of jagir or inam relating to land. The<\/p>\n
     object and purpose of Janmam Act is to do away with such<\/p>\n
     hereditaryship.   Janmam estate which takes in forests, mines and<\/p>\n
     minerals, quarries, rivers and streams, tanks and irrigation work,<\/p>\n
     fisheries and so on stood vested in the State free from all<\/p>\n
48<\/span>
\n     encumbrances. Janmies are also entitled to get ryotwari patta in respect<\/p>\n
     of all lands, if they establish they have been cultivating lands for a<\/p>\n
     continuous period of three agricultural years immediately before the 1st<\/p>\n
     day of June, 1969. Provision for payment of compensation has also<\/p>\n
     been provided under the Act.\n<\/p>\n
     11.                Right not to be deprived of property, save by authority<\/p>\n
     of law is no longer a fundamental right but only a constitutional right<\/p>\n
     which has never been treated as part of the basic structure of the<\/p>\n
     Constitution. Hence the contention that Section 3 violates Articles 14<\/p>\n
     and 300A of the Constitution is without any basis.         Petitioner has,<\/p>\n
     therefore, not succeeded in establishing that, the Act or its provisions<\/p>\n
     have violated any of the fundamental rights guaranteed to them and,<\/p>\n
     therefore, the petitioner has failed to satisfy the first test laid down in<\/p>\n
     Coelho’s case (supra).         Consequently, the question whether the<\/p>\n
     Janmam Act and its provisions have violated the basic structure of the<\/p>\n
     Constitution does not call for examination. Our judicial journey should<\/p>\n
     end here, and we are least concerned with the violation of any<\/p>\n
     constitutional or statutory rights, inadequacy of compensation etc.<\/p>\n
     Assuming that in our onward journey, we carry with us a bundle of right’s<\/p>\n
     violations, which are fundamental, then the question is whether those<\/p>\n
     violations, have the effect of abrogating or destroying the basic structure<\/p>\n
     of the Constitution.\n<\/p>\n
     Second stage: Petitioner urged that the violations which it has pointed<\/p>\n
49<\/span>
\n     out have the effect of shaking the confidence of the public in the rule of<\/p>\n
     law, equality and judicial review which are basic features of the<\/p>\n
     Constitution, among others.\n<\/p>\n
     12.               Right to Equality before law, Right to Equality of<\/p>\n
     Opportunity in matters of public employment, Right to Protection of life<\/p>\n
     and personal liberty, Right against Exploitation, Right to Freedom of<\/p>\n
     Religion etc. are all fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the<\/p>\n
     Constitution and a common thread running through all the Articles in Part<\/p>\n
     III of the Constitution have a common identity committed to an<\/p>\n
     overarching principle which is the basic structure of the Constitution.<\/p>\n
     Rule of law is often said as closely inter-related principle and when<\/p>\n
     interpreted as a principle of law, it envisages separation of powers,<\/p>\n
     judicial review, restriction on the absolute and arbitrary powers, equality,<\/p>\n
     liberty etc. Separation of powers is integral part of rule of law which<\/p>\n
     guarantee independence of judiciary which is a fundamental principle<\/p>\n
     viewed as a safeguard against arbitrary exercise of powers, legislative<\/p>\n
     and constitutional.    Doctrine of absolute or unqualified parliamentary<\/p>\n
     sovereignty is antithesis to rule of law. Doctrine of parliamentary<\/p>\n
     sovereignty may, at times, make rule of law and separation of powers<\/p>\n
     subservient to the wish of the majority in parliament.       Parliamentary<\/p>\n
     supremacy cannot be held unqualified so as to undo the basic structure.<\/p>\n
     Basic structure doctrine is, in effect, a constitutional limitation against<\/p>\n
     parliamentary autocracy. Let us, however, be clear that the principles of<\/p>\n
50<\/span>
\n     equality inherent in the rule of law does not averse to the imposition of<\/p>\n
     special burdens, grant special benefits and privileges to secure to all<\/p>\n
     citizens justice, social and economic and for implementing the directive<\/p>\n
     principles of state policy for establishing an egalitarian society.<\/p>\n
     13.                 I, therefore, fully concur with the views expressed by<\/p>\n
     the Lord Chief Justice that the over arching principles as explained<\/p>\n
     above would fall outside the amendatory power under Article 368 and<\/p>\n
     the petitioner in the case has not succeeded in establishing that any of<\/p>\n
     those principles have been violated.\n<\/p>\n
     14.                Principles laid down in Coelho’s case (supra) were<\/p>\n
     subsequently followed by a five Judges Bench in Ashok Kumar Thakur<\/p>\n
     v. Union of India and others<\/a> (2008) 6 SCC 1 wherein Constitution (93rd<\/p>\n
     Amendment) Act, 2005 and the enactment of the Central Educational<\/p>\n
     Institutions (Reservation in Admission) Act, 2006 were impugned.<\/p>\n
     Referring Article 19(1)(g) Court held that if any constitutional amendment<\/p>\n
     is made which moderately abridges the principle under Article 19(1)(g), it<\/p>\n
     cannot be held that it violates the basic structure of the Constitution. For<\/p>\n
     determining whether a particular feature of the Constitution is part of<\/p>\n
     basic structure, it has to be examined in each individual case, keeping in<\/p>\n
     mind, the scheme of the Constitution, its object and purpose, and the<\/p>\n
     integrity of the Constitution as a fundamental instrument for the complete<\/p>\n
     governance. Further it was pointed out that the principle of equality is a<\/p>\n
     delicate, vulnerable and supremely precious concept for our society and<\/p>\n
51<\/span>
\n     has embraced a critical and essential component of constitutional<\/p>\n
     identity.   Principles of equality of course cannot be completely taken<\/p>\n
     away so as to leave citizens in a state of lawlessness, but it was pointed<\/p>\n
     out that the facets of the principle of equality can always be altered,<\/p>\n
     especially to carry out the directive principles of State policy. Similar<\/p>\n
     view has been taken in State of West Bengal and others v.<\/p>\n
     Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, West Bengal and<\/p>\n
     others 2010 (3) SCC 571, where the Court was examining the powers of<\/p>\n
     the High Court under Article 226 of the               Constitution to order<\/p>\n
     investigation by the Central Bureau of Investigation in respect of a<\/p>\n
     cognizable offence. In conclusion the Bench held as follows:<\/p>\n
     “The fundamental rights, enshrined in Part III of the Constitution are inherent
\n     and cannot be extinguished by any constitutional or statutory provision. Any
\n     law that abrogates or abridges such rights would be violative of the basic
\n     structure. The actual effect and impact of the law on the rights guaranteed
\n     under Part III has to be taken into account in determining whether or not it
\n     destroys the basic structure.”\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
     15.                Fundamental rights enshrined in Part III can be<\/p>\n
     extinguished by Constitutional amendments and if it abrogates or<\/p>\n
     abridges such rights, would not as such, abrogate or abridge the basic<\/p>\n
     structure. The test is whether it has the effect of nullifying the over<\/p>\n
     arching principles of equality, secularism, liberty and so on especially<\/p>\n
     when such a law is placed in the 9th Schedule, which test in the present<\/p>\n
     case has not been satisfied.\n<\/p>\n
     16.                I, therefore, fully concur with the view of the Lord Chief<\/p>\n
52<\/span>
\n     Justice that the writ petitions and the civil appeals deserve dismissal,<\/p>\n
     and there shall be no order as to costs.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
                                                        ………………………J.\n<\/p>\n
                                                       ( K.S. Radhakrishnan)<\/p>\n
     New Delhi
\n     September 9, 2010<\/p>\n
53<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Glanrock Estate (P) Ltd vs The State Of Tamil Nadu on 9 September, 2010 Author: ……………………. Bench: S.H. Kapadia, K.S. Radhakrishnan, Swatanter Kumar IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL\/APPELLATE JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 242 OF 1988 Glanrock Estate (P) Ltd. …. Petitioner(s) Versus The State of Tamil Nadu […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-247227","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nGlanrock Estate (P) Ltd vs The State Of Tamil Nadu on 9 September, 2010 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/glanrock-estate-p-ltd-vs-the-state-of-tamil-nadu-on-9-september-2010\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Glanrock Estate (P) Ltd vs The State Of Tamil Nadu on 9 September, 2010 - 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