{"id":39812,"date":"1985-09-30T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1985-09-29T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/union-of-india-ors-vs-godfrey-philips-india-ltd-etc-on-30-september-1985"},"modified":"2018-08-21T06:00:58","modified_gmt":"2018-08-21T00:30:58","slug":"union-of-india-ors-vs-godfrey-philips-india-ltd-etc-on-30-september-1985","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/union-of-india-ors-vs-godfrey-philips-india-ltd-etc-on-30-september-1985","title":{"rendered":"Union Of India & Ors vs Godfrey Philips India Ltd. Etc. … on 30 September, 1985"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Union Of India & Ors vs Godfrey Philips India Ltd. Etc. … on 30 September, 1985<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1986 AIR 806, \t\t 1985 SCR Supl. (3) 123<\/div>\n
Author: P Bhagwati<\/div>\n
Bench: Bhagwati, P.N. (Cj)<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nUNION OF INDIA & ORS.\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nGODFREY PHILIPS INDIA LTD. ETC. ETC.\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT30\/09\/1985\n\nBENCH:\nBHAGWATI, P.N. (CJ)\nBENCH:\nBHAGWATI, P.N. (CJ)\nPATHAK, R.S.\nSEN, AMARENDRA NATH (J)\n\nCITATION:\n 1986 AIR  806\t\t  1985 SCR  Supl. (3) 123\n 1985 SCC  (4) 369\t  1985 SCALE  (2)619\n CITATOR INFO :\n E&D\t    1987 SC 701\t (19)\n R\t    1987 SC1576\t (3)\n D\t    1987 SC1794\t (29)\n RF\t    1987 SC2414\t (23)\n R\t    1988 SC1531\t (46)\n R\t    1989 SC1933\t (28)\n\t    1990 SC 374\t (4,7,TO10,14,16,17)\n RF\t    1990 SC1276\t (4)\n R\t    1990 SC1676\t (24)\n C&F\t    1991 SC  14\t (11)\n D\t    1991 SC 818\t (18)\n RF\t    1992 SC1075\t (3)\n RF\t    1992 SC2169\t (20)\n\n\nACT:\n     Central Excise  and Salt Act 1944, Section 4(4) (d) (i)\nand Explanation\t thereto - 'value' - 'in a packed condition'\n- Cost\tof such\t packing - Whether to be included for excise\nduty -\tPrimary packing\t and secondary\tpacking - Difference\nbetween.\n     Cigarettes -  Manufactured\t and  packed  in  paper\/card\nboard packets  and then\t in  cartons  -\t Cartons  packed  in\ncorrugated fibre board containers - Cost of corrugated fibre\nboard containers Exclusion for levy of excise duty - Whether\narises.\n     Promissory estoppel\n     Doctrine of  promissory  estoppel\t-  Applicability  of\nExplained.\n     Constitution of India 1950, Article 141\n     Supreme Court  - Enunciation  of law  by a Bench of the\nCourt  -  Whether  Co-ordinate\tBench  entitled\t to  express\ndisagreement.\n     Words and Phrases\n     'Value' -\t'in a  packed  condition'  -  Meaning  of  -\nCentral Excise and Salt Act, 1944 Section 4(4)(d)(i).\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\n     The respondents  in the  appeals were  manufacturers of\ncigarettes. They  manufactured cigarettes in their factories\nand the\t cigarettes so manufactured were packed initially in\npaper\/card board packets of 10 and 20 and these packets were\nthen packed  together in  paper\/card  board  cartons\/outers.\nThese cartons\/outers  were then\t placed in  corrugated fibre\nboard containers and these corrugated fibre board containers\nfilled with  cartons\/outers containing packets of cigarettes\nof 10  and 20  were delivered  by  the\trespondents  to\t the\nWholesale dealers at the factory gate.\n     The wholesale  price charged by the respondents for the\ncigarettes sold\t to the\t wholesale dealers included not only\nthe\n124\ncost of\t primary packing  in packets  of 10 and 20, but also\nthe cost of secondary packing in cartons\/outers and the cost\nof final packing in corrugated fibre board containers.\n     On May  19, 1976 the Cigarette Manufactures Association\nmade a\trepresentation to  the Central\tBoard of  Excise and\nCustoms pointing  out that corrugated fibre board containers\n\"are not  an Integral  or essential requirement for the sale\nof  cigarettes\t and  are  used\t for  the  sole\t purpose  of\nprotecting cigarettes  from any damage that may arise during\ntransportation ,  and that the cost of such corrugated fibre\nboard containers  should not  therefore be  included in\t the\nvalue of  goods for  the purpose  of excise  duty. The Board\naccepted this  plea of the Association and by a letter dated\nMay 24, 1976 intimated to the Association that \"Instructions\nhave been  issued to  the Collectors  of Central Excise that\nthe cost  of corrugated\t fibre board  containers in question\ndoes not  form part  of the  value  of\tcigarettes  for\t the\npurposes of  excise duty\".  This representation contained in\nthe letter  dated May  24, 1976\t continued to hold the field\nuntil November\t2, 1982 when the Central Board of Excise and\nCustoms addressed  a circular  to all  Collectors of Central\nExcise, stating that the matter had been re-examined and the\nearlier advice should be treated as cancelled.\n     In the  appeals by\t the  Revenue  to  this\t Court,\t the\nquestion for  consideration was\t whether the cost of packing\nis includible  in   the value  of  the\tcigarettes  for\t the\npurpose of assessment to excise duty.\n     On behalf\tof the\tappellant-Revenue it  was  contended\nthat on a true construction of section 4 (4)(d)(1) read with\nthe Explanation,  that whatever\t be the\t packing, primary or\nsecondary,  in\t which\tthe   cigarettes  were\tpacked\twhen\ndelivered to  the buyer\t in the course of wholesale trade at\nthe factory  gate, the\tcost of such packing would be liable\nto be  included in  the value of the cigarettes, and that lt\nwas a totally unwarranted gloss on the Language of section 4\n(4)(d)(1) read\twith the  Explanation to  make a distinction\nbetween primary\t and secondary\tpacking because that section\ndid not\t make any  such distinction  and  on  the  contrary,\nprovided in  the clearest terms for inclusion of the cost of\nthe entire  packing in which the cigarettes were packed when\ndelivered to the whole-sale buyer at the time of removal.\n     On behalf\tof  the\t respondents  -\t companies,  it\t was\ncontended that\tthough section\t4(4) (d)(i)  read  with\t the\nExplanation did not make any distinction between the primary\npacking and secondary\n125\npacking, the  cost of only such secondary packing was liable\nto be  included in  the\t value\tof  the\t cigarettes  as\t was\nnecessary for sale of the cigarettes in the wholesale trade,\nand not the cost of secondary packing which was necessitated\nin order  to protect  the packed  cigarettes ant  to prevent\nthem, from being damaged during the course of transportation\nfrom the  factory gate\tto the\tgodown or  warehouse of\t the\nwholesale dealer.  It was further contented that the cost of\ncorrugated fibre  board containers was not includible in the\nvalue of  the goods  because the letter dated 24th May, 1976\nconstituted an\texemption order within the meaning of Rule 8\nsub-rule (2)  of the  Central Excise  Rules,  1944  and\t the\nrespondents were accordingly exempted from payment of excise\nduty on\t the cost  of corrugated fibre board containers w ed\nfor packing  the cigarettes,  and the doctrine of promissory\nestoppel was  invoked against the Government on the basis of\nthe representation  contained in  the letter dated 24th May,\n1976.\n^\n     HELD 1.[per  Bhagwati, C.J..  Pathak and  Sen,j.j]\t The\nCentral Government  and the  Central  Board  of\t Excise\t and\nCustoms were  clearly bound bypromissory estoppel to exclude\nthe cost of corrugated fibre board containers from the value\nof the\tgoods for  the purpose\tof assessment of excise duty\nfor the\t period 24th  May 1976\tto 2nd\tNovember  1982.\t The\nrespondents would  be entitled\tto exclusion  of the cost of\ncorrugated fibre  board containers  from the  value  of\t the\ncigarettes only\t during the  period 24th  May  1976  to\t 2nd\nNovember 1982. [147 B, C]\n     In the  instant case,  a representation was undoubtedly\nmade by the Central Board of Excise and Customs and approved\nand accepted  by the  Central Government,  that the  cost of\ncorrugated fibre  boards containers  would not be includible\nin the value of the cigarettes for the purpose of assessment\nto  excise   duty.   The   respondents\t acted\t upon\tthis\nrepresentation and  continued the  use of  corrugated  fibre\ncontainers for\tpacking the  cartons\/outers of cigarette and\ndid not\t recover from  the wholesale  dealers the  amount of\nexcise duty  attributable to  the cost\tof  such  corrugated\nfibre board  containers during\tthe period  24th May 1976 to\n2nd November 1982. It would be most inequitable to allow the\nExcise authorities  to assess  excise duty on the basis that\nthe value  of the cigarettes manufactured by the respondents\nshould\tinclude\t  the  cost   of  corrugated   fibre   board\ncontainers, when  lt was  clearly represented by the Central\nBoard of  Excise and  Customs that  the cost  of  corrugated\nfibre board  containers would not be includible in the value\nof the\tcigarettes for\tthe purpose  of assessment of excise\nduty. [146 C-F]\n126\n     2. What  has been laid down in Motilal Sugar Mills case\n[1979] 2  S.C.R. 641 represents the correct law in regard to\nthe doctrine  of promissory  estoppel. The  observations  in\nJeet Ram's  case [1980] 3 S.C.R. 689 to the extent that they\nconflict with  the statement  of the  law in  Motilal  sugar\nMills case  and introduce reservations cutting down the full\nwidth and  amplitude of the propositions of law laid down in\nthat case  are dissented from. If the Bench of two Judges in\nJeet Ram's  case found\tthemselves unable  to agree with the\nlaw laid  down in  Motilal sugar  Mills case they could have\nreferred Jeet Ram's case to a larger Bench. It was not right\non  their  part\t to  express  their  disagreement  with\t the\nenunciation of\tthe law\t by a  co-ordinate Bench of the same\nCourt in Motilal Sugar Mills case. [145 c-e]\n     3. Union of India v. Bombay International Ltd.<\/a> 11984] 1\nS.C.C. 467  broadly dealt  with\t the  question\tof  cost  of\npacking, and  it was  conceeded on behalf of the respondents\nin that\t case that  the cost  of  primary  packing  must  be\nregarded as  falling within  the terms of s. 4(4)(d)(i) read\nwith the  Explanation and  lt was only the cost of secondary\npacking which gave rise to dispute between the parties. [131\nF; 134 F]\n     (Per Bhagwati, C.J.)\n     1. Whenever  a question  arises whether the cost of any\nparticular  kind  of  secondary\t packing  is  liable  to  be\nincluded in  the value\tof the\tarticle, the  question to be\nasked is  does the  packed condition in which the article is\ngenerally sold\tin the\twholesale market at the factory gate\ninclude such  secondary packing?  If it\t does, it  would  be\nliable to  be included\tin the\tvalue of the article for the\npurpose of excise duty. lt must therefore follow that if the\npacked condition in which the cigarettes manufactured by the\nrespondents are\t generally sold\t in the\t wholesale market at\nthe factory  gate includes packing in corrugated fibre board\ncontainers  the\t  cost\tof   such  corrugated\tfibre  board\ncontainers would  be liable  to be  included in the value of\nthe cigarettes for the purpose of excise duty. [135 B-D]\n     2. The  condition for  applicability of  the  inclusive\ndefenition of  value in s. 4 (4)(d)(i) is that the goods are\ndelivered at  the time\tof removal  \"in a  packed condition\"\nand where  this condition  is satisfied,  the \"value\" of the\ngoods would  include \"the  cost of  such packings  and \"such\npacking\" must  obviously mean the packing in which the goods\nare when  they are  delivered at  the time  of removal.\t The\nquestion therefore to be\n127\nasked is  - what  is the packed condition in which the goods\nare A when delivered at the time of removal? Whatever is the\npacking of  the goods at the time when they are delivered at\nthe time  of removal,  the cost\t of such  packing  would  be\nliable to  be include  in the  'value'\tof  the\t goods.\t The\nexplanation  to\t  s.  4\t  (4)(d)(i)  provides  as  exclusive\ndefinition of  the term\t \"packing\" and\tit includes not only\nouter packing  but also\t what may  be called  inner packing.\n1135 F-G]\n     3. Ordinarily  bobbin, pirl,  spool, reel and warp beam\non which  yarn is  wound would not be regarded as packing of\nsuch yarn, but brought within the definition of \"packing\" by\nthe Explanation. The Explanation thus extends the meaning of\nthe word \"packing\" to cover items which would not ordinarily\nbe regarded  as forming\t part of  \"packing\". The Explanation\nthen  proceeds\t to  say  that\t\"packing\"  means    wrapper,\ncontainer or  any other\t thing in  which the excisable goods\nare wrapped or contained. [135H;136B]\n     4. It  is\tapparent  from\tthe  wide  language  of\t the\nExplanation that  every kind of container in which it can be\nsaid  that  the\t excisable  goods  are\tcontained  would  be\n\"packing\" within  the meaning  of the  Explanation and\tthis\nwould necessarily  include  a  fortiorari  corrugated  fibre\nboard containers in which the cigarettes are contained. [136\nC]\n     5. The  question is  not for  what purpose a particular\nkind of packing la done. The test is whether particular kind\nof packing  is done  in\t order\tto  put\t the  goods  in\t the\ncondition in  which they are generally sold in the wholesale\nmarket at the factory gate and of they are generally sold in\nthe wholesale market at the factory gate in a certain packed\ncondition, whatever  may be the reason for such packing, the\ncost of such packing would be includible in the value of the\ngoods for assessment to excise duty. [137 E-F]\n     In the  instant case,  there can  therefore be no doubt\nthat  corrugated   fibre  board\t  containers  in  which\t the\ncigarettes are\tcontained  fall\t within\t the  definition  of\n\"packing\" in  the Explanation  and if  they form part of the\npacking in  which the goods are packed when delivered at the\ntime of\t removal, it  is difficult  to resist the conclusion\nthat under  s, 4  (4)(d)(i) read  with the  Explanation, the\ncost of\t such corrugated  fibre board  containers  would  be\nliable to  be included\tis the value of the cigarettes- [136\nE-F]\n128\n     6. Rule  8 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 deals with\nthe power to authorise exemption from duty in special cases.\nSub-rule (2) Rule 8 postulates the making of a special order\nby the\tCentral Board  of Excise  and Customs  in each\tcase\nexempting from\tpayment of  duty any  exciseable goods. [139\nC,G]\n     7- The letter dated 24th May 1976 could not possibly be\nregarded as  a special\torder by the Central Board of Excise\nand Customs  in the  case of  each of  the manufacturers  of\ncigarettes exempting  cigarettes from payment of duty to the\nextent of  the cost  of packing\t by way\t of corrugated fibre\nboard containers.  The argument\t of the respondents based on\nsub-rule (2)  of Rule  8 must be therefore rejected. 1139 G;\n140 A]\n     8.\t The   doctrine\t of  promissory\t estoppel  is  well-\nestablished  in\t  the  administrative\tlaw  of\t  India.  It\nrepresents a  principle evolved by equity to avoid injustice\nand,  though  commonly\tnamed  promissory  estoppel,  lt  is\nneither in  the realm  of  contract  nor  in  the  realm  of\nestoppel. The  basis of\t this doctrine is the inter position\nof equity which has always, true to its form \" stepped in to\nmitigate the rigour of strict law.\n     9. The  doctrine of  promissory estoppel  is applicable\nagainst the  Government in the exercise of its governmental,\npublic or  executive functions\tat the doctrine of executive\nnecessity or  freedom of  future executive  action cannot be\ninvoked to  defeat the\tapplicability  of  the\tdoctrine  of\npromissory estoppel. [144 G]\n     Central   London Property\tTrust Limited  v. High Trees\nHouse Limited,\t[1966] 1  ALL E.  R. 256, Rederiaktiebolaget\nAmphitrite v. The King [1921] 3 K.B. 500, Roberston Minister\nof Pension, [1949] 1 K.B. 227, Union of India v. Indo Afghan\nAgencies,<\/a> [1968]  2 S.C.R.  366\t and  Century  Spinning\t and\nManufacturing Company  Limited v. Ulhasnagar Council,<\/a> [1970]\n3 S.C.B. 854, referred to.\n     10.  The  doctrine\t of  promissory\t estoppel  being  an\nequitable doctrine, must yield the equity so requires, If it\ncan be\tshown by  the Government  or public  authority\tthat\nhaving regard  to the  facts as\t  they\thave transpired,  it\nwould be  inequitable  to  hold\t the  Government  or  public\nauthority to  the promise  or representation made by it. The\nCourt would  not raise\tan equity in favour of the person to\nwhen the  promise or  representation is made and enforce the\npromise or  representation against  the Government or public\nauthority. The doctrine of promissory\n129\nestoppel would\tbe displaced  in such a case, because on the\nfacts A\t equity would  not require  that the  Government  or\npublic authority  should be  held bound\t by the\t promise  or\nrepresentation made by it. [145 G; 146 A]\n     (Per Pathak & Sen, JJ. dissenting)\n     The corrugated fibre board containers are not necessary\nfor selling  the cigarettes  in the  wholesale market at the\nfactory gate. The cost of such packing cannot be included in\nthe 'value'  for the  purpose of  assessment of excise duty.\n[148 G; 151 Bl\n     (Per R.S. Pathak, J.)\n     1. Under  s. 3 of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944\nthe levy  of excise duty is made on manufactured cigarettes,\nthe excisable  goods. Section  4 of the Act provides how the\n'value' shall be determined. The expression \"value\" has been\nextended to  include the cost of packing. The packing itself\nis not the subject of the levy of excise duty. [148 B]\n     2. For  the purpose  of computing\tthe measure  of\t the\nlevy, the  statute has\tgiven an  extended  meaning  to\t the\nexpression 'value'  in clause (d) of sub-s. (4) of sec. 4 of\nthe Act.  The expression must be strictly construed. What is\nbeing included\tin the\tvalue now  is something\t beyond\t the\nvalue of the manufactured commodity itself. [148 C]\n     3. The  corrugated fibre  board containers are employed\nonly for  the purpose  of avoiding  damage or  injury during\ntransit. The  wholesale dealer\twho takes  delivery may have\nhis depot  a very  short distance only from the factory gate\nor may\thave  such  transport  arrangements  available\tthat\ndamage or  injury to  the cigarettes  can  be  avoided.\t The\ncorrugated fibre  board containers  are\t not  necessary\t for\nselling the  cigarettes\t in  the  wholesale  market  at\t the\nfactory gate. [148 F-G]\n     4. The  position expressed\t by  the  Central  Board  of\nExcise and Custom in its letter dated May 24, 1976 was right\nwhen lt\t declared that\tthe Collector  of the Central Excise\nhas been  instructed that the cost of corrugated fibre board\ncontainers in  question does  not form\tpart of the value of\ncigarettes for the purpose of excise duty.\"[148 H]\n     Union of  India  v.  Bombay  Tyre\tInternational  Ltd.,<\/a>\n[1984] 1 S.C.C. 467, referred to.\n130\n     (Per A.N. Sen, J.)\n     1.\t Excise\t duty  which  is  levied  on  the  goods  is\nultimately passed  on to the consumers of the goods and they\nhave ultimately\t to bear the burden. So far as the consumers\nare concerned  they buy\t cigarettes, loose  or in packets or\neven in\t cartons. Cartons  packed in  corrugated fibre board\ncontainers are not purchased by the consumers. So far as the\nretail sellers\tare concerned  who may buy from wholesalers,\nthey usually  buy loose\t packets of cigarettes or packets of\ncigarettes packed  in cartons.\tSo far\tas the buyers in the\nwholesale trade\t are concerned,\t they  buy  the\t cartons  of\ncigarettes In  which the packets of cigarettes are course of\ntheir wholesale\t trade for  selling the sale to retailers or\nto their  customers. It\t is only for the sake of convenience\nin the\tmatter of  smooth delivery  of cartons\tin which the\npackets of  cigarettes are  packed that\t the cartons  may be\nfurther packed\tin corrugated  fibre  board  containers\t for\nfacility of  transport and  smooth transit  of\tthe  cartons\nbefore delivery\t of the sake to the whole ale buyer. [151 B-\nD]\n     2. On  a proper construction of s.4(4)(d)(i) of the Act\nread with the Explanation any secondary packing done for the\npurpose of  facilitating transport and smooth transit of the\ngoods to  be delivered\tto the\tbuyer in the wholesale trade\ncannot\tbe   included  in  the\tvalue  for  the\t purpose  of\nassessment of excise duty. [150 G-H]\n     In the instant case, the cost of corrugated fibre board\ncontainers which  the  cartons\tcontaining  the\t packets  of\ncigarettes is  packed, cannot  be included  in the value for\nthe purpose of assessment of excise duty. [151 A]\n     Union of India v. Bombay Type International Lit.<\/a> [1984]\nS.C.C. 467, referred to.\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1136 of
\n1977.\n<\/p>\n
     From the  Judgment and  Order dated  29.4.1976  of\t the
\nBombay High Court in Misc. Petn. No. 548 of 1974.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t     AND
\n\t       Civil Appeal No. 1244 of 1977.\n<\/p>\n
131<\/span><\/p>\n
     From the  Judgment and  Order dated  15.12.1975 of\t the
\nBombay A High Court in Spl. Misc. Petition No. 293 of 1974.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t    AND
\n\t      Civil Appeal Nos. 55-61 of 1979.\n<\/p>\n
     From the  Judgment and  Order dated  18.8.1977  of\t the
\nAndhra Pradesh\tHigh Court  in Writ  Appeals Nos.  252, 435,
\n550, 553  and 560  of 1976  and Writ  Petition Nos. 3114 and
\n6044 of 1975.\n<\/p>\n
     K. Parasaran,  Solicitor General,\tN.C. Talukdar, Suraj
\nUdai Singh, Dalveer Bhandari, C.V. Subba Rao and R.N. Poddar
\nfor the Appellants.\n<\/p>\n
     N.A. Palkhiwala, J.C. Bhatt, D.B. Engineer, B.H. Antia,
\nRavinder Narain,  O.C. Mathur,\tKamal Mehta,  Talat  Ansari,
\nMrs. A.K.  Verma, Ashok Sagar, Sukumaran, D.N. Mishra, Kamal
\nMehta and Ms. Rainu Walia for the appearing Respondents. D
\n     S.\t Roy   Chowdhury,  Jatin   Ghosh,  D.N.\t  Gupta,  S.
\nRamsubramaniam,\t D.N.\tGupta  and   S.K.  Nandy   for\t the
\nIntervener.\n<\/p>\n
     The following Judgments were delivered
\n     BHAGWATI, C.J.  These appeals  by special leave raise a
\nnumber of  questions relating  to excise  duty\tleviable  on
\ncigarettes manufactured by the respondents. Barring one, all
\nthe other  questions are  now settled  as a  result  of\t the
\ndecision of  this Court\t in Union  of India  v. Bombay\tTyre
\nInternational Ltd.<\/a>  [1984] 1  S.C.C. 467,  and all  that  is
\nrequired is  to direct\tthe assessing  authorities to assess
\nthe excise  duty leviable on the respondents on the basis of
\nthe law laid down in-Bombay Tyre International case (supra).
\nThe only  question which  remains to  be  considered  is  in
\nregard to  cost of  packing includible\tin the\tvalue of the
\ncigarettes for the purpose of assessment to excise duty.\n<\/p>\n
     The respondents  in these\tappeals are manufacturers of
\ncigarettes. They  manufacture cigarettes  in their factories
\nand the\t cigarettes so\tmanufactured are packed initially in
\npaper\/card board  packets of 10 and 20 and these packets are
\nthen packed  together in  paper\/card  board  cartons\/outers.
\nThese cartons\/outers  are then\tplaced in  corrugated  fibre
\nboard containers and it is
\n132<\/span>
\nthese  corrugated   fibre  board   containers  filled\twith
\ncartons\/outers containing packets of cigarettes of 10 and 20
\nwhich are  delivered by\t the respondents  to the  whole sale
\ndealers at  the factory\t gate. It  was common ground between
\nthe  parties  that  the\t whole-sale  price  charged  by\t the
\nrespondents  for  the  cigarettes  sold\t to  the  whole-sale
\ndealers includes  not only  the cost  of primary  packing in
\npackets of 10 and 20, but also the cost of secondary packing
\nin  cartons\/outers   and  the\tcost  of  final\t packing  in
\ncorrugated fibre  board containers.  So far as the two items
\nof cost,  namely cost  of primary packing into packets of 10
\nand 20\tand the cost of secondary packing in cartons\/outers,
\nare concerned, there was no dispute between the parties that
\nthese two  items of cost must be included in determining the
\nvalue of  the cigarettes  for the  purpose of  assessment to
\nexcise duty, since such packing would admittedly fall within
\nthe terms  of section  4(4)(d)(i) of the Central Excises and
\nSalt Act,  1944 (hereinafter  referred to  as the  Act) read
\nwith the  Explanation to  that provision.  But the  question
\nwhether the  cost of final packing in corrugated fibre board
\ncontainers would  be liable  to be  included in the value of
\nthe cigarettes\tfor the purpose of assessment to excise duty
\nraised\ta  serious  controversy\t between  the  parties.\t The
\nappellant contended  that on  a true construction of Section
\n4(4)(d)(i)  read  with\tthe  Explanation,  whatever  be\t the
\npacking, primary  or secondary, in which the cigarettes were
\npacked when  delivered to  the buyer in the course of whole-
\nsale trade  at the  factory gate,  the cost  of such packing
\nwould  be  liable  to  be  included  in\t the  value  of\t the
\ncigarettes. The\t argument of the appellant was that lt was a
\ntotally\t unwarranted   gloss  on  the  language\t of  Section
\n4(4)(d)(i) read\t with the  Explanation to make a distinction
\nbetween primary\t and secondary\tpacking because that section
\ndid not\t make any  such distinction  and  on  the  contrary,
\nprovided in  the clearest terms for inclusion of the cost of
\nthe entire  packing in which the cigarettes were packed when
\ndelivered to  the whole-sale  buyer at\tthe time of removal.
\nThe respondents\t on the\t other hand urged that though it was
\ntrue that  Section 4(4)(d)(i)  read with the Explanation did
\nnot  make   any\t distinction  between  primary\tpacking\t and
\nsecondary packing,  the cost  of only such secondary packing
\nwas liable  to be included in the value of the cigarettes as
\nwas necessary  for sale\t of the cigarettes in the whole sale
\ntrade and  not the  cost  of  secondary\t packing  which\t was
\nnecessitated in\t order to  protect the packed cigarettes and
\nto prevent  them from  being damaged  during the  course  of
\ntransportation from  the  factory  gate\t to  the  godown  or
\nwarehouse  of\tthe  whole-sale\t  dealer.  The\t packing  in
\ncorrugated   fibre    board   containers,    contended\t the
\nrespondents, was not
\n133<\/span>
\nnecessary or  essential for  the  purpose  of  sale  of\t the
\ncigarettes to  the whole-sale dealer at the factory gate but
\nit  was\t  done\tonly   A  with\t a  view   to\tfacilitating
\ntransportation of  the cigarettes  from the  factory gate to
\nthe  godown  or\t warehouse  of\tthe  whole-sale\t dealer\t and
\nprotecting  the\t  cigarettes  against\tdamage\tduring\tsuch
\ntransportation and  therefore the  cost of  such packing was
\nnot liable  to be  included in\tthe value of the cigarettes.
\nThese were  the rival  contentions urged  on behalf  of\t the
\nparties and we shall now proceed to examine them.\n<\/p>\n
     We have  broadly dealt  with the  question of  cost  of
\npacking in  the Judgment  delivered by\tus  in\tBombay\tTyre
\nInternational case  (supra) and\t it would  be convenient  at
\nthis stage  to reproduce  what we have said in that Judgment
\nin regard to the cost of packing:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “The case  in respect\t of the\t cost of  packing is
\n\t  somewhat complex.  The new  Section 4(4)(d)(i) has
\n\t  made express\tprovision for  including the cost of
\n\t  packing in  the determination\t of “value”  for the
\n\t  purpose of  excise duty.  Inasmuch as\t the case of
\n\t  the  parties\t is   that   the   new\t Section   4
\n\t  substantially\t reflects   the\t position  obtaining
\n\t  under the  unamended Act,  we shall proceed on the
\n\t  basis that  the position  in regard to the cost of
\n\t  packing is the same under the Act, both before and
\n\t  after the  amendment of the Act.Section 4(4)(d)(i)
\n\t  reads :\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
x      x     x\t  x    x      x\t      x
\n\t  It is\t relevant to note that the packing, of which
\n\t  the cost  is included, is the packing in which the
\n\t  goods are  wrapped, contained\t or wound  when\t the
\n\t  goods are  delivered at  the time  of removal.  In
\n\t  other words,\tit is  the packing  in which  it  is
\n\t  ordinarily sold  in the  course of wholesale trade
\n\t  to the  wholesale buyer.  The degree of packing in
\n\t  which the excisable article is contained will vary
\n\t  from one  class of  articles to  another. From the
\n\t  particulars detailed\tbefore us  by the assessees,
\n\t  it is\t apparent that\tthe cost of primary packing,
\n\t  that is  to say,  the packing in which the article
\n\t  is contained\tand in\twhich it  is made marketable
\n\t  for the  ordinary consumer,  for example a tube of
\n\t  toothpaste or\t a bottle of tablets in a card-board
\n\t  carton, or biscuits in a paper wrapper or
\n134<\/span>
\n\t  in a\ttin container,\tmust be\t regarded as falling
\n\t  within  A   section  4(4)(d)(i).  That  is  indeed
\n\t  conceded by  learned counsel\tfor the assessee. It
\n\t  is the  cost of secondary packing which has raised
\n\t  serious dispute. Secondary packing is of different
\n\t  grades.  There  is  the  secondary  packing  which
\n\t  consists of  larger cartons  in which\t a  standard
\n\t  number of  primary cartons (in the sense mentioned
\n\t  earlier) are\tpacked. The  large  cartons  may  be
\n\t  packed into  even larger  cartons for facilitating
\n\t  the easier transport of the goods by the wholesale
\n\t  dealer. Is  all the  packing, no  matter  to\twhat
\n\t  degree,  in\twhich  the  wholesale  dealer  takes
\n\t  delivery  of\t the  goods  to\t be  considered\t for
\n\t  including the\t cost thereof  in the  “value” ?  We
\n\t  must remember\t that while  packing is necessary to
\n\t  make\tthe   excisable\t  article   marketable\t the
\n\t  statutory provision  calls for strict construction
\n\t  because the  levy is\tsought to be extended beyond
\n\t  the manufactured  article itself.  It seems  to us
\n\t  that the  degree of  secondary  packing  which  is
\n\t  necessary for putting the excisable article in the
\n\t  condition in\twhich it  is generally\tsold in\t the
\n\t  wholesale market at the factory gate is the degree
\n\t  of packing  whose cost  can  be  included  in\t the
\n\t  “value” of  the article  for the  purpose  of\t the
\n\t  excise levy. To that extent, the cost of secondary
\n\t  packing cannot be deducted from the wholesale cash
\n\t  price of  the excisable  article  at\tthe  factory
\n\t  gate.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
It will\t be noticed  that  so  far  as\tprimary\t packing  is
\nconcerned, it  was conceded  on behalf of the respondents in
\nthat case  that the cost of primary packing must be regarded
\nas falling  within the terms of section 4(4)(d)(i) read with
\nthe Explanation\t and it\t was  only  the\t cost  of  secondary
\npacking which  gave rise to dispute between the parties. But
\nwe did\tnot proceed  to decide\twhether the  cost  of  every
\ndegree of  secondary packing  would be liable to be included
\nin the\tvalue of the goods or whether a distinction could be
\ndrawn between  one degree  of secondary packing and another.
\nWe posed the question: Is all the packing, no matter to what
\ndegree, in which the whole-sale dealer takes delivery of the
\ngoods to be considered for including the cost thereof in the
\nvalue”?\t Or  does  the\tlaw  require  a\t line  to  be  drawn
\nsomewhere?” ‘We\t did not  answer this question specifically,
\nleaving it to a later date when this question would directly
\ncome up for consideration on the facts of a Particular case.
\nWe however laid
\n135<\/span>
\ndown the  general proposition  that “the degree of secondary
\npacking which is necessary for putting the excisable article
\nin the condition in which it is generally sold in the whole-
\nsale market  at the  factory gate  is the  degree of packing
\nwhose cost  can be included in the ‘value of the article for
\nthe purpose  of the excise duty . Where therefore a question
\narises whether\tthe cost of any particular kind of secondary
\npacking is liable to be included in the value of article, we
\nwould have  to ask  does the  packed condition\tin which the
\narticle is  generally sold  in the  whole-sale market at the
\nfactory gate  include such secondary packing? If it does, it
\nwould be  liable to  be included in the value of the article
\nfor the\t purpose of  excise duty.  On this reasoning it must
\nfollow that  if the packed condition in which the cigarettes
\nmanufactured by\t the respondents  are generally\t sold in the
\nwhole-sale market  at the  factory gate\t includes packing in
\ncorrugated  fibre   board  containers,\t the  cost  of\tsuch
\ncorrugated fibre  board containers  would be  liable  to  be
\nincluded in  the value\tof the cigarettes for the purpose of
\nexcise duty.\n<\/p>\n
     We\t may   leave  aside   for  the\t moment\t the   above
\nobservations made  by us  in the  Judgment  in\tBombay\tTyre
\nInternational case  (supra) and turn to examine the language
\nof Section  4(4)(d)(i) read  with the  Explanation.  Section
\n4(4) (d)  (i) enacts  an inclusive  definition of value” and
\nprovides that  E “value” in relation to and excisable goods,
\n“where the  goods are  delivered at the time of removal in a
\npacked condition,  includes the\t cost of such packing except
\nthe cost  of the packing which is of a durable nature and is
\nreturnable by  the buyer  to the assessee. The condition for
\napplicability of  this inclusive  definition of\t ‘value’  is
\nthat the  goods are  delivered at  the time  of removal in a
\npacked conditions and where this condition is satisfied, the
\nvalue” of the goods would include “the cost of such packing”
\nand “such  packing” must obviously mean the packing in which
\nthe goods  are when  they  are\tdelivered  at  the  time  of
\nremoval. The  question which has to be armed is: what is the
\npacked condition  in which  the goods  are when delivered at
\nthe time of removal? Whatever is the packing of the goods at
\nthe time   when\t they are  delivered at the time of removal,
\nthe cost  of such  packing would be liable to be included in
\nthe  ‘value’  of  the  goods.  The  Explanation\t to  Section
\n4(4)(d)(i) provides  an exclusive  definition  of  the\tterm
\n“packing” and  it includes  not only  outer packing but also
\nwhat may  be called  inner packing. Ordinarily bobbin, pirl,
\nspool, reel and warp beam on
\n136<\/span>
\nwhich yarn is wound would not be regarded as packing of such
\nyarn,  but   they  are\tbrought\t within\t the  definition  of
\n“packing” by  the Explanation.\tThe Explanation thus extends
\nthe meaning of the word ‘packing” to cover items which would
\nnot ordinarily\tbe regarded  as forming part of packing. The
\nExplanation  then   proceeds  to  say  that  “packing  means
\nwrapper, container or any other thing in which the excisable
\ngoods are wrapped or contained. It is apparent from the wide
\nlanguage of  the Explanation that every kind of container in
\nwhich it  can be said that the excisable goods are contained
\nwould be  packing” within the meaning of the Explanation and
\nthis would necessarily include a fortiorari corrugated fibre
\nboard containers in which the cigarettes are contained. When
\nBombay Tyre  International case was argued before us, it was
\nat one\tstage sought to be contended, though rather faintly,
\nthat it is only the immediate packing in which the excisable
\ngoods are  contained, that  is primary\tpacking alone, which
\nwould be  liable to  be\t regarded  as  ‘packing\t within\t the
\nmeaning of  the Explanation.  But this argument was given up
\nwhen it was pointed out that even secondary packing would be
\nwithin the  terms of the Explanation, because such secondary
\npacking would  also constitute\ta wrapper  or a container in
\nwhich the  excisable goods are wrapped or contained. That is
\nwhy we\theld in\t the Judgment  in Bombay  Tyre International
\ncase (supra)  that secondary packing is also included within
\nthe term “packing in the Explanation. There can therefore be
\nno doubt that corrugated fibre board containers in which the
\ncigarettes are contained fall
\n within the definition of packing” in the Explanation and if
\nthey form  part of the packing in which the goods are packed
\nwhen delivered\tat the\ttime of\t removal, it is difficult to
\nresist the  conclusion that  under Section  4(4)(d)(i)\tread
\nwith the  Explanation, the  cost of  such  corrugated  fibre
\nboard containers  would be liable to be included in value of
\nthe cigarettes.\n<\/p>\n
     But then  it was contended on behalf of the respondents
\nthat it\t is not\t the cost of every kind of secondary packing
\nwhich is  includible in\t the value  of the  excisable goods.
\nWhether the  cost of  secondary packing is includible or not
\nmust depend  upon the  necessity  or  essentiality  of\tsuch
\nsecondary packing  for sale  of the  excisable goods  at the
\nfactory gate  in the course of wholesale trade. The argument
\nwas that  where the  secondary packing\tis  necessitated  in
\norder to  protect the  packed excisable\t goods\tfrom  damage
\nduring the course of transportation from the factory gate to
\nthe godown or warehouse of the wholesale dealer, the cost of
\nsuch secondary\tpacking cannot\tbe included  in the value of
\nthe goods. The respondents thus sought to draw a
\n137<\/span>
\ndistinction between  secondary\tpacking\t necessary  for\t the
\npurpose A  of selling  the goods  at the factory gate in the
\ncourse o  wholesale trade and the secondary packing used in
\norder to  protect the goods against damage during the course
\nof transportation so that they may safely reach the consumer
\nin proper condition. We find it difficult to appreciate this
\ndistinction  so\t  far  as   assessment\tto  excise  duty  is
\nconcerned. Obviously  every wholesale  dealer would  like to
\ntake delivery  of the  goods from  the manufacturer  in such
\npacking that he can safely transport the goods to his godown
\nor warehouse  and sell\tthe same to the retailer or consumer
\nin  marketable\t condition.  The   wholesale  dealer   would
\ntherefore  insist   that  the  goods  purchased\t by  him  in
\nwholesale should  be properly packed so that they do not get
\ndamaged\t during\t  transportation  or   even   storage.\t The
\nmanufacturer would  accordingly have to deliver the goods at
\nthe factory gate in such packed condition as demanded by the
\nwholesale dealer.  It is  apparent that unless the goods are
\nin such\t packed condition  the wholesale  dealer  would\t not
\nordinarily  take  delivery  of\tthe  goods  and\t necessarily
\ntherefore such\twould be  the packed  condition in which the
\ngoods are  generally sold  in the  wholesale market  at\t the
\nfactory gate. It makes no difference to the applicability of
\nthe definition\tin Section  4(4)(d)(i) read with Explanation
\nthat the  packing  of  the  goods  ordinarily  sold  by\t the
\nmanufacturer in\t the wholesale\ttrade  is  packing  for\t the
\npurpose\t of  protecting\t the  goods  against  damage  during
\ntransportation or  in the warehouse. The question is not for
\nwhat purpose  a particular kind of packing is done. The test
\nis whether  a particular kind of packing is done in order to
\nput the\t goods in  the condition in which they are generally
\nsold in the wholesale market at the factory gate and if they
\nare generally  sold in\tthe wholesale  market at the factory
\ngate in\t a certain  packed condition,  whatever may  be\t the
\nreason for  such packing,  the cost of such packing would be
\nincludible in  the value  of the  goods\t for  assessment  to
\nexcise duty. Of course, as pointed out by us in the judgment
\nin Bombay  Tyre International  case if any special secondary
\npacking is  provided by\t the assessee  at the  instance of a
\nwholesale buyer\t which is not generally provided as a normal
\nfeature of  the wholesale  trade, the  cost of such` special
\npacking would  not be  includible in  the value of the goods
\nand would have to be deducted from the wholesale cash price.\n<\/p>\n
     That takes us to the next contention of the respondents
\nbased on  the letter  dated 24th  May 1976  addressed by the
\nUnder Secretary,  Central Board of Excise and Customs to the
\nCigarette Manufacturers’  Association. It  is necessary,  in
\norder to
\n138<\/span>
\nappreciate the\tcontention based  on this letter, to state a
\nfew facts.  On 19th  May 1976  the Cigarette  Manufacturer’s
\nAssociation made  a representation  to the  Central Board of
\nExcise and  customs pointing out that corrugated fibre board
\ncontainers are\tnot an integral or essential requirement for
\nthe sale  of cigarettes and are used for the sole purpose of
\nprotecting cigarettes  from any damage that may arise during
\ntransportation and  that the  cost of  such corrugated fibre
\nboard containers  should not  therefore be  included in\t the
\nvalue of  the goods  for the  purpose of  excise  duty.\t The
\nCentral Board  of Excise  and Customs  after examining\tthis
\nquestion accepted  the plea  of the Cigarette Manufacturers’
\nAssociation and by a letter dated 24th May 1976 intimated to
\nthe Cigarette  Manufacturers’ Association that “instructions
\nhave been issued to the Collector of Central Excise that the
\ncost of\t corrugated fibre  board containers in question does
\nnot form part of the value of cigarettes for the purposes of
\nexcise duty  . The  respondents and  other manufacturers  of
\ncigarettes, acting  upon this  representation  made  by\t the
\nCentral Board  of Excise and Customs, proceeded on the basis
\nthat the  cost of  corrugated fibre board containers was not
\nliable to  be included\tin the\tvalue of  cigarettes for the
\npurpose of  assessment to  excise duty\tand did\t not recover
\nfrom the wholesale dealers to whom they sold the cigarettes,
\nany amount by way of excise duty attributable to the cost of
\nsuch corrugated\t fibre board containers. This representation
\ncontained in  the letter  dated 24th  May 1976\tcontinued to
\nhold the  field until  2nd November,  1982 when\t the Central
\nBoard of  Excise and  Customs addressed a circular letter to
\nall the Collectors of Central Excise stating that the matter
\nhad been  re-examined in  consultation with  the Ministry of
\nLaw and\t in view of the provisions of Section 4, the cost of
\npacking “whether initial or secondary in which the excisable
\ngoods are packed at the time of the removal may form part of
\nthe assessible\tvalue of  such goods” and the earlier advice
\ninconsistent  with   this  position  should  be\t treated  as
\ncancelled. The\tquestion which\twas raised  on behalf of the
\nrespondents on\tthis set  of facts  was as to whether during
\nthe period  between 24th  May 1976 and 2nd November 1982 the
\nrespondents were liable to pay excise duty on the basis that
\nthe cost of corrugated fibre board containers was includible
\nin the value of the goods. It was contended on behalf of the
\nrespondents  that   the\t cost\tof  corrugated\tfibre  board
\ncontainers was\tnot includible is the value of the goods and
\nthere  were   two  arguments   urged  in   support  of\tthis
\ncontention. The\t first argument\t was that  the letter  dated
\n24th May  1976 constituted  an exemption  order\t within\t the
\nmeaning of  Rule 8 sub-rule (2) of the Central Excise Rules,
\n1944 and the respondents were accordingly
\n139<\/span>
\nexempt from payment of excise duty on the cost of corrugated
\nA fibre\t board containers  used for  packing the cigarettes.
\nThe second  argument  invoked  the  doctrine  of  promissory
\nestoppel  against   the\t Government  on\t the  basis  of\t the
\nrepresentation contained  in the letter dated 24th May 1976.
\nThe first argument is in our opinion not well-founded but so
\nfar as\tthe second argument is concerned, we find that there
\nis considerable force in it. Our reasons are as follows.\n<\/p>\n
     Rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 deals with the
\npower to  authorise exemption from duty in special cases and
\nit reads as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
\t  “Rule 8. Power to authorise exemption from duty in
\n\t  Special cases
\n\t  (1) The  Central Government may from time to time,
\n\t  by notification  in the  Official Gazette,  exempt
\n\t  (subject to such conditions as may be specified in
\n\t  the notification)  any excisable  goods  from\t the
\n\t  whole or any part of duty leviable on such goods.
\n\t  (2) The Central Board of Excise and Customs may by
\n\t  special order in each case exempt from the payment
\n\t  of duty,  under circumstances\t of  an\t exceptional
\n\t  nature, any excisable goods.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
The respondents obviously could not invoke the aid of Rule 8
\nsub-rule (1)  since the\t letter dated  24th May\t 1976 was  a
\ncommunication addressed\t by the\t Central Board of Excise and
\nCustoms and  could not\teven  by  the  farthest\t stretch  of
\nimagination be\tconstrued as  a notification  by the Central
\nGovernment. The\t respondents were  therefore constrained  to
\nplace reliance\ton Rule 8 sub-rule (2) because that sub-rule
\nconfers power  on the Central Board of Excise and Customs to
\ngrant exemption\t and if\t at all,  the letter  dated 24th May
\n1976 could  be justified  only under  that sub-rule.  But we
\nfail to\t see how  Rule 8 sub-rule (2) can possibly avail the
\nrespondents.  That  sub-rule  postulates  the  making  of  a
\nspecial order  by the Central Board of Excise and Customs in
\neach case  exempting from  payment  of\tduty  any  excisable
\ngoods. The  letter dated 24th May 1976 could not possibly be
\nregarded as  a special\torder by the Central Board of Excise
\nand Customs  in the  case of  each of  the manufacturers  of
\ncigarettes exempting  cigarettes from payment of duty to the
\nextent of  the cost  of packing\t by way\t of corrugated fibre
\nboard containers. We
\n140<\/span>
\ndo not think the letter dated 24th May 1976 could be brought
\nwithin the  terms of sub-rule (2) of Rule 8 and the argument
\nof the respondents based on that sub-rule must be rejected.\n<\/p>\n
     The respondents  are however  on firmer ground in their
\nplea of\t promissory estoppel  against the  Central Board  of
\nExcise\tand   Customs  and   the  Central   Government.\t The
\nrepresentation contained  in the letter dated 24th May, 1976
\nwas undoubtedly\t made by  the Central  Board of\t Excise\t and
\nCustoms but  we may  safely assume,  and for this assumption
\nthere is  clear warrant\t in the proceedings in special Civil
\nApplication No.\t 787 of 1976 in the Gujarat High Court, that
\nthis representation  was  made\twith  the  approval  of\t the
\nCentral Government  and\t it  was  accepted  by\tthe  Central
\nGovernment  as\tcorrectly  representing\t the  stand  of\t the
\nRevenue. It is significant to note that when the petitioners
\nin Special  Civil Application No. 787 of 1976 in the Gujarat
\nHigh Court  contended that  the value  of  corrugated  fibre
\nboard containers  was not  includible in  the value  of\t the
\ngoods manufactured  by the  petitioners, it  was conceded on
\nbehalf of the Union of India and the Excise Authorities both
\nin the\taffidavit in  reply filed in the case as also in the
\ncourse of  the arguments  that the  cost of corrugated fibre
\nboard containers  used for  packing by the petitioners would
\nnot form  part of  the value  of the goods for assessment of
\nexcise duty.  The representation  contained  in\t the  letter
\ndated 24th May 1976 could therefore legitimately be regarded
\nby the\trespondents  as\t a  representation  of\tthe  Central
\nGovernment. The\t respondents could  reasonably\tassume\tthat
\nsuch a\trepresentation could  never have  been made  by\t the
\nCentral Board of Excise and Customs with out the approval of
\nthe Central  Government and  if it did not have the approval
\nof the\tCentral Government,  it would  have been immediately
\nobjected to  and the  Central Government would have promptly
\ndirected the Central Board of Excise and Customs to withdraw
\nit. The\t question is whether this representation made by the
\nCentral\t Board\tof  Excise  and\t Customs  and  approved\t and
\naccepted by  the Central  Government could validly found the
\nplea of promissory estoppel.\n<\/p>\n
     Now  the\tdoctrine  of   promissory  estoppelis  well-
\nestablished  in\t  the  administrative\tlaw  of\t  India.  It
\nrepresents a  principle evolved by equity to avoid injustice
\nand,  though  commonly\tnamed  promissory  estoppel,  it  is
\nneither in  the realm  of  contract  nor  in  the  realm  of
\nestoppel. The  basis of\t this doctrine is the inter position
\nof equity  which has always, true to its form, stepped in to
\nmitigate the  rigour of strict law. This doctrine, though of
\nancient vintage,  was rescued from obscurity by the decision
\nof
\n141<\/span>
\nMr. Justice  Denning as\t he  then  was,\t in  his  celebrated
\njudgment in  Central London  property Trust  Limited v. High
\nTrees House  Limited, (1956)  1 All  E. R.  256-.  The\ttrue
\nprinciple of promissory estoppel is that where one party has
\nby his\tword or\t conduct made  to  the\tother  a  clear\t and
\nunequivocal promise  or representation\twhich is intended to
\ncreate legal  relations or  affect a  legal relationship  to
\narise in  the future,  knowing or intending that it would be
\nacted upon  by the  other  party  to  whom  the\t promise  or
\nrepresentation is  made and  it is  in fact so acted upon by
\nthe other  party, the  promise or  representation  would  be
\nbinding on  the party making it and he would not be entitled
\nto go  back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him
\nto do  so, having  regard to  the dealings  which have taken
\nplace between the parties. It has often been said in England
\nthat the  doctrine of  promissory estoppel  cannot itself be
\nthe basis  of an  action: it  can only be a shield and not a
\nsword: but the law in India has gone far ahead of the narrow
\nposition adopted  in England and as a result of the decision
\nof this\t Court in  Motilal Sugar  Mills v.  State  of  Uttar
\nPradesh,<\/a> [1979]\t 2 S.C.R.  641, it  is now well-settled that
\nthe doctrine  of promissory  estoppel is  not limited in its
\napplication only to defence but it can also found a cause of
\naction. The  decision of  this Court  in Motilal Sugar Mills
\ncase  (supra)  contains\t an  exhaustive\t discussion  of\t the
\ndoctrine of promissory estoppel and we find ourselves wholly
\nin agreement  with the\tvarious parameters  of this doctrine
\noutlined in that decision.\n<\/p>\n
     More importantly, it is necessary to point out that the
\ndecision  in  Motilal  Sugar  Mills  case  (supra)  marks  a
\nsignificant development\t in the law relating to the doctrine
\nof promissory  estoppel. The  principal question  debated in
\nthat case  was as  to whether  and if so, to what extent, is
\nthe doctrine  of promissory  estoppel applicable against the
\nGovernment. It was contended on behalf of the State of Uttar
\nPradesh\t that\tthe  plea  of  promissory  estoppel  is\t not
\navailable against the exercise of executive functions of the
\nState, for the State cannot bind itself, so as to fetter its
\nfuture executive  action. There\t is contention was sought to
\nbe supported by relying on the observations of Rowlatt J. in
\nan early  decision in  Roderiaktiebolaget Amphitrite  v. The
\nKing (1921)  3 K.B.  500. But this Court observed in Motilal
\nSugar mills  case (supra)  that what Rowlatt J. said in that
\ncase did  not represent\t the correct  law on the subject and
\npointed\t out   that  the  doctrine  of\texecutive  necessity
\npropounded by  Rowlatt J.  was disapproved by Denning, J. as
\nhe then\t was, in  Roberston v. Minister of Pensions (1949) 1
\nK.B. 227. Denning, J. categorically
\n142<\/span>
\nexpressed the  view in\tRoberston’s case  (supra)  that\t the
\ncrown cannot  escape its  obligation under  the doctrine  of
\npromissory estoppel  by\t praying  in  aid  the\tdoctrine  of
\nexecutive necessity  . This  Court also in Union of India v.
\nIndo Afgan  Agencies<\/a>  [1968]  2\t S.C.R.\t 366,  exploded\t the
\ndoctrine of executive necessity. Shah, J. speaking on behalf
\nof the\tCourt negative\tthe argument  urged on behalf of the
\nGovernment that\t it is\tnot competent  for the Government to
\nfetter its  future executive action which may necessarily be
\ndetermined by  the needs  of the community when the question
\narises and  no promise\tor undertaking\tcan be\theld  to  be
\nbinding on  the Government  so as  to hamper  its freedom of
\nexecutive action and observed at page 376 of the Report:\n<\/p>\n
\t  We are unable to accede to the contention that the
\n\t  executive necessity  releases the  Government from
\n\t  honouring its\t solemn promises  relying  on  which
\n\t  citizens have\t acted to their detriment. Under our
\n\t  constitutional set-up no person may be deprived of
\n\t  his right  or liberty\t except in due course of and
\n\t  by authority\tof law; if a member of the Executive
\n\t  seeks to deprive a citizen of his right or liberty
\n\t  otherwise than  in exercise  of power derived from
\n\t  the law  common or  statute- the  Courts  will  be
\n\t  competent to\tand indeed would be bound to protect
\n\t  the rights of the aggrieved citizens.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
The learned  judge also\t after examining the decisions cited
\nbefore him summed up the position in the following words:\n<\/p>\n
\t  Under our  jurisprudence  the\t Government  is\t not
\n\t  exempt   from\t  liability   to   carry   out\t the
\n\t  representation made by it as to its future conduct
\n\t  and it  cannot on  some undefined  and undisclosed
\n\t  ground of  necessity or  expediency fail  to carry
\n\t  out the  promise solemnly made by it, nor claim to
\n\t  be the  Judge of its own obligation to the citizen
\n\t  on an\t ex-parte appraisement\tof the circumstances
\n\t  in which the obligation has arisen.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
The  defence   of  executive   necessity  was  thus  clearly
\nnegatived by  this Court  and it was pointed out that it did
\nnot release the Government from its obligation to honour the
\npromise made  by it,  if the  citizen, acting in reliance on
\nthe promise,  had altered  his\tposition.  The\tdoctrine  of
\npromissory estoppel  was in  such a  case applicable against
\nthe Government\tand it could not be defeated by invoking the
\ndefence of executive necessity. This
\n143<\/span>
\nCourt in Motilal Sugar Mills case (supra) also negatived the
\nargument that  if the  Government were\theld bound  by every
\nrepresentation made  by\t it  regarding\tits  intention,\t the
\nresult would  be that  the Government  would be\t bound by  a
\ncontractual obligation even though no formal contract in the
\nmanner required\t by Article  299  of  the  Constitution\t was
\nexecuted. It  was held\tby this\t Court that a party who has,
\nacting in  reliance on\ta promise  or representation mate by
\nthe Government, altered his position, is entitled to enforce
\nthe promise  or the  representation against  the Government,
\neven though the promise or representation is not in the form
\nof a  formal contract  as required  by Article\t299 and that
\nArticle does  not militate  against the applicability of the
\ndoctrine of promissory estoppel against the Government.\n<\/p>\n
     The resultant  position summarised\t by  this  Court  in
\nMotilal Sugar Mills case (supra) in the following words:\n<\/p>\n
\t  The law  may therefore  now he taken to be settled
\n\t  as a\tresult\tof  this  decision  that  where\t the
\n\t  Government makes  a promise  knowing or  intending
\n\t  that it  would be acted on by the promises and, in
\n\t  fact, the  promisee, acting  in  reliance  on\t it,
\n\t  alters his  position the  Government would be held
\n\t  bound by  the promise\t and the  promise  would  be
\n\t  enforceable against the Government at the instance
\n\t  of the  promises, notwithstanding that there is no
\n\t  consideration for  The promise  and the promise is
\n\t  not recorded\tin the\tform of a formal contract as
\n\t  required by Article 299 of the Constitution. It is
\n\t  elementary that  in Republic\tgoverned by the rule
\n\t  of law,  on\tone, howsoever high or low, is above
\n\t  the law.  Everyone is\t subject to the law as fully
\n\t  and completely  as any other and the Government is
\n\t  no  exception.   It  is   indeed  the\t  pride\t  of
\n\t  constitutional democracy  and rule of law that the
\n\t  government stands on the same footing as a private
\n\t  individual so\t far as the obligation of the law is
\n\t  concerned: the  former is  equally  bound  as\t the
\n\t  latter. It  is indeed\t difficult to  see  on\twhat
\n\t  principle can\t a government, committed to the rule
\n\t  of  law,  claim  immunity  from  the\tdoctrine  of
\n\t  promissory estoppel.\tCan the\t government say that
\n\t  it is\t under no obligation to act in a manner i.e.
\n\t  fair ant  just or  that it  is not  bound  by\t the
\n\t  considerations of  honesty and  good faith  ?\t Why
\n\t  should the  government  not  be  held\t to  a\thigh
\n\t  standard of rectangular rectitude while dealing
\n144<\/span>
\n\t  with its  citizens ?\tThere was  a time  when\t the
\n\t  doctrine of  executive necessity  was regarded  as
\n\t  sufficient justification  for\t the  government  to
\n\t  repudiate even  its contractual  obligations,\t but
\n\t  let it be said to the eternal glory of this court,
\n\t  this doctrine\t was emphatically  negatived in\t the
\n\t  Indo-Afgan agencies  case and the supremacy of the
\n\t  rule of  law was  established. It was laid down by
\n\t  this court  that the government cannot claim to be
\n\t  immune from  the  applicability  of  the  rule  of
\n\t  promissory estoppel  and repudiate  a promise made
\n\t  by It\t on the\t ground that such promise may fetter
\n\t  its future executive action.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
The doctrine  of promissory  estoppel as explained above was
\nalso held  to be  applicable against  public authorities  as
\npointed out  in Motilal\t Sugar Mills  case.  This  court  in
\nMotilal\t Sugar\t Mills\tcase   quoted  with   approval\t the
\nobservations  of   Shah,  J.   in   Century   Spinning\t and
\nManufacturing  Company\t limited  v.   Ulhasnagar  Municipal
\nCouncil [1970] 3 S.C.R. 854, where the learned Judge said:\n<\/p>\n
\t  Public  bodies   are\tas  much  bound\t as  private
\n\t  individuals to  carry out representations of facts
\n\t  and premises\tmade by them, relying on which other
\n\t  persons  have\t altered  their\t position  to  their
\n\t  prejudice.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  If our  nascent democracy  is to  thrive different
\n\t  standards of conduct for the people and the public
\n\t  bodies cannot\t ordinarily be\tpermitted. A  public
\n\t  body\tis,   in  our\tjudgment,  not\texempt\tfrom
\n\t  liability to\tcarry out  , its  obligation arising
\n\t  out of  representations made\tby it  relying\tupon
\n\t  which a  citizen has\taltered his  position to his
\n\t  prejudice.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
The Court  refused to  make a  distinction between a private
\nindividual and\ta public  body so  far as  the\tdoctrine  of
\npromissory estoppel is concerned.\n<\/p>\n
     There   can therefore  be no doubt that the doctrine of
\npromissory estoppel  is applicable against the Government in
\nthe  exercise  of  its\tgovernmental,  public  or  executive
\nfunctions and the doctrine of executive necessity or freedom
\nof future  executive action  cannot be invoked to defeat the
\napplicability of  the doctrine\tof promissory  estoppel.  We
\nmust concede  that the\tsubsequent decision of this Court in
\nJeet Ran  v. State  of Haryana\t[1980] 3 S.C.R. 689, takes a
\nslightly different view and holds
\n145<\/span>
\nthat the  doctrine of  promissory estoppel  is not available
\nagainst\t  the exercise\tof executive  functions of the State
\nand the\t State\tcannot\tbe  prevented  from  exercising\t its
\nfunctions under\t the law.  This decision  also expresses its
\ndisagreement with  the observation  made  in  Motilal  Sugar
\nMills case  that the  doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot
\nbe defeated  by invoking the defence of executive necessity,
\nsuggesting by  necessary implication  that the\tdoctrine  of
\nexecutive necessity is available to the Government to escape
\nits obligation under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. We
\nfind it difficult to understand how a Bench of two Judges in
\nJeet Ram’s  case could\tpossibly overturn  or disagree\twith
\nwhat was  said by  another Bench  of two  Judges in  Motilal
\nSugar Mills  Case. If  the Bench of two Judges in Jeet Ram’s
\ncase found themselves unable to agree with the law laid down
\nin Motilal  Sugar Mills\t case, they could have referred Jeet
\nRam’s case  to a  larger Bench,\t but we\t do not think it was
\nright on  their part  to express their disagreement with the
\nenunciation of\tthe law\t by a  coordinate Bench\t of the same
\nCourt  in  Motilal  sugar  Mills  case.\t We  have  carefully
\nconsidered both the decision in Motilal Sugar Mills and Jeet
\nRam’s case and we are clearly of the view that what has been
\nlaid down in Motilal sugar Mills case represents the correct
\nlaw in\tregard to the doctrine of promissory estoppel and we
\nexpress our disagreement with the observations in Jeet Ram’s
\ncase to\t the extent that they conflict with the statement of
\nthe  law   in  Motilal\t Sugar\tMills\tcase  and  introduce
\nreservations cutting  down the\tfull width  and amplitude of
\nthe prepositions of law laid down in that case.\n<\/p>\n
     Of course\twe must\t make it clear and that is also laid
\ndown in\t Motilal Sugar Mills case (supra), that there can be
\nno  promissory\testoppel  against  the\tlegislature  in\t the
\nexercise of its legislative functions nor can the Government
\nor public  authority be debarred by promissory estoppel from
\nenforcing a  statutory prohibition.  It is equally true that
\npromissory estoppel  cannot be used to compel the Government
\nor a  public authority\tto carry  out  a  representation  or
\npromise which  is contrary  to law  or which was outside the
\nauthority or  power of\tthe officer  of the Government or of
\nthe public authority to make. We may also point out that the
\ndoctrine of  promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine
\nit must\t yield when  the equity\t so requires,  if it  can be
\nshown by  the Government  or public  authority\tthat  having
\nregard to  the facts  as they  have transpired,\t it would be
\ninequitable to\thold the  Government or\t public authority to
\nthe promise  or representation\tmade by\t it, the Court would
\nnot raise an equity in favour of the person to whom
\n146<\/span>
\nthe promise  or\t representation\t is  made  and\tenforce\t the
\npromise or  representation against  the Government or public
\nauthority. The\tdoctrine of  promissory\t estoppel  would  be
\ndisplaced in such a case, because on the facts, equity would
\nnot require  that the  Government or public authority should
\nbe held\t bound by  the promise or representation made by it.
\nThis aspect has been dealt
\nwith fully  in Motilal\tSugar Mills case (supra) and we find
\nourselves wholly  in agreement\twith what  has been  said in
\nthat decision on this point.\n<\/p>\n
     We may  now turn  to examine  the facts in the light of
\nthe  law   discussed  by   us.\tHere  a\t representation\t was
\nundoubtedly made  by the Central Board of Excise and Customs
\nand approved  and accepted  by the  Central Government, that
\nthe cost  of corrugated fibre boards containers would not be
\nincludible in the value of the cigarettes for the purpose of
\nassessment to  excise duty.  The respondents acted upon this
\nrepresentation and  continued the  use of  corrugated  fibre
\nboard  containers  for\tpacking\t the  cartons  \/  outers  of
\ncigarettes and\tdid not\t recover from  the wholesale dealers
\nthe amount  of excise  duty attributable to the cost of such
\ncorrugated fibre board containers during the period 24th May
\n1976 to\t 2nd November, 1982. It would be most inequitable to
\nallow the  Excise Authorities  to assess  excise duty on the
\nbasis that  the value  of the cigarettes manufactured by the
\nrespondents should  include the\t cost  of  corrugated  fibre
\nboard containers,  when it  was clearly\t represented by\t the
\nCentral Board  of Excise  and Customs  in  response  to\t the
\nsubmission made\t by the Cigarette Manufacturers’ Association\n<\/p>\n
– and  this representation  was approved and accepted by the
\nCentral Government  that the  cost of corrugated fibre board
\ncontainers would  not be  includible in\t the  value  of\t the
\ncigarettes for\tthe purpose of assessment of excise duty. Of
\ncourse,\t this\trepresentation\tcould\toperate\t to   create
\npromissory estoppel  only if it was within the competence of
\nthe Central  Board of  Excise and  Customs and\tthe  Central
\nGovernment  to\t make  good   such  representation  and\t the
\nexclusion of  the cost\tof corrugated fibre board containers
\nfrom the value of the cigarettes was not contrary to law. We
\nthink that  the Central\t Government had\t power under  Rule 8
\nsub-rule (1)  of the Rules to issue a notification excluding
\nfibre board  containers from the value of the cigarettes and
\nthereby exempting  the cigarettes  from\t that  part  of\t the
\nexcise duty  which would  be attributable  to  the  cost  of
\ncorrugated fibre board containers. So also the Central Board
\nof Excise and Customs had power under Rule 8 sub-rule (2) to
\nmake a\tspecial order in the case of each of the respondents
\ngranting the game exemption, because it could
\n147<\/span>
\nlegitimately  be   said\t  that,\t  having   regard   to\t the
\nrepresentation\t   made\t by   the  Cigarette  Manufacturers’
\nAssociation, there  were  circumstances\t of  an\t exceptional
\nnature which  required the  exercise of the power under sub-
\nrule (2)  of Rule  8. The Central Government and the Central
\nBoard of  Excise and Customs were therefore clearly bound by
\npromissory estoppel  to exclude the cost of corrugated fibre
\nboard containers  from the  value of  the B  goods  for\t the
\npurpose of assessment of excise duty for the period 24th May
\n1976 to 2nd November 1982.\n<\/p>\n
     The  respondents\twould  therefore   be  entitled\t  to
\nexclusion of  the cost\tof corrugated fibre board containers
\nfrom the value of the cigarettes only during the period 24th
\nMay 1976 to 2nd November 1982. Save and except in respect of
\nthis  period,\tthe  cost  of  the  corrugated\tfibre  board
\ncontainers would  be liable  to be  included in the value of
\nthe cigarettes for the purpose of assessment of excise duty.
\nI would therefore pass an order in these appeals in terms of
\nthe format  order which\t has  been  evolved  by\t consent  of
\nparties in the, Bombay Tyre International case (supra) and I
\nwould direct that the Assessing Authorities shall assess the
\nexcise duty  under the\tformat order  in the  light  of\t the
\nobservations contained\tin this\t Judgment. There  will be no
\norder as to costs.\n<\/p>\n
     PATHAK, J.\t I have perused the judgment proposed by the
\nlearned Chief  Justice in  these appeals  and while  I\tfind
\nmyself in  agreement with  his\tviews  on  the\tquestion  of
\npromissory estoppel,  I am unable, with regret, to subscribe
\nto the\tview expressed\tby him\ton the question of secondary
\npacking. I  propose, therefore,\t to set\t down my own view in
\nthe matter.\n<\/p>\n
     In Union  of India\t v. Bombay  Tyre International\tLtd.<\/a>
\n[1984] 1  S.C.C. 467, while construing sub-cl. (i) of cl.(d)
\nof sub-s.  (4) of  8. 4 of the Central Excises and & lt Act,
\n1944, which  provides for  including the  cost of packing in
\nthe determination  of value  for the purpose of excise duty,
\nwe observed  that the  cost of primary packing as well as of
\nsecondary packing  in the sense explained in that case would
\nbe included  within the meaning of the expression value . In
\nthe present  case the cigarettes are manufactured and packed
\nin cardboard  packets, each  containing 10 to 20 cigarettes.
\nThose packets  constitute primary packing. Those packets are
\nthereafter packed in cartons or “outers” for delivery to the
\nbuyer. Finally,\t the cartons or outers are themselves packed
\nin corrugated  fibre board  containers, evidently  to ensure
\nthe cartons against injury or damage during transport. The
\n148<\/span>
\nquestion is  whether the  corrugated fibre  board containers
\ncan be\tregarded as secondary packing, the cost of which can
\npermissibly be\tincluded in the determination of value n for
\nthe purpose of excise duty.\n<\/p>\n
     Now it  is apparent that under 8. 3 of the Act the levy
\nof excise  duty is  made on  manufactured cigarettes,  which
\nafter all are the excisable goods. And 8. 4 provides how the
\nvalue of  manufactured cigarettes  shall be  determined. The
\nexpression values  has been  extended to include the cost of
\npacking. The  packing itself  is not the subject of the levy
\nof excise  duty. The manufactured cigarettes are the subject
\nof the\tlevy, because  excise duty  is here  charged on\t the
\nmanufactured commodity,\t that is to say, cigarettes. For the
\npurpose of  computing the  measure of the levy, however, the
\nstatute has  given an  extended meaning\t to  the  expression
\nvalue in  clause (d) of sub-s.4 of 8. 4 of the Act. Plainly,
\nthe extension  must be strictly construed, for what is being
\nincluded in  the value\tnow is something beyond the value of
\nthe Manufactured  commodity itself.  In Union  of  India  v.
\nBombay Tyre International Ltd.<\/a> (supra), we observed :-\n<\/p>\n
\t  It seems  to\tus  that  the  degree  of  secondary
\n\t  packing  which   is  necessary   for\tputting\t the
\n\t  excisable article  in the condition in which it is
\n\t  generally sold  in the  wholesale  market  at\t the
\n\t  factory gate\tis the\tdegree of packing whose cost
\n\t  can be  included in  the value  of the article for
\n\t  the purpose of the excise levy.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Is  the\t  packing  in\tcorrugated  fibre  board  containers
\nnecessary for  putting the  cigarettes in  the condition  in
\nwhich they are generally sold in the wholesale market at the
\nfactory gate?  In my opinion, it is not. The corrugate fibre
\nboard containers  are  employed\t only  for  the\t purpose  of
\navoiding damage\t or injury  during transit.  It is prefectly
\nconceivable that the wholesale dealer who takes delivery may
\nhave his  depot a  very short distance only from the factory
\ngate or\t may have such transport arrangements available that
\ndamage or  injury to  the cigarettes  can  be  avoided.\t The
\ncorrugated fibre  board containers  are\t not  necessary\t for
\nselling the  cigarettes\t in  the  wholesale  market  at\t the
\nfactory gate.\n<\/p>\n
     I think  the position expressed by the Central Board of
\nExcise and  Custom in  its letter  dated May  24,  1976\t was
\nprefectly right\t when it  declared that the Collector of the
\nCentral\t Excise\t  has  been  instructed\t that  the  cost  of
\ncorrugated fibre  board containers in question does not form
\npart of\t the value  of cigarettes  for the purpose of excise
\nduty.\n<\/p>\n
149<\/span><\/p>\n
     The assessing  authorities will  now proceed to make an
\nassessment in  accordance with the opinion expressed in this
\njudgment .\n<\/p>\n
     AMAREDRA NATH SEN, J. I have read the judgment proposed
\nto be delivered by the Learned Chief Justice in this appeal.
\nAfter giving  my anxious  and careful  consideration, I find
\nwith regret  that I cannot persuade myself to agree with the
\nview expressed\tby the Learned Chief Justice on the question
\nof secondary  packing. On  the other  question,\t namely\t the
\nquestion of  promissory estoppel,  I am\t in entire agreement
\nwith his views.\n<\/p>\n
     The Learned  Chief Justice\t in his judgment has set out
\nall the\t material facts\t and circumstances. He has noted the
\nrespective contentions put forward on behalf of the parties.
\nHe has\talso adverted  to the earlier decision of this Court
\nin Union of India v. Bombay Tyre International Ltd<\/a>; [1984] 1
\nS.C.C. 467.  It does not, therefore, become necessary for me
\nto refer  to the  facts and circumstances of this case or to
\nany of these aspect in my judgment.\n<\/p>\n
     The cigarettes  after manufacture are usually placed in
\npaper\/card board  packets, each\t packet containing  10 or 20
\ncigarettes. These  packets before  delivery to the wholesale
\nbuyer\t      are    packed\ttogether    in\t  paper\/card
\nboard\/cartons\/outers, each  of\tsuch  cartons  containing  a
\nnumber of  packets of cigarettes with 10 or 20 cigarettes in
\neach packet. I agree with the Learned Chief Justice that the
\ncost of packing cigarettes in packets of 10 or 20 cigarettes
\neach and  thereafter in\t cartons\/outers for  delivery to the
\nbuyer in  the course of whole-sale trade at the factory gate
\nmust necessarily be included in the value for the purpose of
\nlevy of\t excise duty.  I however, find it difficult to agree
\nwith the  view expressed  by the  learned Chief Justice that
\nwhen a\tnumber of  these cartons are put in corrugated fibre
\nboard containers  for delivery,\t the  cost  of\tthe  further
\npacking\t incurred   for\t putting   cartons\/outers   in\t the
\ncorrugated fibre  board containers  must also be included in
\nthe value for the purpose of assessment of excise duty.\n<\/p>\n
     When tobacco  is  rolled  up  in  paper  following\t the
\nappropriate process  of manufacturing cigarettes, cigarettes
\ncome into  existence. The  paper  in  which  cigarettes\t are
\nrolled is  indeed a part of the manufactured product itself.
\nThe paper  in which  a cigarette  is rolled forms no part of
\nthe packing  and is  indeed a  part of the cigarette itself.
\nWhen the cigarettes, after their
\n150<\/span>
\nmanufacture,  are   put\t in  packets,  each  packet  usually
\ncontaining 10  or 20  cigarettes, the  packets in  which the
\ncigarettes are\tpacked indeed constitute the primary packing
\nfor the\t purpose of  delivery and  there can  be no question
\nthat the  cost of  this packing must necessarily be included
\nin the value for the purpose of assessment of excise duty. A
\nnumber of  packets, containing cigarettes either 10 or 20 in
\nnumber in  each\t packet\t are  then  put\t in  larger  cartons
\naccording to the requirements of the buyer in the whole-sale
\ntrade. Packing a number of packets of cigarettes in a larger
\ncarton for  delivery to\t the buyer  in the  whole-sale trade
\naccording to  his requirement  constitutes secondary packing
\nbut the\t cost of  this packing\ton a true construction of 8.
\n4(4) (d)(i)  of the  Act read with explanation to the clause
\nbut also be included in the value for the purpose of levy of
\nexcise duty. Packets of cigarettes in the larger cartons are
\nto be  delivered to  the buyer\tin the\twhole-sale trade  to
\nenable the  buyers in  the whole-sale  trade to\t sell to the
\nretail sellers\tin the\tsame condition\tor by  removing\t the
\npackets from the cartons. Packets of cigarettes so packed in
\ncartons can  easily be delivered to the buyers in the course
\nof whole-sale  trade at the factory gate without any further
\npacking. If  the buyer who is to take delivery in the course
\nof the\twhole-sale trade  at the  factory gate,\t carries  on
\nbusiness within\t a  reasonable\tdistance  from\tthe  factory
\npremises, the  whole-sale buyer will very likely not want to
\nhave cartons  of cigarettes  further  packed  in  corrugated
\nfibre board  containers. Cartons  of cigarettes\t are usually
\nfurther\t packed\t  in   corrugated   fibre   containers\t for
\nfacilitating transport\tin the\tcourse of delivery to buyers
\nin the\twhole-sale trade  where there  is any possibility of
\nthe cartons becoming otherwise damaged in course of transit.
\nNaturally in such cases, delivery of the cigarettes in those
\ncartons is  effected to\t the buyer at the factory gate after
\nfurther packing\t these cartons\tin  corrugated\tfibre  board
\ncontainers. The\t further packing  of cartons  in  which\t the
\npackets of  cigarettes have  been packed  in the  corrugated
\nfibre board  containers is  not, indeed\t in  the  course  of
\ndelivery to the buyer in the whole-sale trade at the factory
\ngate but is only for the purpose of facilitating the 8 month
\ntransport  of\tthe  cartons   containing  the\t packets  of
\ncigarettes to the buyer in the whole-sale trade. On a proper
\nconstruction of\t S. 4(4)(d)(i)\tof the\tAct  read  with\t the
\nexplanation, I\tam of the opinion that any secondary packing
\ndone for  the purpose  of facilitating transport and 8 month
\ntransit of  the goods  to be  delivered to  the buyer in the
\nwhole-sale trade  cannot be  included in  the value  for the
\npurpose of  assessment of  excise duty.\t I, therefore,\thold
\nthat the cost of corrugated fibre board containers which the
\ncartons
\n151<\/span>
\ncontaining the\tpackets of  cigarettes is  packed, cannot be
\nincluded in  the value\tfor the\t purpose  of  assessment  of
\nexcise A  duty. It  is to  be borne  in mind that the excise
\nduty which is levied on the goods is ultimately passed on to
\nthe consumers  of the goods and they have ultimately to bear
\nthe burden.  So far  as the consumers are concerned they buy
\ncigarettes loose  or in\t packets or even in cartons. Cartons
\npacked\tin   corrugated\t fibre\t board\tcontainers  are\t not
\npurchased by the consumers. So far as the retail sellers are
\nconcerned who  may buy\tfrom whole-sellers, they usually buy
\nloose packets  of cigarettes or packets of cigarettes packed
\nin cartons. So far as the buyers in the whole-sale trade are
\nconcerned, they\t buy the  cartons of cigarettes in which the
\npackets of  cigarettes are  packed in  the course  of  their
\nwhole-sale trade  for selling  the same\t to retailers  or to
\ntheir customers.  It is\t only for the sake of convenience in
\nthe matter  of smooth  delivery\t of  cartons  in  which\t the
\npackets of  cigarettes are  packed that\t the cartons  may be
\nfurther packed\tin corrugated  fibre  board  containers\t for
\nfacility of  transport and  smooth transit  of\tthe  cartons
\nbefore delivery of the same to the whole-sale buyer.\n<\/p>\n
     The letter\t dated 4th  May, 1976 addressed by the Under
\nSecretary, Central  Board  of  Excise  and  Customs  to\t the
\nCigarette Manufacturers\t Association which has been referred
\nto and\tconsidered at  length in the judgment of the Learned
\nChief Justice,\tclearly supports,  in my opinion, the view I
\nhave taken.\n<\/p>\n
     For reasons  briefly indicated  above, I have to record
\nmy dissent  with the  view expressed  by the  Learned  Chief
\nJustice on this question of secondary packing.\n<\/p>\n
     On\t the   other  question,\t  namely,  the\tquestion  of
\npromissory estoppel  I am in entire agreement with the views
\nexpressed by  the learned Chief Justice for reasons recorded
\nby him in his judgment and I have nothing to add.\n<\/p>\n
     I accordingly hold that the cost of the further packing
\nof the cartons in which the packets of cigarettes are packed
\nin the\tcorrugated fibre board containers cannot be included
\nin the value for the purpose of assessment of excise duty.\n<\/p>\n
     I agree  with the\tLearned Chief  Justice that  in\t the
\nlight of  the judgment\tand decision  delivered by  us,\t the
\nAssessing  Authorities\t will  now   proceed  to   make\t the
\nassessment.\n<\/p>\n
N.V .K .\n<\/p>\n
152<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Union Of India & Ors vs Godfrey Philips India Ltd. Etc. … on 30 September, 1985 Equivalent citations: 1986 AIR 806, 1985 SCR Supl. (3) 123 Author: P Bhagwati Bench: Bhagwati, P.N. (Cj) PETITIONER: UNION OF INDIA & ORS. Vs. RESPONDENT: GODFREY PHILIPS INDIA LTD. ETC. ETC. DATE OF JUDGMENT30\/09\/1985 BENCH: […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-39812","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nUnion Of India & Ors vs Godfrey Philips India Ltd. Etc. ... on 30 September, 1985 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/union-of-india-ors-vs-godfrey-philips-india-ltd-etc-on-30-september-1985\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Union Of India & Ors vs Godfrey Philips India Ltd. Etc. ... on 30 September, 1985 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/union-of-india-ors-vs-godfrey-philips-india-ltd-etc-on-30-september-1985\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"1985-09-29T18:30:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2018-08-21T00:30:58+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@legaliadmin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@Legal_india\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"60 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/union-of-india-ors-vs-godfrey-philips-india-ltd-etc-on-30-september-1985#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/union-of-india-ors-vs-godfrey-philips-india-ltd-etc-on-30-september-1985\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\"},\"headline\":\"Union Of India & Ors vs Godfrey Philips India Ltd. Etc. … on 30 September, 1985\",\"datePublished\":\"1985-09-29T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2018-08-21T00:30:58+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/union-of-india-ors-vs-godfrey-philips-india-ltd-etc-on-30-september-1985\"},\"wordCount\":8991,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"articleSection\":[\"Supreme Court of India\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/union-of-india-ors-vs-godfrey-philips-india-ltd-etc-on-30-september-1985#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/union-of-india-ors-vs-godfrey-philips-india-ltd-etc-on-30-september-1985\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/union-of-india-ors-vs-godfrey-philips-india-ltd-etc-on-30-september-1985\",\"name\":\"Union Of India & Ors vs Godfrey Philips India Ltd. Etc. ... on 30 September, 1985 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"1985-09-29T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2018-08-21T00:30:58+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/union-of-india-ors-vs-godfrey-philips-india-ltd-etc-on-30-september-1985#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/union-of-india-ors-vs-godfrey-philips-india-ltd-etc-on-30-september-1985\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/union-of-india-ors-vs-godfrey-philips-india-ltd-etc-on-30-september-1985#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Union Of India & Ors vs Godfrey Philips India Ltd. Etc. … on 30 September, 1985\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"name\":\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"description\":\"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"alternateName\":\"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"alternateName\":\"Legal India\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"width\":512,\"height\":512,\"caption\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.facebook.com\\\/LegalindiaCom\\\/\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/Legal_india\"]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\",\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Legal India Admin\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/legaliadmin\"],\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/author\\\/legal-india-admin\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Union Of India & Ors vs Godfrey Philips India Ltd. Etc. ... on 30 September, 1985 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/union-of-india-ors-vs-godfrey-philips-india-ltd-etc-on-30-september-1985","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Union Of India & Ors vs Godfrey Philips India Ltd. Etc. ... on 30 September, 1985 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","og_url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/union-of-india-ors-vs-godfrey-philips-india-ltd-etc-on-30-september-1985","og_site_name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","article_published_time":"1985-09-29T18:30:00+00:00","article_modified_time":"2018-08-21T00:30:58+00:00","og_image":[{"width":512,"height":512,"url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Legal India Admin","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@legaliadmin","twitter_site":"@Legal_india","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Legal India Admin","Est. reading time":"60 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/union-of-india-ors-vs-godfrey-philips-india-ltd-etc-on-30-september-1985#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/union-of-india-ors-vs-godfrey-philips-india-ltd-etc-on-30-september-1985"},"author":{"name":"Legal India Admin","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea"},"headline":"Union Of India & Ors vs Godfrey Philips India Ltd. Etc. … on 30 September, 1985","datePublished":"1985-09-29T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2018-08-21T00:30:58+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/union-of-india-ors-vs-godfrey-philips-india-ltd-etc-on-30-september-1985"},"wordCount":8991,"commentCount":0,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"articleSection":["Supreme Court of India"],"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/union-of-india-ors-vs-godfrey-philips-india-ltd-etc-on-30-september-1985#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/union-of-india-ors-vs-godfrey-philips-india-ltd-etc-on-30-september-1985","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/union-of-india-ors-vs-godfrey-philips-india-ltd-etc-on-30-september-1985","name":"Union Of India & Ors vs Godfrey Philips India Ltd. Etc. ... on 30 September, 1985 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website"},"datePublished":"1985-09-29T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2018-08-21T00:30:58+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/union-of-india-ors-vs-godfrey-philips-india-ltd-etc-on-30-september-1985#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/union-of-india-ors-vs-godfrey-philips-india-ltd-etc-on-30-september-1985"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/union-of-india-ors-vs-godfrey-philips-india-ltd-etc-on-30-september-1985#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Union Of India & Ors vs Godfrey Philips India Ltd. Etc. … on 30 September, 1985"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","description":"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"alternateName":"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization","name":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","alternateName":"Legal India","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","width":512,"height":512,"caption":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","https:\/\/x.com\/Legal_india"]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea","name":"Legal India Admin","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Legal India Admin"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com","https:\/\/x.com\/legaliadmin"],"url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/author\/legal-india-admin"}]}},"modified_by":null,"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/39812","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=39812"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/39812\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=39812"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=39812"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=39812"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}