{"id":24744,"date":"1968-07-30T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1968-07-29T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-punjab-vs-sat-pal-dang-ors-on-30-july-1968"},"modified":"2018-07-05T08:56:45","modified_gmt":"2018-07-05T03:26:45","slug":"state-of-punjab-vs-sat-pal-dang-ors-on-30-july-1968","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-punjab-vs-sat-pal-dang-ors-on-30-july-1968","title":{"rendered":"State Of Punjab vs Sat Pal Dang & Ors on 30 July, 1968"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
State Of Punjab vs Sat Pal Dang & Ors on 30 July, 1968<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1969 AIR 903, \t\t 1969 SCR (1) 478<\/div>\n
Author: M Hidayatullah<\/div>\n
Bench: Hidayatullah, M. (Cj), Shah, J.C., Ramaswami, V., Mitter, G.K., Grover, A.N.<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nSTATE OF PUNJAB\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nSAT PAL DANG & ORS.\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT:\n30\/07\/1968\n\nBENCH:\nHIDAYATULLAH, M. (CJ)\nBENCH:\nHIDAYATULLAH, M. (CJ)\nSHAH, J.C.\nRAMASWAMI, V.\nMITTER, G.K.\nGROVER, A.N.\n\nCITATION:\n 1969 AIR  903\t\t  1969 SCR  (1) 478\n CITATOR INFO :\n R\t    1970 SC 765\t (10)\n R\t    1974 SC1533\t (16)\n R\t    1977 SC1361\t (200)\n RF\t    1988 SC 440\t (23)\n R\t    1992 SC 320\t (31)\n\n\nACT:\nConstitution of India, 1950, Arts. 174, 189, 199, 208,\t209,\n212 and 213--Rules of Procedure\t and Conduct of Business  in\nthe   Punjab   Legislative   Assembly,\trr.   7,   105\t and\n112--Prorogation   of  Assembly\t by  Governor,\thow  to\t  be\nnotified--When commences-Governor's power of promulgation of\nOrdinance--Scope  of--If  extends to making law\t under\tArt.\n209--Punjab Legislative (Regulation of Procedure in Relation\nto    Financial\t Business)  Ordinance,\t(1  of\t 1968),\t  s.\n3--Conflict  with  Art.\t 189(4)\t  and r.  105  of  Rules  of\nProcedure--If  section\t unconstitutional--Speaker's  ruling\nhow   far  final  and  beyond  challenge   in\tcourts\t  of\nlaw--Deputy Speaker, if can certify Money Bills in place  of\nSpeaker.\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\n   On the 7th of March, 1968, the proceedings in the  Punjab\nLegislative  Assembly led to rowdy scenes and  the  Speaker,\nacting under r. 105 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of\nBusiness  in  the Punjab Legislative  Assembly\t made  under\n_Art.\t208 of the  Constitution,  adjourned   the  Assembly\nfor  two months.  This led to an impasse.  The Assembly\t was\nin  session  but it was put in a state of  inaction  by\t the\nadjournment.   The  Budget 'Session of the Assembly  had  to\nreach  a conclusion before 31st March, as, after that  date,\nno  money could be drawn from the Consolidated Fund  and  no\nexpenditure in the State could\tbe  incurred.  The Governor,\ntherefore,  on 11th March prorogued the Assembly under\tArt.\n174(2)\t(a).   The order of the Governor was  caused  to  be\nprinted\t in  the  State Gazette the same day  by  the  Chief\nSecretary   under   the\t Business Rules, and copies  of\t the\nGazette\t were dispatched to the Secretary of  the  Assembly,\nthe Speaker and other members on the following day.  On 13th\nMarch,\tthe  Government promulgated the\t Punjab\t Legislature\n(Regulation of Procedure in Relation to Financial  Business)\nOrdinance,  1968. Section 3 of the Ordinance  provides\tthat\nthe  sitting  of either House of Legislature was not  to  be\nadjourned without the consent of the House until  completion\nof  financial  Business.   On  14th  March,  the    Governor\nsummoned  the  Legislative Assembly under Art.\t174,  fixing\n18th March for its sitting, and, under Art. 175(2), directed\nthe  Assembly to consider the Estimates of Expenditure,\t the\nDemands\t for  Supplementary  Grants  and  two  Appropriation\nBills.\t On  18th  March, after\t considering  certain  other\nmatters, the Speaker ruled that the House was prorogued\t not\non  the 11th March but on the 18th. and that  in  accordance\nwith  his  earlier ruling dated 7th March, the\tHouse  stood\nadjourned  for two months.  After some commotion the  Deputy\nSpeaker\t occupied the Chair and the Assembly  kept  sitting.\nThe  proceedings were conducted without demur even from\t the\nopposition.   The  Bills were passed.  The Bills  were\tthen\ntransmitted  to\t the Legislative Council  certified  by\t the\nDeputy\tSpeaker\t that they were Money  Bills.\tThe  Speaker\nwrote  to the Chairman of the  Legislative Council  pointing\nout  that there was no certificate by him as  required\tArt.\n199(4) and that he had adjourned the Assembly when the Bills\nwere adopted.  The Legislative Council, however,  considered\nand passed the two Bills and the Governor assented to them.\n    On\tthe  questions\twhether: (1)  the  prorogation\ttook\neffect\ton  18th March and therefore the  summoning  of\t the\nLegislature   before  prorogation  was\tinvalid;   (2)\t the\nOrdinance could not be passed by the Governor, because,\t the\nprorogation was a fraud on the Constitution and since the\n479\nprorogation  was  invalid  the\tHouse  continued  to  be  in\nsession; (3) The Governor's power to promulgate an Ordinance\nis  confined to Lists II and Iii of the Seventh Schedule  to\nthe  Constitution;  (4)\t Section  3  of\t the  Ordinance\t was\nunconstitutional as there was a conflict with, (a) r. 105 of\nthe Rules of Procedure made under Art. 208 which gives power\nto    Speaker to adjourn the Assembly or suspend sitting  in\ncase  of   grave disorder, and (b) Art. 189(4)\twhich  gives\npower to the  Speaker to adjourn the Assembly or suspend the\nmeeting for want of quorum; (5)\t ruling of the Speaker given\non  18th March was not open to challenge in courts; (6)\t the\nfurther proceedings in the Assembly were illegal and (7) the\ntwo  Appropriation  Acts  were ultra  vires   because,\t the\nDeputy Speaker and not the Speaker, certified them as  Money\nBills to the Legislative Council and the Governor.\n    HELD:  (1) Under r. 7 of the Rules of  Procedure  framed\nunder Art. 208. when a session of the Assembly is  prorogued\nthe Secretary of the Assembly shall notify the order in\t the\nGazette\t and  inform the members.  The words  indicate\tthat\nthere  is already a prorogation and the rest of the rule  is\nintended  for  communication of the fact to the\t public\t and\nconveying the order to the members.  It cannot be said\tfrom\nthis that only the Secretary of the Assembly could so notify\nand  that  the\tGovernor  could\t not  notify  his  order  of\nprorogation. [489 E-F; 490 B]\n    Article  174(2), which enables the Governor to  prorogue\nthe Legislature does not indicate the manner in which he  is\nto  make   known  his orders.  The means  open\tto  him\t are\n'public notification' that is, notification in the  Official\nGazette\t and 'proclamation'.  If he notifies in the  Gazette\nthrough his Chief Secretary acting under the Business Rules,\nit  becomes  a\tpublic act of which the\t Court\tshould\ttake\njudicial  notice.   Therefore,\tin  the\t present  case\t the\nprorogation  to place on the 11th March, '1968, the date  of\npublication   in  the  Gazette,\t and  the  Legislature\t was\nresummoned  only   thereafter.\t The  resummoning   of\t the\nLegislature   by  the Governor was also a step in the  right\ndirection  as it set up once again the democratic  machinery\nwhich had been disturbed by  the Speaker. [490 A-E]\n    (2)\t Under Art. 174(2) there are no restrictions on\t the\npower  of  the\tGovernor  to  prorogue.\t  The  power   being\nuntrammeled  and  an emergency having arisen, there  was  no\nabuse  of power by him nor can his motives be  described  as\nmsla  fide.   In fact it was the only reasonable  method  of\ngetting\t rid  of the adjournment and solving  the  political\ncrisis.\t  The  House,  in fact,\t transacted  other  business\nshowing that the prorogation and resummoning were considered\nvalid.\t After the prorogation there was no further curb  on\nthe  legislative  power of the Governor\t to  promulgate\t the\nOrdinance. [448 D, F-G; 490 E-F]\nKalyanam  v. Veerabhadrayya, A.I.R. 1950 Mad. 243,  referred\nto.\n    (3)\t  The  Governor's  power  under\t Art.  213  of\t the\nConstitution, of legislation by Ordinance is as wide as\t the\npower  of  the\tLegislature  of\t the  State  and  therefore,\nincludes the power to pass a law under Art. 209 in  relation\nto financial business. [490 G-H]\n    (4) (a) The inconsistency between the section and r. 105\nhas  to\t be resolved in favour of the  section\tbecause\t the\nlatter\tpart  of Art. 209 itself provides that in  cases  of\nrepugnancy  between the\t rules\tof  procedure  framed  under\nArt.  208 and a law made under Art. 209., the  tatter  shall\nprevail;  (b) As regards the conflict with Art.\t 189(4)\t the\nrule of statutory interpretation--namely, that, even if\t the\nlanguage  of  a\t statute is prima facie wide  it  should  be\nunderstood, if possible, as not attempting something  beyond\nthe competence of the legislative body--applies, because,\n480\nwhether\t a  provision  should be struck down  or  read\tdown\ndepends\t upon how far it is intended to go.  In the  present\ncase,  the Ordinance could never provide for want of  quorum\nwhich  is  dealt  with in the Article  and  in\ttherefore  a\nconstitutional\t requirement.\tThe  Article  continues\t  to\noperate\t in  situations contemplated by it and s. 3  of\t the\nOrdinance  can only deal with other  situations.   Therefore\nthe  section could be read down so as to harmonise with\t the\nArticle. [492 B-C; F-H; 493 A]\n    Diamond  Sugar Mills v.U.P. [1961] 3 S.C.R. 242;  Romesh\nThappar\t v. State of Madras<\/a> [1950] S.C.R. 594 and  Kameshwar\nPrasad\tv.  State  of\tBihar, [1962] Supp.  3\tS.C.R.\t369,\nreferred to\n    (5) Whether the Speaker adjourned the Assembly afresh or\ndeclared  that the former adjournment continued\t to  operate\nmade no difference, because:\n    (a) the former adournment had come to an end by a  valid\nprorogation  and [493 F-G]\n    (b) on the 18th March the Speaker was faced with a valid\nOrdinance, which was binding on the Assembly, including\t the\nSpeaker, by virtue of Art. 209.\t Therefore, the Speaker\t was\npowerless  and the fresh adjournment by him of\tthe  session\nwith  out taking the mandete of the Assembly by majority  as\nrequired by s. 3 of the Ordinance was null and void. [493 D-\nE]\n    It\tcould not be urged that whatever the merits  of\t the\nSpeakers  ruling may be, it should be treated as  final\t and\nbeyond challenge in courts.  A decision of the Speaker on  a\npoint  of  order  is  final under r. 112  of  the  Rules  of\nProcedure,  only  if  it  is  raised  in  relation  to\t the\ninterpretation\t and  enforcement  of  the  rules  and\t the\ninterpretation\t of   the  Articles  of\t  the\tConstitution\nregulating the business of the House and if the question  to\nbe decided was within\/he Speakers cognizance  In the present\ncase,  the Speaker did not attempt to interpret\t Arts.\t208,\n209  and  213, and instead of a resolution  (which  was\t the\nproper\tmethod\tof questioning the Ordinance)  being  passed\nunder Art. 213(2)(a) disapproving the  Ordinance the Speaker\nasserted  himself  against a law which was binding  on\thim.\n[494 A-B, G-H]\n    (6) The continuance of the proceedings under the  Deputy\nSpeaker\t was  vaild,  complying\t as it\tdid,  with  the\t law\npromulgated  by the Governor, and therefore.  the  finaneial\nbusiness   transacted\tbefore\tthe   Assembly\t had   legal\nfoundation. [495 C-D]\n    (7)\t A  provision of law is usually regarded  as  merely\ndirectory,  even though a public duty is imposed by  it\t and\nthe  manner of performance is also indicated  in  imperative\nlanguage  when general injustice or inconvenience result  to\nothers\tif strict compliance is deemed mandatory,  and\tthey\nhave  no control over those exercising the duty.  Judged  by\nthis  test. Art. 199(4) requiring the  Speakers\t certificate\ncannot\tbe viewed as mandatory but only as director in\tview\nof the inconvenience to the State and to the public at large\nthat  may be caused by holding the provision imperative\t and\nnot  directory.\t If the Constitution s law the necessity  of\nproviding a Deputy Speaker to act as the Speaker during\t the\nlatter's  absence  or to perform the office of\tthe  Speaker\nwhen  the  office is vacant, it stands to  reason  that\t the\nConstitution  could  never  have reposed  a  power  of\tmere\ncertification  absolutely in the Speaker and  Speaker  along\nFurther\t Art.  212(1) provides that the\t validities  of\t any\nproceeding in the Legislature of a State shall not be called\nin  question on the t, round of any alleged irregularity  of\nprocedure. [496 D-G; 497 B-C, D-E]\n    State of Bombay v R.M. 1). Chamarbauewala, [1957] S.  R.\n874,  State of U.P. v Manbodhan Lal Srivastava [1958]  SC.R.\n533, State  of\n481\nU.P.  v.  Babu\tRam  Upadhya<\/a> [1961] 2\tS.C.R.\t 679,\tM\/s.\nMangalore Ganesh Bidi Works v. State of Mysore,<\/a> [1963] Supp.\n1 S.C.R. 275, Patna Zilla Brick Owners Association v.  State\nof  Bihar,  A.I.R.  1963 Pat.  16  and\tMay's  Parliamentary\nPractice p. 842. referred to.\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
    CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals  Nos.\t1427
\nand 1428 of 1968.\n<\/p>\n
    Appeals  from the judgment and order dated May 10,\t1968
\nof  the\t Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil\t Writs\tNos.
\n12261227 of 1968.\n<\/p>\n
    C.K.    Daphtary,\t Attorney-General,     Niren\t De,
\nSolicitor  General, G.R. Majithia, Dy. Advocate-General\t for
\nthe  State of Punjab, R.N. Sachthey and S.P. Nayar, for\t the
\nappellant (in both the appeals).\n<\/p>\n
    R.K.  Garg,\t S.C.  Agarwal,\t Anil  Kumar   Gupta,\tN.M.
\nGhatate,  K.M.K.  Nair, Chand Kishore, S.P.  Singh,   Baldev
\nSingh Khoji  and  B.P. Singh, for respondent No. 1 (in\tC.A.
\nNo. 1427 of 1968).\n<\/p>\n
    S.K.  Dholakia and K.L. Hathi, for respondents Nos.\t 2-4
\n(in C.A. No. 1427 of 1968) and respondents Nos. 2, 12 to  14
\nand 16 (in C.A. No. 1428 of 1968).\n<\/p>\n
    1.\tN. Kaushal, and Urmila Kapur, for respondent  No.  6
\n(in C.A. No. 1427 of 1968),and respondent No. 8 (in C.A. No.
\n1428 of 1968).\n<\/p>\n
    M.C.   Chagla,  B.S.  Dhillon  and\tHardev\tSingh,\t for
\nrespondents Nos. 1 to 6 (in C.A. No. 1428 of 1968).
\n    Rajender  Sachar and 1. C. Talwar, for respondent No.  7
\n(in C.A. No. 1428 of 1968).\n<\/p>\n
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
\n    Hidayatullah,   C.J.   These  appeals  arise  from\t two
\npetitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution questioning the
\nvalidity  of Punjab Ordinance I of 1968 promulgated  by\t the
\nGovernor    of\t Punjab\t on  March  13,\t 1968\tand   Punjab
\nAppropriation  Acts Nos. 9 and 10 of 1968. A Full  Bench  of
\nthe High Court of Punjab & Haryana consisting of Mehr  Singh
\nC.J. and Capoor,  Harbans Singh, Mahajan and Bedi, JJ.\theld
\nunanimously that the two Acts were unconstitutional and,  by
\nmajority, that the Ordinance was also unconstitutional.\t The
\nHigh Court certified the cases under Arts. 132 and 133(1)(c)
\nof  the Constitution and the State of Punjab  appeals.\t The
\nrelevant facts were these:\n<\/p>\n
    At the Fourth General Elections Congress won 43 seats in
\nthe Legislative Assembly which has a membership of 104.\t The
\nother  parties (none of which had a majority in\t the  House)
\ncombined  and formed the United Front Party. A Ministry\t was
\nformed
\n482<\/span>
\nunder  Sardar  Gurnam Singh.  Some of the  respondents\there
\nMinister  and  members\tsupporting the\tMinistry.  Lt.\tCol.
\nJoginder  Singh\t Mann  and Dr.\tBaldeo\tSingh  were  elected
\nSpeaker and Deputy Speaker respectively.
\n    On\tNovember 22, 1967, 18 members of United Front  Party
\nincluding  Sardar Lachman Singh Gill defected and  formed  a
\nnew  party–Punjab  Janta Party.  With the  support  of\t the
\nCongress  a  new Ministry was formed  under  Sardar  Lachman
\nSingh  Gill on November 25, 1967.  The Legislative  Assembly
\nwas  then  summoned to meet on February 22,  1968.   As\t the
\nbudget\twas  to be considered, the Financial  Statement\t was
\ndiscussed  on  4, 5 and6 March. On the last  day,  following
\nsome  disturbance in the House and  consequent\tdisciplinary
\naction, a Resolution was moved expressing non-confidence  in
\nthe  Speaker.\tThe House granted leave and  then  adjourned
\nitself to the following day.\n<\/p>\n
    When  the Session commenced Sardar Gumam Singh raised  a
\npoint  of order under rule 112(1) of the Rules of  Procedure
\nmade  under  Art. 208 of the Constitution that there  was  a
\ncontravention  of Art. 179(c) in moving the Resolution.\t  It
\nis  not\t necessary  to go into the merits of  the  point  of
\norder.\tSuffice\t it  to say that the  Speaker  declared\t the
\nmotion\tof non-confidence to be unconstitutional and  deemed
\nnot  to have been moved. Another Resolution was\t then  moved
\nwhich led to rowdy scenes.  The
\n\t      (1)  “112.  Points  of  order  and   decisions
\n\t      thereon.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t   (1)\tA  point  of  order  relate  to\t the
\n\t      interpretation  or enforcement of these  rules
\n\t      or  such\tArticles  of  the  Constitution\t  as
\n\t      regulate\tthe business of the House and  shall
\n\t      raise   a\t  question  which  is\twithin\t the
\n\t      cognizance of the Speaker.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t   (2)\tA  point of order may be  raised  in
\n\t      relation\tto the business before the House  at
\n\t      the moment:\n<\/p>\n
\t\t    Provided  that the Speaker may permit  a
\n\t      member  to raise a point\tof order during\t the
\n\t      interval\tbetween the termination of one\titem
\n\t      of business and the commencement of another if
\n\t      it  relates  to  maintenance of  order  in  or
\n\t      arrangement of business before the House.
\n\t\t (3)  Subject to conditions referred  to  in
\n\t      sub-rules (1) and (2) a member may formulate a
\n\t      point  of order and the Speaker  shall  decide
\n\t      whether  the point raised is a point of  order
\n\t      and, if so, give his decision  thereon,  which
\n\t      shall be final.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t (4)  No debate shall be allowed on a  point
\n\t      of  order, but the Speaker  may, if he  thinks
\n\t      fit, hear members before giving his decision.
\n\t      (5)  A  point  of\t order is  not\ta  point  of
\n\t      privilege.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t (6)  A\t member shall not raise a  point  of
\n\t      order :–\n<\/p>\n
\t\t    (a) to ask for information, or\n<\/p>\n
\t\t    (b) to explain his position, or\n<\/p>\n
\t\t    (c)\t when  a question on any  motion  is
\n\t      being put to the House,or\n<\/p>\n
\t      (d) which may be hypothetical, or\n<\/p>\n
\t\t    (e) that division bells did not ring  or
\n\t      were not heard.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t    (7) A member may raise a point of  order
\n\t      during  a\t division  only on a matter  arising
\n\t      out of the division and shall do so sitting.”\n<\/p>\n
\t      483<\/span><\/p>\n
Speaker\t purporting to act under Rule 105 (1) adjourned\t the
\nAssembly for two months.\n<\/p>\n
    A  political  crisis then arose.  The budget had  to  be
\nadopted before March 31, 1968 but the House stood  adjourned
\nto  May\t 6,  1968.   No\t expenditure  in  the  State  could,
\ntherefore,  be made from April 1, 1968.\t The  Governor\tthen
\nacted  under his constitutional powers.\t On March  11,\t1968
\nthe  Governor prorogued the Assembly under Art.\t 174(2)\t (a)
\n(2).  The order of the Governor was caused to be printed  in
\nthe  State Gazette the same day by the Chief  Secretary\t and
\ncopies\tof the Gazette were dispatched to the  Secretary  of
\nthe Assembly, the Speaker and other members on the following
\nday.  On March 13, 1968 the  Governor promulgated  Ordinance
\nNo.  I\tof  1968  (The\tPunjab\tLegislature  Regulation\t  of
\nProcedure  in  Relation\t to  Financial\tBusiness  Ordinance,
\n1968).\t On  March  14,\t 1968  the  Governor  summoned\t the
\nLegislative Assembly under Art. 174(2) fixing March 18, 1968
\nfor  its  sitting  and under  Art.  175(2)(a)  directed\t the
\nAssembly to consider:\n<\/p>\n
\t\t  (i)\tSupplementary\tEstimates,   1967-68
\n\t      (Second Installment).\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t  (ii) The Punjab Appropriation Bill,  1968,
\n\t      relating\t to  the  Supplementary\t  Estimates,
\n\t      1967-68 (Second Installment).\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t  (iii)\t Demands for Grants as included\t .in
\n\t      the Budget Estimates for the year 1968-69.
\n\t      (1)  “105.  Power of Speaker  to\tadjourn\t the
\n\t      Assembly or suspend sitflag.
\n\t\t    In\tthe  case of grave disorder  in\t the
\n\t      Assembly.\t the  Speaker may. if he  thinks  it
\n\t      necessary\t to  do so  adjourn\/he\tAssembly  or
\n\t      suspend any sitting for a time to be named  by
\n\t      him.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (2)  “Art. 174. Sessions of  the\tLegislature.
\n\t      prorogation and discussion.
\n\t\t (1)  The Governor shall from time  to\ttime
\n\t      summon the House or Houses of the\t Legislature
\n\t      of the State to meet at such time and place as
\n\t      he  thinks  fit.\tbut  six  months  shall\t not
\n\t      intervene\t between  its last  sitting  in\t one
\n\t      session and the date appointed for their first
\n\t      sitting in the next session.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (2) The Governor may from time to time–\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t       (a)  prorogue  the Houses  or  either
\n\t      House:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (b)
\n\t\t  (3)  “Art.  175.  Right  of  Governor\t  to
\n\t      address  and send messages to  the   House  or
\n\t      Houses.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (1)  …..\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t (2)  The Governor may send message  to\t the
\n\t      House  or\t Houses of the\tLegislature  of\t the
\n\t      State,  whether  with respect to a  Bill\tthen
\n\t      pending in the Legislature or otherwise. and a
\n\t      House  to which any message is so\t sent  shall
\n\t      with  all\t convenient  despatch  consider\t any
\n\t      matter  required by the message to  be   taken
\n\t      into consideration.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      484<\/span><\/p>\n
\t\t  (iv) The Punjab Appropriation Bill (No. 2)
\n\t      1968, relating to the Budget Estimates for the
\n\t      year 1968-69.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    When   the\t Legislative  Assembly\tmet  it\t  began\t  by
\nconsidering certain other matters such as privilege motions,
\narrangement for Watch and Ward’ Staff. The Speaker then read
\nthe Message of the Governor referred to above.\tSardar Gumam
\nSingh  rose to move a point of order but the  Speaker  asked
\nhim to wait and the House attended to some other matters. It
\ngranted\t leave of absence to one member who was ill and\t the
\nSpeaker named the Panel of Chairmen.  The Ordinance was then
\nplaced on the Table of the House. The text of the  Ordinance
\nis  given in an appendix to this judgment.  It consisted  of
\nfour  sections.\t  Section  3 provided that  the\t sitting  of
\neither House of Legislature was not to be adjourned  without
\nthe  consent  of that House until  completion  of  financial
\nbusiness,  and section 4 provided that the annual  financial
\nstatement  laid\t before\t the House under  Art.\t202  or\t the
\nstatement showing the estimated amount of any  supplementary
\nor  additional expenditure had been laid under Art. 205\t was
\nnot to lapse by reason. of the prorogation of the House\t and
\nthat  it  would not be necessary to  relay  such  statements
\nbefore the House.\n<\/p>\n
    Sardar  Gurnam  Singh again rose to urge  his  point  of
\norder. He was reminded that a Resolution to the same  effect
\nwas to be brought before the Assembly, but he continued with
\nhis point. He stated that the Ordinance was issued when\t the
\nAssembly  was in Session and the House was summoned  by\t the
\nGovernor  before it was prorogued.  He elaborated his  point
\nof  order  on the same lines as was done  in  the  arguments
\nbefore\tus  and\t we shall come to these\t in  due  course.  A
\ndebate,\t punctuated with uproar in the House, followed.\t  It
\nappears that the Speaker at first was of the opinion that he
\nhad  no power to adjourn the House in view of section  3  of
\nthe Ordinance but Sardar Gumam Singh maintained that he\t had
\nsuch  power under Rule 105.  The Speaker observed:  “Yes,  I
\ncan  adjourn  the (House) but what about  the  Ordinance  ?”
\nSardar Gumam Singh opined that there was no Ordinance.\t The
\nSpeaker then ruled that the House was prorogued not on\t11th
\nMarch  but on the 18th and gave the ruling in the  following
\nwords:\n<\/p>\n
\t\t    “The  order by the Governor dated  14-3-
\n\t      1968  summoning the House is also illegal\t and
\n\t      void and he had no power to resummon the House
\n\t      once  adjourned under Rule 105 of\t the  Vidhan
\n\t      Sabha  Rules referred to above.  Therefore  in
\n\t      accordance with my earlier ruling dated 7-3-68
\n\t      the House stands adjourned for two months from
\n\t      that date.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      485<\/span><\/p>\n
\t      (The Sabha then adjourned)
\n\t      5.05 p.m.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      The meeting had lasted 3 hours.
\n\t      What  followed  may  be  extracted  from\t the
\n\t      proceedings.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t    “(At 5.05 P.M. the Speaker declared that
\n\t      the  House stand adjourned for two months\t and
\n\t      left  the\t Chair. The Members continued to sit
\n\t      in  the House. There was uproar and  furor  in
\n\t      the  House. One of the Han.  Members  occupied
\n\t      the Speaker’s Chair and some members rushed to
\n\t      the Speaker’s dais and stood there.  The\tHon.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      Deputy  Speaker came and occupied seat No.  15<\/span><\/p>\n
\t      in  the House to conduct the proceedings.\t  As
\n\t      the  seats of the Secretary\/other officers  of
\n\t      the   Punjab  Vidhan  Sabha  Secretariat\t and
\n\t      Reporters were also occupied by the Members of
\n\t      the   Opposition,\t they  all  occupied   seats
\n\t      adjoining seat No. 15).\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t    (Noise  and uproar in  the\tHouse-voices
\n\t      of  ‘shame’  ‘shame’ from the Members  of\t the
\n\t      Opposition).\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      Mr. Deputy Speaker:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t    As the Speaker had adjourned the  House.
\n\t      (sic)  When  he  had no  authority  to  do  so
\n\t      (InterrUptions and Uproar) under the Ordinance
\n\t      promulgated   by\tthe  Government,  any\tsuch
\n\t      adjournment   ordered  by\t the  Speaker,\t is,
\n\t      therefore,  null and void (Uproar and  renewed
\n\t      noise  in\t the  House).  The  House  will\t now
\n\t      resume Consideration of business before it and
\n\t      I now call upon the Chief Minister to move the
\n\t      motion.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (Uproar and furore in the House)
\n\t\t    (At\t this stage, the Speaker’s dais\t was
\n\t      clear and the Hon. Deputy Speaker occupied the
\n\t      Speaker’s Chair at the Dais).\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
The Chief Minister then moved that the consideration of\t the
\nFinancial Business be completed within half an hour.   There
\nwas uproar in the House.  The motion was carried.  Next\t the
\nEstimates  of  Expenditure, the\t Demands  for  Supplementary
\ngrants,\t the two Appropriation Bills and the  other  demands
\nwere passed.  A Resolution that the Speaker be removed\tfrom
\noffice\twas moved and forwarded to the Leader of  the  House
\nafter granting leave and the Assembly was adjourned to\tmeet
\nat 2 p.m. on April 5, 1968. The time taken is not stated but
\nthere is reason to think that the limit of 1\/2 hour was\t not
\nexceeded.\n<\/p>\n
    The\t Bills\twere  then transmitted\tto  the\t Legislative
\nCouncil certified by the Deputy Speaker that they were Money
\nBills. An
\n486<\/span>
\nobjection  was\t raised\t that  the  certificate\t under\tArt.
\n199(4)(1)  must be signed by the Speaker of the\t Legislative
\nAssembly.  This was overruled by the Chairman and the  Bills
\nwere passed.  They were then placed before the Governor with
\nanother\t certificate  of the Deputy Speaker.   The  Governor
\nsignified his assent.\n<\/p>\n
     Two  writ petitions were then filed in the High  Court.
\nCivil  Writ  Petition (1226\/68 was filed by Shri  Satya\t Pal
\nDang,  M.L.A.  against\tthe  State  of\tPunjab.\t the   Chief
\nMinister,  the\tFinance\t Minister,  the\t Secretary  to\t the
\nGovernor, the Secretary Legislative Assembly and the  Deputy
\nSpeaker.   The\tsecond petition (1227\/ 68) was\tfiled  by  6
\nmembers\t and was directed against those named in  the  other
\npetition  and  also  joined the Speaker,  the  Chairman\t and
\nDeputy\tChairman of the Legislative Council, the  Controller
\nof  Printing  and Stationery and one  Sardar  Kirpal  Singh,
\nM.L.A.\tThe arguments in the High Court ranged over  a\twide
\nfield.\t They were summarized into eight points\t by  Justice
\nS.B. Capoor which, it is common case, represent the  essence
\nof the matter.\tStated briefly, the arguments were that\t the
\nprorogation took effect on the 18th March.  As a consequence
\nthe  summoning\tof the Legislature  before  prorogation\t was
\ninvalid.    These  points  go  together\t Since\t both\t the
\nprorogation   and  resummoning\t of   the  Legislature\twere
\ninvalid\t the  House  continued to  be  in  session  although
\nadjourned.   Since  the Legislature was\t in  “Session”,\t the
\nOrdinance  could not be passed and it was a fraud  upon\t the
\nConstitution.  Section\t3  of the  Ordinance  was  specially
\nattacked  as  unconstitutional.\t The ruling of\tthe  Speaker
\ngiven on March 18, 1968 was not open to challenge in  courts
\nand  the further proceedings in the Assembly  were  illegal.
\nEven  if everything was regular it was in issue whether\t the
\nSpeaker\t alone\twas  entitled to endorse a  Money  Bill\t and
\ncertify\t it to the Legislative Council and the Governor\t and
\nsince  the certificates were by the Deputy Speaker, the\t two
\nActs were said to be ultra vires.\n<\/p>\n
    In\tthe  High  Courts the Full  Bench  unanimously\theld
\nagainst\t the petitioners on the question of the\t prorogation
\nand  resummoning  of the Legislature which were held  to  be
\nregular and legal. The Full Bench also held unanimously that
\nthe  ruling given by the Speaker on the 18th March made\t the
\nlater  proceedings illegal. There was a difference  ‘on\t the
\npoint that the certification by the Deputy Speaker in  place
\nof the Speaker was valid.  The majority holding that it\t was
\nnot.  Similarly a majority of Judges held that
\n(1) “199. Definition of “Money Bills”\n<\/p>\n
(1) .\n<\/p>\n
   (4)\tThere shall be endorsed on every Money Bill when  it
\nis  transmitted\t to the Legislative’ Council  under  Article
\n198,  and  when it is presented to the Governor\t for  assent
\nunder  Article\t200, the certificate of the Speaker  of\t the
\nLegislative Assembly signed by him that it is a Money Bill.”\n<\/p>\n
487<\/span><\/p>\n
section 3 of the Ordinance was unconstitutional and  invalid
\nand  the Full Bench unanimously held the Appropriation\tActs
\nto be unconstitutional. ‘
\n   In  dealing\twith  these  appeals  we  shall\t follow\t the
\nsequence   of\tevents\t and  examine\tthe   legality\t and
\nconstitutionality  of each happening. That would  show\tthat
\nthe  matter  lies in a narrower compass than what  has\tbeen
\nmade to appear.\t We begin with the prorogation.
\nThe  question here is did the Governor possess the power  to
\nprorogue  the  Legislature  and was his\t action\t bad  merely
\nbecause\t he  was  making  way for  the\tresummoning  of\t the
\nLegislature  after  passing an Ordinance under\tArt.  213(1)
\nexercising the power
\n\t\t(1)  “213.  Power of Governor to  promulgate
\n\t      Ordinances during recess of Legislature.\t (1)
\n\t      If  at any time, except when  the\t Legislative
\n\t      Assembly\tof a State is in session,  or  where
\n\t      there  is\t a Legislative Council in  a  State,
\n\t      except when both Houses of the Legislature are
\n\t      in  session  the Governor\t is  satisfied\tthat
\n\t      circumstances exist which render it  necessary
\n\t      for  him\tto  take immediate  action,  he\t may
\n\t      promulgate    such    Ordinances\t  as\t the
\n\t      circumstances appear to him to require:
\n\t      Provided that the Governor shall not,  without
\n\t      instructions   from\t   the\t  President,
\n\t      promulgate any such Ordinance if :–\n<\/p>\n
\t      (a)  a  Bill containing  the  same  provisions
\n\t      would  under this Constitution  have  required
\n\t      the previous sanction of the President for the
\n\t      introduction thereof into the Legislature; or\n<\/p>\n
\t       (b)  he\twould have deemed  it  necessary  to
\n\t      reserve  a  Bill\tcontaining\t  the\tsame
\n\t      provisions   for\tthe  consideration  of\t the
\n\t      President; or\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t   (c) an Act of the Legislature  of
\n\t      the State containing the same provisions would
\n\t      under  the  Constitution\thave  been   invalid
\n\t      unless,  having\t     been reserved  for\t the
\n\t      consideration   of  the  President,   it\t had
\n\t      received the\t  assent of the President.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t(2)  An\t Ordinance  promulgated\t under\tthis
\n\t      Article  shall have the same  force\t and
\n\t      effect  as  an Act of the Legislature  of\t the
\n\t      State assented to by the\t      Governor,\t but
\n\t      every such Ordinance :-\n<\/p>\n
\t      (a)  shall  be  laid  before  the\t Legislative
\n\t      Assembly\tof the State, or\twhere  there
\n\t      is a Legislative Council in the State,  before
\n\t      both  the\t Houses,\tand shall  cease  to
\n\t      operate  at the expiration of six\t weeks\tfrom
\n\t      the  reassembly  of  the\tLegislature,  or  if
\n\t      before   the  expiration\tof  that  period   a
\n\t      resolution  disapproving it is passed  by\t the
\n\t      Legislative  Assembly  and agreed\t to  by\t the
\n\t      legislative Council, if any, upon the  passing
\n\t      of  the resolution or, as the case may be,  on
\n\t      the resolution being agreed to by the Council;
\n\t      and\n<\/p>\n
\t      (b)  may\tbe  withdrawn at  any  time  by\t the
\n\t      Governor.\n<\/p>\n
\t       Explanation–where   the\t  Houses   of\t the
\n\t      Legislature  of a State having  a\t Legislative
\n\t      Council\tare   summoned\tto   reassemble\t  on
\n\t      different dates, the period of six weeks shall
\n\t      be reckoned from the later of those dates\t for
\n\t      the purposes of this clause.\n<\/p>\n
\t      (3)  If and so far as an Ordinance under\tthis
\n\t      article makes any provision which would not be
\n\t      valid if enacted in an Act of the\t Legislature
\n\t      of  the State assented to by the Governor,  it
\n\t      shall be void:\n<\/p>\n
\t      Provided\t that,\tfor  the  purposes  of\t the
\n\t      provisions  of this Constitution\trelating  to
\n\t      the  effect of an Act of the Legislature of  a
\n\t      State   which  is\t repugnant  to\tan  Act\t  of
\n\t      Parliament of an existing law with respect  to
\n\t      a matter enumerated in the Concurrent List, an
\n\t      Ordinance\t promulgated under this\t article  in
\n\t      pursuance\t of instructions from the  President
\n\t      shall   be  deemed  to  be  an  Act   of\t the
\n\t      Legislature  of  the  State  which  has\tbeen
\n\t      reserved\t for   the  consideration   of\t the
\n\t      President and assented to by him.”\n<\/p>\n
488<\/span><\/p>\n
under  Art. 109(x) ? The power under Art. 213 ‘is  available
\nto  the\t Governor when the Assembly is not in  session,\t The
\nposition after the 7th March adjournment of the Assembly was
\nthis: The Assembly was in session but it was put in a  state
\nof  inaction  for  2 months by\tthe  adjournment  which\t the
\nGovernor  had  no  power to rescind and\t the  Speaker  would
\napparently  not be prepared to recall. Time was running\t out
\nand  the  Budget  Session of the Assembly  had\tto  reach  a
\nconclusion before March 31.  After that date no money  could
\nbe  drawn  from\t the Consolidated Fund\t[Art.  266(3)].\t The
\nGovernor  thus\thad to act and act quickly to put  back\t the
\nLegislative  machinery\tof the State into life.\t   Only\t two
\ncourses\t were  open. One was for the Ministers\tto  ask\t the
\nSpeaker\t under\tRule 16 to recall the  Assembly\t which\twas,
\nperhaps,  attempting  the  impossible.\t The  other  was  to
\nprorogue the Assembly to get rid of the adjournment and then
\nto  resummon  the  Assembly.  The  second  was\tnot  only  a
\nreasonable  solution  but the one most properly\t adapted  to
\nachieve\t a  constitutional result and it was  followed.\t The
\naction of the Governor may now be considered.\n<\/p>\n
      Article 174(2) which enables the Governor to  prorogue
\nthe  Legislature does not indicate any restrictions on\tthis
\npower. Whether a Governor will be justified to do this\twhen
\nthe  Legislature  is  in session and in\t the  midst  of\t its
\nlegislative  work,  is\ta question that does  not  fall\t for
\nconsideration  here.  When that happens the motives  of\t the
\nGovernor may conceivably be questioned on the\tground of an
\nalleged\t want  of  good faith and  abuse  of  constitutional
\npowers.\t  We  do not go as far as the learned Judges  in  Re
\nKalyanam v. Veerabhadrayya (A.I.R. 1950 Mad. 243). But\tthat
\nis  not\t the  case here.  The bona fides  of  the  Speaker’s
\nruling adjourning the Assembly for so long as 2 months\twhen
\nthe  Financial Statement and the budget were on\t the  agenda
\nand  time  was\trunning out are more in\t question  than\t the
\nconduct\t of the Governor.  No mala fides were attributed  to
\nthe  Governor except to say that he acted in excess  of\t his
\npowers\tor  in colorable exercise of them. The\tpower  being
\nuntrammeled  by\t the Constitution and  an  emergency  having
\narisen,\t the action was perfectly understandable.  We  shall
\npresently show that the Governor acted not only properly but
\nin the only constitutional way open to him.  There was\tthus
\nno abuse of power by him, nor can his motives be des-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t (1)  “209.  Regulation by law of  procedure
\n\t      in the Legislature of the State in relation to
\n\t      financial business.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      The  Legislature\tof  a  State  may,  for\t the
\n\t      purpose of the timely completion of  financial
\n\t      business,\t regulate by law the  procedure\t of,
\n\t      and  the conduct of business in, the House  or
\n\t      Houses  of  the Legislature of  the  State  in
\n\t      relation\tto  any financial matter or  to\t any
\n\t      Bill  for the appropriation of moneys  out  of
\n\t      the Consolidated Fund of the State and if\t and
\n\t      so far as any provision of any law so made  is
\n\t      inconsistent  with any rule made by the  House
\n\t      or  either  House of the\tLegislature  of\t the
\n\t      State under clause (1) of article 208 or\twith
\n\t      any  rule or standing order having  effect  in
\n\t      relation to the Legislature of the State under
\n\t      clause  (2)  of that article,  such  provision
\n\t      shall prevail.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
489<\/span><\/p>\n
cribed\tas mala fide as has been said by one of the  learned
\nJudges\tin  the\t judgment under appeal. It is  a  matter  of
\nregret\tthat such a conclusion was reached without any\tplea
\nor material.\n<\/p>\n
    Much energy was, therefore, spent in tiffs Court and  in
\nthe  High  Court  in  an  attempt  to  establish  that\t the
\nprorogation came into effect either on the 18th or the\t16th
\nMarch  at the earliest.\t This was not accepted by  the\tHigh
\nCourt and in our opinion rightly. The argument is based upon
\nrule 7(1) of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of  Business
\nin  the\t Punjab Legislative Assembly and the fact  that\t the
\nnotification of the Secretary of the Assembly must be deemed
\nto  have  reached members on the 16th March  or\t thereafter.
\nThis requires examination
\n    Article  174(2) which enables the Governor\tto  prorogue
\nthe  Legislature does not indicate the manner in  which\t the
\nGovernor  is to make known his orders.\tHe could follow\t the
\nwell-established  practice that such orders  are  ordinarily
\nmade known by a public notification which means no more than
\nthat they are notified in the official Gazette of the State.
\nThere  was  such  a  notification  on  the  11th  March\t and
\nprorogation must be held to have taken effect from the\tdate
\nof  publication.  It was not necessary that the\t order\tmust
\nreach  each and every member individually, before  it  would
\nbecome effective.  Rule 7, which is framed under Article 208
\nof   the  Constitution\tregulates  the\tprocedure   of\t the
\nLegislature  but  is not intended to add a  clause  to\tArt.
\n174(2)\tso as to make it incumbent on the Governor  to\twait
\ntill the Secretary takes his time and issue the notification
\n(if  at all) and informs members. The words of\tthe  seventh
\nrule ‘when a session of the Assembly is prorogued’  indicate
\nthat  there is a prorogation and the rest of it is  intended
\nfor  communication of the fact to the public  and  conveying
\nthe  order  to\tthe  members.\tThe  communications  is\t  by
\nnotification in the Gazette. The action of the Secretary  in
\nsending\t copies\t of  the Gazette to the\t members  is  merely
\nministerial. Rule 7 cannot be read as a condition  precedent
\nfor  the  efficacy of the Governor’s order provided  it\t was
\nduly  notified.\t  It is significant that  while\t Mr.  Chagla
\nbased his entire case on Rule 7, Mr. Garg did not rely on it
\nbut   questioned   the\tvery  power  to\t prorogue   in\t the
\ncircumstances  of  the case.  We can understand\t Mr.  Garg’s
\nargument  although  we\tdo not accept it,  but\twe  find  it
\ndifficult to appreciate the stand taken by Mr. Chagla.
\n    We\tare, therefore,, clearly of the opinion\t (which\t the
\nHigh   Court   also  unanimously   entertained)\t  that\t the
\nprorogation became
\n(1)  “7.  When a session of the assembly  is  prorogued\t the
\nSecretary  shall issue a notification in respect thereof  in
\nthe  Gazette  and  inform the Members.\tOn  prorogation\t all
\npending\t  notices   subject  to\t the   provisions   of\t the
\nConstitution and these Rules shall lapse.”\n<\/p>\n
490<\/span><\/p>\n
effective  on  the 11th when the Governor  issued  a  public
\nnotification.  The  means  open to the\tGovernor  under\t the
\nConstitution  are ‘public notification’ and  ‘proclamation’.
\nArticle 174 does not state what procedure is to be  followed
\nand  rule  7 says that the Secretary to the  Assembly  shall
\nnotify\tthe  order.   If  the  Governor\t followed  the\tsame
\nprocedure no exception can be taken.  The argument that only
\nthe  Secretary\tto the Assembly can notify the order  is  to
\nfurther\t refine a point already very fine, and\tignores\t the
\nBusiness  Rules.   Under  the  business\t Rules,\t the   Chief
\nSecretary deals with all questions relating to the  Assembly
\nand  the  Council and the Governor in notifying it  in\t.the
\nGazette\t through  the Chief Secretary was acting  under\t the
\nBusiness  Rules.   As  a  matter  of  fact  copies  of\t the
\nnotification  were  dispatched on the  12th  and  presumably
\nreached\t the Secretary of the Assembly and also the  Speaker
\nthe  same day.\tWe are bound to take judicial notice of\t the
\nprorogation  and  presume the regularity  of  these  actions
\nwhich  must  be interpreted as far as possible so  that\t the
\nthing done may be valid rather than invalid. This is not the
\nextreme\t case,\tpropounded  by Mr.  Chagla,  of\t a  Governor
\npassing\t an order and keeping ‘it locked in his drawer.\t  It
\nis  significant that even in England where prorogation\tused
\nto  be through a writ or writ patent or a  commission  under
\nthe Great Seal of the United Kingdom read in the House now a
\nproclamation by the Queen suffices under the Prorogation Act
\nof 1867.  Therefore, the Governor’s act became a public\t act
\nafter  the notification.  This was on the 11th\tMarch  1968.
\nWe are also satisfied that there was no other motive than to
\nset right the constitutional machinery by the invocation  of
\nthe powers conferred expressly on the Governor.
\n    After  the prorogation there was no further curb on\t the
\nlegislative power of the Governor.  The power of legislation
\nby  Ordinance is as wide as the power of Legislature of\t the
\nState.\t Article  213  (2  )  provides\tthat  an   ordinance
\npromulgated under that Article has the same force and effect
\nas an Act of the Legislature of the State assented to by the
\nGovernor except that it must be laid, before the Legislative
\nAssembly  of  the State and the Legislative  Council  (where
\nthere is one) and expired after the expiration of 6 weeks or
\nearlier if it is withdrawn by the Governor or disapproved by
\nthe Legislature of the State.  Counsel argued that the power
\nof  the Governor is only to pass a law under the second\t and
\nthird of the Legislative Lists and not under ‘Art. 209.\t  We
\nsee  no force in this submission which is not  supported  by
\nany  provision\tof  the Constitution or\t authority  Of\tthis
\nCourt.\tIn fact, the powers of the legislature are expressly
\nindicated  in  Art. 209\t and  the  Governor  must  therefore
\npossess\t an  equal power unless there be  an  expression  of
\nintention  to the contrary in the Constitution. There is  no
\nsuch  expression of intention and none can be  implied\tfrom
\nArts. 245 and 246 in the face of the special provisions of
\n491<\/span>
\nArt.  213(2).  The Ordinance was therefore, validly  enacted
\nunder the power derived from Arts. 209 and 213.
\n    Article  209 is intended to speed financial business  in
\nthe legislatures so that attempts to filibuster, adjourn  or
\notherwise delay such business may be avoided. If ever  there
\nwas  an\t occasion ,for the regulation of  procedure  in\t the
\nlegislature  of\t the  State in\trelation  to  the  financial
\nbusiness  by  a\t law  under  Art.  209,\t it  was  this.\t The
\nLegislature  could not be allowed to hibernate for 2  months
\nwhile\tthe   financial\t  business   languished\t  and\t the
\nconstitutional machinery and democracy itself were  wrecked.
\nTo  suggest  that  the President’s  rule  should  have\tbeen
\nimposed\t instead, it is to suggest a line of action which  a
\nparty not in majority would have obviously preferred but  it
\nwould  have cut at the root of parliamentary  government  to
\nwhich our country is fortunately committed.  If by  adopting
\nthe   present  course  parliamentary  government  could\t  be
\nrestored  there was neither an error of judgment nor a\tmala
\nfide exercise of power.\t There was nothing colourable  about
\nit.  It was intended to achieve a definite purpose by  using
\nthe constitutional power of the Governor.  We are  therefore
\nquite\tclear  that  the action\t of  prorogation  cannot  be
\nquestioned   on\t any  of  the  grounds\tsuggested   by\t the
\nrespondents.\n<\/p>\n
    The\t  resummoning\tof   the   Legislature\t immediately
\nafterwards  was also a step in the right direction.  It\t set
\nup  once again the democratic machinery in the\tState  which
\nhad  been  rudely disturbed by the action  of  the  Speaker.
\nKnowing\t that it would ordinarily take much time  to  finish
\nthe  Financial\tBusiness, that time was\t short\tand  attempt
\nwould be made to delay matters, the Ordinance created a\t law
\nwhich Art. 209 enables to be enacted for the speedy disposal
\nof financial business.\tThe matters were, therefore, left in
\nthe hands of the Legislature with the only restriction\tthat
\nthe  Legislature would not adjourn except when a House by  a
\nmajority desired it.  This respected the democratic right of
\nthe  Legislature  but  put  down  the  vagaries\t of   action
\ncalculated to delay the business. The measure was  eminently
\nhealthy\t and as it was also legal the Assembly was bound  by
\nthe law thus enacted.\n<\/p>\n
    Therefore, the next attempt was to challenge s. 3 of the
\nOrdinance (see appendix).   The learned Chief Justice upheld
\nthe validity of the section but he was overruled by his four
\ncolleagues.  We\t are  in  entire  agreement  with  the\tview
\nexpressed by the Chief Justice.\t What is the complaint\there
\n?   It is argued that s. 3 of the Ordinance  conflicts\twith
\nthe Rules of Procedure particularly
\n492<\/span>
\nRule  105 and Art. 189(4)(1). Article 189(4) is a  provision
\nof  the\t Constitution  and_ can never  be  abrogated  by  an
\nOrdinance  or  even a law passed by the Legislature  and  so
\nthere  is no repugnancy Article 189(4) continued to  operate
\nin  situations\tcontemplated  by it.  Rule  105\t confer\t two
\npowers, when, on grave disorder arising in the Assembly, the
\nwork  cannot be carried on. One is a power to suspend for  a
\ntime  the sitting of the House and the other is\t to  adjourn
\nthe  House. What the Ordinance did was to put out of  action
\nthe  power to adjourn the session of the  Legislature.\t The
\ninconsistency  between\tRule 105 in so far as  it  concerned
\nsuch  adjournment  was\tto  be resolved\t in  favour  of\t the
\nOrdinance  because  the\t latter\t part  of  Art.\t 209  itself
\nprovides  that in cases of repugnancy between the  rules  of
\nprocedure framed under Art. 208 and the law made under\tArt.
\n209,  the latter provision shall prevail.  Article 209\tgave
\nfull authority to s. 3 of the Ordinance and it was not ultra
\nvires
\n    It is argued that we cannot read down the provisions  of
\nsection 3 of the Ordinance to make room for the\t application
\nof  Art.  189(4)  and  Rule 105\t in  regard  to\t quorum\t and
\nsuspension  of business respectively.  Reference is made  to
\nthe  case  of Diamond Sugar Mills Ltd. v.U.P.(1)  where\t the
\nexpression ‘local area’ was not read down to make it  accord
\nwith  the Constitution. That case was concerned with  excess
\nof legislative power under an entry. The general words\twere
\nread  as they were and pointed to an excessive\tpower  being
\nconferred.  In Romesh Thappar v. The State of Madras<\/a>(2)\t the
\nlaw offended Fundamental Rights and there was no escape from
\nthe operation of Art. 13 of the Constitution when there\t was
\nno room for severability.  In Seth Bikhraj Jaipuria v. Union
\nof  India<\/a>(3) the capacity to contract was involved and\tthat
\ncase hardly applies.  In Kameshwar Prasad and Others v.\t The
\nState  of Bihar and Another(4) there was difficulty  in\t the
\nway  of reading Rule 4-A of the Bihar  Government  Servants’
\nConduct\t Rules 1956 because of its general words  and  hence
\nthe  whole rule was struck down. We can read down section  3
\nof  the Ordinance because the Ordinance could never  provide
\nfor  want of quorum which is a\tconstitutional\trequirement.
\nRule  105 gets out of the way by the operation of Art.\t209.
\nIt  depends  always  on how far the provision of  a  law  is
\nintended  to go.  There is a canon of construction that\t the
\nlanguage of a statute, even if it is prima facie wide, is to
\nbe understood as not attempting something
\n(1)   “189  voting  in\tHouses,\t power\tof  Houses  to\t act
\nnotwithstanding vacancies and quorum.
\n(4)  If\t at  any time during a meeting\tof  the\t Legislative
\nAssembly  or  the Legislative Council of a  State  there  is
\nno .quorum, it shall be the duty of the Speaker or Chairman,
\nor person acting as such, either to adjourn the House or  to
\nsuspend the meeting until there is a quorum.”
\n(1) [1961] 3 S.C.R. 242.\n<\/p>\n
(2) [1950] S.C.R. 594.\n<\/p>\n
(3) [1962] 2 S.C.R. 880.\n<\/p>\n
(4) [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 369
\n493<\/span>
\nbeyond\tthe  competence of the legislative body. In  such  a
\ncase the. overriding law must have its play.  Article 189(4)
\nwas  outside  the law-making power of the Governor  and\t his
\nOrdinance must be read to harmonize with it.  Similarly, the
\npower  of  adjournment was curtailed but not  the  power  to
\nsuspend business.  Even an adjournment was possible provided
\nthe House agreed.  We see, no force in the argument that  s.
\n3 is ultra vires.\n<\/p>\n
    The\t adjournment of the Assembly on 18th March  by\tthe,
\nSpeaker is next presented as a valid and binding ruling.   A
\nword  may be said here about what the Speaker decided.\t The
\nSpeaker in his ruling of the 18th based himself on the\tfact
\nthat in his opinion the order proroguing the Assembly on the
\n11  th March was illegal and void.  Therefore  the  Governor
\nhad  no\t power to resummon on the 14th\tthe  Assembly  which
\nstood  adjourned  for 2 months under Rule 105.\t It  appears
\nfrom  the  proceedings that the Speaker was of\tthe  opinion
\nthat  the Legislature was prorogued on the 18th and not\t the
\n11th.\tWe  have  shown\t above\tthat  the  Legislature\t was
\nprorogued  not\ton  the\t 18th  but  on\tthe  11th  and\t the
\nresummoning  of\t the  Legislature  on  the  14th  after\t the
\nOrdinance  was promulgated on the 13th was perfectly  valid.
\nHis  ruling, therefore, was based on wrong assumption.\t But
\ncan his ruling be called in question ?\tOur answer is in the
\naffirmative.  On  the  18th the Speaker\t was  faced  by\t the
\nOrdinance.   That Ordinance, as we have shown above,  was  a
\nvalid law binding on the Assembly (including the Speaker) by
\nvirtue\tof Art. 209.  The Speaker was, therefore,  powerless
\nand  his  adjournment  of the  session\twithout\t taking\t the
\nmandate\t of the Assembly by majority as required by s. 3  of
\nthe  Ordinance\twas  null and void and of  no  effect.\t The
\nproceedings  clearly  show  that  the  Speaker\thimself\t was
\nreluctant  to  adjourn\tthe House till he  was\tprompted  by
\nSardar\tGurnam\tSingh.\t He doubted  his  own  powers.\t The
\nSpeaker\t did  not attempt to order a fresh  adjournment\t but
\nonly ruled that his earlier adjournment stood.\tWhether\t the
\nSpeaker\t adjourned the Assembly afresh or declared that\t the
\nformer adjournment continued to operate makes no difference.
\nThe  former  adjournment  had  come to an  end\tby  a  valid
\nprorogation  and  the fresh adjournment was null  and  void.
\nThe  House  transacted\tother  business\t showing  that\t the
\nprorogation  was  considered  valid.  If  this\twas  so\t the
\nsession\t had  to continue unless adjourned by the  House  by
\nmajority.\n<\/p>\n
    Reference  was made to Rule 112 which says that a  point
\nof order once raised must be decided by the Speaker and\t his
\ndecision  thereon is final.  It is thus urged that  whatever
\nthe  merits  of the Speaker’s ruling it must be\t treated  as
\nfinal.\tThis is a claim which is unfounded.  Points of order
\ncan  only  be raised in relation to the\t interpretation\t and
\nenforcement of the rules and the interpre-\n<\/p>\n
494<\/span><\/p>\n
tation\tof the Articles of the Constitution  regulating\t the
\nbusiness  of  the  House and the question’ which  is  to  be
\ndecided\t by the Speaker must be within his cognizance  (Rule
\n112(1).\t The finality of the ruling applies subject to\tthis
\ncondition  (Rule  112(3).   Now the  exact  point  of  order
\nconcerned the validity of the Ordinance. The Speaker did not
\nattempt\t to  interpret Arts. 208, 209 and 213.\tHe  did\t not
\nconfine\t his  ruling to matters within\this  cognizance.  He
\nasserted himself against a law which was binding on him.  If
\nthe Ordinance was to be questioned this was not the method..
\nA  resolution  had to be passed under Art. 213 ( 2 ) (\ta  )
\ndisapproving  it. In fact he was told that a resolution\t was
\nto  be\tmade. Perhaps the Speaker was not sure that  a\tsuch
\nresolution   would   be\t passed.  Democratic   process\t and
\nparliamentary practice demanded that the Speaker should have
\nwaited for a resolution to be moved for the consideration of
\nthe Assembly. If he was at all sure that the majority was in
\nfavour\tof disapproving the Ordinance he  would\t undoubtedly
\nhave  waited.  Not being sure, he proceeded to\tnullify\t the
\nOrdinance  by a ruling which he was not competent  to  give.
\nTherefore,  his ruling was only not final, but utterly\tnull
\nand void and of no effect.\n<\/p>\n
    It\tis significant that the Deputy Speaker on  occupying
\nthe Chair declared on the validity of the Ordinance in words
\nwhich may be quoted again:\n<\/p>\n
“Mr. Deputy Speaker:\n<\/p>\n
\t\t     As the Speaker had adjourned the House,
\n\t      when   he\t  had\tno  authority\tto   do\t  so
\n\t      (Interruptions and Uproar) under the Ordinance
\n\t      promulgated by the Government, (sic) any\tsuch
\n\t      adjournment   ordered  by\t the  Speaker,\t is,
\n\t      therefore,  null and void (Uproar and  renewed
\n\t      noise  in\t the  House).  The  House  will\t now
\n\t      resume consideration of business before it and
\n\t      I now call upon the Chief Minister to move the
\n\t      motion.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (Uproar and furore in the House)
\n\t\t     (At this stage, the Speaker’s dais\t was
\n\t      clear and the Hon. Deputy Speaker occupied the
\n\t      Speaker’s Chair at the dais).\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
This ruling had more content under Rule 112 than the  ruling
\npreviously given.  It was also eminently correct.  There was
\nno  reason why it should not prevail when the  other  ruling
\nwas null. and void.  The Assembly kept sitting since (as is.
\nquite  apparent) the members too thought that the ruling  of
\nthe  Speaker  was to be ignored.  All the  proceedings\twere
\nconducted  without demur even from the opposition.   One  is
\ntempted\t to think that the Speaker was not sure of  his\t own
\nposition  in  a\t House\tin which  he  had  probably  lost  a
\nsustaining  _majority. But even if the most liberal view  of
\nthe-action of the Speaker is taken, one is, forced
\n495<\/span>
\nto  the\t conclusion that he acted contrary to  law  and\t the
\ninjunction of the Constitution that the law made under\tArt.
\n209 is to prevail over the rules of procedure.\tWe regret to
\nrecord this conclusion which we would have willingly avoided
\nbut  for  some\targuments advanced on  the  lines  indicated
\nalthough  somewhat hesitatingly by the counsel\trepresenting
\nthe Speaker.  Before tall claims are made which cannot stand
\nagainst\t law  and  the Constitution, those  that  make\tthem
\nshould reasonably be sure that they are right.
\n    The\t necessary  result  of\tour  findings  is  that\t the
\ncontinuance of the proceedings under the Deputy Speaker\t was
\nvalid complying,  as it did with the law promulgated by\t the
\nGovernor.  Each item on the agenda was properly\t passed\t and
\nthere was no objection either during the proceedings in\t the
\nHouse or in the argument before us regarding the  regularity
\nof  the\t action.   We, therefore, hold\tthat  the  financial
\nbusiness   transacted\tbefore\tthe   Assembly\t had   legal
\nfoundation.\n<\/p>\n
    This  brings  us  to the last point which  is  that\t the
\ncertificate  of the Deputy Speaker under Art. 199 was of  no
\neffect. That certificate was issued under the fourth  clause
\nof  that  article.  The argument is that the  provisions  of
\nthis  clause  are  mandatory and only  the  Speaker  of\t the
\nLegislative Assembly should  sign  the Money Bill.  To\tthis
\nthere  are many replies.  The Speaker was not  present\twhen
\nthe  Bills  were passed. Under Art. 180(2)  (1)\t the  Deputy
\nSpeaker acts as the Speaker when the Speaker is absent. Thus
\nthe Deputy Speaker was validly acting as the Speaker of\t the
\nAssembly  which continued to be in session.  No\t doubt\tArt.
\n199  mentions only the Speaker of the  Legislative  Assembly
\nbut  the question remains still whether the  Deputy  Speaker
\ncould not certify the Money Bills effectively.\tCounsel\t for
\nthe  answering respondents drew attention to the  difference
\nin the language of the two clauses.  In the first clause the
\nDeputy\tSpeaker\t or  such  member of  the  Assembly  as\t the
\nGovernor may appoint for the purpose, performs the duties of
\nthe office of the Speaker, when the office is vacant,  while
\nin  the\t second the Deputy Speaker merely  acts\t as  Speaker
\nduring the absence of the Speaker from a sitting of the
\n(1)  “180.  Power of the Deputy Speaker or other  person  to
\nperform the duties of the office of or to act as, Speaker.\n<\/p>\n
(1)<\/span><\/p>\n
  (2) During the absence of the Speaker from any sitting  of
\nthe  Assembly the Deputy Speaker or, if he is  also  absent,
\nsuch  person as may be determined by the rules of  procedure
\nof  the\t Assembly. or, if no such person  is  present,\tsuch
\nother person as may be determined by the Assembly, shall act
\nas Speaker.”\n<\/p>\n
496<\/span><\/p>\n
Assembly.   They suggest that in the latter case the  Deputy
\nSpeaker’s  powers come to an end as soon as the\t sitting  is
\nover and the mandatory language of Article 199(4)  compelled
\nthat  the  certificate\tof the Speaker ought  to  have\tbeen
\nobtained.\n<\/p>\n
    The\t short\tquestion here is whether the  provisions  of
\nArt. 199 (4) must be read as imperative or merely directory.
\nThe  distinction  between a mandatory provision of  law\t and
\nthat  which is merely directory is this that in a  mandatory
\nprovision  there is an implied prohibition to do the act  in
\nany other manner while in a directory provision\t substantial
\ncompliance is considered sufficient.\n<\/p>\n
    There are several tests to determine when the  provision
\nmay be treated as mandatory and when not and they have\tbeen
\ncalled\tfrom books and set down by Subbarao, J. (as he\tthen
\nwas)  in The State of Uttar Pradesh and others v.  Babu\t Ram
\nUpadhya<\/a>:(1) and earlier by Venkatarama lyer, J. in State  of
\nBombay\tv.R.M.D.  Chamarbaugwala(2). For our purpose  it  is
\nnecessary to emphasise only one distinction.  In those cases
\nWhere  strict  compliance  is indicated to  be\ta  condition
\nprecedent to the validity of the act itself, the neglect  to
\nperform\t it  as\t indicated is fatal.   But  in\tcases  where
\nalthough  a  public  duty  is  imposed\tand  the  manner  of
\nperformance  is also indicated in imperative  language,\t the
\nprovision  is  usually\tregarded as  merely  directory\twhen
\ngeneral\t injustice  or inconvenience results to\t others\t and
\nthey have no control over those exercising the duty.
\n    Judged  from  this test the provisions  of\tArt.  199(4)
\ncannot\tbe  viewed as mandatory but only as  directory.\t  If
\nthe.  Constitution saw the necessity of providing  a  Deputy
\nSpeaker to act as the Speaker during the latter’s absence or
\nto perform the office of the Speaker when the office of\t the
\nSpeaker is vacant, it stands to reason that the Constitution
\ncould  never  have  reposed a power  of\t mere  certification
\nabsolutely  in\tthe  Speaker and the  Speaker\talone.\t The
\nhappenings  in the Assembly lend support to this  inference.
\nIt is reasonable to think that the Speaker in his then\tmood
\nmight  have declined to certify and a second  impasse  would
\nhave  ensued. A similar situation may arise not\t because  of
\nintransigence  but  because  of\t illness  or  absence.\t The
\ninconvenience  to  the\tState and the  public  at  large  is
\navoided\t by  holding the provision to be directory  and\t not
\nimperative.\n<\/p>\n
    It\tmight be mentioned that this Court has on  occasions
\nread  apparently imperative provisions as  directory,  only.
\nIn  the case of State of U.P.v. Manbodhan Lal  Srivastava(3)
\nthe provisions of
\n(1) [1961] 2 S.C.R. 679, 710.\n<\/p>\n
(2) [1957] S.C.R. 874, 950.\n<\/p>\n
(3) [1958] S.C.R. 533.\n<\/p>\n
497<\/span><\/p>\n
Arts. 311 ( 2 ) and 3 20 ( 1 ) ( c ) were read as  directory
\nnotwithstanding\t the  mandatory\t language.   Further  it  is
\ninteresting  to\t note  that the Parliament Act\tof  1911  in
\nEngland has an identical provision enjoining.  certification
\nby the Speaker. However May in his ‘Parliamentary  Practice’
\ngives numerous instances of Money Bills (from 1914  onwards)
\ncertified by the Deputy Speaker (see p. 842).
\n    Further  again,  there is Article 212 clause  (1)  which
\nprovides  that\tthe  validity  of  any\tproceeding  in\t the
\nLegislature  of a State shall not be called in\tquestion  on
\nthe  ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure.\tThis
\nclause was invoked in respect of a Money Bill in Patna Zilla
\nBrick  Owners Association and others v. State of  Bihar\t and
\nothers(1)  following a case of this Court in M\/s.  Mangalore
\nGanesh\tBedi Works v. The State of Mysore & Another<\/a>(2).\t  We
\nare  entitled  to rely upon this provision.  Our  conclusion
\ngets  strength\tfrom another fact.  There is  no  suggestion
\neven  that the Appropriation Bills were not Money  Bills  or
\nincluded any matter other than that provided  in Article 199
\nor were not passed by the Assembly.  It is ‘also significant
\nthat  the Speaker wrote to the Chairman of  the\t Legislative
\nCouncil that there was no certificate by him and that he had
\nadjourned  the Assembly when the Bills were adopted but\t the
\nLegislative  Council  in spite of objection  considered\t and
\npassed the two, Bills and the Governor assented to them.  We
\nare of opinion that the two Bills were duly certified.
\n    This concludes the whole case and the-events on which it
\nis  based.  Mr. Garg contended for a larger issue.  He\tsaid
\nthat  the  Legislature\tshould not be at the  mercy  of\t the
\nGovernor  and  the  absolute field of  action  open  to\t the
\nLegislature  and the Speaker would be unreasonably cut\tdown
\nand thus lead to assumption of absolute powers by Governors.
\nWe  do not entertain any such apprehensions.  The  situation
\ncreated\t  in  the  State  of  Punjab  was  unique  and\t was
\nreminiscent  of\t happenings in the age of the  Stuarts.\t The
\naction\tof  the\t Governor appears to be\t drastic.   It\twas,
\nhowever,   constitutional and resulted from a desire to\t set
\nright  a  desperate  situation.\t  As  Bacon  once  said,  no
\nremedies cause so much pain as those which are efficacious.
\n    For\t the reasons given above we allow the  appeals,\t set
\naside the judgment of the High Court and order the dismissal
\nof the two petitions with costs.\n<\/p>\n
V.P.S.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t Appeals allowed.\n<\/p>\n
(1) A.I.R. 3963 Pat. 16.\n<\/p>\n
(2) [3963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 275.\n<\/p>\n
498<\/span><\/p>\n
\t\t\t  APPENDIX
\n\t      “PUNJAB ORDINANCE NO. 1 OF 1968\n<\/p>\n
2. Definitions.\t In this Ordinance :-\n<\/p>\n
(a) “article” means an article of the Constitution of India;
\n(2) “Financial business” means any business relating to\t any
\nof  the financial matter referred to in articles 202  to’206
\n(both inclusive) including Bills for appropriation of moneys
\nout of the Consolidated Fund of State.\n<\/p>\n
    3.\tSitting\t of either House of Legislature\t not  to  be
\nadjourned without consent of that House until completion  of
\nfinancial business.\n<\/p>\n
    Notwithstanding anything contained in any rules made, or
\nrules  or standing order having effect, under  Article\t208,
\nwhen   any   financial\tbusiness  is pending  or  is  to  be
\ntransacted  in\ta House of the Legislature of the  State  of
\nPunjab during any session thereof, then :-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t (a)  Until the completion of such  business
\n\t      during  that session a sitting of\t that  House
\n\t      shall not be adjourned unless a motion of that
\n\t      effect is passed by a majority of the  members
\n\t      of that House present and voting;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t (b)  Any  adjournment\tof  that  House\t  in
\n\t      contravention of the provisions of clause\t (a)
\n\t      shall be null and void and be of no effect;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t (c)  The Leader of the House, may, for\t the
\n\t      timely  completion of the Financial  business,
\n\t      move  a  motion  specifying the\ttime  within
\n\t      which  the  consideration\t of  such   business
\n\t      shall   be  completed  and if  the  motion  is
\n\t      adopted (whether with or without modification)
\n\t      by  a  majority of the Members  of  the  House
\n\t      present  and  voting,  consideration  of\t the
\n\t      business\tshall be completed within  the\ttime
\n\t      specified in the motion as so adopted and\t for
\n\t      that  purpose,  the  Rules  of  Procedure\t and
\n\t      Conduct  of Business (including  the  standing
\n\t      orders,  if any) relating to that House  shall
\n\t      have  effect  subject  to\t the   modifications
\n\t      thereof, if any, specified in the motion.\t and
\n\t      any  such motion may be moved  without  giving
\n\t      any  prior  notice thereof and  shall,  unless
\n\t      the  majority  of\t the members  of  the  House
\n\t      present  and voting determine   otherwise,  be
\n\t      taken into consideration and voted upon on the
\n\t      same  day\t on which it is moved.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
4. Financial statements not to lapse.\n<\/p>\n
    For the removal of the doubts it is hereby declared that
\nif  an\tannual financial statement has been  laid  before  a
\nHouse under Article 202 or a statement showing the estimated
\namount of any  supplementary  or additional expenditure\t has
\nbeen  laid  under article 205 such statement  shall  not  be
\nnecessary to relay such statement before the House.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t     D.C. PAVATE
\n\t\t\t Governor of Punjab.\n<\/p>\n
Chandigarh, the 13th March, 1968
\nJASMER SINGH
\nSecretary to Government,
\nPunjab Legislative Department.”\n<\/p>\n
499<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India State Of Punjab vs Sat Pal Dang & Ors on 30 July, 1968 Equivalent citations: 1969 AIR 903, 1969 SCR (1) 478 Author: M Hidayatullah Bench: Hidayatullah, M. (Cj), Shah, J.C., Ramaswami, V., Mitter, G.K., Grover, A.N. PETITIONER: STATE OF PUNJAB Vs. RESPONDENT: SAT PAL DANG & ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-24744","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nState Of Punjab vs Sat Pal Dang & Ors on 30 July, 1968 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-punjab-vs-sat-pal-dang-ors-on-30-july-1968\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"State Of Punjab vs Sat Pal Dang & Ors on 30 July, 1968 - 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