{"id":28163,"date":"1962-11-15T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1962-11-14T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-mysore-state-electricity-vs-bangalore-woollen-cotton-and-on-15-november-1962"},"modified":"2017-01-22T03:30:56","modified_gmt":"2017-01-21T22:00:56","slug":"the-mysore-state-electricity-vs-bangalore-woollen-cotton-and-on-15-november-1962","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-mysore-state-electricity-vs-bangalore-woollen-cotton-and-on-15-november-1962","title":{"rendered":"The Mysore State Electricity … vs Bangalore Woollen, Cotton And … on 15 November, 1962"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
The Mysore State Electricity … vs Bangalore Woollen, Cotton And … on 15 November, 1962<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1963 AIR 1128, \t\t 1963 SCR Supl. (2) 127<\/div>\n
Author: S Das<\/div>\n
Bench: Das, S.K., Kapur, J.L., Sarkar, A.K., Hidayatullah, M., Dayal, Raghubar<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nTHE MYSORE STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nBANGALORE WOOLLEN, COTTON AND SILK MILLS LTD. & ORS.\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT:\n15\/11\/1962\n\nBENCH:\nDAS, S.K.\nBENCH:\nDAS, S.K.\nKAPUR, J.L.\nSARKAR, A.K.\nHIDAYATULLAH, M.\nDAYAL, RAGHUBAR\n\nCITATION:\n 1963 AIR 1128\t\t  1963 SCR  Supl. (2) 127\n CITATOR INFO :\n R\t    1964 SC1230\t (9)\n R\t    1964 SC1305\t (11,23)\n C\t    1991 SC 101\t (211)\n\n\nACT:\nElectricity-Revision of rates of supply by Government  after\nexpiry of agreement Dispute raised by consumer-If liable  to\narbitration-Electricity\t (Supply) Act, 1948 (54 of 1948)  s.\n76,49,60, Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (9 of 1910) S. 52.\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\nDisputes   arose  between  the\trespondent  mills  and\t the\nappellant Board relating to the payment of revised rates  to\nthe appellant  or its predecessor, the Government of  Mysore\nunder the      Electricity  (Supply) Act, 1948 Prior to\t the\nconstitution of the Board under that Act in September, 1957,\nthe  Government,  of  Mysore was  generating  and  supplying\nelectricity  under  the Electricity Act of  1910.   In\t1945\nagreements were entered into; between the Government and the\nrespondents  for  supply of electricity to them\t at  certain\nrates for a period of five years.  The agreements expired in\n1949-50.   In  March,  1953, the  Government  increased\t the\nrates.\t It  again  increased the rates\t from  April,  1956.\nThese revisions were not made by the Government under s.  49\nof  the 1948 Act as that section came into, force  in  1957.\nThe respondents did not pay at the enhanced rates and  moved\nthe  High  Court  under Art. 226  of  the  Constitution\t for\nrestraining  the Government as also the Board,\twhich  after\nits constitution was added' as a party, from levying at\t the\nincreased  rates.   It was urged on their  behalf  that\t the\nState Government was not entitled to increase the rates\t and\nthat  the  dispute  between them on the\t one  hand  and\t the\nGovernment  and\t the  Board  on the  other  with  regard  to\nincreased  rates  was liable to be  decided  by\t arbitration\nunder s. 76 of the Act of 1948, which had come into force in\nthe  State  of Mysore on December 30 1956.  The\t High  Court\ndecided the first point in favour of the Government but\t did\nnot  decide  the second.  The respondents did  not  pay\t the\narrears at the revised rates and the Board threatened to cut\noff  the  supply.   The\t respondents  then  nominated\tthen\narbitrator  under  s.  76  of  the  Act.   The\tBoard  filed\napplications  before the District judge under s. 33  of\t the\nArbitration  Act for a declaration that the depute  was\t not\ndeferrable to arbitration\n128\nunder\ts.  76\tof  the\t -Electricity  (Supply)\t Act.\t The\nadditional  District  Judge  who heard the  matter  held  in\nfavour\tof the Board.  The respondents moved the High  Court\nin  revision.\tThat Court held that s. 76 applied  and\t the\nrespondents  were entitled to call for an arbitration.\t The\nBoard  appealed to this Court.\tIt was urged on\t its  behalf\nthat  in view of the decision of the High Court on the\twrit\npetition, the claim of reference to arbitration under s.  76\nof  the\t Act  was  barred  by  res-judicata  and  that\t the\nexpression  \"other  person\" in sub-s. (1) of  that  section,\nread  ejusdem  genesis\tcould  not  include  a\tconsumer  of\nelectrical  energy nor was such a consumer entitled  to\t the\nbenefit of sub-s. (2) of that section as no provision of the\nAct  of 1948 read with the Act of 1910 authorised  reference\nof such a dispute to arbitration.\nHeld,  that  it\t was well-settled that\tin  order  to  judge\nwhether a decision in an earlier litigation operated As\t res\njudicata   the\tcourt  must  consider  the  nature  of\t the\nlitigation, the issue raised in it and the actual  decision.\nThe right of the Government or the Board to revise the rates\nand the right of the respondents if any, to raise a  dispute\nas  to the revised rates and seek arbitration  thereupon,  a\nquestion  which was expressly left open by the\tHigh  Court,\nwere  two different matters and the decision on\t the  former\ncould not operate as res judicata in respect of the latter.\nThe  relevant provisions of the Act of 1910 and the  Act  of\n1948,  read  together, made it clear that the  Mysore  State\nGovernment  in the years 1953-56 was free to  contract\twith\nthe  consumers of electricity to supply at such rates as  it\nthought\t  fit.\twhen  therefore\t the  agreements  with\t the\nrespondents  came to an end in 1949-50 it was not  bound  to\ncontinue the supply at the old rates.  The matter rested  in\nthe  region of contract, express or implied, and  could\t not\nraise a question under the Electricity (Supply) -Act of 1948\nso as to attract s. 76 of that Act.\nIt  was not correct to say that ss. 49 and 60 of the Act  of\n948  brought the dispute within the purview of the  Act\t and\nthat,  therefore,  it was to be\t determined  by\t arbitration\nunder 1. 76(1) of the Act.  The revision of the rates  could\nnot be aid to be for any of the purposes of the 1948 Act  as\nrequired  by  s.  60 of the Act nor did s. 49  of  the\tAct,\nproperly construed, attract s. 76(1).\nRyota of Garbandho v. Zamindar of Parlakimedi (1943)\nR.   70 I. A. 129, referred to.\n 129\nNone of the provisions of,the 1910 Act or the 1948 Act under\nwhich  certain questions were to be determined\tby  arbitra-\ntion,\tmention\t the  present  dispute\tas  a\tmatter\t for\narbitration either under s. 52 of the former or s. 76 (2) of\nthe later.\nAlthough the words used by s. 76 (1) were of wide amplitude,\nit  obviously  implied that the question must  be  one\tthat\narose  under  the  Act or had relation to it,  It  would  be\nanomalous to hold that a dispute regarding revision of rates\nmade by the Government before the Board was constituted\t was\none under the Act of 1948.\nSince the dispute could not be said to have arisen under the\nAct of 1948, it was not necessary to decide whether the rule\nof  ejusdeme generis applied in interpreting the  expression\n\"other person\" in s. 76(1) of the Act.\nPer  Hidayatullah,  J.-The dispute relating to\trevision  of\nrates  was  not one that could be  referred  to\t arbitration\nunder s.  76 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948.  It\t was\nnot  necessary\tto  invoke the rule of\tejusdem\t generis  to\ninterpret the expression  \"other person\" in that section  so\nas to bring a consumer disputing the rates thereunder  since\nno provision in the Act permitted such inclusion.\nWilliam\t v.  Golding,  (1865) L. R. I C.  P.  69,  held\t in.\napplicable.\nAlthough  s. 76 of the Act is very wide in its\tlanguage,  a\nqualification  has  to be read into it that the\t dispute  it\ncontemplates  must  be\tone relating to a  matter  with\t the\npurview\t of  the Act.  The Electricity Act of 1910  and\t the\nElectricity (S ply) Act of 1948, read together, clearly show\nthat  a dispute between the Government or the Board  on\t the\none  hand and a consumer on the other relating to  rates  of\nsupply, apart from any contract entered into, cannot at\t all\narise under the Act of 1 948.\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION :Civil Appeals Nos. 629 to\t 632
\nof 1961.\n<\/p>\n
Appeals from the judgment and orders dated August 19,  1960,
\nof the Mysore High Court in C.R.P. Nos. 6 11 to 613 and\t 622
\nof 1959.\n<\/p>\n
M. C. Setalvad,Attorney-General for India. T.\t  Rangaswami
\nAyyanyar, B. R. L. Iyengar and P.  D.\t  Menon,for\t the
\nappellants.\n<\/p>\n
130<\/span><\/p>\n
A.   V. Viswanatha Sastri, D.  N. Mukherjee and B.     N.
\nGhosh, for respondent No. 1 (in C. A. No. 629\/61).
\nN.   C. Chatterjee, V. L. Narasimhamoorthy and S. S. Shukla,
\nfor respondent No. 1 (in C. A. No. 630\/61).\n<\/p>\n
V.   L.\t Narasimhamoorthy and S. S. Shukla,  for  respondent
\nNo. 1 (in C. A. Nos. 631 and 632\/61).\n<\/p>\n
1962.  November 15.  The judgment of S. K Das, Kapur, Sarkar
\nand   Dayal,   JJ.,  was  delivered  by\t S.  K.\t  Das,\t J.,
\nHidayatullah, J., delivered a separate judgment.
\nS.  K.\tDAS, J.-These are four appeals on a  certificate  of
\nfitness\t granted  by  the High Court of\t Mysore\t under\tArt.
\n133(1)(c) of the Constitution.\tThe appeals have been  heard
\ntogether  and  this  judgment will  govern  them  all.\t The
\nappellant  is the Mysore State Electricity Board,  Bangalore
\n(hereinafter  referred\tto  as the Board) in  all  the\tfour
\nappeals.  The respondents are four textile mills, each\tmill
\nbeing respondent in one of the appeals.\t These four  textile
\nmills are : (1) the Bangalore Woollen, Cotton and Silk Mills
\nLtd., Bangalore, 12) the Minerva Mills Ltd., Bangalore,\t (3)
\nSri Krishna Rajendra Mills Ltd., Mysore, and (4) the  Mysore
\nSpinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Bangalore.
\nThe  appeals raise a common question of law,  viz.,  whether
\nunder  s. 76 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948  (LIV  of
\n1948),\t the  respondents  are\tentitled  to  call  for\t  an
\narbitration  in respect. of an alleged dispute between\tthem
\nand  the Board relating to the revision of rates payable  by
\nthem  for electric energy supplied by the appellant  or\t its
\npredecessor   The  provisions  of  two\tActs,\tthe   Indian
\nElectricity  Act,  1910\t (IX of 1910)  and  the\t Electricity
\n(Supply)
\n 131<\/span>
\nAct,  1948  (LIV of 1948), have to be  considered  in  these
\nappeals,  and  it  will be convenient to  cite\tthe  Indian-
\nElectricity  Act, 1910, as the 1910 Act and the\t Electricity
\n(Supply) Act, 1948, as the 1948 Act.\n<\/p>\n
We proceed first to state the facts which have led to  these
\nfour  appeals.\tThe 1910 Act and the 1948 Act were  extended
\nto  the\t State\tof Mysore on April 1, 1951, by\tthe  Part  B
\nStates (Laws) Act, 1951 (III of 1951).\tBut the sections  of
\nthe two Acts did not come into force in the State of  Mysore
\nall at once.  Some sections of the 1948 Act came into  force
\nat  once,  and some came into force on later dates.   It  is
\nsufficient  for our purpose to know that s. 76 of  the\t1948
\nAct came into force in Mysore on December 30, 1956; and s. 5
\nthereof\t came into force on September 30, 1957.\t  The  Board
\nwas  constituted  under s. 5 by\t a  Government\tnotification
\ndated September 27, 1957, to come into effect from September
\n30,  1957.   Prior  to the constitution of  the\t Board.\t the
\nGovernment  of\tMysore was generating  electric\t energy\t and
\nsupplying  it  to  consumers of both high  mention  and\t low
\ntension power.\tOn different dates in the year 1945, written
\nagreements  were  entered  into between\t the  Government  of
\nMysore and the four textile mills for the supply of electric
\nenergy\tto  these textile mills at the rate of O. 55  of  an
\nanna per unit of day power and O. 35 of an anna per. unit of
\nnight  power,  subject\tto the payment\tof  certain  monthly
\nminimum charges.  These agreements were for a period of five
\nyears  and  expired on different dates in  1949-50.   By  an
\norder dated March 23, 1953, the Government of Mysore revised
\nthe  rates for the supply of electric energy  and  increased
\nthe same to O. 65 of an anna per unit of day power and O. 45
\nof an anna per unit of night power.  Subsequently, an expert
\ncommittee,  under Chairmanship of Prof.\t M. S. Thacker,\t the
\nthen  Director of the Institute of Science,  Bangalore,\t was
\nappointed to go into the question of rationalisation of\t the
\nrates for power supply in the State of Mysore.\n<\/p>\n
132<\/span><\/p>\n
On  the recommendation of that Committee, the rates for\t the
\nsupply\tof  electric energy were again revised\twith  effect
\nfrom  April  1, 1956.  This was done by means  of  an  order
\ndated  March 1, 1956.  On April 26, 1956, the  four  textile
\nmills filed four writ petitions in the High Court of  Mysore
\nin  which  they prayed that the State  Government,  and\t the
\nBoard  (which  Board, after its constitution  in  1957,\t was
\nadded\tas  the\t second\t respondent  to\t the  pending\twrit
\npetitions)  be\trestrained from levying\t or  collecting\t the
\nincreased rates as per the order of March 1, 1956, and\tthat
\nthey be directed to continue to levy the same rates for\t the
\nsupply\tof  electric energy as were agreed  to\tbetween\t the
\nparties in the agreements of 1945.  Two points were urged in
\nsupport\t of  these writ petitions.  One was that  the  State
\nGovernment  was not legally competent to increase the  rates
\nfor the supply of electric’ energy.  The second point  urged
\nwas  that there was a dispute between the textile mills\t and
\nGovernment and later the Board, with regard to the rates for
\nthe  supply  of electric energy and such a dispute  must  be
\ndecided\t by arbitration as provided under s. 76 of the\t1948
\nAct.  We shall read s. 76 of the 1948 Act at a later  stage.
\nWe may here observe that of the two points urged in  support
\nof  the writ petitions, the High Court dealt only  with\t the
\nfirst  point  and held that the Government of  Mysore  ‘was’
\nlegally\t competent  to revise the rates for  the  supply  of
\nelectric  energy.  The second point arising out of s. 76  of
\nthe 1948 Act the High Court did not decide.  It said that it
\nexpressed  no opinion as to “‘whether or not the  contention
\nof  the textile mills that the dispute was covered by s.  76
\nof  the 1948 Act and should, be determined  by\tarbitration”
\nwas sound.  The High Court expressed the view that  question
\nwould  have to be determined if and when the  textile  mills
\nwanted to enforce their rights under the procedure laid down
\nunder the Arbitration Act, 1940 (X of 1940).  On the finding
\nthat the Government of
\n 133<\/span>
\nMysore was legally, competent to revise the rates, the\tfour
\nwrit  petitions\t were ;dismissed on January  29,  1958.\t  By
\nMarch  31,  1958,  the four textile mills  were,  in  heavy:
\narrears\t with regard to the payment of the  increased  rates
\nfor  the supply of electric energy to them, though they\t had
\npaid  in  full\taccording  to ,the  old\t rates.\t  After\t the
\nconstitution of the Board in September, 1957, the Board made
\nrepeated  demands  on the basis of the increased  rates\t and
\nasked  the textile mills; to clear all arrears due  by\tthem
\naccording  to the revised rates.  The textile  mills  having
\nfailed to do so, they were informed that the Board would cut
\noff  the supply in exercise of its power under s. 24 of\t the
\n1910  Act.   The textile mills thereupon  contended  that  a
\ndispute had arisen between them on one side and the Boar  on
\nthe other and the dispute had to be submitted to arbitration
\nn  under the provisions of s. 76 of the 1948 Act.  The\tfour
\ntextile-mills then nominated their arbitrator.\tOn  November
\n13,  1958,  the\t Board filed four  applications\t before\t the
\nDistrict  judge, Bangalore, under s. 33 of  the\t Arbitration
\nAct,  in which it asked for a declaration that\tthe  dispute
\nbetween the four textile mills and the Board was not  liable
\nto  be referred to arbitration under s. 76 of the  1948\t Act
\nand also for a direction to restrain the four textile  mills
\nfrom seeking arbitration in respect of the alleged  dispute.
\nThese  four  applications gave rise  to\t four  miscellaneous
\ncases  which  were  dealt with\tby  the\t learned  Additional
\nDistrict judge, ,Bangalore, by a common order.\tThe  learned
\nAdditional  District  judge allowed the petitions  and\theld
\nthat the-four textile mills were not entitled to the benefit
\nof  s. 76 of the 1948 Act, because the dispute\tbetween\t the
\nBoard  and  the four textile mills as to the rates  for\t the
\nsupply\tof electric energy was not liable to be referred  to
\narbitration  under  that section. The order of\tthe  learned
\nAdditional District judge :by which he disposed of the\tfour
\npetitions  was\tdated April 17, 1959.  From that  order\t the
\ntextile mills
\npreferred petitions in revision to the High Court of Mysore.
\nFour  such  petitions  were filed in  respect  of  the\tfour
\nmiscellaneous  cases.\tBy a common order dated\t August\t 19,
\n1960,  the  High  Court allowed the  petitions\tin  revision
\nholding\t that  s.  76  of the  1948  Act  applied,  and\t the
\nrespondent  textile  mills  were entitled  to  call  for  an
\narbitration  in respect of the dispute between them and\t the
\nBoard  in the matter of the revised rates.  The\t Board\tthen
\nasked  for  and obtained a certificate of fitness  from\t the
\nHigh  Court and on that certificate of fitness,\t these\tfour
\nappeals\t have come to this court from the a fore said  order
\nof the\t  High\tCourt dated August 19, 1960. It may  perhaps
\nbe stated here that after the constitution of\t  the  Board
\nin   1957,  another  expert  committee\twas   appointed\t  to
\nrationalise  the various tariffs prevailing in the State  of
\nMysore\twith regard to the supply of electric energy and  on
\nthe  re-commendations  of  this\t Committee  the\t rates\twere
\nrevised\t a  third time.\t But these last revised\t rates\tcame
\ninto effect from July 1, 1959, when presumably the  revision
\npetitions in the High Court were pending.\n<\/p>\n
Before\twe embark on a discussion of the principal  question
\ninvolved in these appeals, it is perhaps necessary to say  a
\nfew words about the interrelation of the two Acts, the\t1910
\nAct and the 1948 Act.  Section 70 of the 1948 Act  indicates
\nthat  relation.\t It states inter alia that no  provision  of
\nthe  1910  Act or any rules made thereunder shall  have\t any
\neffect\tso  far\t as  it is  inconsistent  with\tany  of\t the
\nprovisions  of the 1948 Act; where, however, the  provisions
\nof the two Acts are not inconsistent, the provisions of\t the
\n1948 Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation\t of,
\nthe  1910 Act.\tIt would, therefore, be necessary for us  to
\nrefer  to  the relevant provisions of the two  Acts  on\t two
\npoints which bear upon the principal question mooted  before
\nus.   These  two points are-(a) what are the powers  of\t the
\nBoard
\nor  its predecessor Government to revise the rates  for\t the
\nsupply of electric energy and can a dispute be raised by the
\ntextile mills with regard to such revision; and (b) what are
\nthe  provisions\t in  the  two Acts  for\t the  settlement  of
\ndisputes  by arbitration and who are the persons who can  be
\nparties\t to such a dispute ?  In considering  the  aforesaid
\ntwo  points, a distinction has to be kept in mind.   We\t are
\nconcerned  in this case with two periods.  The first  period
\nis  from  1953\tto September 30, 1957, when  the  Board\t was
\nconstituted.   The second period is the period of the  Board
\ncommencing from September 30, 1957, till November 13,  1958,
\nwhen  the  applications under s. 33 of the  Arbitration\t Act
\nwere made.  As we have stated earlier, the revision which is
\nin  dispute in these cases took place in the  first  period,
\nthat  is,  before the constitution of the  Board.   We\thave
\npointed\t out earlier that the third revision of\t rates\ttook
\neffect from July 1, 1959, when the revision petitions in the
\nHigh Court were pending.\n<\/p>\n
We  think  it  advisable  and convenient  to  refer  to\t the
\nrelevant provisions of the two Acts at a later stage and  in
\ntheir relation to the points which we have stated above.  We
\ndo not think that quoting the sections at this stage and out
\nof  relation to the two points Which fall for  consideration
\nwill serve any useful purpose.\t‘We, therefore, desist\tfrom
\nquoting the relevant sections at this stage, but are content
\nto  refer  here to the difference in the scheme of  the\t two
\nActs, namely, the 1910 Act and the 1948 Act.
\nVery briefly put, the scheme of the 1910 Act was. to empower
\nthe  State  Government,\t on  an\t application  made  in\t the
\nprescribed  form  and on payment of the prescribed  fee,  if
\nany,  to grant a license to any person to  supply.  electric
\nenergy\tin  any specified area.\t A per-son  holding  such  a
\nlicense\t was called the licensee.  The State Government\t had
\ncertain powers to give directions to the licensee in  regard
\nto
\nthe  supply  of electric energy, and to control\t   the\tdis-
\ntribution  and consumption of electric energy etc.   Section
\n28  of\tthe 1910 act laid down that no person other  than  a
\nlicensee  shall engage in the business: of supplying  energy
\nto the public except with the previous sanction of the State
\nGovernment  and\t in accordance with such conditions  as\t the
\nState  Government may fix in that behalf.  Therefore,  under
\nthe  1910  Act there were two classes of persons  who  could
\nsupply\telectric energy, a licensee and a  sanction  holder.
\nThe  1948 Act made some radical changes in the scheme.\t One
\nsuch change was that the expression ‘licensee’ was given  an
\nex-tended meaning to take in not merely a licensee  licensed
\nunder  Part  II of the 1910 Act but also a  person  who\t had
\nobtained  sanction  under  s.  28  of  the  1910  Act.\t The
\nexpression did not, however, include’ the State\t Electricity
\nBoard  which  was constituted for the first time  under\t the
\n1948  Act.   Next, the 1948 Act brought into  existence\t two
\nimportant  authorities, one called the\tCentral\t Electricity
\nAuthority  under  s. 3 of the Act and the  other  the  State
\nElectricity  Board  constituted\t under\ts.  5  of  the\tAct.
\nSection\t 26  of the 1 48 Act, to which a detailed  reference
\nwill  be  made later, lays down that subject 1948  Act,\t the
\nBoard  shall, in respect of State, have all the\t powers\t and
\nobligation licensee under the 1910 Act, and the 1948 to\t the
\nprovisions of the whole of a  Act shall be deemed to be\t the
\nlicense\t of  the  Board for the purposes of  the  1910\tAct.
\nThere  is  a  proviso  which  excepts  the  Board  from\t the
\nobligation of certain provisions of the 1910 Act.  Chapter V
\nof the 1948 Act contains provision  indicating the nature of
\nthe  works which the State Electricity Board  may  undertake
\nand its trading procedure; it includes provisions giving the
\nBoard  power  to establish its own  generating\tstations  to
\nsupply\telectric  energy  to license and  to  other  persons
\nrequiring such supply Under the 1948 Act, every licensee has
\nto company with such reasonable directions as the Board from
\ntime to time
\n137<\/span>
\nmay  give for the purpose of achieving the  maximum  economy
\nand  efficiency\t in  the  operations  of  the\tundertaking.
\nChapter\t VI  deals, with the Board’s finance,  accounts\t and
\naudit and in it occurs s. 60 which says inter alia that\t all
\ndebts and-, obligations incurred, all contracts entered into
\nand  all matters and things engaged to be done by,, with  or
\nfor  the  State Government for any of, the purposes  of\t the
\n1948 Act before the first constitution of the Board shall be
\ndeemed to have been incurred,. entered into or engaged to be
\ndone by, with or for the Board etc.  Chapter VII deals\twith
\nmiscellaneous  provisions one of which is arbitration  under
\ns.  76,\t a  section which we shall quote so far\t as  it\t is,
\nrelevant for our purpose.\n<\/p>\n
\t      “70.   ARBITRATION.-(1) All questions  arising
\n\t      between  ‘the State Government or the  Board,.
\n\t      and  a  licensee\tor  other  person  shall  be
\n\t      determined by arbitration.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (2)   Where any question or matter is, by this
\n\t      Act,, required to be refer-red to arbitration,
\n\t      it shall be so referred-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (a)   in\tcans where the Act so  provides,  to
\n\t      the  Authority  and  on  such  reference\t the
\n\t      Authority\t shall be deemed to have  been\tduly
\n\t      appointed as Arbitrators, and the award of the
\n\t      Authority shall be final and conclusive; or\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (b)   in other cases, to two arbitrators,\t one
\n\t      to be appointed by each party to the dispute.
\n\t       (3)  Subject   to  the  provisions  of\tthis
\n\t      section,\tthe  provisions of  the\t Arbitration
\n\t      Act,  1940  (10 of 1940) shall  apply  to\t the
\n\t      arbitrations under
\n\t       this Act.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t       xx xx\t xx xx.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
138<\/span><\/p>\n
The arguments presented before us on behalf of the appellant
\nmay  be\t put  in  two categories : (1)\tthe  first  line  of
\nargument  is  that the question of the power to\t revise\t the
\nrate  for the supply of electric energy to the four  textile
\nmills  during  the  first  period  (1953  to  1956)  by\t the
\nGovernment  of\tMysore\thaving\tbeen  decided  against\t the
\nrespondents  by the High Court on the writ  petitions,\tthat
\ndecision is binding on them and the respondents cannot raise
\na  dispute  as\tto it by reason of the\tapplication  of\t the
\nprinciple  of res judicata, (2) the second line of  argument
\nis  that on a proper construction of sub-section (1)  of  s.
\n76,  it\t should\t be  held that\tthe  words  “mother  person”
\noccurring therein must be read ejusdem generis or noseitur a
\nsoocis\twith ‘licensee’ and so read, a consumer of  electric
\nenergy\twill  not be entitled to the benefit  of  that\tsub-
\nsection; furthermore., sub-s. (2) of s. 76 will not help the
\nrespondents, because no provision of the 1948 Act read\twith
\nthe  1910  Act\trequires to be\treferred  to  arbitration  a
\ndispute of the nature which is alleged to have arisen in the
\npresent case between the Government or the Board on one side
\nand the textile mills on the other.\n<\/p>\n
We  shall now deal with these two arguments in the order  in
\nwhich we have stated them.  First, as to the argument based,
\non the principle of res judicata.  We may first refer to the
\npleadings  in the writ petitions.  In paras, 7 and 8 of\t the
\naffidavits  which the textile mills filed in support of\t the
\nwrit  petitions,  they\traised two main\t contentions  :\t (a)
\nfirstly,  that\tthe Government of Mysore had “‘no  right  to
\nincrease  the rates for supply of electrical energy  in\t the
\nmanner they have done”; it was stated that there were  prior
\nagreements  (referring\tto the agreements of 1945)  and\t the
\nsupply\thad to be made at the same old rates since  all\t the
\nterms and conditions of the agreements were observed by both
\nthe  parties; (b) secondly, it was stated that the  increase
\nof rates was arbitrary and unfair by reason
\n139<\/span>
\nof the provisions of the Sixth Schedule of the 1948 Act.   A
\nreference  was made to s. 26 of the 1948 Act and  the  Sixth
\nSchedule  thereof.  That Schedule inter alia  provides\tthat
\nthe  licensee  shall so adjust his rates for  the  sale\t of’
\nelectricity by periodical revision that his clear profit  in
\nany year shall not, as far as possible, exceed the amount of
\n“reasonable  return” determined in accordance  with  certain
\nrules  laid down in the Schedule.  It was pleaded on  behalf
\nof  the textile mills that it was possible to find out\tfrom
\nthe  rules  the maximum rate which a licensee  could  charge
\nunder  the  rules, and in view of those rules,\tthe  revised
\nrates fixed by the Government of Mysore were unfair and\t ex-
\ncessive.\n<\/p>\n
\t       The  prayer which was made in the writ  peti-\n<\/p>\n
\t      tions was in these terms :\n<\/p>\n
\t      “The High Court may be pleased to issue A writ
\n\t      of  prohibition or a writ of mandamus or\tsuch
\n\t      other  appropriate  writ, direction  or  order
\n\t      restraining   the\t respondent   (meaning\t the
\n\t      Government of Mysore and later the Board) from
\n\t      levying  or collecting the increased rates  as
\n\t      per the Government order dated March 1,  1956,
\n\t      and   that  the  respondent  be  directed\t  to
\n\t      continue\tto  levy  at  the  rates  agreed  to
\n\t      between  the  parties  in\t the  agreements  of
\n\t      1945.”\n<\/p>\n
The  decision of the High Court on the writ petitions  makes
\nit clear that the only point which was urged before the High
\nCourt on behalf of the textile mills was that under s. 26 of
\nthe 1948 Act the Board had all the powers and obligations of
\na  licensee under the 1910 Act and as the provisions of\t the
\nSixth  Schedule\t and the Seventh Schedule of  the  1948\t Act
\nwere, under s. 57 of that Act, deemed to be incorporated  in
\nthe license of every licensee, the Board which had the\tsame
\nobligations  as a licensee could not demand charges for\t the
\nsupply of electricity
\n140<\/span>
\nwhich  were not in consonance with the principles laid\tdown
\nin those Schedules.  This argument was repelled by the\tHigh
\nCourt, and the High Court pointed out that the Board was not
\na  licensee within the meaning of the 1948 Act and  was\t not
\nsubject to the rules of the Sixth Schedule thereof.  Section
\n26 of the 1948 Act is in these terms
\n\t      “Subject\tto the provisions of this  Act,\t the
\n\t      Board  shall., in respect of the whole  State,
\n\t      have  all\t the  powers  and-obligations  of  a
\n\t      licensee\tunder the Indian  Electricity  Act,,
\n\t      1910,  and this Act shall be deemed to be\t the
\n\t      licensee of the Board for the purposes of that
\n\t      Act.”\n<\/p>\n
The High Court expressed the view that having regard to\t the
\ndefinition clause in s.2(6) which in clear terms stated that
\nthe Board was not a licensee within the meaning of the\t1948
\nAct,  s. 26 was of no assistance to the textile mills.\t The
\nHigh Court decided that the plea of the textile mills  based
\non  the provisions of s. 26 read with the Sixth Schedule  of
\nthe 1948 Act was unsound and could not be accepted.
\nNow,  the  question is, does this decision  operate  as\t res
\njudicata  in the matter of a reference to arbitration  under
\ns.76 of the 1948 Act when the High Court, in express  terms,
\nleft  that  question  open ? The  learned  Attorney  General
\nappearing  for\tthe appellant has put his  argument  in\t the
\nfollowing  way.\t He has submitted that s.26 of the 1948\t Act
\ncame  into  force in Mysore on September 30, 1957,  and\t the
\ndisputed  revision of rates was made by the  Government\t  of
\nMysore\tin 1956 when s.26 of the 1948 Act was not  in  force
\nthere;\tbut  under  s.60 of the 1948 Act,  all\tmatters\t and
\nthings\tengaged\t to  be\t done by,  with\t or  for  the  State
\nGovernment  for any of the purposes of the 1948\t Act  before
\nthe  first  constitution of the Board, ,shall be  deemed  to
\nhave been done by, with or for the Board etc; therefore, the
\nBoard  was  entitled to ask for payment of  all\t arrears  of
\nelectric charges at
\n141<\/span>
\nthe rates revised by the State Government Provided the State
\nGovernment  had\t the  right to revise  the  rates  in  1956.
\nThat  right having been found for the State  Government\t and
\nagainst latter could not re-agitate reference to arbitration
\nunder  the textile mills., the\tquestion and ask for a\ts.76
\nof the 1948 Act.\n<\/p>\n
As  against this line of argument, it has been submitted  on
\nbehalf\tof  the\t textile mills that  having  regard  to\t the
\npleadings in the writ petitions and the decision of the High
\nCourt there-on, all that the High Court decided was that the
\nSixth  Schedule of the 1948 Act did not apply to  the  Board
\nand the revised rates could not be challenged on the  ground
\nthat  there was no compliance with the principles laid\tdown
\nin that Schedule.  The question whether the dispute shall be
\ndetermined  by arbitration under S. 76 of the 1948  Act\t was
\nspecifically  left  open by the High Court  and,  therefore,
\nthat  question\tcannot be shut out by the operation  of\t the
\nprinciple of res judicata.\n<\/p>\n
We  do\tnot think that these appeals can be decided  on\t the
\nnarrow\tground\tof res judicata.  There\t was  some  argument
\nbefore\tus  as to whether a decision on a  question  of\t law
\noperates  as res judicata, and the learned Attorney  General
\nrelying\t on  the  Full Bench decision in  the  Province.  of
\nBombay\tv.  The\t Municipal  Corporation\t of  Ahmedabad(1)has
\ncontended that a decision given by a court on a question  of
\nlaw  may not bind the same parties when they are  litigating
\nwith regard to a matter different from the one on which\t the
\ndecision was given : but a decision of law would the binding
\nbetween the same parties as res judicata if the right that a
\nparty  claimed was the same in the former litigation  as  in
\nthe  later.  We do not think that it is necessary for us  to
\nconsider  in  the abstract to what extent a  decision  on  a
\nquestion  of law, operates as res judicata between the\tsame
\nparties.It is well settled that in order to decide whether a
\n(1) A. I. R. 1954 Bom. 1.\n<\/p>\n
142<\/span><\/p>\n
decision in an earlier litigation operates as res  judicata,
\nthe  court must look at the nature of the  litigation,\twhat
\nwere the issues raised therein and what was actually decided
\nin it.\tIn the cases before us the High Court decided on the
\nwrit petitions that the Board was not a licensee within\t the
\nmeaning\t of s. 26 of the 1948 Act and was not bound  by\t the
\nprinciples  laid down in the Sixth Schedule  thereof.\tThis
\nwas  the  actual decision of the High Court.  It  is  indeed
\ntrue that what becomes res judicata is the “.,matter”  which
\nis actually decided and not the reason which leads the court
\nto  decide the “‘matter.” We find it difficult, however,  to
\nagree  with  the learned Attorney General  that\t the  matter
\nwhich\twas   actually\tdecided\t on  the   writ.   petitions
\nnecessarily  embraced or included the question of the  right
\nof the textile mills to call for an arbitration under s.  76
\nof  the 1948 Act.  The right of the State Government  or  of
\nthe Board to revise the rates, and the right, if any, of the
\ntextile\t mills to raise a dispute as to the  revised  rates,
\nare  two  different matters and the decision on\t one  cannot
\noperate as res judicata with regard to the other.  As to the
\nright  of the textile mills to call for an arbitration,\t the
\nHigh Court, in express terms, left that matter open.
\nWhile we do not agree with the learned Attorney General that
\nthese  cases  can  be decided on the narrow  ground  of\t res
\njudicata,  we do think that a much larger  question  arises,
\nand  this  question  has two  facets,  namely,\twhether\t the
\nalleged\t dispute  about the revision of rates  made  by\t the
\nState  Government in 1956 is a question which at  all  comes
\nunder the 1948 Act and if it does, do the textile mills come
\nwithin the category of “other person” occurring in s.  76(1)
\nof that Act ?\n<\/p>\n
Let us first consider whether the dispute at all comes under
\nthe 1948 Act.  What were the powers of the State  Government
\nto revise the rates in
\n 143<\/span>
\n1953-1956 ? No provision of the 1910 Act as it stood at\t the
\nrelevant  time has been brought to our notice which  imposed
\nany  restriction  on the State Government in the  matter  of
\ncharging  for the electric energy which it supplied,  though
\ns.  23\tof  the\t 1910 Act and some of  the  clauses  in\t the
\nSchedule  of that Act imposed restrictions on a licensee  in
\nthe  matter of charging for electricity which  the  licensee
\nsupplied.    The  State\t Government  was  not,\thowever,   a
\nlicensee, either under the 1910 Act or the 1948 Act, and was
\nnot  bound by those restrictions.  Speaking  generally,\t the
\nBoard takes the place of the State Government under the 1948
\nAct.  Section 49 of the
\n1948 Act states,
\n\t      “Subject to the provisions of this Act and  of
\n\t      any regulations made in this behalf, the Board
\n\t      may supply electricity to any person not being
\n\t      a\t licensee upon such terms and conditions  as
\n\t      the  Board  may from time to time\t fix  having
\n\t      regard to the nature and geographical position
\n\t      of the supply and the purpose for which it  is
\n\t      required :\n<\/p>\n
\t      Provided\tthat  in fixing any such  terms\t and
\n\t      conditions  the  Board shall  not\t show  undue
\n\t      preference to any person.”\n<\/p>\n
It  is worthy of note that this section came into  force  in
\nMysore on September 30, 1957, and the revision of rates made
\nin 1953-1956 by the State Government was not in exercise  of
\nthe powers given to the Board under s. 49.  The position  in
\n1953-1956  was that the State Government of Mysore was\tfree
\nto contract with the consumers of electric energy to  supply
\nat  such rates as it thought fit.  The agreements which\t the
\nState  Government  had entered into with  the  four  textile
\nmills in 1945 had come to an end in 1949-1950 and the  State
\nGovernment  was\t not bound to continue\tto  supply  electric
\nenergy\tto those mills at the old rates.  The matter  rested
\nin the region of
\n144<\/span>
\ncontract, express or implied and. it could not said to raise
\na  question  kinder the 1948 Act- If it was not\t a  question
\nwhich arose under the 1948 Act s.  76  thereof would not  be
\nattracted thereto.\n<\/p>\n
Learned counsel for the respondents has sought to meet\tthis
\ndifficulty ‘in the following way.  He has first referred  to
\ns.  60 of the 1948 Act.\t It :is perhaps necessary  to  quote
\nsub-s. (1) of that section here.\n<\/p>\n
\t      “60 (1).\tAll debts and obligations  incurred,
\n\t      all contracts entered into and all matters and
\n\t      things engaged to be done by, with or for\t the
\n\t\t\t    State  Government for any of the  purposes\t o
\nf
\n\t      this Act before the first constitution of\t the
\n\t      Board shall be deemed to have been  incurred,,
\n\t      entered into or engaged to be done by, with or
\n\t      for  the Board; and all suits or\tother  legal
\n\t      proceedings instituted or which might but\t Tor
\n\t      the issue of the notification under Subsection
\n\t      (4)  of section I have been instituted  by  or
\n\t      against the State Government may be  continued
\n\t      or instituted by or against the Board.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
The argument is that the revision of rates made by the State
\nGovernment in 1956, looked at either as a matter of contract
\nbetween\t the  parties  or as something\tdone  by  the  State
\nGovernment in exercise of its powers to fix such rates as it
\nthought\t fit, shall be deemed under sub-s. (1) of s.  60  to
\nhave  been  done by the Board, and if at the time  when\t the
\nrevision  was made there was a dispute between\tthe  parties
\nwhich, dispute has continued with the Board by reason of the
\nBoard demanding the arrears at the revised rates, it must be
\nheld  that the dispute arises under the 1948 Act and may  be
\ndetermined by arbitration under s. 76 (1) thereof.   Learned
\ncounsel for the respondents has further argued that even  if
\nthe  Board had revised the rates in exercise of\t its  powers
\nunder s. 49 a section which we had earlier
\n 145<\/span>
\nquoted, such power would be subject to the provisions of the
\n1948 Act and would attract S. 76.  There fore, the  argument
\nof learned counsel for the respondents is that the effect of
\nss. 60 and 49 is that the dispute is one which arises  under
\nthe  1948  Act\tand must be  determined\t by  arbitration  as
\nrequired by S. 76 (1).\n<\/p>\n
We  doubt the correctness of this line of argument.   First,
\nas  to S. 60 of the 1948 Act.  The revision of\trates  which
\nwas made by the State Government in 1953-1956 rested, as  we
\nhave  said earlier, either on contract or on the  unilateral
\naction\tof  the State Government.  In either  case,  it\t was
\noutside the 1948 Act and was not referable to any  provision
\nthereof.   A pre-requisite condition for the application  of
\nS.  60 is that the contract made by the State Government  or
\nthe thing done by it must be “for any of the purposes of the
\n1948  Act.” If it was for the purposes of that Act  and\t was
\nentered\t into or done by the,, State Government\t before\t the
\nfirst  constitution of the Board, then the contract  or\t the
\nthing done shall be deemed to have been made or done by\t the
\nBoard  and all suits or other legal proceedings which  might
\nhave  been instituted against the State Government could  be
\ninstituted  against the Board.\tWe have earlier pointed\t out
\nthat  there was no provision in the 1910 Act as it stood  at
\nthe  relevant time which applied to the State Government  in
\nthe  matter  of\t the rates which  it  charged  for  applying
\nelectricity to consumers.  In the 1948 Act also, there is no
\nsection\t which regulates the State Government in the  matter
\nof  what it will charge for electric energy supplied by\t it.
\nThat  being  the  position,  how can it\t be  said  that\t the
\nrevision of the rates by the State Government gave rise to a
\nquestion under the 1948 Act ?\n<\/p>\n
We  now\t turn  to S. 49.  That section came  into  force  in
\nMysore, we have said earlier, on September
\n146<\/span>
\n30,  1957.  That section applied to the Board after  is\t was
\nconstituted.   It  had no application in 1956,\tand  we\t are
\nunable to see how it can be said that any dispute as to\t the
\nrevision of rates made by the State Government in 1956 was a
\nquestion  which\t arose\tunder the  1948\t Act.\tThe  learned
\nAttorney  General has indeed accepted the position that\t the
\nBoard  is the successor-in-interest of the State  Government
\nand the supply of electricity is one of the purposes of\t the
\n1948 Act.  That does not, however, mean that the revision of
\nrates  in  1956 and a dispute raised as\t to  such  revision,
\nbecame a question under the 1948 Act by reason of the demand
\nmade  by  the  Board of the arrears due in  respect  of\t the
\nrevised rate.  The true nature of the question remained what
\nit was in 1956, namely, the right of the State Government to
\nrevise the rates, a right which has no reference to the 1948
\nAct.\n<\/p>\n
Furthermore,  we are unable to accept the argument  advanced
\non  behalf of the respondents that the expression  “”Subject
\nto  the provisions of this Act” occurring in s. 49  attracts
\ns. 76.\tSection 49 seems to give the Board a right to supply
\nelectricity  to\t any person not being a licensee  upon\tsuch
\nterms  and conditions s the Board may from time to time\t fix
\nhaving regard to the nature and geographical position of the
\nsupply\tand  the purposes for which it is required.   ‘\t The
\nproviso to the section states that in fixing any such  terms
\nand conditions, the Board shall not show undue preference to
\nany person.  We are unable to agree with the learned counsel
\nfor  the respondents that the section contemplates that\t the
\nconsumers  may raise a dispute with regard to the terms\t and
\nconditions  and on such a dispute being raised, it shall  be
\ndetermined  by arbitration as required by s. 76 (1)  of\t the
\n1948 Act.  The expression “Subject to the provisions of this
\nAct”   merely  means  that  if\tthere  are  any\t  provisions
\nregulating the Board in the matter
\n 147<\/span>
\nof supplying electricity to any person not being a licensee,
\nthen  the  supply  by the Board will  be  subject  to  those
\nprovisions.   No  provision has been brought to\t our  notice
\nwhich regulates the Board in the matter of the charges which
\nit  may\t fix  for the supply of electricity.   It  has\tbeen
\nargued\tbefore us that the expression “having regard to\t the
\nnature\tand  geographical  position of the  supply  and\t the
\npurposes for which it is required” indicates that a  dispute
\nmay arise between the Board and the consumer of\t electricity
\nin the sense that the consumer may allege that in fixing the
\ncharges\t for  the  supply of electricity the  Board  had  no
\nregard to the nature and geographical position of the supply
\nand  the purposes for which it was required. The  expression
\n,,have regard to” or “having regard to” has been the subject
\nof  judicial  interpretation.\tIn  Ryots  of  Garbandho  v.
\nZamindar  of  Parlakimedi (1) their Lordships of  the  Privy
\nCouncil dealt with the meaning of the expression.  They said
\n\t      “The  view  taken\t by  the  majority  of\t the
\n\t      Collective  Board\t of Revenue  in\t making\t the
\n\t      order  dated  October 19, 1936, which  is\t now
\n\t      complained  of,  is that the   requirement  to
\n\t      “having regard to” the provisions in  question
\n\t      has no more definite or technical meaning than
\n\t      that of ordinary usage, and only requires that
\n\t      these provisions must be taken into considera-
\n\t      tion.”\n<\/p>\n
We do not therefore think that expression contemplates\tthat
\na Consumer of electricity can raise a dispute as against the
\nBoard  on the footing that the Board did not pay due  regard
\nto  the nature and geographical position of the\t supply\t and
\nthe purposes for which it was required.\n<\/p>\n
It  is\tnecessary here to refer to those provisions  of\t the
\n1910  and  1948 Acts which require certain questions  to  be
\ndetermined by arbitration.  In the
\n(1)  (1945) L.R. 70 I.A. 129,168.\n<\/p>\n
148<\/span><\/p>\n
910 Act, the main section dealing with arbitration s.  52
\nwhich was in these terms at the relevant time.\n<\/p>\n
\t      “Where  any matter is, by or under  this\tArt,
\n\t      directed to be determined by arbitration,\t the
\n\t      matter shall, unless it is otherwise expressly
\n\t      provided\tin  the license of  a  licensee,  be
\n\t      determined  by such person or persons  as\t the
\n\t      State  Government may nominate in that  behalf
\n\t      on the application of either party; but in all
\n\t      other respects the arbitration shall be subject
\n\t      to  the  provisions of  the  Arbitration\tAct,
\n\t      1940.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      xx\t xx\t  xx\t    xx\t     XX.”<\/p>\n
The  section lays down that where any matter is by or  under
\nthe  1910 Act directed to be determined by arbitration’\t the
\nmatter shall be determined by arbitration in the manner laid
\ndown  in that section.\tThe scheme is that arbitration\twill
\ntake place only when any matter is by or under the 1910\t Act
\ndirected to be determined_by arbitration.  There are several
\nsections, such as s. 7 A, s. 13(2), s. 14 (3), s. 15 (5), s.
\n16 (3), s. 19 (2), s. 21 (4), s. 22, ss. 22-A (2) and s.  32
\n(3)  which  require  certain matters  to  be  determined  by
\narbitration.   None of these, however, relate to  the  rates
\nfor  the supply of electricity by the State Government.\t  In
\nthe 1948 Act the main section dealing with arbitration is s.
\n76  which we have already set out earlier in this  judgment.
\nThere is some difference in the scheme of s. 76 from that of
\ns.  52.\t Section 76 is in two parts : the  first  subsection
\nstates, in general terms that all questions arising  between
\nthe State Government or the Board on one side and a licensee
\nor  other  person  on  the  other  shall  be  determined  by
\narbitration;  the second sub-section states that  where\t any
\nquestion  or  matter  is  by the 1948  Act  required  to  be
\nreferred  to  arbitration, it shall be so  referred  to\t the
\npersons\t specified  in\tcls. (a) and (b);  in  cl,  (a)\t the
\nauthority named by the Act shall be the
\n\t     149<\/span>
\narbitrator  and\t in cl. (b) the reference shall\t be  to\t two
\narbitrators,  one  to  be appointed by\teach  party  to\t the
\ndispute.   Sub-section\t(2) to s. 76  corresponds,  more  or
\nless, to s. 52 of the 1910 Act, but sub-sec. (1) of s. 76 is
\nmore general in nature.\t The 1948 Act also contains  several
\nprovisions  besides s. 76 (1) which require certain  matters
\nto  be referred to arbitration.\t These provisions are s.  19
\n(4), s. 40, s. 44 (3), s. 45(3), S. 55 (2) and some  clauses
\nof  the\t First\tand  the Fourth\t Schedule.   Some  of  these
\nprovisions  constitute\tthe Central  Electricity  Authority,
\nconstituted  under s. 3 of the 1948 Act, as the\t arbitrating
\nauthority.   Section  19  (4) states that  if  any  question
\narises under sub-s. (1) thereof as to the reasonableness  of
\nthe terms or conditions or time therein mentioned, it  shall
\nbe  determined as provided in s. 76.  Now, s. 19  (1)  deals
\nwith  the powers of the Board to supply electricity  to\t any
\nlicensee  or  person requiring such supply in  any  area  in
\nwhich  a scheme sanctioned under Ch.  V is in force.  It  is
\nclear that s. 19 (4) does not apply in the present case.  If
\nit did, then the respondents might  be intitled to claim  an
\narbitration under sub-s. (2) of s. 76.\n<\/p>\n
Thus,  it appears from what we have stated above, that\tnone
\nof  the provisions of the 1910 Act or the 1948 Act make\t the
\npresent dispute a matter directed or required to be referred
\nto  arbitration either under s. 52 of the 1910 Act or s.  76
\n(2)  of the 1948 Act.  Therefore, the respondents  can\tcall
\nfor  an arbitration under s. 76 (1) of the Act, if they\t can
\nestablish that the dispute in the present case is a question
\nwhich  arises  under the 1948 Act.  It is indeed  true\tthat
\nsub-s. (1) of s. 76 uses words of wide amplitude.  It states
\nthat “all questions arising between the State Government  or
\nthe Board and a licensee or other person shall be determined
\nby  arbitration.” We, however, think that it is implicit  in
\nthe sub-section that the question is one which arises  under
\nthe 1948 Act.  Obviously, it could not have
\n150<\/span>
\nbeen  contemplated  that any question  arising\tbetween\t the
\nState Government on one side and any person  on\t the   other
\nshall  be  determined  by arbitration.\t If  that  were\t the
\nmeaning of the sub-section, then all litigation between\t the
\nState  Government  on one side and any person on  the  other
\nwill  have to be referred to arbitration.  We do  not  think
\nthat  can be the meaning of the sub-section.  When the\tsub-
\nsection\t states\t ” all questions arising between  the  State
\nGovernment  etc.,”‘it must mean questions which arise  under
\nor  have  relation to the 1948 Act.  A dispute\tbetween\t the
\nGovernment  and a private citizen or a dispute\tbetween\t the
\nGovernment  and\t its employee, unrelated to  the  1948\tAct,
\ncannot be subject of an arbitration under this\tsub-section.
\nIf that be the correct interpretation, then the respondents,
\nbefore they can succeed, must establish that the dispute  as
\nto revision of rates made by the State Government in 1956 is
\na  dispute  which arises under the 1948 Act.   It  would  be
\nanomalous  to  hold  that a dispute  regarding\trevision  or
\nfixing\trates of supply made by Government before the  Board
\nwas  constituted  arises  under the 1948 Act,  when  even  a
\nrevision of rates made by the Board under s. 49 of the\t1948
\nAct   will  not\t be  referable\tto  arbitration.   We\tare,
\ntherefore,  of the view that the dispute in these  cases  is
\nnot one which arises under the 1948 Act.\n<\/p>\n
Now,  we  proceed  to  the  third  and\tthe  last  question.
\nAssuming that the dispute is one which arises under the 1948
\nAct, do the respondents, viz., the four textile mills,\tcome
\nwithin\tthe  expression ”  other person” occurring  in\tsub-
\nsection\t (1)  of s. 76 ?  The learned Attorney\tGeneral\t has
\nvery  strenuously contended that the scheme of s. 76 (1)  is
\nthat in the matter of a dispute, the State Government or the
\nBoard  is placed on one side as a party to the\tdispute\t and
\nthe  licensee  or other person is placed on the\t other,\t and
\nhaving\tregard\tto the entire scheme of the  1948  Act,\t the
\nexpression “other person” must take
\n 151<\/span>
\ncolour from the word licensee’ preceding it.  He has further
\ncontended  that the word ‘licensee’ in the ‘context  of\t the
\n1910  and the 1948 Acts denotes a genus or category  and  on
\nthe  application  of the principle of  ejusdem\tgeneris\t the
\nexpression “other person” means persons who are of the\tsame
\ngenus  or category.  He points out that under the 1910\tAct,
\nlicensee’ means a per-son licensed under Part 11 of that Act
\nto  supply electric energy and ” consumer’ means any  person
\nwho is supplied with energy by a licensee or the  Government
\nor by any other person engaged in the business of  supplying
\nenergy\tto the public under the 1910 Act or under any  other
\nlaw for the time being in force.\n<\/p>\n
There  is, however, another class of persons who may  supply
\nelectric  energy and that class consists of persons who\t may
\nbe called sanction-holders under s. 28 of the 1910 Act.\t The
\n1948  Act  includes  both these classes of  persons  in\t the
\ndefinition of licensee, but does not include the Board.\t The
\nargument  of  the learned Attorney General  is\tthat  having
\nregard\tto  these definition clauses,  the  word  “licensee’
\ndenotes\t a genus or category of persons who supply  electric
\nenergy\tto  consumers.\tThere is a third  class\t of  persons
\n(other than the Board) who may supply electric energy and it
\nis  this class of persons who are sought to be\tincluded  by
\nthe expression “other person” occuring after the  expression
\n‘licensee’.  It is clear from s. 49 of the 1948 Act that the
\nBoard  may  supply  electricity to any person  not  being  a
\nlicensee  upon\tsuch terms and conditions as the  Board\t may
\nfrom  time  to time fix.  A similar power is  given  to\t the
\nBoard  also  under ss. 18(c) and 19(1) of  the\tAct.   These
\npersons\t to  whom the Board may supply electricity  may,  in
\ntheir  turn, supply electricity to consumers on\t such  terms
\nand  conditions\t as the Board may lay down.   It  is  clear,
\ntherefore, that the 1948 Act contemplates a class of persons
\n(other\t than  licensees)  who\tmay  get  their\t supply\t  of
\nelectricity
\n152<\/span>
\nfrom  the Board and may, in their turn, supply the  same  to
\nconsumers within the meaning of the definition of that\tword
\nin  the\t 1910  Act.  The argument of  the  learned  Attorney
\nGeneral\t is  that  it  is this\tclass  of  persons  who\t are
\ncontemplated  by the expression other person”  occurring  in
\nsub-s. (1) of s. 76.\n<\/p>\n
The  learned  Attorney\tGeneral has sought  to\tfortify\t his
\nargument by the further circumstance that s. 76(1) obviously
\ndoes  not  contemplate\tthat as between\t a  licensee  and  a
\nconsumer,  there  can be a dispute in respect of  which\t the
\nconsumer  can  call for an arbitration.\t It is\targued\tthat
\nthis  is  obvious from the scheme of s.\t 76(1)\tbecause\t the
\nlicensee or other person is put on the same side, vis-a-vis,
\nthe  State  Government or the Board.  The  argument  of\t the
\nlearned\t Attorney General is that it will be incongruous  to
\nhold  that  s. 76(1) does not take in a\t dispute  between  a
\nlicensee and a consumer, but takes in a dispute between\t the
\nState Government or the Board on one side and a consumer  on
\nthe other, and he points out that so to hold will be to\t put
\nthe  Government or the Board in a much worse  position\tthan
\nthe licensee.  He has drawn our attention to the proviso  to
\ns. 26 of the 1948 Act which excludes the Board from  certain
\nclauses of the Schedule to the 1910 Act and thereby  exempts
\nthe Board from arbitration in respect of matters referred to
\ntherein.   The\targument is that in view of the\t proviso  to
\ns.26 of the 1948 Act, it could not have been contemplated by
\nthe Legislature that the Board would be in a worse  position
\nthan a licensee.\n<\/p>\n
The learned Attorney General has also drawn our attention to
\nss.75 and 77 of the 1948 Act.  According to him, sub-s.\t (3)
\nof  s.\t75  gives a clue to the meaning\t of  the  expression
\n“‘other per-son” occurring in s. 76 (1).  Sub-section (3) of
\ns.  75\tstates\tinter alia that the Board  may\trequire\t any
\nlicensee  or  person  supplying electricity  for  public  or
\nprivate\t purposes or generating electricity for his own\t use
\nto
\n 153<\/span>
\nfurnish\t it with such information and accounts\trelating  to
\nsuch supply or generation and in such form and manner as the
\nnotice\tmay  specify.\tThis  subsection,  so  the   learned
\nAttorney  General has argued, shows that there\tare  persons
\nother  than  licensees who may as required.  by\t the  Board,
\nsupply\telectricity for public or private purposes  or\teven
\ngenerate  electricity for their own use.  According  to\t the
\nlearned-  Attorney  General, these are the persons  who\t are
\nreferred to as “other persons’ in s. 76 (1).  Section 77  is
\nthe penal section and read with s.4 it ,makes it clear\tthat
\nthere  is  a third class of persons  besides,  licensees  or
\nsanction-holders  who may supply electricity for  public  or
\nprivate\t purposes.   Section 4 states that it shall  be\t the
\nduty of each State Electricity, Department or other licensee
\nor  person  supplying  electricity  for\t public\t or  private
\npurposes  or generating electricity for its or his own\tuse,
\nto  furnish  to\t the  Central  Electricity  Authority\tsuch
\naccounts,  statistics and returns as may be  required.\t All
\nthese indicate clearly enough that besides licensees holding
\na licence under Part II of the 1910 Act and sanction holders
\nholding\t a sanction under s. 28 of the 1910 Act, there is  a
\nthird class of persons who may supply electricity for public
\nor private purposes.  This third class of persons is subject
\nto control by the State Government, The Central\t Electricity
\nAuthority  or  the Board.  The contention  of  the,  learned
\nAttorney General is that a dispute between this third  class
\nof persons on one side and the State Government or Board  on
\nthe  other  is the dispute contemplated by the\tuse  of\t the
\nexpression  “other person” occurring in sub-s.(1) of s.\t 76.
\nThe  learned  Attorney General has placed  reliance  on\t the
\ndecision in Williams v. Golding(1).  There the question\t for
\nconsideration was the meaning to be given to the  expression
\n“‘or other person” in the 108th section of the\tMetropolitan
\nBuilding  Act,\t1855 (18th and 19th Vict. c. 122).   It\t was
\nheld  that the expression “‘or other person”  meant  persons
\nejusdem generis with a district surveyor, that
\n(1)  1865 (1) L.R.C.P. 69.\n<\/p>\n
154<\/span><\/p>\n
is, persons having an official duty.  The decision in United
\nTowns  Electric\t Co.  v.  Attorney-General-Newfoundland\t (1)
\nexplains  the  application  of\tthe  principle\tof   ejusdem
\ngeneris,  and  it  was held that there is no  room  for\t the
\napplication of that principle in the absence of any  mention
\nof  genus,  since the mention of a single species  does\t not
\nconstitute a genus.\n<\/p>\n
As  against  these  contentions\t of  the  learned   Attorney
\nGeneral,  it  has been argued on behalf of  the\t respondents
\nthat the main principle on which we must proceed is to\tgive
\nto  all\t the words of s. 76 their common meaning ;  and\t the
\nejusdem\t generis rule which is not automatically  applicable
\nreally\tmeans that there is implied into the  language\tsome
\nrestriction  which  is\tnot there ; it\tis  argued  that  no
\nrestriction can be implied from the language of s. 76 so  as
\nto  exclude  a consumer from the expression  “other  person”
\noccurring  in  sub-s.  (1) of s. 76.  It  has  been  further
\nsubmitted that the word “licensee’ preceding the  expression
\n‘other\tperson’\t does  not denote a  genus  or\tcategory  of
\nsuppliers  of electricity so as to attract the operation  of
\nthe  rule  of  ejusdem\tgeneris.  in  this  connection\t our
\nattention has been drawn to ss. 28, 34, 39, 41 and 43 of the
\n1948 Act.\n<\/p>\n
These contentions urged on both sides would require  careful
\nconsideration in a more appropriate  case where\t  a  dispute
\narises under the 1948 Act.  In view of our   finding,however,
\nthat the dispute in the present\t   case does not arise under
\nthe  1948  Act,\t the question whether the  rule\t of  ejusdem
\ngenesis\t applies  or  not in  interpreting  s.76  is  purely
\nacademic.   We\tdo not propose to  determine  that  academic
\nquestion here.\n<\/p>\n
Before\twe  conclude,  we  may\trefer  to  another  argument
\nadvanced  by  the  learned Attorney  General.\tThe  learned
\nAttorney  General has submitted that if a  question  between
\nthe Board and a consumer is to be
\n(1)  1939-1 All.  E.R. 423.\n<\/p>\n
 155<\/span><\/p>\n
referred  to  arbitration,  then in cases  where  the  Board
\nitself\tsupplies electric energy there may be  thousands  of
\nconsumers  each\t of whom may raise a dispute  and  call\t for
\narbitration.   In  that event, there will  be  thousands  of
\narbitrations   and   the  legislature\tcould\tnever\thave
\ncontemplated  such a situation.\t This is really an  argument
\nbased\ton   inconvenience,  and  we  do  not\tthink\tthat
\ninconvenience  is  a  decisive\tfactor\tin  interpreting   a
\nstatute.\n<\/p>\n
Learned\t counsel for the respondents drew our  attention  to
\ns.51-A of the 1910 Act.\t That section states that where\t the
\nState Government engages in the business of supplying energy
\nto the public, it shall have all the powers and\t obligations
\nof  a  licensee\t under the 1910 Act.   There  is  a  proviso
\nsimilar\t to  the proviso to s.26 which\texcludes  the  State
\nGovernment  from the operation of some of the provisions  of
\nthe  Act.   This  section  is  of  no  materiality  for\t the
\nconsideration of the cases before us, for it was inserted in
\nthe 1910 Act in 1959.\n<\/p>\n
 For  the reasons given above, we allow these  appeals,\t set
\naside  the  orders of the High Court  dated\t August\t 19,
\n1960,  and restore those of the Additional  District  judge,
\nBangalore  dated  April\t 17, 1959.  The\t appellant  will  be
\nentitled to its costs throughout,one hearing fee.
\nHIDAYATULLAH, J.-I agree that this appeal should be allowed.
\nI  am  of the opinion that this is not the kind\t of  dispute
\nwhich can come within s. 76 of the Electricity (Supply) Act,
\n1948.  That section provides
\n\t      “76.   Arbitration.-(1) All questions  arising
\n\t      between the State Government or the Board\t and
\n\t      a licensee or other person shall be determined
\n\t      by arbitration.”\n<\/p>\n
156<\/span><\/p>\n
I  am of opinion that the ejusdem  generis rule\t invoked  by
\nthe appellant to interpret ‘other person’ in the section  is
\nnot  required  ‘to limit the generality\t of  the  expression
\nbecause\t a consumer disputing rates cannot come\t within\t the
\nexpression “other person”,regard being had to the provisions
\nof the Act.\n<\/p>\n
The facts of the ‘case have been set out exhaustively by  my
\nbrother Das and for my purpose I need only mention that\t the
\nrespondents  in these appeals are four\tcompanies  receiving
\nelectrical  energy  in\ttheir  mills  from  the\t  appellant.
\nFormerly  there\t was a contract under which-  the  rate\t was
\nfixed  but the contract expired sometime in 1949-50 and\t the
\nState  Government  has\tnow fixed  the\trates  higher.\t The
\nrespondents have paid the charges for the energy consumed by
\nthem  at  the old rates and large arrears  have\t accumulated
\nrepresenting  the difference between the charge at  the\t old
\nand  the new rates.  The first revision of rates, it may  be
\nmentioned, Was in 1953 and the second in 1956.\tThe  present
\nappellant was constituted in 1957 and in all proceedings  to
\nwhich reference has been made in the judgment of my  learned
\nbrother,  the  appellant  has been  joined.  The  respondent
\ncompanies  admit that they are liable to pay for the  energy
\nconsumed  by  them  at\tthe, rates  agreed  in\tthe  expired
\nagreements  but demur to payment at the new rates  and\tthis
\nhas  raised a dispute which they claim must be\treferred  to
\narbitration as required by s.76.\n<\/p>\n
The short question in this appeal is whether such a  dispute
\nis  compulsorily referrable to, arbitration.  Of course,  if
\nthe dispute is one to which s. 76 applies and the respondent
\ncompanies in their position as consumers, are proper parties
\nto take advantage of s. 76, then the dispute, such as it is,
\nmust  be referred.  The language of s. 76 is both  wide\t and
\nintractable.  But a dispute need not go to arbitration if it
\nis not a dispute to which s. 76 can apply.\n<\/p>\n
 157<\/span><\/p>\n
Also,  the section can hardly be invoked if consumers  (such
\nas  the\t respondents)  do not  come  within  the  expression
\n“,other\t person\t on  the principle  of\tejusdem\t generis  or
\notherwise.\n<\/p>\n
The  Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (54 of 1948) was  passed
\nin  1948  and it was a measure, as the long  title  and\t the
\npreamble  show, to rationalise the production and supply  of
\nelectricity  and generally for taking measures conducive  to
\nelectrical  development.  The Act deals with the  supply  of
\nelectrical  energy  and its  rationalisation,  whether\tsuch
\nenergy be generated by a State Government, State Electricity
\nBoard, a licensee under the Indian Electricity Act, 1910  (9
\nof  1910)  or a person who, having obtained  sanction  under
\nsection\t 28  of\t the  1910 Act, engages\t in  the  supply  of
\nelectrical energy.  The Electricity (Supply Act, ‘1948, does
\nnot  deal with other matters relating to the supply and\t use
\nof  electrical energy which are governed by the earlier\t Act
\nof 1910.  The latter Act deals with the grant of licenses to
\nproduce\t electrical energy,and contains provisions  for\t the
\nsupply,\t transmission  and  use\t of  electrical\t energy\t  by
\nlicensees  and\tnon-licensees  and  generally  with  matters
\nconnected  thereto.  Both the Acts are required to  be\tread
\ntogether but where they differ the later Act prevails.\tBoth
\nthe  Acts provide for arbitration in disputes.\tThe  Act  of
\n1910 provides this by s. 52. which reads
\n\t      “52.   Where any matter is, by or\t under\tthis
\n\t      Act directed to be determined by\tarbitration,
\n\t      the  matter  shall,  unless  it  is  otherwise
\n\t      expressly\t  provided  in\tthe  license  of   a
\n\t      licensee,\t be- determined by’ such  person  or
\n\t      persons  as the State Government may  nominate
\n\t      in  that behalf on the application  of  either
\n\t      party;   but   in\t all  other   respects\t the
\n\t      arbitration shall be subject to the provisions
\n\t      of the Arbitration Act, (1940).\n<\/p>\n
\t      158<\/span><\/p>\n
\t      Provided that where the Government or a  State
\n\t      Electricity Board is a party to a dispute, the
\n\t      dispute shall be referred to two\tarbitrators,
\n\t      one  to  be  appointed by each  party  to\t the
\n\t      dispute.”\n<\/p>\n
This section enjoins arbitration only in disputes which\t are
\nexpressly  directed  by\t the 1910 Act to  be  determined  by
\narbitration and admittedly none of those provisions applies.
\nSection 76 is more general. It enjoins that “all  questions”
\narising between the State Government or the Board on the one
\nhand  and a licensee or other person on the other  shall  be
\ndetermined by arbitration.  Though the section does not\t say
\nthis,  the question must be one which can, arise  under\t the
\nSupply Act.  The section does not mean, notwithstanding\t its
\nextreme\t width, that disputes which have no relation to\t the
\nSupply\tAct  or\t its provisions must  also  be\tresolved  by
\narbitration for to hold so would mean that neither the State
\nGovernment  nor the Board can sue or be sued in courts.\t  It
\nis,   therefore,   quite  plain\t that  one   must   read   a
\nqualification into the section that the dispute must be\t one
\ntouching  a  matter within the Supply Act.   Some  of  these
\ndisputes  are  required by the Act itself to go\t before\t the
\nCentral\t Electricity Authority, one of its duties  being  to
\n“act  as  arbitrators in matters arising between  the  State
\nGovernment  or the Board and a licensee or other  person  as
\nprovided  in this Act”, vide s. 3 (1) (II).  Other  disputes
\narc  required  to  go before two arbitrators  :\t one  to  be
\nappointed  by  each party.  Indeed the four  companies\thave
\nnominated their arbitrator, given a notice to the Board\t and
\nthe Board has filed in the District Court four\tapplications
\nunder  s. 33 of the Arbitration Act, in which it  has  asked
\nfor  a\tdeclaration  that the dispute is not  liable  to  be
\nreferred to arbitration.  This declaration was given by\t the
\nAdditional District judge, Bangalore, but it was
\n 159<\/span>
\ndisallowed by the High Court of Mysore by an order passed on
\nrevision.  The High Court granted certificates on which\t the
\npresent appeals were filed.\n<\/p>\n
Before dealing with the arguments, it is necessary to  refer
\nbriefly\t to the scheme of the two Acts to  discover  whether
\nthis kind of dispute as to rates can arise between the State
\nGovernment  or the State Electricity Board on the  one\thand
\nand the consumer on the other, so as to require a  reference
\nto  arbitration.   The\t1910 Act deals with  the  supply  of
\nenergy\tby licensees and the transmission and  use  thereof.
\nIt regulates the grant of licenses to licensees and  confers
\non  the\t Government the right to control  the  distribution,
\nsupply and consumption of electrical energy.  In addition to
\nthe  licensees\tthe  1910  Act\tgives  power  to  the  State
\nGovernment   (s.   28)\tto  sanction   generation,   supply,
\ntransmission  and use of electrical energy by persons  other
\nthan  the licensees.  The 1910 Act also contains  provisions
\nfor  supervising  the work of licensees\t and  persons  given
\nsanction under s. 28 with a view to seeing that they observe
\nthe provisions of the Act.  The 1910 Act contains a schedule
\ndivided to-day into XVI clauses.  Formerly, two more clauses
\nwhich  were numbered XI and XI A were also in  the  schedule
\nbringing the number of clauses to XVIII.     -Clauses XI and
\nXI A were omitted by the Indian\t   Electricity\t (Amendment)
\nAct 1959 (32 of1959).\t Clauses IX,X, XI, XIA and XII\tdeal
\nwith charges   for  the supply of electrical energy and\t the
\nfixation  of the rates.\n<\/p>\n
Under  the  Electricity\t (Supply)  Act\tof  1948  the  State
\nElectricity  Board has all the powers and obligations  of  a
\nlicensee  under the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, and  under
\ns.  26 of the 1948 Act that Act itself is deemed to  be\t the
\nlicense\t of  the Board for the purpose of that\tAct.   There
\nare, however, two exceptions to this, The first exception is
\nmentioned in the proviso
\n160<\/span>
\nto  s.\t26 by which certain provisions of the 1910  Act\t are
\nmade inapplicable to the Board and these include clauses  IX
\nto  XII\t of  the schedule which deal with  charges  for\t the
\nsupply of electrical energy.  The other exception is in\t the
\ndefinition   of\t “licensee”  in\t which\tit  is\t said\tthat
\nnotwithstanding\t  the,\t provisions  of\t s.  26\t  the\tterm
\n“‘licensee” as used in the Supply Apt 1948, does not include
\nthe Board.  In other words, though the Board carries on work
\nas a licensee for the purposes of the 1910 Act, it is not  a
\nlicensee  in  the  true sense of the  word  And\t duties\t and
\nobligations  of\t a  licensee in the matter  of\tcharges\t and
\nfixing of rates for consumption of electrical energy are not
\napplicable to the Board.  It is, therefore. quite clear that
\nno  dispute  between a consumer and  the  State\t Electricity
\nBoard  can  arise under the 1948 Act in the  matter  of\t the
\nrates at which the Board supplies electrical energy.  In the
\npresent\t cases, there is a still stronger reason for  coming
\nto  the conclusion that there was no dispute under  the\t Act
\nwhich  could  be referred to arbitration because  the  rates
\n‘were fixed by the State Government in 1953 and 1956 and the
\nBoard\titself\tcame  into  existence  in  1957.   When\t  we
\nquestioned Mr. Vishwanath Sastri, how he said that this\t was
\na dispute arising under the 1948 Act, he referred us to s.60
\nof  the Supply Act which makes the Board a successor of\t the
\nState Government in respect of the matters to which the” Act
\napplies.    He\tsaid  that  if\tthe  State  Government\t was
\nincompetent to revise the rates in 1953 and 1956, the  board
\nas  its successor would be the appropriate party with  which
\nthe  dispute can be raised.  In my opinion such,  a  dispute
\nbetween the State Government or Board on the one hand and  a
\nconsumer on the other in respect of the rates of  electrical
\nenergy (apart from any contract that might have been entered
\ninto)  does  not  arise\t under the 1948\t Act  at,  all.\t  No
\nprovision  of  the 1948 Act has been brought to\t our  notice
\nwhich  would embrace such a dispute’ and as I  have  already
\npointed out above that it is only a dispute arising ‘under
\n161<\/span>
\nthe  1948  Act\twhich,\tcan  be\t compulsorily  referred\t  to
\narbitration.\n<\/p>\n
The  next question is whether a consumer is included in\t the
\nexpression  “‘other person”.  The  learned  Attorney-General
\nseeks to-apply the ejusdem generis rule and argues that\t the
\nexpression  “‘other  person” must take its colour  from\t the
\nword  immediately  preceding i. e., licensee.  He.  took  us
\nthrough the two: Acts to show who were the persons who could
\nbe  said  to belong to the genus “licensee”  and  said\tthat
\npersons\t generating electricity with the sanction  of  :the.
\nState  Government  under  s. 28 of the 1910  Act  would,  be
\nanother\t such class belonging to the same genus.  He  relied
\nupon  the  case of William V.’ Golding (1), to\tsupport\t his
\ncontention that even a single; category ‘may’ be regarded as
\na  genus to control the amplitude of the general words\tnext
\nfollowing.   That  case\t arose under an\t Act  in  which\t the
\nexpression.”District  Surveyor”\t was followed by  the  words
\n“‘other\t person” and the words ” other person” were given  a
\nlimited\t meaning  on  the ejusdem  generis  principle.\t The
\nsection\t gave  protection to  ‘persons\texercising  official
\nduties\tand  was  in  the nature  of  a\t public\t authorities
\nprotection clause and the words “‘other person” could not be
\nextended  to cover a private party not\tperforming  official
\nduties.\t  I doubt whether that ruling can be applied to\t the
\npresent\t case.\tI have already stated that the dispute\tmust
\nbe  one which can arise under the Act- If the whole  Act  is
\nscanned\t it will be found that consumers have no’  place  in
\nit.   Wherever\tthe Act uses the word ”\t  other\t person”  it
\ninvariably means persons who generate and supply  electrical
\nenergy\tand not those who consume it.  The only\t section  to
\nwhich our attention was drawn in which a dispute was  likely
\nto  arise  between  the Electricity  Board  and\t a  possible
\nconsumer  (not\ta licensee as defined in the Act)  is  s.49.
\nThat section requires that the Board. may supply electricity
\n“to any person not being a licensee upon
\n(1)  (1865) L. R. I C. P. 69,
\n162<\/span>
\nsuch terms and conditions as the board may from time to time
\nfix having regard to the nature and geographical position of
\nthe supply and for purposes for which it is required without
\nshowing\t undue\tpreference to any  person.   Mr.  Vishwanath
\nSastri\tcontended  that a dispute might arise if  the  Board
\nunreasonably  refused  to supply electricity  to  a  private
\nconsumer or showed undue preference to someone else and such
\na  dispute might be taken to arbitration under s. 76.  I  do
\nnot  wish to pronounce any opinion upon this matter  because
\nthe present dispute is not a dispute of this character.\t For
\nthese  reasons I am of opinion that the Additional  District
\njudge,\tBangalore,  was right in  granting  the\t declaration
\nsought\tby the appellants.  11 would, therefore,  set  aside
\nthe  order  of\tthe  High Court\t and  restore  that  of\t the
\nAdditional  District  judge, Bangalore, with  costs  on\t the
\nrespondents throughout.\t One hearing fee.
\nAppeals allowed.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India The Mysore State Electricity … vs Bangalore Woollen, Cotton And … on 15 November, 1962 Equivalent citations: 1963 AIR 1128, 1963 SCR Supl. (2) 127 Author: S Das Bench: Das, S.K., Kapur, J.L., Sarkar, A.K., Hidayatullah, M., Dayal, Raghubar PETITIONER: THE MYSORE STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD Vs. RESPONDENT: BANGALORE WOOLLEN, COTTON AND […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-28163","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nThe Mysore State Electricity ... vs Bangalore Woollen, Cotton And ... on 15 November, 1962 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-mysore-state-electricity-vs-bangalore-woollen-cotton-and-on-15-november-1962\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"The Mysore State Electricity ... vs Bangalore Woollen, Cotton And ... on 15 November, 1962 - 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