{"id":2962,"date":"1958-03-21T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1958-03-20T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/keshavlal-lallubhai-patel-and-vs-lalbhai-trikumlal-mills-ltd-on-21-march-1958"},"modified":"2015-05-29T08:32:23","modified_gmt":"2015-05-29T03:02:23","slug":"keshavlal-lallubhai-patel-and-vs-lalbhai-trikumlal-mills-ltd-on-21-march-1958","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/keshavlal-lallubhai-patel-and-vs-lalbhai-trikumlal-mills-ltd-on-21-march-1958","title":{"rendered":"Keshavlal Lallubhai Patel And … vs Lalbhai Trikumlal Mills Ltd on 21 March, 1958"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Keshavlal Lallubhai Patel And … vs Lalbhai Trikumlal Mills Ltd on 21 March, 1958<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1958 AIR 512, \t\t 1959 SCR 213<\/div>\n
Author: P Gajendragadkar<\/div>\n
Bench: Gajendragadkar, P.B.<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nKESHAVLAL LALLUBHAI PATEL AND OTHERSAND OTHERS\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nLALBHAI TRIKUMLAL MILLS LTD.\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT:\n21\/03\/1958\n\nBENCH:\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.\nBENCH:\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.\nBHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H.\nKAPUR, J.L.\n\nCITATION:\n 1958 AIR  512\t\t  1959 SCR  213\n\n\nACT:\n       Contract-Extension  of  time  for  performance-Agreement\t of\n       Parties-Requirements    of   Proof-Agreement,   vague\tand\n       uncertain  Binding nature-Indian Contract Act, 1872  (IX\t of\n       1872), SS. 29, 63.\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\nThe  appellants entered into a contract with the  respondent\nmills  for the purchase of certain goods in which  the\ttime\nfor  delivery  was  fixed for the months  of  September\t and\nOctober,  1942.\t Before the expiry of the time\tfixed  there\nwas a strike in the mills and the respondent wrote a  letter\nto  the appellants on August 15, 1942, that in view  of\t the\nstrike and the political situation, the delivery time of all\nthe pending contracts should be automatically understood  as\nextended for the period the working of the mills was stopped\nand until the normal state of affairs recurred.\t Though\t the\nstrike\tcame  to  an end the  respondent  declined  to\tgive\ndelivery of the goods on the ground that the contracts\twere\nvoid.\tIn  the suit filed by the appellants on\t January  9,\n1946, for damages for breach of the contract the  respondent\npleaded that there was no agreement between the parties with\nregard\tto the extension of time and so the suit was  barred\nby  limitation.\t  The appellants' case\tand  their  evidence\nwhich was consistent with the conduct of the parties at\t the\nrelevant  time only showed definitely that they\t had  orally\nagreed to the proposal made by the respondent for  extension\nof  time for the period during which the mills would  remain\nclosed,\t and as regards the second condition referred to  in\nthe  respondent's letter dated August 15, 1942, \"  till\t the\nnormal\tstate  of  affairs  recurs  (which  was\t vague\t and\nuncertain),  the  evidence did not show that  there  was  an\nacceptance  by\tthe appellants of the said  condition.\t The\nquestion was whether there was an enforceable agreement\t for\nextension of time for performance of the contract within the\nmeaning of the Indian Contract Act :\nHeld,  (1) An extension of time for the performance  of\t the\ncontract  Under\t s. 63 of the Indian Contract  Act  must  be\nbased  upon an agreement between the parties, and  it  would\nnot  be open to the promise by his unilateral act to  extend\nthe  time  for\tperformance of his own accord  for  his\t own\nbenefit.  Such an agreement need not necessarily be  reduced\nto writing and can be proved by oral evidence or by evidence\nof conduct.\n(2)  The   respondent's\t proposal  for\textension  of\ttime\ncontained  in the letter dated August 15, 1942, was  subject\nto  two conditions, and the fact that the  second  condition\nwas vague and\n214\nuncertain does not necessarily show that it was intended  to\nbe  treated  as a meaningless surpluses.  As  there  was  no\nacceptance  by the appellants of the second condition  there\nwas  no\t valid or binding agreement for\t extension  of\ttime\nunder s. 63 of the Indian Contract Act.\nNicolene Ld. v. Simmonds, [1953] 1 Q. B. 543, distinguished.\n(3)  In any event as the conditions were so vague and uncer-\ntain  that it was not possible to ascertain  definitely\t the\nperiod\tfor  which  the\t time for  the\tperformance  of\t the\ncontract  was really intended to be extended, the  agreement\nfor  extension was void under S. 29 Of the  Indian  Contract\nAct.\nScammel\t (G.) and Nephew, Ld. v. Oustom (H.  C. and  1.\t G.)\nQueston, [1941] A. C. 251, relied on.\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 78 of 1954.
\nAppeal from the judgment and decree dated April 17, 1950, of
\nthe Bombay High Court in Appeal No. 642 of 1949, arising out
\nof the judgment and decree dated July 30, 1949, of the Court
\nof Civil Judge, Senior Division, Ahmedabad in Suit No. 10 of
\n1946.\n<\/p>\n
Purshottam Tricumdas, M. H. Chhatarpati and S.\t  S. Shukla,
\nfor the appellants.\n<\/p>\n
H.   N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India and I.
\nN. Shroff, for the respondent.\n<\/p>\n
1958.  March 21.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
\nGAJENDRAGADKAR\tJ.-This\t is  an\t appeal\t by  the  plaintiffs
\nagainst\t the  decree  passed by the  High  Court  of  Bombay
\ndismissing  their  suit to recover from\t the  defendant\t Rs.
\n1,52,334-8-9  as  damages for breach of\t contract  for\tnon-
\ndelivery of certain cotton goods.  The plaintiffs’ claim had
\nbeen  decreed by the trial court but on appeal it  has\tbeen
\ndismissed.\n<\/p>\n
The  appellants are the partners of M\/S. Navinchandra &\t Co.
\nThis partnership had placed an order with the respondent for
\n251  bales of printed chints on or about July 4,  1942,\t and
\nthe  said order had been accepted by the respondent  by\t its
\nletters\t dated\tJuly 1 1 and July 20,  1942.   The  delivery
\nperiod\tfor  the  said goods was fixed\tfor  the  months  of
\nSeptember  and October, 1942.  Another order was  placed  by
\nthe
\n215<\/span>
\nappellants  with  the  respondent for 31  bales\t of  printed
\nchints on July 24, 1942, and this order was accepted by\t the
\nrespondent  on July 25, 1942.  The delivery of\tthese  goods
\nwas to be given in the month of October 1942.\n<\/p>\n
On August 9, 1942, the workers in the respondent mills\twent
\non  strike in sympathy with the Quit-India,  movement  which
\nhad then commenced.  In consequence, the respondent wrote to
\nthe appellants’ firm on August 15, 1942, and stated that, in
\nview of the strike and the political situation, the delivery
\ntime  of all the pending contracts should  be  automatically
\nunderstood  as\textended for the period the working  of\t the
\nmills  was  stopped and until the normal  state\t of  affairs
\nrecurred.   The strike came to an end and the mills  resumed
\nworking\t on  November  22,  1942.   On\tDecember  5,   1942,
\nJasubhai,  who was then in charge of the management  of\t the
\nmills  was  approached\tby  the\t appellants,  Keshavlal\t and
\nRatilal, for obtaining delivery of the goods.  He,  however,
\ntold them that the appellants’ contracts were void and so no
\ndelivery  could be claimed or given.  On December  6,  1942,
\nthe  said  Jasubhai wrote to the appellants  informing\tthem
\nthat  their contracts were not binding on the mills as\tthey
\nwere null and void.  It may be mentioned at this stage that,
\nwhen the contracts were made between the appellants and\t the
\nrespondent, Chinubhai Lalbhai was in charge of the  managing
\nagency\tof the mills.  Subsequently, on September 18,  1942,
\nas  a  result of the compromise between\t Chinubhai  and\t his
\nbrothers Jasubhai and Babubhai, this managing agency of\t the
\nmills fell to the share of Jasubhai and Babubhai.
\nOn December 17, 1942, the appellants wrote to the respondent
\nthat, as the respondent had extended the time of delivery of
\nall  goods  by\tits  letter  dated  August  15,\t 1942,\t the
\nrespondent  was\t bound to deliver the contracted  goods\t and
\nthat  if the respondent did not do so, the appellants  would
\nbe   compelled\tto  take  legal\t proceedings   against\t the
\nrespondent.   In reply, the respondent repeated its  earlier
\ncontentions  by\t its letter dated December  20,\t 1942.\t The
\nappellants  then formally demanded the delivery of goods  in
\nJanuary
\n216<\/span>
\nand  again in February 1943, and, since the demand  was\t not
\ncomplied  with,\t the appellants filed the  present  suit  on
\nJanuary\t 9,  1946,  claiming damages to the  extent  of\t Rs.
\n1,52,334-8-9 with interest and costs.\n<\/p>\n
In  the plaint, it was alleged that the suit was in time  because
\nthe request made by the respondent for extension of time had been
\naccepted  by  the  appellants.\t‘The suit  was\tresisted  by  the
\nrespondent  on\tseveral grounds.  In particular,  the  respondent
\nurged that there was no agreement between the parties with regard
\nto  the\t extension  of\ttime  and  so  the  suit  was  barred  by
\nlimitation.   The learned trial judge framed several issues  with
\ntwo  of which the present appeal is concerned.\tThese two  issues
\nrelated to the question of extension of time for the  performance
\nof  the\t contract  and the plea of  limitation.\t  On  both  these
\npoints, the learned judge found in favour of the appellants.   In
\nthe  result  the appellants’ claim was decreed.\t  The  respondent
\nthen  preferred\t an appeal in the High Court at\t Bombay\t and  his
\nappeal\twas allowed.  The learned Judges of the High  Court  have
\nheld  that  the oral evidence led by the appellants to\tshow  the
\nacceptance of the respondent’s proposal for the extension of time
\ncould not be treated as true or reliable.  They also rejected the
\nappellants’ case on the ground that the conduct of the appellants
\nsubsequent to the stoppage of the respondent’s mills did not show
\nacceptance  of the respondent’s proposal for extension\tof  time.
\nBesides, in the opinion of the High Court, even if acceptance had
\nbeen  proved,  it  was not possible to\tascribe\t any  certain  or
\ndefinite  meaning  to  the words used by the  respondent  in  its
\nletter dated August 15, 1942 (Ex.  P. 78), and so this\tagreement
\nto  extend time was void since it wag vague and uncertain.   That
\nis why it was held that the appellants’ suit was barred by  time.
\nIt  is\tthese  findings which are challenged  before  us  by  the
\nappellants  in the present appeal.  It is obvious that the  value
\nof the claim in the trial court as well as before us is more than
\nRs.  20,000 and the judgment of the High Court under  appeal  has
\nreversed  the  decree  passed by the learned  trial  judge.   The
\nappellants are thus entitled to agitate
\n217<\/span>
\nboth questions of fact and of law before us in this appeal.
\nThe  first  point  which has been urged\t before\t us  by\t the
\nappellants  is\tin respect of the finding made by  the\tHigh
\nCourt  against\tthe  appellants\t on  the  question  of\t the
\nextension of time for the performance of the contract.\t The
\nargument  is that the learned Judges of the High Court\twere
\nin  error  in  rejecting  the  oral’  evidence\tled  by\t the
\nappellants.   It would, therefore, be necessary to  consider
\nthe  material evidence bearing on this point.  The  proposal
\nto extend time was made by the respondent by its letter (Ex.
\nP.  78)\t on August 15, 1942.  Ratilal P. W. I  stated  that,
\nfour or five days after this letter was received, he went to
\nAhmedabad where he met and consulted Keshavlal.\t Then he saw
\nChinubhai  at  the mills and told him that he  accepted\t the
\nextension  of  time  as\t per the  said\tletter.\t  In  cross-
\nexamination,  Ratilal  added that he met  Chinubhai  at\t the
\noffice\tin  his mills.\tI He also stated that,\tbesides\t the
\nsubject of extension of time, no other matter was  discussed
\nbetween\t them  at  the said meeting.  He  admitted  that  no
\nletter\thad been written by the appellants confirming  their
\nacceptance of the respondent’s proposal to extend time.\t The
\nevidence  given by Ratilal is corroborated by the  testimony
\nof  Keshavlal.\t It appears on the evidence  of\t both  these
\nwitnesses  that, after the mills reopened, they had gone  to
\nJasubhai and demanded delivery of the bales according to the
\ncontracts.   The appellants argued that there is  really  no
\nreason\twhy  the evidence of these two witnesses  should  be
\ndisbelieved.  It is significant that the main plea raised by
\nthe respondent against the appellants’ claim in the  present
\nsuit was that the contract itself was invalid and not  bind-
\ning on it and that the letter written by Laxmidas on  August
\n15, 1942, was likewise unauthoirised and not binding on\t it.
\nThese pleas have been negatived in the courts below.  It  is
\nfairly\tclear from the record that the attitude\t adopted  by
\nthe  respondent in the present dispute was actuated more  by
\nJasubhai’s prejudice against Chinubhai and it may be safely
\n28<\/span>
\n218<\/span>
\nasserted that some of the pleas taken by the respondent were
\nknown  to the respondent to be untenable.   The\t appellant,%
\nrely  upon this conduct of the respondent and  suggest\tthat
\nthe  oral testimony of Ratilal and  Keshavlal is  consistent
\nwith  probabilities and should be believed.  Chinubhai\talso
\ngave  evidence in the case.  He stated that the proposal  to
\nextend\ttime  had  ‘been  conveyed  by\tLaxmidas  under\t his
\ninstructions.  It is common ground that similar request\t was
\nmade to all the constituents of the mills both in  Ahmedabad
\nand  outside Ahmedabad.\t Chinubhai did not remember  whether
\nhe  had\t got any written reply to the letter of\t August\t 15,
\n1942,  from  the appellants but the effect of  some  of\t the
\nstatements made by him would generally appear to be that lie
\nhad  received oral acceptance of the said proposal from\t the
\nappellants.  However, in answer to further questions put  to
\nhim  in cross-examination, Chinubhai stated that he did\t not
\nremember whether  the appellants accepted the offer or\tnot.
\nIt is, however, clear that the evidence of Chinubhai is\t not
\nat all inconsistent with the statements made by Ratilal\t and
\nKeshavlal.  It is common ground that the prices of the goods
\nwere  rising at the material time and so it is\tmore  likely
\nthat the appellants were willing to extend time because they
\nwould  naturally be keen on obtaining delivery of the  goods
\nunder  the contract.  In both the courts below\tan  argument
\nappears\t to have been urged by reference to the sauda  books
\nkept by the respondent.\t Shri Dharamasi Harilal had  brought
\nthe sauda books in the court but neither party got the books
\nexhibited  in  the case.  The learned trial judge  took\t the
\nview  that,  since  the sauda books were  not  produced\t and
\nproved\tby the respondent, it led to the inference that,  if
\nthe  books  had\t been produced, they  would  have  shown  an
\nendorsement  made  against  the\t suit  contracts  that\t the
\nextension  of time had been agreed upon by  the\t appellants.
\nOn the other hand, the learned Judges of the High Court were
\ninclined  to draw the inference that, since  the  appellants
\ndid not want the said sauda books to be exhibited, it  would
\nappear\tthat the said books did not contain any\t note  about
\nthe extension.\tIn our opinion, it would be
\n     219<\/span>
\nunsafe to draw either of these two inferences in the present
\ncase.  Therefore, the decision of the question would  depend
\nupon  the  appreciation of oral evidence considered  in\t the
\nlight  of probabilities and other relevant circumstances  in
\nthe  case.  On the whole, we are disposed to take  the\tview
\nthat the evidence given by Ratilal and Keshavlal is true.
\nBesides, the conduct of the parties also points to the’ same
\nconclusion.  If the period for the delivery of the goods had
\nnot been extended by mutual consent, we would normally\thave
\nexpected the appellants to make a demand for delivery of the
\ngoods  on due dates as fixed under the\toriginal  contracts.
\nIt  is conceded that no such demand was made.  On the  other
\nhand,  it is only after the mills reopened that Ratilal\t and
\nKeshavlal  saw Jasubhai and discussed with him the  question
\nabout  the delivery of the goods.  This is admitted  by\t the
\nrespondent  in its letter dated December 6, 1942,  (Ex.\t  P.\n<\/p>\n
62).   The appellants were, however, told by the  respondent
\nthat  the  saudas  of their firm were  not  binding  on\t the
\nrespondent  and\t that the same were void.   It\tis  somewhat
\nremarkable  that though this document disputes the  validity
\nof  the sauda, even alternatively it does not  suggest\tthat
\nthe  period  of\t extension had not been\t agreed\t to  by\t the
\nappellants.   It may be that, since Jasubhai then wanted  to
\nchallenge  the validity of the contracts themselves, he\t did
\nnot care to make any alternative plea.\tBut however that may
\nbe,  the  conduct  of the appellants  is,  in  our  opinion,
\nconsistent  with  their\t case that they had  agreed  to\t the
\nextension of time.\n<\/p>\n
The  true legal position in regard to the extension of\ttime
\nfor the performance of a contract is quite clear under s. 63
\nof  the Indian Contract Act.  Every promise, as the  section
\nprovides,  may\textend\ttime  for  the\tperformance  of\t the
\ncontract.   The question as to how extension of time may  be
\nagreed\tupon by the parties has been the  subject-matter  of
\nsome  argument at the Bar in the present appeal.  There\t can
\nbe  no doubt, we think, that both the buyer and\t the  seller
\nmust  agree  to extend time for the delivery of\t goods.\t  It
\nwould  not be open to the promise by his unilateral  act  to
\nextend
\n220<\/span>
\nthe  time  for\tperformance of his own accord  for  his\t own
\nbenefit.  It is true that the agreement to extend time\tneed
\nnot necessarily be reduced to writing.\tIt may be proved  by
\noral  evidence.\t In some cases it may be proved by  evidence
\nof conduct.  Forbearance on, the part of the buyer to make a
\ndemand for the delivery of goods on the due date as fixed in
\nthe  original  contract may conceivably be relevant  on\t the
\nquestion  of  the  intention of the’  buyer  to\t accept\t the
\nseller’s proposal to extend time.  It would be difficult  to
\nlay  down any hard and fast rule about the  requirements  of
\nproof  of  such\t an  agreement.\t It  would  naturally  be  a
\nquestion of fact in each case to be determined in the  light
\nof  evidence adduced by the parties.  Having regard  to\t the
\nprobabilities  in  this\t case, and to  the  conduct  of\t the
\nparties\t at the relevant time, we think the  appellants\t are
\nentitled  to  urge  that  their\t oral  evidence\t about\t the
\nacceptance of the respondent’s proposal for the extension of
\ntime should be believed and the finding of the learned trial
\njudge on this question should be confirmed.
\nThe  finding  in favour of the appellants on this  point  is
\nnot, however, decisive of the dispute between the parties in
\nthe  present  appeal.\tIt still remains  to  be  considered
\nwhether\t  the  agreement  between  the\tparties\t about\t the
\nextension of time suffers from the infirmity of\t uncertainty
\nand  vagueness.\t The learned Judges of the High\t Court\thave
\ncome  to the conclusion that the letter of August 15,  1942,
\nwhich  is  the basis of the agreement for the  extension  of
\ntime  is  so vague and uncertain that the  agreement  as  to
\nextension  of  time itself becomes void\t and  unenforceable.
\nThe  correctness of this conclusion must now be\t considered.
\nThe  basis of the agreement is the letter and so it  is\t the
\nconstruction  of  this\tletter\twhich  assumes\tconsiderable
\nimportance.  This is how the letter reads:\n<\/p>\n
Dear Sirs,
\nYour  good  selves are well aware of the  present  political
\nsituation on account of which entire working of our Mills is
\nclosed.\n<\/p>\n
At present, it is difficult to say as to how long this state
\nof affairs will continue and as such we regret
\n221<\/span>
\nwe  cannot fulfil the orders placed by you with us in  time.
\nUnder the circumstances, please note that the delivery\ttime
\nof all your pending contracts with us shall be automatically
\nunderstood as extended for the period the working is stopped
\nand till the normal state of affairs recurs.”
\nIt  would  be  noticed that the letter begins  by  making  a
\nreference  to the current political situation which  led  to
\nthe  closure  of  the mills and it adds\t that  it  was\tvary
\ndifficult  to anticipate how long the said state of  affairs
\nwould  continue.   It  is  common  knowledge  that,  at\t the
\nmaterial time, the whole country in general and the city  of
\nAhmedabad  in particular was in the grip of a  very  serious
\npolitical agitation and nobody could anticipate how long the
\nstrike\tresulting from the said, agitation would  last.\t  It
\n‘is  in that atmosphere of uncertainty that  the  respondent
\nrequested the appellants to note that the time for  delivery
\nwould be automatically extended ” for the period the working
\nis  stopped and till the normal state of affairs  recurs  “.
\nThe  first  condition does not present any  difficulty.\t  As
\nsoon  as  the strike came to an end and the closure  of\t the
\nmills\twas  terminated,  the  first  condition\t  would\t  be
\nsatisfied.  It is the second condition that creates the real
\ndifficulty.  What exactly was meant by the  introduction  of
\nthe  second condition is really difficult to  determine.  So
\nmany  factors  would contribute to the\trestoration  of\t the
\nnormal state of affairs that the satisfaction of the  second
\ncondition   inevitably\tintroduces  an\telement\t  of   grave
\nuncertainty  and  vagueness in the said\t proposal.   If\t the
\nnormal state of affairs contemplated by the second condition
\nrefers\tto  the\t normal state of affairs  in  the  political
\nsituation  in  the  country that  would\t be  absolutely\t and
\npatently uncertain.  Even if this normal state of affairs is
\nconstrued  favourably  to the appellants and it\t is  assumed
\nthat  it  has reference to the working of  the\tmills,\tthat
\nagain  does not appreciably help to remove the\telements  of
\nuncertainty  and vagueness.  When can normal working of\t the
\nmills  be  deemed to recur?  For the normal working  of\t the
\nmills several factors are essential.  The full complement of
\nworkmen should be
\n222<\/span>
\npresent.  The requisite raw material should be available and
\ncoal in sufficient quantities must be in stock.\t Some  other
\nconditions also may be necessary to make the working of\t the
\nmills  fully  normal.\tNow,  unless  all  the\t constituent
\nelements  of the normal working of the mills are  definitely
\nspecified  and agreed upon, the general expression  used  in
\nthe  letter  in that behalf cannot be construed\t as  showing
\nanything  definite  or\tcertain.   Therefore,  even  if\t the
\nappellants’ evidence about the acceptance is believed,\tthat
\nonly shows in a very general and loose way the acceptance of
\nthe proposal contained in the letter.  It does not assist us
\nin  determining what was understood between the parties\t and
\nagreed\tupon  by them as constituting the  normal  state  of
\naffairs\t mentioned  in the letter.  In this  connection,  it
\nwould  be relevant to refer to the material  allegations  in
\nthe plaint itself.  In para. 7, the plaint has averred\tthat
\nthe plaintiffs agreed to the said extension of time for\t the
\ndelivery  of the said goods as suggested by  the  defendant,
\nthat is by a period during which the said mills would remain
\nclosed.\t In other words, the whole of the plaint proceeds on
\nthe  assumption\t that the extension of the  period  for\t the
\ndelivery of goods had reference only to the stoppage of\t the
\nmills.\tIndeed, it was sought to be argued at one stage that
\nthe  second condition in the letter should be treated  as  a
\nmeaningless surplusage and the extension of time agreed upon
\nbetween the parties should be read in the light of the first
\ncondition  alone.  In support of this argument reliance\t was
\nplaced on the decision in Nicolene Ld. v. Simmonds (1).\t  In
\nthat  case,  a\tcontract  for the  sale\t of  a\tquantity  of
\nreinforcing  steel  bars was expressed as subject to  ”\t the
\nusual conditions of acceptance “. The seller repudiated\t the
\ncontract  whereupon the buyers claimed and were\t awarded  by
\nthe  trial  judge damages for the breach  of  contract.\t  On
\nappeal,\t the  seller  contended that the  contract  was\t not
\nconcluded there being no consensus ad item in regard to\t the
\nconditions of acceptance.  It was held that, there being  no
\n”  usual  conditions  of acceptance  “,\t the  condition\t was
\nmeaningless and should be ignored, and that the
\n(1)  [1953] 1 Q. B. 543, 552.\n<\/p>\n
223<\/span><\/p>\n
contract  was  complete and enforceable.  Dealing  with\t the
\nrelevant clause, Denning L. J. observed, “that clause was so
\nvague  and  uncertain  as to be\t incapable  of\tany  precise
\nmeaning.   It  is  clearly severable from the  rest  of\t the
\ncontract.  It can be rejected without impairing the sense or
\nreasonableness of the contract as a whole, and it should  be
\nso reacted.  The contract should be held good and the clause
\nignored “. Then’ the learned Lord Justice pointed out that ”
\nthe  parties themselves treated the contract as\t subsisting.
\nThey  regarded\tit as creating binding\tobligations  between
\nthem and it would be most unfortunate if the law should\t say
\notherwise  “. ” You would find “, observed the learned\tLord
\nJustice,  ” defaulters all scanning their contracts to\tfind
\nsome  meaningless  clause on which to ride free\t “.  In\t our
\nopinion,  this\tdecision  can be of  no\t assistance  to\t the
\nappellants’  case  before us.  The second condition  in\t the
\nletter\tin  question constitutes a clause which\t had  to  be
\nagreed\tupon  by  the parties since it\tformed\tone  of\t the
\nconditions  of the respondent’s proposals for the  extension
\nof  time.  The respondent’s proposal was to extend time\t for
\nthe  performance of the contract subject to  two  conditions
\nand unless both the conditions were agreed upon between\t the
\nparties there would be no valid or binding extension of time
\nunder  s. 63 of the Indian Contract Act.  The fact that\t the
\nsecond\tcondition introduced by the respondent is vague\t and
\nuncertain, does not necessarily show that the said condition
\nwas  intended  by  the respondent to be the  addition  of  a
\nmeaningless surplusage.\t If that be the true position,\tthen
\nthe  material allegations in the plaint itself\tdemonstrably
\nprove that there has been no acceptance by the appellants of
\nthe  second  condition mentioned by the\t respondent  in\t its
\nproposal to extend time for the performance of the contract.
\nBesides,  as  we  have\talready\t indicated,  it\t is   really
\ndifficult  to  hold  that the respondent  had  a  clear\t and
\nprecise notion as to the constituent elements of the  second
\ncondition  mentioned in its letter and that  the  appellants
\nwere  duly  apprised of the said  constituent  elements\t and
\nagreed with the said condition with that knowledge.  In this
\nconnection, we may usefully refer to the decision
\n224<\/span>
\nof  the\t House of Lords in Scammel (G.) And Nephew,  Ld.  v.
\n(Ouston)  (H.\tC.  And\t J. 0.)\t (1).\tIn  this  case,\t the
\nrespondent  had agreed to purchase from the appellant a\t new
\nmotor-van  but stipulated that this order was given  on\t the
\nunderstanding that the balance of purchase price can be\t had
\non the hire-purchase terms over a. period of two years.\t The
\nHouse  of  Lords held that the clause  as  to  hire-purchase
\nterms  was  so\tvague  that  no\t precise  meaning  could  be
\nattributed  to it and consequently there was no\t enforceable
\ncontract  between the parties.\tIn his speech,\tLord  Wright
\nobserved  that\t” the object of the court is to\t do  justice
\nbetween\t the  parties, and the court will do  its  best,  if
\nsatisfied  that there was an ascertainable  and\t determinate
\nintention  to  contract, to give effect to  that  intention,
\nlooking at substance and not at mere form…… But the test
\nof  intention  is to be found in the words used.   If  these
\nwords, considered however broadly and untechnically and with
\ndue regard to all the just implications, fail to evince\t any
\ndefinite  meaning  on which the court can  safely  act,\t the
\ncourt has no choice but to say that there is no contract  “.
\nThen the learned Law Lord added that his reason for thinking
\nthat  the clause was vague was not only based on the  actual
\nvagueness  and unintelligibility of the words used  but\t was
\nconfirmed  by  the startling diversity of  the\texplanations
\ntendered by those who think there was a bargain of what\t the
\nbargain was.  We would like to add that, when the appellants
\nattempted  to  explain\tthe  true  meaning  of\tthe   second
\ncondition, it was discovered that the explanations given  by
\nthe  appellants’ counsel were diverse and inconsistent.\t  We
\nmust,  therefore, hold that the learned Judges of  the\tHigh
\nCourt  were  right  in coming to  the  conclusion  that\t the
\nconditions mentioned by the respondent in its letter  asking
\nfor extension of time were so vague and uncertain that it is
\nnot  possible to ascertain definitely the period for  which-
\nthe  time  for the performance of the  contract\t was  really
\nintended to be extended.  In such a case, the agreement\t for
\nextension must be held to be vague and
\n(1)  [1941] A.C. 251.\n<\/p>\n
225<\/span><\/p>\n
uncertain  and\tas  such  void under s.\t 29  of\t the  Indian
\nContract Act.\n<\/p>\n
There  is one more point which must be considered.   It\t was
\nstrongly  urged\t before us by the appellants  that,  in\t the
\ntrial  court, no plea had been taken by the respondent\tthat
\nthe  agreement\tfor  the extension of  time  was  vague\t and
\nuncertain.  No such plea appears to have been taken even  in
\nthe  grounds  of appeal preferred by the respondent  in\t the
\nHigh Court at Bombay; but apparently the plea was allowed to
\nbe  raised  in\tthe High Court and the\tappellants  took  no
\nobjection  to it at that stage.\t It cannot be said  that  it
\nwas  not open to the High Court to allow such a plea  to  be
\nraised\teven for the first time in appeal.  After  all,\t the
\nplea  raised  is  a  plea  of  law  based  solely  upon\t the
\nconstruction  of the letter which is the basis of  the\tcase
\nfor  the  extension  of\t time for  the\tperformance  of\t the
\ncontract  and  so it was competent to the  appeal  court  to
\nallow  such  a plea to be raised under 0. 41, r. 2,  of\t the
\nCode  of Civil Procedure.  If, on a fair  construction,\t the
\ncondition  mentioned in the document is held to be vague  or
\nuncertain,  no evidence can be admitted to remove  the\tsaid
\nvagueness  or uncertainty.  The provisions of s. 93  of\t the
\nIndian\tEvidence  Act are clear on this point.\t It  is\t the
\nlanguage  of  the  document  alone  that  will\tdecide\t the
\nquestion.   It\twould not be open to the parties or  to\t the
\ncourt  to  attempt  to remove the  defect  of  vagueness  or
\nuncertainty by relying upon any extrinsic evidence.  Such an
\nattempt\t would\treally\tmean the making of  a  new  contract
\nbetween\t the parties.  That is why we do not think that\t the
\nappellants can now effectively raise the point that the plea
\nof  vagueness should not have been entertained in  the\tHigh
\nCourt.\n<\/p>\n
The  result is we confirm the finding of the High  Court  on
\nthe question of vagueness or uncertainty of the agreement to
\nextend\ttime and that must inevitably lead to the  dismissal
\nof the present appeal.\n<\/p>\n
We  are,  however, free to state that we have  reached\tthis
\nconclusion  with  some reluctance because we  are  satisfied
\nthat there are no bona fides in the attitude
\n29<\/span>
\n226<\/span>
\nadopted\t by the respondent in the present  litigation.\t The
\nmain  pleas  raised by the respondent  against\tthe  binding
\ncharacter of the contracts themselves as well as against the
\nauthority  of Laxmidas to write the letter for extension  of
\ntime  have been rejected by both the courts below,  and\t the
\nonly  ground on which the respondent succeeds before us\t was
\nmade  on  behalf of the ,respondent for the  first  time  in
\nappeal.\t  Under these circumstances we think the fair  order
\nas  to\tcosts would be that parties should  bear  their\t own
\ncosts  throughout.   The result is the appeal fails  and  is
\ndismissed   but\t there\twould  be  no  order  as  to   costs
\nthroughout.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t     Appeal dismissed.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Keshavlal Lallubhai Patel And … vs Lalbhai Trikumlal Mills Ltd on 21 March, 1958 Equivalent citations: 1958 AIR 512, 1959 SCR 213 Author: P Gajendragadkar Bench: Gajendragadkar, P.B. PETITIONER: KESHAVLAL LALLUBHAI PATEL AND OTHERSAND OTHERS Vs. RESPONDENT: LALBHAI TRIKUMLAL MILLS LTD. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 21\/03\/1958 BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2962","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nKeshavlal Lallubhai Patel And ... vs Lalbhai Trikumlal Mills Ltd on 21 March, 1958 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/keshavlal-lallubhai-patel-and-vs-lalbhai-trikumlal-mills-ltd-on-21-march-1958\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Keshavlal Lallubhai Patel And ... vs Lalbhai Trikumlal Mills Ltd on 21 March, 1958 - 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