{"id":258831,"date":"2007-02-16T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-02-15T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/shri-andal-alagar-kalyana-vs-the-union-of-india-rep-on-16-february-2007"},"modified":"2014-09-28T08:11:24","modified_gmt":"2014-09-28T02:41:24","slug":"shri-andal-alagar-kalyana-vs-the-union-of-india-rep-on-16-february-2007","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/shri-andal-alagar-kalyana-vs-the-union-of-india-rep-on-16-february-2007","title":{"rendered":"Shri Andal Alagar Kalyana … vs The Union Of India Rep. on 16 February, 2007"},"content":{"rendered":"
Madras High Court<\/div>\n
Shri Andal Alagar Kalyana … vs The Union Of India Rep. on 16 February, 2007<\/div>\n
       \n\n  \n\n  \n\n \n \n              IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS\n\n                         DATED: 16.02.2007\n\n                              CORAM:\n\n           THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE V.RAMASUBRAMANIAN\n\n                   W.P.Nos.1482 AND 1869 OF 2007\n                                And\n                  M.P.Nos. 2, 3, 1 and 4 of 2007\n                                 \n\nShri Andal Alagar Kalyana Mandapam\nPrivate Limited, Rep., by its\nManaging Director Mrs.V.Prremalatha,\nNo.54-A, Kannammal Street,\nKannabiran Colony,\nChennai-600 093.                   ..  Petitioner  in WP 1482\/2007\n\n1.Mrs.V.Prremalatha\n2.A.Vijayakant\n3.Mrs.K.Amsaveni\n4.Mrs.R.Radha\n5.Mr.L.K.Sudhish\n6.Mrs.Devaki Nagarajan             .. Petitioners in WP 1869\/2007\n\n\n                            vs.\n\n\n1.The Union of India rep., by its Secretary,\n  Ministry of Shipping, Road Transport\n  and Highways, Department of Road\n  Transport and Highways, New Delhi.\n\n2.The Competent Authority and\n  Special District Revenue Officer (L.A.),\n  National Highway Schemes,\n  Kancheepuram and Tiruvallur Districts,\n  R.D.O. Office, Kancheepuram.\n\n3.The Project Director,\n  National Highways Authority of India,\n  SPIC House, No.88, Anna Salai,\n  Guindy, Chennai-600 032.\n\n4.Hon'ble Minister Mr.T.R.Balu,\n  Ministry of Shipping,\n  Road Transport and Highways,\n  Department of Road Transport and\n  Highways, New Delhi.\n\n5.The Central Public Information Officer,\n  National Highways Authority of India,\n  Central Information Commission,\n  Old JNU Campus, Block-IV,\n  5th Floor, New Delhi-110 067.      ..  Respondents in both WPs<\/pre>\n
WP No.1482\/2007:\n<\/p>\n
        Writ  petition filed under Article 226<\/a> of the Constitution<\/p>\n
of  India  praying  for  the  issue of a  Writ  of  Certiorarified<\/p>\n
Mandamus,  calling for the entire records of the first  respondent<\/p>\n
relating  to  the  impugned Notification in S.O.No.1622(E),  dated<\/p>\n
18.11.2005 of the first respondent and the records relating to the<\/p>\n
consequential   award   passed  by  the   second   respondent   in<\/p>\n
Rc.No.466\/2005\/NH dated 8.12.2006 in respect of  the  petitioner’s<\/p>\n
Kalayana Mandapam situated on the lands comprised in T.S.Nos.14\/1,<\/p>\n
14\/2,  14\/3 and 15\/2 in Block No.43 to an Plot area of 3642 square<\/p>\n
metres  at  No.106, Koyambedu Village, Egmore-Nungambakkam  Taluk,<\/p>\n
Chennai  District as referred in the impugned award and quash  the<\/p>\n
said impugned Notification in S.O.No.1622 (E) dated 18.11.2005 and<\/p>\n
the  consequential award in Rc.No.466\/2005\/NH dated 8.12.2006  and<\/p>\n
consequently  to forbear the official respondents  from  acquiring<\/p>\n
the  portion of lands wherein the superstructures are  put  up  in<\/p>\n
Survey  Nos.14\/1, 14\/2, 14\/3 and 15\/2 in Block No.43 in  Koyambedu<\/p>\n
Village, Chennai District.\n<\/p>\n
\n
WP No.1869\/2007:\n<\/p>\n
        Writ  petition filed under Article 226<\/a> of the Constitution<\/p>\n
of  India  praying  for  the  issue of a  Writ  of  Certiorarified<\/p>\n
Mandamus,  calling for the entire records of the first  respondent<\/p>\n
relating  to  the  impugned Notification in S.O.No.1622(E),  dated<\/p>\n
18.11.2005 of the first respondent and the records relating to the<\/p>\n
consequential   award   passed  by  the   second   respondent   in<\/p>\n
Rc.No.466\/2005\/NH dated 8.12.2006 in respect of  the  petitioner’s<\/p>\n
land  and building comprised in T.S.Nos.14\/1, 14\/2, 14\/3 and  15\/2<\/p>\n
in  Block  No.43 to an extent of 2164.5 square metres  at  No.106,<\/p>\n
Koyambedu Village, Egmore-Nungambakkam Taluk, Chennai District  as<\/p>\n
referred  in  the  impugned  award and  quash  the  said  impugned<\/p>\n
Notification   in  S.O.No.1622  (E)  dated  18.11.2005   and   the<\/p>\n
consequential  award  in  Rc.No.466\/2005\/NH  dated  8.12.2006  and<\/p>\n
consequently  to forbear the official respondents  from  acquiring<\/p>\n
the  portion of lands wherein the superstructures are  put  up  in<\/p>\n
Survey  Nos.14\/1, 14\/2, 14\/3 and 15\/2 in Block No.43 in  Koyambedu<\/p>\n
Village, Chennai District.\n<\/p>\n
\n
       For petitioners in both WPs    :  Dr.Rajeev Dhavan,
\n                                      Senior Counsel for
\n                                      Mr.S.Manimaran.<\/p>\n
\n\n       For Respondents-1&2            :  Mr.V.T.Gopalan,\n           in WP 1482\/2007 and           Addl. Solicitor General\n         for Respondents 1to 3\n           in WP 1869\/2007\n\n       For Respondents-3&4          : Mr.P.Wilson,\n           in WP 1482\/2007 and       Asst. Solicitor General\n           for Respondent-4 in\n           WP 1869\/2007\n\n\n\n\t                     COMMON ORDER\n\n\n<\/pre>\n
        Under  the National Highways Development Project  Phase-I,<\/p>\n
known  as “Golden Quadrilateral”, the Government of India proposed<\/p>\n
three  Grade Separators, along National Highways 4, 45 and 205  in<\/p>\n
the  City  of  Chennai, in three major arterial  junctions,  viz.,<\/p>\n
Kathipara  (Guindy), Koyambedu and Padi, apart from a  flyover  in<\/p>\n
front of Chennai Air Port.\n<\/p>\n
\n
        2.  By a notification of the Government of India, Ministry<\/p>\n
of  Shipping,  Road  Transport and Highways  (Department  of  Road<\/p>\n
Transport  and  Highways) bearing No.S.O.1130(E) dated  12.8.2005,<\/p>\n
published in the Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part-II, Section<\/p>\n
3,  Sub Section (ii) dated 12.8.2005, issued under Section 3-A (1)<\/p>\n
of  the National Highways Act<\/a>, 1956, (hereinafter referred  to  as<\/p>\n
the  ‘Act’)  the  proposal to acquire several lands  in  Koyambedu<\/p>\n
Village,  Egmore-Nungambakkam Taluk, Chennai District was notified<\/p>\n
as  being required for the public purpose of construction of  free<\/p>\n
flow facilities along National Highway No.4. The substance of  the<\/p>\n
said  notification  was  published in one English  Daily  and  one<\/p>\n
Vernacular Daily on 20.8.2005 and after considering the objections<\/p>\n
raised  by some of the land owners, with reference to the  remarks<\/p>\n
of  the National Highways Authority of India, a declaration  under<\/p>\n
Section 3-D<\/a> (1) of the Act was issued by way of a notification  in<\/p>\n
S.O.1622(E)  dated  18.11.2005.  The  said  declaration  was  also<\/p>\n
published in the Newspapers on 15.12.2005 and an award was  passed<\/p>\n
on 8-12-2006.\n<\/p>\n
\n
        3.  The lands in New Survey Nos.14\/1, 14\/2, 14\/3 and 15\/2,<\/p>\n
measuring  1582 sq.mtrs., 286 sq.mtrs., 165 sq.mtrs.,  and  1083.5<\/p>\n
sq.mtrs.,  respectively, of Koyambedu Village, Egmore-Nungambakkam<\/p>\n
Taluk,  owned by six members of a family, formed part of the  said<\/p>\n
acquisition. These six members of the family have joined  together<\/p>\n
and  filed a writ petition in W.P.No.1869 of 2007, challenging the<\/p>\n
declaration  issued under Section 3-D<\/a> (1) as  well  as  the  Award<\/p>\n
passed on 8.12.2006.\n<\/p>\n
\n
        4.  Two  out  of  the six land owners,  are  the  Managing<\/p>\n
Director  and Director of a Private Limited Company by  name  Shri<\/p>\n
Andal  Alagar  Kalyana Mandapam Pvt. Ltd., which  owns  a  Kalyana<\/p>\n
Mandapam  constructed on the aforesaid lands.  Therefore,  as  the<\/p>\n
owner of the superstructure, the said Private Limited Company  has<\/p>\n
also filed a writ petition in W.P.No.1482 of 2007, challenging the<\/p>\n
declaration dated 18.11.2005 issued under Section 3-D(1)<\/a>  as  well<\/p>\n
as the Award passed on 8.12.2006.\n<\/p>\n
\n
        5.  I  have heard Dr.Rajeev Dhavan, learned Senior Counsel<\/p>\n
appearing   for  the  petitioners  in  both  the  writ  petitions,<\/p>\n
Mr.V.T.Gopalan,   learned   Additional   Solicitor   General   and<\/p>\n
Mr.P.Wilson,   learned  Asst.  Solicitor  General  for    Official<\/p>\n
respondents in both the writ petitions.\n<\/p>\n
\n
        6.  Before  getting  into  the rival  submissions,  it  is<\/p>\n
necessary to set out the list of dates and events, on which  there<\/p>\n
is no controversy. They are as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
       12.08.2005    Notification under section 3-A<\/a> issued in
\n                     Government Gazette<\/p>\n
       20.08.2005    Paper Publication of the substance of
\n                     Notification made<\/p>\n
       12.09.2005    Competent  Authority  writes  to  Project
\n\t\t\t   Director  seeking for remarks on  objections                    \t\t\t   by land   owners<\/p>\n
       14.09.2005    Remarks sent by NHAI to Competent
\n                     Authority<\/p>\n
       29.09.2005    Proceedings of DRO u\/s 3(C)(2) of NH Act<\/p>\n
       18.11.2005    Notification under Section 3-D(1)<\/a> issued in
\n                     Gazette<\/p>\n
       20.12.2005    Publication  in  News  Papers   of   the
\n\t\t\t   declaration under Section 3-D(1)<\/a><\/p>\n
       05<\/a>.01.2006    One of the writ petitioners write to the
\n                     Competent Authority claiming that no
\n                     notice was issued and no sketch was
\n                     furnished and that therefore she was not
\n                     aware of the portion of the land sought to
\n                     be acquired.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n
                     By  the  said  letter, the  writ  petitioner
\nseeks  information regarding the portion of the land  sought to be acquired, along with a field  map or  sketch. She also encloses                 copies of  documents of title.<\/p>\n
       31.01.2006    Legal notice issued by the Counsel for the
\n                     writ petitioner reiterating her claim that
\n                     no notice was issued and no sketch was
\n                     furnished and that therefore she was not
\n                     aware of the portion of the land sought to
\n                     be acquired. Hence, the counsel also seeks
\n                     the field map and sketch.\n<\/p>\n
       19.02.2006    An interview allegedly given by the
\n                     fourth respondent (Minister) to the Press,
\n                     is published in a Tamil Daily Newspaper.\n<\/p>\n
                     As per the Newspaper report, the fourth
\n                     respondent indicated that the Central
\n                     Government was prepared to reconsider
\n                     if an alternative proposal is submitted by
\n                     the petitioners.\n<\/p>\n
       03.03.2006    Representation submitted by one of the
\n                     writ petitioners along with an alternative
\n                     Plan and a Technical Opinion from a
\n                     retired Chief Urban Planner of the
\n                     Chennai Metropolitan Development
\n                     Authority.\n<\/p>\n
       01.11.2006    Alternative proposal of the writ petitioner
\n                     rejected by the Government of India<\/p>\n
       20.11.2006    Request made by the writ petitioner for
\n                     reconsideration of the matter<\/p>\n
       08.12.2006    Award passed by the Competent
\n                     Authority<\/p>\n
       11.12.2006    Letter of the Competent Authority
\n                     to collect the award amount<\/p>\n
       28.12.2006    Notice issued to Writ Petitioner u\/s
\n                     3-E(1)   of   the  Act  by  the   Competent
\n\t\t\t   Authority<\/p>\n
       03.01.2007     Petition for reconsideration also rejected<\/p>\n
       05.01.2007     Writ petitions filed<\/p>\n
        7.  In  the  background of the events short listed  above,<\/p>\n
Dr.Rajeev  Dhavan,  learned  Senior Counsel  for  the  petitioners<\/p>\n
contended  that the whole sequence of events, could  be  dissected<\/p>\n
into  two  parts,  viz.,  (i)  the  events  commencing  from   the<\/p>\n
notification   under   Section  3-A(1)<\/a>   (dated   12.8.2005)   and<\/p>\n
culminating   in  a  declaration  under  Section   3-D(1)<\/a>   (dated<\/p>\n
20.12.2005); and (ii) the events starting from the request of  the<\/p>\n
petitioner  for  details, by her letter  dated  5.1.2006  and  her<\/p>\n
proposal  dated  3-3-2006 for an alternative Plan, culminating  in<\/p>\n
the  rejection  of the alternative proposal on 1.11.2006  and  the<\/p>\n
Award passed on 8.12.2006.\n<\/p>\n
\n
       8. In so far as the first part of the sequence of events is<\/p>\n
concerned, Dr.Rajeev Dhavan, learned Senior Counsel contended that<\/p>\n
the  notification under Section 3-A(1)<\/a> as well as the  declaration<\/p>\n
under Section 3-D(1)<\/a> are vitiated for two reasons, viz.,:-<\/p>\n
                  (a)  that  the names of the  owners  of<\/p>\n
          these  lands were wrongly mentioned in  respect<\/p>\n
          of  Survey Nos.14\/1 and 15\/2, though they  were<\/p>\n
          correctly   mentioned  in  respect  of   Survey<\/p>\n
          Nos.14\/2 and 14\/3; and<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
                  (b)  that  the precise details  of  the<\/p>\n
          lands sought to be acquired, with reference  to<\/p>\n
          the  sketch\/field map and their portion as part<\/p>\n
          of   the  whole,  were  not  mentioned  in  the<\/p>\n
          notification,   reducing  the  opportunity   of<\/p>\n
          submitting  objections into an empty  formality<\/p>\n
          and a mockery.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n
\n
        9.  In so far as the second part of the sequence of events<\/p>\n
is  concerned,  the  learned Senior Counsel  for  the  petitioners<\/p>\n
contended –\n<\/p>\n
                  (a) that there was a promissory estoppel<\/p>\n
          on the part of the respondents in respect of the<\/p>\n
          alternative    proposal   submitted    by    the<\/p>\n
          petitioners;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                  (b)  that  the petitioners  developed  a<\/p>\n
          legitimate expectation, in view of the  promises<\/p>\n
          made by the fourth respondent that their Kalyana<\/p>\n
          Mandapam could be retained in tact;<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
                   (c)   that   the  invitation   for   an<\/p>\n
          alternative   proposal   before   the    ensuing<\/p>\n
          Elections  and the rejection of the  alternative<\/p>\n
          proposal  after the Elections, exposed the  mala<\/p>\n
          fide  intentions  on  the  part  of  the  fourth<\/p>\n
          respondent; and<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
                  (d)  that  even  while exercising  their<\/p>\n
          powers   as   administrative  authorities,   the<\/p>\n
          respondents  are duty bound to adopt  the  least<\/p>\n
          invasive   or   least  restrictive   choice   of<\/p>\n
          measures, so that there is “proportionality” and<\/p>\n
          “reasonableness” in the administrative action.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n
         10.   Per   contra,  Mr.V.T.Gopalan,  learned  Additional<\/p>\n
Solicitor General contended –\n<\/p>\n
                   (a)   that   the   challenge   to   the<\/p>\n
         acquisition proceedings, having been  made  after<\/p>\n
         the  property vested with the Central  Government<\/p>\n
         under  Section  3-D<\/a> (2) and after the  Award  was<\/p>\n
         passed under Section 3-G<\/a>, was not maintainable;<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
                 (b)  that the proposal for an alternative<\/p>\n
         Plan   itself,   having   emanated   after    the<\/p>\n
         declaration  under Section 3-D(1)<\/a> and  after  the<\/p>\n
         property   having   vested   with   the   Central<\/p>\n
         Government under Section 3-D(2)<\/a>, could  not  have<\/p>\n
         been  considered in the teeth of  the  provisions<\/p>\n
         of the Act;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                 (c)  that the question of mala fides  did<\/p>\n
         not  arise  in  as much as the very proposal  for<\/p>\n
         acquisition was mooted way back in the year  2004<\/p>\n
         with   the  preparation  of  a  Detailed  Project<\/p>\n
         Report,  survey of the lands, floating of tenders<\/p>\n
         etc.,  while  one  of the petitioners  admittedly<\/p>\n
         started  a  Political Party  only  in  September,<\/p>\n
         2005   and  that  therefore  no  one  could  have<\/p>\n
         envisaged  the  future course of events  at  that<\/p>\n
         stage;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                 (d)  that there was no promise  and  that<\/p>\n
         there  could  not  have been  a  promise  against<\/p>\n
         statutory  provisions and hence the  question  of<\/p>\n
         promissory estoppel did not arise; and<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
                 (e)  that  the  course of  events  showed<\/p>\n
         that   there   was   no  scope   for   legitimate<\/p>\n
         expectation.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n<\/blockquote>\n
Now let us consider the rival submissions one after another.<\/p>\n
\t\tI.  CHALLENGE  TO THE ACQUISITION ON THE GROUND OF  <\/p>\n
VAGUENESS  AND LACK OF PARTICULARS:\n<\/p>\n
        11. Assailing the acquisition proceedings on the ground of<\/p>\n
vagueness  and  lack  of  particulars, Dr.Rajeev  Dhavan,  learned<\/p>\n
Senior  Counsel  for  the petitioners, drew my  attention  to  the<\/p>\n
notification  under  Section  3-A(1)<\/a>  and  pointed  out  that  the<\/p>\n
notification did not mention the names of the owners of any of the<\/p>\n
lands sought to be acquired. In Column No.2 of the Schedule to the<\/p>\n
notification, the Survey Numbers are mentioned with or without the<\/p>\n
word “Part”, Column No.3 mentioned the type of land as “Private or<\/p>\n
Government”, Column No.4 mentioned the nature of land as “Ryotwari<\/p>\n
Manai” or “Village Natham” and Column No.5 mentioned the extent in<\/p>\n
square metres. There were no details in the notification regarding<\/p>\n
the  portion  of the land sought to be acquired, wherever  only  a<\/p>\n
part  of  the land was sought to be acquired. Therefore, the  land<\/p>\n
owners,  even  if  they had any notice regarding the  acquisition,<\/p>\n
they  did  not have any information regarding the portion  of  the<\/p>\n
land sought to be acquired.\n<\/p>\n
\n
        12.  Section  3-A(2)<\/a> of the National Highways  Act,  1956,<\/p>\n
hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’, made it mandatory for  every<\/p>\n
notification  to  contain a brief description  of  the  land.  The<\/p>\n
Section reads as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
                 “3-A. POWER TO ACQUIRE LAND ETC.–<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
                 (1)    ..     ..     ..     ..\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                   (2)  Every  notification  under   Sub<\/p>\n
          Section (1) shall give a brief description  of<\/p>\n
          the land.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n
        13.  In order to drive home the aforesaid contention,  the<\/p>\n
learned  Senior  Counsel  for  the petitioners,  relied  upon  the<\/p>\n
decisions  of  the Supreme Court in Munshi Singh  and  Others  vs.<\/p>\n
Union  of  India<\/a> ((1973) 2 SCC 337)), State of Orissa vs.  Sridhar<\/p>\n
Kumar Mallik and Others<\/a> ((1985) 3 SCC 697)), Om Prakash Sharma and<\/p>\n
Others  vs. M.P.Audyogik Kendra Vikas Nigam and Others ((2005)  10<\/p>\n
SCC  306)) and Competent Authority vs. Barangore Jute Factory  and<\/p>\n
Others<\/a> ((2005) 13 SCC 477)).\n<\/p>\n
\n
        14. In Munshi Singh case, the Supreme Court found on facts<\/p>\n
that the notification under Section 4(1)<\/a> was vitiated by vagueness<\/p>\n
and  indefiniteness of the public purpose for which the  land  was<\/p>\n
sought to be acquired.  Therefore, the Supreme Court held in para-<\/p>\n
9  that  if the opportunity to file objections and participate  in<\/p>\n
the enquiry under Section 5-A<\/a> has any purpose and if it has to  be<\/p>\n
given  its  full effect, the notification under Section 4(1)<\/a>  must<\/p>\n
give  some definite indication or particulars of the purpose.  But<\/p>\n
while  holding so, the Supreme Court also gave reasons for such  a<\/p>\n
conclusion in the following words, in para-9:-<\/p>\n
                 “In  the  absence of such specific  or<\/p>\n
         particular  purpose being stated the  objector<\/p>\n
         cannot  file  any proper or cogent  objections<\/p>\n
         under  Section 5-A<\/a> which he has a right to  do<\/p>\n
         under  that  provision. We  would  accordingly<\/p>\n
         hold   that   owing  to  the   vagueness   and<\/p>\n
         indefiniteness  of the public  purpose  stated<\/p>\n
         in  the  notifications under Section 4(1)<\/a>  and<\/p>\n
         in   the   absence  of  any  proof  that   the<\/p>\n
         appellants were either aware of or were  shown<\/p>\n
         the  scheme  or the Master Plan in respect  of<\/p>\n
         the   planned  development  of  the  area   in<\/p>\n
         question the appellants were wholly unable  to<\/p>\n
         object  effectively and exercise  their  right<\/p>\n
         under Section 5-A<\/a> of the Acquisition Act.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
Thus,  the  Supreme Court was convinced on facts in the said  case<\/p>\n
that  the  appellants therein were neither aware of nor shown  the<\/p>\n
scheme  or  Master Plan in respect of planned development  of  the<\/p>\n
area in question.\n<\/p>\n
\n
        15. In State of Orissa vs. Sridhar Kumar Mallik<\/a> (1985  (3)<\/p>\n
SCC  697),  the  Supreme Court was concerned with  a  proclamation<\/p>\n
issued  under  Section  417-A<\/a> (1-a) of the Orissa  Municipal  Act,<\/p>\n
1950.   The  proclamation  was  intended  to  extend  the   Orissa<\/p>\n
Municipality  Act,  1950, to an area other  than  a  Municipality,<\/p>\n
leading  to  certain  consequences  such  as  the  imposition   of<\/p>\n
different  kinds  of taxes. Therefore, the law laid  down  therein<\/p>\n
that  the proclamation must be precise and clear and must indicate<\/p>\n
with sufficient accuracy, the area intended to be notified, cannot<\/p>\n
be imported to a case of land acquisition.\n<\/p>\n
\n
        16.  In  Om Prakash Sharma case (2005 (10) SCC  306),  the<\/p>\n
notification under Section 4(1)<\/a> of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,<\/p>\n
was  held  to be invalid, on account of the fact that neither  the<\/p>\n
survey numbers nor the names of the land owners were furnished  in<\/p>\n
the  notification. But in the present case, the survey numbers  as<\/p>\n
well  as  the extent are mentioned and hence it cannot be compared<\/p>\n
with Om Prakash Sharma case.\n<\/p>\n
\n
       17. Heavy reliance was placed by the learned Senior Counsel<\/p>\n
for  the  petitioners, on the judgment in Competent Authority  vs.<\/p>\n
Barangore Jute Factory<\/a> (2005 (13) SCC 477).  The facts of the said<\/p>\n
case come almost closer to the facts of the case on hand. That was<\/p>\n
also  a  case  under the National Highways Act<\/a>, 1956.  As  in  the<\/p>\n
present case, the notification under Section 3-A(1)<\/a> contained  the<\/p>\n
details  of the survey numbers, extent of land, classification  of<\/p>\n
land etc. But many of the lands sought to be acquired in that case<\/p>\n
were  only  part  of  the  whole land in certain  survey  numbers.<\/p>\n
Therefore,  a contention was raised that when only  a  part  of  a<\/p>\n
larger  tract  or larger chunk of land was sought to be  acquired,<\/p>\n
the  land owners will not be in a position to know which part  was<\/p>\n
acquired  and  they would not be in a position to  object  to  the<\/p>\n
acquisition  effectively. Considering the scope of the requirement<\/p>\n
under  Section  3-A(2)<\/a> to give a brief description  of  land,  the<\/p>\n
Supreme Court held in para-5 of the said judgment as follows:-<\/p>\n
                 “So  far  as  the question  whether  the<\/p>\n
         impugned  notification meets the requirement  of<\/p>\n
         Section  3-A(1)<\/a>  of  the  Act  regarding  giving<\/p>\n
         brief description of land is concerned, we  have<\/p>\n
         already  shown that even though plot numbers  of<\/p>\n
         lands  in  respect  of  each  mouza  are  given,<\/p>\n
         different pieces of land are acquired either  as<\/p>\n
         whole  or  in part. Wherever the acquisition  is<\/p>\n
         of  a  portion of a bigger piece of land,  there<\/p>\n
         is  no description as to which portion was being<\/p>\n
         acquired.  Unless  it  is  known  as  to   which<\/p>\n
         portion  was  to  be acquired,  the  petitioners<\/p>\n
         would  be  unable to understand  the  impact  of<\/p>\n
         acquisition  or  to  raise any  objection  about<\/p>\n
         user  of  the  acquired land  for  the  purposes<\/p>\n
         specified  under the Act or to make a claim  for<\/p>\n
         compensation.  It is settled law  that  where  a<\/p>\n
         statute requires a particular act to be done  in<\/p>\n
         a  particular manner, the act has to be done  in<\/p>\n
         that  manner  alone. Every word of  the  statute<\/p>\n
         has  to  be given its due meaning. In our  view,<\/p>\n
         the  impugned  notification fails  to  meet  the<\/p>\n
         statutory  mandate. It is vague. The least  that<\/p>\n
         is   required   in  such  cases  is   that   the<\/p>\n
         acquisition notification should let  the  person<\/p>\n
         whose  land is sought to be acquired  know  what<\/p>\n
         he  is  going to lose. The impugned notification<\/p>\n
         in  this  case is, therefore, not in  accordance<\/p>\n
         with the law.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n
        18.  Even  in  the  present case, the  notification  under<\/p>\n
Section 3-A<\/a> (1) shows that in respect of a few survey numbers, the<\/p>\n
entire  land in the survey number is sought to be acquired and  in<\/p>\n
respect of a few survey numbers, only a part of the land is sought<\/p>\n
to  be  acquired. The details of the portion of  the  land  to  be<\/p>\n
acquired  and the portion of the land left out, are not  indicated<\/p>\n
in the notification and hence the ratio laid down in the aforesaid<\/p>\n
decision of the Supreme Court appears, on a cursory glance, to  be<\/p>\n
squarely applicable to the case on hand. But it is not so.<\/p>\n
        19.  After  laying  down the law in para-5  (as  extracted<\/p>\n
above),  the  Supreme Court, qualified the same with  a  rider  in<\/p>\n
paras-6 and 7 as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
                 “6.  While dealing with the question  of<\/p>\n
         brief  description  of land in  the  acquisition<\/p>\n
         notifications,  reference  was  made   to   some<\/p>\n
         judgments   of  this  Court  where   acquisition<\/p>\n
         notifications  under  Section  4<\/a>  of  the   Land<\/p>\n
         Acquisition  Act  had come up for  consideration<\/p>\n
         on  account of challenge being levelled  on  the<\/p>\n
         ground  of  vagueness of the  notifications.  In<\/p>\n
         most  of  these  cases, plan of the  area  under<\/p>\n
         acquisition  was made part of the  notifications<\/p>\n
         to  show that the requirement of description  of<\/p>\n
         land  was met. This leads us to inquire  whether<\/p>\n
         there  was  any site plan forming  part  of  the<\/p>\n
         impugned notification.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                 7.  The  availability of  a  plan  would<\/p>\n
         have  made  all the difference. If  there  is  a<\/p>\n
         plan,   the   area  under  acquisition   becomes<\/p>\n
         identifiable  immediately. The question  whether<\/p>\n
         the  impugned notification meets the requirement<\/p>\n
         of  brief  description of land under Section  3-<\/p>\n
         A(2)  goes to the root of the matter.  The  High<\/p>\n
         Court  rightly  observed: “… It  is  just  not<\/p>\n
         possible  to proceed to determine the  necessity<\/p>\n
         of  acquisition  of a particular  plot  of  land<\/p>\n
         without  preparation  of  a  proper  plan.”  The<\/p>\n
         appendix  to  the  impugned  notification  shows<\/p>\n
         that  in many cases small parts of larger chunks<\/p>\n
         of  land  have  been notified  for  acquisition.<\/p>\n
         This  is not possible without preparing a  plan.<\/p>\n
         But  where  is  the  plan? The  notification  in<\/p>\n
         question  makes no reference to  any  plan.  Our<\/p>\n
         attention  was drawn to averments  in  pleadings<\/p>\n
         by  the writ petitioners and replies thereto  of<\/p>\n
         the  acquiring  authority. The writ  petitioners<\/p>\n
         have  pleaded  that there was no  plan.  Replies<\/p>\n
         are  vague  and  by  way of  rolled-up  answers.<\/p>\n
         There  is no specific reply. It is obvious  that<\/p>\n
         there  was  no  plan  and, therefore,  none  was<\/p>\n
         referred  to  in the pleadings nor anything  was<\/p>\n
         produced   before  the  Court  at  the  hearing.<\/p>\n
         Learned  counsel  for  the  competent  authority<\/p>\n
         tried to submit before us that there was a  plan<\/p>\n
         at  the  time  of issue of the notification  and<\/p>\n
         the  writ  petitioners ought to  have  inspected<\/p>\n
         it,  if  they  so desired. He further  submitted<\/p>\n
         that  the  plan  was produced  before  the  High<\/p>\n
         Court.  We find that both these submissions  are<\/p>\n
         not  sustainable  as  they are  not  correct.  A<\/p>\n
         reference  to  the  impugned notification  shows<\/p>\n
         that  there  is no mention of any plan.  Without<\/p>\n
         this  how can anybody know that there was a plan<\/p>\n
         which  could  be inspected and inspected  where?<\/p>\n
         We  are  inclined to accept that  there  was  no<\/p>\n
         plan  accompanying  the  impugned  notification.<\/p>\n
         During  the  course of hearing we were  shown  a<\/p>\n
         plan  which  we  are unable  to  link  with  the<\/p>\n
         impugned  notification.  This  was  a  1996  PWD<\/p>\n
         plan.   PWD   is  a  department  of  the   State<\/p>\n
         Government. The impugned notification is by  the<\/p>\n
         Central Government. NHAI is established under  a<\/p>\n
         Central  Act<\/a>.  The  competent  authority   under<\/p>\n
         Section  3<\/a>  of  the  Act  is  appointed  by  the<\/p>\n
         Central   Government.  Therefore,   this   State<\/p>\n
         Government   plan   of   1996   (the    impugned<\/p>\n
         notification  is of 1998) is of  no  assistance.<\/p>\n
         The   impugned  judgment  of  the   High   Court<\/p>\n
         emphasises  the  need for a plan.  It  is  clear<\/p>\n
         from  the  judgment of the High  Court  that  no<\/p>\n
         plan was produced before it. The absence of  any<\/p>\n
         reference   to   a   plan   in   the    impugned<\/p>\n
         notification  and  in  fact non-availability  of<\/p>\n
         any  plan  linked to the notification, fortifies<\/p>\n
         the  argument that the description of  the  land<\/p>\n
         under  acquisition in the impugned  notification<\/p>\n
         fails  to meet the legal requirement of a  brief<\/p>\n
         description  of  the  land  which  renders   the<\/p>\n
         notification invalid.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n
        20. Thus, the acquiring authority failed at two levels  in<\/p>\n
the  said  case before the Supreme Court, viz., (i) by failure  to<\/p>\n
append a plan to the notification and (ii) by failure to produce a<\/p>\n
plan even at the time of hearing, so as to link the same with  the<\/p>\n
notification. But in the present case, the notification  published<\/p>\n
in  the  Gazette  of  India under Section  3-A<\/a>  (1)  of  the  Act,<\/p>\n
contained  the following information, as part of the  notification<\/p>\n
itself, immediately before the schedule:-<\/p>\n
                 “The  land  plans and other details  of<\/p>\n
         the  land  covered under this notification  are<\/p>\n
         available   and   can  be  inspected   by   the<\/p>\n
         interested  persons  at  the  Office   of   the<\/p>\n
         Competent Authority.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n
        21. The notification dated 12.8.2005 gave a time limit  of<\/p>\n
21 days for any person interested in the lands to raise objections<\/p>\n
under  Section 3-C<\/a> (1) of the Act and admittedly, the  petitioners<\/p>\n
failed  to  avail  the said opportunity. The petitioners  did  not<\/p>\n
avail either the opportunity to file objections in response to the<\/p>\n
notification  dated 12.8.2005 or the opportunity  to  inspect  the<\/p>\n
land  plans  and  other  details at the Office  of  the  Competent<\/p>\n
Authority, despite an offer being made in the notification itself.<\/p>\n
Therefore, on facts, I find that the law laid down by the  Supreme<\/p>\n
Court in Competent Authority vs. Barangore Jute Factory<\/a> (2005 (13)<\/p>\n
SCC 477), is not applicable to the case on hand. A similar view is<\/p>\n
taken  by the Division Bench of this Court in The General  Manager<\/p>\n
(Tech.) and Project Director, National Highways Authority of India<\/p>\n
vs.  Mrs.Sridevi  and  Others<\/a> (2006  (5)  CTC  634),  whereby  the<\/p>\n
Division Bench distinguished the aforesaid decision of the Supreme<\/p>\n
Court  with  reference  to  the specific  statement  made  in  the<\/p>\n
notification  itself to the effect that the land plans  and  other<\/p>\n
details can be inspected by any person interested at the Office of<\/p>\n
the Competent Authority.\n<\/p>\n
\n
        22.  In any event, the petitioners may not be entitled  to<\/p>\n
raise  the issue of vagueness in notification, since the  sequence<\/p>\n
of  events show that the petitioners have understood what portions<\/p>\n
of  the land are sought to be acquired. As observed by the Supreme<\/p>\n
Court  in para-8 of the aforesaid decision, the absence of a  plan<\/p>\n
renders  the  right to file objections, nugatory. As  a  necessary<\/p>\n
corollary,  clarity in the notification was always insisted,  only<\/p>\n
for  the  purpose  of  making the opportunity to  file  objections<\/p>\n
meaningful.  In  this  case,  after having  sent  a  letter  dated<\/p>\n
5.1.2006,  followed  by a legal notice dated  31.1.2006,  feigning<\/p>\n
ignorance  of the details, the petitioners were able to submit  an<\/p>\n
alternative  proposal on 3.3.2006, with an expert opinion  from  a<\/p>\n
retired   Chief   Urban   Planner  of  the  Chennai   Metropolitan<\/p>\n
Development  Authority.  Thus,  the  petitioners  appear  to  have<\/p>\n
understood  precisely, what portion of the land was  going  to  be<\/p>\n
acquired  and what portion was going to be left out. Without  such<\/p>\n
an  understanding,  the petitioners could not  have  submitted  an<\/p>\n
alternative  proposal  with  an  expert  opinion.  Therefore,  the<\/p>\n
absence of precise details in the notification, had not prejudiced<\/p>\n
the rights of the petitioners.\n<\/p>\n
\n
        23. It is also pertinent to note that the petitioners have<\/p>\n
not  chosen  to  challenge the notification under  Section  3-A(1)<\/a><\/p>\n
dated  12.8.2005,  but  chosen to challenge only  the  declaration<\/p>\n
under  Section  3-D(1)<\/a> dated 18.11.2005 and the  Award  passed  on<\/p>\n
8.12.2006.  As  a matter of fact, the petitioners have  stated  in<\/p>\n
para-10  of the affidavit in support of W.P.No.1482 of  2007  that<\/p>\n
they have no objection for the acquisition of their vacant portion<\/p>\n
of  land.  After having said so, it is not open to the petitioners<\/p>\n
to  contend that the notification under Section 3-A(1)<\/a> is vitiated<\/p>\n
on account of vagueness.\n<\/p>\n
\n
         24.  As  rightly  contended  by  the  learned  Additional<\/p>\n
Solicitor  General,  the  notification under  Section  3-A(1)<\/a>  was<\/p>\n
issued  on  12.8.2005, the declaration under  Section  3-D(1)<\/a>  was<\/p>\n
issued  on  18.11.2005 and the substance of the declaration  under<\/p>\n
Section  3-D(1)<\/a>  was  published in the Newspapers  on  20.12.2005.<\/p>\n
Consequently,  the property vested with the Central Government  by<\/p>\n
virtue  of  Section  3-D(2)<\/a> and the Award  itself  was  passed  on<\/p>\n
8.12.2006. The petitioners chose to come to Court only in  January<\/p>\n
2007, after allowing the Award to be passed. The Supreme Court, in<\/p>\n
Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay vs. Industrial Development<\/p>\n
Investment  Co. Pvt. Ltd and Others<\/a> ((1996) 11 SCC  501)),  traced<\/p>\n
the  history of law relating to the maintainability of a challenge<\/p>\n
to  the  acquisition proceedings, after the Award is passed,  from<\/p>\n
paragraph-23 onwards and held in para-29 that the Court should  be<\/p>\n
loath  to quash the notifications, when there is inordinate  delay<\/p>\n
in  filing  the  writ  petition and when all steps  taken  in  the<\/p>\n
acquisition proceedings have become final.<\/p>\n
        25. In Municipal Council, Ahmed Nagar vs. Shah Hyder Beig<\/a>,<\/p>\n
2000 (2) SCC 48, the Supreme Court held in para-17 as follows:-<\/p>\n
                 “17.  In any event, after the award  is<\/p>\n
         passed   no   writ  petition   can   be   filed<\/p>\n
         challenging the acquisition notice  or  against<\/p>\n
         any  proceeding thereunder. This has  been  the<\/p>\n
         consistent view taken by this Court and in  one<\/p>\n
         of the recent cases.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n
        26. Though the aforesaid view that no writ petition can be<\/p>\n
entertained  after  the  Award is passed,  appears  to  have  been<\/p>\n
explained in the latest decision relied upon by the learned Senior<\/p>\n
Counsel  for the petitioners in Competent Authority vs.  Barangore<\/p>\n
Jute Factory<\/a> (2005 (13) SCC 477), the same need not detain us  for<\/p>\n
long  in view of the fact that the said decision is not applicable<\/p>\n
to  the  facts  of  the present case, for the  reasons  stated  in<\/p>\n
paragraphs-20 and 21 above.\n<\/p>\n
II. PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL:\n<\/p>\n
        27.  Coming to the second part of the sequence of  events,<\/p>\n
commencing from the Newspaper report dated 19.2.2006, the  learned<\/p>\n
Senior  Counsel  for  the  petitioners  contended  that  the  very<\/p>\n
invitation for an alternative proposal from the Minister concerned<\/p>\n
(the  4th  respondent  herein), amounted to  promissory  estoppel.<\/p>\n
Drawing my attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Union<\/p>\n
of  India  vs.  Godfrey Philips India Ltd<\/a> (AIR 1986 SC  806),  the<\/p>\n
learned  Senior Counsel contended that the doctrine of  promissory<\/p>\n
estoppel  is well established in the Administrative Law of  India.<\/p>\n
It represents a principle evolved by equity to avoid injustice. In<\/p>\n
para-9  of  the  said  judgment, the Supreme Court  explained  the<\/p>\n
doctrine in the following words:-\n<\/p>\n
                  “The   true  principle  of  promissory<\/p>\n
         estoppel  is that where one party  has  by  his<\/p>\n
         word  or conduct made to the other a clear  and<\/p>\n
         unequivocal promise or representation which  is<\/p>\n
         intended to create legal relations or affect  a<\/p>\n
         legal  relationship  to arise  in  the  future,<\/p>\n
         knowing  or  intending that it would  be  acted<\/p>\n
         upon by the other party to whom the promise  or<\/p>\n
         representation is made and it  is  in  fact  so<\/p>\n
         acted  upon by the other party, the promise  or<\/p>\n
         representation would be binding  on  the  party<\/p>\n
         making  it and he would not be entitled  to  go<\/p>\n
         back  upon  it,  if it would be inequitable  to<\/p>\n
         allow  him  to  do  so, having  regard  to  the<\/p>\n
         dealings  which  have taken place  between  the<\/p>\n
         parties.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n
        28. The learned Senior Counsel relied upon the decision in<\/p>\n
Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd vs. Union of India<\/a> (1988 (1) SCC<\/p>\n
86), to drive home the point that it is not necessary to prove any<\/p>\n
damage,  detriment  or  prejudice  to  the  party  asserting   the<\/p>\n
estoppel.  The Supreme Court held in the said case in  para-24  as<\/p>\n
follows:-\n<\/p>\n
                  “24. The concept of detriment as we now<\/p>\n
          understand  it  is whether it  appears  unjust,<\/p>\n
          unreasonable  or inequitable that the  promisor<\/p>\n
          should  be allowed to resile from his assurance<\/p>\n
          or  representation, having regard to  what  the<\/p>\n
          promisee  has done or refrained from  doing  in<\/p>\n
          reliance on the assurance or representation.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n
        29. The doctrine of promissory estoppel, according to  the<\/p>\n
learned  Senior Counsel for the petitioners, took a leap  forward,<\/p>\n
in the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab vs. Nestle<\/p>\n
India  Limited<\/a>  (2004 (6) SCC 465), where the Supreme  Court  held<\/p>\n
that  the  principle  would be applied even when  the  promise  is<\/p>\n
intended  to create legal relations or affect a legal relationship<\/p>\n
which would arise in future. In para-29 of the said judgment,  the<\/p>\n
Supreme  Court  made  it  clear that the  Government  was  equally<\/p>\n
susceptible to the operation of the doctrine, in whatever area  or<\/p>\n
field  the  promise  is  made  –  contractual,  administrative  or<\/p>\n
statutory.\n<\/p>\n
\n
        30.  There  is  no  doubt about the applicability  of  the<\/p>\n
doctrine  even  to  administrative or statutory functions  of  the<\/p>\n
Government.  But  there  are  well known  pre-conditions  for  the<\/p>\n
applicability and the operation of the doctrine, which are  spelt-<\/p>\n
out  in para-28 of the judgment in Nestle India case. They are  as<\/p>\n
follows:-\n<\/p>\n
                “(1)  a  clear  and unequivocal  promise<\/p>\n
        knowing  and  intending that it would  be  acted<\/p>\n
        upon by the promisee;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                (2) such acting upon the promise by  the<\/p>\n
        promisee  so  that  it would be  inequitable  to<\/p>\n
        allow the promisor to go back on the promise.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n
       31. Applying the above two pre-conditions, I do not find in<\/p>\n
this case that there was either a clear and unequivocal promise by<\/p>\n
the respondents including the 4th respondent or such an acting  on<\/p>\n
the  part of the petitioners as would make it inequitable to allow<\/p>\n
the  respondents  to go back on the same. Even if  we  go  by  the<\/p>\n
Newspaper report dated 19.2.2006, the statement that is attributed<\/p>\n
to  the  fourth  respondent  is that the  Central  Government  was<\/p>\n
prepared  to  reconsider the matter, if any alternative  proposal,<\/p>\n
which would not affect the other land owners, was submitted.  Even<\/p>\n
if  such a statement is taken to be a promise, by stretching it  a<\/p>\n
little  in  favour  of the petitioners, I do  not  find  that  the<\/p>\n
petitioners have acted on the promise in such a manner or  altered<\/p>\n
their position to such an extent, as would make it inequitable  to<\/p>\n
permit  the  respondents  to go back on the  same.  All  that  the<\/p>\n
petitioners  have  done in response to the said statement,  is  to<\/p>\n
submit  an  alternative proposal. The position of the  petitioners<\/p>\n
did not get altered on account of the promise and their acting  on<\/p>\n
the  promise and they did not become worse off on account  of  the<\/p>\n
said  statement  and  the submission of an  alternative  proposal.<\/p>\n
There  is  no  averment in the affidavits in support of  the  writ<\/p>\n
petitions that the petitioners altered their position, on  account<\/p>\n
of the statement made by the fourth respondent, as reported in the<\/p>\n
Press  on  19.2.2006. Therefore, I am of the considered view  that<\/p>\n
there was neither a promise nor an estoppel in this case.<\/p>\n
III. LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION:-\n<\/p>\n
        32.  Dr.Rajeev  Dhavan,  learned Senior  Counsel  for  the<\/p>\n
petitioners  contended  that  the  promise  made  by  the   fourth<\/p>\n
respondent in his Press interview as reported in the Newspaper  on<\/p>\n
19.2.2006,  inviting  alternative  proposal,  gave   rise   to   a<\/p>\n
legitimate expectation on the part of the petitioners, even if the<\/p>\n
same  is  not  taken  to  have conferred a legal  right  upon  the<\/p>\n
petitioners. Therefore, it is the contention of the learned Senior<\/p>\n
Counsel  that  the  respondents  were  obliged  to  give   a   due<\/p>\n
consideration to the alternative proposal made by the  petitioners<\/p>\n
and  that  the respondents were duty bound “to treat  the  citizen<\/p>\n
with fullest personal consideration”.\n<\/p>\n
\n
        33. In Madras City Wine Merchants’ Association and Another<\/p>\n
vs.  State  of  Tamil Nadu<\/a> (1994 (5) SCC 509), the  Supreme  Court<\/p>\n
considered the doctrine of legitimate expectation at length,  from<\/p>\n
paragraph-43  onwards upto paragraph-48. In para-45  of  the  said<\/p>\n
judgment,  the  Supreme Court extracted the meaning  of  the  term<\/p>\n
“Legitimate  Expectation”, as it appears  in  Halsbury’s  Laws  of<\/p>\n
England as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
                  “A   person   may  have  a   legitimate<\/p>\n
         expectation  of being treated in a  certain  way<\/p>\n
         by  an  Administrative Authority even though  he<\/p>\n
         has  no  legal right in Private Law  to  receive<\/p>\n
         such treatment”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n
        34.  After  pointing out that such expectation  may  arise<\/p>\n
either from a representation or promise made by the authority, the<\/p>\n
Supreme  Court pointed out in the said decision that though  there<\/p>\n
is  an analogy between the doctrines of legitimate expectation and<\/p>\n
of  estoppel,  the  two are distinct in that detrimental  reliance<\/p>\n
upon the representation\/promise was not a necessary ingredient  of<\/p>\n
a legitimate expectation.\n<\/p>\n
\n
        35.  It  is  no  doubt true that the requirement  of  “due<\/p>\n
consideration”  of  a legitimate expectation  forms  part  of  the<\/p>\n
principle  of non-arbitrariness, which is a necessary  concomitant<\/p>\n
of  the Rule of Law and the Government Departments are expected to<\/p>\n
treat the citizen with fullest personal consideration. But as held<\/p>\n
by  the  Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Hindustan Development<\/p>\n
Corporation  and Others<\/a> (1993 (3) SCC 499), which is  also  quoted<\/p>\n
with approval in Madras City Wine Merchants’ Association case:<\/p>\n
                  “if a denial of legitimate expectation<\/p>\n
          in  a  given case amounts to denial  of  right<\/p>\n
          guaranteed  or  is arbitrary,  discriminatory,<\/p>\n
          unfair  or  biased, gross abuse  of  power  or<\/p>\n
          violation  of  principles of natural  justice,<\/p>\n
          the  same can be questioned on the well  known<\/p>\n
          grounds  attracting Article  14<\/a>  but  a  claim<\/p>\n
          based on a mere legitimate expectation without<\/p>\n
          anything more cannot ipso facto give  a  right<\/p>\n
          to  invoke these principles. It can be one  of<\/p>\n
          the  grounds  to consider but the  Court  must<\/p>\n
          lift the veil and see whether the decision  is<\/p>\n
          violative   of  these  principles   warranting<\/p>\n
          interference.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n
        36.  The scope and ambit of the doctrine was again lucidly<\/p>\n
spelt out in para-35 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Union<\/p>\n
of India vs. Hindustan Development Corporation<\/a> (1993 (3) SCC 499),<\/p>\n
in the following words:-\n<\/p>\n
                   “It   follows  that  the  concept   of<\/p>\n
          legitimate  expectation is not  the  key  which<\/p>\n
          unlocks the treasury of natural justice and  it<\/p>\n
          ought  not to unlock the gates which shuts  the<\/p>\n
          Court out of review on the merits, particularly<\/p>\n
          when the element of speculation and uncertainty<\/p>\n
          is inherent in that very concept.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n
        37. In the light of the principles underlying the doctrine<\/p>\n
of  legitimate expectation as culled out from the decisions of the<\/p>\n
Supreme  Court, it is clear that the petitioners should  establish<\/p>\n
that   there   was  no  due  consideration  or  fullest   personal<\/p>\n
consideration  or  that  there was a violation  of  principles  of<\/p>\n
natural  justice  or  that  the  action  of  the  respondents  was<\/p>\n
arbitrary,  discriminatory, unfair or biased  or  that  there  was<\/p>\n
gross  abuse  of  power,  for enabling this  Court  to  apply  the<\/p>\n
doctrine to the benefit of the petitioners.<\/p>\n
        38.  But a perusal of the records in this case shows  that<\/p>\n
none  of  the above principles underlying the doctrine,  has  been<\/p>\n
violated. This is seen from the following sequence of events:-<\/p>\n
                   (a)   The   petitioners   submit    an<\/p>\n
         alternative   proposal  on  3.3.2006,   to   the<\/p>\n
         Central   Government,  with  a   copy   to   the<\/p>\n
         Competent   Authority   and   Special   District<\/p>\n
         Revenue    Officer   (LA),   National   Highways<\/p>\n
         Schemes, Kancheepuram.\n<\/p>\n
                 (b)  The  Competent Authority  in  turn,<\/p>\n
         forwards  the proposal to the Project  Director,<\/p>\n
         National  Highways  Authority  of  India,  by  a<\/p>\n
         letter dated 13.3.2006.\n<\/p>\n
                 (c)  The National Highways Authority  of<\/p>\n
         India,  forwards the proposal to the Tamil  Nadu<\/p>\n
         Road   Development   Company   Ltd.,   for    an<\/p>\n
         examination of the proposal, “with reference  to<\/p>\n
         the  site  conditions” and for submission  of  a<\/p>\n
         report.\n<\/p>\n
                 (d)  The  Tamil  Nadu  Road  Development<\/p>\n
         Company   Ltd.,  which  is  actually  a  Company<\/p>\n
         promoted    by   the   Tamil   Nadu   Industrial<\/p>\n
         Development      Corporation      Ltd.,      and<\/p>\n
         Infrastructure  Leasing and  Financial  Services<\/p>\n
         Ltd.,  examines the proposal and issues a  reply<\/p>\n
         on  9.5.2006 to the National Highways  Authority<\/p>\n
         of  India. The contents of the said reply are as<\/p>\n
         follows:-\n<\/p>\n
                     “The   Land  Owner’s  Alternate<\/p>\n
            Proposal   does  not  contain  geometric<\/p>\n
            details  of  loops and  ramps.  However,<\/p>\n
            based  on the available details and  the<\/p>\n
            provisions  of relevant IRC  Codes,  the<\/p>\n
            following brief comments are offered  on<\/p>\n
            the Alternate Proposal:\n<\/p>\n
                    (a)  No provision has been  made<\/p>\n
            for Right turn from Parrys to Padi.\n<\/p>\n
                    (b)  Incorporation of Parrys  to<\/p>\n
            Padi   Right   turn  in  the   Alternate<\/p>\n
            Proposal   will  entail   provision   of<\/p>\n
            unacceptable high-grade. As per IRC  86-\n<\/p>\n
            1983  Clause  11.2, a max. grade  of  4%<\/p>\n
            only is permissible.\n<\/p>\n
                     (c)  The  horizontal  geometric<\/p>\n
            alignment of the Southeast Loop and free<\/p>\n
            left  from  Parrys  to  Guindy  do   not<\/p>\n
            satisfy the Codal provisions of IRC  86-\n<\/p>\n
            1983.    Clause   10.3   which   require<\/p>\n
            provision of super elevation of 4% for a<\/p>\n
            design speed of 30 kmph.<\/p>\n
\n
                    (d)  As  per IRC 92-1985  Clause<\/p>\n
            15.2,    the   merging   in\/out   length<\/p>\n
            (acceleration and deceleration  lengths)<\/p>\n
            shall be 180 and 90 m respectively.  The<\/p>\n
            separation between the points  of  entry<\/p>\n
            and exist from the Loops does not appear<\/p>\n
            to be as per this provision.\n<\/p>\n
            The   objective  of  constructing   this<\/p>\n
            Interchange at Koyambedu is  to  provide<\/p>\n
            free  flow  facilities to  Chennai  City<\/p>\n
            from  NH-4. The Alternate Proposal  does<\/p>\n
            not   fulfill  the  objective   and   is<\/p>\n
            therefore not implementable.”\n<\/p>\n
                 (e)  The National Highways Authority  of<\/p>\n
         India  communicated  the opinion  of  the  Tamil<\/p>\n
         Nadu  Road  Development  Company  Ltd.,  to  the<\/p>\n
         Competent   Authority,   by   a   letter   dated<\/p>\n
         20.6.2006  and  further pointed  out  that  “the<\/p>\n
         objective of construction of grade separator  at<\/p>\n
         Koyambedu Junction was to provide free  flow  of<\/p>\n
         traffic on all the four directions and that  the<\/p>\n
         alternative proposal of the petitioners did  not<\/p>\n
         fulfill  the  objectives  for  which  the  grade<\/p>\n
         separator has been proposed at the junction.”<\/p>\n
                 (f)  In view of the opinion tendered  by<\/p>\n
         Tamil  Nadu Road Development Company  Ltd.,  and<\/p>\n
         the  National Highways Authority of  India,  the<\/p>\n
         Central Government informed the petitioners,  by<\/p>\n
         the  letter dated 1.11.2006 that the alternative<\/p>\n
         proposal  was found to be technically  deficient<\/p>\n
         and  that  therefore,  it was  not  possible  to<\/p>\n
         change  the  layout  plan  of  Koyambedu   grade<\/p>\n
         separator at that stage.<\/p>\n
\n
                  (g)   The   petitioners  sent   another<\/p>\n
         representation     dated     20.11.2006      for<\/p>\n
         reconsideration and the same was  also  rejected<\/p>\n
         by an order dated 3.1.2007.\n<\/p>\n
\n
        39.  The above flow of events shows that there has been  a<\/p>\n
due  consideration of the alternative proposal. The  proposal  was<\/p>\n
examined  by  an  independent expert body namely Tamil  Nadu  Road<\/p>\n
Development  Company  Ltd (promoted by the Tamil  Nadu  Industrial<\/p>\n
Development  Corporation  Ltd.,  and  Infrastructure  Leasing  and<\/p>\n
Financial  Services  Ltd.).  Therefore,  the  rejection   of   the<\/p>\n
alternative  proposal  also does not appear  to  be  arbitrary  or<\/p>\n
unfair or violative of the principles of natural justice. Hence, I<\/p>\n
am unable to accept the contention that there has been a violation<\/p>\n
of the doctrine of legitimate expectation.<\/p>\n
        40.  Moreover, as held by the Supreme Court  in  Union  of<\/p>\n
India  vs.  International Trading Co. And Another<\/a>  (2003  (5)  SCC<\/p>\n
437):\n<\/p>\n
                 “The  doctrines of promissory  estoppel<\/p>\n
         and  legitimate expectation cannot come in  the<\/p>\n
         way  of  public interest, which has to  prevail<\/p>\n
         over private interest.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
As  a  matter of fact, the Supreme Court cautioned that “for legal<\/p>\n
purposes, expectation is not the same as anticipation”. Therefore,<\/p>\n
in  my  considered view, the petitioners have not made out a  case<\/p>\n
for the invocation of the doctrine of legitimate expectation.<\/p>\n
IV. MALA FIDES:\n<\/p>\n
        41.  In  the  affidavits  filed in  support  of  the  writ<\/p>\n
petitions,  it  is  contended  by the  petitioners  that  a  State<\/p>\n
Political  Party  was  formed by one of the  writ  petitioners  in<\/p>\n
September 2005 and that the popular support for the party was ever<\/p>\n
growing as seen from the fact that even by contesting the Assembly<\/p>\n
Elections  independently  without any alliance  in  May  2006,  it<\/p>\n
secured  8.33% of votes polled in the State. It is stated  in  the<\/p>\n
affidavits that on account of the impact created by the Party, the<\/p>\n
rival  Political Parties decided to throttle and crush  the  Party<\/p>\n
floated by the petitioners even at the threshold. Taking cue  from<\/p>\n
those  averments, the learned Senior Counsel for  the  petitioners<\/p>\n
contended that the invitation for an alternative proposal was made<\/p>\n
by  the  fourth respondent on 19.2.2006, the General Elections  to<\/p>\n
the  State  Assembly were held in May 2006, the Elections  to  the<\/p>\n
Local  Bodies were held in October 2006 and the rejection  of  the<\/p>\n
alternative  proposal  submitted by the petitioners  was  made  on<\/p>\n
1.11.2006.   From  this  sequence of events,  the  learned  Senior<\/p>\n
Counsel  wanted  to draw an inference that the  rejection  of  the<\/p>\n
alternative proposal amounted to mala fide exercise of power in as<\/p>\n
much  as there was a long gap of about eight months in considering<\/p>\n
the  alternative proposal and communicating the decision  thereon.<\/p>\n
It  is only during this period of eight months from 3.3.2006 (date<\/p>\n
of  submission  of  alternative proposal) to  1.11.2006  (date  of<\/p>\n
rejection  of the same) that the Assembly Elections were  held  in<\/p>\n
May  2006  and  Local Body Elections were held  in  October  2006.<\/p>\n
Therefore,   the  learned  Senior  Counsel  for  the   petitioners<\/p>\n
contended  that  the  reasons  for rejection  of  the  alternative<\/p>\n
proposal were obvious.\n<\/p>\n
\n
        42.  In  support of his contention about the alleged  mala<\/p>\n
fide  exercise  of  power,  the learned  Senior  Counsel  for  the<\/p>\n
petitioners  relied  upon the decisions of the  Supreme  Court  in<\/p>\n
S.Partap Singh vs. State of Punjab<\/a> (AIR 1964 SC 72) and C.S.Rowjee<\/p>\n
vs. State of Andhra Pradesh<\/a> (AIR 1964 SC 962).<\/p>\n
        43.  In  Partap Singh’s case, after holding that  indirect<\/p>\n
motive or purpose or bad faith or personal ill-will is not  to  be<\/p>\n
held  established except on clear proof thereof, the Supreme Court<\/p>\n
accepted that it is obviously difficult to establish the state  of<\/p>\n
a  man’s mind. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded in para-8 of<\/p>\n
the  said  judgment  that bad faith can be  inferred  from  proved<\/p>\n
facts, in the following words:-\n<\/p>\n
                  “We   must,  however,  demur  to   the<\/p>\n
         suggestion  that, mala fide  in  the  sense  of<\/p>\n
         improper motive should be established  only  by<\/p>\n
         direct  evidence  that  is  that  it  must   be<\/p>\n
         discernible from the order impugned or must  be<\/p>\n
         shown  from  the  notings  in  the  file  which<\/p>\n
         preceded the order. If bad faith would  vitiate<\/p>\n
         the  order,  the same can, in our  opinion,  be<\/p>\n
         deduced   as   a  reasonable  and   inescapable<\/p>\n
         inference from proved facts.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n
        44.  After holding so in Partap Singh’s case, the  Supreme<\/p>\n
Court  also added a word of caution in C.S.Rowjee’s case,  on  the<\/p>\n
following lines:-\n<\/p>\n
                  “It  is  true that allegations of  mala<\/p>\n
          fides  and of improper motives on the  part  of<\/p>\n
          those  in  power are frequently made and  their<\/p>\n
          frequency has increased in recent times. It  is<\/p>\n
          also  somewhat unfortunate that allegations  of<\/p>\n
          this  nature which have no foundation in  fact,<\/p>\n
          are  made  in several of the cases  which  have<\/p>\n
          come  up  before  the Supreme Court  and  other<\/p>\n
          Courts and it is found that they have been made<\/p>\n
          merely with a view to cause prejudice or in the<\/p>\n
          hope  that whether they have basis in  fact  or<\/p>\n
          not,   some   of  it  at  least  might   stick.<\/p>\n
          Consequently  it  has become the  duty  of  the<\/p>\n
          Court to scrutinise these allegations with care<\/p>\n
          so  as  to avoid being in any manner influenced<\/p>\n
          by them, in cases where they have no foundation<\/p>\n
          in fact.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n
        45.  The  above note of caution appears to have percolated<\/p>\n
down  in  all  subsequent  decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court.  In<\/p>\n
E.P.Royappa vs. State of Tamil Nadu<\/a> (1974 (4) SCC 3), the  Supreme<\/p>\n
Court  held  that the burden of establishing mala  fides  is  very<\/p>\n
heavy  on  the  person  who alleges it. In  para-92  of  the  said<\/p>\n
decision, the Apex Court held that “the allegations of mala  fides<\/p>\n
are often more easily made than proved and the very seriousness of<\/p>\n
such allegations demands proof of a high order of credibility.”<\/p>\n
       46. Again in para-25 of its decision in State of Punjab vs.<\/p>\n
V.K.  Khanna<\/a>  (2001  (2)  SCC 330), the  Apex  Court  held  in  no<\/p>\n
uncertain  terms, as to what would constitute “mala fide”  in  the<\/p>\n
following words:-\n<\/p>\n
               “The  expression “mala fide” has a  definite<\/p>\n
       significance in the legal phraseology and  the  same<\/p>\n
       cannot  possibly emanate out of fanciful imagination<\/p>\n
       or  even  apprehensions but there must  be  existing<\/p>\n
       definite  evidence of bias and actions which  cannot<\/p>\n
       be  attributed to be otherwise bona fide  –  actions<\/p>\n
       not  otherwise  bona  fide, however,  by  themselves<\/p>\n
       would not amount to be mala fide unless the same  is<\/p>\n
       in accompaniment with some other factors which would<\/p>\n
       depict  a  bad motive or intent on the part  of  the<\/p>\n
       doer of the act.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n
        47.  In  the backdrop of the law laid down by the  Supreme<\/p>\n
Court  on  the  issue relating to mala fides, if  we  examine  the<\/p>\n
pleadings  of the petitioners, the documents available  on  record<\/p>\n
and   the  circumstances  surrounding  the  examination   of   the<\/p>\n
alternative  proposal submitted by the petitioners,  it  is  clear<\/p>\n
that  there has been no mala fide exercise of power. If  we  again<\/p>\n
look  into the sequence of events, at the risk of repetition,  the<\/p>\n
project   for  construction  of  “grade  separators”  for  “golden<\/p>\n
quadrilateral”,  was  mooted in 2004 and  the  notification  under<\/p>\n
Section  3-A(1)<\/a> itself was issued on 12.8.2005, one  month  before<\/p>\n
one  of  the petitioners floated the Political Party on 14.9.2005.<\/p>\n
Even  before the strength of the said Political Party could become<\/p>\n
known in terms of popular support, the declaration under Section 3-<\/p>\n
D(1)  was  issued on 18.11.2005. Therefore, the property  actually<\/p>\n
vested  with the Central Government, by virtue of Section  3-D(2)<\/a>,<\/p>\n
immediately after the publication of the declaration under Section<\/p>\n
3-D(1)<\/a>. The Press statement attributed to the fourth respondent is<\/p>\n
dated  19.2.2006  and the alternative proposal  was  submitted  on<\/p>\n
3.3.2006. Thus it is clear that there is no and there cannot  also<\/p>\n
be, any allegation of mala fides, upto the stage of publication of<\/p>\n
the  declaration and the vesting of the property  in  the  Central<\/p>\n
Government.\n<\/p>\n
\n
        48.  Coming  to  the events after the  submission  of  the<\/p>\n
alternative proposal, it is seen from the scheme of the  Act  that<\/p>\n
there  is  no  provision in the Act either for  divesting  or  for<\/p>\n
reconveyancing, of a land which vests with the Central Government.<\/p>\n
While  under  the  Land Acquisition Act<\/a>, 1894, the  Government  is<\/p>\n
given  liberty to withdraw from the acquisition, of any  land,  of<\/p>\n
which,  possession has not been taken, under Section 48(1)<\/a> of  the<\/p>\n
Act  and  there is also a provision for reconveyance under Section<\/p>\n
48-B<\/a> of the Act, in so far as the State of Tamil Nadu is concerned<\/p>\n
(by  virtue of Tamil Nadu Amendment Act 16 of 1997), there  is  no<\/p>\n
similar provision in the National Highways Act<\/a>, 1956. In order  to<\/p>\n
remove  any  doubt about the possible invocation of the provisions<\/p>\n
of  the  Land  Acquisition Act<\/a>, 1894, the National  Highways  Act<\/a>,<\/p>\n
1956,  makes it clear under Section 3-J<\/a> that “nothing in the  Land<\/p>\n
Acquisition  Act<\/a>, 1894, shall apply to an acquisition  under  this<\/p>\n
Act”.\n<\/p>\n
        49.  In  the light of the scheme of the National  Highways<\/p>\n
Act<\/a>,  1956,  and  the absence of any provision  for  divesting  or<\/p>\n
reconveyancing,  I  am  unable  to see  how  far  the  respondents<\/p>\n
including  the  fourth respondent could have gone, in  considering<\/p>\n
the  alternative proposal submitted by the petitioners, after  the<\/p>\n
land  vested with the Central Government. Interestingly, there  is<\/p>\n
not  even a provision in the National Highways Act<\/a>, 1956, akin  to<\/p>\n
Section  11-A<\/a>  of  the  Land Acquisition Act,  1894,  whereby  the<\/p>\n
acquisition  proceedings  would  lapse  for  the  failure  of  the<\/p>\n
Collector  to pass an Award within a prescribed period.  The  only<\/p>\n
provision  in  the  National Highways  Act<\/a>,  1956,  by  which  the<\/p>\n
proceedings shall lapse, is found in Section 3-D(3)<\/a>. It prescribes<\/p>\n
that if a declaration under Section 3-D(1)<\/a> is not published within<\/p>\n
one year of a notification under Section 3-A<\/a> (1), the notification<\/p>\n
shall cease to have effect.\n<\/p>\n
\n
        50. In this case, the declaration under Section 3-D(1)<\/a> was<\/p>\n
published  on  18.11.2005, within one year the notification  under<\/p>\n
Section  3-A(1)<\/a> dated 12.8.2005 and hence the land vested  in  the<\/p>\n
Central  Government  after the publication under  Section  3-D(1)<\/a>.<\/p>\n
Since  the  alternative proposal itself was made only on  3.3.2006<\/p>\n
after  the  vesting took place, the acquisition proceedings  could<\/p>\n
not  even  have  been allowed to lapse, either by not  passing  an<\/p>\n
Award  under Section 3-G<\/a> or by not taking possession under Section<\/p>\n
3-E<\/a>.\n<\/p>\n
\n
        51.  If  the allegation of mala fide exercise of power  is<\/p>\n
tested  in  the  context  of  the absence  of  any  provision  for<\/p>\n
divesting  or  reconveyancing or for allowing the  proceedings  to<\/p>\n
lapse,  the  conclusion is inevitable that the  fourth  respondent<\/p>\n
could  have done nothing in favour of the petitioners. As a matter<\/p>\n
of  fact,  if the respondents had done anything in favour  of  the<\/p>\n
petitioners,  by considering the alternative proposal  favourably,<\/p>\n
the same might have come under attack from other land owners, as a<\/p>\n
mala  fide exercise of power in favour of the petitioners.  It  is<\/p>\n
seen from the orders passed under Section 3-C(2)<\/a> of the Act by the<\/p>\n
Competent  Authority  that even at that  stage,  many  other  land<\/p>\n
owners  came  up with alternative proposals for a “realignment  of<\/p>\n
the  grade  separator” so as to avoid or minimise  the  impact  of<\/p>\n
acquisition. All those proposals for realignment were rejected  by<\/p>\n
the  Competent  Authority  in his order  under  Section  3-C<\/a>  (2).<\/p>\n
Therefore,   if   the  alternative  proposal  submitted   by   the<\/p>\n
petitioners  after the declaration under Section 3-D(1)<\/a>  had  been<\/p>\n
considered  favourably, the other land owners would have  come  up<\/p>\n
with a challenge to the entire proceedings, on the same grounds on<\/p>\n
which the petitioners have now come, with the only difference that<\/p>\n
their  case might be on a stronger footing in view of the  absence<\/p>\n
of any provision in the Act for divesting or reconveyancing or for<\/p>\n
allowing  the  proceedings to lapse. Therefore,  I  am  unable  to<\/p>\n
countenance  the  challenge of the petitioners to the  acquisition<\/p>\n
proceedings,  as  well  as  to the rejection  of  the  alternative<\/p>\n
proposal, on the ground of mala fides.\n<\/p>\n
\n
V. PROPORTIONALITY:\n<\/p>\n
        52.  Dr.  Rajeev  Dhavan, learned Senior Counsel  for  the<\/p>\n
petitioners contended that a time has come for the Courts to  test<\/p>\n
administrative   action,  on  the  basis  of   the   doctrine   of<\/p>\n
proportionality,  to  find  out if the Administrative  Authorities<\/p>\n
could  have adopted the least invasive or least restrictive choice<\/p>\n
of   measures.   Relying  upon  a  passage  from   the   book   on<\/p>\n
“Administrative  Law”  by  Sir William Wade,  the  learned  Senior<\/p>\n
Counsel contended that “the Wednesbury doctrine is now in terminal<\/p>\n
decline,  but the coup de grace has not yet fallen, despite  calls<\/p>\n
for it from very high authorities”. Contending that the Wednesbury<\/p>\n
test  is  moving  closer to proportionality,  the  learned  Senior<\/p>\n
Counsel drew my attention to paragraph-46 of the decision  of  the<\/p>\n
Supreme Court in Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd vs. U.T. Chandigarh  and<\/p>\n
Others<\/a> (2004 (2) SCC 130), which reads as follows:-<\/p>\n
                  “46.  By  proportionality, it  is  meant<\/p>\n
          that   the  question  whether  while  regulating<\/p>\n
          exercise  of fundamental rights, the appropriate<\/p>\n
          or least restrictive choice of measures has been<\/p>\n
          made by the legislature or the administrator  so<\/p>\n
          as  to achieve the object of the legislation  or<\/p>\n
          the  purpose of the administrative order, as the<\/p>\n
          case may be. Under the principle, the Court will<\/p>\n
          see  that the legislature and the administrative<\/p>\n
          authority<\/p>\n
                      “maintain   a   proper   balance<\/p>\n
            between  the  adverse  effects  which  the<\/p>\n
            legislation  or  the administrative  order<\/p>\n
            may  have  on  the  rights,  liberties  or<\/p>\n
            interests of persons keeping in  mind  the<\/p>\n
            purpose   which  they  were  intended   to<\/p>\n
            serve”.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n
        53.  The bone of contention of the learned Senior  Counsel<\/p>\n
for  the  petitioners, on this aspect, is that if the  respondents<\/p>\n
had  applied  the  test of proportionality, the  Kalyana  Mandapam<\/p>\n
erected  on  the land sought to be acquired at a huge cost,  could<\/p>\n
have been saved, especially since the petitioners were willing  to<\/p>\n
give  alternative land. Though the said contention of the  learned<\/p>\n
Senior Counsel is appealing at first sight, I am unable to fall in<\/p>\n
love  with the same, for the reason that the technical experts  in<\/p>\n
the  field viz., the Tamil Nadu Road Development Company  Ltd  and<\/p>\n
the National Highways Authority of India had examined the proposal<\/p>\n
and  found  it  to  be technically not feasible.  They  have  also<\/p>\n
recorded the reasons for such a conclusion, in their communication<\/p>\n
to the Competent Authority. In the alternative plan shown to me by<\/p>\n
the  learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, it is  seen  that<\/p>\n
they  have adopted a mirror image of the clover-leaf on the  North<\/p>\n
East, to the South East. But such an adoption is stated to involve<\/p>\n
certain  difficulties as per the Codal provisions of  IRC  86-1983<\/p>\n
and 92-1985. It appears that the alternative proposal submitted by<\/p>\n
the petitioners would also involve acquisition of the lands or the<\/p>\n
additional  lands from other persons. Therefore, what  could  have<\/p>\n
been a least restrictive or least invasive choice of measures, for<\/p>\n
the  petitioners, would have actually become the most  restrictive<\/p>\n
or  invasive choice of measures for another person. Therefore, the<\/p>\n
Courts would do well to keep their hands off, when experts form an<\/p>\n
opinion.  The  restraint to be exercised in such cases,  is  aptly<\/p>\n
stated by Justice V.R.Krishna Iyer in Dr.Jagadish Saran and Others<\/p>\n
vs. Union of India<\/a> (1980 (2) SCC 768), in the following words:-<\/p>\n
                   “Judges  should  not  rush  in   where<\/p>\n
          specialists  fear to tread. .. .. To  doubt  is<\/p>\n
          not enough to demolish.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Therefore,   in   my  considered  view,  even  the   doctrine   of<\/p>\n
proportionality will not go to the rescue of the petitioners.<\/p>\n
        54.  Relying  upon the decision of the  Supreme  Court  in<\/p>\n
Jnanedaya  Yogam and Another vs. K.K.Pankajakshy and Others<\/a>  (1999<\/p>\n
(9)  SCC  492),  the  learned Senior Counsel for  the  petitioners<\/p>\n
contended  that  the  Courts have favoured alternative  lands  for<\/p>\n
passages  and  roads,  whenever  the  original  proposal  involved<\/p>\n
demolition of a superstructure. But I am afraid that the facts  in<\/p>\n
the  said  case are on different footing. In the case  before  the<\/p>\n
Supreme  Court,  the  land  of the respondent  was  sought  to  be<\/p>\n
acquired  for  the  purpose  of providing  passage  to  Pallivetta<\/p>\n
procession of Sree Jagannath Temple, Tellicherry. It involved  the<\/p>\n
demolition  of  a  shop  belonging  to  the  respondent  and   the<\/p>\n
respondent contended that a little diversion of the road may  save<\/p>\n
her shop without in any way hindering the procession from reaching<\/p>\n
the  destination.  Since the enquiry under Section  5-A<\/a>  had  been<\/p>\n
dispensed with in the said case, the Supreme Court considered  the<\/p>\n
alternative  proposal and found it to be fair. The only  objection<\/p>\n
of  the  appellant,  to  the alternative  proposal  was  that  the<\/p>\n
original proposal was considered to be a sanctified route  as  per<\/p>\n
the advice of  Astrologers. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded<\/p>\n
that  the  acquisition  cannot  be on  the  basis  of  sentimental<\/p>\n
approach  of  the authorities and that no valid acquisition  under<\/p>\n
the Act can be based on Astrologers’ satisfaction only. But in the<\/p>\n
present   case,   the  alternative  proposal  submitted   by   the<\/p>\n
petitioners,  was  considered by an expert body,  which  has  also<\/p>\n
furnished technical reasons for rejecting the same. Therefore, the<\/p>\n
same  cannot  be  placed  on par with the  satisfaction  that  the<\/p>\n
Authorities reached in the case before the Supreme Court.<\/p>\n
        55. In fine, I am unable to sustain any of the grounds  on<\/p>\n
which the petitioners have assailed the acquisition proceedings as<\/p>\n
well as the rejection of their alternative proposal. Consequently,<\/p>\n
both  the  writ  petitions  are  dismissed.  No  costs.  Connected<\/p>\n
miscellaneous petitions are also dismissed.<\/p>\n
Svn<\/p>\n
To<\/p>\n
1.The Secretary,
\n  Union of India,
\n  Ministry of Shipping, Road Transport
\n  and Highways, Department of Road
\n  Transport and Highways, New Delhi.\n<\/p>\n
2.The Competent Authority and
\n  Special District Revenue Officer (L.A.),
\n  National Highway Schemes,
\n  Kancheepuram and Tiruvallur Districts,
\n  R.D.O. Office, Kancheepuram.\n<\/p>\n
3.The Project Director,
\n  National Highways Authority of India,
\n  SPIC House, No.88, Anna Salai,
\n  Guindy, Chennai-600 032.\n<\/p>\n
4.Hon’ble Minister Mr.T.R.Balu,
\n  Ministry of Shipping,
\n  Road Transport and Highways,
\n  Department of Road Transport and
\n  Highways, New Delhi.\n<\/p>\n
5.The Central Public Information Officer,
\n  National Highways Authority of India,
\n  Central Information Commission,
\n  Old JNU Campus, Block-IV,
\n  5th Floor, New Delhi-110 067.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Madras High Court Shri Andal Alagar Kalyana … vs The Union Of India Rep. on 16 February, 2007 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED: 16.02.2007 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE V.RAMASUBRAMANIAN W.P.Nos.1482 AND 1869 OF 2007 And M.P.Nos. 2, 3, 1 and 4 of 2007 Shri Andal Alagar Kalyana Mandapam Private Limited, […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[8,13],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-258831","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-high-court","category-madras-high-court"],"yoast_head":"\nShri Andal Alagar Kalyana ... vs The Union Of India Rep. on 16 February, 2007 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/shri-andal-alagar-kalyana-vs-the-union-of-india-rep-on-16-february-2007\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Shri Andal Alagar Kalyana ... vs The Union Of India Rep. on 16 February, 2007 - 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