{"id":260659,"date":"1994-12-08T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1994-12-07T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/papnasam-labour-union-vs-madura-coats-ltd-on-8-december-1994"},"modified":"2017-03-20T07:56:01","modified_gmt":"2017-03-20T02:26:01","slug":"papnasam-labour-union-vs-madura-coats-ltd-on-8-december-1994","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/papnasam-labour-union-vs-madura-coats-ltd-on-8-december-1994","title":{"rendered":"Papnasam Labour Union vs Madura Coats Ltd on 8 December, 1994"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Papnasam Labour Union vs Madura Coats Ltd on 8 December, 1994<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1995 AIR 2200, 1995 SCC (1) 501<\/div>\n
Author: G Ray<\/div>\n
Bench: Ray, G.N. (J)<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nPAPNASAM LABOUR UNION\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nMADURA COATS LTD.\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT08\/12\/1994\n\nBENCH:\nRAY, G.N. (J)\nBENCH:\nRAY, G.N. (J)\nHANSARIA B.L. (J)\n\nCITATION:\n 1995 AIR 2200\t\t  1995 SCC  (1) 501\n JT 1995 (1)\t71\t  1994 SCALE  (5)153\n\n\nACT:\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
\nG.N.  RAY,  J.- This appeal is directed\t against  the  order
\ndated  9-4-1981\t passed by the Division Bench  of  the\tHigh
\nCourt  of  Madras in Writ Petition No. 11 19 of\t 1977.\t The
\nsaid  writ petition was moved by Respondent 1  Madura  Coats
\nLtd., for a declaration that Section 25-M<\/a> of the  Industrial
\nDisputes Act, 1947 as it stood under the Industrial Disputes
\n(Amendment)   Act<\/a>,  1976  insofar  as  it   required   prior
\npermission  to be obtained to effect layoff is\tultra  vires
\nand void.  The writ petitioner Respondent I also prayed that
\nthe  State  of Tamil Nadu represented by  the  Secretary  to
\nGovernment, Labour and Employment Department, Madras  should
\nbe  restrained\tfrom enforcing the provisions  of  the\tsaid
\nIndustrial  Disputes (Amendment) Act<\/a> in respect of the\tlay-
\noff application being Application No. 4 of 1976 made by\t the
\npetitioner.   The petitioner also prayed for a writ  in\t the
\nnature\tof certiorari calling for the records of  the  Joint
\nCommissioner of Labour, Madras, for quashing the order dated
\n11  -9-1976  by\t which\tthe  said  lay-off  application\t was
\nrejected  by the Joint Labour Commissioner.  Along with\t the
\nsaid  Writ Petition No. 11 19 of 1977, a number\t of  similar
\nwrit petitions challenging the vires of Section 25-M<\/a> of\t the
\nIndustrial  Disputes  Act  and\tconsequential  prosecutional
\npenalty\t for  the lay-off in contravention of  Section\t25-M<\/a>
\nwere  heard by the Division Bench of the Madras\t High  Court
\nand by one common judgment, all the said writ petitions were
\ndisposed of.\n<\/p>\n
2.The  Division\t Bench of the Madras High Court\t inter\talia
\nheld that Section 25-M<\/a> as it stood under the said  Amendment
\nAct<\/a>, 1976 was constitutionally invalid for the reasons given
\nby this Court in invalidating Section 25-0<\/a> of the Industrial
\nDisputes Act in the decision rendered in Excel Wear v. Union
\nof India<\/a> 1. The Madras High Court further held that in\tview
\nof  its\t finding  that\tSection\t 25-M<\/a>  was  constitutionally
\ninvalid,  it  was unnecessary for the court to go  into\t the
\nvalidity   or  otherwise  of  the  orders  passed   by\t the
\nauthorities  which  had been impugned in some of  the  cases
\nbefore the High
\n1 (1978) 4 SCC 224: 1978 SCC (L&S) 509 :(1979) 1 SCR 1009
\n505<\/span>
\nCourt.\tThe High Court also rejected the prayer for granting
\nleave to appeal to this Court by indicating that as the High
\nCourt  had followed the judgment of the Apex Court in  Excel
\nWear case1, there was no occasion to hold that the  impugned
\ndecision  involved a substantial question of law of  general
\nimportance  which  was required to be decided  by  the\tApex
\nCourt.\n<\/p>\n
3.For the purpose of appreciating the respective contentions
\nof the parties in this appeal, the provisions of Section 25-
\nM  of  the  Industrial\tDisputes  Act  as  amended  by\t the
\nIndustrial  Disputes  (Amendment) Act<\/a>, 1976 is\tset  out  as
\nhereunder:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “25-M.\tProhibition  of\t lay-off.-  (1)\t  No
\n\t      workman  (other  than  a badli  workman  or  a
\n\t      casual  workman)\twhose name is borne  on\t the
\n\t      muster-rolls of an industrial establishment to
\n\t      which  this Chapter applies shall be laid\t off
\n\t      by  his  employer\t except\t with  the  previous
\n\t      permission   of  such  authority\tas  may\t  be
\n\t      specified\t by that appropriate  Government  by
\n\t      notification  in the Official Gazette,  unless
\n\t      such lay-off is due to shortage of power or to
\n\t      natural calamity.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (2)Where\tthe  workman  (other  than  badli
\n\t      workman  or casual workman) of  an  industrial
\n\t      establishment  referred to in sub-section\t (1)
\n\t      have been laid off before the commencement  of
\n\t      the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act<\/a>,\t1976
\n\t      and    such   lay-off   continues\t  at\tsuch
\n\t      commencement, the employer in relation to such
\n\t      establishment   shall,  within  a\t period\t  of
\n\t      fifteen days from such commencement, apply  to
\n\t      the authority specified under sub-section\t (1)
\n\t      for permission to continue the lay-off.
\n\t      (3)   In\tthe  case of every  application\t for
\n\t      permission under sub-section (1)or    sub-
\n\t      section\t(2),  the  authority  to  whom\t the
\n\t      application  has been made may,  after  making
\n\t      such  inquiry  as\t he  thinks  fit,  grant  or
\n\t      refuse, for reasons to be recorded in writing,
\n\t      the permission applied for.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (4)Where an application for permission  has
\n\t      been made under sub-section(1)   or   sub-
\n\t      section  (2)  and the authority  to  whom\t the
\n\t      application is madedoes not communicate  the
\n\t      permission   or  the  refusal  to\t grant\t the
\n\t      permission to the employer within a period  of
\n\t      two   months  from  the  date  on\t which\t the
\n\t      application  is made, the\t permission  applied
\n\t      for  shall be deemed to have been\t granted  on
\n\t      the  expiration  of  the said  period  of\t two
\n\t      months.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (5)Where\tno  application\t for   permission
\n\t      under  sub-section  (1) is made, or  where  no
\n\t      application  for permission under\t sub-section
\n\t      (2) has been made within the period  specified
\n\t      therein, or where the permission for the\tlay-
\n\t      off or the continuance of the lay-off has been
\n\t      refused,\tsuch lay-off shall be deemed  to  be
\n\t      illegal  from  the date on which\tthe  workmen
\n\t      have  been laid off and the workmen  shall  be
\n\t      entitled to all the benefits under any law for
\n\t      the  time\t being in force as if they  had\t not
\n\t      been laid off.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      506<\/span><\/p>\n
\t      (6) The provisions of Section 25-C<\/a> (other than
\n\t      the  second  proviso thereto) shall  apply  to
\n\t      cases of lay-off referred to in this section.
\n\t      Explanation.-   For  the\tpurposes   of\tthis
\n\t      section,\ta workman shall not be deemed to  be
\n\t      laid  off\t by  an employer  if  such  employer
\n\t      offers  any alternative employment  (which  in
\n\t      the opinion of the employer does not call\t for
\n\t      any  special skill or previous experience\t and
\n\t      can  be  done  by the  workman)  in  the\tsame
\n\t      establishment from which he has been laid\t off
\n\t      or in any other establishment belonging to the
\n\t      same  employer,  situate in the same  town  or
\n\t      village, or situate within such distance\tfrom
\n\t      the establishment to which he belongs that the
\n\t      transfer\twill not involve undue\thardship  to
\n\t      the  workman  having regard to the  facts\t and
\n\t      circumstances  of his case, provided that\t the
\n\t      wages  which would normally have been paid  to
\n\t      the  workman are offered for  the\t alternative
\n\t      appointment also.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      4.    Mr Kumar, learned counsel appearing\t for
\n\t      the appellant has contended that the  decision
\n\t      rendered\tin  Excel  Wear\t case1\tis   clearly
\n\t      distinguishable  and the High Court  has\tgone
\n\t      wrong  in\t relying on the\t said  decision\t and
\n\t      accepting the reasons which weighed with\tthis
\n\t      Court  in\t striking  down\t the  constitutional
\n\t      validity\tof  Section 25-0<\/a> of  the  Industrial
\n\t      Disputes Act by holding that the said  reasons
\n\t      are  equally  applicable\tin  considering\t the
\n\t      validity\tof  the\t Section 25-M<\/a>  and  on\tsuch
\n\t      premises declared Section 25-M<\/a> as ultra  vires
\n\t      the Constitution.\t Mr Kumar has submitted that
\n\t      in  the  decision in Excel  Wear\tcase1,\tthis
\n\t      Court  noticed the distinguishing features  in
\n\t      Section  25-M<\/a> and Section 25-N<\/a>, when  compared
\n\t      with  Section 25-0<\/a> of the Industrial  Disputes
\n\t      Act.   This Court noticed that: (SCC  p.\t238,
\n\t      para 16)
\n\t      “Section\t25-M<\/a>  dealt with the  imposition  of
\n\t      further restrictions in the matter of lay-off.
\n\t      Section 25-N<\/a> provided for conditions precedent
\n\t      to  retrenchment of workmen.  In\tthese  cases
\n\t      the vires of neither of the two sections\twere
\n\t      attacked.\t Rather, a contrast was made between
\n\t      the said provisions with those of Section 25-0<\/a>
\n\t      to  attack  the latter.  The  main  difference
\n\t      pointed  out  was that in sub-section  (3)  of
\n\t      Section 25-M<\/a>, the authority while granting  or
\n\t      refusing permission to the employer to  layoff
\n\t      was required to record reasons in writing\t and
\n\t      in  sub-section (4) a provision was made\tthat
\n\t      the permission applied for shall be deemed  to
\n\t      have  been  granted on the expiration  of\t the
\n\t      period of two months.  The period provided  in
\n\t      sub-section (4) enjoins the authority to\tpass
\n\t      the order one way or the other within the said
\n\t      period.\tSimilarly,  in\tsub-section  (2)  of
\n\t      Section  25-N<\/a>  reasons  are  required  to\t  be
\n\t      recorded\tin writing for grant or\t refusal  of
\n\t      the   permission\tfor  retrenchment  and\t the
\n\t      provision\t for retrenchment and the  provision
\n\t      for  deemed permission was made in  subsection
\n\t      (3)   on\tthe  failure  of  the\tgovernmental
\n\t      authority to communicate the permission or the
\n\t      refusal within a period of three months.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
5.   In\t Excel\tWear’  decision\t this  Court  analysed\t the
\nprovisions  of Section 25-0<\/a> and it has been  indicated\tthat
\nunder  Section\t25-0<\/a>, if in the opinion of  the\t appropriate
\nGovernment, the reasons for the intended closure are not
\n507<\/span>
\nadequate and sufficient or if the closure was prejudicial to
\nthe  public  interest,\tpermission to close  down  could  be
\nrefused.   It  was pointed out by this\tCourt  that  reasons
\ngiven  for the closure by the employer might be correct\t yet
\npermission  could be refused if they were thought to be\t not
\nadequate  and  sufficient  by the State\t Government  and  no
\nreason\twas required to be given in the order  granting\t the
\npermission or refusing it.  It was also pointed out that the
\nappropriate Government was not enjoined to pass the order in
\nterms  of sub-section (2) and Section 25-0<\/a> within  90  days’
\nperiod of the notice.  It was indicated in Excel Wear  case’
\nthat even though a situation might arise both from the point
\nof view of law and order and financial aspect that  employer
\nwould  find it impossible to carry on business\tany  longer,
\npermission  could  be  refused even  when  the\treasons\t for
\nintended closure were bona fide but the authority  concerned
\nfelt  that  the closure was against public  interest,  which
\nreason\twould  be universal in all cases of  closure.\tSuch
\nprovision  with potentiality to pass unreasonable order\t was
\nheld  to  be  beyond  the  pale\t of  reasonable\t restriction
\npermitted by Article 19(6)<\/a> of the Constitution.\n<\/p>\n
6.   The learned counsel has submitted that Section 25-M<\/a> and
\nSection 25-N<\/a> have common distinguishing features which\tmake
\nthe  said  two provisions different from  Section  25-0<\/a>\t the
\nvalidity of which was considered by this Court in Excel Wear
\ncase’.\t  In  the  aforesaid  circumstances,  the   decision
\nrendered in Excel Wear case1 is not applicable for  deciding
\nthe constitutional validity of Section 25-M<\/a>.\n<\/p>\n
7.   The  learned  counsel for the  appellant  has  strongly
\nrelied on the decision of this Court in the case of  Workmen
\nv.   Meenakshi\tMills  Ltd<\/a>.2  In  the  said  decision,\t the
\nconstitutional validity of Section 25-N<\/a> as it stood prior to
\nthe  substitution  by Industrial Disputes  (Amendment)\tAct<\/a>,
\n1984  was taken into consideration and it has been  held  by
\nthis   Court  that  conferment\tof  power   on\t appropriate
\nGovernment  authority  to  grant or  refuse  permission\t for
\nretrenchment  is  not vitiated on the ground of\t absence  of
\nprovision  for appeal or revision against or review  of\t the
\norder passed by the Government or authority as the order  is
\nrequired  to be a speaking order to be passed  on  objective
\nconsiderations.\t It has also been held that sub-section\t (2)
\nof  Section  25-N<\/a>  is not vitiated on  the  ground  of\tnon-
\nprescription of guidelines for exercise of the power because
\nexercise  of  the  power under\tSection\t 25-N<\/a>  being  quasi-
\njudicial  in  nature  and  not\tpurely\tadministrative\t and
\ndiscretionary,\tguidelines are not required.  Moreover,\t the
\npower has to be exercised not only by indicating reasons but
\nalso  in  accordance  with the objective  indicated  in\t the
\nStatement of Objects and Reasons given in the said  Amending
\nAct<\/a>,  19’\/6  as\t also  the  basic  idea\t of  settlement\t  of
\nindustrial  disputes and promotion of industrial peace.\t  It
\nhas also been held in the decision in Meenakshi Mills  case2
\nthat  Section  25-N<\/a> as it stood prior to the  Amending\tAct<\/a>,
\n1984,  though  imposed restriction on  employer’s  right  to
\nretrench  workmen,  but such retrenchment  were\t imposed  in
\nconsonance with
\n2 (1992) 3 SCC 336: 1992 SCC (L&S) 679
\n508<\/span>
\nthe Directive Principles of the Constitution and in  general
\npublic\tinterest  and  therefore should be  presumed  to  be
\nreasonable.\n<\/p>\n
8.   The   learned  counsel  has  also\tsubmitted  that\t  in
\nMeenakshi  Mills case2 this Court has  specifically  pointed
\nout that the decision in Excel Wear case1 is not  applicable
\nfor  considering the constitutional validity of the  Section
\n25-N<\/a>.\tIt  has\t been  pointed\tout  in\t distinguishing\t the
\ndecision  made in Excel Wear case1 that sub-section  (2)  of
\nSection 25-0<\/a> provided for an order being passed by the State
\nGovernment  refusing  to  grant\t permission  to\t close\t the
\nundertaking on its subjective satisfaction and there was  no
\nrequirement  for recording of reasons in the said order\t and
\nin these circumstances, this Court held that the absence  of
\na  right  of  appeal  or review\t or  revision  rendered\t the
\nrestriction  as\t unreasonable.\t The  learned  counsel\t has
\ntherefore  submitted  that  in\tview  of  the  decision\t  in
\nMeenakshi  Mills  case2,  the  constitutional  validity\t  of
\nSection\t 25-M<\/a>  cannot  be challenged and  Section  25-M<\/a>\t and
\nSection\t 25-N<\/a>  having  common  features\t and  being  clearly
\ndistinguishable from Section 25-0<\/a> of the Industrial Disputes
\nAct,  the  reasons indicated in Meenakshi  Mills  case2\t for
\nupholding the constitutional validity of Section 25-N<\/a>  fully
\napplies for upholding the constitutional validity of Section
\n25-M<\/a>.  The learned counsel has therefore submitted that\t the
\nappeal should be allowed by holding that Section 25-M<\/a> as  it
\nstood  prior  to  Amending Act<\/a>, 1984 was  valid\t and  orders
\npassed under Section 25-M<\/a> cannot be held illegal and void.\n<\/p>\n
9.   Dr Shankar Ghosh, learned Senior Advocate appearing for
\nRespondent 1, Madura Coats Ltd., has however submitted\tthat
\nfor  appreciating the question of  unreasonable\t restriction
\nimposed\t on  the  fundamental right to\tcarry  on  trade  or
\nbusiness  under the guise of protecting public interest,  it
\nis  necessary  to consider whether or  not  the\t restriction
\nimposed under the statute is consistent with and limited  to
\nthe extent of control required for achieving the purpose for
\nwhich  the  restriction was sought to be imposed.   In\tthis
\nconnection, Dr Ghosh has referred to an earlier decision  of
\nthis  Court in Chintaman Rao v. State of M.p3. In  the\tsaid
\ndecision, Sections 3 and 4 of the Central Province and Berar
\nRegulation  of Manufacture of Bidi  (Agricultural  Purposes)
\nAct, 1948 were taken into consideration.  Under Section 3<\/a> of
\nthe said Act, the Deputy Commissioner was empowered to issue
\nnotification  thereby fixing a period to be an\tagricultural
\nseason\twith  respect to such villages as may  be  specified
\ntherein.   Under  sub-section (1) of Section 4<\/a> of  the\tsaid
\nAct, the Deputy Commissioner was empowered to issue an order
\nin  respect  of\t such villages as  he  may  specify  thereby
\nprohibiting the manufacture of Bidi during the\tagricultural
\nseason.\t  Sub-section  (2)  of Section 4<\/a>  provided  that  no
\nperson residing in a village specified in such order,  shall
\nduring\tthe  agricultural  season,  engage  himself  in\t the
\nmanufacture  of Bidis and no manufacturer shall\t during\t the
\nsaid season employ any person for the manufacture of  Bidis.
\nIn Chintaman Rao case3 this Court has held:
\n3 1950 SCR 759 : AIR 1951 SC 11 8
\n509<\/span>
\n“The  phrase  ‘reasonable  restriction’\t connotes  that\t the
\nlimitation  imposed  on a person in enjoyment of  the  right
\nshould\tnot be arbitrary or of an excessive  nature,  beyond
\nwhat  is required in the interests of the public.  The\tword
\n‘reasonable’ implies intelligent care and deliberation, that
\nis,   the  choice  of  a  course  which\t  reason   dictates.
\nLegislation  which  arbitrarily or excessively\tinvades\t the
\nright\tcannot\t be   said  to\tcontain\t  the\tquality\t  of
\nreasonableness\tand  unless  it\t strikes  a  proper  balance
\nbetween\t the freedom guaranteed in Article 19(1)(g)<\/a> and\t the
\nsocial\tcontrol\t permitted by clause (6) of Article  19<\/a>,  it
\nmust be held to be wanting in that quality.”\n<\/p>\n
10.It  has  been held by this Court in the  said  decision
\nthat  the object of the statute is to provide  measures\t for
\nthe  supply of adequate labour for agricultural purposes  in
\nBidi  manufacturing  areas of the Province and it  could  be
\nachieved  by  legislation  restraining\tthe  employment\t  of
\nagricultural  labour in the manufacture of Bidis during\t the
\nagricultural  season.  Even in point of time, a\t restriction
\nmay  have been reasonable if it amounted to a regulation  of
\nthe  hours  of\twork in the  business.\t But  the  aforesaid
\nprovisions  of\tthe Act have no reasonable relation  to\t the
\nobject in view but the said provisions are drastic in  scope
\nthat they go in much excess of the object.\n<\/p>\n
11.Dr Ghosh has also referred to another decision of  this
\nCourt  in Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. State of Up4 In<\/a>\t the
\nsaid case, constitutional validity of clause 43 of U.P\tCoal
\nControl Order, 1953 was taken into consideration and it\t has
\nbeen held in the said decision that the licensing  authority
\nmay  grant,  refuse  to grant, renew or refuse\tto  renew  a
\nlicence\t and  may  suspend, cancel,  revoke  or\t modify\t any
\nlicence\t or any term thereof granted by him under the  order
\nfor  reasons  to be recorded for the action he\ttakes.\t Not
\nonly  so,  the power could be exercised by any to  whom\t the
\nState Coal Controller may choose to delegate the same.\tSuch
\nwide power including the power to delegate to any person  of
\nthe  choice of the Controller without any guiding  principle
\nwas  held  to  be  unreasonable and far\t in  excess  of\t the
\nreasonable restriction required to achieve the purpose.\n<\/p>\n
12.Dr  Ghosh has further referred to the decision of  this
\nCourt  in  Pathumma  v.\t State\tof  Kerala5<\/a>.   In  the\tsaid
\ndecision,  the constitutional validity of Section 20 of\t the
\nKerala\tAgriculturists\tDebt  Relief  Act  was\ttaken\tinto
\nconsideration  by  a larger Bench of seven Judges.   It\t has
\nbeen held in the said decision by upholding the validity  of
\nSection\t 20  of\t the Kerala Act\t that  in  interpreting\t the
\nconstitutional provision, the court should keep in mind\t the
\nsocial\tsetting\t of  the country so as to  show\t a  complete
\nconsciousness and deep awareness of the growing requirements
\nof  the\t society, the increasing needs of  the\tnation,\t the
\nburning\t problems of the day and the complex  issues  facing
\nthe  people  which  the Legislature in\tits  wisdom  through
\nbeneficial  legislation,  seeks\t to  solve.   The   judicial
\napproach should be dynamic rather than static, pragmatic and
\nnot pedantic and elastic rather than rigid.  It has
\n4    1954 SCR 803 : AIR 1954 SC 224
\n5    (1978) 2 SCC 1 : AIR 1978 SC 771
\n510<\/span>
\nalso been indicated that Article 19<\/a> guarantees all the seven
\nfreedoms to the citizens of the country including the  right
\nto  hold, acquire and dispose of property.  But\t Article  19<\/a>
\nalso  provides\treasonable  restrictions  to  be  placed  by
\nParliament  or the Legislature in public interest.   It\t has
\nbeen further indicated that in judging the reasonableness of
\nthe  restrictions imposed by clause (6) of Article  19<\/a>,\t the
\nCourt has to bear in mind the directive principles.  It\t has
\nalso  been indicated that restriction to be reasonable\tmust
\nnot  be arbitrary or in excessive nature so as to go  beyond
\nthe requirement of the interest of general public.\n<\/p>\n
13.Dr  Ghosh  has finally referred to the decision  of\tthis
\nCourt  in Management of Kairbetta Estate  v.  Rajamanickam6<\/a>.
\nIn  this decision, this Court considered the import  of\t the
\nexpression “any other reason” in the definition of “lay-off’
\nunder  Section\t2(kkk)<\/a> of Industrial Disputes Act.   It\t has
\nbeen held that:\n<\/p>\n
“Any  other reason to which the definition refers, must,  we
\nthink,\tbe a reason which is allied or analogous to  reasons
\nalready specified.” Dr Ghosh contends that the definition of
\nlay-off\t clearly indicates a number of\tcontingencies  which
\nmay  justify  lay-off.\tHe has submitted that  in  Meenakshi
\nMills  case2,  this  Court has also  noted  the\t distinctive
\nfeatures of “lay-off’.\n<\/p>\n
14.Dr  Ghosh has contended that the decision  rendered\tin
\nMeenakshi  Mills  case2\t has  not  laid\t down  any  absolute
\nproposition that unfettered restriction on the right to hold
\nand  acquire  property\tand  carry  on\ttrade  and  business
\nactivity  can  be  imposed  only  on  the  score  of  social
\ninterest.   He\thas also submitted that in  Meenakshi  Mills
\ncase2, the provisions for retrenchment under Section 25-N<\/a> of
\nthe  Industrial Disputes Act were taken\t into  consideration
\nbut  retrenchment is a crystallised or frozen  occasion\t and
\nthe same should not be held on a par with the provisions for
\nlay-off\t under\tSection 25-M<\/a>.  It has been contended  by  Dr
\nGhosh\tthat   if  the\tdistinction  between   lay-off\t and
\nretrenchment and different types of problems associated with
\nlay-off\t and  retrenchment are considered  in  their  proper
\nperspective  the  reasonings for upholding the\tvalidity  of
\nSection\t 25-N<\/a> should not be made applicable in deciding\t the
\nvires of Section 25-M<\/a>.\tDr Ghosh has submitted that for\t the
\npurpose\t of  upholding\tthe  constitutional  validity  of  a
\nstatute,  upon\ta  challenge  on  account  of\tunreasonable
\nrestriction,  the Court is required to look into  the  facts
\nand  circumstances and the ground realities under which\t the
\noffending  provision  of the statute is to be  applied.\t  No
\nstrait-jacket  formula,\t therefore,  can be  laid  down\t for
\ndeciding the question of reasonable restriction in each\t and
\nevery statute.\tHe has submitted that in the matter of\tlay-
\noff  under  Section  25-M<\/a>, excepting in the  case  of  power
\nfailure\t and natural calamity, in all other cases,  even  if
\nthere  are  genuine urgent grounds for immediate  action  of
\nlay-off, a prior permission is required to be obtained.\t  It
\nis  permissible under Section 25-M<\/a> to defer disposal  of  an
\napplication for such permission for approval up to a  period
\nof  two\t months\t from  the  date  of  application  even\t  if
\nultimately such permission is accorded.\t Such outer limit
\n6 (1960) 3 SCR 371 : AIR 1960 SC 893
\n511<\/span>
\nof  two months in a given case, may be\twholly\tunreasonable
\nthereby frustrating the very purpose for which an  immediate
\naction for lay-off was warranted.  Dr Ghosh has submitted in
\nsupport of his contention that even if in a given case there
\nis breakdown of essential components of a machinery  without
\nwhich the productive activity in a particular factory cannot
\nbe carried on and even if it so happens that any attempt  to
\nrun the factory involves substantial risk even in respect of
\nother\tplants\tand  also  the\tlabour\tforce  involved\t  in
\noperational activity, the management though has a bona\tfide
\nand  urgent need to immediately lay-off the labourers  whose
\nservice\t cannot be gainfully utilised until  the  productive
\nactivities can be effectively restored on some future  date,
\ncannot\tresort\tto  lay-off lawfully  unless  permission  is
\naccorded by the authority concerned.  Dr Ghosh has submitted
\nthat  it  may  not  be unlikely\t that  in  some\t cases\tsuch
\nmachinery being imported and highly sophisticated may not be
\nrepaired  and  commissioned  in near future and\t a  case  of
\nimmediate  lay-off was essentially necessary, but the  rigid
\nprovisions  of\tSection\t 25-M<\/a>  do  not\tprovide\t for  taking
\nimmediate  action  in  such and\t similar  contingency.\t The
\nprovisions of Section 25-M<\/a> requiring formal approval in\t all
\ncircumstances except in the case of power failure or natural
\ncalamity  must\tbe  held to be\tabsolutely  undesirable\t and
\nharsh.\t The restriction imposed in Section 25-M<\/a> is  far  in
\nexcess\tof reasonable restriction necessary to\tachieve\t the
\nobject\tof  preventing improper action of  the\temployer  in
\nresorting  to  lay-off.\t  The  unreasonable  compulsion\t  in
\nretaining  a  large labour force without any  service  being
\nrendered by them may lead to closure of the unit being\tsick
\nand economically not a viable unit.  Such undesirable result
\nbrought on the employer on compulsion cannot be held to be a
\nnormal\t incidence  of\ta  reasonable  restriction  on\t the
\nemployer’s  right to lay-off.  Such provision may  not\teven
\nserve  the interest of labour force because in the event  of
\nclosure,,  the job opportunity is bound to be  affected\t and
\nthe  economic  interest\t of the nation is  bound  to  be  in
\njeopardy.    Dr\t Ghosh\thas  submitted\tthat  the   problems
\nassociated  with “lay-off’ have their special  features\t and
\nincidence  and\tthe  principle\tunderlying  the\t restriction
\nimposed on retrenchment under Section 25-N<\/a> as considered  in
\nMeenakshi  Mills  case2 is not applicable on  all  fours  in
\nconsidering  the reasonableness of the restrictions  imposed
\nin  Section  25-M<\/a>.  Dr Ghosh has submitted  that  the  broad
\nfeatures  which weighed with this Court in  holding  Section
\n25-0<\/a> as unconstitutional in Excel Wear case1 are  applicable
\nin deciding the constitutional validity of Section 25-M<\/a>.  In
\nthe  aforesaid facts, the impugned decision holding  Section
\n25-M<\/a> before amendment in 1984 as unconstitutional should not
\nbe interfered with and the appeal should be dismissed.\n<\/p>\n
15.After  considering  the respective submissions  of  the
\nlearned\t counsel  for the parties  and\tconsidering  various
\ndecisions  of  this  Court  in\tdeciding  the  question\t  of
\nreasonableness\tof the restriction imposed by a\t statute  on
\nthe  Fundamental  Rights  guaranteed by Article\t 19<\/a>  of\t the
\nConstitution  of  India (reference to which  would  be\tmade
\nhereinafter), it appears to us that the following principles
\nand guidelines should be kept in mind for considering
\n512<\/span>
\nthe  constitutionality\tof  a  statutory  provision  upon  a
\nchallenge  on  the alleged vice of unreasonableness  of\t the
\nrestriction imposed by it:\n<\/p>\n
\t      (a)   The restriction sought to be imposed  on
\n\t      the  Fundamental Rights guaranteed by  Article
\n\t      19<\/a>  of the Constitution must not be  arbitrary
\n\t      or  of an excessive nature so as to go  beyond
\n\t      the  requirement of felt need of\tthe  society
\n\t      and object sought to be achieved7.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (b)   There  must\t be a direct  and  proximate
\n\t      nexus  or a reasonable connection between\t the
\n\t      restriction  imposed and the object sought  to
\n\t      be achieved8.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (c)   No\tabstract or fixed principle  can  be
\n\t      laid down which may have universal application
\n\t      in  all  cases.\tSuch  consideration  on\t the
\n\t      question\t of   quality\tof   reasonableness,
\n\t      therefore,  is expected to vary from  case  to
\n\t      case9.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (d)   In\t    interpreting      constitutional
\n\t      provisions, courts should be alive to the felt
\n\t      need of the society and complex issues  facing
\n\t      the  people which the Legislature\t intends  to
\n\t      solve through effective legislation10.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (e)   In\tappreciating such problems and\tfelt
\n\t      need of the society the judicial approach must
\n\t      necessarily be dynamic, pragmatic and  elastic\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      11.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (f)It is imperative that for consideration  of
\n\t      reasonableness  of  restriction imposed  by  a
\n\t      statute, the Court should examine whether\t the
\n\t      social  control as envisaged in Article 19<\/a>  is
\n\t      being  effectuated by the restriction  imposed
\n\t      on the Fundamental Rights 12.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (g)   Although  Article 19<\/a> guarantees all\t the
\n\t      seven freedoms to the citizen, such  guarantee
\n\t      does not confer any absolute or  unconditional
\n\t      right but is subject to reasonable restriction
\n\t      which  the  Legislature may impose  in  public
\n\t      interest.\t It is therefore
\n7    Chintaman Rao v. State of M.P<\/a>, 1950 SCR 759 : AIR\t1951
\nSC  118; Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. State of\t U.P<\/a>.,\t1954
\nSCR  803  : AIR 1954 SC 224; Excel Wear v. Union  of  India<\/a>,
\n(1978) 4 SCC 224: 1978 SCC (L&S) 509: (1979) 1 SCR 1009
\n8    O.K. Ghosh v. E.X. Joseph<\/a>, AIR 1963 SC 812; Pathumma v.
\nState of Kerala<\/a>, (1978) 2 SCC 1 AIR 1978 SC 771; Workmen  v.
\nMeenakshi Mills Ltd<\/a>., (1992) 3 SCC 336: 1992 SCC (L&S) 679
\n9    Kavalappara  Kottarathil Kochuni v. State of  Madras  &
\nKerala<\/a>, AIR 1960 SC 1080 : (1960) 3 SCR 887 : Jyoti  Pershad
\nv.  Administrator<\/a>.for Union Territory of Delhi, AIR 1961  SC
\n1602 (1962) 2 SCR 125; Pathumma v. State of Kerala<\/a>, (1978) 2
\nSCC 1 : AIR 1978 SC 771
\n10   Jyoti  Pershad v. Administrator<\/a>.for Union Territory  of
\nDelhi, AIR 1961 SC 1602 (1962) 2 SCR 125; Pathumma v.  State
\nof Kerala<\/a>, (1978) 2 SCC 1 : AIR 1978 SC 771
\n11   Jyoti  Pershad v. Administrator<\/a>.for Union Territory  of
\nDelhi,\tAIR  1961  SC  1602 (1962)  2  SCR  125;  Fatehchand
\nHimmatlal  v. State of Maharashtra<\/a>, (1977) 2 SCC 670  :\t AIR
\n1977 SC 1825; Pathumma v. State of Kerala<\/a>, (1978) 2 SCC 1  :
\nAIR 1978 SC 771
\n12   State of Madras v. VG.  Row, AIR 1952 SC 196 : 1952 SCR
\n597; State of U.P v. Kaushailiya, AIR 1964 SC 416 : (1964) 4
\nSCR 1002; Pathumma v. State of Kerala<\/a>, (1978) 2 SCC 1 :\t AIR
\n1978 SC 771
\n513<\/span>
\n\t      necessary to examine whether such\t restriction
\n\t      is meant to protect social welfare  satisfying
\n\t      the need of prevailing social values13.\n<\/p>\n
\t      (h)   The reasonableness has got to be  tested
\n\t      both  from  the  procedural  and\t substantive
\n\t      aspects.\tIt should not be bound by processual
\n\t      perniciousness  or jurisprudence\tof  remedies\n<\/p>\n
\t      14.\n<\/p>\n
\t      (j)   Restriction\t imposed on the\t Fundamental
\n\t      Rights  guaranteed  under Article\t 19<\/a>  of\t the
\n\t      Constitution must not be arbitrary, unbridled,
\n\t      uncanalised   and\t excessive  and\t  also\t not
\n\t      unreasonably  discriminatory.   Ex  hypothesis
\n\t      therefore, a restriction to be reasonable must
\n\t      also  be\tconsistent with Article\t 14<\/a>  of\t the
\n\t      Constitution.\n<\/p>\n
\t      (k)   In\tjudging\t the reasonableness  of\t the
\n\t      restriction  imposed by clause  (6)of  Article
\n\t      19<\/a>,  the Court has to bear in  mind  Directive
\n\t      Principles of State Policy15.\n<\/p>\n
\t      (l)Ordinarily,  any restriction so  imposed
\n\t      which   has   the\t effect\t of   promoting\t  or
\n\t      effectuating  a  directive  principle  can  be
\n\t      presumed\tto  be a reasonable  restriction  in
\n\t      public interest16.\n<\/p>\n
16.  In\t Meenakshi Mills case2, the contention that  Section
\n25-N<\/a> has imposed unreasonable restriction on the fundamental
\nright  to hold property and to carry on business  activities
\nhas  been rejected by indicating that the object  underlying
\nthe enactment of Section 25-N<\/a> by introducing prior  scrutiny
\nof  the\t reasons for retrenchment is  to  prevent  avoidable
\nhardship  to  the employees resulting from  retrenchment  by
\nprotecting  existing employment and to check the  growth  of
\nunemployment  which would otherwise be the  consequences  of
\nretrenchment  in industrial establishment employing a  large
\nnumber\tof workmen.  It has also been indicated in the\tsaid
\ndecision that the restriction imposed in Section 25-N<\/a> on the
\n,  right  of  retrenchment of the employer  is\tintended  to
\nmaintain  higher  tempo of production  and  productivity  by
\npreserving industrial peace and harmony, and in that  sense,
\nSection\t 25-N<\/a> seeks to give effect to the mandate  contained
\nin the Directive Principles of the Constitution as contained
\nin Articles 38, 39(a), 41 and 43.  It has been indicated  in
\nMeenakshi  Mills  case2 that ordinarily any  restriction  so
\nimposed which has the effect of promoting or effectuating  a
\ndirective  principle  can  be  presumed\t to  be\t  reasonable
\nrestriction in public interest and a restriction imposed  on
\nthe employer’s right to terminate the service of an employee
\nis not alien to the constitutional scheme
\n13   State of Madras v. VG.  Row, AIR 1952 SC 196 : 1952 SCR
\n597; State of U.P. v. Kaushailiya, AIR 1964 SC: 416:  (1964)
\n4 SCR 1002; Bachan Singh v. State<\/a> a Punjab, (1971) 1 SCC 712
\nAIR 1971 SC 2164; Pathumma v. State<\/a> a Kerala, (1978)2 SCC  1
\n: AIR 1978 SC 771
\n14   Fatehchand Himmatlal v. State of Maharashtra<\/a>, (1977)  2
\nSCC  670:  AIR 1977 SC 1825; Excel Wear v. Union  of  India<\/a>,
\n(1978) 4 SCC 224: 1978 SCC (L&S) 509 :(1979) 1 SCR 1009
\n15   Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of  Kerala<\/a>,
\n(1973)\t4  SCC 225 : AIR 1973 SC 146 1; State of  Kerala  v.
\nN.M.  Thomas<\/a>, (1976) 2 SCC 310 : 1976, SCC (L&S) 227  :\t AIR
\n1976  SC 490; Pathumma v. State of Kerala<\/a>, (1978) 2 SCC 1  :
\nAIR 1978 SC 771
\n16  Workmen v. Meenakshi Mills Ltd<\/a>., (1992) 3 SCC 336:\t1992
\nSCC (L&S) 679
\n514<\/span>
\nwhich  indicates that the employer’s right is not  absolute.
\nWe  may indicate here that even in Excel Wear case1  it\t has
\nbeen held that:\n<\/p>\n
“the  right to close a business is an integral part  of\t the
\nfundamental  right to carry on a business.  But as no  right
\nis absolute in its scope so is the nature of this right.  It
\ncan certainly be restricted, regulated or controlled by\t law
\nin the interest of general public.” (emphasis supplied)\n<\/p>\n
17.In  Meenakshi  Mills case2, it has been held\t that  the
\npower  to  grant or refuse permission  for  retrenchment  of
\nworkmen conferred under sub-section (2) of Section 25-N<\/a>\t has
\nto  be\texercised  on  an  objective  consideration  of\t the
\nrelevant facts after affording an opportunity to the parties
\nhaving\tan  interest in the matter and reasons\thave  to  be
\nrecorded in the order that is passed.  The enquiry which has
\nto be made under sub-section (2) before an order granting or
\nrefusing  permission for retrenchment of workmen is  passed,
\nwould  require an examination of the particulars  which\t are
\nrequired  to  be supplied by the  employer.   Such  decision
\nbeing quasi-judicial, is justiciable before High Court.\t  In
\nview  of the time-limit of three months prescribed  in\tsub-
\nsection\t (3) of Section 25-N<\/a>, there is need for\t expeditious
\ndisposal  which may not be feasible if the  proceedings\t are
\nconducted  before  a  judicial\tofficer\t accustomed  to\t the
\njudicial  process.   Moreover,\tduring the  course  of\tsuch
\nconsideration, it may become necessary to explore the  steps
\nthat may have to be taken to remove the causes necessitating
\nthe  proposed  retrenchment which  may\tinvolve\t interaction
\nbetween the various departments of the Government.  This can
\nbe  better appreciated and achieved by an Executive  Officer
\nrather than a Judicial Officer.\t It has also been  indicated
\nin  Meenakshi Mills case2 that in the matter of exercise  of
\nthe power conferred by sub-section (2) of Section 25-N<\/a>,\t the
\npower has to be exercised keeping in view the provisions  of
\nthe  Act and the object underlying the Amending Act<\/a> of\t1976
\nwhereby\t Section 25-N<\/a> was inserted in the Act.\t The  object
\nunderlying   the   requirement\tof  prior   permission\t for
\nretrenchment  of  workmen  introduced  by  Section  25N<\/a>\t  as
\nindicated  in the Statement of Objects and Reasons  for\t the
\nAmending  Act<\/a> of 1976, is to prevent avoidable\thardship  to
\nthe  employees\tresulting from\tretrenchment  by  protecting
\nemployment  to\tthose already employed and  maintain  higher
\ntempo\tof   production\t and  productivity   by\t  preserving
\nindustrial  peace  and\tharmony.   The\tsaid   consideration
\ncoupled with the basic idea underlying the provisions of the
\nAct, namely, settlement of industrial disputes and promotion
\nof  industrial peace, gives a sufficient indication  of\t the
\nfactors\t which\thave to be home in mind by  the\t appropriate
\nGovernment or authority by exercising its power to grant  or
\nrefuse permission for retrenchment under sub-section(2).\n<\/p>\n
18.In  our view, the aforesaid observations  in\t upholding
\nthe validity of Section25-N  squarely apply  in\t upholding
\nthe validity of Section 25-M<\/a>.  It is evidentthat\tthe
\nLegislature  has taken care in exempting the need for  prior
\npermission  for lay-off in Section 25-M<\/a> if such\t lay-off  is
\nnecessitated   on  account  of\tpower  failure\tor   natural
\ncalamities  because  such reasons being\t grave,\t sudden\t and
\nexplicit,  no further scrutiny is called for.  There may  be
\nvarious\t other contingencies justifying an immediate  action
\nof lay-off but
\n515<\/span>
\nthen the Legislature in its wisdom has thought it  desirable
\nin  the\t greater public interest that  decision\t to  lay-off
\nshould\tnot be taken by the employer on its  own  assessment
\nwith  immediate effect but the employer must  seek  approval
\nfrom the authority concerned which is reasonably expected to
\nbe  alive  to  the problems  associated\t with  the  industry
\nconcerned and other relevant factors, so that on scrutiny of
\nthe  reasons pleaded for permitting layoff,  such  authority
\nmay  arrive at a just and proper decision in the  matter  of
\naccording or refusing permission to lay-off.  Such authority
\nis  under  an obligation to dispose of\tthe  application  to
\naccord\tpermission for a lay-off expeditiously and,  in\t any
\nevent,\twithin\ta period not exceeding two months  from\t the
\ndate of seeking permission.  It may not be unlikely that  in
\nsome cases an employer may suffer unmerited hardship up to a
\nperiod\tof two months within which his application for\tlay-
\noff is required to be disposed of by the authority concerned
\nbut  having undertaken a productive venture by\testablishing
\nan  industrial\tunit employing a large\tlabour\tforce,\tsuch
\nemployer has to face such consequence on some occasions\t and
\nmay  have  to  suffer some hardship  for  sometime  but\t not
\nexceeding two months within which his case for a lay-off  is
\nrequired  to  be  considered  by  the  authority   concerned
\notherwise  it  will  be\t deemed\t that  permission  has\tbeen
\naccorded.   In the greater public interest  for\t maintaining
\nindustrial  peace  and harmony and to  prevent\tunemployment
\nwithout\t just  cause,  the restriction\timposed\t under\tsub-
\nsection (2) of Section 25-M<\/a> cannot be held to be  arbitrary,
\nunreasonable  or  far in excess of the need for\t which\tsuch
\nrestriction has been sought to be imposed.\n<\/p>\n
19.It  may  be pointed out that sub-section  (3)  requires
\nrecording  of reasons for the decision taken, and a copy  of
\nthe  order is required to be communicated to all  concerned.
\nFurther, by force of sub-section (4), permission sought\t for
\nshall be deemed to have been granted, if the decision is not
\ncommunicated   within  the  mentioned  period.\t  Procedural
\nreasonableness\thas been taken care of by these\t provisions.
\nAs regards substantive reasonableness, we feel satisfied, as
\nthe  power  in question would be exercised  by\ta  specified
\nauthority and as it can well be presumed that the one to  be
\nspecified  would be a high authority who would be  conscious
\nof his duties and obligation.  If such an authority would be
\ninformed  that\tlay-off is reuired because  of,\t any  sudden
\nbreakdown  of machinery, which illustration was given by  Dr
\nGhosh\tto  persuade  us  to  regard  the   restriction\t  as
\nunreasonable, we have no doubt that the authority would\t act
\npromptly  and see that the establishment in question is\t not
\nput to loss for no fault on its part.  As every power has to
\nbe  exercised  reasonably,  and as such\t an  exercise  takes
\nwithin its fold, exercise of power within reasonable time we
\ncan  take for granted that the statutory provision  requires
\nthat  in apparent causes (like sudden breakdown)  justifying
\nlay-off, the authority would act with speed.\n<\/p>\n
20.As  already\tindicated,  the\t distinguishing\t  features
\nbetween\t Section  25-M<\/a>\tand Section 25-N<\/a>  on  one  hand\t and
\nSection 25-0<\/a> on the other have been noticed in the  decision
\nin Excel Wear case1.\n<\/p>\n
21.In  our  view, the reasonings indicated in  Excel  Wear
\ncase1  in striking down Section 25-0<\/a> are not applicable\t for
\nconsidering the constitutional
\n516<\/span>
\nvalidity  of’ Section 25-M(2)<\/a>.\tOn the contrary, it  appears
\nto us that the reasonings indicated in Meenakshi Mills case1
\nin upholding the validity of Section 25-N<\/a> squarely apply  in
\nupholding the vires of Section 25-M<\/a>.  It also appears to  us
\nthat  the  impugned  provision\tof  Section  25-M<\/a>  satisfies
\nvarious\t  aspects  of  scrutiny\t for  upholding\t  reasonable
\nrestriction  on\t the fundamental right when  tested  in\t the
\ncontext of guidelines and principles indicated hereinbefore.
\nThe  restriction  appears necessary to us in  larger  public
\ninterest  and to protect the interest of workmen,  who,\t but
\nfor  the restriction may be subjected to uncalled  for\tlay-
\noff.   The  application of this\t restriction  to  industrial
\nestablishments specified in Section 25-K<\/a> duly takes care  of
\nthe  hardship  which  could otherwise  be  caused  to  small
\nestablishments.\t Directive Principles do require placing  of
\nthe restriction on large industrial establishments employing
\nlarge  number  of  workmen.  The impugned  decision  of\t the
\nMadras\tHigh Court, therefore, must be held to be  erroneous
\nand the same is, set aside by upholding the vires of Section
\n25-M<\/a>  of  the  Industrial  Disputes  Act,  1947\t which\t was
\nintroduced under the Amending Act<\/a> of 1976.  This appeal\t is,
\ntherefore, allowed without, however, any order as to costs.\n<\/p>\n
517<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Papnasam Labour Union vs Madura Coats Ltd on 8 December, 1994 Equivalent citations: 1995 AIR 2200, 1995 SCC (1) 501 Author: G Ray Bench: Ray, G.N. (J) PETITIONER: PAPNASAM LABOUR UNION Vs. RESPONDENT: MADURA COATS LTD. DATE OF JUDGMENT08\/12\/1994 BENCH: RAY, G.N. (J) BENCH: RAY, G.N. (J) HANSARIA B.L. (J) CITATION: […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-260659","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nPapnasam Labour Union vs Madura Coats Ltd on 8 December, 1994 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/papnasam-labour-union-vs-madura-coats-ltd-on-8-december-1994\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Papnasam Labour Union vs Madura Coats Ltd on 8 December, 1994 - 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