{"id":36114,"date":"1999-09-16T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1999-09-15T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ajit-singh-and-ors-vs-the-state-of-punjab-and-ors-on-16-september-1999"},"modified":"2017-11-11T01:26:25","modified_gmt":"2017-11-10T19:56:25","slug":"ajit-singh-and-ors-vs-the-state-of-punjab-and-ors-on-16-september-1999","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ajit-singh-and-ors-vs-the-state-of-punjab-and-ors-on-16-september-1999","title":{"rendered":"Ajit Singh And Ors vs The State Of Punjab And Ors on 16 September, 1999"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Ajit Singh And Ors vs The State Of Punjab And Ors on 16 September, 1999<\/div>\n
Author: M Rao<\/div>\n
Bench: S.P. Kurdukar, M. Jagannadha Rao.<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nAJIT SINGH AND ORS.\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nTHE STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT:\t16\/09\/1999\n\nBENCH:\nS.P. KURDUKAR, & M. JAGANNADHA RAO.\n\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
M.JAGANNADHA RAO,J.\n<\/p>\n
\t  We  have  before  us\t these\tthree  Interlocutory
\nApplications  Nos.  1 to 3 filed for “clarification” by\t the
\nState  of  Punjab in Civil Appeal Nos.3792-94 of 1989  (Ajit
\nSingh  Januja  & Others vs.  State of Punjab)<\/a> [1996 (2)\t SCC
\n215]  (hereinafter  referred  to  as   Ajit  Singh  in\tthis
\njudgment).   The  matter  concerns  a  dispute\trelating  to
\nseniority of reserved candidates and general candidates.\n<\/p>\n
\t  At  the  outset  we  make it clear  that  in\tthis
\njudgment we are not concerned with the reservation policy of
\nthe  State  or\twith the validity of  any  procedure  fixing
\nroster\t points\t for  purpose  of  promotion   of   reserved
\ncandidates.   We  are  here  dealing  only  with  a  limited
\nquestion  relating  mainly  to\tseniority  of  the  reserved
\ncandidates promoted at roster points.\n<\/p>\n
\t  We  also  make it clear that what we are  deciding
\ntoday is based on principles already laid down by this Court
\nsince  1950  and in particular since 1963.  Basing on  those
\nprinciples, we are concerned with the limited question as to
\nwhether\t Union of India vs.  Virpal Singh<\/a> [1993 (6) SCC 685]
\nand  Ajit  Singh Januja vs.  State of Punjab<\/a> [1996  (2)\t SCC
\n215],  which  were earlier decided in favour of the  general
\ncandidates  are\t to  be\t affirmed   or\twhether\t the  latter
\ndeviation  made\t in Jagdish Lal vs.  State of Haryana<\/a>  [1997
\n(6)  SCC  538]\tagainst\t the general candidates,  is  to  be
\naccepted.    How  these\t IAs  1-3   came  to  be  filed\t for
\nclarification:?\t  The circumstances under which the State of
\nPunjab\thas  filed  these  IAs\t for  clarification  are  as
\nfollows:-  Initially,  in  a  case relating  to\t the  Indian
\nRailways,  a two Judge Bench of this Court in Union of India
\nvs.   Virpal Singh<\/a> [1995 (6) SCC 685] (hereinafter  referred
\nto  as\tVirpal)\t held  that it\twas  “permissible”  for\t the
\nRailways  to say that reserved candidates who get  promotion
\nat  the\t roster\t points\t would\tnot  be\t entitled  to  claim
\nseniority at the promotional level as against senior general
\ncandidates  who got promoted at a later point of time to the
\nsame  level.  It was further held that “it would be open” to
\nthe  State  to provide that as and when the  senior  general
\ncandidate  got promoted under the rules, – whether by way of
\na seniority rule or a selection rule – to the level to which
\nthe  reserved  candidate was promoted earlier,\tthe  general
\ncandidate would have to be treated as senior to the reserved
\ncandidate  (the\t roster point promotee) at  the\t promotional
\nlevel as well, unless, of course, the reserved candidate got
\na further promotion by that time to a higher post.  (This is
\ndescribed  for convenience, as the ‘catch up’ rule) Close on
\nthe  heels of Virpal, came Ajit Singh from Punjab, before  a
\nthree  Judge  Bench and the Bench held that the question  of
\nseniority  at  the  promotional level had to be\t decided  by
\napplying  the provisions of Article 14 and 16 (1) and if any
\norder,\t circular  or  rule   provided\tthat  such  reserved
\ncandidates  who\t got promotions at roster points were to  be
\ntreated\t as senior to the senior general candidates who were
\npromoted  later, then such an order, circular or rule  would
\nbe violative of Article 14 and 16(1).  It was, however, held
\nthat  the  position  would be different if by the  time\t the
\nsenior\tgeneral candidate got his promotion under the normal
\nrules  of seniority or selection, the reserved candidate who
\nwas  promoted earlier at the roster point, had got a further
\npromotion.  In other words, the `catch up’ principle as laid
\ndown  in  Virpal  was  accepted.  In  coming  to  the  above
\nconclusions,   the  three  Judge   Bench  relied  upon\t the
\nprinciples  laid  down\tby the nine Judge  Bench  in  Indira
\nSawhney\t vs.  Union of India<\/a> [1992 Suppl.  (3) SCC 251]\t and
\nby  the\t Constitution Bench in R.K.Sabharwal vs.   State  of
\nPunjab<\/a>\t[1995  (2) SCC 745].  These two cases had laid\tdown
\nearlier\t the  manner  in  which the rights  of\tthe  general
\ncandidates and the reserved candidates ought to be balanced.
\nIn  Ajit Singh the Court said the balance must be maintained
\nin  such  a manner that there was no reverse  discrimination
\nagainst\t the general candidates and that any rule,  circular
\nor  order  which gave seniority to the\treserved  candidates
\npromoted  at roster point, would be violative of Articles 14
\nand 16(1) of the Constitution of India.\t The Indian Railways
\nfollowing  the law laid down in Virpal issued a circular  on
\n28.2.97\t to the effect that the reserved candidates promoted
\nat  roster points could not claim seniority over the  senior
\ngeneral\t candidates  promoted  later.  The State  of  Punjab
\nafter\tfollowing  Ajit\t Singh\t was  proceeding  to  revise
\nseniority  lists  and make further promotions of the  senior
\ngeneral\t candidates  who had reached the level to which\t the
\nreserved  candidates had reached earlier.  At that point  of
\ntime,  another three Judge Bench came to decide a case\tfrom
\nthe  State  of Haryana in Jagdish Lal vs.  State of  Haryana<\/a>
\n[1997  (6)  SCC 538] and took a view contrary to Virpal\t and
\nAjit  Singh.   It held that the general rule in the  Service
\nRules  relating\t to  seniority from the date  of  continuous
\nofficiation  which  was\t applicable to\tcandidates  promoted
\nunder  the  normal  seniority\/selection procedure  would  be
\nattracted  even\t to the roster point promotees as  otherwise
\nthere\twould  be  discrimination   against   the   reserved
\ncandidates.   The  Bench  also observed that  the  right  to
\npromotion  was\ta  statutory right while the rights  of\t the
\nreserved  candidates under Article 16(4) and Article  16(4A)
\nwere  fundamental  rights  and in that behalf,\tit  followed
\nAshok  Kumar  Gupta vs.\t State of U.P.\t[1997 (5)  SCC\t201]
\nwhere  a  similar  principle  had   been  laid\tdown.\t The
\nContentions  in\t brief:\t  Sri Hardev Singh,  learned  senior
\ncounsel for the State of Punjab submitted that since Jagdish
\nLal  decided something contrary to Virpal and Ajit Singh the
\nState  was in a `quandary what to do.  In these IAs and\t the
\nconnected batch of cases which have been listed together and
\nheard, contentions have been raised by Sri Rajeev Dhawan for
\nthe  State  of\tHaryana\t and  Sri  Altaf  Ahmad,  Additional
\nSolicitor  General  of India for the State of Rajasthan\t and
\nthe  Union  of India.  According to the learned counsel\t the
\n‘roster\t point\tpromotees’, ( i.e.  a reserved candidate  at
\nLevel 1 who is promoted to Level 2 at the roster point meant
\nfor  such promotion) namely, the reserved candidates  cannot
\nclaim  seniority  on  the basis of  continuous\tofficiation.
\nHowever,  learned  Additional  Solicitor General,  Sri\tC.S.
\nVaidyanathan  for  the Indian Railways has taken a  contrary
\nstand-,\t in  spite  of the fact that  Railways\thas  already
\naccepted  Virpal  and issued a circular on  28.2.1997  -that
\nroster\tpoint  promotions  in the Railways  did\t not  confer
\nseniority.   Senior counsel Sri Harish Salve and others\t for
\nthe  general candidates contended that Virpal and Ajit Singh
\nwere  correctly decided and Jagdish Lal was wrongly decided.
\nSenior counsel Sri K.  Parasaran, Sri D.D.  Thakur, Sri M.N.
\nRao,  and  others  including Sri Jose P.  Verghese  for\t the
\nreserved  candidates  relied  upon   Jagdish  Lal  and\tthey
\ncontended  that Virpal and Ajit Singh were wrongly  decided.
\nThe  validity of the ‘catch-up’ rule accepted in Virpal\t and
\nAjit  Singh in favour of general candidates was also put  in
\nissue.\t One additional point was also argued.\tThis related
\nto  the “prospectivity” of R.K.Sabharwal and Ajit Singh.  In
\nR.K.Sabharwal this Court has held that once the roster point
\npromotions  were  all  made  in\t  respect  of  the  reserved
\ncandidates, the roster ceased to operate.  Unless any of the
\nreserved  candidates  already promoted had retired  or\tbeen
\nfurther\t promoted  etc.\t  and  unless there  was  a  vacancy
\ngenerated  at  the points already filled,  fresh  candidates
\nfrom  the  reserved  candidates\t could not  be\tpromoted  by
\nfurther\t operation of the roster.  Having so held, the Court
\nsaid that the judgment would be “prospective”.\tThe reserved
\ncandidates  now contend that the above direction means\tthat
\nnot  only  the reserved candidates so promoted in excess  of
\nthe  roster  points  could not be reverted  but\t that  their
\nseniority  against such excess promotions was also protected
\nvide Sabharwal.\n<\/p>\n
\t  Likewise,  in regard to Ajit Singh, the contention
\nwas  as\t follows:  Assume there are rosters at Level  1\t and
\nagain at Level 2.  Assume that a reserved candidate has been
\npromoted  from Level 1 to Level 2 on the basis of the roster
\npoint  and again from Level 2 to Level 3 on roster point.  A
\nsenior\tgeneral candidate at Level 1 has later reached Level
\n3  and by that date the reserved candidate is still at Level\n<\/p>\n
3.   Assume that the plea of the general candidates that the
\ngeneral\t candidate  became senior at Level 3 to the  earlier
\npromoted  reserved  candidate,\tis  correct.   Ignoring\t the
\nsenior\tgeneral candidate at Level 3, the reserved candidate
\nhas been further promoted to Level 4 before 1.3.96 when Ajit
\nSingh was decided.  In that event, the prospective operation
\nof  Ajit Singh means, according to the reserved\t candidates,
\nthat  such  a  reserved\t candidate is not  only\t not  to  be
\nreverted  but  his  seniority  at  Level 4  is\talso  to  be
\nprotected.  The general candidates say that after Ajit Singh
\nwas  decided  on 1.3.96 the said promotion made to Level  4,
\nignoring  the case of the senior general candidate at  Level
\n3,  is\tto  be reviewed and seniority at Level 3  is  to  be
\nrefixed.   At Level 4, – when the general candidate is\talso
\npromoted to Level 4, the seniority of the reserved candidate
\nhas  also to be fixed on the basis as to when he would\thave
\notherwise  been\t promoted to Level 4, after considering\t the
\ncase  of his senior general candidate at Level 3.  We  shall
\nbe dealing with these main contentions in this judgment.  So
\nfar  as\t the individual points raised in the Civil  Appeals,
\nContempt  Cases\t and other IAs are concerned, we shall\tdeal
\nwith them by separate judgments for convenience.\n<\/p>\n
\t  On  the above contentions, the following four main
\npoints arise for consideration:\t Points:\n<\/p>\n
……….L…..T…….T…….T…….T…….T…….T..J
\n\t  (1)  Can  the\t roster point promotees\t (  reserved
\n\t  category)  count  their seniority in the  promoted
\n\t  category  from  the  date   of  their\t  continuous
\n\t  officiation  vis-a-vis general candidates who were
\n\t  senior  to them in the lower category and who were
\n\t  later\t promoted  to  the  same  level?   (2)\tHave
\n\t  Virpal,  Ajit Singh been correctly decided and has
\n\t  Jagdish  Lal been correctly decided?\t(3)  Whether
\n\t  the  ‘catch-up’  principles contended for  by\t the
\n\t  general  candidates are tenable?  (4) What is\t the
\n\t  meaning   of\t the   ‘prospective’  operation\t  of
\n\t  Sabbarwal  and  to what extent can Ajit  Singh  be
\n\t  prospective?\t .lm10\tPoints (1) and (2):  A\tword
\n\t  with\tregard\tto Article 16(4) & Article 16  (4A):
\n\t  Learned  senior counsel for the general candidates
\n\t  submitted  at the outset that while Indira Sawhney
\n\t  permitted reservations for a period of five years,
\n\t  the  Constitution  was  amended  within  the\tsaid
\n\t  period   and\tArticle\t  16(4A)  was\tincorporated
\n\t  permitting   reservation   in\t   promotions\t but
\n\t  restricting  the  same  to  Scheduled\t Castes\t and
\n\t  Scheduled  Tribes.  Learned counsel submitted that
\n\t  it  was  their contention that this amendment\t was
\n\t  not constitutionally permissible but this question
\n\t  need not be decided in this batch as separate writ
\n\t  petitions  challenging  the  validity\t of  Article
\n\t  16(4A)  are pending in this Court.  In view of the
\n\t  above\t stand,\t we shall proceed in these cases  on
\n\t  the assumption that Article 16(4A) is valid and is
\n\t  not  unconstitutional.  At the same time, we\talso
\n\t  note\tthe  contention of the\treserved  candidates
\n\t  that\t Article  16(4A)  must\tbe  deemed   to\t  be
\n\t  constitutional  unless  otherwise  declared.\t .pa
\n\t  Article  16(1), 16(4) and 16(4A):  In the  context
\n\t  of the first and second questions, it is necessary
\n\t  to  refer  to the relevant parts of Article 16  of
\n\t  the  Constitution of India.  Sub-clauses (1),\t (4)
\n\t  and  (4A)  of Article 16 which have  relevance  in
\n\t  this\tcase  read  as\t follows:   “Article  16(1)-
\n\t  Equality  of\tappointment  in\t matters  of  public
\n\t  employment:-\t There\t shall\t  be   equality\t  of
\n\t  opportunity  for all citizens in matters  relating
\n\t  to  employment or appointment to any office  under
\n\t  the State.\n<\/p>\n
\t  (2)………………………………..\n<\/p>\n
\t  (3)………………………………..\n<\/p>\n
\t  (4)  Nothing\tin  this Article shall\tprevent\t the
\n\t  State\t  from\t making\t any   provision   for\t the
\n\t  reservation  of appointment or posts in favour  of
\n\t  any  backward\t class\tof citizens  which,  in\t the
\n\t  opinion   of\t the  State,   is   not\t  adequately
\n\t  represented in the services under the State.\n<\/p>\n
\t  (4A)\tNothing\t in this Article shall\tprevent\t the
\n\t  State from making any provision for reservation in
\n\t  matters  of  promotion of any class or classes  of
\n\t  posts in the services under the State in favour of
\n\t  Scheduled  Castes and the Scheduled Tribes  which,
\n\t  in  the  opinion of the State are  not  adequately
\n\t  represented in the services under the State.”\n<\/p>\n
\t  I…….T…….T…….T…….T…….T…….T…….T..J
\n\t  Constitution\tis  not\t static:  We  shall  at\t the
\n\t  outset  deal\twith  the contention raised  by\t Sri
\n\t  D.D.Thakur,  learned senior counsel appearing\t for
\n\t  the reserved candidates that Article 16(4) must be
\n\t  interpreted\tkeeping\t in   mind  the\t  conditions
\n\t  prevailing  fifty years ago when the\tConstitution
\n\t  was\tdrafted\t  and  when    Article\t 16(4)\t was
\n\t  incorporated in the Constitution.  Learned counsel
\n\t  submitted that the founding fathers were conscious
\n\t  that\ta  special  provision  for  reservation\t was
\n\t  necessary  to\t see  that the backward\t classes  of
\n\t  citizens   were  adequately\trepresented  in\t the
\n\t  services.   Hence  an interpretation\twhich  would
\n\t  advance  the\tsaid  objective\t  must\tbe  applied.
\n\t  Reliance  was\t also  placed on  the  Statement  of
\n\t  Objects  and\tReasons\t in   connection  with\t the
\n\t  incorporation of Article 16(4A).  In fact, all the
\n\t  learned   counsel  appearing\t for  the   reserved
\n\t  candidates  contended that the said officers could
\n\t  not be treated as equals to the general candidates
\n\t  and  that  their  backwardness   and\tpast  social
\n\t  oppression must be borne in mind.  Nobody can deny
\n\t  that\tthe  above approach is the proper one  while
\n\t  dealing  with\t the reserved classes.\tThe  primary
\n\t  purpose of Article 16(4) and Article 16(4A) is due
\n\t  representation  of  certain\tclasses\t in  certain
\n\t  posts.   However,  we\t must bear in mind  and\t not
\n\t  ignore  that\tthere are other provisions,  namely,
\n\t  Articles   14,  16(1)\t and   Article\t335  of\t the
\n\t  Constitution\twhich are also very important.\t The
\n\t  Constitution\thas  laid  down in Articles  14\t and
\n\t  16(1) the permissible limits of affirmative action
\n\t  by  way  of reservation under Articles  16(4)\t and
\n\t  16(4A).  While permitting reservations at the same
\n\t  time,\t it  has also placed certain limitations  by
\n\t  way  of Articles 14 and 16(1) so that there is  no
\n\t  reverse  discrimination.  It has also incorporated
\n\t  Article   335\t  so   that    the   efficiency\t  of
\n\t  administration   is\tnot    jeopardized.    While
\n\t  interpreting provisions of the Constitution and in
\n\t  particular  fundamental rights of citizens, it  is
\n\t  well to bear in mind certain fundamental concepts.
\n\t  In  McCulloch\t Vs.  Maryland ( 1819) 4  Wheel\t (17
\n\t  U.S.316), Chief Justice Marshall cautioned that we
\n\t  must keep in mind that it is the Constitution that
\n\t  we  are expounding.  He said that the Constitution
\n\t  was  intended\t to endure for ages to come and\t had
\n\t  consequently\tto be adapted to the various  crises
\n\t  of  human  affairs from time to time.\t Brandeis  J
\n\t  wrote\t :   “Our  Constitution is  not\t a  straight
\n\t  jacket.   It is a living organism.  As such it  is
\n\t  capable  of growth, of expansion and of adaptation
\n\t  to   new  conditions.\t   Growth  implies  changes,
\n\t  political,  economic and social.  Growth which  is
\n\t  significant\t manifests    itself\trather\t  in
\n\t  intellectual\tand  moral conceptions\tof  material
\n\t  things”  (Brandeis  Papers, Harvard  Law  School).
\n\t  Similarly, in a beautiful metaphor Mr.  J.M.\tBeck
\n\t  said as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “The\tConstitution is neither, on the one hand,  a
\n\t  Gibraltor Rock, which wholly resists the ceaseless
\n\t  washing  of time and circumstances, nor is it,  on
\n\t  the  other  hand, a sandy beach, which  is  slowly
\n\t  destroyed  by erosion of the waves.  It is  rather
\n\t  to  be  likened  to a floating dock  which,  while
\n\t  firmly attached to its moorings, and not therefore
\n\t  at  the caprice of the waves, yet rises and  falls
\n\t  with\t the  tide  of\t time\tand   circumstances”\n<\/p>\n
\t  (Constitution\t of  the United\t States,  Yesterday,
\n\t  Today\t and  Tomorrow’ ( 1924)\t (Oxford  University
\n\t  Press).”\n<\/p>\n
L………I…..T…….T…….T…….T…….T…….T..J
\n\t  Such\tshould\tbe  and\t would be  our\tapproach  in
\nresolving  the\timportant constitutional issues\t arising  in
\nthese IAs and in this batch of cases.\n<\/p>\n
\t  We  shall  first deal with the fundamental  rights
\nunder  Articles 14 and 16(1) and then with the nature of the
\nrights\tof the reserved candidates under Articles 16(4)\t and
\n16(4A).\n<\/p>\n
\t  Articles  14 and 16(1):  Is right to be considered
\nfor promotion a fundamental right?\n<\/p>\n
\t  Article   14\tand  Article   16(1)   are   closely
\nconnected.   They deal with individual rights of the person.
\nArticle\t 14  demands that the “State shall not deny  to\t any
\nperson\tequality  before the law or the equal protection  of
\nthe  laws”.   Article 16(1) issues a positive  command\tthat
\n“there\tshall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in
\nthe  matters  relating to employment or appointment  to\t any
\noffice\tunder  the State”.  It has been held  repeatedly  by
\nthis  Court that sub-clause (1) of Article 16 is a facet  of
\nArticle 14 and that it takes its roots from Article 14.\t The
\nsaid sub- clause particularizes the generality in Article 14
\nand   identifies,   in\ta  constitutional  sense   “equality
\nopportunity” in matters of employment and appointment to any
\noffice\tunder the State.  The word ’employment’ being wider,
\nthere  is  no  dispute that it takes within  its  fold,\t the
\naspect\tof  promotions to posts above the stage\t of  initial
\nlevel  of  recruitment.\t  Article 16(1)\t provides  to  every
\nemployee  otherwise  eligible  for promotion  or  who  comes
\nwithin\tthe zone of consideration, a fundamental right to be
\n“considered”  for  promotion.  Equal opportunity here  means
\nthe  right  to be “considered” for promotion.  If  a  person
\nsatisfies  the\teligibility  and zone criteria\tbut  is\t not
\nconsidered  for\t promotion,  then  there  will\tbe  a  clear
\ninfraction  of his fundamental right to be “considered”\t for
\npromotion,  which is his personal right.  “Promotion”  based
\non  equal  opportunity\tand  ‘seniority’  attached  to\tsuch
\npromotion  are\tfacets\tof fundamental right  under  Article
\n16(1):\t Where promotional avenues are available,  seniority
\nbecomes\t closely interlinked with promotion provided such  a
\npromotion  is  made  after complying with the  principle  of
\nequal  opportunity stated in Article 16(1).  For example, if
\nthe  promotion\tis by rule of `seniority-cum-  suitability’,
\nthe  eligible  seniors at the basic level as  per  seniority
\nfixed  at  that\t level\tand  who  are  within  the  zone  of
\nconsideration  must be first considered for promotion and be
\npromoted  if found suitable.  In the promoted category\tthey
\nwould  have  to count their seniority from the date of\tsuch
\npromotion  because  they get promotion through a process  of
\nequal  opportunity.   Similarly, if the promotion  from\t the
\nbasic  level is by selection or merit or any rule  involving
\nconsideration  of  merit, the senior who is eligible at\t the
\nbasic level has to be considered and if found meritorious in
\ncomparison  with others, he will have to be promoted  first.
\nIf  he\tis  not found so meritorious, the next in  order  of
\nseniority is to be considered and if found eligible and more
\nmeritorious  than the first person in the seniority list, he
\nshould be promoted.  In either case, the person who is first
\npromoted  will normally count his seniority from the date of
\nsuch  promotion.  (There are minor modifications in  various
\nservices  in  the  matter of counting of seniority  of\tsuch
\npromotees  but\tin all cases the senior most person  at\t the
\nbasic level is to be considered first and then the others in
\nthe  line of seniority).  That is how right to be considered
\nfor promotion and the `seniority’ attached to such promotion
\nbecome\timportant facets of the fundamental right guaranteed
\nin  Article 16(1).  Right to be considered for promotion  is
\nnot  a mere statutory right:  The question is as to  whether
\nthe right to be considered for promotion is a mere statutory
\nright  or  a fundamental right.\t Learned senior counsel\t for
\nthe  general candidates submitted that in Ashok Kumar  Gupta
\nVs.   State  of U.P.  (1997 (5) SCC 201), it has  been\tlaid
\ndown that the right to promotion is only a “statutory right”
\nwhile  the  rights covered by Articles 16(4) and 16(4A)\t are
\n“fundamental  rights”.\tSuch a view has also been  expressed
\nin Jagdish Lal and some other latter cases where these cases
\nhave been followed.  Counsel submitted that this was not the
\ncorrect\t constitutional\t position.  In this  connection\t our
\nattention  has been invited to para 43 of Ashok Kumar Gupta.
\nIt reads as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
\t  “It would thus be clear that right to promotion is
\na  statutory  right.   It is not a fundamental\tright.\t The
\nright  to promotion to a post or class of posts depends upon
\nthe  operation of the conditions of service.  Article  16(4)
\nread  with  Articles  16(1)  and 14 guarantees\ta  right  to
\npromotion  to Dalits and Tribes as a fundamental right where
\nthey  do not have adequate representation consistently\twith
\nthe  efficiency of administration…  before expiry  thereof
\n(i.e.  5 years rule), Article 16(4) has come into force from
\n17.6.1995.  Therefore, the right to promotion continues as a
\nconstitutionally  guaranteed  fundamental right.” A  similar
\nview was expressed in Jagdishlal and followed in some latter
\ncases.\t In  the  above\t passage,  it  was  laid  down\tthat
\npromotion  was a statutory right and that Articles 16(4) and
\n16(4A)\tconferred  fundamental rights.\tIn our opinion,\t the
\nabove  view expressed in Ashok Kumar Gupta, and followed  in
\nJagdish\t Lal and other cases, if it is intended to lay\tdown
\nthat   the   right  guaranteed\tto   employees\t for   being
\n“considered”  for  promotion according to relevant rules  of
\nrecruitment by promotion(i.e.  whether on basis of seniority
\nor  merit)  is only a statutory right and not a\t fundamental
\nright,\twe  cannot accept the proposition.  We have  already
\nstated\tearlier\t that the right to equal opportunity in\t the
\nmatter\tof  promotion  in  the\tsense\tof  a  right  to  be
\n“considered”  for  promotion is indeed a  fundamental  right
\nguaranteed  under  Article  16(1) and this  has\t never\tbeen
\ndoubted\t in  any other case before Ashok Kumar Gupta,  right
\nfrom  1950.   Articles\t16(4) and 16(4A) do not\t confer\t any
\nfundamental  right  to\treservation:  We next  come  to\t the
\nquestion whether Article 16(4) and Article 16(4A) guaranteed
\nany  fundamental  right to reservation.\t It should be  noted
\nthat  both these Articles open with a non-obstante clause  –
\n“Nothing in this Article shall prevent the State from making
\nany  provision\tfor  reservation…..”.\t There is  a  marked
\ndifference  in the language employed in Article 16(1) on the
\none  hand and Article 16(4) and Article 16(4A).\t There is no
\ndirective  or command in Article 16(4) or Article 16(4A)  as
\nin  Article 16(1).  On the face of it, the above language in
\neach  of  Articles 16(4) and 16(4A), is in the nature of  an
\nenabling  provision  and  it has been so held  in  judgments
\nrendered  by  Constitution Benches and in other cases  right
\nfrom  1963.   We may in this connection point out  that\t the
\nattention  of  the  learned Judges who decided\tAshok  Kumar
\nGupta  and  Jagdish Lal was not obviously drawn to a  direct
\ncase  decided  by a Constitution Bench in C.A.Rajendran\t vs.
\nUnion  of  India<\/a> 1968 (1) SCC 721 which arose under  Article
\n16(4).\t It  was clearly laid down by the five\tJudge  Bench
\nthat  Article  16(4)  was only an enabling  provision,\tthat
\nArticle\t 16(4)\twas not a fundamental right and that it\t did
\nnot  impose  any constitutional duty.  It only\tconferred  a
\ndiscretion  on\tthe  State.  The passage in the\t above\tcase
\nreads as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “Our\tconclusion  therefore is that Article  16(4)
\ndoes  not confer any right on the petitioner and there is no
\nconstitutional\tduty  imposed  on  the\tgovernment  to\tmake
\nreservation  for  Scheduled  Castes  and  Scheduled  Tribes,
\neither\tat  the initial stage or at the stage of  promotion.
\nIn  other words, Article 16(4) is an enabling provision\t and
\nconfers\t discretionary\tpower  on  the\t State\tto  make   a
\nreservation  of\t appointment in favour of backward class  of
\ncitizens   which,   in\tits   opinion,\tis  not\t  adequately
\nrepresented in the services of the State.”\n<\/p>\n
\t  The  above  principle was reiterated in two  three
\nJudge  Bench  judgments\t in  P&T  SC\/ST\t Employees’  Welfare
\nAssociation  vs.   Union of India<\/a> 1988 (4) SCC 147;  and  in
\nSBI  SC\/ST Employees Welfare Association vs.  State Bank  of
\nIndia  1996 (4) SCC 119.  In fact, as long back as in  1963,
\nin  M.R.Balaji vs.  State of Mysore<\/a> 1963 Suppl.\t (1) SCR 439
\n(at  p.474)  which was decided by Five learned\tJudges,\t the
\nCourt  said the same thing in connection with Articles 15(4)
\nand  Article  16(4).  Stating that Article 15(4)  and  16(4)
\nwere  only enabling provisions, Gajendragadkar, J.  ( as  he
\nthen was ) observed:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “In  this connection, it is necessary to emphasise
\nthat  Article  15(4)  like  Article  16(4)  is\tan  enabling
\nprovision,  it\tdoes  not impose an obligation,\t but  merely
\nleaves it to the discretion of the appropriate government to
\ntake suitable action, if necessary.”\n<\/p>\n
\t  Unfortunately, all these rulings of larger Benches
\nwere  not  brought to the notice of the Bench which  decided
\nAshok  Kumar Gupta and Jagdish Lal and to the Benches  which
\nfollowed  these\t two  cases.  In view  of  the\toverwhelming
\nauthority  right from 1963, we hold that both Articles 16(4)
\nand  16(4A) do not confer any fundamental rights nor do they
\nimpose\tany constitutional duties but are only in the nature
\nof  enabling provision vesting a discretion in the State  to
\nconsider   providing   reservation  if\t the   circumstances
\nmentioned  in  those Articles so warranted.  We\t accordingly
\nhold  that on this aspect Ashok Kumar Gupta, Jagdishlal\t and
\nthe cases which followed these cases do not lay down the law
\ncorrectly.   Power  is\tcoupled with duty:   Learned  senior
\ncounsel for the reserved candidates, Sri K.Parasaran however
\ncontended  that\t Article 16(4) and Article 16(4A)  confer  a
\npower  coupled with a duty and that it would be\t permissible
\nto  enforce  such  a  duty by issuing a\t writ  of  mandamus.
\nReliance  for  that purpose was placed upon Comptroller\t and
\nAuditor\t General of India, Gian Prakash vs.  K.S.Jagannathan<\/a>
\n[1986  (2)  SCC\t 679] and also on Julius  vs.\tLord  Bishop
\n(1880)\t5  AC 214 which case was followed by this  Court  in
\nCommissioner  of  Police  vs.  Gordhandas Bhanji<\/a>  [1952\t SCR
\n135].  We are unable to agree with the above contention.  As
\npointed out earlier, the Constitution Bench of this Court in
\nC.A.   Rajendran Vs.  Union of India (1968(1) SCR 721)\theld
\nthat Article 16(4) conferred a discretion and did not create
\nany  constitutional  duty or obligation.  In fact,  in\tthat
\ncase,  a  mandamus  was sought to direct the  Government  of
\nIndia  to  provide  for reservation under Article  16(4)  in
\ncertain\t Class\tI  and Class II\t services.   The  Government
\nstated\tthat  in  the  context of Article  335\tand  in\t the
\ninterests  of efficiency of administration at those  levels,
\nit was of the view that there should be no reservation.\t The
\nsaid opinion of the Government was accepted by this Court as
\nreasonable and mandamus was refused.  Even in M.R.  Balaji’s
\ncase,  the  Constitution Bench declared that  Article  16(4)
\nconferred   only  a  discretion.   It\tis  true   that\t  in
\nJagannathan’s case, the three Judge Bench issued a mandamus,
\nafter referring to Article 142, that the Government must add
\n25  marks  to  SC\/ST  candidates who had  taken\t the  S.A.S.
\nExamination  for  promotion  as Sections Officers  and\talso
\nthat,  in  future, a reduced minimum marks must be  provided
\nand  announced\tbefore\tthe  examination.   The\t Court\talso
\nobserved  that the Department had not passed orders as per a
\ngeneral\t O.M.\tof the Government dated 21.9.1977.  But\t the
\nattention  of the Court was not drawn to the judgment of the
\nConstitution Bench in C.A.  Rajendran’s case and other cases
\nto which we have referred earlier.  Further, if the State is
\nof  the\t opinion  that\tin the interests  of  efficiency  of
\nadministration,\t reservation  or relaxation in marks is\t not
\nappropriate,  then it will not be permissible for the  Court
\nto   issue  a  mandamus\t to   provide  for  reservation\t  or
\nrelaxation.   We also note that in Superintending  Engineer,
\nPublic\tHealth\tVs.   Kuldeep  Singh  (\t 1997(9)  SCC  199),
\nJagannathan’s  case  was followed and reference was made  to
\nArticle\t 16(4) and Article 16(4A) and to the principle\tthat
\nwhere  a power is coupled with a duty as in Julius Vs.\tLord
\nBishop\tand  Commissioner of Police Vs.\t Gordhandas  Bhanji,
\nthe  same could be enforced by the Court.  But we may  point
\nout that even in Kuldeep Singh’s case, no reference was made
\nto  C.A.  Rajendran and other cases.  We, accordingly,\thold
\nthat  the view in Jagannathan and Kuldeep Singh’s cases that
\na  mandamus can be issued either to provide for\t reservation
\nor  for\t relaxation  is\t not correct  and  runs\t counter  to
\njudgments  of  earlier Constitution Benches and,  therefore,
\nthese  two  judgments cannot be said to be laying  down\t the
\ncorrect law.\n<\/p>\n
\t  Balancing  of\t fundamental  rights  under  Article
\n16(1)  and the rights of reserved candidates under  Articles
\n16(4) and 16(4A):\n<\/p>\n
\t  Having  noticed  that Article 16(1) deals  with  a
\nfundamental  right and Article 16(4) and Article 16(4A)\t are
\nenabling  provisions, we next come to the need for balancing
\nArticle\t 16(1)\tand  Articles  16(4)  and  16(4A).   Such  a
\nbalancing principle was enunciated by the Constitution Bench
\nin  1963 in M.R.  Balaji Vs.  State of Mysore :\t 1963 Suppl.
\n(1)  SCR 439 wherein it was stated that the interests of the
\nreserved  classes must be balanced against the interests  of
\nother segments of society.  In Indira Sawhney’s case, Jeevan
\nReddy,\tJ.   explained\thow  the fundamental  right  of\t the
\ncitizens  as  declared in Article 16(1) has to\tbe  balanced
\nagainst\t the  claims of the reserved candidates\t in  Article
\n16(4).\tThe learned Judge stated:  (See page 734 para 808):\n<\/p>\n
\t  “It  needs  no emphasis to say that the  principal
\naim  of\t Articles  14  and 16 is equality  and\tequality  of
\nopportunity  and that clause (4) of Article 16 is a means of
\nachieving  the very same objective.  Clause (4) is a special
\nprovision – though not an exception to clause (1).  Both the
\nprovisions  have  to be harmonised keeping in mind the\tfact
\nthat  both  are restatements of the principles\tof  equality
\nenshrined  in Article 14.  The provision under Article 16(4)\n<\/p>\n
–  conceived in the interests of certain sections of society\n<\/p>\n
–  should  be  balanced against the  guarantee\tof  equality
\nenshrined  in clause (1) of Article 16 which is a  guarantee
\nheld  out to every citizen and to the entire society”.\t The
\nsame  principle\t was  reiterated  in  the  judgment  of\t the
\nConstitution  Bench  in Post Graduate Institute\t of  Medical
\nEducation and Research vs.  Faculty Association<\/a> 1998 (4) SCC
\n1 after referring to several earlier cases.  It was stated :
\n(P.22)\t” The doctrine of equality of opportunity in  clause
\n(1)  of Article 16 is to be reconciled in favour of backward
\nclasses under clause (4) of Article 16 in such a manner that
\nthe latter while serving the cause of backward classes shall
\nnot unreasonably encroach upon the field of equality”.\n<\/p>\n
\t  In Ajit Singh, in the context of seniority for the
\nroster point promotees it was observed :  (p.733 of SCC)<\/p>\n
\t  “For\tattracting meritorious and talented  persons
\ninto  service,\ta  balance has to be  struck,  while  making
\nprovisions  for\t reservation in respect of a section of\t the
\nsociety.   This\t Court\tfrom time to time has  been  issuing
\ndirections to maintain that balance….”\n<\/p>\n
\t  The  above  approach\tin Balaji  in  1963,  Indira
\nSawhney\t in 1991 later in Ajit Singh in 1996 and in PGI Case
\nin  1998  for  striking a balance  between  the\t individuals
\nrights\tunder  Articles\t 14 and 16(1) on the  one  hand\t and
\naffirmative  action  under  Articles 16(4) & 16(4A)  on\t the
\nother, appears to us to be on the same lines as the approach
\nof the U.S.  Supreme Court under the Equal Protection Clause
\nin  Richmond Vs.  Croson and Co.  (1989) 488 U.S.  469 (  at\n<\/p>\n
493).\tIn that case, it was stated that while dealing\twith
\nthe affirmative action taken in favour of African-Americans,
\nthe  Equal  Protection\tClause\twhich  conferred  individual
\nrights\thave  to  be kept in mind by  the  Courts.   Justice
\nSandra Day O’Connor observed:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “The\tEqual  Protection Clause of  the  Fourteenth
\nAmendment  provides  that  “No State shall ….deny  to\t any
\nperson\twithin its jurisdiction the equal protection of\t the
\nlaws”  (emphasis  added).   As this Court has noted  in\t the
\npast,  the  “rights  created  by the first  section  of\t the
\nFourteenth  Amendment  are, by its terms, guaranteed to\t the
\nindividuals.   The  rights established are personal  rights”
\n(Shelly Vs.  Kraemer) 334 U.S.(1948) ”\n<\/p>\n
\t  The  same  learned  Judge,   Justice\tSandra\t Day
\nO’Connor,  stated again recently in Adarand Constructors Inc
\nVs.  Pena ( 1995) 515 U.S.200, that in such matters relating
\nto  affirmative action, the Court would launch an inquiry to
\nensure that the<\/p>\n
\t  “personal  right  to equal protection of the\tlaws
\nhas not been infringed.”\n<\/p>\n
\t  Thus\tthis  Court has to ensure that,\t in  matters
\nrelating  to  affirmative  action by the State,\t the  rights
\nunder  Articles\t 14 and 16 of the individual to equality  of
\nopportunity,  are not affected.\t A reasonable balance has to
\nbe  struck  so that the affirmative action does not lead  to
\nreverse\t discrimination.  We shall here refer to the  speech
\nof Dr.\tAmbedkar in the Constituent Assembly:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “Supposing,  for  instance, we were to concede  in
\nfull  the demands of these communities who have not been  so
\nfar  employed in the public services to the fullest  extent,
\nwhat  would  really  happen  is,   we  shall  be  completely
\ndestroying  the\t first\tproposition upon which\twe  are\t all
\nagreed, that there shall be equality in opportunity”.\n<\/p>\n
\t  Krishna Iyer,J.  also cautioned in Akhil Bharatiya
\nSoshit Karamchari Sangh (Railway) Vs.  Union of India ( 1981
\n(1) SCC 246 ( at P.286) that “care must be taken to see that
\nclassification\tis not pushed to such an extreme point as to
\nmake  the  fundamental\tright  to   equality  cave  in\t and
\ncollapse”.   The  learned  Judge relied\t upon  Triloki\tNath
\nKhosla\tVs.   State of Jammu and Kashmir ( 1974 (1) SCC\t 19)
\nand  State  of\tKerala\tVs.  Thomas (  1976  (2)  SCC  310).
\nKrishna\t Iyer,\tJ.  stated in Soshit Karamchari Case,  (para\n<\/p>\n
102)  that  reservations cannot lead to an  `overkill’.\t  At
\npage  301, His Lordship said:  “The remedy of ‘reservations’
\nto correct inherited imbalances must not be an overkill”.\n<\/p>\n
\t  In  other  words, affirmative action\tstops  where
\nreverse\t  discrimination   begins.     (i)   Efficiency\t  of
\nadministration and Article 335:\t It is necessary to see that
\nthe rule of adequate representation in Article 16(4) for the
\nBackward  Classes and the rule of adequate representation in
\npromotion  for\tScheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes  under
\nArticle\t 16(4A)\t do not adversely affect the  efficiency  in
\nadministration.\t  In  fact, Article 335 takes care  to\tmake
\nthis   an  express  constitutional   limitation\t  upon\t the
\ndiscretion  vested  in the State while making provision\t for
\nadequate  representation  for the  Scheduled  Castes\/Tribes.
\nThus,  in  the matter of due representation in\tservice\t for
\nBackward Classes and Schedule Castes and Tribes, maintenance
\nof  efficiency of administration is of paramount importance.
\nAs  pointed  in\t Indira\t Sawhney,   the\t provisions  of\t the
\nConstitution  must  be interpreted in such a manner  that  a
\nsense  of  competition\tis   cultivated\t among\tall  service
\npersonnel,   including\t the   reserved\t categories.\t(ii)
\nReservation  and effect of the Roster Point reservation:  It
\nmust  be  noted that whenever a reserved candidate goes\t for
\nrecruitment  at\t the initial level (say Level 1), he is\t not
\ngoing  through\tthe  normal process of\tselection  which  is
\napplied\t to  a general candidate but gets appointment  to  a
\npost  reserved\tfor  his group.\t That is what  is  meant  by
\n`reservation’.\tThat is the effect of `reservation’.  Now in
\na case where the reserved candidate has not opted to contest
\non  his\t merit\tbut has opted for the reserved\tpost,  if  a
\nroster\tis  set\t at Level 1 for promotion  of  the  reserved
\ncandidate  at various roster points to level 2, the reserved
\ncandidate  if he is otherwise at the end of the merit  list,
\ngoes  to  Level 2 without competing with general  candidates
\nand  he\t goes up by a large number of places.  In  a  roster
\nwith 100 places, if the roster points are 8, 16, 24 etc.  at
\neach  of these points the reserved candidate if he is at the
\nend  of\t the  merit  list,  gets promotion  to\tLevel  2  by
\nside-stepping  several\tgeneral\t candidates.   That  is\t the
\neffect\tof  the roster point promotion.\t It deserves  to  be
\nnoticed\t that  the  roster points fixed at Level 1  are\t not
\nintended  to  determine\t any seniority at  Level  1  between
\ngeneral candidates and the reserved candidates.\t This aspect
\nwe  shall consider again when we come to Mervyn Continho vs.
\nCollector  of  Customs<\/a> [1966 (3) SCR 600] lower\t down.\t The
\nroster\tpoint  merely becomes operative whenever  a  vacancy
\nreserved  at Level 2 becomes available.\t Once such vacancies
\nare   all  filled,  the\t roster\t  has  worked  itself\tout.
\nThereafter  other  reserved candidates can be promoted\tonly
\nwhen a vacancy at the reserved points already filled arises.
\nThat  was  what was decided in R.K.Sabharwal vs.   State  of
\nPunjab.<\/a>\t  (iii) Seniority of roster promotees:\tQuestion  is
\nwhether\t roster point promotions from Level 1 to Level 2  to
\nreserved  candidates  will also give seniority at  Level  2?
\nThis  is  the crucial question.\t We shall here refer to\t two
\nlines  of  argument  on behalf of the  reserved\t candidates.
\nAjit Singh was an appeal from the judgment of the Full Bench
\nof  the\t Punjab\t & Haryana High Court in Jaswant  Singh\t Vs.
\nSecretary  to  Govt.  Punjab Education Department, 1989\t (4)
\nS.L.R.\t 257.\tIn  that case, reliance was  placed  by\t the
\nreserved  candidates  on  a general Circular  dated  19.7.69
\nissued by the Punjab Government which stated that the roster
\npoint  promotions  would  also confer seniority.   In  fact,
\nwhile  dismissing  the Writ petitions filed by\tthe  general
\ncandidates  the\t High  Court  declared that  the  State\t was
\nobliged\t to count seniority of the reserved candidates\tfrom
\nthe  date  of  their  promotion as per\tthe  Circular  dated
\n19.7.69.   The\tjudgment of the Full Bench was\treversed  by
\nthis  Court in Ajit Singh in the appeal filed by the general
\ncandidates.  That resulted in the setting aside of the above
\ndeclaration regarding seniority of roster point promotees as
\nstated\tin  the Punjab circular dated 19.7.69..\t But  before
\nus,  reliance  was placed by the reserved candidates as\t was
\ndone  in  Jagdish  Lal,\t upon  the  general  seniority\tRule
\ncontained  in various Punjab Service Rules applicable in the
\nCivil  Secretariat, Education, Financial Commissioner,\tetc.
\nDepartments  which  Rules  generally  deal  with  method  of
\nrecruitment,   probation,   seniority\tand  other   service
\nconditions.   All  these Rules provide a single\t scheme\t for
\nrecruitment   by  promotion  on\t  the  basis  of  seniority-
\ncum-merit  and\tthen for seniority to be determined  in\t the
\npromotional  post from the date of “continuous officiation”,
\nwhenever  the  promotion is as per the method prescribed  in
\nthose  Rules.\tIt  is on this seniority  rule\trelating  to
\n`continuous  officiation’  at  the  promotional\t level\tthat
\nreliance was placed before us by the reserved candidates, as
\nwas  done in Jagdish Lal.  Question is whether roster points
\npromotees can rely on such a seniority rule?\n<\/p>\n
\t  In  this  context it is necessary to remember\t two
\nfundamental concepts.\n<\/p>\n
\t  (a)  Statutory  Rules\t relating to  promotion\t and
\nseniority:\n<\/p>\n
\t  We  shall  take  up  the rules  in  one  of  these
\nServices  in Punjab – namely the rules concerning Ajit Singh
\nin which the present IAs have been filed.\n<\/p>\n
\t  There\t are three sets of Rules for Class I, II and
\nIII  Services.\t The  Punjab Secretariat Class\tIII  Service
\nRules,\t1976  deal  with  the\tposts  of  clerk(Level\t 1),
\nAssistant(Level\t 2)  and Superintendent(Grade II)(Level\t 3).
\nAt each of these two levels 1 and 2, there is a roster which
\nimplements  reservation.   The reservation is by way of\t the
\ncircular  dated\t 19.7.1969  in Punjab.\tFor  promotion\tfrom
\nlevel  1 to 2 and from Level 2 to Level 3, the employees are
\nrespectively  governed by Rule 7 for promotion and by Rule 9
\nfor  seniority.\t It is provided in proviso(iii) to Rule 7(1)
\nthat  all promotions shall be made by selection on the basis
\nof  seniority-cum-merit and no person shall have a right  of
\npromotion on the basis of seniority alone.  Rule 9 speaks of
\nseniority from the date of continuous officiation.\n<\/p>\n
\t  The  Civil  Secretariat Service, Class-II  Service
\nrules, 1963 deal with Superintendents(Grade I) i.e.  Level 4
\nand  Rule  8(2) states that promotion to the above posts  in
\nClass II is by the method of seniority-cum-merit and Rule 10
\nstates\tthat  seniority\t is  to\t be  counted  from  date  of
\ncontinuous  officiation.   Above Class II is class  I  which
\nconsists  of  posts of Under Secretary(Level 5)\t and  Deputy
\nSecretary(Level\t  6).\tRule  6(3)  of\tthe   Punjab   Civil
\nSecretariat  (Class  I) Rules, 1974 refers to  promotion  by
\nseniority-cum-merit while Rule 8 thereof speaks of seniority
\nby  continuous\tofficiation.  For promotion to Class II\t and
\nClass  I, there is no roster promotion i.e.  no reservation.
\nThere  is  reservation\tonly in Class III posts\t by  way  of
\nroster at two stages.\n<\/p>\n
\t  It  is  clear, therefore, that the seniority\trule
\nrelating to `continuous officiation’ in promotion is part of
\nthe  general  scheme of recruitment -by direct\trecruitment,
\npromotion,  etc.- in each of the Services in Class I, II and
\nIII – and is based upon a principle of equal opportunity for
\npromotion.   In\t our opinion, it is only to such  promotions
\nthat  the  seniority  rule of  `continuous  officiation’  is
\nattracted.\n<\/p>\n
\t  (b) Statutory rule of seniority cannot be delinked
\nand applied to roster-point promotions:\n<\/p>\n
\t  As  stated above in Ajit Singh, the promotion rule
\nin  Rule 7(1) proviso (iii) and the seniority Rule in Rule 9
\nunder  the 1976 Rules for Class III form a single scheme and
\nare  interlinked.  In other words, only in case the officers
\nhave  reached the level of Superintendents Grade II(Level 3)
\nin  the\t manner mentioned in the Rule 7(1) proviso (iii)  by
\ncompetition   between  the  Assistants\t (Level\t 2)  and  on
\nconsideration\tof   their   cases    on   the\t basis\t  of
\nseniority-cum-merit,  can  the\tseniority  Rule\t in  Rule  9
\nrelating   to\tcontinuous  officiation\t in  the   post\t  of
\nSuperintendent Grade II (Level 3) be applied.  Here there is
\na roster in Ajit Singh for promotion from Level 1 to Level 2
\nand from Level 2 to Level 3.  The consequence is that in the
\ncase  of roster point promotees, the said candidates who get
\npromoted  as  Superintendents Grade II (Level 3) as per\t the
\nroster,\t – having not been promoted as per Rule 7(1) proviso\n<\/p>\n
(iii)  of the 1976 Rules i.e.  upon consideration with their
\ncases  on the basis of seniority-cum-merit at the  Assistant
\nlevel  (Level 2), -they cannot rely upon Rule 9 of the\t1976
\nRules  dealing\twith seniority from the date of\t “continuous
\nofficiation”  as  Superintendents Grade II(Level 3).  It  is
\nnot  permissible  to  delink  the seniority  Rule  from\t the
\nrecruitment  Rule based on equal opportunity and apply it to
\npromotions  made on the basis of the roster which promotions
\nare  made  out\tside the equal opportunity  principle.\t The
\nproper\tbalancing  of  rights:\tIn the light  of  the  above
\ndiscussion, the proper balancing of the rights, in our view,
\nwill be as follows.\n<\/p>\n
\t  The\tgeneral\t candidates  who   are\t senior\t  at
\nAssistants’   level(Level   2)\t and\twho   have   reached
\nSuperintendent\t Grade-II(Level\t 3)   before  the   reserved
\ncandidate  moved to Level 4(Supdt.  Grade- I), will have  to
\nbe  treated as senior at the level 3 also(Supdt.   Grade-II)
\nand  it is on that basis that promotion to the post of Level
\n4  must\t be  made, upon first considering the cases  of\t the
\nsenior\tgeneral candidates at Level 3.\tIf the cases of\t the
\nsenior general candidates who have reached Level 3 though at
\na  latter  point  of  time, are\t not  first  considered\t for
\npromotion  to  Level 4, and if the roster point promotee  at
\nLevel  3  is treated senior and promoted to level  4,  there
\nwill   be  violation  of  Article  14  and  16(1)   of\t the
\nConstitution  of India.\t Such a promotion and the  seniority
\nat  Level  4 has to be reviewed after the decision  of\tAjit
\nSingh.\t But  if  reserved category candidate  is  otherwise
\neligible  and posts are available for promotion to Level  4,
\nthey  cannot be denied right to be considered for  promotion
\nto  Level  4, merely because erstwhile seniors at the  entry
\nlevels\thave not reached Level 3.  What we have stated above
\naccords,  in  fact,  with what was actually stated  in\tAjit
\nSingh  (  1996(2)  SCC 715).  In that case, N.P.   Singh,  J
\nobserved ( P.  731):\n<\/p>\n
\t  “It  also cannot be overlooked that for the  first
\npromotion  from\t the basic grade, there was no\toccasion  to
\nexamine their merit and suitability for promotion”.\n<\/p>\n
\t  That,\t in  our view, is the correct  approach\t for
\nbalancing  the\tfundamental  rights  under  Article  14\t and
\nArticle 16(1) on the one hand and the provisions relating to
\nreservation in Article 16(4) and Article 16(4A).\n<\/p>\n
\t  Was Jagdish Lal correctly decided:\n<\/p>\n
\t  Learned senior counsel for the reserved candidates
\nhowever\t relied upon Jagdish Lal to contend that the  roster
\npromotees  can count seniority in the promoted post from the
\ndate  of  continuous officiation as against  senior  general
\ncandidates  promoted later.  On the other hand, the  learned
\nsenior counsel for the general candidates contended that the
\nsaid  decision\tdoes  not lay down the\tlaw  correctly.\t  We
\nshall,\ttherefore,  have  to refer to Jagdishlal.   We\twere
\ninitially  of  the view that it may not be necessary  to  go
\ninto  the  correctness\tof Jagdish Lal, and  that  we  could
\ndistinguish  the  same on the ground that all  the  reserved
\ncandidates  there  had\tgot   further  promotions  from\t the
\npromotional  level of Dy.Superintendents* before the general
\ncandidates  reached that Level.\t But from the table set\t out
\nin  Jagdishlal,\t it  would  be noticed that  in\t that  case,
\nJagdishlal,  the  general  candidate, reached  the  post  of
\nDeputy\tSuperintendent\ton  27.10.87   before  the  reserved
\ncandidate  H.S.\t Hira was further promoted as Superintendent
\non 27.5.88.  Similarly, Ram Dayal, another general candidate
\ngot\t  promoted\tas\t Deputy\t      Superintendent
\n_____________________________________________________________
\n* In Jagdishlal, the hierarchy of posts is Clerk, Assistant,
\nDeputy\t    Superintendent,\t    Superintendent,\tetc.
\n____________________________________________________________
\non 16.1.89 before the reserved candidates Sant Lal and Ajmer
\nSingh  got promoted as Superintendent on 8.2.90 and  1.7.90.
\nIn  that view of the matter, it becomes necessary to go into
\nthe  correctness  of  Jagdish Lal on merits.   As  we  would
\npresently  show,  in  Jagdishlal, the seniority\t rule  which
\nreferred  to  continuous  officiation and which\t applied  to
\npromotions  made  after providing equal opportunity  as\t per
\nrules  – was delinked from the promotion rule and applied to
\nroster\tpromotees,  which, in our view, was the main  reason
\nfor  arriving at a different result.  Jagdish Lal arose from
\nHaryana.   The Haryana Education Directorate (State  Service
\nClass  III) Rule 1974 provided for recruitment to the  posts
\nof  clerk  (Level  1),\tAssistant   (Level  2)\tand   Deputy
\nSuperintendent(Level   3).   Rule  9(3)\t  stated  that\t all
\npromotions would have to be made by selection based on merit
\nand  taking into consideration seniority but seniority alone
\nwould  not  give  any  right to such  promotions.   Rule  11
\nprovided  that\tseniority would be counted from the date  of
\n“continuous officiation”.  The Court held in Jagdishlal that
\nthe  roster  promotees\twho were promoted to Level  3  could
\ncount\ttheir\tseniority  from\t  the  date  of\t  continuous
\nofficiation  in that level in view of Rule 11.\tFrom Level 1
\nto  Level  2  and  from\t Level 2 to  Level  3,\tthe  rosters
\noperated.   From  the level beyond Level 3, the\t posts\twere
\nSuperintendent,\t Budget\t Officer,  Assistant  Registrar\t and
\nRegistrar  and\twere  governed\tby  the\t Haryana   Education
\nDepartment  (State  Service, Group B) Rule, 1980, and  there
\nwas  no reservation.  In those Rules also, Rule 9(3)  stated
\nthat all promotions would have to be made by selection based
\non  merit  and\ttaking\t into  consideration  seniority\t but
\nseniority alone was not to give any right to such promotion.
\nRule  11 of the 1980 Rules also stated that seniority  would
\ncount  from  the dates of continuous officiation.  Thus,  in
\nthe  Class  III as well as Class II(Group B)  Services,\t the
\n“continuous  officiation”  rule\t was  interlinked  with\t the
\npromotion rule based on equal opportunity, as in Ajit Singh,
\nand  formed  a\tsingle\tscheme.\t The Court  in\tJagdish\t Lal
\ndelinked  Rule 11 from the recruitment rules and applied the
\nsame to the roster promotees.  For the reasons given already
\nin  regard to Ajit Singh, we hold that Jagdishlal arrived at
\nan  incorrect  conclusion  because  of applying\t a  rule  of
\ncontinuous  officiation\t which was not intended to apply  to
\nthe reserved candidates promoted at roster points.\n<\/p>\n
\t  The  various rulings relied upon in Jagdishlal  do
\nnot,  in our opinion, support the conclusions arrived at  in
\nthat  case.   Some of these rulings were those where it\t was
\nheld  that  mere empanelment in a seniority list  would\t not
\nconfer\ta right to promotion.  Some other cases relied\tupon
\nwere cases where it was held that mere chances of promotions
\nwere  not `conditions of service’ which were protected.\t  So
\nfar as the cases which held that mere inclusion of a name in
\na  panel did not create any right to promotion, there  could
\nbe  no\tquarrel\t with the said proposition.  So far  as\t the
\ncases  like  State of Maharashtra vs.  Chandrakant  Kulkarni<\/a>
\n1981 (4) SCC 130, Mohd.\t Shujat Ali vs.\t Union of India 1975
\n(3)  SCC 76, which held that mere chances of promotion\twere
\nnot  conditions of service, they were not applicable to\t the
\npresent\t situation.   It  must be noticed that\tthose  cases
\narose  under  the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 where\t the
\nwords ‘conditions of service’ were used in Section 115(7) of
\nthat  Act.   The  factual  position   there  was  that\twhen
\nemployees  of  two different States were  integrated,  their
\nseniority  in  the parent States necessarily  got  affected.
\nThe  proviso to Section 115(7) of the Act required that,  if
\nthe  State to which they were allotted wanted to alter their
\n“conditions  of service”, previous permission of the Central
\nGovernment  was\t necessary.  It was in that context that  it
\nwas held that mere chances of promotions were not conditions
\nof service and there was no question of seeking the sanction
\nof  the\t Central  Government if chances\t of  promotion\twere
\naffected  after\t allotment  to a new State.   In  fact,\t the
\nCentral\t Government, had issued orders, under Section 115(7)
\nthat various other conditions of service in the parent State
\nlike  salary, leave etc.  alone would remain protected.\t The
\nabove  cases were therefore not in point.  The case in Mohd.
\nBhakar\tvs.   Y.Krishna Reddy 1967 SLR 753(SC) was  in\tfact
\noverruled  in Mohd.  Shujat Ali.  So far as K.Jagadeesan vs.
\nUnion of India<\/a> 1990 (2) SCC 228 was concerned, it related to
\na  case\t where\ta person’s seniority stood  affected  by  an
\namendment  to  the Rules and it was held that that  did\t not
\nmake  the rule retrospective.  Syed Khalid Rizvi vs.   Union
\nof  India 1993 Suppl.  (3) SCC 575 no doubt said that  there
\nwas no “right to promotion” but even that case accepted that
\nthere  was a right to be “considered” for promotion.  So far
\nas  Akhil  Bhartiya  Soshit Karamchari Sangh vs.   Union  of
\nIndia  1996 (6) SCC 65 to which one of us  (G.B.Pattanaik,J.
\nwas  party).  That case, in our view, was correctly  decided
\non  facts because by the date the general candidate  reached
\nthe  higher  category,\tthe reserved category  promotee\t who
\nreached\t that category earlier had got a further  promotion.
\nReference  was also made in Jagdish Lal, to A.K.   Bhatnagar
\nvs.  Union of India<\/a> 1991 (1) SCC 544.  That was a case where
\nadhoc recruits were regularised subsequently and were placed
\nbelow  regular recruits.  It was held that their past  adhoc
\nservice\t could not be taken into account since they remained
\nout  of\t the cadre until regularisation.  That case, in\t our
\nview,  has also no application.\t Jagdish Lal is,  therefore,
\nnot correctly decided.\n<\/p>\n
\t  Observations\tin  Ashok  Kumar   Gupta  which\t run
\ncontrary  to  Indira  Sawhney & Sabharwal do  not  lay\tdown
\ncorrect\t law:\tWe  may state that there are  various  other
\nobservations made in Ashok Kumar Gupta and we find that they
\nrun  counter  to the principles laid down by the nine  Judge
\nBench  in  Indira  Sawhney  and the  Constitution  Bench  in
\nSabharwal.  In our view, these observations must, therefore,
\nbe  treated  as\t not laying down the correct  law.   Learned
\ncounsel\t for the parties were in agreement with this live of
\napproach.  We, therefore, leave Ashok Kumar Gupta and do not
\ndeal with it any further.\n<\/p>\n
\t  Was  Virpal not decided correctly, as contended by
\nreserved candidates?:\n<\/p>\n
\t  We  then come to another important point that\t was
\nargued\tby  learned senior counsel Sri K.Parasaran.  It\t was
\nargued\tthat  in  Virpal,  the Court was  concerned  with  a
\ncircular  of  the  Railways dated  31.8.82  which  permitted
\ndiscounting  the seniority of roster promotee from the\tdate
\nof  continuous\tofficiation and which also stated  that\t his
\nseniority  should be as per the ranking in the basic  level.
\nThe  Court in Virpal held that it was “permissible” for\t the
\nGovernment  to do so.  It was argued by Sri K.Parasaran that
\nit was one thing to say that it was “open” to the Government
\nto  deprive  the  roster  promotee of the  benefit  of\tsuch
\nseniority  from\t the  date of roster promotion\tbut  it\t was
\nanother thing to say that even if the Government thought fit
\nto  give  benefit  of  seniority  on  the  basis  of  roster
\npromotion, the same should be tested on the anvil of Article
\n14  and\t 16(1) of the Constitution of India.  Thus,  it\t was
\nargued\tthat Ajit Singh went far beyond Virpal when it\theld
\nthat  any circular, order or rule granting seniority to\t the
\nroster\tpromotee would be violative of Article 14 and  16(1)
\nof  the\t Constitution of India.\t That brings us to  a  close
\nexamination of the main principle laid down in Virpal and in
\nAjit  Singh.  We shall first take up Virpal.  In Virpal, the
\nfacts  were  that  the Court was concerned with\t a  circular
\ndated  31.8.82\tof  the\t Railways   which  stated  that\t the
\nseniority  of  the roster promotees would be based on  their
\npanel  position in the initial grade.  The case involved two
\nservices  –  Guards  and Station Masters.   Railways  Guards
\nwould  be recruited as Guard C and promoted as Guard B, then
\nas  Guard A and as Guard (Special).  Promotion was to be  by
\nrule  of  seniority-cum-suitability.  In other words,  these
\nwere non-selection posts.  On the other hand, in the case of
\nStation\t Masters,  a  selection\t process  was  involved\t for
\npurposes of promotion.\n<\/p>\n
\t  It  is  argued  by the  reserved  candidates\tthat
\nVirpal\twas  not  correctly decided because in\tVirpal,\t the
\nCourt  went  by a printed Brochure and committed  a  factual
\nmistake in thinking that the circular of the Railways itself
\nrequired  the  panel  seniority at the initial level  to  be
\nreflected  at  higher levels.  The same point was raised  by
\nthe  Indian  Railways in its intervention  applications\t IAs
\n10-12\/98.   It was argued that in Virpal the Court erred  in
\nnot  noticing  the full text of the Circular  dated  31.8.82
\nwhich,\tshowed\tthat,  as  per\t para  319  of\tthe  Railway
\nEstablishment  Code,  Vol.1,  panels  were  required  to  be
\nprepared at each level.\n<\/p>\n
\t  We  have  examined Virpal closely in the light  of
\nthe  above  objection.\tIn our view, the above criticism  is
\nwholly\tunjustified  and is based upon a wrong mixing up  of
\nthe  separate conclusions arrived at in Virpal in regard  to
\ntwo  different\tsets of employees.  As stated  earlier,\t the
\nCourt  was there concerned with posts of Railway Guards\t and
\nalso  with  posts  of Station Masters.\tThe  former  (\ti.e.
\nGuard\tposts)\t were  posts  governed\t by  the   rule\t  of
\nseniority-cum-suitability.   In\t other\twords,\tfor  Guards,
\nseniority  would  govern subject to omission of those  found
\nunsuitable  for\t promotion.   On  the  other  hand,  Station
\nMasters’  posts were governed by selection at every level of
\npromotion.   The learned Judge, Justice Jeevan Reddy,  while
\ndealing\t initially with the promotions of Guards ( See P.702
\nof  SCC)  from\tC  Grade to B, from B to A, and\t from  A  to
\nSpecial\t Grade A pointed out that the seniority- cum-fitness
\nrule  applicable in their cases resulted in the seniority at
\nthe  Level  of Guard C in the initial panel being  reflected
\nfrom  stage to stage, subject to fitness.  When the  learned
\nJudge  came  to\t discuss  the  issues  relating\t to  Station
\nMasters,(See  SCC  P.711)  where merit\tand  selection\twere
\ninvolved, the learned Judge stated that separate panels were
\nto  be\tprepared  at every level and also that those  in  an
\nearlier\t panel\twould be senior to those in a latter  panel.
\nIn  either  situation,\tit was laid down that  the  reserved
\ncandidates could not count their ‘seniority’ on the basis of
\nroster\t point\tpromotion.    Learned  Additional  Solicitor
\nGeneral,  Sri  C.S.  Vaidyanathan, attempted to\t argue\tthat
\nwhat  the Court said in para 25, 26 was wrong as it  assumed
\nthat  seniority at Level 1 would get reflected in the levels
\nhigher up and what is stated in para 46, 47 in regard to one
\nprevious  panel\t having\t priority over a later\tpanel  would
\napply  in all cases, even to Guards referred to in paras 25,\n<\/p>\n
26.   The said contention, in our view, is based on a mixing
\nup  of\tthe  cases of Station Masters and  Guards  who\twere
\ngoverned  by different rules of promotion.  We are satisfied
\nthat  there is no factual mistake committed in the  judgment
\nin  Virpal.   In  fact, subsequent to Virpal,  the  Railways
\naccepted  the judgment and issued an order on 28.2.1997 both
\nin  regard to non-selection and selection posts.  The  point
\nraised\tin the IAs by the Railways is therefore liable to be
\nrejected.  We shall refer to these IAs again in our separate
\njudgment  relating  to individual cases.  Did Ajit Singh  go
\nbeyond\tVirpal and if so, was it correctly decided?  We\t now
\ndeal  with  the\t points raised by  the\treserved  candidates
\nagainst\t the  correctness  of Ajit Singh.  It was  urged  by
\nlearned senior counsel Sri K.Parasaran, that Ajit Singh went
\nfar  beyond Virpal.  It is pointed out that in Virpal,\tthis
\nCourt  was  concerned with a circular of the Railways  which
\nstated\tthat the roster promotees could not, on that  count,
\nclaim  seniority.   In\tthat context, Jeevan Reddy,  J.\t  no
\ndoubt  stated  in Virpal ( See 1995 (6) SCC 684 at  701)  as
\nfollows:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “In  short,  it is open to the State, if it is  so
\nadvised\t ……\t It is permissible for the State to do\tso.”
\nBut, according to learned senior counsel, Sri K.  Parasaran,
\nin  Ajit Singh, this Court went further and stated that\t any
\nrule,  circular or order which gave seniority to the  roster
\npoint  promotees was bad and that this view is not  correct.
\nOur  attention\tis invited to 1996 (2) SCC 715 ( at 732)  as
\nfollows:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “According to us, this question cannot be examined
\nonly  on the basis of any circular, order or rule issued  or
\nframed\tby the State Government or the Union of India.\tThis
\nhas  to be tested on the basis of our constitutional  scheme
\nof Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.”\n<\/p>\n
\t  In  our  opinion,  there  is no  conflict  in\t the
\nprinciples  laid  down in these two judgments, nor is  there
\nanything  wrong\t in  the above elucidation of the  law.\t  In
\nVirpal\tit  was not necessary for the Court to go  into\t the
\nquestion  whether any circular – if it gave seniority to the
\nroster\tpoint  promotees  (reserved candidates) –  could  be
\ntreated\t as  valid.  But, in Ajit Singh which was an  appeal
\nagainst\t the  Full Bench Judgment in Jaswant singh 1989\t (4)
\nSLR  257, this Court was dealing with a declaration made  by
\nthe  Full  Bench for implementation of the  Punjab  circular
\ndated  19.7.69 (see para 29 of Full Bench) which  positively
\ndeclared  that\tthe “roster points were\t seniority  points”.
\nThat  was  why in Ajit Singh this Court had to consider\t the
\nvalidity  of such a Circular.  In Ajit Singh this Court held
\nthat the declaration granted in the impugned judgment of the
\nFull  Bench  in\t Jaswant singh on the basis  of\t the  Punjab
\ncircular  would\t be in conflict with Article 14 and  Article
\n16(1).\t This  Court  had  therefore to lay  down  that\t any
\ncircular,  order  or rule issued to confer seniority to\t the
\nroster\tpoint  promotees,  would  be  invalid.\t Thus,\t the
\ndecision  in  Ajit Singh cannot be found fault\twith.\tDoes
\nIndira\tSawhney\t protect  seniority of promotees  at  roster
\npoint:\t Learned  senior counsel Sri  K.Parasaran  contended
\nthat Indira Sawhney permitted reservations in promotions for
\na  further  period  of 5 years and that during\tthat  period
\nArticle\t 16(4A)\t was  incorporated  in\t Part  III  of\t the
\nConstitution  and,  therefore,\tthe   concept  of  seniority
\nattached  to  the roster promotion, as per  certain  rulings
\nthen  in force, must be deemed to continue and deemed to  be
\npermissible  in\t view of Article 16(4A).  We may  point\t out
\nthat  Indira Sawhney did not have to go into issues relating
\nto  seniority  and  on\tthe other hand it  referred  to\t the
\nprinciple  of balancing Article 16(4) against the rights  of
\nthe  individual under Article 16(1).  It is, therefore,\t not
\npossible  to accept that the 5 year rule and Article  16(4A)
\nwould  keep  out the applicability of Article 16(1) to\ttest
\nthe  validity of any circular, order or rule which conferred
\nseniority  to the roster point promotees.  Do principles  in
\nMervyn\t Continho  1966\t (3)  SCR   60\tapply  to   reserved
\ncandidates?   Does the roster point for reserved  candidates
\nat  Level  1  decide  seniority at  Level  1?\tConsiderable
\nreliance was placed by learned senior counsel Sri D.D.Thakur
\nand  Sri Raju Ramachandran on the decision of this Court  in
\nMervyn\tContinho & Others vs.  Collector of Customs<\/a> 1966 (3)
\nSCR 600.\n<\/p>\n
\t  In that case, the service was constituted from two
\nsources,  namely direct recruits and promotees.\t Question of
\nseniority  arose at two levels – at the level of  Appraisers
\nand  at\t the level of Principal Appraisers.  At the  initial
\nlevel  of Appraisers, there was a roster for determining the
\nseniority  of the direct recruits and promotees.  The direct
\nrecruits  were\tplaced\tfirst  in the roster  and  then\t the
\npromotees  alternatively at the basic level.  The  promotees
\nwho  joined  service  earlier questioned the above  rule  as
\nbeing  violative  of  their  seniority\t at  the  level\t  of
\nAppraisers  in\tview of Article 16(1).\tThis  challenge\t was
\nnegatived  by this Court on the ground that such  ‘anomalies
\narise  not  on account of there being no direct\t recruitment
\nfor  several  years’ and the roster point seniority was\t not
\nopposed\t to  the  principle of equality\t of  opportunity  in
\nGovernment  service.  It was said that the anomaly arose out
\nof  the\t fortuitous  circumstance  that\t in  the  particular
\nservice\t of  Appraisers,  for one reason  or  other,  direct
\nrecruitment had fallen short of the quota fixed for it.\t The
\nCourt said:  “we are not prepared to say that the rotational
\nsystem\tof  fixing  seniority  itself  offends\tequality  of
\nopportunity….”.  To this extent the Court held against the
\npromotees  in  regard  to seniority at the  basic  level  of
\nAppraisers.  The point here is the roster points in the case
\nof  reserved  candidates do not determine seniority  at\t the
\nbasic level.\n<\/p>\n
\t  Learned senior counsel for the reserved candidates
\nhowever\t relied upon the second part of Mervyn which related
\nto  seniority at the next level of Principal Appraisers.  It
\nwas  the contention of the direct recruits-respondents\tthat
\nhere again the seniority should be alternated between direct
\nrecruits  and  promotees as done at the basic level,  though
\nthere  was  no\tsuch rule.  Here,  the\tpromotee  Appraisers
\ncontended  that\t the  seniority at the\tlevel  of  Principal
\nAppraisers  would  be  governed by the\trule  of  continuous
\nofficiation  and that there can be no rotation alternatively
\nat this higher level on the basis of birthmarks at the level
\nof  Appraisers.\t This plea of the promotees was accepted  by
\nthis  Court.  The point here is that once the roster at\t the
\nlevel of Appraisers is one which fixed seniority at level 1,
\npromotions  to\tLevel  2   for\tPrincipal  Appraisers,\thave
\nnecessarily  to be made on that basis.\tFor fixing seniority
\nat  Level 2, there is no question of placing direct recruits
\nand  promotees alternatively.  It has to be on the basis  of
\ndate  of  promotion  of\t each of the officers  to  Level  2,
\nirrespective  of  their birthmarks.  The above\tdecision  in
\nMervyn\tcannot\tapply to a case of reservation\tbecause\t the
\nroster\tin Mervyn was intended to determine seniority  while
\nthe  roster in the cases of reservation under Article  16(4)
\nor  Article  16(4A) are not intended to determine  seniority
\nbut are merely intended to provide “adequate representation”
\nat   the  promotional  level.\tTo  what  extent,   Hiralal,
\nKaramchand and Kailash Chand Joshi’s cases help the reserved
\ncandidates?   Learned  senior  counsel\t for  the   reserved
\ncandidates  placed strong reliance on three other  decisions
\nof this Court namely, State of Punjab vs.  Hira Lal<\/a> 1970 (3)
\nSCC  567,  Karam Chand vs.  Haryana State Electricity  Board<\/a>
\n1989  Suppl.   (1)  SCC\t 342 and  Kailash  Chand  Joshi\t vs.
\nRajasthan High Court<\/a> 1996 (1) SCALE 752.  In Hira Lal’s case
\ndecided\t by a three Judge Bench, there was a circular issued
\nby  the\t Punjab\t Government providing, for the\tfirst  time,
\nreservation  in\t promotional posts.  The 1st respondent\t who
\nwas  a\tgeneral candidate senior to the\t reserved  candidate
\n(respondent 3) was not promoted while the reserved candidate
\nthough\tjunior,\t was promoted.\tThe High Court\tallowed\t the
\nwrit   petition\t  filed\t by   the  general  candidate\t(1st
\nrespondent)  on\t the ground of violation of  Article  16(1).
\nThe said judgment was set aside in view of the law laid down
\nin  the\t General Manager, Southern Railway  vs.\t  Rangachari<\/a>
\n1962  (2)  SCR 586 that reservation was permissible  at\t the
\npromotional  level.  In that case, the Court had no occasion
\nto consider any circular prescribing seniority to the roster
\npromotees.    That   case  is\ttherefore  not\t in   point.
\nKaramchand,  decided  by  a two Judge Bench was,  no  doubt,
\nconcerned with the question of seniority of the roster point
\npromotee.    The  appellant,  who   was\t from  the  reserved
\ncategory,  belonged  to the Haryana State Electricity  Board
\nand  the Haryana Government’s circular dated 27.4.72 pointed
\nout  that the roster was meant only for reservation and\t not
\nfor  fixing  inter-se-seniority and that seniority  depended
\nupon  the  merit  list\tprepared   by  the  Public   Service
\nCommission  or\tSelection  Board.  But\tthe  appellant,\t the
\nreserved  candidate  relied  upon  Rule\t  9  of\t the  Punjab
\nPWD(Electricity Branch) Service Class III(Subordinate Posts)
\nrules, 1952 where Rule 9 provided seniority to be determined
\nfrom  the date of “regular” promotion.\tThe limited  dispute
\nwas  whether his case fell within the “Exception” in Rule  9
\nwhich  related\tto “temporary” promotees who would  not\t get
\nseniority  upon such temporary promotion.  The contention of
\nthe  Board that he was a temporary promotee was not accepted
\nby  this  Court\t on  the facts of  the\tcase.\tNo  question
\nvis-a-vis  a  general  candidate arose.\t  There\t are  indeed
\ncertain\t  observations\tthat  seniority\t  of  the   reserved
\ncandidate  had\tto  be\tcounted from  the  date\t of  regular
\npromotion  which,  in  our  opinion, are  not  correct.\t  No
\nquestion  of Article 16(1) or seniority as against a general
\ncandidate  arose.  That case is distinguishable.  In Kailash
\nChand  Joshi the appellant, who was senior, belonged to\t the
\nnon-  reserved\tcategory  in  the  cadre  of  Munsifs.\t The
\nrespondents  3\tto  11 though junior in that  cadre  to\t the
\nappellant,  were  promoted  as Civil Judges earlier  on\t the
\nbasis  of  roster.  The general candidate (appellant  )\t got
\npromoted  as Civil Judge later and claimed seniority in\t the
\ncadre  of Civil Judge.\tBy that date the roster promotee did
\nnot  get  any further promotion.  This was not\taccepted  by
\nthis  Court  in view of Rule 11.  There are two\t aspects  of
\nthis  decision.\t Firstly, the Court did not notice that once
\nthe  general candidate, the appellant, who was senior to the
\nrespondents  reached the level of Civil Judge, the  position
\nwould  be different.  Such a principle, in fact, came to  be
\nlaid  down shortly thereafter in Virpal by the same  learned
\nJudge who decided Kailash Chand Joshi.\tSecondly, it was not
\nnoticed\t that Rule 22 relating to seniority from the date of
\ncontinuous  officiation\t was  closely interlinked  with\t the
\npromotional  Rule based on equal opportunity.  We may  state
\nthat  any  observations in the above cases that\t the  roster
\npromotees  will\t get  seniority\t  over\tthe  senior  general
\ncandidates  who\t reach\tthat level later,  (but\t before\t the
\nfurther\t promotion  of\tthe reserved  candidate)  cannot  be
\naccepted  as  correct in view of the legal  position  stated
\nearlier.  A ‘poignant scenario’ in some cases:\tWe next come
\nto  the\t poignant scenario in several of the matters  before
\nus.   Virpal  referred to such a scenario where all  the  33
\ncandidates  who were to be considered for 11 vacancies\twere
\nfrom  the  SC\/ST category ( see P.710 of SCC).\t Before\t us,
\nsimilar\t facts\tare placed by the general  candidates.\t The
\nfactual\t position  is not disputed, though  certain  reasons
\nhave   been   set  out\tby   both  sides  which\t  none\t has
\nscientifically examined.  It is to be noticed that :  (i) in
\nAjit  Singh itself, – (see p.76 and PP.200-215, 232 of paper
\nbook)  as  on  30.9.94\tout  of\t 107  officers\tworking\t  as
\nSuperintendent\tGrade  I,  the first 23\t officers  are\tfrom
\nScheduled Castes.  At the level of Under Secretaries, out of
\n19,  the first 11 are from SC category.\t In the category  of
\nDy.   Secretary, out of four, 2 are from SC category.  As on
\n30.9.94,  the  position\t was  that   at\t these\tlevels,\t the
\npercentage  was 22.5%, 54% and 67% respectively in the above
\ncategories.   If  the seniority is to be counted as per\t the
\ncase  of the reserved candidates, the position would be that
\nDy.   Secretaries would be 100% manned by Scheduled  Castes,
\nand  Under  Secretaries\t would\tagain\tbe  100%  manned  by
\nScheduled  Castes while Superintendents Grade I would be  so
\nmanned to the extent of 53%.\n<\/p>\n
\t  (ii)\tIn Jatinderpal Singh’s case ( C.A.Nos.\t316-
\n317\/99)\t the  top  134 positions of Principals (  from\tHead
\nMasters’  source)  would be from Scheduled Castes while\t the
\ntop  72\t positions ( from Head Mistress’s source)  would  be
\nfrom  Scheduled Castes.\t It is stated that ” adding this  to
\nthe  number awaiting promotions”, the position would be that
\ntop  217  and  111 in these categories\twould  be  Scheduled
\ncastes\tcandidates – which would be 100% and 71% ( the posts
\nbeing  only 156 under each source).  One does not know\twhat
\nwill happen in posts beyond Principal, if all persons in the
\nzone are from SC\/ST category.\n<\/p>\n
\t  (iii) In Kamal Kant (SLP.4945\/97 from Haryana ) as
\nof  today:  (a) among Deputy Secretaries, the first 8  posts
\nare occupied by the reserved category ( Scheduled Castes and
\nBackward  Classes)  (b)\t among Under Secretaries  (Group  A)
\n(officiating)  14 posts at the higher levels are occupied by
\nthe reserved category.\n<\/p>\n
\t  The  above  factual  position\t is  not,  in\tfact
\ndisputed  but  it  is said that this could  be\tbecause\t the
\nroster\twas  operated again and again till that was  stopped
\nafter  Sabbarwal was decided, but no body has gone into\t the
\nextent\tto which excess roster operation has created such  a
\nsituation.\n<\/p>\n
\t  In  the  written  submissions\t of  learned  senior
\ncounsel,   Sri\tRaju  Ramachandran   dated  5.8.99,  such  a
\nsituation  of almost all top posts being manned by  reserved
\ncandidates   is\t sought\t to  be\t  justified  as\t being\t not
\nconstitutionally  inhibited.  In our view, such a  situation
\nwas never intended by the founding fathers.  One should only
\nread the speech of Dr.\tAmbedkar in the Constituent Assembly
\nas quoted in Indira Sawhney (see pp.660-661 SCC)(referred to
\nearlier).\n<\/p>\n
\t  We  may, however, make it clear that our  decision
\nin  regard  to the Article 16(1), Article 16(4) and  Article
\n16(4A)\t that  the  rule  of  “continuous  officiation”\t  is
\napplicable  only to promotions made as per rules which\tgive
\nequal  opportunity  – and not otherwise,  -is  independently
\narrived\t at on the basis of the constitutional position\t and
\nis  in\tno  way coloured or influenced by  the\tabove  facts
\nmentioned  by  the general candidates.\tOur  Conclusions  on
\nPoints\t1 and 2:  We, therefore, hold that the roster  point
\npromotees  (reserved category) cannot count their  seniority
\nin  the promoted category from the date of their  continuous
\nofficiation  in the promoted post, – vis- a-vis the  general
\ncandidates who were senior to them in the lower category and
\nwho  were  later  promoted.  On the other hand,\t the  senior
\ngeneral\t candidate  at\tthe lower level, if he\treaches\t the
\npromotional  level later but before the further promotion of
\nthe reserved candidate-he will have to be treated as senior,
\nat  the promotional level, to the reserved candidate even if
\nthe  reserved candidate was earlier promoted to that  level.
\nWe  shall explain this further under Point 3.  We also\thold
\nthat  Virpal and Ajit Singh have been correctly decided\t and
\nthat Jagdishlal is not correctly decided.  Point 1 and 2 are
\ndecided\t accordingly.  Point 3:\t During the discussion under
\nthis  “catch-up”  point – for purposes of convenience, –  we
\ntake  the example of the cadres in Ajit Singh i.e.  there is
\nroster point promotion for reserved candidates for promotion
\nfrom  Level 1 to Level 2 and from Level 2 to Level 3.  There
\nis  no\troster for promotion from Level 3 to Level  4.\t Two
\n‘catch\tup’ rules contended for by general candidates:\tNow,
\nas  stated  earlier, the counsel for the general  candidates
\nargued\tfor  acceptance of two catch-up rules.\t.pa  Extreme
\n‘catch-up’  rule:   So far as the extreme contention of\t the
\ngeneral\t candidates  that at Level 3, the  roster  candidate
\nmust  wait  at Level 3 – before being promoted to Level 4  –
\ntill  the  last senior general candidate at Level 1  reached
\nLevel  3,  – we reject the same in as much as that will\t not
\namount\tto  a  reasonable  balancing of the  rights  of\t the
\ncandidates  in the two groups.\tNor do we accept that  posts
\nmust  be  kept\tvacant\tand  no\t promotions  of\t the  roster
\ncandidates  be\tmade.  Other Catch-up rule:  As accepted  in
\nVirpal\t(  see 1995(6) SCC 684 at 702) and Ajit\t Singh\t(see
\n1996(2)\t SCC  at  P.729), we hold that in  case\t any  senior
\ngeneral\t candidate at Level 2 (Assistant) reaches Level 3  (
\nSuperintendent\tGrade  II)  before  the\t reserved  candidate
\n(roster\t point promotee) at Level 3 goes further up to Level
\n4  in that case the seniority at Level 3 has to be  modified
\nby  placing  such  a  general  candidate  above\t the  roster
\npromotee,  reflecting  their inter se seniority at Level  2.
\nFurther\t promotion to Level 4 must be on the basis of such a
\nmodified  seniority  at\t Level 3, namely,  that\t the  senior
\ngeneral\t candidate  of\tLevel 2 will remain senior  also  at
\nLevel  3  to the reserved candidate, even if the latter\t had
\nreached\t Level 3 earlier and remained there when the  senior
\ngeneral\t candidate reached that Level 3.  In cases where the
\nreserved  candidate  has  gone\tupto Level  4  ignoring\t the
\nseniority  of  the  senior  general candidate  at  Level  3,
\nseniority  at  Level  4 has to be refixed (when\t the  senior
\ngeneral\t candidate  is promoted to Level 4) on the basis  of
\nwhen the time of reserved candidate for promotion to Level 4
\nwould  have  come,  if\tthe   case  of\tthe  senior  general
\ncandidates  was\t considered at Level 3 in due time.  To\t the
\nabove  extent, we accept the first part of the contention of
\nthe  learned  counsel  for the general candidates.   Such  a
\nprocedure  in  our view will properly balance the rights  of
\nthe   reserved\tcandidates  and\t  the\tfundamental   rights
\nguaranteed  under  Article 16(1) to the general\t candidates.
\nNo  difficulty\tin  amending  seniority list:\tOne  of\t the
\nobjections  raised before us and which appealed to the\tFull
\nBench  in  Jaswant  Singh’s case was that  this\t ‘catch\t up’
\nprinciple would lead to frequent alteration of the seniority
\nlist  at  Level\t 3.  We do not find any difficulty  in\tthis
\nbehalf.\t The seniority list at Level 3 would have only to be
\nmerely amended whenever the senior general candidate reaches
\nLevel  3.   Examples  given by reserved candidates  -do\t not
\ncreate\t any  anomaly:\t Learned   senior  counsel  Sri\t  K.
\nParasaran  and\tSri  Raju Ramachandran then  adverted  to  a
\nsituation  which  according  to them  might  create  serious
\nproblems  if a senior general candidate is to be treated  as
\nsenior\tat  the promotional level if he reaches\t that  level
\nbefore\tthe  roster promotee goes further up.\tThe  example
\ngiven  refer to cases where after the roster point  promotee
\n(reserved candidate) reaches the promotional level, there is
\ndirect\trecruitment  or\t recruitment  by  transfer  at\tthat
\npromotional level.  Counsel submit that, if a senior general
\ncandidate  is  thereafter  promoted  and  placed  above\t the
\nreserved  candidate,  can  he became senior  to\t the  direct
\nrecruit\t and  transferee?  We do not find any anomaly.\t The
\ndirect\trecruit\t or transferee who has no grievance  against
\nthe  reserved  candidate who was already there can  have  no
\ngrievance  against  a  senior general candidate\t who  has  a
\nsuperior  claim,  in  law, against the\treserved  candidate.
\nEven  if seniority of roster point promotee does not  Count,
\nexperience of both groups can be considered as part of merit
\nfor  further  promotion:   Before we leave point 3,  we\t may
\nrefer  to  another  submission made by\tSri  K.\t  Parasaran,
\nlearned senior counsel for the reserved candidates.  Learned
\ncounsel submitted that even if the seniority of the reserved
\ncandidates  had gone up to Level 3 earlier by the roster  at
\ntwo  levels  1\t& 2 is not counted, still  the\t‘experience’
\ngained\tby  them at Level 3 well before the  senior  general
\ncandidate  ‘caught up’ to that Level, cannot be\t disregarded
\nfor  purposes of promotion to Level 4.\tIt is true that\t the
\nroster\tpoint promotee who has reached the promotional level
\n3  even if he is not entitled to seniority would have gained
\nconsiderable  `experience’  at that level.  That  experience
\nis,  no doubt, of considerable relevance in considering\t his
\ncase  for  further promotion to Level 4.  But, at  the\tsame
\ntime,  it  is  to be noted that the general  candidates\t had
\nlonger experience at level 1 and level 2 and have come up to
\nlevel  3 by way of competition among the general  candidates
\nat  two stages.\t The said longer `experience’ gained by them
\nat  the\t lower levels 1 and 2 and the manner in\t which\tthey
\nhave reached the level 3 to which the reserved candidate had
\nreached\t earlier, are also relevant factors.  The quality of
\nthe  experience\t of  these groups also needs to be  kept  in
\nview.\tThe above principle would be an equitable  balancing
\nof the `experience’ of the candidates at various levels.  It
\nwill be appropriate for the Government of India or the State
\nGovernment,  as the case may be, to formulate guidelines  by
\nway  of\t administrative\t orders or by way of rules  in\tthis
\nbehalf.\t Point 3 is disposed of accordingly.  Point 4:\tThis
\npoint  concerns\t the  “prospective”  operation\tof  the\t two
\njudgments  in Sabharwal and Ajit Singh.\t The point regarding
\nthese  two cases directly arises in the appeals from Punjab,
\nHaryana and Rajasthan.\tThe prospectivity of Virpal has been
\nparticularly raised by learned Additional Solicitor General,
\nSri  C.S.   Vaidyanathan, in the IAs filed by the  Railways.
\nOnce  again  our approach here is to prevent reversions\t and
\navoid  hardship to the reserved candidates already  promoted
\nbefore\tthe  two  judgments and at the same time to  try  to
\nbalance the rights to seniority of the general candidates as
\nagainst\t those\tof the reserved candidates, in the light  of
\nArticle 16(1).\tProspectivity of Sabharwal:\n<\/p>\n
\t  (i)\tWhat   Sabbarwal    said    in\t regard\t  to\n\"prospectivity\":\n\n\n<\/pre>\n
\t  Before  Sabharwal  was  decided on  10.2.1995,  it
\nappears\t that, in several services, the roster was initially
\nput  in\t operation and promotions at all the  roster  points
\nwere  filled up.  But the roster was once again operated  on
\nfuture\tvacancies,  even  though all the  required  reserved
\ncandidates  were  in position at the promotional level.\t  It
\nwas  not  realised  that  once the roster  points  were\t all
\nfilled,\t the roster had served its purpose and fresh members
\nof  the reserved classes could claim promotional posts\tonly
\nif  any\t promotional  posts already filled by  the  reserved
\ncandidates  fell vacant.  This misapplication of the  roster
\ncame  to  be  removed  for the first time  on  10.2.95\twhen
\nSabharwal  was\tdecided.   Obviously, by that  time  several
\nreserved  candidates  had got promotion in excess  of  their
\nquota  because\tof the wrong “re- operation” of\t the  roster
\npoints.\t If the law declared in Sabbarwal were to be treated
\nas retroactive as is the normal position whenever the law is
\ndeclared by this Court, it would have resulted in reversions
\nof  several  officers  of  the\treserved  classes  as  their
\npromotions  before  10.2.95  by the fresh operation  of\t the
\nroster\tas aforesaid was wholly unjustified.  This Court  in
\nSabbarwal  therefore  tried to prevent such  reversions\t and
\ndeclared ( P.  753 of SCC, Para 11) as follows at the end of
\nthe judgment:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “We, however, direct that the interpretation given
\nby  us to the working of the roster and our findings on this
\npoint shall be operative prospectively”.\n<\/p>\n
\t  (ii)\tThe  rival  contentions:  To the  extent  of
\nsaving\tthe  reversions\t of   those  from  reserved  classes
\npromoted  before  10.2.95 though such promotions  were\tmade
\ncontrary  to  what  was decided in Sabharwal,  there  is  no
\nserious dispute from the side of the general candidates, but
\na  contention  is raised by the reserved candidates who\t got
\nsuch promotions in excess of the reservation quota that they
\nshould\tin addition get the benefit of the seniority in\t the
\npromotional  post even if such promotion made before 10.2.95
\nwas  wrong in view of what was decided in Sabharwal .\tThis
\nplea  is strongly opposed by the general candidates.   (iii)
\nOur  conclusion:   It is axiomatic in service  jurisprudence
\nthat  any promotions made wrongly in excess of any quota are
\nto  be treated as ad hoc.  This applies to reservation quota
\nas much as it applies to direct recruits and promotee cases.
\nIf  a  Court decides that in order only to  remove  hardship
\nsuch  roster  point promotees are not to face reversions,  –
\nthen  it  would,  in  our opinion be, necessary\t to  hold  –
\nconsistent  with our interpretation of Articles 14 and 16(1)\n<\/p>\n
–  that\t such  promotees  cannot  plead\t for  grant  of\t any
\nadditional  benefit  of\t seniority   flowing  from  a  wrong
\napplication  of\t the roster.  In our view, while Courts\t can
\nrelieve immediate hardship arising out of a past illegality,
\nCourts cannot grant additional benefits like seniority which
\nhave   no  element  of\t immediate  hardship.\tThus,  while
\npromotions  in\texcess\tof roster made\tbefore\t10.2.95\t are
\nprotected, such promotees cannot claim seniority.  Seniority
\nin  the\t promotional  cadre  of\t such  excess  roster  point
\npromotees  shall have to be reviewed after 10.2.95 and\twill
\ncount  only from the date on which they would have otherwise
\ngot normal promotion in any future vacancy arising in a post
\npreviously  occupied by a reserved candidate.  That disposes
\nof  the\t ‘prospectivity”  point in relation  to  Sabharwal.
\nProspectivity of Ajit Singh:\n<\/p>\n
\t  Coming  to  the  ‘prospectivity’  of\tAjit  Singh,
\ndecided on 1.3.96 the question is in regard to the seniority
\nof  the\t reserved candidates at the promotional level  where
\nsuch  promotions  have taken place before 1.3.96.   We\thave
\naccepted,  while  dealing  with\t Points 1  and\t2  that\t the
\nreserved candidates who get promoted at two levels by roster
\npoints ( say) from Level 1 to Level 2 and level 2 to level 3
\ncannot\tcount  their seniority at Level 3 as against  senior
\ngeneral\t candidates who reached Level 3 before the  reserved
\ncandidates moved upto Level 4.\tThe general candidate has to
\nbe  treated as senior at Level 3.  Where, before 1.3.96,i.e.
\nthe  date  of Ajit Singh’s judgment , at the level 3,  there
\nwere  reserved candidates who reached there earlier and also
\nsenior\tgeneral\t candidates  who reached there\tlater,\t(but
\nbefore\tthe reserved candidate was promoted to level 4)\t and
\nwhen  in spite of the fact that the senior general candidate
\nhad  to\t be  treated as senior at level 3 (in view  of\tAjit
\nSingh),\t the reserved candidate is further promoted to level
\n4  –  without considering the fact that the  senior  general
\ncandidate  was\talso  available\t at level 3  –\tthen,  after
\n1.3.96,\t it becomes necessary to review the promotion of the
\nreserved  candidate  to\t level\t4 and  reconsider  the\tsame
\n(without  causing  reversion to the reserved  candidate\t who
\nreached\t level\t4  before 1.3.96).  As and when\t the  senior
\nreserved  candidate  is\t later\tpromoted  to  level  4,\t the
\nseniority  at level 4 has also to be refixed on the basis of
\nwhen  the  reserved candidate at level 3 would have got\t his
\nnormal\tpromotion,  treating  him as junior  to\t the  senior
\ngeneral\t candidate  at level 3.\t Chander Paul Vs.  State  of
\nHaryana\t (  1997(10)  SCC 474) has to be understood  in\t the
\nmanner\tstated\tabove.\tWe hold accordingly on Point 4.\t  We
\ndispose\t of  the  clarification applications IAs 1  to\t3\/98
\nfiled  by the State of Punjab accordingly and hold that Ajit
\nSingh  and  Virpal lay down the correct law and not  Jagdish
\nLal,  which  must  be  considered as  confined\tto  its\t own
\npeculiar  facts.  We shall be passing separate orders in the
\nPunjab,\t Haryana and Rajasthan cases and Contempt Cases\t and
\nother  IAs on the basis of the principles laid down in\tthis
\njudgment  which,  for convenience will be called Ajit  Singh
\nII.  IAs Nos.1 to 3\/98 are disposed of accordingly.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Ajit Singh And Ors vs The State Of Punjab And Ors on 16 September, 1999 Author: M Rao Bench: S.P. Kurdukar, M. Jagannadha Rao. PETITIONER: AJIT SINGH AND ORS. Vs. RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 16\/09\/1999 BENCH: S.P. KURDUKAR, & M. JAGANNADHA RAO. JUDGMENT: M.JAGANNADHA RAO,J. […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-36114","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nAjit Singh And Ors vs The State Of Punjab And Ors on 16 September, 1999 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ajit-singh-and-ors-vs-the-state-of-punjab-and-ors-on-16-september-1999\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Ajit Singh And Ors vs The State Of Punjab And Ors on 16 September, 1999 - 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