{"id":46505,"date":"2008-07-24T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2008-07-23T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/suraj-singh-vs-state-of-u-p-on-24-july-2008"},"modified":"2015-03-11T01:32:31","modified_gmt":"2015-03-10T20:02:31","slug":"suraj-singh-vs-state-of-u-p-on-24-july-2008","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/suraj-singh-vs-state-of-u-p-on-24-july-2008","title":{"rendered":"Suraj Singh vs State Of U.P on 24 July, 2008"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Suraj Singh vs State Of U.P on 24 July, 2008<\/div>\n
Author: . A Pasayat<\/div>\n
Bench: Arijit Pasayat, Mukundakam Sharma<\/div>\n
                                                         REPORTABLE\n\n                IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA\n\n                CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION\n\n                CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1072 OF 2004\n\n\nSuraj Singh                                         ..Appellant\n\n\n                             Versus\n\n\n\nState of U.P.                                       ..\n\nRespondent\n\n                         JUDGMENT\n<\/pre>\n
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
1.   Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division<\/p>\n
Bench of the Allahabad High Court allowing the appeal filed by<\/p>\n
the State of U.P. questioning the judgment of acquittal passed by<\/p>\n
learned Additional Sessions Judge, Special Judge (E.C. Act),<\/p>\n
Mainpuri in Sessions Trial No.169 of 1993. Two persons i.e. the<\/p>\n
present appellant and his wife Smt. Kapoori Devi were tried for
\noffence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of<\/p>\n
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the `IPC’) for the murder of<\/p>\n
one Jagat Singh (hereinafter referred to as the `deceased’). The<\/p>\n
trial Court directed acquittal of the appellant primarily on the<\/p>\n
ground that there was discrepancy between the ocular evidence<\/p>\n
and the medical evidence, independent witnesses were not<\/p>\n
examined. In appeal filed by the State, the High Court held that<\/p>\n
while the acquittal of Smt. Kapoori Devi (A-2) was correct, the<\/p>\n
same was not sustainable so far as the present appellant is<\/p>\n
concerned.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
2.   Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:<\/p>\n
     The incident took place on 23.9.1992 at about 12.20 p.m. at<\/p>\n
the house of the deceased Jagat Singh and the accused persons<\/p>\n
situated in village Chhibkaria, P.S. Bhongaon, District Mainpuri.<\/p>\n
The report was lodged on 23.9.1992 at 1.45 p.m. by the eye-<\/p>\n
witness Jaivir Singh (PW-1-who was nephew of the deceased).<\/p>\n
The accused are also close relatives of the deceased. Suraj Singh<\/p>\n
is son of Ram Sahai Yadav who was real brother of father of the<\/p>\n
                              2<\/span>
\ndeceased. Suraj Singh was a police constable and was posted at<\/p>\n
Aligarh. He was in shadow duty of an Ex-M.L.A. On the day of<\/p>\n
incident, he was going from his house to join his duty. The<\/p>\n
deceased Jagat Singh asked him to go after constructing the<\/p>\n
earth partition of the agricultural plot. Accused Suraj Singh<\/p>\n
abused him. His wife Kapoori Devi exhorted him to go after<\/p>\n
finishing him. Suraj Singh and his wife then climbed up their<\/p>\n
roof. Suraj Singh fired two shots from his gun whereas his wife<\/p>\n
Kapoori Devi fired three shots from a revolver which hit Jagat<\/p>\n
Singh who died instantaneously. The incident was seen by Sant<\/p>\n
Saran (PW.2) as also by Dafedar Singh, Gajraj Singh, Atar Sri-<\/p>\n
wife of Jagat Singh and other villagers. Consequent upon the<\/p>\n
registering of the case, investigation was taken up by S.S.I. S.K.<\/p>\n
Dixit (PW.5.) The postmortem over the dead body of the deceased<\/p>\n
was conducted by Dr. D.S.Rathore (PW.4) on 24.9.1992 at 1.45<\/p>\n
P.M. The following ante-mortem injuries were found on his<\/p>\n
person who aged about 50 years.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
          1.   Lacerated wound 0.5 cm x 0.3 cm x muscle
\n          deep on front aspect of left ear pinna middle part.<\/p>\n
                              3<\/span>\n<\/p>\n
2.    Firearm wound 0.5 cm x 0.3 bone deep on
\nright and front aspect of upper part of nose 1.00
\ncm below root of nose, underlying nasal bone
\nfractured. Margins charred.\n<\/p>\n
3.  Lacerated wound 1.00 cm x 0.4 cm x
\nmuscle deep on outer and front aspect of right
\nupper arm, 11.00 cm above the right elbow joint.<\/p>\n
4.   Two firearm wounds 0.5 cm x 0.3 cm x skin
\ndeep anterior outer aspect of right upper, arm,
\nplaced 3 cm apart, just above the right elbow.
\nMargins charred.\n<\/p>\n
5.   Firearm wound of entry 0.4 cm x 0.3 cm x
\nmuscle deep on front of neck 2.5 cm right to
\nmidline just above the clavicle. Margins inverted
\nand charred.\n<\/p>\n
6.   Firearm wound of entry 0.3 cm. x 0.3 cm. x
\nmuscle deep on right side of neck 3.00 cm away
\nfrom injury No.5 just 3.00 cm above the clavicle.
\nMargins charred and inverted.\n<\/p>\n
7.   Multiple firearm wounds of entry 0.4 cm x
\n0.3 cm x chest cavity deep to 0.4 cm x 0.4 cm
\nmuscle deep in size in an area of 7.00 cm x 6.00
\ncm on front of chest midline on both sides in
\nmiddle part of front chest. Margins charred and
\ninverted.\n<\/p>\n
8.   Firearm wound of entry 0.4 cm x 0.4 cm x
\nchest cavity deep on lower part front and outer
\naspect of right side of chest 11.00 cm away from
\nright nipple, at 7 O’clock position. Margins
\ninverted and charred.\n<\/p>\n
                   4<\/span>
\n     On internal examination, two metallic pieces were recovered<\/p>\n
from the soft tissues of the neck, two from left ventricle, one<\/p>\n
pellet from right chest cavity and one from abdomen cavity. The<\/p>\n
death had occurred due to shock and haemorrhage owing to<\/p>\n
ante-mortem injuries.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
     Apart from the medical and formal evidence including that<\/p>\n
of investigation, the prosecution relied upon the testimony of<\/p>\n
Jaivir Singh (PW-1) and Sant Saran (PW-2) as eye-witnesses. The<\/p>\n
defence was of denial.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
     Trial   Court   held   that there   were   discrepancies   and<\/p>\n
accusations have not been established. An appeal was filed by<\/p>\n
the State.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
     The High Court found that there was no discrepancy so far<\/p>\n
as the medical evidence and the ocular evidence is concerned. It<\/p>\n
was also held that non examination of other persons did not<\/p>\n
adversely affect the credibility of the evidence tendered, and<\/p>\n
when there is direct evidence of eye witnesses the alleged<\/p>\n
                               5<\/span>
\ninconsistency relating to distance from which the gunshots were<\/p>\n
fired is of no consequence particularly when the prosecution<\/p>\n
version relating to assault by guns and pistol substantially<\/p>\n
tallied with the medical evidence. Accordingly, appellant was<\/p>\n
found guilty of offence punishable under Section 302 IPC and<\/p>\n
sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life.<\/p>\n
3.   In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant<\/p>\n
submitted that the High Court had not kept in view the<\/p>\n
parameters of an appeal against acquittal. It is submitted that<\/p>\n
when two views are possible on the basis of the evidence on<\/p>\n
record and the one favourable to the accused is taken by the trial<\/p>\n
Court, same should not be disturbed.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
4.   Learned counsel for the State on the other hand supported<\/p>\n
the judgment and submitted that the conclusions of the trial<\/p>\n
Court were erroneous both on law and facts and, therefore, the<\/p>\n
High Court was justified in interfering with the order of the trial<\/p>\n
Court.\n<\/p>\n
                              6<\/span>\n<\/p>\n
5.   In view of rival submissions of the parties, we think it<\/p>\n
proper to consider and clarify the legal position first. Chapter<\/p>\n
XXIX (Sections 372-394) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973<\/p>\n
(hereinafter referred to as “the present Code”) deals with appeals.<\/p>\n
Section 372 expressly declares that no appeal shall lie from any<\/p>\n
judgment or order of a criminal court except as provided by the<\/p>\n
Code or by any other law for the time being in force. Section 373<\/p>\n
provides for filing of appeals in certain cases. Section 374 allows<\/p>\n
appeals from convictions. Section 375 bars appeals in cases<\/p>\n
where the accused pleads guilty. Likewise, no appeal is<\/p>\n
maintainable in petty cases (Section 376). Section 377 permits<\/p>\n
appeals by the State for enhancement of sentence. Section 378<\/p>\n
confers power on the State to present an appeal to the High<\/p>\n
Court from an order of acquittal. The said section is material and<\/p>\n
may be quoted in extenso:\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
           “378. Appeal in case of acquittal.–(1) Save as
\n          otherwise provided in sub-section (2) and subject
\n          to the provisions of sub-sections (3) and (5), the
\n          State Government may, in any case, direct the
\n          Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the
\n          High Court from an original or appellate order of
\n          acquittal passed by any court other than a High<\/p>\n
                              7<\/span>
\nCourt, or an order of acquittal passed by the
\nCourt of Session in revision.<\/p>\n
(2) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any
\ncase in which the offence has been investigated
\nby the Delhi Special Police Establishment
\nconstituted under the Delhi Special Police
\nEstablishment Act, 1946 (25 of 1946), or by any
\nother agency empowered to make investigation
\ninto an offence under any Central Act other than
\nthis Code, the Central Government may also
\ndirect the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal,
\nsubject to the provisions of sub-section (3), to the
\nHigh Court from the order of acquittal.\n<\/p>\n
(3) No appeal under sub-section (1) or sub-
\nsection (2) shall be entertained except with the
\nleave of the High Court.\n<\/p>\n
(4) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any
\ncase instituted upon complaint and the High
\nCourt, on an application made to it by the
\ncomplainant in this behalf, grants special leave to
\nappeal from the order of acquittal, the
\ncomplainant may present such an appeal to the
\nHigh Court.\n<\/p>\n
(5) No application under sub-section (4) for the
\ngrant of special leave to appeal from an order of
\nacquittal shall be entertained by the High Court
\nafter the expiry of six months, where the
\ncomplainant is a public servant, and sixty days
\nin every other case, computed from the date of
\nthat order of acquittal.\n<\/p>\n
(6) If, in any case, the application under sub-
\nsection (4) for the grant of special leave to appeal
\nfrom an order of acquittal is refused, no appeal
\nfrom that order of acquittal shall lie under sub-
\nsection (1) or under sub-section (2).\n<\/p>\n
                    8<\/span>\n<\/p>\n
6.   Whereas Sections 379-380 cover special cases of appeals,<\/p>\n
other sections lay down procedure to be followed by appellate<\/p>\n
courts.\n<\/p>\n
7.   It may be stated that more or less similar provisions were<\/p>\n
found in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter<\/p>\n
referred to as “the old Code”) which came up for consideration<\/p>\n
before various High Courts, Judicial Committee of the Privy<\/p>\n
Council as also before this Court. Since in the present appeal, we<\/p>\n
have been called upon to decide the ambit and scope of the<\/p>\n
power of an appellate court in an appeal against an order of<\/p>\n
acquittal, we have confined ourselves to one aspect only i.e. an<\/p>\n
appeal against an order of acquittal.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
8.   Bare reading of Section 378 of the present Code (appeal in<\/p>\n
case of acquittal) quoted above, makes it clear that no<\/p>\n
restrictions have been imposed by the legislature on the powers<\/p>\n
of the appellate court in dealing with appeals against acquittal.<\/p>\n
When such an appeal is filed, the High Court has full power to<\/p>\n
reappreciate, review and reconsider the evidence at large, the<\/p>\n
                              9<\/span>
\nmaterial on which the order of acquittal is founded and to reach<\/p>\n
its own conclusions on such evidence. Both questions of fact and<\/p>\n
of law are open to determination by the High Court in an appeal<\/p>\n
against an order of acquittal.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
9.    It cannot, however, be forgotten that in case of acquittal,<\/p>\n
there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly,<\/p>\n
the presumption of innocence is available to him under the<\/p>\n
fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every<\/p>\n
person should be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved to<\/p>\n
be guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused<\/p>\n
having secured an acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is<\/p>\n
certainly   not   weakened       but   reinforced,   reaffirmed   and<\/p>\n
strengthened by the trial court.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
10.   Though the above principles are well established, a different<\/p>\n
note was struck in several decisions by various High Courts and<\/p>\n
even by this Court. It is, therefore, appropriate if we consider<\/p>\n
some of the leading decisions on the point.<\/p>\n
                                 10<\/span>\n<\/p>\n
11.   The first important decision was rendered by the Judicial<\/p>\n
Committee of the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup v. R. Emperor<\/p>\n
(1934) 61 IA 398). In Sheo Swarup the accused were acquitted<\/p>\n
by the trial court and the local Government directed the Public<\/p>\n
Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from an order<\/p>\n
of acquittal under Section 417 of the old Code (similar to Section<\/p>\n
378 of the present Code). At the time of hearing of appeal before<\/p>\n
the High Court, it was contended on behalf of the accused that in<\/p>\n
an appeal from an order of acquittal, it was not open to the<\/p>\n
appellate court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by<\/p>\n
the trial Judge unless such findings could not have been reached<\/p>\n
by him had there not been some perversity or incompetence on<\/p>\n
his part. The High Court, however, declined to accept the said<\/p>\n
view. It held that no condition was imposed on the High Court in<\/p>\n
such appeal. It accordingly reviewed all the evidence in the case<\/p>\n
and having formed an opinion of its weight and reliability<\/p>\n
different from that of the trial Judge, recorded an order of<\/p>\n
conviction. A petition was presented to His Majesty in Council for<\/p>\n
                              11<\/span>
\nleave to appeal on the ground that conflicting views had been<\/p>\n
expressed by the High Courts in different parts of India upon the<\/p>\n
question whether in an appeal from an order of acquittal, an<\/p>\n
appellate court had the power to interfere with the findings of<\/p>\n
fact recorded by the trial Judge. Their Lordships thought it fit to<\/p>\n
clarify the legal position and accordingly upon the “humble<\/p>\n
advice of their Lordships”, leave was granted by His Majesty. The<\/p>\n
case was, thereafter, argued. The Committee considered the<\/p>\n
scheme and interpreting Section 417 of the Code (old Code)<\/p>\n
observed that there was no indication in the Code of any<\/p>\n
limitation or restriction on the High Court in exercise of powers<\/p>\n
as an Appellate Tribunal. The Code also made no distinction as<\/p>\n
regards powers of the High Court in dealing with an appeal<\/p>\n
against acquittal and an appeal against conviction. Though<\/p>\n
several authorities were cited revealing different views by the<\/p>\n
High Courts dealing with an appeal from an order of acquittal,<\/p>\n
the Committee did not think it proper to discuss all the cases.<\/p>\n
12.   Lord Russel summed up the legal position thus:<\/p>\n
                              12<\/span>
\n           “There is, in their opinion, no foundation for the
\n           view, apparently supported by the judgments of
\n           some courts in India, that the High Court has no
\n           power or jurisdiction to reverse an order of
\n           acquittal on a matter of fact, except in cases in
\n           which the lower court has `obstinately
\n           blundered’, or has `through incompetence,
\n           stupidity or perversity’ reached such `distorted
\n           conclusions as to produce a positive miscarriage
\n           of justice’, or has in some other way so
\n           conducted or misconducted itself as to produce a
\n           glaring miscarriage of justice, or has been tricked
\n           by the defence so as to produce a similar result.”<\/p>\n
13.   His Lordship, then proceeded to observe: (IA p.404)<\/p>\n
           “Sections 417, 418 and 423 of the Code give to
\n           the High Court full power to review at large the
\n           evidence upon which the order of acquittal was
\n           founded, and to reach the conclusion that upon
\n           that evidence the order of acquittal should be
\n           reversed. No limitation should be placed upon
\n           that power, unless it be found expressly stated in
\n           the Code.”\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
14.   The Committee, however, cautioned appellate courts and<\/p>\n
stated: (IA p.404)<\/p>\n
           “But in exercising the power conferred by the
\n           Code and before reaching its conclusions upon
\n           fact, the High Court should and will always give<\/p>\n
                              13<\/span>
\n           proper weight and consideration to such matters
\n           as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the
\n           credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption
\n           of innocence in favour of the accused, a
\n           presumption certainly not weakened by the fact
\n           that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the
\n           right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt;
\n           and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in
\n           disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a judge
\n           who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses.
\n           To state this, however, is only to say that the High
\n           Court in its conduct of the appeal should and will
\n           act in accordance with rules and principles well
\n           known and recognised in the administration of
\n           justice.”\n<\/p>\n
                                      (emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
15.   In Nur Mohd. v. Emperor (AIR 1945 PC 151), the Committee<\/p>\n
reiterated the above view in Sheo Swarup (Supra) and held that in<\/p>\n
an appeal against acquittal, the High Court has full powers to<\/p>\n
review and to reverse acquittal.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
16.   So far as this Court is concerned, probably the first decision<\/p>\n
on the point was Prandas v. State (AIR 1954 SC 36) (though the<\/p>\n
case was decided on 14-3-1950, it was reported only in 1954). In<\/p>\n
that case, the accused was acquitted by the trial court. The<\/p>\n
Provincial Government preferred an appeal which was allowed<\/p>\n
                               14<\/span>
\nand the accused was convicted for offences punishable under<\/p>\n
Sections 302 and 323 IPC. The High Court, for convicting the<\/p>\n
accused, placed reliance on certain eyewitnesses.<\/p>\n
17.   Upholding the decision of the High Court and following the<\/p>\n
proposition of law in Sheo Swarup (supra), a six-Judge Bench<\/p>\n
held as follows:\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
           “6. It must be observed at the very outset that we
\n           cannot support the view which has been expressed
\n           in several cases that the High Court has no power
\n           under Section 417, Criminal Procedure Code, to
\n           reverse a judgment of acquittal, unless the
\n           judgment is perverse or the subordinate court has
\n           in some way or other misdirected itself so as to
\n           produce a miscarriage of justice.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                                               (emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
18.   In Surajpal Singh v. State (1952 SCR 193), a two-Judge<\/p>\n
Bench observed that it was well established that in an appeal<\/p>\n
under Section 417 of the (old) Code, the High Court had full<\/p>\n
power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal<\/p>\n
was   founded.     But   it   was    equally    well   settled   that   the<\/p>\n
                                15<\/span>
\npresumption of innocence of the accused was further reinforced<\/p>\n
by his acquittal by the trial court, and the findings of the trial<\/p>\n
court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and<\/p>\n
hearing their evidence could be reversed only for very substantial<\/p>\n
and compelling reasons.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
19.   In Ajmer Singh v. State of Punjab (1953 SCR 418) the<\/p>\n
accused was acquitted by the trial court but was convicted by<\/p>\n
the High Court in an appeal against acquittal filed by the State.<\/p>\n
The aggrieved accused approached this Court. It was contended<\/p>\n
by him that there were “no compelling reasons” for setting aside<\/p>\n
the order of acquittal and due and proper weight had not been<\/p>\n
given by the High Court to the opinion of the trial court as<\/p>\n
regards the credibility of witnesses seen and examined. It was<\/p>\n
also commented that the High Court committed an error of law<\/p>\n
in observing that “when a strong `prima facie’ case is made out<\/p>\n
against an accused person it is his duty to explain the<\/p>\n
circumstances appearing in evidence against him and he cannot<\/p>\n
take shelter behind the presumption of innocence and cannot<\/p>\n
state that the law entitles him to keep his lips sealed”.<\/p>\n
                               16<\/span>\n<\/p>\n
20. Upholding the contention, this Court said:<\/p>\n
           “We think this criticism is well founded. After an
\n           order of acquittal has been made the
\n           presumption of innocence is further reinforced by
\n           that order, and that being so, the trial court’s
\n           decision can be reversed not on the ground that
\n           the accused had failed to explain the
\n           circumstances appearing against him but only
\n           for very substantial and compelling reasons.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                                      (emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
21.   In Atley v. State of U.P. (AIR 1955 SC 807) this Court said:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
           “In our opinion, it is not correct to say that
\n           unless the appellate court in an appeal under
\n           Section 417, Criminal Procedure Code came to
\n           the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal
\n           under appeal was perverse it could not set aside
\n           that order.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<\/blockquote>\n
           It has been laid down by this Court that it is
\n           open to the High Court on an appeal against an
\n           order of acquittal to review the entire evidence
\n           and to come to its own conclusion, of course,
\n           keeping in view the well-established rule that the
\n           presumption of innocence of the accused is not
\n           weakened but strengthened by the judgment of
\n           acquittal passed by the trial court which had the
\n           advantage of observing the demeanour of<\/p>\n
                               17<\/span>
\n           witnesses whose evidence have been recorded in
\n           its presence.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
           It is also well settled that the court of appeal has
\n           as wide powers of appreciation of evidence in an
\n           appeal against an order of acquittal as in the
\n           case of an appeal against an order of conviction,
\n           subject to the riders that the presumption of
\n           innocence with which the accused person starts
\n           in the trial court continues even up to the
\n           appellate stage and that the appellate court
\n           should attach due weight to the opinion of the
\n           trial court which recorded the order of acquittal.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
           If the appellate court reviews the evidence,
\n           keeping those principles in mind, and comes to a
\n           contrary conclusion, the judgment cannot be
\n           said to have been vitiated.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                                        (emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
22. In Aher Raja Khima v. State of Saurashtra<\/a> (1955) 2 SCR<\/p>\n
1285) the accused was prosecuted under Sections 302 and 447<\/p>\n
IPC. He was acquitted by the trial court but convicted by the<\/p>\n
High Court. Dealing with the power of the High Court against an<\/p>\n
order of acquittal, Bose, J. speaking for the majority (2:1) stated:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
(AIR p. 220, para 1) “It is, in our opinion, well settled that it is<\/p>\n
not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the<\/p>\n
evidence; there must also be substantial and compelling reasons<\/p>\n
for holding that the trial court was wrong.”<\/p>\n
                               18<\/span>
\n                                            (emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
23.   In Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan<\/a> (1961) 3 SCR 120, a<\/p>\n
three-Judge Bench considered almost all leading decisions on<\/p>\n
the point and observed that there was no difficulty in applying<\/p>\n
the principles laid down by the Privy Council and accepted by<\/p>\n
the Supreme Court. The Court, however, noted that appellate<\/p>\n
courts found considerable difficulty in understanding the<\/p>\n
scope of the words “substantial and compelling reasons” used<\/p>\n
in certain decisions. It was observed inter-alia as follows:<\/p>\n
           “This Court obviously did not and could not add
\n           a condition to Section 417 of the Criminal
\n           Procedure Code. The words were intended to
\n           convey the idea that an appellate court not only
\n           shall bear in mind the principles laid down by
\n           the Privy Council but also must give its clear
\n           reasons for coming to the conclusion that the
\n           order of acquittal was wrong.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
           The Court concluded as follows:<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
           “9. The foregoing discussion yields the following
\n           results: (1) an appellate court has full power to
\n           review the evidence upon which the order of
\n           acquittal is founded; (2) the principles laid down
\n           in Sheo Swarup case afford a correct guide for the<\/p>\n
                               19<\/span>
\n           appellate court’s approach to a case in disposing
\n           of such an appeal; and (3) the different
\n           phraseology used in the judgments of this Court,
\n           such as, (i) `substantial and compelling reasons’,\n<\/p>\n
           (ii) `good and sufficiently cogent reasons’, and (iii)
\n           `strong reasons’ are not intended to curtail the
\n           undoubted power of an appellate court in an
\n           appeal against acquittal to review the entire
\n           evidence and to come to its own conclusion; but
\n           in doing so it should not only consider every
\n           matter on record having a bearing on the
\n           questions of fact and the reasons given by the
\n           court below in support of its order of acquittal in
\n           its arriving at a conclusion on those facts, but
\n           should also express those reasons in its
\n           judgment, which lead it to hold that the acquittal
\n           was not justified.”\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
24.   Again, in M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra<\/a> (1963) 2 SCR<\/p>\n
405, the point was raised before a Constitution Bench of this<\/p>\n
Court. Taking note of earlier decisions, it was observed as<\/p>\n
follows:\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
           “17. In some of the earlier decisions of this Court,
\n           however, in emphasising the importance of
\n           adopting a cautious approach in dealing with
\n           appeals against acquittals, it was observed that
\n           the presumption of innocence is reinforced by the
\n           order of acquittal and so, `the findings of the trial
\n           court which had the advantage of seeing the
\n           witnesses and hearing their evidence can be
\n           reversed only for very substantial and compelling
\n           reasons’: vide Surajpal Singh v. State (1952 SCR<\/p>\n
                                20<\/span>\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
193). Similarly in Ajmer Singh v. State of Punjab
\n(1953 SCR 418), it was observed that the
\ninterference of the High Court in an appeal
\nagainst the order of acquittal would be justified
\nonly if there are `very substantial and compelling
\nreasons to do so’. In some other decisions, it has
\nbeen stated that an order of acquittal can be
\nreversed only for `good and sufficiently cogent
\nreasons’ or for `strong reasons’. In appreciating
\nthe effect of these observations, it must be
\nremembered that these observations were not
\nintended to lay down a rigid or inflexible rule
\nwhich should govern the decision of the High
\nCourt in appeals against acquittals. They were
\nnot intended, and should not be read to have
\nintended to introduce an additional condition in
\nclause (a) of Section 423(1) of the Code. All that
\nthe said observations are intended to emphasize
\nis that the approach of the High Court in dealing
\nwith an appeal against acquittal ought to be
\ncautious because as Lord Russell observed in
\nSheo Swarup the presumption of innocence in
\nfavour of the accused `is not certainly weakened
\nby the fact that he has been acquitted at his
\ntrial’. Therefore, the test suggested by the
\nexpression `substantial and compelling reasons’
\nshould not be construed as a formula which has
\nto be rigidly applied in every case. That is the
\neffect of the recent decisions of this Court, for
\ninstance, in Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan
\nand Harbans Singh<\/a> v. State of Punjab (1962 Supp
\n1 SCR 104) and so, it is not necessary that before
\nreversing a judgment of acquittal, the High Court
\nmust necessarily characterise the findings
\nrecorded therein as perverse.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                          (emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
                   21<\/span>\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
25.   Yet in another leading decision in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade<\/p>\n
v. State of Maharashtra<\/a> (1973 (2) SCC 793) this Court held that<\/p>\n
in India, there is no jurisdictional limitation on the powers of<\/p>\n
appellate court. “In law there are no fetters on the plenary power<\/p>\n
of the appellate court to review the whole evidence on which the<\/p>\n
order of acquittal is founded and, indeed, it has a duty to<\/p>\n
scrutinise the probative material de novo, informed, however, by<\/p>\n
the weighty thought that the rebuttable innocence attributed to<\/p>\n
the accused having been converted into an acquittal the homage<\/p>\n
our jurisprudence owes to individual liberty constrains the<\/p>\n
higher court not to upset the holding without very convincing<\/p>\n
reasons and comprehensive consideration.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
26. Putting emphasis on balance between importance of<\/p>\n
individual liberty and evil of acquitting guilty persons, this Court<\/p>\n
observed as follows:\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
           “6. Even at this stage we may remind ourselves of
\n           a necessary social perspective in criminal cases
\n           which    suffers    from   insufficient  forensic
\n           appreciation. The dangers of exaggerated
\n           devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt at the<\/p>\n
                               22<\/span>
\nexpense of social defence and to the soothing
\nsentiment that all acquittals are always good
\nregardless of justice to the victim and the
\ncommunity, demand especial emphasis in the
\ncontemporary context of escalating crime and
\nescape. The judicial instrument has a public
\naccountability. The cherished principles or
\ngolden thread of proof beyond reasonable doubt
\nwhich runs thro’ the web of our law should not
\nbe stretched morbidly to embrace every hunch,
\nhesitancy and degree of doubt. The excessive
\nsolicitude reflected in the attitude that a
\nthousand guilty men may go but one innocent
\nmartyr shall not suffer is a false dilemma. Only
\nreasonable doubts belong to the accused.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Otherwise any practical system of justice will
\nthen breakdown and lose credibility with the
\ncommunity. The evil of acquitting a guilty person
\nlight-heartedly, as a learned author (Glanville
\nWilliams in Proof of Guilt) has saliently observed,
\ngoes much beyond the simple fact that just one
\nguilty person has gone unpunished. If unmerited
\nacquittals become general, they tend to lead to a
\ncynical disregard of the law, and this in turn
\nleads to a public demand for harsher legal
\npresumptions against indicted `persons’ and
\nmore severe punishment of those who are found
\nguilty. Thus, too frequent acquittals of the guilty
\nmay lead to a ferocious penal law, eventually
\neroding the judicial protection of the guiltless.
\nFor all these reasons it is true to say, with
\nViscount Simon, that `a miscarriage of justice
\nmay arise from the acquittal of the guilty no less
\nthan from the conviction of the innocent….’ In
\nshort,    our   jurisprudential  enthusiasm     for
\npresumed innocence must be moderated by the
\npragmatic need to make criminal justice potent and
\nrealistic. A balance has to be struck between
\nchasing chance possibilities as good enough to set<\/p>\n
                   23<\/span>
\n           the delinquent free and chopping the logic of
\n           preponderant probability to punish marginal
\n           innocents.”\n<\/p>\n
                                     (emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
27.   In K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P (1979) 1 SCC 355, the<\/p>\n
Court was considering the power of the High Court against an<\/p>\n
order of acquittal under Section 378 of the present Code. After<\/p>\n
considering the relevant decisions on the point it was stated as<\/p>\n
follows:\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
           “9. The principles are now well settled. At one
\n           time it was thought that an order of acquittal
\n           could be set aside for `substantial and compelling
\n           reasons’ only and courts used to launch on a
\n           search to discover those `substantial and
\n           compelling reasons’. However, the `formulae’ of
\n           `substantial and compelling reasons’, `good and
\n           sufficiently cogent reasons’ and `strong reasons’
\n           and the search for them were abandoned as a
\n           result of the pronouncement of this Court in
\n           Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan<\/a> (1961) 3 SCR\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
           120. In Sanwat Singh case this Court harked
\n           back to the principles enunciated by the Privy
\n           Council in Sheo Swarup v. R. Emperor and
\n           reaffirmed those principles. After Sanwat Singh v.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
           State of Rajasthan this Court has consistently
\n           recognised the right of the appellate court to
\n           review the entire evidence and to come to its own
\n           conclusion bearing in mind the considerations<\/p>\n
                              24<\/span>
\nmentioned by the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup
\ncase. Occasionally phrases like `manifestly
\nillegal’, `grossly unjust’, have been used to
\ndescribe the orders of acquittal which warrant
\ninterference. But, such expressions have been
\nused more as flourishes of language, to
\nemphasise the reluctance of the appellate court
\nto interfere with an order of acquittal than to
\ncurtail the power of the appellate court to review
\nthe entire evidence and to come to its own
\nconclusion. In some cases (Ramaphupala Reddy
\nv. State of A.P., (AIR 1971 SC 460) Bhim Singh
\nRup Singh v. State of Maharashtra (AIR<\/a> 1974 SC\n<\/p>\n
286), it has been said that to the principles laid
\ndown in Sanwat Singh case may be added the
\nfurther principle that `if two reasonable
\nconclusions can be reached on the basis of the
\nevidence on record, the appellate court should
\nnot disturb the finding of the trial court’. This, of
\ncourse, is not a new principle. It stems out of the
\nfundamental       principle    of    our    criminal
\njurisprudence that the accused is entitled to the
\nbenefit of any reasonable doubt. If two
\nreasonably probable and evenly balanced views
\nof the evidence are possible, one must
\nnecessarily concede the existence of a reasonable
\ndoubt. But, fanciful and remote possibilities
\nmust be left out of account. To entitle an accused
\nperson to the benefit of a doubt arising from the
\npossibility of a duality of views, the possible view
\nin favour of the accused must be as nearly
\nreasonably probable as that against him. If the
\npreponderance of probability is all one way, a
\nbare possibility of another view will not entitle
\nthe accused to claim the benefit of any doubt. It
\nis, therefore, essential that any view of the
\nevidence in favour of the accused must be
\nreasonable even as any doubt, the benefit of
\nwhich an accused person may claim, must be<\/p>\n
                    25<\/span>
\n           reasonable.”\n<\/p>\n
                                        (emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
28.   In Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat<\/a> (1996) 9 SCC<\/p>\n
225, this Court said:\n<\/p>\n
           “While sitting in judgment over an acquittal the
\n           appellate court is first required to seek an
\n           answer to the question whether the findings of
\n           the trial court are palpably wrong, manifestly
\n           erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. If
\n           the appellate court answers the above question
\n           in the negative the order of acquittal is not to be
\n           disturbed. Conversely, if the appellate court
\n           holds, for reasons to be recorded, that the order
\n           of acquittal cannot at all be sustained in view of
\n           any of the above infirmities it can then-and then
\n           only-reappraise the evidence to arrive at its own
\n           conclusions.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
29.   In Allarakha K. Mansuri v. State of Gujarat<\/a> (2002) 3 SCC 57,<\/p>\n
referring to earlier decisions, the Court stated:<\/p>\n
           “7. The paramount consideration of the court
\n           should be to avoid miscarriage of justice. A
\n           miscarriage of justice which may arise from the
\n           acquittal of guilty is no less than from the
\n           conviction of an innocent. In a case where the
\n           trial court has taken a view based upon
\n           conjectures and hypothesis and not on the legal<\/p>\n
                               26<\/span>
\n           evidence, a duty is cast upon the High Court to
\n           reappreciate the evidence in acquittal appeal for
\n           the purposes of ascertaining as to whether the
\n           accused has committed any offence or not.
\n           Probable view taken by the trial court which may
\n           not be disturbed in the appeal is such a view
\n           which is based upon legal and admissible
\n           evidence. Only because the accused has been
\n           acquitted by the trial court, cannot be made a
\n           basis to urge that the High Court under all
\n           circumstances should not disturb such a
\n           finding.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
30.   In Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P. (2002) 4 SCC 85, the trial<\/p>\n
court acquitted the accused but the High Court convicted them.<\/p>\n
Negativing the contention of the appellants that the High Court<\/p>\n
could not have disturbed the findings of fact of the trial court<\/p>\n
even if that view was not correct, this Court observed:<\/p>\n
           “7. We do not agree with the submissions of the
\n           learned counsel for the appellants that under
\n           Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
\n           the High Court could not disturb the finding of
\n           facts of the trial court even if it found that the
\n           view taken by the trial court was not proper. On
\n           the basis of the pronouncements of this Court,
\n           the settled position of law regarding the powers of
\n           the High Court in an appeal against an order of
\n           acquittal is that the Court has full powers to
\n           review the evidence upon which an order of
\n           acquittal is based and generally it will not
\n           interfere with the order of acquittal because by<\/p>\n
                              27<\/span>
\n           passing an order of acquittal the presumption of
\n           innocence in favour of the accused is reinforced.
\n           The golden thread which runs through the web of
\n           administration of justice in criminal case is that
\n           if two views are possible on the evidence adduced
\n           in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the
\n           accused and the other to his innocence, the view
\n           which is favourable to the accused should be
\n           adopted. Such is not a jurisdiction limitation on
\n           the appellate court but judge-made guidelines for
\n           circumspection. The paramount consideration of
\n           the court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice
\n           is avoided. A miscarriage of justice which may
\n           arise from the acquittal of the guilty is no less
\n           than from the conviction of an innocent. In a
\n           case where the trial court has taken a view
\n           ignoring the admissible evidence, a duty is cast
\n           upon the High Court to reappreciate the evidence
\n           in acquittal appeal for the purposes of
\n           ascertaining as to whether all or any of the
\n           accused has committed any offence or not”.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
31.   In Harijana Thirupala v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P.<\/a><\/p>\n
(2002) 6 SCC 470, this Court said:\n<\/p>\n
           “12. Doubtless the High Court in appeal either
\n           against an order of acquittal or conviction as a
\n           court of first appeal has full power to review the
\n           evidence to reach its own independent
\n           conclusion. However, it will not interfere with an
\n           order of acquittal lightly or merely because one
\n           other view is possible, because with the passing
\n           of an order of acquittal presumption of
\n           innocence in favour of the accused gets
\n           reinforced and strengthened. The High Court
\n           would not be justified to interfere with order of<\/p>\n
                               28<\/span>
\n          acquittal merely because it feels that sitting as a
\n          trial court it would have proceeded to record a
\n          conviction; a duty is cast on the High Court
\n          while reversing an order of acquittal to examine
\n          and discuss the reasons given by the trial court
\n          to acquit the accused and then to dispel those
\n          reasons. If the High Court fails to make such an
\n          exercise the judgment will suffer from serious
\n          infirmity.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
32.   In Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhu Nath Jha<\/a> (2003) 12 SCC<\/p>\n
606, this Court observed:\n<\/p>\n
          “21. There is no embargo on the appellate court
\n          reviewing the evidence upon which an order of
\n          acquittal is based. Generally, the order of
\n          acquittal shall not be interfered with because the
\n          presumption of innocence of the accused is
\n          further strengthened by acquittal. The golden
\n          thread which runs through the web of
\n          administration of justice in criminal cases is that
\n          if two views are possible on the evidence adduced
\n          in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the
\n          accused and the other to his innocence, the view
\n          which is favourable to the accused should be
\n          adopted. The paramount consideration of the
\n          court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is
\n          prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may
\n          arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than
\n          from the conviction of an innocent. In a case
\n          where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is
\n          cast upon the appellate court to reappreciate the
\n          evidence in a case where the accused has been
\n          acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as to
\n          whether any of the accused committed any
\n          offence or not”.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                              29<\/span><\/p>\n
           whether any of the accused committed any
\n           offence or not”.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
33.   Again in Kallu v. State of M.P. (2006) 10 SCC 313, this Court<\/p>\n
stated:\n<\/p>\n
           “8. While deciding an appeal against acquittal,
\n           the power of the appellate court is no less than
\n           the power exercised while hearing appeals
\n           against conviction. In both types of appeals, the
\n           power exists to review the entire evidence.
\n           However, one significant difference is that an
\n           order of acquittal will not be interfered with, by
\n           an appellate court, where the judgment of the
\n           trial court is based on evidence and the view
\n           taken is reasonable and plausible. It will not
\n           reverse the decision of the trial court merely
\n           because a different view is possible. The
\n           appellate court will also bear in mind that there
\n           is a presumption of innocence in favour of the
\n           accused and the accused is entitled to get the
\n           benefit of any doubt. Further if it decides to
\n           interfere, it should assign reasons for differing
\n           with the decision of the trial court.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                                         (emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
34.   From the above decisions, in Chandrappa and Ors. v. State<\/p>\n
of Karnataka<\/a> (2007 (4) SCC 415), the following general principles<\/p>\n
regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an<\/p>\n
appeal against an order of acquittal were culled out:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                              30<\/span><\/p>\n
(1)           An appellate court has full power to review,<\/p>\n
reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the<\/p>\n
order of acquittal is founded.\n<\/p>\n
(2)       The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no<\/p>\n
limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power<\/p>\n
and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach<\/p>\n
its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.<\/p>\n
(3)       Various expressions, such as, “substantial and<\/p>\n
compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very<\/p>\n
strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring<\/p>\n
mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers<\/p>\n
of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such<\/p>\n
phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of<\/p>\n
language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court<\/p>\n
to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the<\/p>\n
court to review the evidence and to come to its own<\/p>\n
conclusion.\n<\/p>\n
(4)       An appellate court, however, must bear in mind<\/p>\n
that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in<\/p>\n
                            31<\/span>
\n  favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence<\/p>\n
  is available to him under the fundamental principle of<\/p>\n
  criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed<\/p>\n
  to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent<\/p>\n
  court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his<\/p>\n
  acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further<\/p>\n
  reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.<\/p>\n
      (5)   If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the<\/p>\n
  basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should<\/p>\n
  not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial<\/p>\n
  court.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
35.     A person has, no doubt, a profound right not to be<\/p>\n
convicted of an offence which is not established by the evidential<\/p>\n
standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Though this<\/p>\n
standard is a higher standard, there is, however, no absolute<\/p>\n
standard. What degree of probability amounts to “proof” is an<\/p>\n
exercise      particular   to   each   case.   Referring   to   the<\/p>\n
interdependence of evidence and the confirmation of one piece of<\/p>\n
                                32<\/span>
\nevidence   by   another,   a   learned   author   says   [see    “The<\/p>\n
Mathematics of Proof II”: Glanville Williams, Criminal Law<\/p>\n
Review, 1979, by Sweet and Maxwell, p.340 (342)]:<\/p>\n
           “The simple multiplication rule does not apply if
\n           the separate pieces of evidence are dependent.
\n           Two events are dependent when they tend to
\n           occur together, and the evidence of such events
\n           may also be said to be dependent. In a criminal
\n           case, different pieces of evidence directed to
\n           establishing that the defendant did the
\n           prohibited act with the specified state of mind are
\n           generally dependent. A junior may feel doubt
\n           whether to credit an alleged confession, and
\n           doubt whether to infer guilt from the fact that the
\n           defendant fled from justice. But since it is
\n           generally guilty rather than innocent people who
\n           make confessions, and guilty rather than
\n           innocent people who run away, the two doubts
\n           are not to be multiplied together. The one piece of
\n           evidence may confirm the other.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
36.   Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free from a<\/p>\n
zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot afford any favourite<\/p>\n
other than truth. To constitute reasonable doubt, it must be free<\/p>\n
from an overemotional response. Doubts must be actual and<\/p>\n
substantial doubts as to the guilt of the accused persons arising<\/p>\n
from the evidence, or from the lack of it, as opposed to mere<\/p>\n
                               33<\/span>
\nvague apprehensions. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary,<\/p>\n
trivial or a merely possible doubt, but a fair doubt based upon<\/p>\n
reason and common sense. It must grow out of the evidence in<\/p>\n
the case.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
37.   The concepts of probability, and the degrees of it, cannot<\/p>\n
obviously be expressed in terms of units to be mathematically<\/p>\n
enumerated as to how many of such units constitute proof<\/p>\n
beyond reasonable doubt. There is an unmistakable subjective<\/p>\n
element in the evaluation of the degrees of probability and the<\/p>\n
quantum of proof. Forensic probability must, in the last analysis,<\/p>\n
rest on a robust common sense and, ultimately, on the trained<\/p>\n
intuitions of the Judge. While the protection given by the<\/p>\n
criminal process to the accused persons is not to be eroded, at<\/p>\n
the same time, uninformed legitimization of trivialities would<\/p>\n
make a mockery of administration of criminal justice. This<\/p>\n
position was illuminatingly stated by Venkatachaliah, J. (as His<\/p>\n
Lordship then was) in State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal<\/a> (1988 (4)<\/p>\n
SCC 302).\n<\/p>\n
                              34<\/span>\n<\/p>\n
38.   The above position was highlighted in Krishnan and Anr. v.<\/p>\n
State represented by Inspector of Police (2003 (7) SCC 56).<\/p>\n
39.   So far as discrepancy between ocular evidence and medical<\/p>\n
evidence is concerned, this Court in Kamaljit Singh v. State of<\/p>\n
Punjab<\/a> (2003 (12) SCC 155) observed as under:<\/p>\n
           “It is trite law that minor variations between
\n           medical evidence and ocular evidence do not take
\n           away the primacy of the latter. Unless medical
\n           evidence in its term goes so far as to completely
\n           rule out all possibilities whatsoever of injuries
\n           taking place in the manner stated by the
\n           eyewitnesses, the testimony of the eyewitnesses
\n           cannot be thrown out. (See Solanki Chimanbhai
\n           Ukabhai v. State of Gujarat<\/a> (1983 (2) SCC 174).
\n           The position was illuminatingly and exhaustively
\n           reiterated in State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal<\/a> (1988
\n           (4) SCC 302). When the acquittal by the trial
\n           court was found to be on the basis of
\n           unwarranted       assumptions      and  manifestly
\n           erroneous appreciation of evidence by ignoring
\n           valuable and credible evidence resulting in
\n           serious and substantial miscarriage of justice,
\n           the High Court cannot in this case be found fault
\n           with for its well-merited interference.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                               35<\/span><\/p>\n
40.   Coming to the plea that the medical evidence is at variance<\/p>\n
with ocular evidence, it has to be noted that it would be<\/p>\n
erroneous to accord undue primacy to the hypothetical answers<\/p>\n
of medical witnesses to exclude the eyewitnesses’ account which<\/p>\n
had to be tested independently and not treated as the “variable”<\/p>\n
keeping the medical evidence as the “constant”.<\/p>\n
41.   It is trite that where the eyewitnesses’ account is found<\/p>\n
credible and trustworthy, medical opinion pointing to alternative<\/p>\n
possibilities is not accepted as conclusive. Witnesses, as<\/p>\n
Bentham said, are the eyes and ears of justice. Hence the<\/p>\n
importance and primacy of the quality of the trial process.<\/p>\n
Eyewitnesses’ account would require a careful independent<\/p>\n
assessment and evaluation for its credibility which should not be<\/p>\n
adversely prejudged making any other evidence, including<\/p>\n
medical evidence, as the sole touchstone for the test of such<\/p>\n
credibility. The evidence must be tested for its inherent<\/p>\n
consistency and the inherent probability of the story; consistency<\/p>\n
with the account of other witnesses held to be creditworthy;<\/p>\n
                              36<\/span>
\nconsistency with the undisputed facts, the “credit” of the<\/p>\n
witnesses; their performance in the witness box; their power of<\/p>\n
observation etc. Then the probative value of such evidence<\/p>\n
becomes eligible to be put into the scales for a cumulative<\/p>\n
evaluation.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
42.   In the instant case, the trial Court erroneously concluded<\/p>\n
that the medical evidence was at variance with the ocular<\/p>\n
evidence. The oral testimony is not at variance with the medical<\/p>\n
evidence as rightly observed by the High Court.<\/p>\n
43.   This Court in Lila Ram (D) thr. Duli Chand v. State of<\/p>\n
Haryana and Anr. (JT 1999 (6) SC 274) held that it was<\/p>\n
immaterial whether one or two gunshots were fired. Such<\/p>\n
contradiction does not travel to the root of the nature of the<\/p>\n
offence. The discrepancy in ocular and medical evidence vis-a-<\/p>\n
vis distance cannot affect the credibility of evidence. In State of<\/p>\n
U.P. v. Suhar Singh (AIR<\/a> 1987 SC 191) it was observed that<\/p>\n
when there is direct evidence of eye witness available the<\/p>\n
                              37<\/span>
\ninconsistency relating to distance from which the gunshots were<\/p>\n
fired is of no consequence when the prosecution evidence<\/p>\n
pertaining to assault by guns and pistol substantially tallied with<\/p>\n
the medical evidence. The present case, belongs to that category.<\/p>\n
Additionally, there was no discrepancy pointed out in the<\/p>\n
evidence of eye witnesses. Merely because PW-1 and PW-2 were<\/p>\n
close relatives of the deceased, that cannot be a ground to affect<\/p>\n
credibility of their evidence. Looked at from any angle there is no<\/p>\n
merit in the appeal which is accordingly dismissed.<\/p>\n
                                ……. …………………………….J.
\n                                (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)<\/p>\n
                                ……………………………………J.
\n                                (Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA)
\nNew Delhi,
\nJuly 24, 2008<\/p>\n
                              38<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Suraj Singh vs State Of U.P on 24 July, 2008 Author: . A Pasayat Bench: Arijit Pasayat, Mukundakam Sharma REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1072 OF 2004 Suraj Singh ..Appellant Versus State of U.P. .. Respondent JUDGMENT Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Challenge in […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-46505","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nSuraj Singh vs State Of U.P on 24 July, 2008 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/suraj-singh-vs-state-of-u-p-on-24-july-2008\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Suraj Singh vs State Of U.P on 24 July, 2008 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/suraj-singh-vs-state-of-u-p-on-24-july-2008\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2008-07-23T18:30:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2015-03-10T20:02:31+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@legaliadmin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@Legal_india\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"38 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/suraj-singh-vs-state-of-u-p-on-24-july-2008#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/suraj-singh-vs-state-of-u-p-on-24-july-2008\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\"},\"headline\":\"Suraj Singh vs State Of U.P on 24 July, 2008\",\"datePublished\":\"2008-07-23T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2015-03-10T20:02:31+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/suraj-singh-vs-state-of-u-p-on-24-july-2008\"},\"wordCount\":7518,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"articleSection\":[\"Supreme Court of India\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/suraj-singh-vs-state-of-u-p-on-24-july-2008#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/suraj-singh-vs-state-of-u-p-on-24-july-2008\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/suraj-singh-vs-state-of-u-p-on-24-july-2008\",\"name\":\"Suraj Singh vs State Of U.P on 24 July, 2008 - 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