{"id":271082,"date":"1988-09-26T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1988-09-25T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/roop-chand-adlakha-and-ors-vs-delhi-development-authority-and-on-26-september-1988"},"modified":"2018-07-18T22:33:36","modified_gmt":"2018-07-18T17:03:36","slug":"roop-chand-adlakha-and-ors-vs-delhi-development-authority-and-on-26-september-1988","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/roop-chand-adlakha-and-ors-vs-delhi-development-authority-and-on-26-september-1988","title":{"rendered":"Roop Chand Adlakha And Ors vs Delhi Development Authority And … on 26 September, 1988"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Roop Chand Adlakha And Ors vs Delhi Development Authority And … on 26 September, 1988<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1989 AIR 307, 1988 SCR Supl. (3) 253<\/div>\n
Author: M Venkatachalliah<\/div>\n
Bench: Venkatachalliah, M.N. (J)<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nROOP CHAND ADLAKHA AND ORS.\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nDELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND ORS.\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT26\/09\/1988\n\nBENCH:\nVENKATACHALLIAH, M.N. (J)\nBENCH:\nVENKATACHALLIAH, M.N. (J)\nMISRA RANGNATH\n\nCITATION:\n 1989 AIR  307\t\t  1988 SCR  Supl. (3) 253\n 1989 SCC  Supl.  (1) 116 JT 1988 (4)\t114\n 1988 SCALE  (2)897\n\n\nACT:\n    Constitution of India, 1950 Articles 14 and l6 Services-\nAppointment and promotion-State entitled to prescribe that a\ncandidate  should  have a particular  qualification  plus  a\nstipulated quantum of service experience.\n%\n    Civil Services-D.D.A.-Engineering Cadre Promotion of\nJunior\tEngineers  to  Assistant  Engineers  and   Assistant\nEngineers  to  Executive Engineers-Different  conditions  of\neligibility  of Diploma-Holder\tand  Graduates-Prescription\nof-Whether violative of Articles 14 and 16.\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\n    The Rules of the Central Public Works Department  (CPWD)\nadopted\t by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA)  stipulate\nand provide that 50% of the posts of Assistant Engineers  in\nDDA  be\t filed-up  by promotion from  the  cadre  of  Junior\nEngineers  comprising of both Graduates in  Engineering\t and\nDiploma-Holders in Engineering in the equal ratio  (50%:50%)\nof  the promotional posts. Half of it, i.e. 25% were  to  be\nfilled\tup  by promotion of Graduate  Junior-Engineers\twith\nthree  years'  service experience as  Junior-Engineers;\t the\nother  25%  to\tbe filled up  from  Diploma-Holder.  Junior-\nEngineers.  who\t had X years service experience\t as  Junior-\nEngineers.  The\t Rules further provide\tthat  the  Executive\nEngineers' post in DDA were purely promotional and  Graduate\nAssistant  Engineers  with 8 years'  service-experience\t and\nDiploma-Holder\tAssistant Engineers with 10 years'  service-\nexperience  were eligible for promotion. No inter  se  quota\nbetween the two class of officers; was prescribed.\n    The\t Diploma-Holders in the Cadres of .junior  Engineers\nand Assistant Engineers filed separate writ petitions in the\nHigh  Court  assailing the constitutional  validity  of\t the\nprescriptions made by the rules in the matter of requirement\nof  differential service-experiences between  the  Graduates\nand  the Diploma-Holders for promotion to the higher  caders\nof Assistant Engineers and Executive Engineers respectively.\nThey  also assailed the promotion of Graduate  Engineers  to\nthe higher cadres made on the strength of the Rules.\n\t\t\t\t\t\t  PG NO 253\n\t\t\t\t\t\t  PG NO 254\n    The\t High Court allowed the writ petitions and  declared\nthe different standards of service-experience prescribed for\nDegree-Holders\tand Diploma-Holders in respect of  both\t the\ncadres\t as  violative\tof  Articles  1-1  and\t16  of\t the\nConstitution.\n    In the appeal to this Court, on behalf of appellants  it\nwas contended; (l) that the view taken by the High Court  is\ndemonstrably   erroneous   and\topposed\t to   well   settled\nprinciples;  (2) that the High Court took an erroneous\tview\nthat  in  Shujat Ali's case (1975 (1) SCR  449)\t this  Court\nstruck down the service rule impugned in that case; (3) that\nthe  fundamental distinction between Triloki  Nath  Khosa's,\ncase  [1974] 1 SCR 771 and Shujat Ali's case was lost  sight\nof  by the High Court;(4) that the present case was not\t one\nin  which  the Diploma-Holders, proprio vigore\tand  without\nmore,  were  held eligible for\tpromotion.  The\t educational\nqualification of a Diploma in engineering was not treated as\nequivalent   to\t a  Degree  for\t purposes   of\t determining\neligibility.  Nor  the Degree itself  was  determinative  of\neligibility  for promotion. The eligibility of promotion  is\nbased  on a combination of factors which vary  according  to\nthe  basic educational qualification of the two\t classes  of\nengineers;  (5)\t that this distinction was  germane  to\t the\nrequirements  of higher technical and academic\tquality\t for\nthe  higher  posts which involved  expertise  in  structural\ndesign.\t etc.  and  (6) that even  where  recruitment  to  a\nparticular  cadre was made from different  sources,resulting\nin  the formation of a single homogeneous cadre it  was\t not\nimpermissible  to make a further classification amongst\t the\nmembers\t of such a cadre for purposes of  further  promotion\nbased  on  the\thigher\teducational  qualification  of\t the\ncandidates.\n    On\tbehalf\tof  the respondent  Diploma-Holders  it\t was\ncontended(1) that this Court had, more than once.  cautioned\nagainst\t  undue\t accent,  in  the  matter   of\t promotional\nopportunities,\ton academic-qualification alone which  might\nlead  to  elitist  perferences\tand  tend  to  obscure\t the\negalitarian  principle\tand  social justice;  (2)  that\t the\neffect\tof  the\t distinction  is  really  an   imperceptible\nextension   or\t magnification\tof   insubstantial   factors\nsubverting the precious guarantee of equality and(3) that to\ndiscriminate  between  Diploma-Holders\tand  Graduates\t who\nbelong\tto the same cadre and hold  inter-changeable  posts,\nboth in the present cadre and in the prospective promotional\nposts,\ton the mere lack of some higher academic  attainment\nis  to\tplace a high premium on these  social  and  economic\npursuits for the economically disadvantaged difficult.\n    Allowing the Appeals,\n\t\t\t\t\t\t  PG NO 255\n    HELD: l. The inherent distinction between a person\twith\na Degree and one who is merely a Diploma-Holder is much\t too\nobvious. But the question for consideration, in the  present\ncontext,  is  whether  the  differences\t have  a  reasonable\nrelation to the nature of the office to which the  promotion\nis  contemplated.  The\tidea of equality in  the  matter  of\npromotion  can\tbe predicated only when the  candidates\t for\npromotion are drawn from the same source. If the differences\nin the qualification has a reasonable relation to the nature\nof  duties  and\t responsibilities.  that  go  with  and\t are\nattendant  upon the promotional post, the more\tadvantageous\ntreatment   of\t those\t who   possess\t higher\t   technical\nqualifications\tcan  be\t legitimised  on  the  doctrine\t  of\nclassification.\t There may,conceivably, be cases  where\t the\ndifferences  in\t the educational qualifications may  not  be\nsufficient  to give any preferential treatment to one  class\nof candidates as against another. Whether the classification\nis  reasonable\tor not must, therefore,\t necessarily  depend\nupon  facts of each case and the circumstances obtaining  at\nthe  relevant  time. When the State makes  a  classification\nbetween\t two sources, unless the vice of the  classification\nis  writ large on the face of it, the person  assailing\t the\nclassification\tmust  show  that  it  is  unreasonable\t and\nviolative of Article 14.<\/a> [263A-C ]\n    2. A wooden equality as between all classes of employees\nirrespective  of all distinction or qualifications, or\tjob-\nrequirements  is  neither  constitutionally  compelled\t nor\npractically meaningful. [263D]\n    The process of classification is in itself productive of\ninequality  and in that sense antithetical of equality.\t The\nprocess\t would be constitutionally valid if it recognises  a\npre-existing  inequality and acts in aid of amelioration  of\nthe effects of such pre-existent inequality. The the process\ncannot\t merely\t  blow-up  or  magnify\t in-substantial\t  or\nmicroscopic differences on merely meretricious or plausible.\nThe  over-emphasis on the doctrine of classification or\t any\nanxious\t and sustained attempts to discover some  basis\t for\nclassification\tmay gradually and imperceptibly deprive\t the\narticle\t of  its  precious content  and\t end  in  re-placing\ndoctrine    of\t equality   by\t the   doctrine\t   of\t the\nclassification.[264C-D]\n    4.\t The   presumption   of\t good  faith   in   and\t  of\nconstitutionality  of a classification cannot be  pushed  to\nthe  point of predicating some possible or hypothetical\t but\nundisclosed   and  unknown  reason  for\t  a   classification\nrendering the precious guarantee of equality \"a mere rope of\nsand\". [264E]\n\t\t\t\t\t\t  PG NO 256\n    Central Railway v. A.V.R<\/a>. sidhanti, [1974] 3 SCR 207  at\n214  and T.Devadasan V. The Union of India<\/a>, [1964] 4 SCR  at\n689 & 690 followed.\n    5.\"To  overdo classification is to undo  equality\".\t The\nidea of similarity or dissimilarity of situations of persons\nto justify classification, cannot rest on merely differentia\nwhich may, by themselves rational or logical, but depends on\nwhether the differences are relevant to the goals sought  to\nbe  reached  by\t the  law  which  seeks\t to  classify.\t The\njustification  of  the classification  must,  therefore,  be\nsought\tbeyond the classification. All marks of\t distinction\ndo  not necessarily justify classification  irrespective  of\nthe  relevance or nexus to objects sought to be achieved  by\nthe law imposing the classification. [264F-G]\n    State  of  Jammu  &\t Kashmir v.  Triloki  Nath  Khosa  &\nOrs<\/a>.,[1974]  I\tSCR 771; Bidi Suppy Co.v.  Union  of  India<\/a>,\n[1956]\tSCR 182, relied no; Mohammad shujat Ali v.  UOI\t and\nothers<\/a>,\t [1975]1 SCR 449; H.C. Sharma and Ors. v.  Municipal\nCorporation  of Delhi and Ors<\/a>., [1983]3 SCR 372\t and  Punjab\nState Electricity Board, Patiala, and Anr.v. Ravinder  Kumar\nSharma\t&  Ors<\/a>.,[1986]\t4 SCC 617  distinguished;  State  of\nMysore v. Narasinga Rao<\/a>, [1968] 1 SCR 401 and Union of India\nv. Mrs. S.B. Kohli<\/a>, [1973]3 SCR 117, referred to.\n    6. In the present case, the possession of a diploma.  by\nitself\tand  without  more,  does  not\tconfer\teligibility.\nDiploma,  for  purposes\t of  promotion,\t is  not  considered\nequivalent to the degree. [268d]\n    7.If   the\teducational  qualification  by\titself\t was\nrecognised as confering eligibility for promotion, then\t the\nsuper-imposition of further conditions such as a  particular\nperiod of service, selectively, on the Diploma Holders alone\nto their disadvantage might become discriminatory. This does\nnot  prevent  the  State from  formulating  a  policy  which\nprescribes  as an essential part of the conditions  for\t the\nvery eligibility that the candidate must  have a  particular\nqualification\tplus   a  stipulated  quantum\tof   service\nexperience.[268G-H;269A]\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
    CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal\t Nos.896  to
\n899 of 1988 and Civil Appeal No. 3352 of 1988.
\n    From the Judgment and Order dated 2.9.1987 of the  Delhi
\nHigh Court in C.W.P. No. 2131,2082 of 1984 respectively.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t\t  PG NO 257
\n    G. Ramaswami, Additional Solicitor General, R.K. Jain,
\nP.P.   Rao,  M.S.  Gujaral,  S.\t Rangarajan,  A.K.   Sanghi,
\nMrs.  Madhu Kapur, Arun Kr. Vijayesh Roy, Sanjay  Kr.  Kaul,
\nSardar\tBahadur, V.B. Saharaya, R.K. Khanna, Vishnu  Mathur,
\nAshok  Aggarwal,  R.N.\tKeswani\t and  R.S.  Sodhi  for\t the
\nappearing parties.\n<\/p>\n
    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
\n    VENKATACHALIAH,  J. These four Civil Appeals by  Special
\nLeave  and the Special Leave Petition arise out of  and\t are
\ndirected against the common Judgment dated 2.9.1987, of\t the
\nHigh  Court of Delhi in C.W.P. No. 2132 and C.W.P. No.\t2082
\nof  1984 in which the principal controversy was whether\t the
\nRules  prescribing different conditions of  eligibility\t for
\nDiploma-Holders\t and Graduates for promotion from the  cadre
\nof Junior-Engineers to that of Assistant-Engineers and\tfrom
\nthe  cadre  of\tAssistant-Engineers to\tthat  of  Executive-
\nEngineers  in  the  Public Works  Department  of  the  Delhi
\nDevelopment Authority (DDA) is violative of Articles 14\t and
\n16  of the Constitution and would, therefore, require to  be
\ndeclared void.\n<\/p>\n
    The\t High  Court,  in the writ petitions  filed  by\t the
\nDiploma-Holders,  has held that such differential  treatment
\nof  Diploma-Holders  and Graduates by  the  prescription  of
\ndifferent  standards of service-experience for\tpurposes  of
\neligibility   for   promotion  to  the\thigher\t cadres\t  is
\nunconstitutional.\n<\/p>\n
    2.\tThe D.D.A. which is the appellant in  Civil  Appeals
\nNo.898\tof 1988 and No. 899 of 1988 assails the\t correctness
\nof  the view taken by the High Court. Civil Appeals No.\t 896
\nof  1988 and 897 of 1988 are by the  Graduate-Engineers\t who
\nwere  respondents  before  the\tHigh  Court  and  who\tare,
\nsimilarly,  aggrieved by the decision under appeal SLP\t6181
\nof 1988 is by the DDA Graduate Engineers Association”  which
\nseeks  to  espouse the cause of the  Graduate-Engineers.  We
\ngrant  Special Leave in SLP. All the five appeals are  heard
\nand disposed of by this common judgment.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t\t  PG NO 258
\n    C.A.899 of 1988, C.A. 896 of 1988 and SLP 6181 arise out
\nof  C.W.P. 2132 of 1984. C.A. 898 of 1988, C.A. 897 of\t1988
\narise out of C.W.P. 2082 of 1984.\n<\/p>\n
    3. The D.D.A. by its resolution No. 574 dated 13.11.1963
\nadopted,  pro-tanto, the rules of the Central  Public  Works
\nDepartment (CPWD) in regard to the mode of  recruitment-both
\nby direct recruitment and by promotion-to the posts of Asst.
\nEngineers.  The rules, so adopted, in  substance,  stipulate
\nand  provide  that  50% of the posts  be  filled  by  direct
\nrecruitment  or\t by  deputation and that the  other  50%  be
\nfilled-up  by promotion from the cadre of  Junior-Engineers.
\nThe  cadre  of\tJunior-Engineers itself\t comprises  of\tboth
\nGraduates in Engineering and Diploma-Holders in Engineering.
\nThe  two  categories of officers in the\t cadre\tof  Junior-
\nEngineers  were provided with promotional  opportunities  to
\nthe post of Asst. Engineers in the equal ratio (50%:50%)  of
\nthe  promotional-posts.\t Half  of it, i.e., 25%\t was  to  be
\nfilled\tup  by promotion of  Graduate-Engineers\t with  three
\nyears’ service-experience as Junior-Engineers; the other 25%
\nto  be\tfilled-up from Diploma-Holder  Junior-Engineers\t who
\nwere diploma holders who had 8 years’ service-experience as
\nJunior-Engineers.\n<\/p>\n
    By resolution No. 105 dated 16.6.1971 the DDA similarly
\nadopted\t the  relevant rules in the CPWD in  the  matter  of
\nrecruitment   to  the  posts  of  Executive-Engineers.\t The
\nExecutive-Engineers’  post  in the DDA\tthus  became  purely
\npromotional  and  Graduate  Asst. Engineers  with  8  years’
\nservice-experience  and\t diploma  Asst.\t Engineers  with  10
\nyears’\tservice-experience were eligible for  promotion.  No
\ninter-se  quota\t between  the  two  class  of  officers\t was
\nprescribed.\n<\/p>\n
    The following table delineates the effect and purport of
\nthe rules adopted under resolution No. 574 dated  13.11.1963
\nand  No. 105 dated 16.6.1971. The table also  indicates\t the
\nmode  of  initial  recruitment\tto  the\t cadre\tof   Junior-
\nEngineers:\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t\t  PG NO 259
\n\t\t EXECUTIVE ENGINEERS
\n\t\t   [By promotion]
\nAsst. Engrs.’\t\t\t\t  Asst. Engrs.’
\n[Degree] +\t\t\t\t  [Diploma]
\n8 years\t\t\t\t\t  +10 years
\nservice\t\t\t\t\t    service
\n\t\t ASSISTANT ENGINEERS
\n\t\t Graduates and Dimploma
\n\t\t holders
\n\t\t  50%by promotion\t   50%.By
\n\t\t\t\t\t   Direct
\n\t\t\t\t\t  recruitment
\n25%\t\t\t\t25%
\nJr. Enger.\t\t      Jr.Engr.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
[Degree]\t\t      [Diploma]\n+3 yrs.\t\t\t      + 8 years\nservice\t\t\t       service\n\t\t JUNIOR ENGINEERS\n\t\t[Sectional Officers]\n\t\t Direct recruitment\nGraduates in\t\t\t\t     Diploma-\nEngineering\t\t\t\t      holders\n[No prior\t\t\t\t      [with 2\nexperience\t\t\t\t       years\nPrescribed]\t\t\t\t     experience\n<\/pre>\n
    In\tthe  years 1984 the Diploma-Holder in the  cadre  of
\nJunior-Engineers  and in he cadre of Asst. Engineers  sought
\nto  assail, by means of two writ-petitions presented to\t the
\nDelhi  High  Court,  the  Constitutional  validity  of\t the
\nprescriptions made by the rules in the matter of requirement
\nof  differential service-experiences between  the  Graduates
\nand Diploma-Holders for promotion to the higher cadres\tviz.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
of  Asst.  Engineers and  Executive-Engineers  respectively.
\nThey  also assailed the promotions of Graduate-Engineers  to
\nthe  higher cadres made on the strength of the\tRules.\tCWP.
\n2132  of  1984\tpertained to the resolution  No.  574  dated
\n13.11.1963  adopting the relevant CPWD Rules  prescribing  3
\nyears’\tand  8 years’ service-experience for  Graduates\t and
\nDiploma-Holders\t respectively  and the\tdiscrimination\tthus
\nbrought\t about between them. CWP No. 2082 of 1984  pertained
\nto  the contitutionality of the analogous provisions in\t the
\nrules adopted  by resolution  No. 105 dated 16.6.1971.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t\t  PG NO 260
\n    The High Court heard these two petitions together and by
\nits common judgment dated 2.9.1987 upheld the challenge\t and
\ndeclared  the  different  standards  of\t  service-experience
\nprescribed for Degree-Holders and Diploma-Holders in respect
\nof both the cadres as violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the
\nConstitution.\n<\/p>\n
    5.\tThe principal question that arises in these  appeals
\nis  whether,  where, as here, recruitment  to  a  particular
\ncadre  of  posts  is  made,   from  two\t different  sources,
\ndifferent   conditions,\t  based\t on   the   differences\t  in
\neducational  qualifications, can be prescribed\tconditioning
\nthe  eligibility for further-promotion to a higher cadre  in
\nservice.\n<\/p>\n
    The\t High Court, by the judgment now under\tappeal,\t has
\nheld that such prescription of differential  standards-based
\neven   on   the\t differences   in   technical,\t educational
\nqualifications-is  violative  of Article 14<\/a> and\t 16<\/a>  of\t the
\nConstitution. In reaching such conclusions as it did on\t the
\npoint,\tthe High Court placed reliance on the  pronouncement
\nof   this   Court  in  Mohammad\t Shujat\t Ali  v.   UOI\t and
\nOthers<\/a>,[1975] 1 SCR 449, H. C. Sharma and Ors. v.  Municipal
\nCorporation  of Delhi and Ors<\/a>., [1983] 3 SCR 372 and  Punjab
\nState Electricity Board,Patiala, and Anr. v. Ravinder  Kumar
\nSharma & Ors<\/a>.,[1986] 4 SCC 617 and T.R: Kapur and Others  v.
\nState of Haryana and Others<\/a>, AIR 1987 SC 415. The High Court
\ndistinguished the decision of this (Court in State of  Jammu
\n& Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa & Ors<\/a>., l1974] 1 SCR 771.
\n    The High Court drew a distinction between the  situation
\nwhere diploma-holders were wholly excluded from\t eligibility
\nfor  promotion to the higher cadre and the situation  where,
\nwhile they were considered eligible for promotion,  however,
\nwere  subjected\t to  more  onerous  and\t less\tadvantageous
\nconditions for such promotion. The High Court  distinguished
\nTriloki Nath Khosa’s case observing:\n<\/p>\n
   “7.\tThis  was a case where diploma\tholders\t were  found
\ncompletely  ineligible for promotion to the higher post\t for
\nlack   of  essential  educational  qualification   but\t the
\nconsiderations\tmay  vary  if they are\tfound  eligible\t for
\npromotion  to the higher post but still\t certain  conditions
\nare laid as distinct from degree holders before they  become
\neligible  for  promotion.  The\tquestion  then\twould  arise
\nwhether such distinction can be justified and is based on
\nany rationality or not ..”\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t\t  PG NO 261
\n    Answering this point in favour of the  “Diploma-Holders”
\nthe High Court held:\n<\/p>\n
“…The\t moment the diploma holders and degree\tholders\t are
\nconsidered to constitute one class for purposes of promotion
\nthere cannot be any differentiation between the two  vis-a-
\nvis  the qualification for promotion. It could be  that\t for
\nreasons of efficiency in administration the authorities\t may
\nlay  down that diploma holders are not at all  eligible\t for
\npromotion to the higher post and such a bar can be upheld in
\nview  of  the ratio laid down in the case  of  Triloki\tNath
\nKhosa but after the authorities considered them eligible for
\npromotion  there could be no rationale in their\t making\t any
\ndistinction  between the degree-holders and  diploma-holders
\nfor granting promotion to them to the higher post….”\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t (Emphasis Supplied)
\n    The\t point\tof distinction, as apprehended by  the\tHigh
\nCourt,\tis that in the present case a  Diploma,\t ipso-facto,
\nqualifies  for promotion. The real question is whether\tthis
\nassumption  is\tcorrect\t and  whether  the  relevant   Rules
\ndetermine  the eligibility for promotion on the basis  of  a
\nDiploma,  or for that matter even a Degree, Or\twhether\t the
\neligibility  for promotion is determined not with  reference
\nmerely\tto the educational attainments but on the  basis  of
\neducational  qualifications  plus  a  measure  of  service-
\nexperience,   stipulated  differently  for   Graduates\t and
\nDiploma-Holders.\n<\/p>\n
    6.\tLearned counsel for the appellants,  contended\tthat
\nthe  view  that\t commended  itself  to\tthe  High  Court  is
\ndemonstrably  erroneous and is opposed to principles  which,
\nby  now, should be considered well-settled.  They  submitted
\nthat  the High Court fell into an obvious error in its\tview
\nthat in Shujat Ali’s case ( 1975) 1 SCR 449, this Court\t had
\nstuck  down the service-rule impugned in that case.  Learned
\nCounsel\t submitted that the fundamental distinction  between
\nthe  two  sets of cases, one of which Triloki  Nath  Khosa’s
\ncase  is represents, and the other typified by Shujat  Ali’s
\ncase,  was  lost sight of by the High Court  and  the  error
\npervading  the\tjudgment is the result of  overlooking\tthis
\nessential distinction between the two sets of cases.
\n    It\twas  contended for the appellants that\tthe  present
\ncase  was  not one in which  the  Diploma-Holders  proprio-
\nvigore, and without more, were held eligible for  promotion.
\nIf the effect and intent of the rules were such as to  treat
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t  PG NO 262
\nDiploma\t as equivalent to a Degree for\tpurposes of  further
\npromotion  then,  the  view of the  High  Court-that  having
\nconsidered  both  class\t of officers  equally  eligible\t for
\npromotion   on\tthe  mere  strength  of\t their\t educational
\nqualifications, any further discrimination brought about  by
\nsubjecting  the Diploma-Holders alone to a more onerous\t and
\nless  advantageous  stipulation for  such  promotion   would
\nviolate,  the constitutional pledge of\tequality-might\thave
\nsome  qualification.  But  in  the  present  case,   counsel
\ncontended,  that  is  not  the\tposition.  The\t educational
\nqualification of a Diploma in engineering was not treated as
\nequivalent   to\t a  Degree  for\t purposes   of\t determining
\neligibility.  Nor  the Degree itself  was  determinative  of
\neligibility for promotion. The eligibility for promotion is,
\nit  is urged, based on a combination of factors\t which\tvary
\naccording as the basic educational  qualification of the two
\nclasses\t of engineers; that this distinction was germane  to
\nthe  requirements of higher technical and  academic  quality
\nfor the higher posts which involved expertise in structural-
\ndesign\tetc.  Learned  counsel\tsubmitted  that\t even  where
\nrecruitment  to a particular cadre was made  from  different
\nsources, resulting in the formation of single a\t homogeneous
\ncadre,\t it  was  not  impermissible  to  make\t a   further
\nclassification\tamongst\t the  members of such  a  cadre\t for
\npurposes   of\tfurther\t promotion  based  on\tthe   higher
\neducational qualification of the candidates.
\n    Learned  counsel  for  the\t respondent-diploma-holders,
\nwhile  seeking\tto support the judgment of  the\t High  Court
\nurged that this Court had, more than once, cautioned against
\nundue accent, in the matter of promotional opportunities, on
\nacademic  qualification\t alone which might lead\t to  elitist
\npreferences  and tend to obscure the  egalitarian  principle
\nand  social-justice. It was, therefore, contended  that\t the
\neffect\tof  the distinction, in the  ultimate  analysis,  is
\nreally\tan  imperceptible  extension  or  magnification\t  of
\ninsubstantial factors sub-verting the precious guarantee  of
\nequality.  Sri\tGujral, learned Senior\tCounsel,  sought  to
\nimpart\tto the situation a dimension of\t social-justice\t and
\nmade  an  impassioned  plea  that  to  discriminate  between
\nDiploma-Holders\t and Graduates who belong to the same  cadre
\nand  hold inter-changeable posts, both in the  present-cadre
\nand  in the prospective promotional posts, on the mere\tlack
\nof  some  higher  academic attainment is  to  place  a\thigh
\npremium\t on  those social and economic ills of\tthe  society
\nwhich  rendered\t the  further  academic\t pursuits  for\t the
\neconomically disadvantaged difficult.\n<\/p>\n
    7.\tA large number of authorities were cited  on  either
\nside. We by first examine the cases relied upon by the\tHigh
\nCourt in support of its conclusion. The inherent distinction
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t  PG NO 263
\nbetween\t a  person  with a Degree and one who  is  merely  a
\nDiploma-Holder\tis much too obvious. But the  question\tthat
\nfalls for consideration, in the context such as the  present
\none,  is whether the differences have a reasonable  relation
\nto  the\t nature\t of the office to  which  the  promotion  is
\ncontemplated.  The  idea  of  equality\tin  the\t matter\t  of
\npromotion  can\tbe predicated only when the  candidates\t for
\npromotion are drawn from the same source. If the differences
\nin the qualification has a reasonable relation to the nature
\nof  duties  and\t responsibilities,  that  go  with  and\t are
\nattendant  upon the promotional-post, the more\tadvantageous
\ntreatment   of\t those\t who   possess\t higher\t   technical
\nqualifications\tcan  be\t legitimised  on  the  doctrine\t  of
\nclassification.\t There may, conceivably, be cases where\t the
\ndifferences  in\t the educational qualifications may  not  be
\nsufficient  to give any preferential treatment to one  class
\nof candidates as against another. Whether the classification
\nis  reasonable\tor not must, therefore,\t necessarily  depend
\nupon  facts of each case and the circumstances obtaining  at
\nthe  relevant  time. When the state makes  a  classification
\nbetween\t two sources, unless the vice of the  classification
\nis  writ large on the face of it, the person  assailing\t the
\nclassification\tmust  show  that  it  is  unreasonable\t and
\nviolative  of Article 14.<\/a> A wooden equality as\tbetween\t all
\nclasses\t of  employees irrespective of all  distinctions  or
\nqualifications,\t    or\t  job-requirements    is     neither
\nconstitutionally compelled nor practically meaningful.\tThis
\nCourt  in Central Railway v.A.V.R. Siddhanti<\/a>, [1974]  3\t SCR
\n207 at 214 observed:\n<\/p>\n
    “….A  wooden  equality  as  between  all\tclasses\t  of
\nemployees regardless of qualifications, kind of jobs, nature
\nof  responsibility and performance of the employees  is\t not
\nintended, nor is it practicable if the administration is  to
\nrun.  Indeed,  the  maintenance of  such  a  ‘classless\t and
\nundiscerning   ‘equality’   where,   in\t  reality,   glaring
\ninequalities   and  intelligible  differentia  exist,\twill
\ndeprive\t the  guarantee\t of  its  practical  content.  Broad
\nclassification\tbased  on reason, executive  pragmatism\t and
\nexperience having a direct relation with the achievement  of
\nefficiency in administration, is permissible ….
\n    In T. Devadasan v. The Union of India<\/a>,[1964]4 SCR 680 at
\n689 & 690 this Court observed:\n<\/p>\n
    “….What  is  meant  by equality in  this\tArticle\t is,
\nequality amongst equals. It does not provide for an absolute
\nequality  of  treatment to all persons\tin  utter  disregard
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t  PG NO 264
\nin every conceivable circumstance of the differences such as
\nage,  sex, education and so on and so forth as may be  found
\namongst\t people\t in general. Indeed, while the aim  of\tthis
\nArticle is to ensure that invidious distinction or arbitrary
\ndiscrimination\tshall  not be made by the  State  between  a
\ncitizen\t and a citizen who answer the same  description\t and
\nthe  differences  which may obtain between them\t are  of  no
\nrelevance  for\tthe  purpose of applying  a  particular\t law
\nreasonable  classification is permissible. It does not\tmean
\nanything more.\n<\/p>\n
    But\t then  the process of classification  is  in  itself
\nproductive  of inequality and in that sense antithetical  of
\nequality. The process would be constitutionally valid if  it
\nrecognises  a  pre-existing inequality and acts\t in  aid  of
\namelioration of the effects of such pre-existent inequality.
\nBut  the process cannot in itself generate or aggravate\t the
\ninequality. The process cannot merely blow-up or magnify in-
\nsubstantial    or   microscopic\t  differences\ton    merely
\nmeretricious or plausible dif-ferences. The over-emphasis on
\nthe doctrine of classification or any anxious and  sustained
\nattempts  to  discover\tsome basis  for\t classification\t may
\ngradually  and\timperceptibly  deprive the  article  of\t its
\nprecious  content and end in replacing Doctrine of  equality
\nby  the doctrine of classification. The presumption of\tgood
\nfaith in and of constitutionality of a classification cannot
\nbe  pushed  “to the point of predicating  some\tpossible  or
\nhypothetical  but  undisclosed\tand  unknown  reason  for  a
\nclassification rendering the precious guarantee of  equality
\n“a mere rope of sand”.\n<\/p>\n
    “To overdo classification is to undo equality”. The idea
\nof similarity or dissimilarity of situations of persons,  to
\njustify\t classification, cannot rest on\t merely\t differentia
\nwhich may, by themselves be rational or logical, but depends
\non whether the differences are relevant to the goals  sought
\nto  be\treached\t by the law which  seeks  to  classify.\t The
\njustification  of the classification must needs,  therefore,
\nto  be\tsought\tbeyond\tthe  classification.  All  marks  of
\ndistinction   do  not  necessarily  justify   classification
\nirrespective of the relevance or nexus to objects sought  to
\nbe achieved by the law imposing the classification.\n<\/p>\n
    8.\tIn  Mohd.  Sujat  Ali’s\t case  the  validity  of   a
\nprescription  of  the rules of the State of  Andhra  Pradesh
\ntreating Graduate-Engineers, on the one hand, and  engineers
\nwith  diploma  or equivalent qualification,  on\t the  other,
\ndifferently   for   purposes   of   promotion\tarose\t for
\nconsideration.\tStrictly  speaking, the High Court  was\t not
\nright  in  its under-standing of the actual  result  of\t the
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t  PG NO 265
\nease. The High Court, in para 8 of the judgment observed:\n<\/p>\n
    “The  Supreme  Court had then struck down this  rule  as
\nviolative of fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 14 and
\n16 of the Constitution of India..”\n<\/p>\n
    But\t it  is to be noticed that the\twrit-petitions\twere
\nultimately  dismissed by this Court. There are,\t of  course,
\ncertain\t observations  which  caution  against\ttoo  readily
\nresorting   to\tthe  expedience\t of  classification.   After
\nreferring to Triloki Nath Khosa’s ease it was observed:\n<\/p>\n
    “…..But from these decisions it cannot be laid down as
\nan invariable rule that whenever any classification is\tmade
\non  the\t basis of variant educational  qualification.,\tsuch
\nclassification must be held to be valid irrespective of\t the
\nnature and purpose of the classification or the quality\t and
\nextent of the differences in the educational qualifications.
\nIt  must be remembered that “life has relations not  capable
\nalways of division into inflexible compartments”. The moulds
\nexpand and shrink. The test of reasonable classification has
\nto  be\tapplied\t in  each ease on  its\tpeculiar  facts\t and
\ncircumstances ……..\t”\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t(Emphasis Supplied)
\n    This  echoes  what Vivian Bose, J. had earlier  said  in
\nBidi ,Supply Co. v. Union<\/a> of lndia [1956] SCR 182:\n<\/p>\n
    “Article 14<\/a> sets out, to my mind, an attitude of  mind,a
\nway of life. rather than a precise rule of law ……\n<\/p>\n
    “…..In  a\t given case that it falls this side  of\t the
\nline or that and because of that decisions on the same point
\nwill vary as conditions vary, one conclusion in one part  of
\nthe country and another somewhere else; one decision   today
\nand  another tomorrow when the basis of society has  altered
\nand  the structure of current social thinking is  different.
\nIt is not the law that alters but the changing conditions of
\nthe times and Article t4 narrows down to a question of\tfact
\nwhich  must be determined by the highest Judges in the\tland
\nas each ease arises…..”\n<\/p>\n
    Shujat  Ali’s ease itself recognised the  permissibility
\nand  validity  of such classification if the nature  of\t the
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t  PG NO 266
\nfunctions  and duties attached to the promotional-posts\t are
\nsuch  as  to justify the classification in the\tinterest  of
\nefficiency in public service; but, where both graduates\t and
\nnon-graduates were regarded as equally fit and eligible\t for
\npromotion,the\tdenial\tof promotion to a  person  otherwise
\neligible  and due for promotion on the basis of a quota\t was
\nnot  justified. On this point it was observed by this  Court
\nin Shujat Ali’s case:\n<\/p>\n
   “…..But  where  graduates and  non-graduates  are\tboth
\nregarded as fit and, therefore, eligible for promotion,it is
\ndifficult to see how, consistently, with the claim for equal
\nopportunity, any differentiation can be made between them by
\nlaying\tdown  a\t quota\tof promotion  for  each\t and  giving
\npreferential  treatment to graduates over  non-graduates  in
\nthe matter of fixation of such quota. The result of fixation
\nof  quota  of promotion for each of the\t two  categories  of
\nsupervisors would be that when a vacancy, arises in the post
\nof Asst. Engineer, which, according to the quota is reserved
\nfor  graduate supervisors, a non-graduate supervisor  cannot
\nbe  promoted  to that vacancy, even if he is senior  to\t all
\nother graduate supervisors and more suitable than they.\t His
\nopportunity for promotion would be limited only to vacancies
\navailable  for non-graduate supervisors. That would  clearly
\namount to  denial of equal opportunity\tto him
\n    In\tthe  present appeals before us,\t the  Graduates\t and
\nDiploma-Holders\t were  not treated equal in  the  mattes  of
\neligibility  for promotion. What is, therefore, assailed  is
\nnot  the aspect of the mere fixation of a quota\t as  between
\nthe  Diploma-Holders  and the Graduates in  the\t promotional
\nposts,\tbut the very prescription of different standards  or
\nconditions   of\t eligibility.  In  Shujat  Ali’s  case\t the
\ninfirmity  of  the differential treatment stemmed  from\t the
\nfundamental  basis that, at that point, both  Graduates\t and
\nDiploma-holders were equally eligible but the Rule  operated
\nto  deny  promotion to a Diploma-holder on the\tbasis  of  a
\nquota.\tThe observations in that case pertained to  a  stage
\nwhich arose after the equality of eligibility for  promotion
\nbetween the two classes of persons had been recognised.\t But
\nin  the\t present  appeals the  different  prescriptions\t for
\nconditioning  eligibility  are themselves  questioned  which
\nneed  to be decided on the basis whether the  discrimination
\ncontemplated and brought about in the matter of promotional-
\nopportunities between graduates and non-graduates, based  on
\nthe   differences   in\tthe  quality  of   their   technical
\nqualifications,\t were  relatable to, and  justified  on\t the
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t  PG NO 267
\nbasis of, the requirements of the   promotional-posts. It is
\nrelevant  to mention here that the different  standards\t and
\nConditions  for eligibility were prescribed with a  view  to
\ninjecting a higher technical quality in the promotions-cadre
\nbased on the recommendations of a committee, called  “Vaish-
\nCommittee”, constituted for the purpose.
\n    H.C. Sharma’s and Punjab State Electricity Board’s cases
\nwere  also matters where Graduates and Diploma-holders\twere
\nmerged\tinto  and formed part of a  homogenious\t cadre\twith
\nequal\teligibility   for  promotion  and  what\t  fell\t for
\nconsideration  was the validity of the further\tprescription
\nof  quotas  between  them. Here-again, no  question  of\t the
\nvalidity of the different standards prescribed for the\tvery
\neligibility  for  promotion  fell  for\tconsideration.\t The
\npresent cases, however, are those where, havig regard to the
\nrequirements of the promotional-posts, different  conditions
\nof eligibility for promotion on the differences based on the
\neducational   qualifications  and  service-experience\twere
\nprescribed.\n<\/p>\n
    9. In State of Mysore v. Narasinga Rao<\/a>,[1968] 1 SCR 40 1
\nhigher\teducational qualifications were considered  relevant
\nfor fixation of higher pay-scales. In Union of India v. Mrs.
\nS.B.  Kohli<\/a>,[1973]  3  SCR 117 the  requirement\t of  a\tpost
\ngraduate  specialisation  in the particular  discipline\t was
\nconsidered not irrelevant and a classification based on
\nsuch specialisation was upheld.\n<\/p>\n
    Triloki  Nath  Khosa’s case is more directly  in  point.
\nThere,\tGraduate-Engineers  and Diploma-Holders\t were  in  a
\ncommon-cadre   of  Asst.  Engineers.  But  for\tpurposes  of
\nfurther promotion to the higher cadre of Executive-Engineers
\nonly  the Graduate were held eligible. Diploma-Holders\twere
\nbarred\tfor  promotion.\t Repelling  the\t challenge  to\tthis
\nprovision made by the Diploma Holders, this Court said:\n<\/p>\n
    “The classification of Assistant Engineers into Degree-
\nholders and Diploma-holders could not be held to rest on any
\nunreal\tor unreasonable basis. The classification  was\tmade
\nwith  a view to achieving administrative efficiency  in\t the
\nEngineering   services.\t  If  this  be\t the   object,\t the
\nclassification\tis  clearly  correlated\t to  it\t for  higher
\neducational qualifications are at least presumption evidence
\nof a higher mental equipment.”\n<\/p>\n
    “Classification    on   the\t  basis\t   of\t educational
\nqualifictions  made with a view to achieving  administrative
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t  PG NO 268
\nefficiency  cannot  be\tsaid  to  rest\ton  any\t  fortuitous
\ncircumstances  and one has always to bear in mind the  facts
\nand circumstances of the case in order to judge the validity
\nof a classification.”\n<\/p>\n
    “Though persons appointed directly and by promotion were
\nintegrated into a common class of Assistant Engineers,\tthey
\ncould, for purposes of promotion to then cadre of  Executive
\nEngineers,  be\tclassified  on\tthe  basis  of\t educational
\nqualifications\t  the\trule   providing   that\t   graduates
\nshall  be  eligible for such promotion to the  exclusion  of
\ndiploma-holders\t does not violate Articles 14 and 16 of\t the
\nConstitution and must be upheld. ”\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t       (Emphasis Supplied)
\n    In\t Triloki  Nath’s  case\tdiploma-holders\t  were\t not
\nconsidered eligible for promotion to the higher post.  Here,
\nin the present case, the possession of a diploma, by  itself
\nand without more, does not confer eligibility. Diploma,\t for
\npurposes  of promotion, is not considered equivalent to\t the
\ndegree.\t This is the point of distinction in the  situations
\nin  the\t two  cases. If\t Diploma-Holders-of  course  on\t the
\njustification of the job-requirements and in the interest of
\nmaintaining a certain quality of technical expertise in\t the
\ncadre-could  validly  be excluded from the  eligibility\t for
\npromotion  to  the  higher cadre, it  does  not\t necessarily
\nfollow\tas  an inevitable corollary that the choice  of\t the
\nrecruitment  policy  is\t limited only  two  choices,  namely
\neither to consider them “eligible” or “not eligible”. State,
\nconsistent  with the requirements of  the  promotional-posts
\nand in the interest of the efficiency of the service, is not
\nprecluded  from\t conferring eligibility\t on  Diploma-Holders
\nconditioning  it by other requirements which may,  as  here,
\ninclude\t certain  quantum  of  service-experience.  In\t the
\npresent\t case,\teligibility-determination  was\tmade  by   a
\ncumulative-criterion of a certain educational  qualification
\nplus a particular quantum of service experience. It  cannot,
\nin  our opinion, be said, as postulated by the\tHigh  Court,
\nthat  the  choice  of  the State  was  either  to  recognise
\nDiploma-Holders\t as  “eligible”\t for  promotion\t or   wholly
\nexclude\t  them\t as  “not-eligible”.  If   the\t educational
\nqualification\tby  itself  was\t recognised  as\t  conferring
\neligibility  for  promotion, then, the\tsuper-imposition  of
\nfurther\t conditions such as a particular period of  service,
\nselectively,   on   the\t Diploma-Holders  alone\t  to   their
\ndisadvantage  might  become discriminatory.  This  does\t not
\nprevent the State from formulating a policy which prescribes
\nas  an\tessential  part\t of  the  conditions  for  the\tvary
\neligibility  that  the\tcandidate  must\t have  a  particular
\nqualification\tplus  a\t stipulated  quantum   of   service-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t\t  PG NO 269
\nexperience.  It is stated that on the basis of\tthe  “Vaish-
\nCommittee”  report, the authorities considered the  infusion
\nof  higher academic and technical quality in  the  personnel
\nrequirements in the relevant cadres of Engineering  Services
\nnecessary.  These are essentially matters of policy.  Unless
\nthe  provision is shown to be arbitrary, capricious,  or  to
\nbring  about grossly unfair results, judicial policy  should
\nbe  one\t of judicial- restraint. The  prescriptions  may  be
\nsomewhat  cumbersome  or  produce  some\t hardship  in  their
\napplication  in some individual cases; but they can  not  be
\nstruck\tdown as unreasonable, capricious or  arbitrary.\t The
\nHigh  Court, in our opinion, was not justified\tin  striking
\ndown the Rules as violative of Articles 14 and 16.\n<\/p>\n
    10.\t Accordingly,  all  the\t Appeals  are  allowed,\t the
\nJudgment of the High Court dated 2.9.1987 set-aside and\t the
\nCivil  Writ Petitions No. 2 132 of 1984 and 2082 of 1984  in
\nthe  High Court dismissed. However, the parties are left  to
\nbear and pay their costs, both here and below.\n<\/p>\n
A.P.J .\t\t\t\t\tAppeals allowed.\n<\/pre>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Roop Chand Adlakha And Ors vs Delhi Development Authority And … on 26 September, 1988 Equivalent citations: 1989 AIR 307, 1988 SCR Supl. (3) 253 Author: M Venkatachalliah Bench: Venkatachalliah, M.N. (J) PETITIONER: ROOP CHAND ADLAKHA AND ORS. Vs. RESPONDENT: DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT26\/09\/1988 BENCH: VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N. […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-271082","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nRoop Chand Adlakha And Ors vs Delhi Development Authority And ... on 26 September, 1988 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/roop-chand-adlakha-and-ors-vs-delhi-development-authority-and-on-26-september-1988\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Roop Chand Adlakha And Ors vs Delhi Development Authority And ... on 26 September, 1988 - 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