{"id":32923,"date":"1977-11-15T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1977-11-14T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/tharamel-krishnan-vs-guruvayoor-devaswom-managing-on-15-november-1977"},"modified":"2016-01-29T22:33:41","modified_gmt":"2016-01-29T17:03:41","slug":"tharamel-krishnan-vs-guruvayoor-devaswom-managing-on-15-november-1977","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/tharamel-krishnan-vs-guruvayoor-devaswom-managing-on-15-november-1977","title":{"rendered":"Tharamel Krishnan vs Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing … on 15 November, 1977"},"content":{"rendered":"
Kerala High Court<\/div>\n
Tharamel Krishnan vs Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing … on 15 November, 1977<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: AIR 1978 Ker 68<\/div>\n
Author: V Iyer<\/div>\n
Bench: V B Eradi, G V Iyer, K Bhaskaran, T C Menon, K Narendran<\/div>\n<\/p>\n
<\/pre>\n
JUDGMENT<\/p>\n
 Balakrishna Eradi, J. (for himself and on behalf of K. Bhaskaran, T. Chandrasekhara Menon and K.K. Narendran, JJ.) <\/p>\n
 1.  Kerala is justly famous for its numerous temples, churches, mosques and synagogues which exist side by side in perfect amity and mutual respect, catering to the spiritual needs of all sections of people belonging to different religious persuasions. Foremost amongst the Hindu Shrines in the State is the Sreekrishna Temple at Guruvayoor to which there is an incessant flow of many thousands of pilgrims from all parts of India throughout the year.\n<\/p>\n
2. In 1971 the Kerala State Legislature enacted the Guruvayoor Devaswom Act, 1971 (Act 6 of 1971), hereinafter called the Act, avowedly to make provision for the proper administration of the Guruvayoor Devaswom. The petitioner, a Hindu, claiming to be a worshipper of the Guruvayoor Temple has filed this petition both in his individual capacity as well as in his capacity as the President of the Malabar Pradesh Kshethra Samrakshana Samithi which   is   a   society   registered    tinder Societies Registration Act and having as its   objects    inter alia    the  reconstruction  and     renovation     of Hindu temples which are in ruins, the adoption of necessary measures to ensure that   temples are     managed   property and  administered    correctly    and   the reorganisation     and    rejuvenation    of Hindu society    so    as to    enthuse in them proper  interest  in temple   worship, rites     and     rituals.    Permission has  also    been  granted    to  the  petitioner   by   this   Court   under   Order   I Rule   8 of the   Code   of Civil   Procedure to    institute and    maintain this writ    petition     in     a    representative capacity  on  behalf of the entire  denomination consisting    of    the    large section  of the     Hindu   public having faith in temple worship and who are vitally   interested   in   seeing   that   the affairs of the temple are administered in     accordance  with     its customs and traditions and that its properties and   funds  are   not   diverted for  purposes unconnected     with  the temple or   with     Hindu    religious    practices. The   reliefs prayed     for in the writ petition are    that this    Court should declare the Act and the Guruvayoor Devaswom    (Amendment)    Act,     1972 (Act   28   of   1972)  and  more   particularly Sections 3, 4, 5 (3) (a), 5 (5), 6, 11,   14,   18,   20,  24   (3) (I)   29   and   32 (1) of the Act  and  Sections 2,   3 and 4   of   Act   28   of   1972   as  unconstitutional  and    void    on    the  ground   of contravention  of Articles    14   and   26 of  the Constitution  of  India.    There is also a prayer in the Original Petition that   Resolution No.    31  of the Guruvayoor       Devaswom       Managing Committee     (1st  respondent)     constituted   under  Section  3  of the Act –Ext.   P-1   —  resolving    to    grant     a donation   of    Rs.     50,000\/-     from  the temple     funds     to     the    “one    lakh housing scheme”    of the    State  Government is    illegal    and    invalid.    A further    relief    sought    in    the    writ petition   is    that    this    Court  should declare   that   the   Renovation   Executive  Committee  constituted    or     recognised under    Section    32   of   the Act  is  an  illegally  constituted   body and that it has no legal authority to perform  any acts  in   relation  to the temple.\n<\/p>\n
3.   Before we   proceed   to   set   out in detail the contentions pat forward<\/p>\n
by the petitioner in support of his challenge against the provisions of the enactments it will be convenient to narrate in brief the prior history relating to the administration of the Guruvayoor Temple. It is admitted on all sides that the Coraims right over the Temple was herediterily vested jointly in the Zamoria Raia of Calicut and the Karanavan for the time being of the Mallisseri Illam at Guruvayoor. This fact is expressly recognised and specifically mentioned in the Preamble to the Act. That the Ooraimaship was vested jointly in the Zamorin Raja and the Karanavan of the Mallisseri Illam had also been declared by the Madras High Court in its judgment dated 1st November, 1889 in Appeal No. 35 of 1887. In the year 1926 the Madras Legislature passed the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act and it came into force on the 8th February, 1927. Shortly thereafter some of the worshippers of the temple filed a petition before the Hindu Religious Endowments Board constituted under the said Act complaining against alleged mismanagement of the affairs of the Temple by the hereditary trustees. On that petition the Board started an enquiry which finally resulted in a scheme of administration being settled for the Temple under Section 63 (1) of the said Act. Under that scheme the Board totally disregarded the rights of the Mallisseri Nambudiri to function as the hereditary trustee of the Temple and entrusted the day-to-day management of the institution solely to the Zamorin Raja as hereditary trustee subject to certain conditions regarding supervision by officers of the Board and other similar safeguards. The Karanavan of the Mallisseri Illam instituted O. S. No. 1 of 1929 in the District Court of South Malabar at Calicut under Section 63 (4) of the Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1927 to amend the scheme settled by the Board by recognising his due position as joint Ooralan of the Devaswom. The worshippers on whose petition the scheme had been framed by the Board instituted O. S. No. 2 of 1929 in the same Court contending that the Board had not incorporated sufficient safeguards in the scheme for
\nensuring the proper management of the institution and praying that the scheme should be amended by making provision for the appointment of additional non-hereditary trustees and placing the management in the hands of a Board of five trustees, three of whom were to be nominated by the Board. The District Court upheld the claim of Mallisseri Nambudiri to be a joint hereditary trustee of the Temple along with the Zamorin Raja and certain amendments were made in the scheme of ad ministration settled by the Board, both for the purpose of providing for joint management by the Nambudiri and Zamorin Raja as co-trustees and also for inserting further safeguards to ensure good administration of the institution. Against the said decision of the District Court the Zamorin Raja filed A. S. Nos. 211 and 212 of 1930 before the Madras High Court. Those appeals were disposed of by a Division Bench as per an elaborate judgment dated 21st November, 1930. The learned Judges confirmed the decree of the District Court in so far as it recognised the right of Matlisseri Nambudiri to function as joint Ooralan (hereditary trustee) of the Temple and the modification effected in the scheme in this regard was upheld. Dealing with the provisions contained in the scheme settled by the Board which had been modified in certain respects by the District Court on the basis of the contentions put forward by the worshippers that the public was dissatisfied with the management of the Temple and that there was a considerable body of persons feeling that the administration of the institution should not be left in the hands of the hereditary trustees without adequate and stringent safeguards, the learned Judges of the Division Bench while confirming the decision of the District Judge declining to make provision in the scheme for the appointment of three non-hereditary trustees, incorporated certain additional safeguards in the scheme with intent to enable the worshippers to maintain a close and effective watch on the manner of administration of the Devaswom by the trustees. One of the new provisions so incorporated in the scheme was that a public notice intimating the date and time of opening of the Bhandarams should be put up by the trustees sufficiently in advance so that those amongst the, worshippers who cared to be present, may attend at the time of the opening and it was also made obligatory that the entries regarding the cash, jewellery etc. found as the contents of the Bhandarams should be attested at least, by two of such members of the worshipping public.\n<\/p>\n
4. Thereafter, till 1933 the management of the Temple was being carried on under the provisions of the scheme as finalised by the aforesaid decision of the Madras High Court. Subsequently, a suit — O. S. No. 1 of 1933–was filed by some of the worshippers for modifying the above-mentioned scheme. As per the decree passed in that suit some slight modifications were effected in the aforesaid scheme by the District Court. Since then the administration of the Temple was being carried on under the scheme as so modified. This position continued even after Madras Act 2 of 1929 was replaced by the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 (Madras Act 19 of 1951) which came into force on 30th September, 1951.\n<\/p>\n
5. In 1965, the Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments (Administration) Department filed O. P. No. 3 of 1965 in the court of the Subordinate Judge, Trichur under Section 62 (3) (a) of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 praying that the court should be pleased to amend and modify the existing scheme for the Guruvayoor Temple on the lines indicated in a draft scheme submitted along with the said application. That petition was pending before the Subordinate Judge’s Court at the time when the impugned statute was passed by the Kerala Legislature. In the meantime, a fire accident took place in the Temple in November, 1970 and a commission was appointed by the Government to go into the circumstances that led to the fire accident. It would appear that the commission in its report expressed the view that
\nthe accident had occurred due to prolonged neglect and indifference on the part of the management in the matter of maintenance and timely repairs. According to the stand taken in the counter-affidavit, the fire accident “brought home the need for immediate effective action” and hence the impugned statute was enacted.\n<\/p>\n
6. The Zamorin Raja and Mallisseri Nambudiri in their capacity as hereditary trustees of the Temple had filed O. P. No. 812 of 1971 challenging the validity of the Act (Act 6 of 1971) on the ground that its provisions infringed their fundamental rights under Clauses (b) and (d) of Article 26 of the Constitution of India. That contention was rejected by a Full Bench of three Judges of this Court as per the judgment reported in Kunhettan Thempuran v. State of Kerala, 1973 Ker LT 106: (AIR 1973 Ker 106 (FB)). In that writ petition the main grievance of the petitioners therein was that their rights and privileges as hereditary trustees had been seriously and excessively interfered with by the statute by practically divesting them of any effective part in the management and administration of the religious institution and that this constituted an infringement of Clauses (b) and (d) of Article 26 of the Constitution. The writ petition had not been filed by them in a representative capacity on behalf of the denomination consisting of the worshippers of the Temple. The present writ petition originally came up for hearing before the Division Bench consisting of Gopalan Nambiyar. J. (as he then was) and Viswanatha Iyer, J. both of whom were members of the Full Bench that decided the earlier case in 1973 Ker LT 106 : (AIR 1973 Ker 106 (FB)). By their order of reference dated 29th June, 1973 the learned Judges referred this case to a Full Bench observing that many of the important aspects that are sought to be urged in this writ petition had not been fully developed and presented before the Full Bench which heard the previous case and that hence it was felt necessary that all those points should be considered by a Full Bench.\n<\/p>\n
Since the present petitioner was not a party to the earlier writ proceeding which, as already observed, was not a representative action, the principle of res judicata is not attracted and there is no legal bar against his urging before this Court all the contentions raised in this writ petition. Pursuant to the aforementioned order of reference by the Division Bench the case was initially posted before a Full Bench of three Judges. Since it was found that a consideration of the contentions raised by the petitioner necessarily involves an examination of the correctness of the decision rendered by the earlier Full Bench (1973 Ker LT 106): (AIR 1973 Ker 106 (FB)), the case was referred to a larger Bench and accordingly it has come up before this Bench of five Judges.\n<\/p>\n
7. To appreciate the points arising for consideration it will be convenient  to refer briefly at this stage to the scheme and the salient provisions of the impugned Act. The object of the Act, as stated in the preamble is to reorganise, in the interests of the general public, the scheme of management of the affairs of the Guruvayoor Devaswom and to provide better administration therefor in supersession of the provisions of the scheme framed by the High Court of Madras in Appeals Nos. 211 and 212 of 1930 as subsequently modified by the District Court of South Malabar in O. S. No. 1 of 1933 on the basis of which the administration and management were hitherto being carried on by the hereditary trustees. Section 1 after mentioning the name of the Act states that the Act shall be deemed to have come into force on the 9th of March, 1971. The significance of the said date is that the Guruvayoor Devaswom Ordinance 1971 containing substantially the same provisions had been promulgated by the Governor of Kerala on 9-3-1971 and that Ordinance was being replaced by the Act.\n<\/p>\n
8. Section 3 lays down that the administration, control and management of the Devaswom shall be vested in a committee constituted in the manner specified in the next Section of the Act, that the said committee shall by the name of the
\n“Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee” be a body corporate and it shall have perpetual succession and a common seal and shall by the said name sue and be sued through the Administrator. Section 4 deals with the composition of the Committee. Sub-section (1) thereof lays down that the Committee shall consist of (a) the Zamorin Raia who shall be the Chairman, (b) the Karanavan for the time being of the Mallisseri Illam at Guruvayoor who shall be the Vice-Chairman, (c) the Administrator appointed under Section 14 who is to be an ex-afficio member of the Committee, (d) the Chairman of the Guruvayoor Township Committee provided he is a person professing Hindu religion –ex-officio –, (e) the Tantri of the Temple — ex-officio –, (f) a representative of the Employees of the Devaswom nominated by the .Government and (g) not more than 11 persons nominated by ,the Government of whom one shall be a Harijan, Sub-section (2,) states that a person shall be disqualified for being nominated under Clause (g) of subjection (1) if (i) he does not profess the Hindu religion or (ii) he is an employee under the Government or the Devaswom or (iii) he is below 30 years of age or more than 70 years of age or (iv) he is engaged in any subsisting contract with the Devaswom or (v) he is subject to any fit the disqualifications mentioned in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Sub-section (3) of Section 5,<\/p>\n
9. Sub-section (i) of Section 5 provides that a member nominated under Clause (f) or Clause (g) of Sub-section (1) of Section 4 shall hold office for a period of three years from the date of his nomination and shall be eligible for renomination. Sub-section (2) of Section 5 merely recognises the right of any member of the Committee to resign his office by giving notice in writing thereof to the Government and it states that on such resignation being accepted by the Government the person shall cease to be a member. Sub-section (3) is an important provision. B states that the Government may by order remove from office a member nominated under Clause (f) or Clause (e) of Sub-section (1) of Section 4 on<\/p>\n
any of the grounds mentioned in Clauses (a) to (h) of the said Sub-section Clauses (a) to (c) deal with disqualification by reason of un-soundness of mind declared by a competent court or adjudication as an insolvent or conviction for any offence involving moral turpitude. Clause (f) contains the usual provision for removal on the ground of absence for more than three consecutive meetings of the committee without valid or sufficient explanation. The grounds for removal mentioned in Clauses (d), (e), (e) and (h) are respectively as follows :–\n<\/p>\n
”(d) he has been guilty of corruption or misconduct in the administration of the Devaswom;\n<\/p>\n
(e) his presence in the Committee is in the opinion of the Government, prejudicial to the interests of the Devaswom;\n<\/p>\n
(g) he, being a legal practitioner, has acted or appeared on behalf of any person against the Devaswom in any legal proceeding;\n<\/p>\n
(h) he ceases to profess the Hindu religion.”\n<\/p>\n
Sub-section (4) of Section 5 states that a member shall not be removed under Sub-section (3) unless he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against his removal. Sub-section (5) declares that an order of the Government removing from office a member of the committee under Sub-section (3) shall be final and shall not be liable to be questioned in any court of law.\n<\/p>\n
10. Section 6 empowers the Government to issue a notification superseding the Committee for such period, not exceeding six months, as it may think fit, if the Government after making such enquiry as may be necessary is of opinion that the Committee is not competent to perform or makes default in performing the duties imposed on it under the Act or exceeds or abuses its powers. Sub-section (2) of Section 6 enjoins that before issuing such a Notification the Government shall communicate to the Committee the grounds on which they propose to take the action for its supersession, fix a reasonable time for the Committee to show cause against the proposal and consider its explanation and objections, it any, Sub-section (3) of Section 6 provides that where a Committee is superseded under the said Section the Government shall appoint a person in its service professing the Hindu Religion to exercise the powers and perform the functions of the Committee until the expiry of the period of supersession.\n<\/p>\n
11. The next provision in the Act that is relevant is Section 10, Clauses (a) to (g) whereof enumerate the duties of the Committee. Clause (a) states that the Committee shall, subject to the custom and usage in the Temple, arrange for the proper performance of the rites and ceremonies in the Temple and the subordinate temples attached thereto in accordance with the dittam or scale of expenditure fixed in respect of them under the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act. Clause (b) states that it shall be the Committee’s responsibility to provide facilities for the proper performance of worship by the worshippers. Under Clause (c) the Committee is invested with the duty to ensure the safe custody of the funds, valuable securities and jewelleries and the preservation and management of the properties vested in the Temple. Clause (d) states that it shall be the duty of the Committee to maintain order and discipline and proper hygienic conditions in the Temple and the subordinate temples attached thereto and of proper standard of cleanliness and purity in the offerings made therein. A duty is cast on the Committee under Clause (e) to ensure that the funds of the endowments of the Temple are spent according to the wishes so far as may be known of the donors. Clause (f) states that it shall be the duty of the Committee for payment of suitable emoluments to the salaried staff of the Devaswom. Clause (g) states in general terms that the Committee shall do all such things as may be incidental and conducive to the efficient management of the affairs of the Devaswom and the convenience of the worshippers.\n<\/p>\n
12. Section 11 deals with the alienation of Devaswom properties. Sub-section (i) thereof states that no movable property of a non-perishable<\/p>\n
nature which is in the possession of the Committee and the value of which is more than five thousand rupees and no jewellery shall be sold, pledged or otherwise alienated without the previous approval of the Government. Sub-section (2) lays down that no immovable property taken possession of by the Committee shall be mortgaged, sold or otherwise alienated except with the previous sanction of the Government. Dealing with the Committee’s powers to borrow or lend money Section 12 provides that the Committee shall have no power to borrow money from or to lend money to any person except with the previous sanction of the Government. Thus the only inhibition placed in the way of alienations of movable or immovable properties belonging to the Devaswom and on either borrowing money on the credit of the Devaswom or lending its monies is that the Committee should have obtained either the ‘previous approval’ or the ‘previous sanction’ of the Government. No guidelines are contained in Sections 11 and 12 as to what principles or considerations are to weigh with the Government in the matter of granting the ‘previous approval’ or the ‘previous sanction’ referred to in those Sections.\n<\/p>\n
13. Section 13 provides that the Committee shall annually submit to the Government through the Commissioner a report on the administration of the affairs of the Devasavom at such time as the Government may prescribe and that such report shall be forthwith published by the Committee in the prescribed manner and that it shall thereafter be also laid before the Legislative Assembly as soon as possible.\n<\/p>\n
14. Chapter III of the Act consisting of Sections 14 to 20 deals with “Administration and Establishment”, Section 14 states that the Government shall appoint an officer not below the rank of Deputy Collector or Deputy Commissioner appointed under the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act and professing Hindu religion to be the Administrator for the Devaswom. It is laid down by Section 15 that the Administrator, shall be a full-time
\nofficer of the Devaswom and that he should not undertake any work unconnected with his office without the permission of the Committee. He is to be paid out of the Temple Fund such salary and allowances as the Government may fix in that behalf. It is further provided by the said Section that a contribution shall be levied from the Temple Fund towards the leave allowances, pension and provident fund of the Administrator to the extent required by the rules for the time being in force and that the other conditions of service of the Administrator shall be such as may be prescribed by the Governor.\n<\/p>\n
15. Section 16 states that notwithstanding the provisions in Sections 14 and 15 it shall be competent for the Government to appoint an officer of the Government not below the rank of Deputy Collector or Deputy Commissioner appointed under the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act to be in additional charge of the office of the Administrator, pending appointment of the Administrator under Section 14 or when the office is temporarily vacant. The proviso incorporates a condition that the period of such additional charge shall not exceed one month. It is significant that under this provision it is open to the Government to appoint an officer not professing the Hindu religion to be in additional charge of the office of the Administrator of the Temple and during the period when he holds such charge he is competent to exercise all the powers and functions vested in the Administrator under the Act.\n<\/p>\n
16. The powers and duties of the Administrator are enumerated in Section 17. Sub-section (i) thereof states that the Administrator shall be the Secretary to the Committee and its Chief Executive Officer and shall, subject to the control of the Committee have powers to carry out its decisions in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act so far as they are applicable. Sub-section (2) provides that notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (i) or in Section 3 (which vests the administration, control and the management of the Devaswom in the Committee) the Administrator shall be responsible for the custody of all the records and properties of the Devaswom. He has to arrange for the proper collection of the offerings made in the Temple. He is conferred power under Sub-section (4) (a) to grant licences for the use of the lands of the Temple for a period not exceeding one year at a time or to lease out for a period not exceeding one year at a time the buildings of the Temple which are ordinarily let. He is also empowered to call for tenders for works or supplies and to accept such tenders when the amount or value thereof does not exceed five thousand rupees and to order for any emergency repairs the cost of which does not exceed five thousand rupees (Clauses (b) and (c) of Sub-section (4)). It is further provided by Section 18 that the Administrator may in cases of emergency direct the execution of any work or the doing of any act which is not provided for in the budget for the year the immediate execution or the doing of which is in his opinion necessary for the preservation of the properties of the temple and its endowments or for the service or safety of worshippers resorting to the Temple or for the due performance of the rites and ceremonies therein in accordance with the custom and usage in the Temple and to direct that the expenses of executing such work or doing such act shall be paid from the Temple Fund. Sub-section (2) of Section 18 enjoins that any action taken by the Administrator under Sub-section (1) shall be forthwith reported by him to the Committee together with the reasons therefor.\n<\/p>\n
17. Section 19 deals with the preparation of an Establishment Schedule and it states that the Administrator is to prepare and submit to the Committee a schedule setting forth the duties, designations and grades of the officers and employees who are to constitute the establishment of the Temple and embodying his proposals in regard to the salaries and allowances payable to them. The Committee under Sub-section (2)
\nis to forward to the Commissioner for his approval the schedule submitted to it by the Administrator with its recommendations thereon. Sub-section (3) states that the Commissioner shall after considering the recommendations of the Committee approve such schedule either without modifications or with such modifications as he deems necessary and thereupon the schedule as approved by the Commissioner shall come into force. Sub-section (6) of Section 19 lays down that the creation of any new appointment carrying a salary of not less than two hundred rupees per mensem shall be subject to the previous sanction of the Government<\/p>\n
18. The topic of appointment of officers and employees of the Temple is dealt with in Section 20. Under that provision appointments of all officers and employees of the Temple are to be made by a Board consisting of (a) the Commissioner who shall be the Chairman, (b) the Administrator, (c) an officer professing Hindu religion authorised by the District Collector, Trichur in that behalf and (d) two persons selected by the Committee from amongst its members. Sub-section (2) states that in exercising its power of appointment the Board shall follow such procedure as may be prescribed by the Government. It is to be noted that while under Section 3 the administration, control and the management of the Devaswom is vested in the Committee, the power of appointment of officers and employees of the Temple is vested in a totally different body, namely the Board referred to in this Section. Out of the five members constituting the Board three are officers of the Government and the remaining two alone are to be elected by the Committee, the composition of the Committee itself being such that there is an overwhelming predominance of the Government nominees.\n<\/p>\n
19. Sections 21 to 23 comprised in Chapter IV deal with budget, accounts and audit. Under Section 21 the Administrator is to prepare every year in such manner and in such form as may be prescribed a budget estimate of the receipts and expenditure of the Devaswom for the following year   and  place   it before the Committee which)    may    approve    it without    modification,    or    with such modifications as    it    may    deem    fit. Thereafter,  the  budget is to be submitted to   the     Government through the Commissioner before such date as may  be  fixed by the Government in that   behalf.    In    so    submitting    the budget  to the Government  the Commissioner   is  to make his   recommendations    on: the    proposals.    Sub-section   (4)   lays down  that   before   sanctioning   a   budget,    the    Government shall satisfy themselves that adequate provision had been made therein  for the maintenance     of     the  prescribed working balance     and    meeting    the liabilities    of     the     Devaswom.     The Government     is     empowered     under Sub-section  (5)  to   modify    any  part of  the   budget so as   to  ensure  that adequate  provision    is made    for the maintenance  of  the   prescribed  working balance   and for meeting the Devaswom     liabilities.        Provision      is made  in Section 22 empowering    the Committee to submit in the course of any year a supplementary or revised budget to    the    Government  through the Commissioner    Section 23  makes it obligatory    that   the   Commissioner shall   forward   to   the   Government   a copy   of the   audit   report   relating  to the   accounts   of   the   Devaswom   sent to   him   by    the   Auditor    under Section   72   of   the   Madras   Hindu   Religious     and     Charitable     Endowments Act  together    with     a    copy    of the order  passed    by    the    Commissioner under   Sub-section   (3)   of   Section   74 of the said Act.\n<\/p>\n
20. Next we come to a very important provision contained in Section 24 which lays down that there shall be constituted a fund to be called “Sree Guruvayoor Temple Fund” and that the said Fund shall be vested in and be administered by the Committee. Sub-section (2) states that the Fund shall consist of (a) the income derived from, the movable and immovable properties of the Devaswom, (b) any contributions by the Government either by way of a grant or by way of loan, (c) all fines, and penalties imposed under the Act, (d) all recoveries under the Act and (e) any other gifts or contributions made by the public; local authorities or institutions, other than the contributions referred to in Sub-section (4) at Section 32, namely, contributions received by the Renovation Executive Committee for the specific purpose of renovation and improvement of the Temple. Sub-section (3) of the Section (Section 24) as originally enacted was in the following terms:–\n<\/p>\n
“The fund may be utilised for any of the purposes prescribed under this Act and for all or any of the following purposes, namely:–\n<\/p>\n
(a) maintenance (including repairs and reconstruction), management and administration of the Temple, its properties and the temples subordinate thereto:\n<\/p>\n
(b) training of archakas to perform the religious worship and ceremonies in the Temple and the temples subordinate thereto;\n<\/p>\n
(c) medical relief, water supply and other sanitary arrangements for the worshippers and the pilgrims and construction of buildings for their accommodation:\n<\/p>\n
(d) culture and propagation of the tenets and philosophy associated with the Temple;\n<\/p>\n
(e) any other work or undertaking for the purposes of the Devaswom authorised by the Government so long as such authorisation subsits; and<\/p>\n
(f) with the previous sanction of the Government, for the establishment and maintenance of, or the making of any grant or contribution to any poor-home or other similar institution”.\n<\/p>\n
In the place of Clause (f) which had originally stood as above, the following clause was substituted by Section 2 of the Guruvayoor Devaswom (Amendment) Act, 1972:–\n<\/p>\n
“(f) with the previous sanction of the Government,–\n<\/p>\n
(i) for the establishment and maintenance of, or the making of any grant or contribution to, any poor home or other similar institution;\n<\/p>\n
(ii) for the establishment and maintenance of any educational institution owned or managed by the Devaswom or in which the Devaswom has interest:\n<\/p>\n
(iii) for the making of any contribution to any religious institution: and<\/p>\n
(iv) for the making of any contribution to any fund instituted by the Government for the amelioration of the poor or for National Defence.” Clauses (a) to (e) have been left to remain as originally enacted. This Section brings about a radical departure from the established legal position relating to Hindu Religious Trusts that the properties of the Trust including the income derived therefrom belong to and stand vested in the deity and that the Ooralans or so-called trustees are only in the position of Managers invested with fiduciary functions. The direct consequence of this Section is to divest the deity of its ownership over the income derived from the movable and immovable properties of the Devaswom and also over the donations and offerings made by the worshipping public and to constitute all those into a Fund called the “Temple Fund” and vest the same in the Managing Committee. The Committee is also conferred power to utilise such Fund for any of the purposes enumerated in Sub-section (3), irrespective of any question as to the availability of a surplus. Clause (f) of Sub-section (3) permits the diversion of temple funds for purposes some of which may be totally unconnected with the Temple and its affairs and may be purely secular in nature.\n<\/p>\n
21. Section 25 lays down that the Government may call and examine the records of the Administrator, the Committee or the Commissioner to satisfy themselves about the regularity of such proceedings or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order made therein and in case it appears to the Government that any such decision or order should be modified, annulled, revised or remitted for reconsideration, they may pass orders accordingly. Under this wide and unrestricted power every action taken or order passed by the Administrator, the Committee etc. even in relation to the day-to-day management or administration of the Temple is made subject to active superintendence and control by the Government. Sub-section (2) provides that pending the exercise of the revisional power conferred by Sub-section (i) the Government may stay the execution of any decision or order which is proposed to be revised by it. Section 26 empowers the Government to make rules to carry out the purpose of the Act and enumerates in Sub-section (2) thereof the various matters in respect of which such rules may be made.\n<\/p>\n
22. Section 27 states that the Committee may, subject to the approval of the Government, make regulations not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder to provide for the manner in which the duties imposed on it under the Act and its functions thereunder shall be discharged. It is stated in Sub-section (2) that such regulations may in particular, provide for (a) conditions of service of the officers and employees of the Devaswom, (b) the observance of the rites and ceremonies and other usages in the Temple and the temples subordinate thereto and (c) any other matter for which regulations are required to be made for the purposes of the Act. It is laid down by Section 28 that the Committee shall be entitled to take and be in possession of all movable and immovable properties including jewelleries records, documents and other assets belonging to the Deveswom. Provision is also made by the said Section that the Committee may requisition the assistance of the Collector of the District for the removal of resistance or obstruction in the matter of delivery of possession of Devaswom properties being taken.\n<\/p>\n
23. Section 29 states that no suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against the Government, the Commissioner, the Committee or any member thereof, or the Administrator or any person acting under the instructions of the Committee or authorised by it for anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done under the Act or the rules made there under. A total ban is thus imposed against the institution of any suits or other legal proceedings for challenging the actions of the Committee or its members as well as of the Commissioner and the State Government, the only condition for attracting the bar being that the action concerned should have been taken in good faith.\n<\/p>\n
24.    The   next   section     that  is    relevant   is   Section   32   which   provides for   the   constitution  of   a   Renovation Executive     Committee.     Sub-section    (1) thereof   as   it now    stands    after    its substitution  by the   amending   Act  of 1972   (Act   28  of     1972)    states    that notwithstanding    anything      contained in   the   Act  or in   the   Madras  Hindu Religious     and     Charitable      Endowments   Act  the   Government     may, if they  consider it necessary   in  the interests   of  the   affairs   of  the    Temple and   worshipping  public  to     renovate or   improve the   Temple,   by   notification  in the  gazette,  constitute a committee     by     name     the     Guruvayoor Devaswom       Renovation       Executive Committee.     It  is   provided  by    Sub-sections   (1A)   and   (1B)   that   the   Renovation   Executive    Committee    shall consist   of   such   number   of members not exceeding  thirty  as may   be  appointed     by     the     Government     and that  the   Minister   of    the     State    of Kerala    in     charge     of      Devaswoms shall be  the   President   of the    Renovation   Executive     Committee.      Sub-section   (1C)   states   that   the Government  may   by order   nominate   one of the   members   of  the   Renovation   Executive Committee to  be    the     Vice-President  and   Working   Chairman   of the Committee.     It is stated in   Sub-section   (1F)   that   a   person   shall     be disqualified   for   being   appointed   as a member   of  the     Renovation     Executive   Committee   if he   does  not   profess the     Hindu religion    or if he   is engaged   in   any    subsisting     contract with   the   Devaswom   or   the   Renovation Executive     Committee   or   if   he is subject to any  of  the  disqualifications  mentioned   in   Clauses   (a)   to   (c)  of Sub-section  (3)   of  Section   5.   The    Government may appoint one  of the members   of   the      Renovation      Executive Committee   to  be   its   Secretary     and his   term   of   office   and   other   conditions of service are  to   be    such    as may   be   prescribed   by   the     Government   (Sub-sections      (1G)   and   (1H)). Any  casual vacancy  in  the  office   of the  Working  Chairman  or a member or  the Secretary  of  the     Renovation Executive  Committee shall  be    filled by the Government.    The    term    of office   of the   members    is     fixed   as three   years.   (Sub-sections     (1I)     and (1J)).      Sub-section     (1L)     empowers the   Government to  remove   from  office   the     Working      Chairman      or a member  or the   Secretary  of the Renovation   Executive   Committee  if    he is  subject to  any  of the disqualifications mentioned  in Clauses   (a)  to (c)  & (h)  of Sub-section  (3)  of Section  5 or has been guilty   of   corruption     or     any     misconduct   in   the   discharge   of his functions  or   if  his   presence   in the    Renovation   Executive   Committee   is,   in the   opinion  of  the  Government, prejudicial to the interests of the  Devaswom   or   detrimental   to    its     object for which the Committee is constituted.      Two   other   grounds    for     such removal   contained   in    Clauses   (d)      and (e) of   Sub-section   (1L)   are      absence by   the   concerned   member   for   more than     three      consecutive       meetings Without   satisfactory   explanation    and appearance   against  the  Devaswom or the   Renovation    Executive     Committee   in   any    legal    proceeding     by a member   of   the  Committee   who   is a legal   practitioner.      Sub-section   (1M)   provides   that  before   action   is   taken  by the   Govt.   for   the   removal     of      the Working   Chairman   or   a  member   or the   Secretary,   he   should   be   given a reasonable   opportunity     of     showing cause   against the  proposed   action.\n<\/p>\n
25. Sub-section (2) of Section 32 states that the Renovation Executive Committee shall exercise such powers and discharge such functions in connection with the renovation and improvement of the Temple and shall follow such procedure as may be specified by the Government by notification in the gazette. Sub-section (3) provides that the Renovation Executive Committee shall constitute a fund to be called the “Sree Guruvayoor Renovation Fund” which shall be administered by the Renovation Executive Committee subject to such directions as the Government may from time to time issue. That Fund is to consist of all contributions received by the Renovation Executive Committee for the specific purpose of renovation and improvement of the Temple. (Sub-section (4)). It is laid down by Sub-section (5) that the fund shall be utilised for the renovation and improvement of the Temple and for incidental purposes including the maintenance of the necessary establishments and that any unspent amount of the fund shall be transferred to the Temple Fund. Sub-sections (6) to (8) state that the Government shall every year appoint an auditor to audit the accounts of the Renovation Executive Committee, that the remuneration of the auditor shall be paid from the Sree Guruvayoor Renovation Fund, that the Auditor shall submit his report to the Renovation Executive Committee and send a copy of it to the Government and that the Government may issue such directions thereon as they deem fit and the Committee shall comply with those directions.  Sub-section (9) provides that the report of the auditor and the directions issued by the Government thereon shall be published in the prescribed manner.\n<\/p>\n
26. Section 33 is a saving provision and it is in the following terms:–\n<\/p>\n
  “Nothing in this Act shall save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act or the rules made thereunder, affect any honour, emolument or perquisite to which any person is entitled by custom or otherwise from or in the Devaswom, or its established usage in regard to any other matter.”\n<\/p>\n
27. Section 34 confers power on the Government to issue any order or to take such other action as may be found necessary for the purposes of removal of difficulties in giving effect to the provisions of the Act. It is laid down by Section 35 that the provisions of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act shall apply to the Devaswom except in respect of matters for which provisions have been made in the Act. By Section 36 it is declared that the scheme framed for the Temple by the High Court of Madras in Appeals Nos. 211 and 212 of 1930 or modified by the District Court, South Malabar in O. S. No. 1 of 1933 shall cease to apply to the Temple. That closes this brief survey of the various sections contained in the Act.\n<\/p>\n
28.   The   petitioner     contends   that Sections 3, 4, 5 (3) (c), 5 (5), 11, 14, 15, 20, 24 (3), 29 and 32 of the Act are violative of Articles 25 (1) and 26 of the Constitution of India on the ground that they abridge and interfere with the right of the denomination consisting of the vast section of Hindus believing in temple worship to freely practice their religion and to maintain their religious institution, namely, the Guruvayoor Temple, and administer its properties in accordance with their beliefs and religious practices. According to the petitioner, the cumulative effect of the totality of the provisions contained in the Act is to completely take away the management and control of the institution and the administration of its properties and funds from the hands of the denomination and to vest it in the executive Government of the State. It is contended by the petitioner that it becomes evident on an examination of the scheme of the Act as disclosed by its provisions that under the guise of legislating for the better management of the Devaswom what the legislature has really done is to invest the Government with full and absolute control over the Devaswom and its religious as well as secular affairs with no right whatever to the denomination to call in question the acts of the Government and its officers and nominees. Elaborating this contention it is pointed out that though under the Act the administration of the Temple and all its properties is nominally to vest in a managing committee, in the context of the provisions contained in the Act conferring arbitrary powers on the Government to nominate all except three out of the seventeen members constituting the Committee, and to remove at the Government’s pleasure any of the members so nominated or even to supersede the entire Committee, the said Committee can never be expected to function in an independent manner but only as an agency subservient to the Government. It is further urged on behalf of the petitioner that since the Section does not provide any guidelines as to the manner in which the persons are to <\/p>\n
be   chosen  by   Government  for  nomination   to   the Committee    the    Government,   which   in  the    present    democratic   set   up  will   necessarily     be that of the political  party that  is in power   for   the   time   being,     is     left free to arbitrarily nominate as members   of   the Committee   even   persons whose political  creed   or personal belief  may   be   such   as   is     completely opposed   to temple   worship  or    even faith   in  God.   It is  pointed   out   that even   amongst  Hindus  there   are  sections who  have   no   faith    in    rituals and   idol  worship   and    who     regard rituals   and   temple  worship  as based only  on   mere superstition and  ignorance   and   as  constituting   an   obstacle in   the   path   of   true     spiritual    progress.   The   petitioner   urges   that  under   Section  4 of the  Act it is    open to  the  Government   to    fill     up    the Committee   with     persons     belonging to   either   of the   aforementioned   two categories   and   that   nothing   can    be more   dangerous  and   fatal     for    the continued   existence   of    the    institution   itself.      Another   point   taken  by the   petitioners   is   that   the    denomination  which  is     vitally     concerned with   the   maintenance      and   administration   of the  Temple   and   its properties   is   completely left  out  of  account   in   the  matter  of    constituting the Managing  Committee   as   no provision   whatever   is   made   for   ascertaining  the  wishes  of  the  denomination   in   regard  to the   choice   of   the members   to   be    nominated     to     the Committee.     Unlike in the    case    of other   similar  temples  in    the     State governed   by the  provisions     of    the Madras   Hindu   Religious   and   Charitable   Endowments   Act   1951     or    by the   Travancore-Cochin  Hindu      Religious   Institutions   Act   which   contain adequate     provisions      enabling     the members   of the  worshipping     public to  take   prompt   action   by   suit,    appeal  or application  to  check and correct   any   act    of      maladministration on the part of the persons in management,    the denomination is completely   deprived   of    the    said    valuable right  which  it had  all     along    possessed in relation to the  Guruvayoor Temple until the passing of the impugned  Act.     The  Committee is not answerable in   any  manner    to    the denomination and none of   its   Acts can be called in  question by members of   the   denomination   by     any     process either  before   a   civil    court    or before   any   other   authority.    According  to   the   petitioner   it   is   therefore futile   to   contend   that   the   Committee is a body  representing the  denomination.     Nowhere  in   the    Act    is any   provision   made   for   members of religious   denomination    to    be     consulted   or   heard   by  the     Committee, the   Administrator   or      the   Govt.   at least   before   important   decisions   are taken   in   respect   of   the   most    vital matters   concerning   the   religious    or temporal    affairs   of   the     Devaswom. The   petitioner   urges  that   such   total deprivation   of   the     rights     of      the denomination   in  the  matter   of maintaining   and   administering  the    Temple   and   its   properties   amounts   to a flagrant   violation   of   the   fundamental   rights guaranteed   under Articles   25 and   26  of     the     Constitution.       The petitioner  submits that the   impugned  Act  has the effect of transferring the   administration    of    the    Temple and   its   properties   to  the   direct  and active – control of the   executive  Government   in   manifest   violation  of the guarantee  enshrined   in    Article   26     of the   Constitution   and    also     of      the principle   of   secularism    which      has been   declared to  be   a   basic   feature of the  Constitution   in   its   preamble as   recently  amended.     Another contention   urged   by    the      petitioner is that   even   though     it    is     stated    in Section 3 of the Act that the administration,      control and     management of   the   Devaswom     is     vested      in a Committee an    examination     of     the provisions   contained   in     Chapter   III of the   Act  would  show that   all  the powers   are really  vested  in the  Administrator   appointed   by   the      Government   over   whom   the    Committee has no effective control. If the Committee is   really     intended   to    be   in charge  of the     administration  of the Devaswom the  power to  appoint the Administrator    should      have      been vested in  it  but    neither    the    said power   nor   any   disciplinary      control over  the  Administrator  is   conferred on  the    Committee.    It    is    further pointed  out by  the    petitioner    that even the  power  to appoint the   officers  and  employees   of  the     Temple is not given to the   Committee but, instead, it is vested in a separate body, namely, the Board constituted under Section 20. Of the five members of that Board three are full-time officers of the State Government and only two members are to be elected by the Committee. The petitioner contends that the aforementioned provisions of the Act clearly go to show that the constitution of the Committee is only an extensible facade to camouflage the investiture of all the effective powers in the controlling hands of the executive Government.\n<\/p>\n
29. Serious objection is taken by the petitioner to the provision contained in Section 24 of the Act regarding the constitution of the fund called “Sree Guruvayoor Temple Fund” and the declaration that the said fund shall be vested in the managing Committee, It is urged that both under custom as well as under the law governing Hindu Religious Trusts the properties and funds of the Guruvayoor Temple inclusive of the recurring income from its immovable properties and the offerings made by the worshipping public belong to the deity and any attempt to divest the deity of such proprietary right constitutes a serious interference with the fundamental rights of the denomination under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. The petitioner submits that it is an essential part of the religious practice of the denomination that the immovable and movable properties belonging to the Temple and also the offerings made by the devotees in cash and kind shall be vested in the deity and that those assets shall be preserved and utilised as such for the purposes of the Devaswom as sanctioned by usage. Very serious objection is taken by the- petitioner to the provision contained in Clause (f) of Sub-section (3) of Section 24 which authorises the Committee to effect a diversion of the trust funds with the sanction of the Government for the purposes mentioned therein, some of which are totally unconnected with the Temple. Such diversion of trust funds for secular purposes unconnected with the Temple is contended to be wholly contrary to the
\nestablished custom, traditions and usage of the Temple. It is also pointed out that under the aforesaid provision a diversion of the trust fund is permitted irrespective of whether or not any surplus is available after meeting all the requirements of the Devaswom and that this is completely opposed to the well-established principle of cy pres which has all along been considered to be applicable in respect of such trusts. On this ground also it is contended that Section 24 (3) (f) in so far as it empowers the State Government to sanction the diversion of trust funds for secular purposes unrelated to the Temple is violative of Articles 25 (1), 26 (b) and (d) of the Constitution. 30. Strong attack is also levelled by the petitioner against Section 32 of the Act which provides for the constitution of a Renovation Executive Committee as a separate body wholly independent of the Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee and not answerable to the latter in any manner. Against the provisions of Section 32 laying down the made of constitution of the Renovation Executive Committee and prescribing the precarious nature of its tenure, depending as it does on the pleasure of the executive Government, the petitioner has urged the same contentions as have been put forward against the provisions of Sections 3 and 4 relating to the Managing Committee. In addition, it is urged that unlike in respect of the Managing Committee where there is at least an attempted camouflage of the real seat of all control, in the case of the Renovation Executive Committee the controlling hand of the Government emerges into the open in the provision contained in Sub-section (1B) of Section 32 that the Minister of the State of Kerala in charge of Devaswom shall be the President of the Renovation Executive Committee. That committee may consist of as many as thirty members all of whom are to be appointed by the Government. Neither of the two hereditary trustees nor the Tantri of the Temple need be on this committee. Except for stating that a person shall be disqualified for being a member of the<\/p>\n
committee   if he     does    not    profess the  Hindu   religion or  if he    is    engaged   in     any     subsisting       contract with  the Devaswom  or  is  subject to any     of     the     disqualifications   mentioned  in   Clauses   (a),  (b)   and   (c) of Section  5   (3),  no    guidelines    whatever  are  contained  in  the   Section as to how the members   of the   Renovation   Executive   Committee   are   to   be chosen   by   the     Government.     It     is pointed   out   by   the     petitioner   that like  in   the  case    of    the     Managing Committee     there     is     no     provision whatever   for   ascertaining   the   wishes of  the   denomination  in    the    matter of choice of members to the Renovation  Executive     Committee also   and the denomination is left without  any remedy   to   check   and     correct     any maladministration of     funds   by     the Renovation       Executive      Committee. Another   point   urged   by    the      petitioner   is   that   the work  of     renovation and   improvement  of the Temple is   an   integral   part    of     administration  and   management   of  the    Devaswom  and  hence there is  no  justification   to   set     up     an      independent committee   for   the said   purpose   and to   authorise   it   to   collect     funds    on behalf   of  the   Devaswom   and   to expend such  funds     without  even  any reference   to   the   Managing    Committee  which   is    the    body     statutorily vested   with   the   duty   of  administering  and managing    the    trust.     The petitioner   further      contends   that all contributions       received      from      the members   of   the   public   for  the purposes   of   renovation      and      improvement   of   the Temple   constitute    part of   the   trust   fund   belonging   to    the deity and   Section  32  in  so  far  as it empowers   such   funds   to   be   collected  and  expended  by   a body     other than  the   Committee     which   is    purported to  be placed  in charge  of the administration   of the  trust  is  clearly violative   of religious      freedom   guaranteed   to  the   denomination      under Articles   25   and   26   of  the   Constitution. Finally   it   was   urged   that   in   singling   out  the   Guruvayoor     Devaswom and   the worshipping  public   who  are devotees   of   Lord      Guruvayoorappan for   discriminatory   and   hostile   treatment  by  denying  to  the    denomination   the elementary     right  to   participate   in   the   administration   of    the Temple  and  to take  proceedings  before   court   whenever    found     necessary   for   ensuring   that   there   is    no mismanagement   of     the     institution, by  placing   the   institution     and      its properties  virtually   under  the   arbitrary   control   of  the   executive    Government  by   a  process   of    nationalisation of the    Temple  as it were in contravention   of    the    principle     of secularism enshrined in the preamble to   the   Constitution,   by   divesting the deity   of   its   proprietary  right      over the   temple  funds    and     transferring such   right   to   the     Managing     Committee,   by   empowering   the    Government   to   divert  the   temple funds for secular   purposes    unconnected      with the   temple   in   total   disregard   of the usage  and   custom   obtaining    in    the institution   and   the    wishes    of     the donors and  by     abrogating the  principle   of   cy   pres   by     permitting   the diversion   of     funds      irrespective   of the availability of any surplus there has been   a   clear    violation     of     the principle   of     equality     enshrined   in Article   14  of  the  Constitution.  Refuting the   stand   of the   State   that     Guruvayoor   Devaswom   being     a     unique institution   there  is  justification  for a classification   it   is   submitted by    the petitioner that there are other equally unique and rich temples in Kerala like   Sree   Dharma   Sastha    Temple at Sabari   Mala    and    the      Bhagavathy Temple   at   Chottanikkara   which   also attract  large  numbers     of     pilgrims from  all   over   India.     According     to the   petitioner   if  the    true      purpose was    to    safeguard     the     Devaswom against mismanagement  by  the  hereditary trustees,    adequate     provisions are   contained  in the  Madras     Hindu Religious    and     Charitable      Endowments   Act   to   deal with   such    situations.      It   is   further    contended     by the   petitioner     that     the      impugned provisions   of   the   Act which   deprive the   denomination   of   all   its valuable rights   in   relation   to    the     maintenance and   administration  of the Temple and which authorise the     diversion   of   temple     funds    for     secular purposes   after   divesting    the     deity of  the  proprietary  right over     such funds   have   no   rational   nexus  whatever  with  the    avowed    object    and purpose   of  the   enactment  and   those provisions are  therefore  bad  on   the ground of    arbitrary      discrimination. The  petitioner submits  that  even   if<\/p>\n
a classification of the Guruvayoor Temple can be said to be justified on the ground of its uniqueness for purposes of making special provisions for its management, the said ground of classification has no rational nexus whatever with the real object and purpose effectively achieved by the impugned provisions of the statute namely to take over to Government control the management of the Devaswom and its properties. There is also an allegation in the petition that the Act is a colourable piece of legislation and that under the ostensible purpose of better management of the Devaswom what has been done by the legislature is to enable the Govt. to get absolute and un-fettered control over the Devaswom and its funds with authority to utilise the funds of the Temple for secular purposes, which, though considered laudable by the State, may be totally unconnected with the Temple.\n<\/p>\n
31. The respondents have sought to sustain the validity of the impugned provisions of the Act by contending that they are reasonable provisions enacted with the sole object and purpose of ensuring the proper administration of the Temple and its properties in the larger interests of the general public. It is stated that the Sree Krishna Temple at Guruvayoor is a unique institution having all India importance and that on account of various factors the management of the Devaswom was in a must unsatisfactory state and there were persistent demands from among the public that Government should put an end to the mismanagement of the Temple and its properties by the trustees-A high level committee appointed by the Government to go into the affairs of the Temples in Kerala had also recommended that some special provisions for effective supervision of the management of the famous Temple in Guruvayoor were badly needed and that necessary steps in that regard should be taken by the Govt. There was a fire accident in the Temple in November, 1970 and a Commission appointed by the Government to go into the circumstances that led to the fire accident had submitted a finding that the occurrence of the fire was almost entirely due to the prolonged neglect and indifference on the part of the management in the matter of maintenance and timely repairs of the Temple buildings. According to the respondents, the provisions contained in the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 and the scheme of management framed for the temple were found to be inadequate to ensure proper management of the institution. The Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Department had filed O. P. No. 3 of 1965 in the Sub-Court, Trichur praying for an amendment of the scheme settled in A. S. Nos. 211 and 212 of 1930 of the Madras High Court as modified by the District Court, South Malabar in O. S. No. 1 of 1933 but final orders in that matter had not been passed by the Court even by March, 1971. It is averred in the counter affidavit of the respondents that the fire accident of the Devaswom in 1970 brought home the need for immediate effective action and hence the Guruvayoor Devaswom Ordinance, 1971 was promulgated by the Governor of Kerala on 9th March, 1971 and that was subsequently replaced by the Act. It is submitted by the respondents that having regard to the unique nature of the Temple which attracts pilgrims in thousands from all parts of India there was need to enact special provisions for its proper administration and this classification is fully justified. The petitioner’s allegation that the Temple and its worshippers have been arbitrarily singled out in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution is stoutly denied by the respondents. According to the submission of respondents none of the provisions of the Act has interfered with the religious freedom guranteed to the denomination under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. It is said that the provisions of the Act provide only for the management of the secular affairs of the Temple and do not interfere with the religious affairs thereof which are enjoined to be<\/p>\n
continued to be performed in accordance with the custom and usage obtaining in the Temple. The further case of the respondents is that the provisions of the Act far from interfering with the rights of the denomination, safeguard their interests by providing for proper management of the Temple and its properties. The contention of the petitioner that the Act confers on the Government absolute powers of management over the Temple is denied in the counter-affidavit. It is submitted by the respondents that simply because some of the members of the managing Committee are nominated by the Government it cannot be said that the Temple has been taken under Government control. The counter affidavit proceeds to state that the Managing Committee constituted under Section 3 is not subject to influence by the Government and that the Administrator appointed under Section 14 is subject to the supervision and control of the Managing Committee. The petitioner’s contention that the Managing Committee is a limb of Government and that it is impossible for the Committee to resist a direction from the Government is refuted in the counter-affidavit as incorrect. A further plea taken by the respondents is that the Managing Committee constituted under the Act is a body representing the denomination and hence there is no substance in the petitioner’s contention that the denomination has been completely deprived of its right to administer the institution and that the management of the temple is vested by the statute in a different secular authority. It is also said that the provisions of the Act only regulate the administration, management and control of the properties of the Devaswom in consonance with tile provisions contained in Article 26 (d) of the Constitution. In answer to the challenge raised by the petitioner against the validity of Section 24 of the Act it is stated in the counter-affidavit that the utilisation of the temple funds for the purposes enumerated in Clause (f) of Sub-section (3) of the said Section cannot be said to be opposed to the custom and usage of the institution and it will
\nnot constitute any breach of trust. Dealing with the attack made by the petitioner against the resolution Ext. P-1 sanctioning a donation of Rs. 50,000\/- towards the one lakh housing scheme of the State Government, it was submitted on behalf of the respondents that the Government has not granted and does not also hereafter propose to grant sanction for implementing the said resolution passed by the Managing Committee and that hence it is unnecessary to go into the question of validity of the said resolution. Regarding Section 32 which provides for the constitution of the Renovation Executive Committee it is stated by the respondents that the creation of such a separate body was felt by the legislature to be necessary in view of the fact that very substantial works of renovation and reconstruction of the Temple buildings had to be undertaken at enormous expense for repairing the damage caused by the fire accident and for prevention of recurrence of such mishaps in future. Finally it is submitted on behalf of the respondents that the provisions of the impugned Act are modelled on the lines of those enacted by the Orissa Legislature in the Shri Jagannath Temple Act 1955 (Orissa Act 11 of 1956) and the Rajasthan Legislature is the Nathdwara Temple Act, 1939 (Rajasthan Act 13 of 1959) and since the validity of both these enactments has been tested and upheld by the Supreme Court the challenge raised by the petitioner that the impugned Act violates Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution is devoid of any merit.\n<\/p>\n
32. The scope and extent of the rights conferred by Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution are now well settled by the decisions of the Supreme Court. Article 25, as its language indicates, secures to every person, subject to public order, health and morality, a freedom not only to entertain such religious belief, as may be approved of by his judgment and conscience, but also to exhibit his belief in such outward acts as he thinks proper and to propagate and disseminate his ideas for the edification of others. Sub-clause (a) of Clause (2), however, saves the<\/p>\n
power of the State to make laws regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated with religious practice; and Sub-clause (b) reserves the State’s power to make laws providing for social reform and social welfare even though they might interfere with religious practices. The fundamental right conferred by this Article is subject only to the above restrictions which the Article itself has imposed.\n<\/p>\n
33. The free exercise of religion by which is meant the performance of outward acts in pursuance of religious belief, is thus subject to State regulation imposed to secure order, public health and morals of the people. What Sub-clause (a) of Clause (2) of Article 25 contemplates is not State regulation of the religious practices as such which, unless they run counter to public health or morality, are protected, but of activities which are really of an economic, commercial or political character though they may be associated with religious practices. Though a religion undoubtedly has its basis in a system of beliefs or doctrines which are regarded by those who profess that religion as conducive to their spiritual well-being, it would not be correct to say that religion is nothing else but a doctrine or belief. A religion may not only lay down a code of ethical rules for its followers to accept, it might prescribe rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which are regarded as integral parts of religion, and these forms and observances might extend even to matters of food and dress. The guarantee under Article 25 protects not only the freedom of religious opinion but also acts done in pursuance of a religion and this is made clear by the use of the expression ‘practice of religion’ in the said Article. It is not correct to state that under Clause (2) (a) of Article 25 all secular activities which may be associated with religion but do not really constitute an essential part of it are amenable to State regulation. If the tenets of any particular religious sect prescribe that offerings of food should be given to the idol at particular hours of the
\nday, that periodical ceremonies should be performed in a certain way at certain periods of the year or that there should be daily recital of sacred texts or oblations to the sacred fire etc. all these would be regarded as parts of religion and the mere fact that they involve expenditure of money or employment of priests and servants or the use of marketable commodities would not make them secular activities partaking of a commercial or economic character; all of them are religious practices and should be regarded as ‘matters of religion’ within the meaning of Article 26 (b). That Article 25 (2) (a) contemplates is not regulation by State of religious practices as such, the freedom of which is guaranteed by the Constitution except when they run counter to public order, health and morality, but regulation of activities which are economic, commercial or political in their character though they are associated with religious practices, (see The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Tirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR<\/a> 1954 SC 282 at pages 289 and 290).\n<\/p>\n
34. Under Article 26 every religious denomination or section thereof has the guaranteed right to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purpose and to manage in its own way all affairs in matters of religion. Rights are also given to such denomination or a section of it to acquire and own movable and immovable properties and to administer such properties in accordance with law. In regard to affairs in matters of religion the right of management given to religious denomination it, a guaranteed fundamental right which no legislation can take away. However, as regards administration of property which a religious denomination is entitled to own and acquire, it has the right to administer such property only ‘in accordance with law’ meaning thereby that the State can regulate the administration of trust properties by means of laws validly enacted. But it is important to remember that under Article 26 (d) it its the religious denomination itself<\/p>\n
which has been given the right to administer its property in accordance with any law which the State may validly impose. Hence a law which takes away the right of administration altogether from the religious denomination and vests it in any other secular authority would amount to violation of the right guaranteed by Article 26 (d). (See Ratila) Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, AIR<\/a> 1954 SC 388 at pages 391 and 392). As already noticed, religious practices or performances of acts in pursuance of religious belief are as much a part of religion as faith or belief in particular doctrines. Under Article 26 (b) a religious denomination enjoys complete autonomy in the matter of deciding as to what rights and ceremonies are essential according to the tenets of the religion and no outside authority has any jurisdiction to interfere in such matters — See The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR<\/a> 1954 SC 282 and Digyadarsan Rajendra Ramdassji Varu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR<\/a> 1970 SC 181, at page 187. Hence it is not open to restrict or prohibit the performance of such rites or ceremonies under the guise of regulating the administration of the trust estate. The scale of expense to be incurred in connection with such religious observances is a matter of administration of property belonging to the religious institutions and if the expenses under these heads are likely to deplete the endowed properties or affect the stability of the institution, proper control can be exercised by the statutory agencies as the law may provide. The distinction between matters of religion and those of secular administration of religious properties may at times appear to be very thin; but in cases of doubt the court should take a common-sense view and be actuated by considerations of practical necessity. (Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, AIR<\/a> 1954 SC 388 at page 392).\n<\/p>\n
35. A religious sect or denomination has the undoubted right guaranteed by the Constitution to manage its own affairs in matters of religion and this includes the right to spend the trust property or its income for the religious purposes and objects indicated by the founder of the trust or established by the usage obtaining in a particular institution. To divert the trust properties or funds for purposes which a statutory authority or official or even a court considers expedient or proper, although the original objects of the founder can still be carried out, is an unwarrantable encroachment on the freedom of religious institutions in regard to the management of their religious affairs. A statute cannot therefore empower any secular authority to divert the trust money for purposes other than those for which the trust was created as that would constitute a violation of the right which a religious denomination has under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution to practice its religion and to manage its own affairs in matters of religion. The State can step in only when the trust fails or is incapable of being carried out either in whole or in part — See AIR 1954 SC 388.\n<\/p>\n
36. In this context it is relevant to bear in mind the historical background which led to the inclusion of Articles 25 to 30 in the Chapter on fundamental rights in the Constitution. The said background has been most succinctly explained by Khanna J. in para. 75 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in The Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College Society v. State of Gujarat (AIR 1974 SC 1389) at page 1413 which we shall extract:\n<\/p>\n
“Before we deal with the contentions advanced before us and the scope and ambit of Article 30 of the Constitution, it may be pertinent to refer to the historical background. India is the second most populous country of the world. The people inhabiting this vast land profess different religions and speak different languages. Despite the diversity of religion and language, there runs through the fabric of the nation the golden thread of a basic inmate unity. It is a mosaic of different religions, languages and cultures. Each of them has made a mark on<\/p>\n
the Indian polity and India today represents a synthesis of them all. The closing years of the British rule were marked by communal riots and dissensions. There was also a feeling of distrust and the demand was made by a section of the Muslims for a separate homeland. This ultimately resulted in the partition of the country. Those who led the fight for independence in India always laid great stress on communal amity and accord. They wanted the establishment of a secular State wherein people belonging to the different religions should all have a feeling of equality and nondiscrimination. Demand has also been made before the partition by sections of people belonging to the minorities for reservation of seats and separate electorates. In order to bring about integration and fusion of the different sections of the population the framers of the Constitution did away with separate electorates and introduced the system of joint electorates, so that every candidate in an election should have to look for support of all sections of the citizens. Special safeguards were guaranteed for the minorities and they were made a part of the fundamental rights with a view to instil a sense of confidence and security in the minorities. Those provisions were a kind of a charter of rights for the minorities so that none might have the feeling that any section of the population consisted of first-class citizens and the others of second-class citizens. The result was that minorities gave up their claims for reservation of seats. Sardar Patel, who was the Chairman of the Advisory Committee dealing with the question of minorities, said in the course of his speech delivered on February 27, 1947:\n<\/p>\n
  ‘This Committee forms one of the most vital parts of the Constituent Assembly and one of the most difficult tasks that has to be done by us is the work of this committee. Often you must have heard in various debates in British Parliament that have been held on this question recently and before when it has been claimed on behalf of the British Government that they have a special responsibility–a special obligation–for protection of the interests of the minorities. They claim to have more special interest than we have. It is for us to prove that it is a bogus claim, a false claim, and that nobody can be more interested than us in India in the protection of our minorities. Our mission is to satisfy every interest and safeguard the interests of all the minorities to their satisfaction. (The Framing of India’s Constitution, B. Shiva Rao, Select Documents, Vol. II, P. 66).’ <\/p>\n
It  is  in  the    context of    that  background   that    we     should     view   the provisions   of    the    Constitution   contained   in    Articles    25    to   30.    The object   of   Articles   25   to   30   was   to preserve the    rights of    religious and linguistic   minorities,     to   place   them on  a  secure     pedestal   and  withdraw them   from  the  vicissitudes  of  political      controversy.    These     provisions enshrined   a   befitting   pledge   to   the minorities  in the  Constitution  of the country  whose   greatest  son   had  laid down   his   life   for   the   protection   of the minorities.    As  long as  the Constitution  stands    as    it  is    today,   no tampering  with  those     rights   can be countenanced.    Any attempt to do so would be not only an act of breach of  faith,   it would  be  constitutionally impermissible and liable to be struck down   by  the  courts.    Although   the words secular state are not expressly mentioned in the    Constitution, there can   be   no     doubt     that    our    Constitution-makers    wanted       establishment of such a state.    The provisions of the     Constitution     were  designed accordingly.    There is     no mysticism in the secular character of the State. Secularism  is    neither    anti-God,  nor pro-God;   it treats     alike  the devout, the  agnostic and the atheist.    It eliminates God from the matters of the state   and   ensures   that   no   one  shall be     discriminated     against     on    the ground   of religion.    The  Constitution at  the same  time expressly  guarantees  freedom of     conscience and the right   freely  to  profess,   practise  and propagate   religion.   The   Constitution-makers  were  conscious     of the  deep attachment   the   vast     masses   of   our country  had     towards     religion,   the sway it had on their minds and the significant     role  it  played     in their<\/p>\n
lives. To allay all apprehensions of interference by the legislature and the executive in matters of religion, the rights mentioned in Articles 25 to 30 were made a part of the fundamental rights and religious freedom contained in those Articles was guaranteed by the Constitution.”\n<\/p>\n
Thus the real purpose and intendment of Articles 25 and 26 is to guarantee especially to the religious minorities in this country the freedom to profess, practise and propagate their religion, to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes, to manage its own affairs in matters of religion, to own and acquire properties and to administer such properties in accordance with law subject only to the limitations ‘and restrictions indicated in those Articles. No doubt, the freedom guaranteed by these two Articles applies not merely to religious minorities hut to all persons (Article 25) and all religious denominations or sections thereof (Article 26). But, in interpreting the scope and content of the guarantee contained in the two Articles the court will always have to keep in mind the real purpose underlying the incorporation of these provisions in the fundamental rights chapter. When a challenge is raised before a court against the validity of any statute as contravening the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 25 and 26 it is from the above perspective that the court will approach the question and the tests to be applied for adjudging the validity of the statute will be the same irrespective of whether the person or denomination complaining about the infringement of the said fundamental right belongs to a religious minority or not.\n<\/p>\n
37. In adjudging the validity of a statute which is impugned on the ground that it abridges the fundamental rights of the petitioner the object or purpose of the law is irrelevant. It is the effect brought about by the totality of the provisions of the Statute on the concerned fundamental right and its exercise that will have to be examined by the court. The true test is whether the impugned provisions have the effect of taking away or abridging the fundamental rights. As observed by the Supreme Court in Bennett Coleman and Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR<\/a> 1973 SC 106 at pages 119 and 120, it is the effect of the law upon the right which attracts the jurisdiction of the court to grant relief.\n<\/p>\n
38. It is also well settled that if the denomination had lost its right to administer the religious institution and its properties prior to the Constitution by a valid law they cannot regain that right on the plea that that law contravenes the right guaranteed under Article 26 of the Constitution. If the right to administer the religious institution never vested in the denomination or had been validly surrendered by it or had otherwise been effectively lost to it prior to the Constitution, Article 26 cannot be successfully invoked by the denomination in such a case. Article 26 (c) and (d) do not operate to create rights in any denomination or its section which it never had: they merely safeguard and guarantee the continuance of rights which such denomination or section had. (See Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali, AIR<\/a> 1961 SC 1402 at page 1406 and State of Rajasthan v. Sajjanlal Panjawat, AIR<\/a> 1975 SC 706 at page 715).\n<\/p>\n
39. In the case before us a contention was urged by the learned Advocate appearing for the 1st respondent — The Managing Committee of the Devaswom represented by the Administrator — that the denomination consisting of the  general body of worshippers was not having any right in relation to the administration of the Guruvayoor Temple as on the date of the coming into force of the Constitution, We see no force at all in this contention. At the time when the Constitution came into force the management of the Temple was being carried on by the hereditary trustees in accordance with the provisions of the scheme settled by the High Court of Madras in Appeal Nos. 211 and 212 of 1930 as later modified by the District Court of South Malabar in O. S. No. 1 of 1933 and also in conformity with the relevant provisions contained in the Madras Hindu Religious<\/p>\n
and Charitable Endowments Act. We have already adverted to the fact that the aforementioned scheme itself came to be framed as a result of proceedings initiated by certain worshippers on whose petition the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Board started the enquiry which culminated in the framing of the scheme. Further, in the scheme that was finally settled by the Madras High Court, sufficient safeguards were incorporated at the instance of the worshippers to ensure that there would be no maladministration of the Temple and its funds by the trustees and it was even provided that the ‘Bhandarams’ of the temple should be opened only after previous public notice to the worshippers and only in the presence of the worshippers who cared to be present and that at least two of the worshippers should attest the formal entries relating to the actual receipts in cash and kind obtained from the ‘Bhandarams’. The provisions of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926 which governed the Temple at the time of the commencement of the Constitution fully recognised the rights of the worshippers to intervene for the purposes of preventing mismanagement. Section 9 (9) of that Act defined the expression “person having interest” in the case of a temple as a person who is entitled to attend at the performance of worship or service in the temple and who is in the habit of attending such performance. It was mandatory under the provisions of that Act to give notice to ‘persons interested’ (worshipping public) and to hear their representations before any action of consequence, such as the framing of a scheme, the sanctioning of alienations of temple properties etc. was taken by the Board in relation to the temple and its properties. (See Sections 57, 67, 76 etc.) Right was also specifically reserved to ‘persons interested’ to move the court for modifying a scheme already settled in respect of a temple (Section 65) and also to institute suits in the competent court praying for reliefs of the nature mentioned in Section 92, C.P.C. (Section 73). In the case of the Guruvayoor Temple it has already been seen that
\nthe worshipping public had been asserting and exercising their rights under the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act and the scheme itself was originally framed by the Board on the petition filed by some worshippers. Not being satisfied with the provisions contained in the scheme framed by the Board, certain worshippers, 24 in number, instituted O. S. 2 of 1929 in the District Court of South Malabar to amend the said scheme. A. S. No. 212 of 1930 was an appeal filed in the Madras High Court by the hereditary trustee Zamorin Raja against the decree passed in that suit. It cannot therefore be said on the facts of this case that the denomination had either surrendered or lost its rights in relation to the administration of the Temple and its properties by any process known to law prior to the commencement of the Constitution.\n<\/p>\n
40. We shall now proceed to examine the consequences brought about by the provisions of the impugned Act either severally or cumulatively in relation to the rights of the denomination falling within the scope of Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. Section 3 which states that the administration, control and management of the devaswom shall be vested in a Committee called “The Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee” constituted in the manner provided in Section 4 is by itself unobiectionable provided that the Committee constituted under Section 4 can reasonably be regarded as a body representative of the denomination. But, as per Section 4, the committee is to consist of (a) the two hereditary trustees, namely, the Zamorin Raja and the Karanavan of the Mellisseri Illam (b) three ex-officio members, namely, the Administrator appointed under Section 14, the Chairman of the Guruvayoor Township Committee, in case he is a person professing the Hindu religion, and the Tantri of the Temple (c) a representative of the employees of the Devaswom, nominated by the Government and (d) not more than eleven persons nominated by the Government of whom one shall be a Harijan. Thus, out of<\/p>\n
the   seventeen     members    who     may constitute the     Committee     as many as     twelve     members     are     persons nominated   by   the     Government   and even out of the  remaining five persons two are Government officers because   it    is    the     District   Collector, Trichur who   is   ex-officio   Chairman of  the    Guruvayoor   Township   Committee.    The section does not provide any guidelines   as to how  the  eleven persons   mentioned    in    Clause   (g)   of Sub-section   (1)   are  to  be  chosen   for nomination      by      the      Government. Sub-section     (2)  merely     enumerates the   grounds     of     disqualification   for nomination.    Under Clause  (i) of that sub-section  a    person  who    does not profess   the     Hindu     religion   is   disqualified    for    nomination.    In   other words,   the   persons   to   be   nominated must    be      persons      professing     the Hindu   religion.     We     find     there   is considerable   force    in   the   contention of   the   petitioner  that   a   person   who professes’      Hindu   religion   need   not be   believer   in   temple   worship     and that  on  the  other  hand  he  may  be completely   opposed      to   the   practice of   idol   worship.     It   is    well  known that  there     are    sections    of  Hindus whose schools  of thought and philosophy   do   not   consider   idol   worship, rituals   and   ceremonials   as   necessary or  even    conducive to    the  spiritual progress   of   men.     There     are     also political    creeds     or    social     theories which  openly     condemn     such  forms of  worship   as   being   based   on   mere superstition     and      ignorance.     Many persons,  who  are     born  Hindus  and who   may   be  said   to  profess   Hinduism   solely     because   they     have  not openly renounced the Hindu faith by any recognised process, may ardently believe   in     such     political    or   social ideologies which  do  not view temple worship with favour.    There is nothing in Section 4 which precludes the Government     from   nominating     such persons to be members of the Managing   Committee   under   Clause   (g)   of Sub-section   (1)    of    Section 4.    Quite apart from the serious prejudice  and peril   that   will  be   caused   to  the  interests   of  the   institution   by   reason of such   a  step,   it   will   not   be    possible  to  say  that  such  a  Committee constituted with     members belonging to the aforementioned types of philosophical or political persuasion represents the religious denomination consisting of the Section of the Hindu public having faith in temple worship. We have already referred to the definition of the expression ‘person having interest’ contained in Section 9 (9) of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926. The identical definition is also contained in Section 6 (ii) of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 and it furnishes a useful guideline as to who alone can be considered as a member of the religious denominations in relation to a temple.\n<\/p>\n
41. Though it was contended by the petitioner that the power of nomination of the members of the Managing Committee who will virtually he functioning as the trustees of the Temple should not be vested in the executive Government we are not prepared to go to the extent of holding that the conferment of the power of nomination on the Government is by itself illegal. We may, however, observe that in the light of the recent amendment of the preamble to the Constitution emphasising the secular character of the State it is desirable that the legislature should consider whether the power to nominate the members of the Committee should not be conferred on an independent statutory body other than the State Government with sufficient guidelines furnished to it for ensuring that the nominations will be effected in such a way as to be truly representative of the denomination consisting of the worshipping public.\n<\/p>\n
42. Under Section 4 (1) of the Act the legislature has conferred on the State Government the power of nomination of the members of the Managing Committee without sufficient guidelines, thereby rendering it possible for the Government to completely by-pass the denomination and appoint a Committee consisting largely or even wholly of persons who may not have any faith at all in temple worship. It is also difficult to understand why in respect of the management of a single Temple it has been considered necessary or expedient to constitute such a large Committee   consisting   of  as   many   as seventeen      members.        Under      the Travancore-Cochin    Hindu    Religious Institutions Act the     Travancore Devaswom     Board     and     the     Cochin Devaswom  Board which  are entrusted with the task of administering all the temples in the erstwhile Travancore   and   Cochin   territories   respectively  are to consist only  three members each.   Even in the draft scheme which was filed on behalf of the Department   in  O.   P.  No.   3   of   1965  of the   Sub-Court,   Trichur   the   proposal was   only   for   the   appointment   of   a Board   consisting   of  the   two   hereditary trustees   and     three  non-hereditary trustees.    The purpose of ensuring  efficient  and     proper administration  of    the    Devaswom    would  undoubtedly be    better    served    by    a compact      committee      consisting      of persons having faith in the deity and real   interest     in   the   affairs     of   the institution.     However    that    may  be, we are of opinion that the provisions of Section   4   (1)  of the  Act must be held to be bad   for the   reason that the   power   of     nomination   conferred on the    Government    is     naked  and arbitrary  without   any   safeguard  being  provided  for     ensuring that  the Committee will be a body representing   the   denomination.     The   right   to administer the     Temple being vested in the     denomination     any statutory provision which     completely     ignores the   denomination    in   the    matter  of setting up the Committee to administer the religious     institution belonging  to  the  denomination  will  necessarily  be  violative  of     Article  26  of the Constitution.\n<\/p>\n
43. Strong reliance was placed by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the respondents on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan, AIR<\/a> 1963 SC 1638, and Raja Bira Kishore Deb v. The State of Orissa, AIR 1964 SC 1501, and it was contended that in both these decisions the Supreme Court has upheld the validity of similar provisions contained in the Rajasthan Nathdwara Temple Act and in the Shri Jagannath Temple Act empowering the concerned State Government to constitute committees of
\nmanagement    for the    administration of Hindu Temples.    In AIR 1964 SC 1501     the     challenge   was      directed against the    provisions    of   the Shri Jagannath Temple    Act,  1954  (Orissa Act 11 of 1955) on the ground that they were  violative     of fundamental rights of Raja of Puri under Articles 14,   19   (1)   (f)   and   31   of the  Constitution.    The appeal   which   came up for    decision     before    the    Supreme Court arose    out of a    writ petition filed  by  the    Raja of    Puri    in  the High  Court of Orissa.    The  case  put forward   by    the    petitioner   therein was that the  Shri Jagannath Temple was his    private property    and that the  impugned     Act which     deprived him  of his  property was unconstitutional   in view  of    Article   19  of the Constitution.    In    the    alternative, it was  contended     that     the petitioner had sole right of the superintendence and management  of  the  temple, that the  said  right    could     not be taken away without payment of compensation and in as much as the Act took away   that   right     without any   compensation   it   was     hit   by   Article   31 of the  Constitution.    A   further   plea put forward by the    petitioner   was that   the  right      of      superintendence was   ‘property’      within  the    meaning of Article 19 (1) (f) and the impugned  provisions of the    statute     which deprived  him  of  his     property   constituted       unreasonable        restrictions which   were  not  saved     under   Article  19  (5).     The Act was further attacked  on  the  ground  that    it    was discriminatory      and     that    therefore hit  by Article  14  of    the    Constitution  in as much as the    temple had been   singled   out   for   special   legislation even  though   there  was a   general law  in   force    in    the    State     of Orissa   with   respect   to   Hindu   religious   endowments,   namely,   the  Orissa Hindu      Religious     Endowments   Act. Reliance was also vaguely placed by the   petitioner   on Articles     25,     26,     27 and   28  of the  Constitution  to  invalidate   the   Act.    The   High   Court   repelled   almost all  the   contentions   of the petitioner and held that the Act was   valid   and   constitutional    except for the   provision     contained in   Section   28   (2)   (f)  thereof    which     was held  to  be  invalid.  Against  the said decision the Raja of Puri had    filed the appeal before the Supreme Court<\/p>\n
reiterating his contention that the entire Act was unconstitutional as violating Articles 14, 19, 25, 26 and 31 of the Constitution. Dealing with the contention put forward by the appellant based on Article 26 the Supreme Court observed as follows (at p. 1510):–\n<\/p>\n
  “In the first place besides saying in the petition that the Act was hit by Article 26 there was no indication anywhere therein as to which was the denomination which was concerned with the Temple and whose rights to administer the Temple have been taken away. As a matter of fact the petition was filed on the basis that the appellant was the owner of the Temple which was his private property. There was no claim put forward on behalf of any denomination in the petition. Under these circumstances we are of opinion that it is not open to the  appellant to argue that the Act is bad as it is hit by Article 26 (d).”\n<\/p>\n
The High Court had gone into the merits of the contention based on Arts, 25 and 26 and repelled it on the ground that since the temple was meant for all Hindus and the entire Hindu community had therefore to be treated as the denomination for the purpose of Article 26 and since the committee constituted under the Act consisted entirely of Hindus the management still remained with the denomination and hence Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution could not be said to have been infringed. The correctness of the said view was canvassed before the Supreme Court but their Lordships observed that in as much as no foundation has been laid in pleadings for any contention based on Article 26 (d) it was wholly unnecessary for the High Court to consider the said question. The Supreme Court therefore declined to go into the question and observed as follows:–\n<\/p>\n
  “In view of the defective state of pleadings however we are not ore-pared to allow the argument under Article 26 (d) to be raised before us and must reject it on the sole ground that no such contention was properly raised in the High Court.” The question having been thus specifically excluded from consideration by the Supreme Court it is not possible to regard the above decision as an authority holding that the provision contained in the statute impugned therein relating to the constitution of the committee of management did not infringe Article 26 (d) of the Constitution. As already noticed, the writ petition which gave rise to the appeal before the Supreme Court was not a proceeding filed on behalf of the denomination but, on the other hand, it was instituted by the Raja of Puri asserting that the Temple was his private property. There was therefore no scope at all in that case for considering the question whether the fundamental rights of the denomination had been infringed by the provisions contained in the impugned enactment for the constitution of the committee of management. It is also worthy of mention that unlike in Section 4 of the Guruvayoor Devaswom Act. Section 5 of the Shri Jagannath Temple Act contained clear guidelines as to how the members of the managing committee were to be selected for nomination by the State Government from amongst the different categories of the sevaks or worshippers.\n<\/p>\n
44. The decision in Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharai v. State of Rajasthan, AIR<\/a> 1963 SC 1638, is also clearly distinguishable. The challenge in that case was against the provisions of the Rajasthan Nathdwara Temple Act, 1959 (Act 13 of 1959). Tilkayat Govindlalji who was the main appellant before the Supreme Court contended that the idol of Shri Shrinathji in the Nathdwara Temple and all the property pertaining to it were his private properties and as such the State Legislature was not competent to pass the Act. In the alternative, it was urged that even if the Nathdwara Temple was to be held to be a public temple and the Tilkayat the Mahant or Shebait in charge of it, as such Mahant or Shebait he had a beneficial interest in  the  office  of\tthe    high    priest as well  as   in    the\tproperties    of     the temple   and  the\tprovisions    of    the impugned    Act    were    violative     of Article   19  (1)  (f) of    the    Constitution. In  addition, it was     contended  that even if the temple was held to be a public temple the Act would be invalid     because    it contravened    the fundamental    rights     guaranteed    to the   denomination   under    Articles   25 (1) and   26   (b)   and   (c)  of the   Constitution.     The    denomination    supported the Tilkayat’s case  that he was the proprietor  of the  temple    who    was solely entitled to manage the temple and    its    properties.    The     Supreme Court elaborately went   into the historical   background    of    the    temple and  the course of events in relation to the management of its  properties which ultimately led to    the passing of the Act.     Their Lordships     found that  even if the Tilkayat had originally any absolute    rights  of management, those  rights  had  been taken away by   a   Firman   issued      by    the Rana  of Udaipur on  31st December, 1934  which    laid    down     that     the Shrine  of Shrinathji    was  a    public temple,   that  the   Tilkayat     Maharai was  merely   a     custodian,     manager and trustee  of the  property of    the Shrine   and   that   the   Udaipur Darbar had   absolute   rights   to   supervise  the administration of the temple  and ensure  that   the   property   dedicated   to the   Shrine was   only   used     for    the legitimate  purposes   of   the     institution.   It   was   further   found that   under   the   said   Firman the Udaipur Darbar had reserved to itself the    right to   depose   any   Tilkayat   Maharai   for the time being in office if in its absolute discretion   such   Maharai     was considered    unfit.      Their     Lordships pointed   out   that      at    the      relevant time   when   the   Firman   was     issued, the Maharana of Udaipur was an absolute  monarch  in   whom   vested    all the  legislative,  judicial      and    executive powers of the  State    and    that hence  any order issued    by     such a Ruler  had  the    force  of law  and it would     govern    the    rights    of    the parties  affected thereby.    The rights of the Udaipur Darbar had devolved on  the  State  of Mewar and    subsequently on the  State   of     Rajasthan as its successor State. It was against the background of this factual    and legal position that obtained in   relation to the temple that the Supreme
\nCourt proceeded to examine the constitutionality of the impugned provision of that Act The situation that prevailed in relation to the Shri Nathdwara Temple on the date of coming into force of the Constitution was that the Government of the United State of Rajasthan had the absolute right to supervise the administration of the temple and to determine who should be in charge of its administration and management and no rights were recognised as existing in the denomination in regard to the said matter. Even in the appeal before the Supreme Court the denomination did not put forward any case that it had the right to maintain or administer the temple nor was there any complaint about the infringement of any such right belonging to it. On the other hand, the sole plea put forward by the denomination was that the right of the Tilkayat to manage the temple had been unlawfully taken away by the Act. This is clear from the following observations contained in paragraph 61 of the judgment of the Supreme Court at page 1661:–\n<\/p>\n
  “The only right, which according to the denomination, has been contravened is the right of the Tilkayat to manage the property belonging to the temple. It is urged that throughout the history of this temple, its properties have been managed by the Tilkayat and so, such management by the Tilkayat amounts to a religious practice under Article 25 (1) and constitutes the denomination’s right to manage the affairs of its religion under Article 26 (b).”\n<\/p>\n
The Supreme Court rejected that contention pointing out that after the Firman of 1934 the Tilkayat did not have any absolute right of management over the temple and that he was only in the position of a custodian or trustee subject to the supervision and control of the Darbar. On this ground it was further held that the mere right of management of properties possessed by the Raja of Puri was a purely secular matter and it cannot be regarded as a religious practice so as to fall under Article 25 (1) or as amounting to<\/p>\n
affairs in matter of religion within the meaning of Article 26. Their Lordships accordingly rejected the contention put forward by the denomination that the Act infringed the rights guaranteed to it by Articles 25 (1) and 26 (b) of the Constitution.\n<\/p>\n
45. The factual and legal position occupied by the denomination in relation to the Guruvayoor Temple is entirely different The denomination has all along been recognised as being the body in whom ultimately rests the right to maintain and administer the Temple and the hereditary trustees have been functioning only as its representatives, their actions being liable to be called in question by the denomination either by proceedings before the statutory authorities constituted under the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act or before the civil court by the institution of suits as provided in the said Act.\n<\/p>\n
46. Further, Section 5 of the Nathdwara Temple Act which provided for the constitution of the Nathdwara Temple Board contained guidelines as to how the members of the Board should be nominated by the Government Referring to this matter the Supreme Court observed as follows in paragraph 64 at page 1662:–\n<\/p>\n
  “It is, however, argued that by the constitution of the Board in which the administration of the property now vests is not the denomination and since the administration is now left to the Board, the denomination has been wholly deprived of its right to administer the property. It is remarkable that this plea should be made by the representatives of the denomination who in their writ petition were prepared to support the Tilkayat in his case that the temple and the properties of the temple were his private property. That apart, we think that the constitution of the Board has been deliberately so prescribed by the legislature as to ensure that the denomination should be adequately and fairly represented on the Board. We have already construed Section 5 and we have held that Section 5 (2) (g) requires   that   the   members   of      the Board   other than    the    Collector    of Udaipur District should  not only profess  Hindu Religion but    must     also belong to  the    Pushti-Margiya    Vallabhi  Sampradaya.     It  is  true    that these   members     are    nominated    by the  State Government,  but we   have not   been  told  how  else    this     could have   been    effectively    arranged     in the   interests   of the     temple     itself. The  number  of  the  devotees   visiting the temple   runs  into lacs,     there    is no   organisation    which      comprehensively   represents   the      devotees   as a class:   there is  no  register of the  devotees   and   in   the     very      nature   of things,   it   is   impossible to keep  such a register.   Therefore,   the   very   large mass   of   Vallabh’s   followers who constitute   the   denomination  can   be   represented   on   the   Board   of   management   only  by   a   proper     nomination made   by the   State   Government, and so.  we   are   not    impressed      by    the plea   that   the     management by     the Board    constituted    under    the    Act will   not   be   the management  of   the denomination.   In   this   connection,   we may   refer  to  Clause   (1)   of  the Firman which vested  in the Darbar absolute  right to supervise the     management   of   the   property.     As   a   successor-in-interest   of   the   Darbar,   the State   of  Rajasthan can   be trusted to nominate   members    on     the      Board who  would   fairly  represent  the    denomination.      Having  regard     to    all relevant   circumstances   of   this    case, we   do not think that  the   legislature could   have   adopted any   other   alternative   for   the   purpose   of   constituting   the   Board.     Therefore,   we  must hold   that the   challenge  to   the   validity  of  the  Act  on  the   ground    that it contravenes     Articles      25   (1),   26   (b) and   26 (d)  must be  repelled.”\n<\/p>\n
The facts of the present case are materially different from those which the Supreme Court had to consider in the Tilkayat’s case. In respect of the Nathdwara Temple the State of Rajasthan as the successor-in-interest of the Udaipur Darbar was already vested with absolute rights of supervisions and control over the administration of the institution as on the date of the coming into force of the Constitution and the denomination had no subsisting rights in<\/p>\n
regard to the said matter. Secondly, Section 5 of the Nathdwara Temple Act contained sufficient guidelines to ensure that the committee to be constituted thereunder by the State Government would be a body truly representative of the members of the denomination consisting of Hindus belonging to the Pushti-Margiya Vallabhai Sampradaya belonging to all parts of India. Any such guidelines are totally absent in Sections 3 and 4 of the impugned Act. The decision of the Supreme Court in Tikayat’s case (AIR 1963 SC 1638) being therefore clearly distinguishable it is of little assistance to the Advocate-General in the matter of sustaining the constitutionality of Section 4 of the Act now under challenge before us.\n<\/p>\n
47. In view of our conclusion that the provisions contained in Sections 3 and 4 of the Act regarding the constitution and composition of the Managing Committee are violative of Article 26 of the Constitution it is really unnecessary for us to consider the attack levelled by the petitioner against Section 5 which deals inter alia with the subject of removal from office of the members of the Committee. It was strongly urged on behalf of the petitioner that even if it is constitutionally permissible to empower the Government to constitute the Committee of management for a religious institution it is not contemplated by Articles 25 and 26 that the executive Government should retain and exercise active control over the administration of a religious institution. According to the petitioner, once the Committee is constituted by the Government it should thereafter be left to some other competent authority. Tribunal or Court to exercise necessary supervision and control Over the functioning of the Committee and there should be no direct Or indirect involvement by the Government in regard to the said matter. It is pointed out that the position that obtains under Section 5 of the Act is that the members of the Committee are to hold office only during the arbitrary pleasure of the Government since the Government is empowered to remove a member
\nfrom office if, in its subjective opinion, the presence of such member in the Committee is prejudicial to the interest of the Devaswom. Sub-section (5) also lays down that such an order of removal of a member passed by the Government is final and shall not be liable to be Questioned in any court of law. Section 6 of the Act which provides for dissolution and supersession of the Committee is also challenger! by the petitioner on identical grounds. Here too, the Government is empowered to supersede the Committee for a period not exceeding six months if, in its opinion, the Committee is not competent to perform or makes default in performing the duties imposed on it by the Act or exceeds or abuses its powers. It is, however, provided by Sub-section (2) of Section 6 that before issuing a notification superseding the Committee the Government shall communicate to the Committee the grounds on which they propose to take the action, fix a reasonable time to show cause against the proposal and consider its explanations and objections, if any. No remedy is provided by the Act against the order of supersession passed by the Government. We are of opinion that there is force in the petitioner’s contention that the aforementioned provisions contained in Sections 5 and 6 have the undoubted effect of curbing the independence of the Committee and converting it into a body subservient to the executive Government. The powers of removal and supersession conferred on the Government are naked and absolute in character and the member who is removed or the superseded Committee is left without any remedy since even a suit is barred by Section 29 of the Act. Had it been necessary to consider the constitutionality of these provisions (Section 5 (3) and Section 6) we would have been inclined to uphold the petitioner’s contention that these provisions offend the principle of secularism that is now firmly enshrined in the preamble to the Constitution as forming a basic feature of our constitutional struct are by the recent amendment effected in the preamble by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act. But, as already pointed out, since we have held Section 4 to be invalid it is unnecessarv for us to pronounce upon the validity of the impugned provisions contained in Sections 5 and 6.\n<\/p>\n
48. Then we come to Sections 11 and 12 which deal with the subject of alienation of Devaswom property and borrowing and lending powers of the Committee. Section 11 states that no movable property of a non-perishable nature which is in the possession of the Committee and the value of which is more than five thousand rupees and no jewellery shall be sold or pledged without the previous approval of the Government, It is further provided by Sub-section (2) thereof that no immovable property taken possession of by the Committee shall be mortgaged, sold or otherwise alienated except with the previous sanction of the Government. Under the law governing Hindu religious trusts the properties of the temple, whether moveable or immovable can be alienated only if the proposal to alienate is supported by Devaswom necessity or by manifest benefit to the institution. The complaint of the petitioner against the provision in Section 11 is two-fold. Firstly, it is contended that the Section confers power on the Government to grant previous approval authorising the Committee to alienate the movable or immovable properties of the Devaswom irrespective of the existence of any justifying necessity or benefit. Secondly, the petitioner submits that it is not permissible for the executive Government of a secular State to directly involve itself in matters of routine administration of a religious institution. We have no reason to think that the impugned provision has been enacted by the legislature otherwise than actuated by a genuine desire to ensure that the properties of the Devaswom are not improperly alienated by the Committee. But the provision as actually enacted does suffer from the vice of leaving it to the absolute and un-guided discretion of the Government to sanction alienations of movable and immovable properties belonging to the Temple without even insisting on any prerequisite condition regarding the existence of supporting necessity or benefit. This is clearly prejudicial to the interests of the denomination which has the right to maintain and preserve the institution and its properties in accordance with the doctrines of law and the usages applicable to institution in relation to the alienation of trust properties. If the properties of the institution are to be alienated without any justifying necessity or benefit the very continued existence of the institution will itself be imperilled and in that sense it has an intimate bearing on the right to maintain the institution conferred on the denomination by Article 26 (a) of the Constitution. More important in relation to the right of the denomination is the circumstance that an order passed by the Government sanctioning an alienation of Devaswom properties is not amenable to any kind of challenge before any forum at the instance of the denomination, even a suit being barred under Section 29 of the Act. We have to uphold the petitioner’s contention that the provisions contained in Section 11 in so far as they confer arbitrary power on the Government to sanction alienations of Devaswom properties even in the absence of any justifying necessity or benefit and leave the denomination without any remedy to question the order passed by the Government are violative of Article 26 (a), (b) and (d) of the Constitution.\n<\/p>\n
49. Section 12 states that the Committee shall have no power to borrow money from or to lend money to any person except with the previous sanction of the Govt. Excepting for the aspect already pointed out by us, namely, that the secular Govt. is not expected to intimately involve itself in the administration of a religious institution we do not see any other objectionable feature in this Section.\n<\/p>\n
50.   Then  we  pass\ton to  Sections   14 and   15   which     may\tbe     considered together.   Section   14\tlays  down  that the Government shall appoint an officer not below the rank of Deputy Collector or Deputy Commissioner appointed under the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act to be the Administrator for the Devaswom, Section 15 states that the Administrator shall be a full-time officer of the Devaswom, that he shall be paid out of the Temple Fund such salary and allowances as the Government may fix and the conditions of the service of the Administrator shall be such as may be prescribed by the Government. When under the scheme of the Act the administration, control and the management of the Devaswom are to vest in the Managing Committee constituted under Section 3 and the underlying assumption is that the Committee represents the denomination which is possessed of the fundamental right to maintain and administer the Temple the power to appoint the Administrator who is to be the Secretary of the Committee and its chief executive officer should ordinarily vest in the Committee. The power to appoint the Administrative officer is a necessary concomitant of the power of administration, control and management which is conferred on the Committee under Section 3, Section 14 in so far as it deprives the Committee of the crucial power to  appoint its own Secretary who is also to be the chief executive officer of the Temple and confers such power on the secular Government undoubtedly makes a serious inroad into the fundamental right guaranteed to the denomination under Article 26 (a), (b) and (d) (for the purposes of this discussion we are assuming that the Committee constituted under Section 3 represents the denomination). It may also be mentioned in this connection that even though Section 17 mentions that the Administrator shall be subject to the control of the Committee, Section 26 (2) (a) empowers the Government to make rules providing for the manner of exercise of control by the Committee over the actions of the Administrator. Rules 3 and 4 of the Guruvayoor Devaswom Rules, 1971 are the relevant rules
\nframed by the Government in this regard. They are in the following terms:–\n<\/p>\n
“3. Power of the Committee over the actions of the Administrator: –It shall be competent for the Committee to call for and examine any papers connected with any action of the Administrator and give such directions to the Administrator, in accordance with the provisions of the Act and these rules, as the Committee may consider necessary.\n<\/p>\n
4. Administrator to carry out the decision of the Committee:– The Administrator shall take steps to implement the decisions of the Committee and in the event of failure without adequate reasons, the Committee may bring the matter to the notice of the Government and the Government shall take such action as it deems necessary against the Administrator.”\n<\/p>\n
It is obvious from a mere reading of the above rules that the Committee is left without any effective control over the Administrator and he is answerable only to the Government by whose order he is appointed and who alone is vested with the power to take disciplinary action against him. The Administrator being an officer of the Devaswom it should be left to the Committee to regulate his conditions of service and to exercise effective control over his work and conduct inclusive of full powers to take disciplinary proceedings for any misconduct. In so far as Section 15 (4) violates the above principle it interferes with the denomination’s right to administer the Temple under Article 26 and has to be declared invalid.\n<\/p>\n
51. Section 16 provides that when the office of the Aministrator is temporarily vacant it shall be competent for the Government, notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 14 and 15, to appoint an officer of the Government not below the rank of Deputy Collector or Deputy Commissioner appointed under the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act to be in additional charge of the office of the Administrator, provided that the period of such additional charge shall not exceed one month. By reason of the non obstante clause contained in this Section which excludes the applicability of even the qualification mentioned in Section 14 that the person to be appointed as Administrator of the Devaswom should profess the Hindu religion, it is rendered possible for the Government to place a non-Hindu officer in additional charge of the office of the Administrator temporarily for a period not exceeding one month. When we look into the provisions of Section 17 wherein the powers and duties of the Administrator are enumerated it will be seen that he is the chief executive officer of the Devaswom who is charged inter alia with the duties to arrange for the proper performance of the rites and ceremonies in the Temple, to provide facilities for the proper performance of the worship by the worshippers, to ensure the safe custody of all funds and properties including jewelleries and to arrange for the proper collection of offerings made in the Temple. His functions cannot be said to be merely secular in as much as he is to arrange for the performance of the rites and ceremonies in the Temple in accordance with the custom and usage obtaining in the Temple as per the directions of the Committee. We feel no doubt that Section 16 in so far as it empowers the Government to appoint a non-Hindu to be in additional charge of the functions of the Administrator of the Temple constitutes a clear violation of the rights of the denomination under Articles 25 and 26 (a) and 26 (b) of the Constitution.\n<\/p>\n
52. Sections 17 to 19 are relevant only to show that even though a Committee is constituted under Section 3 in whom the administration and control of the Devaswom is purported to be vested, it is really the Administrator appointed and controlled by the Government who wields and exercises all the powers of administration. Sub-section (2) of Section 17 says that notwithstanding the provisions of Section 3 (1) vesting the administration and management of the Devaswom in the Committee the Administrator shall be responsible for the custody of all
\nrecords and properties of the Devaswom. By Sub-section (4) he is vested with the power to grant licences in respect of Temple lands and leases of Temple buildings for periods not exceeding one year and to call for and accept tenders for works or supplies the value whereof does not exceed five thousand rupees. He is also empowered to order for any emergency repairs the cost of which does not exceed five thousand rupees. Further Section 18 states that the Administrator may in cases of emergency direct the execution of any work or the doing of any act which is not provided for in the budget and the immediate execution or the doing of which is in his opinion necessary for the preservation of the properties or safety of worshippers or for the due performance of the rites and ceremonies in the Temple irrespective of the amount of cost that such work may involve. The only duty that is cast on the Administrator is to make a report to the Committee about the action so taken by him with the reasons therefor. We have at ready referred to the fact that under the rules promulgated by the Government the Committee is not vested with any effective control over  the Administrator and he is virtually to function only under the control of the Government. The conferment of “extraordinary powers” on the Administrator under Section 38 without making him fully answerable to the Committee constitutes, in our opinion, an infringement of the right of the denomination to manage and administer the institution and its properties under Article 26 Clauses (b) and (d).\n<\/p>\n
53. No objection can be taken to, the provisions of Section 19 in so far as they provide for the preparation of the establishment schedule by the Administrator and its submission to the Committee and later to the Commissioner for the latter’s approval. But, Sub-section (6) of that Section which states that the creation of any new appointment carrying a salary of not less than Rs. 200\/- per mensem shall be subject to the previous sanction of the Government suffers from the infirmity already referred to by us, namely, the direct involvement of the Government in the routine administration of a religious institution which is inconsistent with the secular character of the State.\n<\/p>\n
54.   Very      strong      objection    was taken  by  the  petitioner to the   provisions   of    Section   20    which    deal with   subject  of  appointment  of   officers  and   employees   of     the     Temple.   Sub-section   (1)   of    the     Section lays   down   that  appointments   of   all officers   and   employees  of the    Temple are to be made by a Board consisting    of    (a)    the     Commissioner, Hindu   Religious   and   Charitable    Endowments   Department   (b)     the    Administrator   (c)   an   officer    professing the   Hindu religion   authorised   in  that behalf   by   the   District Collector   and (d)     two     persons    elected     by     the Managing   Committee      from     among its   members.      Sub-section   (2)     provides   that in   exercising   the     power of   appointment      conferred   by    Sub-section   (1)  the  Board    shall     follow such   procedure   as may   be   prescribed  by the  Government.     It will    be seen   that   the     constitution     of    the Board   is   such  that  three  out   of   its five   members   are      full-time   officers of the   State     Government    and    the remaining   two   members    are to    be elected   by   the    Managing     Committee.      When   under     the    scheme    of the  Act   the      administration,   control and   management   of the      Devaswom is  to  vest   in   the   Managing   Committee   constituted    under     Section   3    which, we  may  assume   for  the   purpose    of this   discussion,   is   intended   to   function   as   a   representative   of   the    denomination,   it   passes   one’s     comprehension   as   to   why     the     power    to appoint the officers and employees of the Temple which is basically an essential component of the right of administration and management    of  the Temple     should be taken out  of the hands of the  Managing Committee  and  vested   in a totally   distinct and independent body, namely, the Board over whose functioning the Managing   Committee  has   absolutely  no   control.    In this connection it was     rightly stressed by the petitioner that the employees of the Temple referred to in Section 20   will include also  the Melsanthi   (the Head Priest) and his   assistants who are in charge of the performance of the daily rituals   and   ceremonies inside  the  sanctum sanctorum. The choice of the Melsanthi and other employees who are to be in charge of the performance of the rituals and ceremonies will necessarily have to be made on the basis of considerations having an intimate bearing on the religious practice, usage and tradition obtaining in respect of the Temple. Hence there is force in the contention of the petitioner that it will be highly detrimental to the interests of the institution and the denomination to which it belongs to entrust the power of appointment of such employees in the Temple to the Board comprised mainly of officers of the secular Government. Further, the right to make appointments of the officers and employees of the Temple being an important ingredient of the right of administration and management, it should vest in the body which represents the denomination and not in any other agency. The Board constituted under Section 20 cannot by any stretch of imagination be regarded as a representative of the denomination. In fact, even according to the respondents, it is only the Managing Committee constituted under Section 3 which is to be regarded as the representative of the denomination. In so far as Section 20 confers the power of appointment of officers and employees of the Temple not on the Managing Committee but on a separate and independent body, namely, the Board, it must be held that the Section is violative of Article 26 (a), (b) and (d) of the Constitution.\n<\/p>\n
55. While dealing with this subject of control and involvement by Government we may also refer to the provisions of Section 21 which provides that the budget is to be prepared annually for the Devaswom by the Administrator and after its approval by the Committee it is to be submitted to the Government and it is to become operative only on its being sanctioned by the Government. Power is given to the Government to modify any part of the budget so as to satisfy itself that adequate provision has been made for the maintenance of the prescribed working balance and for meeting the liabilities of the Devaswom. It is further provided by Section 22 that if, in the course of any year, the Committee considers it necessary to modify the figures shown in the budget with regard to its receipts or expenditure a supplementary budget should be submitted by it to the Government through the Commissioner. To crown everything there is<\/p>\n
a revisional power conferred on the Government under Section 25 in the widest possible terms. Under that Section the Government is empowered to call for and examine the records of the Administrator or the Committee or the Commissioner to satisfy themselves as to the regularity, correctness, Legality or proprioty of any decision taken or order passed by those authorities and to pass such orders as the Government considers fit in supersession of the action taken by the Administrator or the Committee etc. In short, the scheme of the Act as emerging from a combined reading of its provisions is as follows: — Though the administration, control and management of the Devaswom is purported to be vested in the Committee constituted under Section 3 that Committee is to consist overwhelmingly of members nominated by the Government who are to hold office at the arbitrary pleasure of the Government with a Damocleus sword of threat of removal or supersession constantly handling above their heads. The real powers of administration including even the right to he in custody of all records and properties of the Devaswom are vested in an Administrator who is to be a Government officer of the rank of a Deputy Collector or Deputy Commissioner (Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments. The power of appointment of the Administrator is vested in the Government as also the power to take disciplinary action against him. Though he is to function as the Secretary of the Committee the Committee is left without any effective control over his work or conduct and the Administrator is really answerable only to the Government. Even the power to appoint the other officers and servants of the Devaswom is not given to the Committee but is conferred on a separate body, namely, the Board appointed by the Government under Section 20. The power to sanction alienations of moveable or immovable properties of the Devaswom is vested in the Government. If the Committee is to lend money to any person or to borrow money on behalf of the Devaswom and it should obtain previous sanction of the Government. The Committee is only to submit to the Government a report on the Administration of the affairs of the Devaswom (Section 13). The annual budget is to be submitted to the Government and it becomes operative only when sanctioned by the Government, power being reserved with the Government to make
\nmodifications in the budget proposals. Section 24 (3) (e) to which we shall be presently referring, empowers the Government to authorise the execution of any work or undertaking for the purpose of the Devaswom by expending the temple funds and Clause (f) thereof confers a further power on the Government to sanction the diversion of Temple funds for any of the purposes enumerated therein, some of which are totally unconnected with the Temple and its affairs. Any action or decision taken or order passed by the Administrator or the Committee irrespective of whether it relates to the performance and conduct of the rites and ceremonies inside the Temple or the management of the properties, is liable to be scrutinised and revised by the Government in the exercise of the power conferred by Section 25, thereby making it possible for the Government to interfere even with the day-to-day administration of the Temple in relation to both its religious as well as secular matters. The orders passed by the Government are expressly declared by Section 29 to be immune from challenge before any court of law, thereby leaving the denomination completely powerless to question before any forum the action taken by the Government. The resultant position is that even though the Act has by Section 3 provided for the constitution of a Managing Committee it is the executive Government that is vested under the Act with the effective control and superintendence of even the day-to-day administration of all the religious and temporal affairs of the Temple. As already indicated by us such active involvement by Government in the administration of a religious institution is not consistent with the secular character of the State. The State can undoubtedly make laws to regulate the administration of the trust properties and other secular activities connected with a religious institution. Such laws may provide necessary safeguards to ensure that the properties are administered by the denomination in accordance with the law; but the actual administration must be left to the denomination itself and cannot be taken over by the State either directly or even indirectly. In so far as the aforementioned provisions of the Act virtually vest the administration and control over the institution and its funds in the State Government we must hold that these provisions offend the religious freedom guaranteed to the denomination<\/p>\n
under Article   26   (a),   (b)  and   (d) of  the Constitution.\n<\/p>\n
56. Next we come to the attack levelled by the petitioner against Section 24 which states that there shall be constituted a fund called “Sree Guruvayoor Temple Fund” and that it should be vested in and administered by the Committee. Among other things that fund is to consist of the income derived from the movable and immovable properties of the Devaswom and all gifts or contributions made by the worshipping public other than the contributions collected by the Renovation Executive Committee referred to in Section 32. Both under the law relating to Hindu religious trusts and also under the custom, usage and tradition governing the institution, the properties of the Guruvayoor Temple and the income derived, therefrom are vested in the Deity. The effect of the impugned Section is to divest the idol or Deity of its proprietary right over the income and to transfer it to the Committee constituted under Section 3. Under the guise of providing for better administration of the trust it is not permissible for the legislature to divest the Deity of its proprietary interest in the trust properties and transfer it to another body. The movable properties of the Temple include also the jewels used for adorning the Deity as well as the vessels and other paraphernalia that are intimately connected with the performance of the religious rites in the Temple. The transference of the proprietorship over the movable and immovable properties from the Deity to the Committee constitutes a serious interference with the religious practice of the denomination and also with its right to manage its own affairs in matter of religion and to administer its property in accordance with law. We have no hesitation to strike down Sub-section (1) of Section 24 which purports to vest the Guruvayoor Devaswom Fund in the Committee as unconstitutional and void.\n<\/p>\n
57. Strong objection was taken by the petitioner to the provisions of Clause (i) of Sub-section (3) of the Section (Section 24) which states that the Committee may with the previous sanction of the Government utilise the Devaswom Fund for any of the following purposes:–\n<\/p>\n
“(i) for the establishment and maintenance of, or the making of any grant by contribution to, any poor home or other similar institution;\n<\/p>\n
(ii) for the establishment and maintenance of any educational institution or the maintenance of any educational institution owned or managed by the Devaswom or in which the Devaswom has interest;\n<\/p>\n
(iii) for the making of any contribution to any religious institution; and<\/p>\n
(iv) for the making of any contribution to any fund instituted by the Government for the amelioration of the poor or for National Defence.”\n<\/p>\n
There is force in the objection raised by the petitioner that the Section empowers the Committee to make such diversion of Devaswom funds even without the prerequisite condition that a diversion is to be effected only in the event of there being a surplus left after meeting all the purposes of the trust.\n<\/p>\n
58. The next ground of objection raised by the petitioner is even more formidable and it is that none of the purposes mentioned in Clauses (i) to (iv) can be said to be connected with the Devaswom or related to the purposes for which the trust was founded. In Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay A. I. R.<\/a> 1954 S. C. 368, the validity of Sections 55 and 56 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 (29 of 1950) which inter alia empowered the Charity Commissioner and the court to divert the trust funds for purposes which the Charity Commissioner or the court considers expedient or proper came up for consideration before the Supreme Court. Dealing with the said question their Lordships observed in paragraph 19 at page 394:\n<\/p>\n
 “The provisions of Sections 55 and 56, however, have extended the doctrine much beyond its recognised limits and have further introduced certain principles which run counter to well-established rules of law regarding the administration of charitable trusts. When the particular purpose for which a charitable trust is created fails or by reason of certain circumstances the trust cannot be carried into effect either in whole or in part, or where there is a surplus left after exhausting the purposes specified by the settlor, the court would not, when there is a general charitable intention expressed by the settlor, allow the trust to fail but would execute it ‘cy pres’, that is to say, in some way as nearly as possible to that which the author of the trust intended. In such cases, it cannot be disputed that the court can frame a scheme and give suitable directions regarding the  objects upon which the trust money  can  be   spent.\n<\/p>\n
It is well established, however, that where the donors’ intention can be given effect to, the court has no authority to sanction any deviation from the intentions expressed by the settlor on the grounds of expediency and the court cannot exercise the power of applying the trust property or its income to other purposes simply because it considers them to be more expedient or more beneficial than what the settlor had directed. — Vide Halsbury, 2nd Edn. Vol. IV, p. 228. But this is exactly what has been done by the provision of Section 55 (c) read with Section 56 of the Act. These provisions allow a diversion of property belonging to a public trust or the income thereof to objects other than those intended by the donors if the Charity Commissioner is of opinion, and the court confirms its opinion and decides, that carrying out wholly or partially the original intentions of the author of the trust or the object for which the trust was created is not wholly or partially expedient, practicable, desirable or necessary; and that the property or income of the public trust or any portion thereof should be applied to any other charitable or religious object.\n<\/p>\n
Whether a provision like this is reasonable or not is not pertinent to our enquiry and we may assume that the legislature, which is competent to legislate on the subject of charitable and religious trust, is at liberty to make any provision which may not be in consonance with the existing law; but the question before us is, whether such provision invades any fundamental right guaranteed by our Constitution, and we have no hesitation in holding that it does so in the case of religious trusts. A religious sect or denomination has the undoubted right guaranteed by the Constitution to manage its own affairs in matter of religion and this includes the right to spend the trust property or its income for the religious purpose and objects indicated by the founder of the trust or established by usage obtaining in a particular institution. To divert the trust property or funds for purposes which the Charity Commissioner or the court considers expedient or proper, although the original objects of the founder can still be carried out is to our minds an unwarrantable encroachment on the freedom of religious institutions in regard to the management
\nof their religious affairs. It is perfectly true, as has been stated by the learned counsel for the appellants, that it is an established maxim of the Jain religion that ‘Devadravya’ or religious property cannot be diverted to purposes other than those which are considered sacred in the Jain scriptures.\n<\/p>\n
But apart from the tenets of the Jain religion, we consider it to be a violation of the freedom of religion and of the right which a religious denomination has under our Constitution to manage its own affairs in matters of religion, to allow any secular authority to divert the trust money for purposes other than those for which the trust was created. The State can step in only when the trust fails or is incapable of being carried out either in whole or in part. We hold, therefore, that Clause (3) of Section 55, which contains the offending provision and the corresponding provision relating to the powers of the court occurring in the latter part of Section 56 (1), must be held to be void.”\n<\/p>\n
To the same effect are the following observations of Rajagopala Ayyangar, J, in Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay, A. I. R.<\/a> 1962 S. C. 853 at page 873:–\n<\/p>\n
  “Article 26 confers on every religious denomination two rights which are relevant in the present context, by Clause (b) –‘to manage its own affairs in matters of religion’ — and by the last clause — Clause (d) — ‘to administer such property’ which the denomination owns or has acquired (vide Clause (c)) ‘in accordance with law’. In considering the scope of Article 26 one has to bear in mind two basic postulates; First that a religious denomination is possessed of property which is dedicated for definite uses and which under Article 26 (d) the religious denomination has the right to administer. From this it would follow that subject to any law grounded on public order, morality or health the limitations with which Article 26 opens, the denomination has a right to have the property used for the purposes for which it was dedicated. So far as the present case is concerned, the management of the property and the right and the duty to ensure the proper application of that property is admittedly vested in the Dai as the religious head of the denomination. Article 26 (d) speaks of the administration of the property being in accordance with law and the learned Attorney-General suggested that<\/p>\n
e valid law could be enacted which would permit the diversion of those funds to purposes which the legislature in its wisdom thought it fit to appropriate. I feel wholly unable to accept this argument.”\n<\/p>\n
In the light of the aforesaid pronouncements it has to be held that the provision contained in Section 24 (3) (f) empowering a secular authority, namely, the State Government to sanction the diversion of Devaswom funds for purposes unconnected with the Devaswom and its affairs is unconstitutional and void.\n<\/p>\n
59. The next Section to be noticed is Section 29 which bars suits, prosecution or other legal proceedings against the Government, the Commissioner, the Committee or any members thereof or the Administrator in respect of anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done under the Act or the Rules made thereunder. In as much as the remedy under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure is made unavailable to the members of the denomination by reason of Section 5 (3) (e) of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act the applicability of which to the Guruvayoor Devaswom is kept in force by Section 35 of the Act, the effect of this Section (Section 29) is to completely deprive the denomination of any right to approach the civil court for questioning the acts of the Administrator, the Committee or the Government and for safeguarding the interests of the Temple against mismanagement. In fact this provision drives the last nail on the coffin so far as the denomination is concerned and it imposes a total restraint on the denomination from discharging its legitimate role in protecting the interests of the religious institution in respect of the maintenance and administration of which it has a guaranteed fundamental right. We do not find it possible to uphold the constitutional validity of Section 29 in the setting in which the said Section occurs in this Act.\n<\/p>\n
60. Lastly, we come to Section 32 which provides for the constitution of the Renovation Executive Committee. The said committee is to consist of such number of members not exceeding thirty as may be appointed by the Government and the Minister of the State of Kerala in charge of Devaswom is to be the President of the committee. The Government is empowered to nominate one of the members of the committee to be its
\nVice-President and Working Chairman. The Section does not prescribe any qualifications as such for membership of the committee. But Sub-section (1F) enumerates certain disqualifications for membership, namely, (a) not professing the Hindu religion (b) being engaged in any subsisting contract with the Devaswom of the committee or (c) being subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in Clauses (a) to (c) of Section 5 (3) to which reference has already been made. The members of the committee are to hold office for a period of three years. As in the case of the members of the Managing Committee, the Government is empowered to remove from office any member of the Renovation Executive Committee for the reason inter alia that his presence in the committee is, in the opinion of the Government, prejudicial to the interests of the Devaswom or detrimental to the object for which the Committee is constituted. This Committee is to exercise such powers and discharge such functions in connection with the renovation and improvement of the Temple as may be specified by the Government. The Committee is empowered to receive contributions from the public for the specific purpose of renovation and improvement of the Temple. All such contributions are to go into a fund called the “Sree Guruvayoor Renovation Fund” and it is to be administered by the Renovation Executive Committee subject to such directions as the Government may from time to time issue. The fund is to be utilised for the renovation and improvement of the Temple and for incidental purposes including the manitenance of necessary establishments and any unspent amount of the fund is to be transferred to the Temple Fund. It is to be noted that the Renovation Executive Committee is a body wholly independent of the Managing Committee constituted under Section 3 and it is not in any manner answerable or accountable to the Managing Committee. The responsibility to carry out necessary works of renovation and improvement of the Temple is essentially an integral part of the function of administration and management of the Temple. Under Section 3 the administration and management of the Temple is statutorily vested in the Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee on the assumption that it is a body representative of the denomination.\n<\/p>\n
It is   difficult   to   see   how   it   is   legally permissible to   divest   that   body of the<\/p>\n
important function of deciding what works of renovation and improvement have to be carried out in the Temple and getting the same executed. To invest that function in an independent Committee and to empower that Committee to collect contributions from the public in the name of the Temple and to expend those amounts in the guise of administering a special fund is certainly highly objectionable. All amounts contributed by the devotees and the general public for the purpose of renovation and improvement of the Temple automatically become part of the trust fund belonging to the Devaswom and it is only the body legally charged with the duty of administering the trust that can deal with the said funds. To permit any other agency which can in no way be regarded as the duly constituted representative of the denomination, to collect funds in the name of the Devaswom and to administer such fund in accordance with such direction as may be issued by the secular Government is totally opposed to all fundamental principles of law governing the administration of religions trusts. We have no hesitation to hold that, Section 32 interferes with the freedom of the denomination to practice its religion and to maintain the religious institution and administer its properties in accordance with law and is hence violative of Articles 25 and 26 (a), (b) and (d) of the Constitution. For the reasons already indicated by us it is also not permissible for the Government to involve itself directly in the matter of renovation and reconstruction of a religious institution like the Temple by providing that a Minister of the State Government shall be the President of the Renovation Executive Committee. This is another defect fatal to the validity of the Section.\n<\/p>\n
61. What remains is only to consider the contentions urged by the petitioner based on Article 14 of the Constitution. Firstly, it was argued that in singling out the Guruvayoor Devaswom for special treatment without including in the scope of the Act many other important temples in respect of which also there is need for ensuring proper administration, there has been an arbitrary discrimination resulting in violation of Article 14. We see no merit in this contention. The Sree Krishna Temple at Guruvayoor is unique in many respects. If the legislature considered that there was necessity to make special provisions for ensuring the proper administration of this Temple which attracts lakhs of devotees from all parts of the country it was perfectly open for it to enact a special legislation for regulating the administration of the affairs of this institution alone. The uniqueness of the institution affords sufficient basis and justification for a classification. Article 14 cannot therefore be said to be violated merely on account of the fact that the legislation is in respect of the Guruvayoor Devaswom alone. It was however further contended by the petitioner that even if there is justification for a classification of the Temple for purposes of enacting a special legislation for regulating its administration, the provisions of the impugned Act are such that their underlying purpose has no reasonable nexus with the basis of the classification. Elaborate arguments were addressed before us with respect to the different provisions of the Act which have the effect of completely depriving the denomination of its rights in relation to the administration of the Temple and its properties, of vesting in the Managing Committee ‘the Temple Fund’ which really forms the property of the Deity and of authorising the Managing Committee, with the sanction of the Government, to divert the temple funds for secular purposes unconnected with the Temple even in the absence of any surplus etc., the contention being that there is no rational nexus whatever between the ground of classification referred to above and the purpose underlying these impugned provisions. We feel that there is prima facie force in this ground of attack raised by the petitioner based on Article 14 of the Constitution. But, since the arguments urged in support of this contention substantially overlap those which have been already considered by us in detail while dealing with the challenge raised by the petitioner against the same provisions of the Act on the ground of violation of Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution, and especially in view of the conclusion recorded by us that these provisions are liable to be struck down as violative of Articles 25 and 26, we do not think it necessary to pronounce upon the merits of this plea based on Article 14 of the Constitution.\n<\/p>\n
62. To sum up, we hold that for the reasons mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs Sections 3, 4, 11, 12, 14 to 18, Sub-section (6) of Section 19, Section 20, Section 21, Section 24 (1), (2) and Clause (f) of Sub-section (3), Section 29 and Section 32 are unconstitutional and void. Since the operative provisions of the Act are<\/p>\n
mainly contained in the aforementioned provisions which we have held to be invalid and since it is not possible to effectuate the object, purpose and scheme of the Act with the aid of the remaining provisions alone the result is that the entire statute is rendered ineffective and void.\n<\/p>\n
63. In the light of our conclusion that Section 24 (3) (f) is invalid and unconstitutional it must automatically follow that the impugned resolution Ext. P-1 passed by the Managing Committee is illegal and void. Ext. P-1 will therefore stand quashed.\n<\/p>\n
64. Before parting with the case we wish to place on record our grateful appreciation of the very valuable assistance that we have derived from the exhaustive and learned arguments advanced before us by the counsel appearing on both sides.\n<\/p>\n
65. The original petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. We direct the parties to bear their respective costs.\n<\/p>\n
A carbon copy of this judgment will be furnished to the learned Additional Advocate-General free of charge forthwith. Like copies will be furnished to the other counsel appearing in the case on payment of the requisite charges.\n<\/p>\n
 Viswanatha Iyer, J.\n<\/p>\n
 66.    I am a party to the decision in Kunhettan Thampuran v. ‘State of Kerala, (1973) Ker LT 106 : (AIR 1973 Ker 106) (FB). In that case though many sections of the Guruvayoor Devaswom Act, 1971 were challenged, it was expressly made clear by the counsel appearing for the petitioners that the attack is confined to Clauses (a), (b) and (g) of Section 10 and Clause (b) of Section 27 (2) of the Act and in the first paragraph of the judgment pronounced by Raghavan, C. J. (for himself and on my behalf) this fact is specifically referred to. In the light of that submission limiting the attack to certain Sections only, the validity of the other provisions of the Act were not considered in that case. Gopalan Nambiyar, J. (as he then was) agreed with that judgment. In the present petition which is being considered by a larger Bench the entire Act & of 1971 as amended by the Guruvayoor Devaswom (Amendment) Act 28 of 1972 is challenged and a fuller and detailed examination of the provisions of the Act as amended shows that the administration of the Guruvayoor Devaswom and properties is completely taken out of the Hindu denomination and hence the Act violates Article 26 of the Constitution. I agree with the leading judgment delivered by V. Balakrishna Eradi, J.\n<\/p>\n
 ORDER OF   FULL   BENCH <\/p>\n
67. Since it will not be in the public interest to create a hiatus in the matter of the administration of the Devaswom even for any short period, we consider it appropriate in the interests of justice to direct that the operation of this judgment will stand stayed for a period of two weeks from to-day in order to allow reasonable time to the State to take such steps as it may deem fit in the light of this pronouncement by this Court.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Kerala High Court Tharamel Krishnan vs Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing … on 15 November, 1977 Equivalent citations: AIR 1978 Ker 68 Author: V Iyer Bench: V B Eradi, G V Iyer, K Bhaskaran, T C Menon, K Narendran JUDGMENT Balakrishna Eradi, J. (for himself and on behalf of K. Bhaskaran, T. Chandrasekhara Menon and K.K. Narendran, […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[8,21],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-32923","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-high-court","category-kerala-high-court"],"yoast_head":"\nTharamel Krishnan vs Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing ... on 15 November, 1977 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/tharamel-krishnan-vs-guruvayoor-devaswom-managing-on-15-november-1977\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Tharamel Krishnan vs Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing ... on 15 November, 1977 - 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