{"id":265867,"date":"2006-04-21T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-04-20T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/sharath-kumar-rath-vs-the-central-administrative-on-21-april-2006"},"modified":"2014-02-19T21:48:46","modified_gmt":"2014-02-19T16:18:46","slug":"sharath-kumar-rath-vs-the-central-administrative-on-21-april-2006","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/sharath-kumar-rath-vs-the-central-administrative-on-21-april-2006","title":{"rendered":"Sharath Kumar Rath vs The Central Administrative … on 21 April, 2006"},"content":{"rendered":"
Madras High Court<\/div>\n
Sharath Kumar Rath vs The Central Administrative … on 21 April, 2006<\/div>\n
       \n\n  \n\n  \n\n \n \n IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS           \n\nDATED: 21\/04\/2006  \n\nCORAM   \n\nTHE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.K. MISRA         \nAND  \nTHE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE CHITRA VENKATARAMAN               \n\nW.P.NO.26975 of 2005  \nand \nW.P.Nos.39564, 39583 of 2005  \nand \nW.P.No.15158 of 2002  \nand \nWPMP.Nos.29393 to 29396, 42049,42416 and 42432 of 2005     \n\nW.P.No.26975 of 2005  \n\n1. Sharath Kumar Rath \n   No.94, Lakshmana Salai,\n   K.K. Nagar, Chennai 78.\n\n2. Saroj Kumar Sadangi, \n   A29\/3, Anna Nagar East,\n   Chennai 102.\n\n3. Parameswaran Satyam   \n   No.97\/G, (MB Flats)\n   Lakshmana Salai, K.K. Nagar,\n   Chennai 78.                  ..  Petitioners\n\n-Vs-\n\n1. The Central Administrative Tribunal\n   rep. by its Registrar,\n   City Civil Court Buildings,\n   Chennai 104.\n\n2. The Union of India,\n   rep. by the Secretary to Government,\n   Department of Revenue, North Block,\n   New Delhi.\n\n3. The Chairman, \n   Central Board of Excise and Customs\n   Department of Revenue,\n   Ministry of Finance, New Delhi 1.\n\n4. The Chief Commissioner of Customs, \n   Custom House, Chennai.               ..  Respondents\n\nW.P.No.39564 of 2005  \n\nT.S. Jayachandar, \nDeputy Commissioner of Customs   \n  and Central Excise,\n11, 51th Street, Ashok Nagar,\nChennai 600 083.                        ..  Petitioners\n\n        Vs.\n\n\n\n\n1. The Central Administrative Tribunal\n   rep. by its Registrar,\n   City Civil Court Buildings,\n   Chennai 104.\n\n2. The Union of India,\n   rep. by the Secretary to Government,\n   Department of Revenue, North Block,\n   New Delhi.\n\n3. The Chief Commissioner of Customs, \n   Custom House, Chennai. \n\n4. C. Ramkumar  \n   Deputy Commissioner of Customs,  \n   Custom House, Chennai. \n\n5. K.M. Nagarajan,\n   Deputy Commissioner of Customs,  \n   Vallalar Road, Manchakuppam, \n   Cuddalore.\n\n6. M. Chandra Bose, \n   Deputy Director of Customs and\n     Central Excise,\n   Directorate of Systems, SRU,\n   Nungambakkam, Chennai 34.   \n\n7. K. Venkata Ram Reddy  \n   Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise,\n   Vinayaga Marga Siddartham Nagar, \n   Mysore 570 011.                      ..  Respondents\n\nW.P.No.39583 of 2005  \n1. The Chennai Customs Appraising  \n     Officers Association,\n   Rep. by its Secretary,\n   R. Prakash, Appraiser,\n   Custom House, Chennai. \n\n2. Parvathi Kailasam,\n   Deputy Commissioner of Customs,  \n   Custom House, Chennai. \n\n3. T.H. Rao,\n   Deputy Commissioner of Customs,  \n   Custom House, Chennai. \n\n4. Bertsie Sundaram, \n   Deputy Commissioner of Central\n     Excise, Chennai 90.                ..  Petitioners\n\n                Vs.\n1. The Central Administrative Tribunal\n   rep. by its Registrar,\n   City Civil Court Buildings,\n   Chennai 104.\n\n2. The Union of India,\n   rep. by the Secretary to Government,\n   Department of Revenue, North Block,\n   New Delhi.\n\n3. The Chief Commissioner of Customs, \n   Custom House, Chennai. \n\n4. C. Ramkumar  \n   Deputy Commissioner of Customs,  \n   Custom House, Chennai. \n\n5. K.M. Nagarajan,\n   Deputy Commissioner of Customs,  \n   Vallalar Road, Manchakuppam, \n   Cuddalore.\n\n6. M. Chandra Bose, \n   Deputy Director of Customs and\n     Central Excise,\n   Directorate of Systems, SRU,\n   Nungambakkam, Chennai 34.   \n7. K. Venkata Ram Reddy  \n   Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise,\n   Vinayaga Marga Siddartham Nagar, \n   Mysore 570 011.                      ..  Respondents\n\nW.P.No.15158 of 2002  \nA. Cletus                               ..  Petitioners\n\n                Vs.\n\n1. The Union of India,\n   rep. by the Secretary,\n   Department of Revenue,\n   Ministry of Finance,\n   North Block, New Delhi 1.\n\n2. The Commissioner of Customs,  \n   Custom House, 33, Rajaji Salai,\n   Chennai 1.\n\n3. V.B. Yuvaraj\n4. Mrs. Bertsie Sundaram \n5. Mrs. Tamilmani Sriram\n6. K. Ramesh, \n7. B. Ramesh Kumar  \n8. P.S. Uma Mahesh  \n9. A.M. Madhusudara Rao  \n10. M.J. Baby Rao \n11. O.P. Phalgunan, \n12. P. Shantharam \n13. N. Ravichandra\n14. V. Sukumar \n15. The Registrar,\n    Central Administrative Tribunal,\n    Madras Bench,\n    Chennai 104.                        ..  Respondents\n\n\n        W.P.No.26975 of 2005 is filed under Article 226<\/a> of the Constitution of\nIndia for the issuance of Certiorarified Mandamus to call for the  proceedings\nof  the  Central  Administrative  Tribunal,  Madras  Bench, the 1st respondent\nherein in O.A.No.566\/2005 dated 9.8.2005 and quash the same  and  consequently  \ndirect  the respondents 2 to 4 to finalise and circulate the seniority list of\nAppraisers in the light of the  objections  made  by  the  petitioners  before\nmaking promotions to the post of Assistant Commissioner of Customs and Central \nExcise (Group A) Post. \n        W.P.No.39564 of 2005 is filed under Article 226<\/a> of the Constitution of\nIndia  for  the  issuance of Certiorari to call for the proceedings of the 1st\nrespondent Tribunal in O.A.No.408\/2005 dated 9.8.2005 upholding  the  validity\nof    the    impugned    seniority   list   of   Appraisers   circulating   in\nF.No.23011\/1\/2004-AD.II A dated 16.12.2004 of the 2nd respondent and quash the \nsame. \n\n        W.P.No.39583 of 2005 is filed under Article 226<\/a> of the Constitution of\nIndia for the issuance of Certiorari to call for the proceedings  of  the  1st\nrespondent  Tribunal  in O.A.No.419\/2005 dated 9.8.2005 upholding the validity\nof   the   impugned   seniority   list   of    Appraisers    circulating    in\nF.No.23011\/1\/2004-AD.II A dated 16.12.2004 of the 2nd respondent and quash the \nsame. \n\n        W.P.No.15158 of 2002 is filed under Article 226<\/a> of the Constitution of\nIndia  for  the  issuance  of  Certiorari  to  call for the proceedings of the\nrespondent Tribunal in O.A.No.833\/1999 dated 17.10.2000 and consequentially to\nquash the seniority list issued by  the  1st  respondent  in  his  proceedings\nF.A.23011\/1\/96 AdII(A) dated 12.11.1997 in so far as the fixation of seniority\nof Respondents 3 to 14 and to direct the 1st respondent to refit the seniority\nof  the  respondents  3  to 14 taking into account of the actual date of their\nregularisation in the grade of Appraiser and  consequentially  to  direct  the\nfirst  respondent  to  promote  the  petitioner  to  the  grade  of  Assistant\nCommissioner with effect from the date on which his junior  respondents  4,8,9\nand 10 were promoted as Assistant Commissioners and quash the same.    \n\n!For Petitioner :  Mr.R.  Thiagarajan,\n                   in WP.Nos.26975, Senior Counsel for\n                39564 & 39583\/2005      Mr.V.  Vijay Shankar\n\nFor Petitioner  :  Mr.Sathish Parasaran for\n                in WP.No.15158\/02 Mr.N.  Kannan\n\nFor Respondents 2to4:  Mr.V.T.  Gopalan \n                in WP.No.26975\/05 & Addl.Solicitor General for\n                Respondents 2 & 3 in Mr.S.  Udhaya Kumar, SCGSC\n                WPs.39564 & 39583\/05\n\nFor Respondents 4 to7:  Mr.J.  Srinivasa Mohan\n                in WPs.39564 &39583\/05\n\nFor Respondents 1-2     :  Mr.R.  Santhanam\n                in WP.No.15158\/02\nRespondents 4 &10 :  Mr.V.  Parthiban for\n                                M\/s.Paul & Paul\n\nRespondents 5,7,13 &15:  No Appearance   \nRespondent-8    :  Mr.  Ashok Menon for\n                                M\/s.  Menon & Goklaney\n\nRespondents 3,6,9,11, Notice Dispensed with \n                        12 & 14 :  vide order dt.23.1.2006\n                        - - -\n:COMMON JUDGMENT       \n\nP.K.  MISRA, J \n\n                W.P.Nos.39564,  39583  & 26975 of 2005 have been filed against\nthe common order dated 9.8.2005 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal,\n(hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) in O.A.Nos.408,  419  and  566  of\n2005 respectively.  O.A.No.408  of  2005 was filed by one T.  S.  Jayachander,\npresently working as Deputy Commissioner of Customs.  O.A.No.419 of  2005  was  \nfiled  by the Chennai Customs Appraising Officers Association, represented by\nits Secretary along with three other applicants,  namely,  Parvathi  Kailasam,\nT.H.   Rao,  Bertsie  Sundaram,  who  are  also  working  presently  as Deputy\nCommissioner of Customs, Chennai.  O.A.No.566 of  2005  was  filed  by  Sharat\nKumar  Rath,  Saroj  Kumar Sadangi and Parameswaram Satyam, who are working as     \nappraisers.  In O.A.Nos.408 & 419 of 2005, the Union of India  and  the  Chief\nCommissioner of Customs were arrayed as Respondents 1 & 2 and in O.A.No.566 of    \n2 005  they  were arrayed as Respondents 1 & 3.  The Chairman of Central Board\nof Excise and Customs was not arrayed as Respondent in O.A.Nos.408  &  419  of  \n2005, but was arrayed as Respondent No.2 in O.A.No.566 of 2005.  In such O.A., \nthere was no other private respondent, whereas in O.A.Nos.408 and 419 of 2005,\nfour  Deputy  Commissioners  of Customs were arrayed as Respondent Nos.3 to 7.  \nAll such applicants, who are the writ petitioners  in  three  writ  petitions,\nnamely,  W.P.Nos.39564,  39583  & 26975 of 2005, are promotee appraisers under  \nthe Customs Department, whereas Respondents 3 to 7 in  O.A.Nos.408  &  419  of  \n2005 are  the direct recruit appraisers.  For convenience, the applicants\/writ\npetitioners in three Writ Petitions, namely, W.P.Nos.26975, 39564 & 3 9583  of\n2005  are  referred  to  as  the  promotees  and  the private respondents in\nO.A.Nos.408 & 419 of 2005 are referred to as  the direct  recruits,  whereas\nUnion  of  India  and  other  subordinate  officials  are  referred to as the\nofficial respondents.\n        W.P.No.15158  of  2002  arises  out  of  order  dated  17.10.2000   in\nO.A.No.833 of  1999.   Such Original Application was filed by direct recruits.\nThe applicant \/  Petitioner  No.4  in  O.A.No.419  of  2005  corresponding  to\nW.P.No.39583 of  2005,  was  Respondent No.4 in O.A.No.833 of 1999.  The other \nrespondents in the said O.A.  \/ writ petitions are not parties in  the  matter\nrelating to O.A.Nos.408, 419 & 566 of 2005.  However, they are the respondents\nin W.P.No.15158 of 2002. \n\n                2.   The  main  question  in all the writ petitions relates to\nquestion of seniority in the cadre of Appraisers  in  Custom  House,  Chennai.\nThe perennial  fight  is between direct recruits and the promotees.  The fight\nfor the first time reached the Supreme Court about four  decades  back.    The\nSupreme  Court  at  that  stage  was  concerned  with  the Rules and Procedure\nrelating to recruitment and seniority of direct recruits and promotees on  the\nbasis of  executive  instructions.  The question related to seniority of those\nappraisers who are appointed from 15.8 .1947.  Ultimately, the  Supreme  Court\nin the  decision  reported in AIR 1967 SC 52 (MERVYN COUTINHO v.  COLLECTOR OF       \nCUSTOMS<\/a>), held that quota system  was  operating  rotationally  and  seniority\nshould  be  followed  on  the  basis  of  quota  and rotation, irrespective of\ncontinuous length of service of the promotees.  In  the  meantime,  the  Rules\nframed  under  Article 309<\/a> of the Constitution known as the Customs Appraisers\nService, Class II Recruitment Rules, 1961, came into effect.  Rules 3 &  4  of\n1961 Rules, being relevant, are extracted hereunder :-\n\n        Rule 3.\n                Recruitment  to  the  Service  shall  be  made  by  any of the\nfollowing methods :-\n        (a) By competitive examination in India in accordance with Part III of\nthese rules.\n        (b) By promotion in accordance with Part IV of these rules.     (c) By\ntransfer of an Officer in Government Service in  accordance  with  Part  V  of\nthese rules.\n        (d)  By  direct recruitment by selection otherwise than by competitive\nexamination in accordance with Part VI of these rules.\n        Rule 4\n        (a) No appointment shall be made to the Service or to any  post  borne\non the cadre of the Service by any method not specified in Rule 3.\n\n        (b)  Subject  to  the  provisions  of  sub-rule  (a),  the Board shall\ndetermine the method or methods of recruitment to be employed for the  purpose\nof  filling  in  particular vacancies in the Service, as may be required to be\nfilled during any particular  period  and  the  number  of  candidates  to  be\nrecruited by each method.\n        (c)  The  percentage  of  posts  to be filled by direct recruitment by\ncompetitive  examination  or  by  selection  otherwise  than  by   competitive\nexamination  shall  not  be  less  than  50  per  cent  of  the total cadre of\nAppraisers.  The remaining posts may be filled by any other  method  mentioned\nin rule 3.\n\n                3.   The  salient  feature  of  the  said  Rules  is  that  no\nparticular quota was fixed for the promotees but, as  per  Rule  4(c)  of  the\nRules,  at  least  50%  of  the  vacancies  are  to be filled up by the direct\nrecruits and the  rest  could  be  filled  up  from  other  sources  including\npromotion.  The effect of 1961 Rules on the question of seniority was directly\nin issue  in GAYA BAKSH YADAV v.  UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS<\/a> [(1996) 4 SCC 23].         \nSince such decision is the basis of the contention (or  rather,  the  bone  of\ncontention)  for  both  the  parties,  it  is  more appropriate to extract the\nrelevant portion of the judgment :-\n        14.  Having travelled thus far let us take stock  of  the  situation,\ntry to grasp it and smoothen its rough edges:\n\n        (iii)  As per mandate of Rule 4-C of the above Rules the percentage of\nposts to be filled by direct recruitment, either by competitive examination or\nby selection otherwise than by competitive examination, could not be less than\n50% of the total cadre of Appraisers and the remaining posts could  be  filled\nup by any other method mentioned in Rule 3.  50% allocation is thus assured to\ndirect recruits in the total cadre.  They may get even more; there is no limit\nto it.\n\n\n        (iv)  The  above  Rules  expressly  do not provide a fixed unalterable\nquota for the promotees (remaining sources), which can keep fluctuating.\n\n        (v) In the absence of specific quotas being  fixed  in  the  Rules  it\nbecomes evident  that the quota rule stands discarded.  When there is no quota\nprovided in the Rules the rotational system cannot function.\n\n        (xiii) The Direct Recruit case is the amalgamation of all  streams  of\nthought, confluencing the entire case-law on the subject and given appropriate\nplacement.   Individual reference of each case as cited therein and at the bar\nneed not be made herein.  Reference may be had with advantage to the report in\nthe Direct Recruit case.\n        (Other sub-paras are omitted as not necessary for the present case)\n\n        15.  We are not expected to unsettle the principle of Mervyn  Coutinho\nor  to  discover  instances of the breaking down of the rotational rule on the\nbasis of some anomalies having  arisen,  because  of  direct  recruitment  not\nkeeping pace  with  the  situations arising from time to time.  We are equally\nnot  expected  to  discover  any  deemed  relaxation  of  the  Rule  on  the\nsupposition of  the quota rule having been broken down.  We have to proceed on\nthe supposition that in the respective Customs Houses, termed as cadres, there\nis no inter se dispute of  seniority  amongst  the  allocated  direct  recruit\nAppraisers and  departmentally promoted Appraisers.  The dispute is narrow and\ncentres on the need to prepare an All-India seniority list.  On every occasion\nwhen the Government of India has made an effort to draw one,  its  effort  was\nthwarted  by decisions in succession by the Bombay High Court, the Madras High \nCourt and the Central Administrative Tribunal.  The matter has again been left\nto the Government of India to devise a proper principle for drawing a combined\nseniority\n\nlist and the placement of the respective personnel on that list.\n\n        16.  We must bear in  mind  and  strive  that  there  should,  in  the\ninterests of  justice,  be  an  end to litigation.  It has also to be borne in\nmind that the attempt herein is not to amalgamate separate services.  Here the\nservice was and is one i.e,.  an All India Service of Appraisers.    Prior  to\nthe  Rules  50% posts in the service were filled by direct recruitment and the\nseniority of the selectees was  fixed  by  the  U.P.S.C.    in  the  order  of\nselection.   Inter  se  seniority  amongst  direct  recruits was thus a sealed\nevent.  That was  the  foundation.    Entry  into  service  by  promotion  was\nfortuitous  dependent  on  the  exercise by the departmental committees in the\nrespective Customs Houses and the outcome.  Mervyn Coutinhos case  tells  the \nway to  work  it  out.   In their respective quotas direct recruits as well as\npromotees rotate the quota system as 1:1 as  mentioned  in  Mervyn  Coutinhos\ncase.   But  after the Rules of 1961, when the quota system has been discarded\nMervyn Coutinhos rule cannot apply.  As per Rule 4-C of the 1961  rules,  the\nallocation  of  at  least 50% posts in favour of direct recruits is ensured at\nall times.  The enlistment of the direct recruits, allocated to Customs Houses\non the basis of  their  selection,  would  obviously  present  no  difficulty.\nEqually enlistment of promotee Appraisers, since coming from feeder sources of\n\nCustoms Houses, from the date of their promotion, would present no difficulty.\nBoth  would  be entitled to placement in the joint seniority list on the basis\nof their continuous officiation.\n\n        17.  We thus go to uphold the orders of the Tribunal  to  this  extent\nthat  a  fresh  All  India  Combined  List  of  Appraisers  be prepared by the\nrespondents on the basis of continuous officiation of  the  incumbent  in  the\npost  of  Appraiser  appointed  on and from the date of the Customs Appraisers\nService, Class II Recruitment Rules 1961.  But for appraisers appointed  prior\nto  that  date  the rule of Mervyn Coutinho would be the basis to work out the\ninter se seniority of the incumbents  to  operate  the  quota  and  rotational\nrule.          (emphasis supplied)\n\n                4.   Such  1961  Rules  remained in force till such rules were\nsuperseded by Department of Revenue (Customs Appraiser) Recruitment Rules, 19   \n88, with effect from 1.5.1988.  1988 Recruitment Rules provide for recruitment\nof 50% through direct recruitment and 50% by promotion.  However, the Rules do\nnot contain any specific provision relating to fixation of seniority and there\nis nothing specifically contained in such rules that seniority has to be fixed\nby adopting the principle of quota as well as rotation.\n\n                5.  At this stage, it  is  necessary  to  notice  the  various\ndevelopments  including  decisions  of the Central Administrative Tribunal, in\nshort the Tribunal.  It appears that after introduction of 1988  Recruitment\nRules, some of  the  promotees, namely, V.B.  Yuvaraj, Mrs.  Bertsie Sundaram,\nMrs.  Tamilmani Sriram, K.  Ramesh and B.  Ramesh Kumar, who are  respectively  \nopposite  party Nos.3,4,5,6 & 7 in O.A.No.833 of 1999 (present W.P.No.15158 of\n2002) filed O.A.No.39 of  1988  before  the  Madras  Bench  of  the  Tribunal.\nSimilarly, P.S.   Uma Mahesh, opposite party No.8 in O.A.No.833 of 1999, filed\nO.A.No.162 of 1988 and A.  Madhusudana Rao and M.J.  Babu Rao, opposite  party   \nNos.9  &  10 in O.A.No.833 of 1999 against Union of India and other officials.\nThe specific prayer was to  the  effect  that  Order  No.B12014\/4\/87  Ad.II(A)\nshould  be  quashed  and  the  Union  of  India  and other officials should be\ndirected not to revert the applicants on the basis of  new  recruitment  Rules\nfor Customs  Appraisers.   The common contention in such Original Applications\nwas to the effect that even though such applicants had been promoted on ad hoc\nbasis they were in  fact  regular  promotees  because  they  were  allowed  to\nofficiate  in  the higher post and the promotion had been made on the basis of\nthe recommendation of the duly constituted recommendation committee, which had  \ngone into qualification, seniority as well as merit  of  such  applicants  and\nsuch  promotions were apparently made on the vacancies which were in existence \nprior to 1987 i.e., before coming into force of  the  new  recruitment  rules.\nThe  further contention was to the effect that new recruitment rules were only\nprospective and were effective from 1.1.1988.  The stand of the department  at\nthat  stage  was  that  the  applicants had not been promoted on regular basis\nunder the old Rules, namely, 1961 Rules.  It was specifically pointed  out  as\nper  the  said Rules at least 50% of the posts of Appraisers were to be filled\nup by direct recruitment and the balance could be filled up  by  promotion  or\nother  sources  as  there was a shortfall in the direct recruitment quota, the\napplicants  had  been  promoted  on   ad   hoc   basis   on   the   basis   of\nseniority-cum-fitness   and  in  the  promotional  order  itself  was  it  was\nspecifically stated that promotion was on ad hoc basis, which would not confer\nright on such appointees, and such ad hoc promotion should not be equated with\nregular appointment and such ad hoc service would not count for seniority  and\nsuch  promotions  were  made  in  order to meet the urgent requirements of the\nadministration and the instructions contained in  the  Department  of  Revenue\nCircular dated  16.10.1980  had been followed.  It was indicated that they had\nnot been promoted against any vacancy post existing prior to  1.1.1988  within\nthe  permissible  limit for the promotees and they had been merely promoted on\nad hoc basis.\n\n                6.  After hearing both sides, Madras  Bench  of  the  Tribunal\nultimately concluded :-\n        ...  Accordingly we are clear in our view that the applicants had not\nbeen  promoted  on  a regular basis against the promotion quota, in accordance\nwith the 1961 recruitment rules.  They  have  been  merely  holding  posts  as\nCustoms  Appraisers  in  the quota meant for direct recruits, purely on ad hoc\nbasis and that such promotions cannot be equated with regular promotions  made \nunder the  1961  recruitment rules.  The promotion of the applicants would not\nconfer on them any right to be regularly promoted as Customs Appraisers  under\nthe 1961  recruitment  rules.    Further, all ad hoc promotions are subject to\nperiodical reviews.  The first respondent is therefore within  his  rights  to\ndirect  the other two respondents to conduct a review of the ad hoc promotions\nmade earlier under the direct recruitment quota.  Therefore the prayer of  the\napplicants  that  the  impugned order of the first respondent directing such a\nreview should be set aside, cannot be granted nor can any direction be  issued\nto the  respondents  not  to revert the applicants.  However, we make it clear\nthat on the basis of a review which may be conducted by the respondents, if at\nall it comes to notice of the respondents that the applicants had in fact been\nfunctioning on ad hoc basis against posts not  meant  for  direct  recruitment\nquota, but meant as promotion quota, their cases will have to be considered as\nper  the  1961  Recruitment  rules,  which  were applicable to vacancies which\nexisted up to 31.12.1987.  In such an event the applicants are at  liberty  to\napproach  this  Tribunal if they are aggrieved by any order that may be passed\nafter a review by the respondents.\n\n                7.  Such order of  the  Tribunal  was  challenged  before  the\nSupreme Court and the following order was passed by the Supreme Court in Civil\nAppeal No.1194 of 1990 :-\n          After  hearing  learned  counsel  for  the parties, we find no good\nground  to  interfere  with  the  order  of   the   Administrative   Tribunal,\nspecifically in view of the following observations:\n        However,  we make it clear that on the basis of a review which may be\nconducted by the respondents, if at all it comes to notice of the  respondents\nthat the applicants had in fact been functioning on ad hoc basis against posts\nnot  meant  for  direct recruitment quota, but meant as promotion quota, their\ncases will have to be considered as per the 1961 Recruitment rules, which were\napplicable to vacancies which existed upto 31.12.1987.\n                        (Emphasis supplied)\n\n                8.   Subsequently,  by  Office  Order  No.470  of  1994,  Smt.\nBertsie Sundaram, Smt.   Tamilmani  Sriraman,  Smt.S.   Kousalya and P.S.  Uma  \nMahesh were regularly promoted as Appraisers.  It is relevant to  extract  the\nactual order of one such promotion :-\n          The  promotion  of  the following Officers who were promoted to the\ngrade of Appraiser purely on  ad  hoc  basis  vide  this  Custom  House  Order\nNos.147\/86 dt.08.07.1986,  58\/87,  dt.    13.03.87  and 407\/82 dt.28.12.92 are\nregularised in the scale of pay of Rs.2000-60-2300-eb-75-3200-10 0-3500.  They\nare assigned date of promotion with effect from the date they assume charge as\nAppraisers (on regular basis).\n\n                9.  Under paragraph 2 of the very same order, the  petitioners\n1  and 2 in W.P.No.26975 of 2005 and one Mathias Dung Dung were also promoted.   \n(It may be emphasised that these three persons were  promoted  for  the  first\ntime  on  regular  basis,  but  in their case they were not promoted on ad hoc\nbasis earlier).  Similar orders relating to  promotion  on  regular  basis  in\nrespect  of  many other ad hoc Appraisers were issued by Order Nos.554 of 1995\nand 284 of 1996.   However,  the  orders  being  almost  similar,  it  is  not\nnecessary to extract each such order in extenso.\n\n                10.   Thereafter  the  Union  of  India  purported  to issue a\nseniority list of direct recruits and  promotees  appointed  \/  promoted  upto\n31.12.1 987  vide  letter  dated  2.11.1997.    In  such  letter,  it was also\nindicated that All India Seniority list of Direct Recruit and Promotee Customs\nAppraiser appointed \/ promoted after coming into force  of  Customs  Appraiser\nRecruitment Rule,  1988  with  effect from 1.1.1988 will follow.  In All India\ncombined seniority\/consideration list of Customs Appraiser relating to  period\nprior  to  31.12.1987,  Serial Nos.1 to 72 were apparently the persons who had\nbeen appointed\/promoted as Customs Appraisers prior to coming  into  force  of\nCustoms  Appraiser Service, Class-II Recruitment Rule, 1961 and such seniority\nof those 72 Appraisers had been  fixed  on  quota-rota  basis  as  per  Mervyn\nCoutinhos case.    Serial  Nos.73  to 1043 purported to indicate seniority of\npromotees and direct recruits, apparently  on  the  basis  of  the  directions\ncontained in  the  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court in Yadavs case.  At that\nstage, the name of Mrs.  Bertsie Sundaram, Tamilmani Sriram, K.  Ramesh,  M.J. \nBabu Rao, A.    Madhusudhana  Rao and P.S.  Uma Mahesh were included at Serial   \nNos.1015 to 1020 respectively  indicating  the  date\/deemed  date  of  joining\nCustoms Appraisers  as  13\/12.3.1987.   It is obvious that such seniority list\nwas on the basis of the date of ad hoc promotion rather than on the  basis  of\nthe subsequent regular promotion.\n\n                11.  The direct recruits who were appointed between the period\n1987 and 1994 and were shown junior to such promotees, who were promoted on ad   \nhoc  basis in March, 1987 but made regular only after 1994 and 19 95 by fixing\ntheir seniority from the date of their ad hoc promotion filed  representations\nto  the  effect  that such ad hoc promotees should not be treated as senior to\nthe direct recruits.  However, when no specific order was passed and\nit was found that some of the promotees had been further promoted  on  ad  hoc\nbasis as Assistant Commissioners, the direct recruits filed O.A.No.833 of 1999\nbefore the Madras Bench of the Tribunal.  At that stage, a reply statement was\nfiled on  behalf  of  the  official respondents.  In such reply statement, the\nofficial respondents  raised  the  question  of  limitation.    The   official\nrespondents  took the stand that between 1987 and 1994 at no point of time the\nrequirement of direct recruit Appraisers had been met in  full  and  vacancies\nalways  existed  against  direct  recruit  quota, which necessitated giving of\npromotion to the post of Appraisers.  It was further indicated :-\n         9.  ...  The Supreme Court judgment did not give  any  direction  to\nthe  effect  that  on  joining  of  one  Direct  Recruit Appraiser, one of the\nPromotee Appraiser who is officiating on ad-hoc basis against a Direct Recruit\nvacancy should be reverted.  The Supreme Court judgment is not to  the  effect\nthat  once a Direct Recruit is available for appointment, the Respondents 3 to\n14 in the O.A.No.39 of 1988, 162 of 1988 and 168 of 1988 ought  to  have  been\nreverted to  the  lower  post.    The very idea of effecting promotion against\nDirect Recruit vacancies is to make the working  strength  equivalent  to  the\nsanctioned strength.    If  there  were  vacancies  inspite  of Direct recruit\njoining, then going by the idea of filling all the vacancies had  to  continue\nfor the  reasons  mentioned earlier.  This has resulted in adjusting the adhoc\npromotees against the vacancies, allowing them to continue and not  to  revert\nthem.   This  was  necessitated  out  of public interest and not to favour the\npromotees.  Further at no point of  time  any  Direct  Recruit  Appraiser  was\nturned away for want to Direct Recruit vacancy.\n\n                12.   At  that  stage, the official respondents took the stand\nthat seniority given to  the  promotees  from  the  date  of  initial  ad  hoc\npromotion  was  correct in the light of the subsequent decision of the Supreme\nCourt in Gaya Baksh Yadavs case as such seniority had been counted  from  the \ndate of continuous officiation.\n\n                13.   The  Madras  Bench of the Tribunal by its judgment dated\n17.10.20 00, dismissed O.A.No.833 of 1998 filed by the direct recruits.    The\nfirst  conclusion  of  the  Tribunal  is  to  the  effect  that  the  Original\nApplication filed by the direct  recruits  was  barred  by  limitation.    The\nTribunal  also  rejected the contention of the direct recruits by relying upon\nthe decision of the Supreme Court in Gaya Baksh Yadavs case.   Such  decision\nof  the  Tribunal  is the subject matter of challenge in W.P.No.15158 of 2002,\nwhich had been filed by the direct recruits.\n\n                14.  While the dispute relating to  seniority  of  the  direct\nrecruits  vis-a-vis  the  promotees  in  the  Custom  House of Madras was thus\npending before the Madras Bench of the Tribunal or the High Court  at  Madras,\nsimilar  dispute  was  raised  by  the direct recruits posted in Bombay Custom\nHouse before the Bombay Bench of the Tribunal in O.A.No.855  of  1998.    Such\napplication  was  filed  by  All  India  Customs  Officers  (  Direct  Recruit\nAppraisers) Association along with two other direct recruits.  Apart from  the\nUnion  of  India  and  the  Chairman, Central Board of Excise and Customs, All\nIndia Customs Appraising Officers Federation,  purportedly  representing  the\npromotees, was impleaded as Respondent No.3.  The Bombay Bench of the Tribunal   \nreferred to the observation of the Supreme Court in Gaya Baksh Yadavs case to\nthe  effect  that  allocation  of  at  least 50% posts in favour of the direct\nrecruits must be ensured  at  all  times  and  direct  recruits  and  promotee\nAppraisers will be\nentitled  to  placement  in  the  joint  seniority  list on the basis of their\ncontinuous officiation and observed :-\n        4.  Applicants case is that Direct Recruits for all times,  entitled\nto 50%  of the post of Appraisers.  After the promulgation of 1961 Recruitment\nRules, which were in force on 31.12.1987, every year the  intake  of  promotee\nAppraisers has  been  far  in  excess  of  their entitlement of 50%.  As such,\npromotion of persons which  were  made  beyond  50%  has  to  be  reckoned  as\npromotions  contrary  to  the  Recruitment  Rules  and  general  principles of\nSeniority, 1959.\n\n                15.  The Bombay Bench of Central Administrative Tribunal  also\nreferred  to  the  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  in the case of All India\nFederation of Central Excise V.  Union of India<\/a> [(1997 SCC (L &  S)  159]  and\nultimately  held  that  the  promotees  cannot take advantage of any promotion\nbeyond the percentage applicable to them as per 1961 Rules and such  promotion \nbeyond  the  prescribed  limit  should  be considered as promotion de hors the\nRules.  It was further concluded that the persons promoted  on  ad  hoc  basis\ncannot claim  the  benefit of seniority.  Ultimately, the seniority list dated\n12.11.1997 was quashed and the official respondents were  directed  to  review\npositions  of  those who had been promoted beyond 50% of their quota on ad hoc\nbasis which is violative of the terms of Rule 4(c) of 1961  Recruitment  Rules\nand General  Principles  of Seniority, 1959.  It is not in dispute that a writ\npetition has been filed against the aforesaid decision and is  pending  before\nthe Bombay High Court. \n\n                16.   In purported exercise of the directions so issued by the\nBombay  Bench  of  the  Tribunal,  the  Union  Government  and  the   official\nrespondents  have issued another draft list of seniority, wherein the position\nof some of the ad hoc promotees has been pushed down and some  of  the  direct \nrecruits have  been  shown as senior.  The official respondents have purported\nto follow the principle of seniority  on  the  basis  of  rotation.    On  the\nissuance  of such draft seniority list, apprehending that further promotion to\nthe next promotional post from the Appraiser would take place on the basis  of\nsuch  draft  seniority  list,  two  of  the  ad  hoc  promotees  who have been\nregularised subsequently have filed O.A.Nos.408 and 419 and of  2005  and  the\none  promoted for the first time on regular basis has filed O.A.No.566 of 2005\nbefore the Madras Bench of the Tribunal.\n                17.  The main prayer in such Original Applications is  to  the\neffect  that  no  promotion  should  be  effected  on  the  basis of the draft\nseniority list and promotion, if any, should be done on the basis of seniority\nlist dated 12.11.1997.\n\n                18.  Such Original  Applications  have  been  disposed  of  by\ncommon  order  dated 9.8.2005 by the Madras Bench of the Tribunal by observing\nthat the Madras Bench of the Tribunal is bound by the decision of  the  Bombay\nBench  of  the  Tribunal  and  since the matter was pending in the Bombay High\nCourt, the promotees have to pursue their remedy either  in  the  Bombay  High\nCourt or  await  for  the  final  outcome  of  the litigation.  The three writ\npetitions, namely, W.P.Nos.39564, 39583 and 26975 of 2005  are  filed  by  the\npromotees against such order of the Tribunal.\n\n                19.   In the above backdrop, stage is now set to advert to the\nthorny issue.  The main contention raised by the promotees is  to  the  effect\nthat  in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Gaya Baksh Yadavs case,\nseniority had been rightly counted from the date of continuous officiation and\nthe seniority list  thus  finalised  in  November,  19  97  was  correct  and,\ntherefore, there  was no occasion to issue a further draft seniority list.  It\nis further contended that at any rate no promotion should be effected  on  the\nbasis  of  the  draft  seniority  list by ignoring the earlier seniority list,\nwhich was final.\n\n\n\n                20.  The stand of the direct recruits is to  the  effect  that\nthose  promotees, who had been promoted on ad hoc basis prior to 31.12.1987 or\neven after 1.1.1988, in excess of 50%  available  to  the  promotees  must  be\nconsidered  as purely ad hoc promotees and cannot claim any seniority on their\nsubsequent regularisation from the date of initial ad hoc promotion and  their\nseniority  should  be  counted  only  from  the  date when they were regularly\npromoted within 50% available to them.\n\n\n                21.  So far as the official respondents are  concerned,  there\nhas been  a  discernible  shift  in  their  stand  like  shifting  sand.   The\ncontention of the Union Government and the official respondents at present  is\nto  the effect that the promotees had no right to get any promotion beyond the\nmaximum of 50%, as envisaged under Rule 4(c) of 1961 Rules, and giving them ad \nhoc promotion did not clothe them with any right to claim seniority  from  the\ndate of  their ad hoc promotion.  It is their further stand that seniority has\nto be now fixed after 1.1.1988 by following quota as well as rotation rule and\naccordingly the draft seniority list has been prepared.\n\n                22.  In the three writ petitions, namely, W.P.Nos.39564, 39583\nand 2 6975 of 2005, filed by the promotees, the specific stand of the official\nRespondents is to  the  effect  that  ad  hoc  seniority  list  has  not  been\nfinalised,  but  since  many  promotional posts are available, steps are being\ntaken to fill up the promotional post in the rank of Assistant Commissioner on\nad hoc basis, subject to finalisation of seniority list and subject to various\nlitigations pending before different courts and if the  position  relating  to\nseniority would subsequently change, obviously, there would be a review of the\nsituation even relating to the question of promotion.\n\n                23.  Learned counsels appearing for the promotees have pointed\nout  that  in  view of the specific stand taken by the Union Government during\nearlier litigations before Madras Bench and even before Bombay  Bench  of  the\nTribunal,  the  Union  Government  should not be permitted to take a different\nstand at this stage.  However, we are  not  inclined  to  consider  the  above\nsubmission as even assuming that the Union of India should not be permitted to\ntake  a  different stand, it is obvious that the direct recruits are not bound\nby any stand taken by the Union of India at different  times  and,  therefore,\nthe  matter  has to be decided on the basis of interpretation of the Rules and\nthe relevant decisions.\n\n                24.  The O.A.No.833 of 1996 filed by the direct  recruits  has\nbeen rejected  on  two  counts.    Firstly,  on  the ground of limitation and,\nsecondly, on merit.  So far as the question of limitation  is  concerned,  the\nTribunal  has  observed  that the draft seniority list had been circulated and\nsome of the applicants knew of  such  draft  seniority  list  and  even  after\nfinalisation  of  the  seniority  list, the Original Application was not filed\nwithin the prescribed period of limitation and, therefore, such application is\nbarred by limitation.\n\n                25.  In Section 21<\/a> of the Administrative Tribunals  Act,  1985\nthe  period  of  limitation  is  prescribed, but simultaneously power has been\nconferred on the Tribunal to condone delay, if any.  In the present case, even\nassuming that the application was barred by limitation, it can be said without\nfear of any contradiction that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of  the\ncase, delay,  if  any,  was required to be condoned.  Apart from the fact that\nsome representations had  been  made,  the  question  raised  was  of  seminal\nimportance  not  only  to  the  Appraisers of Custom House of Madras, but also\nthroughout India and, therefore, it was required of the Tribunal to gloss over\nthe question of limitation if any.  Apart from  the  above,  the  question  of\nlimitation has no significant bearing as the matter has now come to High Court\nnot  only  from  the  very  same  litigation  but  also from other litigations\ninvolving similar question.  Moreover, as rightly pointed out by  the  learned\ncounsels  for  the direct recruits as well as the Union Government, the Bombay\nBench of the Tribunal has quashed the seniority list on all  India  basis  and\nsuch  decision  is not confined merely to Bombay Custom House and the Union of \nIndia  has  been  directed  to  reconsider  the  question  of  seniority  and,\ntherefore, the technical bar raised by the Madras Bench of the Tribunal has no\nsignificance.  To be fair to the learned counsels appearing for the promotees,\nit  must  be  said that such learned counsels have stated that the question of\nlimitation, has no significance because of the subsequent events including the\nsetting aside of the seniority list by the Bombay Bench of  the  Tribunal  and\nthey have rightly submitted that the matter has to be decided on its own merit\nby the High Court.\n\n                26.   The first contention raised in the three writ petitions,\nnamely, W.P.Nos.26975, 39564 and 39583 of 2005, is the propriety of the action\nof the Government in issuing a further draft seniority list when  a  seniority\nlist  had  already  been  prepared  and  finalised  in  1997  and  moreover in\ncontemplating promotion to the next higher post on the  basis  of  such  draft\nseniority list without finalising the question of seniority.\n\n                27.   This  question  raised by the learned counsels appearing\nfor the promotees can be met with a short answer.  In view of the decision  of\nthe Bombay Bench of the Tribunal it cannot be said that final seniority list\ncirculated in  the  year  1997 is any longer final.  As rightly pointed out by\nthe learned counsel appearing for Union of India, in the absence of  any  stay\nby  the  Bombay  High  Court, the Union Government has sought to implement the \ndirections without prejudice to the contentions raised in the  writ  petition.\nIt  is  also  made  clear  in the counter affidavit that the Union of India is\ncontemplating to give promotion only on ad hoc basis without prejudice to  the\nclaim  of  any of the Appraiser to be ultimately decided after finalisation of\nthe seniority list at the end of the myriad of litigations.\n\n                28.  Learned Additional Solicitor General has  submitted  that\neven in the absence of finalisation of formal seniority list the Government is\nnot  precluded  from acting upon the provisions contained in the draft rule or\non the basis of the draft seniority list in exigencies of  service.    In  our\nopinion,  the  stand  taken  by the Union of India cannot be found fault with.\nThe decision of the Bombay Bench of the Tribunal has obviously opened the door\nfor re-drawing the seniority list and the Central Government has  taken  steps\nin that  regard  by  circulating  a draft seniority list.  Since the seniority\nlist of 1997 can no longer be said to be the final list, it  is  open  to  the\nUnion  of  India  to consider the question of promotion purely on ad hoc basis\nincluding the draft seniority list without conferring any substantive right on\nsuch ad hoc promotee. \n\n                29.  The main question, of course, relates to the principle on\nwhich seniority is to be fixed.  In view of the decision of the Supreme  Court\nin Coutinhos case (AIR 1967 SC 52), obviously there is no dispute relating to\nseniority of the Appraisers (either direct recruits or promotees) who had been\nrecruited  on  the  basis  of  the  instructions  which were applicable before\nintroduction of 1961 Rules.  There is no dispute that  after  introduction  of\n1961  Rules, the question of seniority has to be fixed in accordance with such\nrules which were interpreted by the Supreme  Court  in  Yadavs  case.    Even\nthough  Yadavs  case purported to bring all disputes to an end, unfortunately\nthe litigations have not come to an end.  As per the learned counsels for  the\npromotees,  in  view  of  the  specific  observation  of  the Supreme Court as\ncontained in paragraph 16 and the direction contained in paragraph 17 of  such\ndecision, seniority has to be reckoned from the date of continuous officiation\nof  the  promotees  and  on that basis the promotees had been rightly shown as\nseniors in the seniority list, which was finalised on 12.11.1997.\n\n                30.  Learned counsels appearing for the direct  recruits  (and\neven  the  learned  counsels  appearing for the Union of India by adopting an\nimproved and new model stand) different stand have contended  that  paragraph\n16 of such decision makes it very clear that at least 50% of the vacancies are\nensured  at  all  times  in favour of the direct recruits and, therefore, such\nobservation of the Supreme Court obviously means to the  extent  any  promotee\nhad  been  promoted by exceeding the balance 50% available to other appointees\nincluding the promotees, is thus an encroachment on the allocation of at least\n50% posts for the direct recruits and any such promotee who has been  promoted \nin  excess  of  50%  would  obviously  be  considered as an ad hoc promotee in\nfortuitous circumstance and  such  promotee  cannot  claim  any  advantage  of\nseniority  from  the  date  of  such  ad  hoc  appointment  on  his subsequent\nregularisation.  In this context, it is also further submitted by the  learned\ncounsels appearing for the direct recruits as well as Union of India that in a\nlong  line of decisions it has been held that the persons being promoted on ad\nhoc basis cannot claim any right of seniority unless  the  rules  so  envisage\nspecifically.   In  this  context,  it  is also pointed out that in the orders\nrelating to promotion of various claimants now before the Court, it  had  been\nspecifically  indicated  that promotion was purely on ad hoc basis which would\nnot give them any right of regular promotion and subsequently at the  time  of\nregular  promotion  also  it  was  so  indicated  that  their service shall be\nregularly counted from the date when they assumed charge.    It  is  therefore\ncontended  that  in  view of the specific terms of the appointment, in view of\nthe settled principle of law and in view of the fact that direct recruits  are\nensured  allocation of 50% of posts at all times, the contention raised by the\npromotees cannot be accepted.  \n\n                31.  Learned  counsels  for  both  sides  have  placed  strong\nreliance  upon the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1990(2) SCC 715 (\nDIRECT RECRUIT CLASS  II  ENGINEERING  OFFICERS  ASSOCIATION  v.    STATE  OF           \nMAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS<\/a>), which is also apparently the basis of the decision in     \nYadavs  case,  and  it  is therefore necessary to extract in extenso from the\nsaid decision, where the Constitution  Bench  summarised  its  conclusions  as\nfollows :-\n\n\n        47.  To sum up, we hold that :\n\n        (A)  Once  an  incumbent is appointed to a post according to rule, his\nseniority has to be counted from the date of his appointment and not according\nto the date of his confirmation.\n        The corollary of the above rule is that where the initial  appointment\nis  only ad hoc and not according to rules and made as a stop-gap arrangement,\nthe officiation in such post cannot be taken into account for considering  the\nseniority.\n        (B)  If the initial appointment is not made by following the procedure\nlaid down by the rules but the appointee continues in the post uninterruptedly\ntill the regularisation of his service  in  accordance  with  the  rules,  the\nperiod of officiating service will be counted.\n        (C)  When  appointments  are  made  from  more  than one source, it is\npermissible to fix the ratio for recruitment from the different  sources,  and\nif rules are framed in this regard they must ordinarily be followed strictly.\n        (D)  If it becomes impossible to adhere to the existing quota rule, it\nshould be substituted by  an  appropriate  rule  to  meet  the  needs  of  the\nsituation.   In case, however, the quota rule is not followed continuously for\na number of years because it was impossible  to  do  so  the  interference  is\nirresistible that the quota rule had broken down.\n        (E) Where the quota rule has broken down and the appointments are made\nfrom  one  source  in  excess  of  the quota, but are made after following the\nprocedure prescribed by the rules for the appointment, the  appointees  should\nnot  be pushed down below the appointees from the other source inducted in the\nservice at a later date.\n        (F) Where the rules permit the authorities  to  relax  the  provisions\nrelating  to  the  quota, ordinarily a presumption should be raised that there\nwas such relaxation when there is a deviation from the quota rule.\n        (G) The quota for  recruitment  from  the  different  sources  may  be\nprescribed by executive instructions, if the rules are silent on the subject.\n        (H)  If  the quota rule is prescribed by an executive instruction, and\nis not followed continuously for a number of years, the inference is that  the\nexecutive instruction has ceased to remain operative.\n        (I)  The  posts  held by the permanent Deputy Engineers as well as the\nofficiating Deputy Engineers under the State of Maharashtra  belonged  to  the\nsingle cadre of Deputy Engineers.\n        (J)  The  decision  dealing  with  important  questions  concerning  a\n\n\nparticular service given  after  careful  consideration  should  be  respected\nrather than  scrutinised for finding out any possible error.  It is not in the\ninterest of Service to unsettle a settled position.\n\n        With respect to Writ Petition No.1327 of 1982, we further hold:\n\n        (K) That a dispute raised by an application under Article  32<\/a>  of  the\nConstitution must be held to be barred by principles of res judicata including\nthe  rule of constructive res judicata if the same has been earlier decided by\na competent court by a j ent which became final.\n\nIn view of the above and the other findings recorded earlier, we do  not  find\nany  merit  in  any  of  the  civil  appeals, writ petitions and special leave\npetitions which are accordingly dismissed.\n\n                32.  The learned counsels appearing  for  the  promotees  have\nsubmitted  that in view of ratio of the aforesaid decision as reflected in 47(\nB), the seniority of the promotees should be counted from the  date  of  adhoc\npromotion,  whereas  according to the counsels for the Direct Recruits and the\nUnion of  India,  para  47(A)  is  applicable.    In  order  to  resolve   the\ncontroversy,  it  is necessary to consider some of the decisions touching upon\nthe question rendered before and after the decision in Direct Recruits  case.\nIt  is  significant  to  observe that in all the cases the ratio of the Direct\nRecruits case has been clarified and followed.\n\n                33.  In (1976) 2 SCC 901 (V.B.  BADAMI AND OTHERS v.  STATE OF \nMYSORE AND OTHERS<\/a>), it was observed that where appointment was made in  excess       \nof quota, such temporary promotion would not give any benefit in the matter of\nseniority.\n\n                34.  In (1977)  1  SCC 308 (N.K.  CHAUHAN AND OTHERS v.  STATE\nOF GUJARAT AND OTHERS<\/a>), the question  of  seniority  was  in  dispute  between  \ndirect  recruits  and  the  promotees  to the post of Deputy Collectors in the\nState of Gujarat.  It was observed inter alia :-\n        40.   This  brief  and  quick  survey  of  decided  cases   and   the\nsubmissions,  considered  by  us in the judicial crucible, yield the following\nconclusions, leaving aside the question of confirmation in service which, in\nthe Gujarat set-up, leaves our controversy untouched;\n        (a) The  quota  system  does  not  necessitate  the  adoption  of  the\nrotational rule  in  practical  application.  Many ways of working out quota\nprescription can be devised of which rota is certainly one.\n        ...\n<\/pre>\n
        (e) Promotees who have been fitted into vacancies beyond  their  quota
\nduring  the  period  B    the  year  being regarded as the unit  must suffer
\nsurvival as invalid appointees acquiring new  life  when  vacancies  in  their
\nquota fall  to  be  filled  up.  To that extent they will step down, rather be
\npushed down as against direct recruits who were later but regularly  appointed
\nwithin their quota.            (Emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
                35.  In (1992) Supp(1) SCC 272(KESHAV CHANDRA JOSHI AND OTHERS
\nv.  UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS<\/a>), Justice K.  Ramaswamy, speaking for the Bench,
\nafter referring to the propositions A and B in paragraph 47 of Direct Recruits
\ncase, observed :-\n<\/p>\n
        26.   As stated, the counsel for the promotees placed strong reliance
\non proposition B while  the  counsel  for  the  Direct  Recruits  relied  on
\nproposition A.    The  controversy  is as to which of the propositions would
\napply to the facts of this case.  The proposition A lays down that  once  an
\nincumbent  is  appointed to a post according to rules, his seniority has to be
\ncounted from the date of his appointment and not according to the date of  his
\nconfirmation.   The  latter  part  thereof  amplifies  that  where the initial
\nappointment is only ad hoc and not according to rules and is made  as  a  stop
\ngap  arrangement,  the period of officiation in such post cannot be taken into
\naccount for reckoning seniority.  The quintessence of the propositions is that
\nthe appointment to a post must be according to rules and not by way of ad  hoc
\nor stop gap arrangement made due to administrative exigencies.  If the initial
\nappointment thus made was de hors the rules, the entire length of such service
\ncannot be  counted for seniority.  In other words the appointee would become a
\nmember of the service in  the  substantive  capacity  from  the  date  of  his
\nappointment  only if the appointment was made according to rules and seniority
\nwould be counted only  from  that  date.    Propositions  A  and  B  cover
\ndifferent aspects   of  one  situation.    One  must  discern  the  difference
\ncritically.  Proposition  B must, therefore, be read along with para  13  of
\nthe  judgment  wherein the ratio decidendi of Narender Chadha was held to have
\nconsiderable force.  The latter postulated that if the initial appointment  to
\na  substantive post or vacancy was made deliberately, in disregard of the rule
\nand allowed the incumbent to continue on the post for well over 15 to 20 years
\nwithout reversion and till the  date  of  regularisation  of  the  service  in
\naccordance with the rules, the period of officiating service has to be counted
\ntowards seniority.    This  Court in Narender Chadha case was cognizant of the
\nfact that the rules empower the government to relax the rule  of  appointment.
\nWithout  reading  paragraph  13  and Proposition B and Narender Chadha ratio
\ntogether the true import of the proposition would  not  be  appreciated.    We
\nwould deal  with  the  exercise  of  power  of relaxing the rule later.  After
\ngiving anxious consideration, we are of the  view  that  the  latter  half  of
\nProposition A would apply to the facts of the case and the rule laid down in
\nthat half  is to be followed.  If the concerned rules provide the procedure to
\nfix inter se seniority between direct recruits and  promotees,  the  seniority
\nhas to be determined in that manner.\n<\/p>\n
        …\n<\/p>\n
        34.  Accordingly we have no hesitation to hold that the promotees have
\nadmittedly been appointed on ad hoc basis as a stop gap arrangement, though in
\nsubstantive  posts,  and till the regular recruits are appointed in accordance
\nwith the rules.  Their appointments are de hors the rules and until  they  are
\nappointed  by  the Governor according to rules, they do not become the members
\nof the service in a substantive capacity.  Continuous length of ad hoc service
\nfrom the date of initial appointment  cannot  be  counted  towards  seniority.
\n…
\n                                (Emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
                36.  In (1993) 3 SCC 371 (STATE OF WEST BENGAL v.  AGHORE NATH
\nDEY<\/a>), it was observed :-\n<\/p>\n
        21.   We  shall  now  deal  with  the  conclusions (A) and (B) of the
\nConstitution Bench in the Maharashtra Engineers case quoted above.\n<\/p>\n
        22.  there can be no doubt that these two conclusions have to be  read
\nharmoniously,  and  conclusion  (B)  cannot  cover  cases  which are expressly
\nexcluded by conclusion (A).  We may, therefore, first refer to conclusion (A).
\nIt is clear from conclusion (a) that to enable seniority to  be  counted  from
\nthe date of initial appointment and not according to the date of confirmation,
\nthe  incumbent of the post has to be initially appointed according to rules.
\nThe corollary set out in conclusion (A), then  is,  that  where  the  initial
\nappointment  is  only  ad hoc and not according to rules and made as a stopgap
\narrangement, the officiation in such posts cannot be taken  into  account  for
\nconsidering the  seniority.   Thus, the corollary in conclusion (A) expressly
\nexcludes the category of cases where the initial appointment is  only  ad  hoc
\nand not  according  to  rules,  being made only as a stopgap arrangement.  The
\ncase  of  the  writ  petitioners  squarely  falls  within  this  corollary  in
\nconclusion  (A), which says that the officiation in such posts cannot be taken
\ninto account for counting the seniority.\n<\/p>\n
        23.  This  being  the  obvious  inference  from  conclusion  (A),  the
\nquestion is whether the present case can also fall within conclusion (B) which
\ndeals  with  cases  in which period of officiating service will be counted for
\nseniority.  We have no doubt that conclusion (B) cannot  include,  within  its
\nambit,  those cases which are expressly covered by the corollary in conclusion
\n(A), since the two conclusions cannot be read in conflict with each other.\n<\/p>\n
        24.  The question, therefore,  is  of  the  category  which  would  be
\ncovered  by  conclusion  (B)  excluding  therefrom  the  cases  covered by the
\ncorollary in conclusion (A).\n<\/p>\n
        25.  In our opinion, the conclusion (B) was added to cover a different
\nkind of situation, wherein the appointments are otherwise regular, except  for
\nthe  deficiency  of  certain  procedural  requirements laid down by the rules.
\nThis is clear from the opening words of the conclusion (B),  namely,  if  the
\ninitial  appointment  is  not made by following the procedure laid down by the
\nrules and the latter expression  till the regularisation of his  service  in
\naccordance with the rules.  We read conclusion (B), and it must be so read to
\nreconcile   with  conclusion  (A),  to  cover  the  cases  where  the  initial
\nappointment is made against an existing vacancy, not limited to a fixed period
\nof time or purpose by the appointment order itself, and is made subject to the
\ndeficiency  in  the  procedural  requirements  prescribed  by  the  rules  for
\nadjudging suitability of the appointee for the post being cured at the time of
\nregularisation, the appointee being eligible and qualified in every manner for
\na  regular  appointment  on  the  date  of  initial appointment in such cases.
\nDecision about the nature of the appointment, for determining whether it falls
\nin this category, has to be made on the basis of  the  terms  of  the  initial
\nappointment itself  and  the  provisions  in  the  rules.   In such cases, the
\ndeficiency in the procedural requirements laid down by the  rules  has  to  be
\ncured at the first available opportunity, without any default of the employee,
\nand  the  appointee  must  continue  in  the  post  uninterruptedly  till  the
\nregularisation of his service, in accordance with the rules.  In  such  cases,
\nthe   appointee  is  not  to  blame  for  the  deficiency  in  the  procedural
\nrequirements of the rules being fulfilled at the  earliest.    In  such  cases
\nalso,  if  there be any delay in curing the defects on account of any fault of
\nthe appointee, the appointee would not get the full  benefit  of  the  earlier
\nperiod  on  account  of  his  default,  the benefit being confined only to the
\nperiod for which he is not to blame.  This category of cases is different from
\nthose covered by the corollary in conclusion (A) which relates to  appointment
\nonly on  ad hoc basis as a stopgap arrangement and not according to rules.  It
\nis, therefore, not correct to say that the present cases can fall  within  the
\nambit  of  conclusion  (B),  even  though  they  are  squarely  covered by the
\ncorollary in conclusion (A).   (Emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
                37.  In (1995) Supp.(2)  SCC  407  (STATE  OF  MAHARASHTA  AND
\nANOTHER A.  W.    DHOPE  AND  OTHERS  v.    SANJAY  THAKRE AND OTHERS<\/a>), it was
\nobserved :-\n<\/p>\n
        6.  Insofar as in the second aspect of the case  is  concerned,  Shri
\nBhandare,  appearing  for  the State, is at pains to urge that in view of what
\nwas held by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of W.P.    v.    Aghore
\nNath  Dey  the present was pre-eminently a fit case where the service rendered
\nby the promotees, even though ad hoc, was  required  to  be  counted  for  the
\npurpose of  seniority.    We  have  two  observations  to  make regarding this
\nsubmission.  The first is that Aghore Nath was not a  case  of  claim  by  the
\npromotees  for  seniority  over  direct  recruits;  as  was  in  the  cases of
\nJanardhana and Narender Chadha, ratio of which cases was not applied in Aghore
\nNath case for the reason that the cases did not deal with inter  se  seniority
\nbetween direct  recruits  and  promotees.    So  the ratio of Aghore Nath case
\ncannot apply to the facts of the present case as here we  are  concerned  with
\ninter se  seniority.  This apart, a perusal of Aghore Nath decision shows that
\nbenefit of ad hoc service  would  not  be  admissible  if  appointment  be  in
\nviolation of rules.  Now, if the quota rule had not broken down as held by the
\nTribunal  which  view  we have affirmed, the appointment of promotes has to be
\nregarded as in violation of rules.\n<\/p>\n
        …\n<\/p>\n
        8.  For the aforesaid reason, what  was  stated  by  the  Constitution
\nBench in  Direct  Recruit Class II Engineering Officers Assn.  case would not
\nalso apply because to get benefit of what was stated in subpara (B) of para 44
\n[(1990)2 SCC p.745, para 47(B)], which is strongly  pressed  into  service  by
\nShri Dholakia, the appointment has to be as per the rules, which was not so in
\nthe present case so far as the promotees are concerned.<\/p>\n
                38.  In  (1996)  7  SCC  759  (V.P.  SHRIVASTAVA AND OTHERS v.
\nSTATE OF M.P.  AND OTHERS<\/a>), after referring to Direct Recruits case in para 9,
\nthe Supreme Court observed:-\n<\/p>\n
        10.  We are not concerned with the other propositions  laid  down  by
\nthis Court  in  the present case.  In the case in hand the initial appointment
\nof the respondents on promotion not having been made following  the  procedure
\nlaid down by the Recruitment Rules of 1965 and even though they are continuing
\nin  the  post  uninterruptedly  but  the  Public Service Commission having not
\napproved  their  appointments  as  yet,  proposition  B  above  will  have  no
\napplication.     Consequently,    applying    proposition    A    above,   the
\nappellants-direct recruits must be held senior to the  respondents    private
\nrespondents   ad  hoc  promotees.  The Tribunal obviously erred in law in not
\nfollowing  the  aforesaid  authoritative  pronouncement  of  this  Court   for
\ndetermination  of  the  inter  se  seniority  between  direct recruits and the
\npromotees.\n<\/p>\n
        11.  In the three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in  the  case  of
\nState of W.B.  v.  Aghore Nath Dey<\/a>, this Court held:  (SCC p.382, para 22 )
\n        …   that to enable seniority to be counted from the date of initial
\nappointment and not according to the date of confirmation,  the  incumbent  of
\nthe post  has  to  be initially appointed according to rules.  The corollary
\nset out in conclusion (A), then is, that where  the  initial  appointment  is
\nonly  ad hoc and not according to rules and made as a stopgap arrangement, the
\nofficiation in such posts cannot be taken into  account  for  considering  the
\nseniority.<\/p>\n
        12.   It  was  thus  held that conclusions A and B of the Constitution
\nBench in Direct Recruits case have to be read harmoniously  and  conclusion  B
\ncannot cover cases which are expressly excluded by conclusion A.\n<\/p>\n
        13.  In a more recent case of V.  Sreenivasa Reddy v.  Govt.  of A.P<\/a>.,
\nwhere  one  of  us  (brother Ramaswamy, J.) was a member, all the decisions of
\nthis Court on the point have been considered and it has been  laid  down  that
\ntemporary  or  ad hoc appointments are not appointments in accordance with the
\nrules and the temporary service cannot be counted towards the seniority.<\/p>\n
                39.  In (1998) 5 SCC 293 (Dr.  ANURADHA  BODI  AND  OTHERS  v.
\nMUNICIPAL  CORPORATION OF DELHI AND OTHERS<\/a>), while considering the question of
\nseniority of ad hoc appointees, the Direct  Recruits  case  and  Aghore  Nath
\nDeys  case  were referred to and it was observed that Paragraph ( A) sub para
\nwould be applicable.  It was further observed:\n<\/p>\n
        12.  If the facts of these two cases are analysed in the light of the
\naforesaid decisions, there can be no doubt whatever that the petitioners  fall
\nwithin the  corollary  in Conclusion (A).  The orders of appointment issued to
\nthe petitioners are very specific in their  terms.    Though  the  recruitment
\nrules  came  into  force  on  6-8-1982,  the  appointments  were  not  made in
\naccordance therewith.  They were ad hoc and made  as  a  stopgap  arrangement.
\nThe  orders  themselves  indicated that for the purpose of regular appointment
\nthe petitioners were bound to pass the UPSC examination in the  normal  course
\nin the direct competition.  Hence the petitioners will not fall under the main
\npart  of  Conclusion (A) or Conclusion (B) as contended by the learned counsel
\nfor the petitioners.<\/p>\n
                40.  In (2000) 7 SCC 561 (SURAJ PARKASH GUPTA  AND  OTHERS  v.
\nSTATE  OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR AND OTHERS<\/a>), the Supreme Court distinguished (1985
\n) 2 SCC 604 (G.S.  LAMBA v.  UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS<\/a>) and (1986) 2  SCC  157
\n(NARENDER CHADHA  v.  UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS<\/a>) (latter case had been noticed
\nin Direct Recruits case (1990) 2 SCC 715) by observing that recent  trend  of
\ncases in this Court is entirely different.\n<\/p>\n
        28.   The decisions of this Court have recently been requiring strict
\nconformity with the Recruitment Rules for both direct recruits and  promotees.
\nThe  view is that there can be no relaxation of the basic or fundamental rules
\nof recruitment.  In Keshav Chandra Joshi v.  Union of India the Rule<\/a> permitted
\nrelaxation of the conditions of service and it was  held  by  the  three-Judge
\nBench that the Rule did not permit relaxation of Recruitment Rules.  The words
\nmay consult PSC were, it was observed, to be read as shall consult PSC and
\nthe Rule was  treated  as  mandatory.  In Syed Khalid Rizvi v.  Union of India<\/a>
\n(1993 Supp(3)SCC 575 at p.603) decided  by  a  three-Judge  Bench,  a  similar
\nstrict principle  was  laid down.  The relevant Rule  Rule 3 of the Residuary
\nRules (see p.603, para 33) in that case did permit relaxation of the  Rules.
\nEven  so,  this  Court  refused  to  imply  relaxation of Recruitment Rule and
\nobserved :  (SCC pp.603-04, para 33)<\/p>\n
        The condition precedent,  therefore,  is  that  there  should  be  an
\nappointment  to  the  service in accordance with rules and by operation of the
\nrule, undue hardship has been caused, …  It is already held that  conditions
\nof  recruitment  and  conditions  of  service  are  distinct and the latter is
\npreceded by an appointment according to rules.  The former cannot be relaxed.
\n(emphasis added)\n<\/p>\n
        29.  Similarly, in State of Orissa v.  Sukanti Mohapatra<\/a> it  was  held
\nthat  though  the power of relaxation stated in the rule was in regard to any
\nof the provisions of the rules, this did not permit relaxation of the rule of
\ndirect recruitment without consulting the Commission and  the  entire  ad  hoc
\nservice  of  a  direct  recruit  could  not  be  treated  as  regular service.
\nSimilarly, in M.A.  Haque (Dr) v.  Union of India<\/a> it was held that for  direct
\nrecruitment,  the  rules  relating  to  recruitment through the Public Service
\nCommission could not be relaxed.  In J&K Pubic  Service  Commission  v.    Dr.
\nNarinder  Mohan<\/a> it was held that the provisions of the J&K Medical Recruitment
\nRules could not be relaxed  for  direct  recruitment.    The  backdoor  direct
\nrecruitments, could  not  be  permitted.   (See also Arundhati Ajit Pargaonkar
\n(Dr) v.  State of Maharashtra<\/a>).  In Surinder Singh Jamwal (Dr) v.    State  of
\nJ&K<\/a>  this  Court  directed the direct recruits to go before the Public Service
\nCommission. <\/p>\n
        40.1 After concluding that quota rule had not broken  down,  regarding
\napplicability on the basis of rotation, it was observed :-\n<\/p>\n
        40.   We  shall  next refer to the contention for the direct recruits
\nthat rota quota rule is to be applied.  Before us, it is not disputed by the
\nlearned counsel for the direct recruits that in the Recruitment  Rules,  1978,
\nthere  is  only  a  quota  rule  and  that  no  rota  rule  has been expressly
\nprescribed.\n<\/p>\n
        Question is whether rota can be implied\n<\/p>\n
        41.  The direct recruits contend that rota is to be  implied  or  read
\ninto the  quota  rule.    It  is  also argued that there has been a previous
\npractice of applying a  rota  and  that  this  fact  stands  conceded  in  the
\ncounter-affidavit filed  by the Government in SWP No.824-B of 1994 .  Reliance
\nis also placed on the Cabinet note of December 1997 where the view of the  Law
\nDepartment that quota-rota rule is to be applied, is referred to.\n<\/p>\n
        42.  In our opinion, in view of the admission before us by all parties
\nthat there is no express rota rule, the decision of the High Court that rota
\nprinciple applied cannot be  upheld.    As  held in N.K.  Chauhan v.  State of
\nGujarat<\/a> by Krishna Iyer, J.  there is no question of a quota being necessarily
\ninterlocked with rota.  It is not necessarily inscribed within  every  quota
\nrule.  Again in B.S.   Yadav v.  State of Haryana Chandrachud, C.J.  held that
\na quota does not imply a rota.  The first part  of  the  contention  of  the
\ndirect recruits is without any substance.\n<\/p>\n
Rota cannot be brought in only because of past
\npractice<\/p>\n
        43.   So  far as the second part of the contention that there has been
\nprevious practice, we may refer to L.   Chandrakishore  Singh  v.    State  of
\nManipur<\/a> ((1999) 8  SCC 287 at p.302 :  JT at p.593).  There it was held that a
\npractice must be consistent with rules and that a practice not consistent with
\nrules is not acceptable.  In that case, the practice of  not  considering  for
\npromotion  probationers and considering only confirmed candidates was held not
\nconsistent with the Rules and could  not  be  permitted.    Similarly,  in  D.
\nStephen Joseph  v.   Union of India<\/a> it was held that a past practice which was
\nde hors a rule could be of no help.  The question  in  that  case  was  as  to
\nwhether  the  requirement  of  particular years of service with graduation for
\npromotion meant service after graduation or  service  during  which  a  degree
\nqualification was  acquired.    A  practice  of  counting  three  years  after
\nobtaining qualification was not accepted.  In that view  of  the  matter,  the
\nsecond part of this contention also goes.\n<\/p>\n
        44.   Hence,  it must be held that there is no rota coupled with quota
\nbut that there is only a quota rule.  Point 2 is decided accordingly.<\/p>\n
        40.2 In para 72, (1988) Supp.  SCC 225 (K.  SIVA REDDY v.    STATE  OF
\nANDHRA PRADESH AND OTHERS<\/a>) was distinguished as the service rendered on ad hoc
\nbasis  was against the quota and the post was within the direct recruit quota.
\nIt was observed :\n<\/p>\n
        77.  We shall next refer to another set of cases relied upon  by  the
\ndirect  recruits  where, on facts, the promotees were not given the benefit of
\nad hoc\/stopgap service.  Here the service rendered by the promotees was either
\noutside quota or the candidates were not eligible by the  date  the  order  of
\nregularisation was  passed  or  were not having the required experience.  C.K.
\nAntony v.  B.  Muraleedharan<\/a>  arising  from  Kerala  State  has  some  special
\nfeatures.  There was a rule similar to Rule 23 of the J&K Rules and Rule 23(a)
\nof the   Andhra   Pradesh  Rules.    The  said  Rule  permitted  retrospective
\nregularisation of the promotees from anterior dates but this Rule stated  that
\nthe said regularisation should be without prejudice to seniority.  It was no
\ndoubt  interpreted  that  the Rule meant that the seniority of direct recruits
\ncould not be affected.  The question as to when it  could  be  said  that  the
\nseniority  of  a  direct  recruit  would  be  prejudiced,  was not elaborated.
\nWhether the case of direct recruits would be prejudiced even if the  promotees
\nwere given seniority from an anterior date upon a post within their quota, was
\nnot decided.  Further, on facts, the earlier ad hoc promotion of the promotees
\nwas not  against  cadre  posts  but was in excess of the quota.  Obviously, it
\ncould not  count  for  seniority  in  view  of  Direct  Recruit  case.     Any
\nregularisation  of  such service in a direct recruitment post would definitely
\nprejudice the seniority of direct recruits.  In view  of  the  above  peculiar
\nfeatures, the case is clearly distinguishable.\n<\/p>\n
        …\n<\/p>\n
        79.   Summarising  the  position,  we  therefore hold that the ad hoc\/
\nstopgap service of the promotees cannot be treated as non est  merely  because
\nPSC was not consulted in respect of continuance of the ad hoc\/ stopgap service
\nbeyond six months.  Such service is capable of being regularised under Rule 23
\nof  the J&K (CCA) Rules, 1956 and rectified with retrospective effect from the
\ndate of occurrence of a clear vacancy  in  the  promotion  quota,  subject  to
\neligibility, fitness  and  other  relevant  factors.   There is no rota rule
\napplicable.  The quota rule has not broken down.  Excess promotees occupying
\ndirect recruitment posts  have  to  be  pushed  down  and  adjusted  in  later
\nvacancies within  their quota, after due regularisation.  Such service outside
\nthe promotee quota cannot count for seniority.  Service of the promotees which
\nis regularised with retrospective effect from the date of vacancies within the
\nquota counts for seniority.  However, any part of such ad hoc\/stopgap or  even
\nregular  service  rendered while occupying the direct recruitment quota cannot
\nbe counted.  Seniority of the promotees or transferees is to be fixed  as  per
\nquota  and  from  the date of commencement of probation\/regular appointment as
\nstated above.  Seniority of direct recruits is from the  date  of  substantive
\nappointment.   Seniority  has  to  be  worked  out between direct recruits and
\npromotees for each year.  We decide Point 3 accordingly.
\n                                (Emphasis added)<\/p>\n
        40.3 In paragraphs 80 and 81, it was  observed  that  direct  recruits
\ncannot  claim  appointment  from the date of vacancy within quota before their
\nselection.  It was further observed :\n<\/p>\n
        …  in service jurisprudence, a direct recruit can  claim  seniority
\nonly from the date of his regular appointment.  He cannot claim seniority from
\na date when he was not borne in service.  This principle is well settled.
\n(For  the aforesaid purpose, reliance was placed upon (1977) 1 SCC 30 8 (cited
\nabove), (1983) 3 SCC 601(Janardhana V.  Union of India<\/a>), (198 7) Suppl.    SCC
\n763 (A.N.  Pathak v.  Secretary to the Government<\/a>).\n<\/p>\n
                42.  In (2003) 4 SCC 65 (A.G.  SAINATH REDDY v.  GOVERNMENT OF
\nANDHRA  PRADESH  AND  OTHERS<\/a>),  the  Department had considered the question of
\nseniority for the promotee from the  date  of  ad  hoc  promotion,  which  was<\/p>\n
challenged  by  the  direct  recruits  before  the Tribunal which allowed such
\napplication.  In appeal,  the  Supreme  Court  upheld  such  decision  of  the
\nTribunal by following the ratio of Aghore Nath Deys case.\n<\/p>\n
                43.  In (2004) 6 SCC 729 (M.  SUBBA REDDY AND ANOTHER v.  A.P.
\nSTATE  ROAD  TRANSPORT  CORPORATION  AND  OTHERS<\/a>) by distinguishing the Direct
\nRecruits case and by following the subsequent decision in (1993)  3  SCC  371
\n(STATE OF WEST BENGAL v.  AGHORE NATH DEY<\/a>), the majority observed :-\n<\/p>\n
        8.   The  appellants  have  relied upon the judgment of this Court in
\nDirect Recruit Class II Engg.  Officers Assn.  Case.    In  that  matter,  an
\nunusual  situation  had  developed  under  which the rota-and-quota system had
\nbroken down.  The promotees had worked for twenty years without being reverted
\nand in view of that fact, the Constitution Bench of this Court  confirmed  the
\nprinciples   of   counting   towards   seniority,  the  period  of  continuous
\nofficiation.  The said judgment has no application to the facts of this  case.
\nIn  the  present case, the argument of the appellants is that on the date when
\nthe appellants were regularised, there were no direct recruits  available  and
\nconsequently  they  cannot  be  pushed  down in the integrated seniority list.
\nHence, the judgment of this Court in the case of Direct Recruit Class II Engg.
\nOfficers Assn.  has no application to the present case.    In  fact,  in  the
\nlater judgment of this Court in the case of State of W.B.  v.  Aghore Nath Dey<\/a>
\nit  has been held, relying on the judgment in the case of Direct Recruit Class
\nII Engg.  Officers Assn.  that seniority has to be counted from the  date  of
\ninitial appointment and not from the date of confirmation provided the initial
\nappointment is<\/p>\n
according to  the  rules.   But the corollary to the above proposition is that
\nwhere initial appointment is only ad hoc and not according to the  rules,  the
\nofficiation cannot  be  taken into account for considering the seniority.  The
\nratio of the judgment of this Court in the case of Aghore Nath Dey is that the
\nbenefit of ad hoc or temporary service is not admissible, if  appointment  was
\noutside the  rules.    Applying the ratio of the said judgment to the facts of
\nthis  case,the  benefit  of  temporary  promotion  to  the  appellants   under
\nRegulation 30 was not admissible to them for computation of seniority.\n<\/p>\n
        9.   It  was,  however,  urged  on  behalf  of the appellants that the
\nposition changed when vacancies became available in the  promotion  quota  and
\nthe appellants  came to be regularised vide order dated 9-9-1988.  By the said
\norder,  according  to  the  appellants,   regularisation   took   place   with
\nretrospective  effect from the dates indicated against their names and against
\nthe post earmarked for promotion and consequently in the integrated  seniority
\nlist, they were not liable to be pushed down below direct recruits.  We do not
\nfind any merit in this argument.  Under Regulation 30 read with Regulation 34,
\ntemporary  promotees  were  liable  to be reverted as and when approved direct
\nrecruits became available.  The promotees were liable to be replaced by direct
\nrecruits.  Under Regulation 34, the said revertees were to be  considered  for
\nrepromotion only  against the quota of vacancies reserved for promotees.  This
\nis clear from the terms of the order dated 9-9-1988.   In  the  case  of  U.P.
\nSecretariat U.D.A.  Assn.   v.   State of U.P<\/a>.  it has been held that a direct
\nrecruit is to be treated as in service from the date he joins it, whereas  the
\npromotee  has to be fitted into service from the date when he becomes entitled
\nto fitment in accordance with the quota-and-rota  rule  prescribed  under  the
\nrules.  In the  case of A.N.  Sehgal v.  Raje Ram Sheoran<\/a> one of the arguments
\nadvanced on behalf of the promotees was that they were promoted  as  Executive
\nEngineers  against  regular  vacancies  and  they continued in service without
\nbreak from the respective dates of<\/p>\n
their promotion, therefore, they were members of the  service  in  substantive
\ncapacity from  respective  dates  of promotion.  It was argued that the direct
\nrecruit Shri Raje Ram was recruited long after the promotion of the appellants
\n(promotees) and, therefore, the promotees cannot be  pushed  down  and  placed
\nbelow the  direct recruit.  On examination of the rules, this Court found that
\nrecruitment to the service was from three sources, namely, direct recruitment,
\npromotion and by transfer.  A ratio was prescribed under Rule 5(2) between the
\npromotees and direct recruits.  The ratio was 1:1.  It was held that Rule 5(2)
\nhad restricted the number of posts to promotees at 50%.  Under the proviso  to
\nRule  5(2),  it  was  laid  down that the rigour of 50% quota maybe relaxed in
\ncases where direct recruits were not available.  On reading  Rule  5,  it  was
\nheld  by  this  Court  that  a  promotee within his quota under Rule 5 got his
\nseniority from the date when the vacancy arose in his quota.  It was held that
\nthe promotee occupying the  post  within  50%  quota  of  the  direct  recruit
\nacquired  no  right  to the post and should yield to the direct recruit though
\npromoted later than him.  It was held that the seniority of the  promotee  has
\nto  be reckoned only from the date of availability of the post and, therefore,
\nhe has to be placed below his immediate senior promotee within the said quota.
\nThe officiating period of the promotee between the date of  initial  promotion
\nand the  date  of  availability  of  vacancy  would  stand excluded.  A direct
\nrecruit on promotion within  his  quota,  though  later  to  the  promotee  is
\ninterposed  in between the periods and interjects the promotees seniority; he
\nsnaps the links in the chain  of  continuity  and  steals  a  march  over  the
\npromotee.  It has been further held that the rule of quota is a statutory rule
\nand must  be  strictly  implemented.  The result of pushing down the promotees
\nmay work hardship but it is unavoidable as  it  would  otherwise  nullify  the
\nstatutory rules.  In the  case of U.P.  Secretariat U.D.A.  Assn.  it has been
\nheld by this Court that mere inaction on the part of the Government cannot  be
\nmade a  ground to contend that the quota rule has broken down.  In the present
\ncase, in the absence of direct recruitment, the appellants could not have  got
\nseniority over  direct  recruits.   Where there is inaction on the part of the
\nGovernment or employer or imposed ban on direct recruitment in filling up  the
\nposts  meant  for direct recruits, it cannot be held that the quota has broken
\ndown.
\n                                (Emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
                44.  In (2000) 4 SCC 20 (T.  VIJAYAN AND OTHERS v.  DIVISIONAL
\nRAILWAY MANAGER AND OTHERS<\/a>), the persons who had been promoted on ad hoc basis
\nand subsequently regularised were given seniority from the date of initial  ad
\nhoc  promotion  by  referring  to Direct Recruits case as well as Aghore Nath
\nDeys case and by following (1999) 1 SCC 280 ( Keshav Deo v.  State  of  U.P<\/a>.)
\nand (1999) 9  SCC  596 (Ajit Kumar Rath v.  State of Orissa<\/a>).  However, in the
\nabove case there was no promotion encroaching upon the quota of other category
\nand this decision is therefore distinguishable.\n<\/p>\n
                45.  In (2003) 5 SCC 511 (SANTOSH KUMAR v.   STATE  OF  ANDHRA
\nPRADESH  AND  OTHERS<\/a>),  the  subsequent regularisation of a temporary promotee
\nwith retrospective effect was found justified by applying  the  ratio  of  the
\nDirect Recruit  case.   However, in the said case, it was found that promotion
\ngiven was within the promotion quota and,  therefore,  it  was  observed  that
\ndirect recruit,  who  was  recruited  later  on,  could  not  challenge.  This
\ndecision is distinguishable.\n<\/p>\n
                46.  From the aforesaid decisions, it is apparent  that  where
\nthe  appointment  is  in excess of the quota, the appointees in excess of such
\nquota would obviously be held to be recruits de hors to the rules and as such,
\nwould not have any right to  claim  seniority  (more  particularly  when  such
\npromotion is explicitly on ad hoc basis).\n<\/p>\n
                47.   It  cannot  be  construed that the Supreme Court in Gaya
\nBaksh Yadav case intended to depart from the well settled principles  relating
\nto  fixation  of  seniority  and it cannot be understood that it was laid down
\neven if the promotion is purely ad hoc  and  not  within  the  quota  for  all
\nclasses,  yet  such  seniority  should  be  counted  from  the  date of ad hoc
\npromotion.  As a matter of fact, the Supreme Court has pointedly  referred  to
\nthe principles  enumerated  in Direct Recruits case.  The Direct Recruits case
\nhas been consistently interpreted subsequently to mean that where there is  an
\nad  hoc  promotion coming within para 47(A), para 47(B) of such decision would
\nnot be applicable.  There are several decisions of the Supreme  Court  wherein
\nit  was  observed that when a quota has been fixed by the Rules, any promotion
\nmade contrary to the quota rule should be taken to be  ad  hoc  or  fortuitous
\ngiving  no  right  to  such  person to claim seniority from the date of ad hoc
\npromotion.  This applies with more vigour to  a  case  where  promotion  order
\nitself specifically says that promotion is purely ad hoc and does not give any
\nright to claim promotion on substantive basis as in the present case.\n<\/p>\n
                48.   Of  course,  when the court comes to the conclusion that
\nquota rule has broken down, obviously the appointment made in  excess  of  the
\nquota can  be  counted.    However,  it  is  evident that before coming to the
\nconclusion that quota has broken down, the Court has to arrive at  a  definite
\nconclusion   that   consistently  for  a  considerable  length  of  time,  the
\nappropriate authority had consciously departed from the quota.\n<\/p>\n
                49.  In the present case, it cannot be said that the quota had
\nbroken down.  On the other hand, the Supreme Court in Gaya Baksh Yadavs  case
\ncategoricaklly observed that at least 50% is preserved for the direct recruits
\nat all  times.  So far as ad hoc promotion before December, 1987 is concerned,
\nto the extent that such appointment had  been  made  within  the  maximum  50%
\navailable  for  the  promotees,  the  observation of the Supreme Court in Gaya
\nBaksh Yadavs case  i.e.,  seniority  should  be  counted  from  the  date  of
\ncontinuous officiation,  is  required  to  be followed.  However, it cannot be
\nsaid that the Supreme Court also intended to lay down an inexorable  principle
\nthat the promotees promoted on ad hoc basis before December, 1987 in excess of
\nmaximum  50%  available  to  the promotees, on their subsequent regularisation
\nafter 1988 Rules came into force, were also to be  given  seniority  from  the
\ndate of  their  ad  hoc  promotion.  Such interpretation would rather militate
\nagainst the observation of the Supreme Court  that  the  direct  recruits  are
\nensured 50% of the posts at all times.\n<\/p>\n
                50.   In  view of the discussion, the inevitable conclusion is
\nas follows :-\n<\/p>\n
        (A) Promotees who had been regularised by December, 1987 should be  in
\nthe seniority list on the basis of continuous officiation.\n<\/p>\n
        (B)  Ad  hoc  promotees  within  permissible 50%, who were regularised
\nafter 1988 Rules came into force can claim seniority from the date of their ad
\nhoc promotion, provided their selection was otherwise in accordance  with  the
\n1961 Rules.    However,  ad  hoc  promotees  promoted before December, 1987 in
\nexcess  of  maximum  permissible  50%  of  the  post,  on   their   subsequent
\nregularisation  after  1988 Rules came into force can claim seniority from the
\ndate of regular promotion and not from the date of their ad hoc promotion.\n<\/p>\n
        (C) The seniority of a direct recruit can be counted from the date  of
\nappointment.\n<\/p>\n
        (D)  There  is nothing in 1988 Rules to indicate that seniority has to
\nbe fixed on the basis of principle of rotation.  Therefore, to the  extent,  a
\nparticular  appointment is within the quota earmarked in 198 8 Rules seniority
\nhas to be counted from the date of the substantive appointment  and  if  there
\nhas  been  any appointment in excess of the quota for a particular year, for a
\nparticular category, obviously such a person must be pushed down and should be
\nadjusted against the quota of the category  concerned  during  the  subsequent
\nyears.\n<\/p>\n
        (E) Seniority need not be on the basis of rotation unless there is any
\nspecific  instruction to that effect validly issued after coming into force of
\n1988 Rules and the Department cannot fall back on the instructions  which  had
\nbeen  issued  before  1961  or  before  1987  as  it  cannot be said that such
\ninstructions are in vogue even after new Rules have come into force.\n<\/p>\n
                51.  The Supreme Court has recognised the right of an employer
\nto give ad hoc  promotion  notwithstanding  that  draft  rules  had  not  been
\nfinalised  or  even  draft  seniority  list  had  not  been  finalised on some
\nreasonable basis.  However, if any such ad  hoc  promotion  is  given,  it  is
\nobvious  that  such  ad  hoc promotion would not give any substantive right to
\nsuch  person  and  such  person  is  liable  to  be  reverted  on   subsequent
\nfinalisation  of  the  seniority  list  and  regular  promotion  of any senior
\nofficer.  This observation is being made in view of the submission  that  many
\npromotional posts  are lying vacant.  As a matter of fact, in the affidavit it
\nhas been clarified by the Union Government  that  only  ad  hoc  promotion  is
\nintended to be given.\n<\/p>\n
                52.   In view of the aforesaid conclusions, the prayer made in
\nvarious writ petitions are to be specifically considered.\n<\/p>\n
        Prayer in W.P.No.26975 of 2005 is for issuing a writ of Certiorarified
\nMandamus for quashing the order  dated  9.8.2005  and  further  directing  the
\nrespondents  2  to  4, namely, Union of India and other officials, to finalise
\nthe seniority list in the light of objections made by  the  petitioner  before
\nmaking  promotion to the post of Assistant Commissioner of Customs and Central
\nExcise (Group A) Post.\n<\/p>\n
        Similarly, in W.P.Nos.39564 of 2005 and 39583 of 2005, prayer has been
\nmade for quashing the common order dated 9.8.2005 passed by the  Tribunal  and
\nfor quashing the seniority list dated 16.12.2004.\n<\/p>\n
                53.   The  Tribunal  has observed that the concerned promotees
\nhave to await the  decision  of  the  Bombay  High  Court  or  get  themselves
\nimpleaded there  to  pursue  their remedy.  The stand of the Union of India is
\nthat seniority list is being finalised but the  Union  of  India  is  keen  to
\npromote persons on the basis of draft seniority list which would be subject to
\nthe finalisation  of the seniority list.  The main contention of the promotees
\nis that on the basis of  continuous  officiation  from  the  date  of  ad  hoc
\npromotion they should be considered as seniors to the direct recruits who have
\nbeen appointed subsequently.\n<\/p>\n
                54.  This contention is not acceptable in view of the analysis
\nof  position  of  law  made  earlier  to the extent, any promotee who had been
\npromoted before December, 1987  within  the  maximum  50%  available  for  the
\npromotees,   his  seniority  can  be  counted  from  the  date  of  continuous
\nofficiation, whereas, a promotee promoted on ad  hoc  basis  before  December,
\n1987  in  excess  of  50% and regularised against a regular vacancy after 1988
\nRules came into force, cannot claim seniority.  In view of the specific  stand
\nof  the  Union of India that it is only contemplating to give ad hoc promotion
\non the basis of the draft seniority list, the promotees cannot be said  to  be
\naggrieved  as  the  question  of regular promotion would obviously depend upon
\nsubsequent finalisation  of  the  seniority  list.    While  giving  any  such
\npromotion,  the  Union  of India should make it clear that the promotion is ad
\nhoc subject to finalisation of the seniority list.\n<\/p>\n
        Subject to these observations, W.P.Nos.26975, 39564 and 39583 of 200 5
\nare disposed of.\n<\/p>\n
                55.  So far as W.P.No.15158 of 2002 is  concerned,  such  writ
\npetition  is  to  be allowed and the order or the Tribunal cannot be upheld in
\nview of the position of law analysed earlier.\n<\/p>\n
                56.  In the result, W.P.Nos.26975, 39564 and 39583 of 2005 are
\ndisposed of subject to the observations made above and W.P.No.15158 of  200  2
\nis allowed.  There would be no order as to costs.  Consequently, the connected
\nmiscellaneous petitions are closed.\n<\/p>\n
To<\/p>\n
1.  The Central Administrative Tribunal
\nrep.  by its Registrar,
\nCity Civil Court Buildings,
\nChennai 104.\n<\/p>\n
2.  The Union of India,
\nrep.  by the Secretary to Government,
\nDepartment of Revenue, North Block, New Delhi.\n<\/p>\n
3.  The Chairman,
\nCentral Board of Excise and Customs
\nDepartment of Revenue,
\nMinistry of Finance, New Delhi 1.\n<\/p>\n
4.  The Chief Commissioner of Customs,
\nCustom House, Chennai.\n<\/p>\n
\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Madras High Court Sharath Kumar Rath vs The Central Administrative … on 21 April, 2006 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED: 21\/04\/2006 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.K. MISRA AND THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE CHITRA VENKATARAMAN W.P.NO.26975 of 2005 and W.P.Nos.39564, 39583 of 2005 and W.P.No.15158 of 2002 and WPMP.Nos.29393 to 29396, […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[8,13],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-265867","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-high-court","category-madras-high-court"],"yoast_head":"\nSharath Kumar Rath vs The Central Administrative ... on 21 April, 2006 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/sharath-kumar-rath-vs-the-central-administrative-on-21-april-2006\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Sharath Kumar Rath vs The Central Administrative ... on 21 April, 2006 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/sharath-kumar-rath-vs-the-central-administrative-on-21-april-2006\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2006-04-20T18:30:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2014-02-19T16:18:46+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@legaliadmin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@Legal_india\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"71 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/sharath-kumar-rath-vs-the-central-administrative-on-21-april-2006#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/sharath-kumar-rath-vs-the-central-administrative-on-21-april-2006\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\"},\"headline\":\"Sharath Kumar Rath vs The Central Administrative … on 21 April, 2006\",\"datePublished\":\"2006-04-20T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2014-02-19T16:18:46+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/sharath-kumar-rath-vs-the-central-administrative-on-21-april-2006\"},\"wordCount\":6435,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"articleSection\":[\"High Court\",\"Madras High Court\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/sharath-kumar-rath-vs-the-central-administrative-on-21-april-2006#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/sharath-kumar-rath-vs-the-central-administrative-on-21-april-2006\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/sharath-kumar-rath-vs-the-central-administrative-on-21-april-2006\",\"name\":\"Sharath Kumar Rath vs The Central Administrative ... on 21 April, 2006 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"2006-04-20T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2014-02-19T16:18:46+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/sharath-kumar-rath-vs-the-central-administrative-on-21-april-2006#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/sharath-kumar-rath-vs-the-central-administrative-on-21-april-2006\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/sharath-kumar-rath-vs-the-central-administrative-on-21-april-2006#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Sharath Kumar Rath vs The Central Administrative … on 21 April, 2006\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"name\":\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"description\":\"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"alternateName\":\"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"alternateName\":\"Legal India\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"width\":512,\"height\":512,\"caption\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.facebook.com\\\/LegalindiaCom\\\/\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/Legal_india\"]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\",\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Legal India Admin\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/legaliadmin\"],\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/author\\\/legal-india-admin\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Sharath Kumar Rath vs The Central Administrative ... on 21 April, 2006 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/sharath-kumar-rath-vs-the-central-administrative-on-21-april-2006","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Sharath Kumar Rath vs The Central Administrative ... on 21 April, 2006 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","og_url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/sharath-kumar-rath-vs-the-central-administrative-on-21-april-2006","og_site_name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","article_published_time":"2006-04-20T18:30:00+00:00","article_modified_time":"2014-02-19T16:18:46+00:00","og_image":[{"width":512,"height":512,"url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Legal India Admin","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@legaliadmin","twitter_site":"@Legal_india","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Legal India Admin","Est. reading time":"71 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/sharath-kumar-rath-vs-the-central-administrative-on-21-april-2006#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/sharath-kumar-rath-vs-the-central-administrative-on-21-april-2006"},"author":{"name":"Legal India Admin","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea"},"headline":"Sharath Kumar Rath vs The Central Administrative … on 21 April, 2006","datePublished":"2006-04-20T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2014-02-19T16:18:46+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/sharath-kumar-rath-vs-the-central-administrative-on-21-april-2006"},"wordCount":6435,"commentCount":0,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"articleSection":["High Court","Madras High Court"],"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/sharath-kumar-rath-vs-the-central-administrative-on-21-april-2006#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/sharath-kumar-rath-vs-the-central-administrative-on-21-april-2006","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/sharath-kumar-rath-vs-the-central-administrative-on-21-april-2006","name":"Sharath Kumar Rath vs The Central Administrative ... on 21 April, 2006 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website"},"datePublished":"2006-04-20T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2014-02-19T16:18:46+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/sharath-kumar-rath-vs-the-central-administrative-on-21-april-2006#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/sharath-kumar-rath-vs-the-central-administrative-on-21-april-2006"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/sharath-kumar-rath-vs-the-central-administrative-on-21-april-2006#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Sharath Kumar Rath vs The Central Administrative … on 21 April, 2006"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","description":"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"alternateName":"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization","name":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","alternateName":"Legal India","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","width":512,"height":512,"caption":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","https:\/\/x.com\/Legal_india"]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea","name":"Legal India Admin","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Legal India Admin"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com","https:\/\/x.com\/legaliadmin"],"url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/author\/legal-india-admin"}]}},"modified_by":null,"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/265867","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=265867"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/265867\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=265867"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=265867"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=265867"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}