{"id":48564,"date":"1982-08-27T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1982-08-26T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/md-ibrahim-khan-vs-susheel-kumar-and-anr-on-27-august-1982"},"modified":"2015-10-13T01:44:51","modified_gmt":"2015-10-12T20:14:51","slug":"md-ibrahim-khan-vs-susheel-kumar-and-anr-on-27-august-1982","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/md-ibrahim-khan-vs-susheel-kumar-and-anr-on-27-august-1982","title":{"rendered":"Md. Ibrahim Khan vs Susheel Kumar And Anr. on 27 August, 1982"},"content":{"rendered":"
Andhra High Court<\/div>\n
Md. Ibrahim Khan vs Susheel Kumar And Anr. on 27 August, 1982<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: AIR 1983 AP 69<\/div>\n
Author: C Reddy<\/div>\n
Bench: C Reddy, Kodandaramayya<\/div>\n<\/p>\n
<\/pre>\n
JUDGMENT<\/p>\n
 Chennakesav Reddy, J. <\/p>\n
 1. Mohammad Ibrahim Khan, now know to the  public as the ‘King of Land Grabbers’ is the petitioner in this  writ petition. He disclosed to be public disturbing facts. He involved in the alleged acts of land grabbing some senior  civilians and veteran political grandsires provoking a probe by a high power commission. He now seeks to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 of the  Constitution  to interdict the proceeding of the commission of Inquiry, Land Grabbing, by the issue of ‘writ mainly on the ground that the procedure followed by the commission is contrary to the  provisions of the  commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 and the  Rules  made thereunder.\n<\/p>\n
 2.  By G.O. Ms. No. 146, General Administration (General-B) Department, dated 17th March, 1982 the Government of Andhra pradesh appointed a commission of Inquiry under the commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952  (central Act 60 of 1952) consisting of  a single member viz., sri susheel Kumar, I.A.S. commissioner of sugar and Ex-officio secretary to Government industries and commerce department to enquire into the allegations of  land  grabbing by Mohd. Ibrahim Khan,the  petitioner.  The  commission was requested to complete its enquiry and submit its report on or before 17th May, 1982.  Subsequently, by G.O. Ms. No. 208. General Administration (General-B)  department dated 13 April, 1982, an amendment to the Notification issued under G.O. Ms. No. 146 was issued.  By the said amendment, the  terms of reference were modified and they read as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
 “2.  The terms of  reference of th commission shall be as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
 (1) to probe and inquire into such of the cases pertaining to complaints and allegations of alnd grabbing of Government  lands, local authorities land and also of certain private owners’ lands by sri Mohd. Ibrahim Khan son of sri Mahaboob Khan of Hydewrabad city and his associates, either directly or by formation of  bogus co-operative Housing  societies registered in the Hyderabad (urban)  and Ranga reddy districts or otherwise which are submitted to or filed in the  office of the commission  by the  Director general of police, andhra pradesh or by the commissioner of police, Hyderabad city or by the district collectors of Hyderabad (urban)  and Ranga  Reddy Districts or by the  state crime branch C.I.D. more  particularly into  those  cases that are described in the  Annexure appended hereto.\n<\/p>\n
 (2)  to inquire into other complaints and allegations related thereto or connected therewith”.\n<\/p>\n
 By G.O. Ms. No. 271 dated 17th may, 1982 the time limit for the submission of the report was also extended till 15th July, 1982.\n<\/p>\n
 3.  The commission issued notices on 26-5-1982 under Rule 4(1) (a) of the Andhra Pradesh commissions of Inquiry rules, 1968   (hereinafter referred ot as the rules)  to the  petitioner and several others to furingh statements in duplicate accompanied by affadavits and  documents relating to the matters mentioned in the notice. Simultaneously with the issue  of the aforesaid notice, a  general notification in all important local dailies was got pulbished as required by Rule  4 (1) (b0 of the Rules. In response  to the above notices, several persons filed statements supported  by affidavits  and  documents indicting the petitioner. But the petitioner raised several objections to the notice contending that the  notice was ultra vires the provisions  of Article 20 (3) of the  Constitution, and  further that  land grabbing  by a particular individual  was not a matter of public  importance for the appointment of any commission to recall its notice.  On a consideration  of the  objections raised by the petitioner the commission by its order dated 23rd June,  1982  rejected the contentionsof the petitioner.  The  commission to inspect such documents as were produced before the commission.  After  a careful scrutiny of the  several affidavits and documents received by the  commission in response to the notices under Rule 4 (1) (b) of the  rules the commission felt  that the allegations contained in and the information furnished through the aforesaid affidavits and documents might prejudicially affect the petitioner’s reputation.  So on 24-6-1982.  Three notices were issued to the petitioner under section 8-b of the commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on 24-6-82  and 26-6-82  and 26-6-82.  By the  said notices, the  petitioner was informed that it was  necessary to enquire inyo  his  conduct and his  reputation may be prejudicially affected by the  allegations contained and the  information furnished in   the  affidavits mentioned   in the notices.   He was further informed that he may avail of the  opportunity by producing the necessary material in the form of  affidavits  accompanied by the  authenticated  documents touching the matters raised in the affidavits particularly  regarding the nature, identity of  survey Numbers and extent of the land abutting or forming part of Makta madar shah’ the possession of which the  Government had taken on 2-5-1982,  the land alleged to  have been  encroached upon by Bakelite Hylam Employees’ co-operative House building  society, the  land claimed by the  united co-operative Housing  society.  Hyderabad and our home weaker sections co-operative society which is said  to belong  to jubilee hills Housing society,  hyderabad.  The  petitioner made three applications on 29-6-1982, 30-6-1982  and 1-7-1982, in respect of the aforesaid three notices respectively requesting the commission  to furnish the copies of the several documents referred to in the  affidavits mentioned in the notices and give him  reasonable time  to submit his explanation after furnishing the copies.  He also requested that  under  the Act he cannot be called upon to submit his explanation even before he is given an opportunity to cross examine the witnesses by calling  them before the commission with reference to the affidavits filed by them.  The commission of Inquiry by its order dated 3-7-1982, obseved that the commission of Inquiry was only a fact-finding body  and that the procedure adopted by the commission was not violative of the principles of natural justice.  Further the petitioner was permitted to inspect all the documents filed before the commission between 5-7-1982  and 9-7-1982  and take copies of any documents in the presence of the secretary to the commission within the stipulated time.  He was also granted extension of time  to avail of the opportunity as provided in the notices  under section 8B of the Act by 12-7-1982.  On 5-7-1982  While the petitioner was taking extracts of the order dated 15-9-1950. The representative of the  revenue Department N. Veera Reddy objected to the taking  of extracts from the above report.  Therefore the petitioner filed a petition on 5-7-1982, requesting the commission to permit him to take a copy of the report of the  land record Officer referred to  in the  order of the collector dated 15-9-1950.  He also filed petitions on  6-7-1982  and 7-7-1982  to summon  the officers who have given report against  him and permit him to cross-examine them as well as the  investigating officers.  He claimed that  he has such a right to cross-examine the  witnesses under the  Act and the Rules made thereunder.  The commission of  inquiry by its order  dated 7-7-1982  up held  the privilege claimed on behalf of  the revenue department under sections  123  and  124 of the Evidence Act in respect of 4 documents and permitted the petitioner to take copies of the other documents.  The  prayer of the petitioner to cross-examine the witnesses who have sworn to  the affidavits before  the Commission was rejected holding that the  right to cross-examine a witness arises only when a witness is examined orally by the commission and not when the evidence is taken on affidavits.  The  petitioner wa permitted by the commission to tender his evidence in the  form of affidavits as already intimated to him in the notices issued under section 8B of the Act.  Aggrieved against  the  proceedings of the commission dated 24-6-1982,  26-6-1982   and 26-6-1982  under sec. 8B of the Act and the  order of the commission dated 7-7-1982  rejecting the  request of the petitioner to cross-examine the witnesses who have given evidence by way of  affidavits, the  petitioner has filed this writ petition to quash the said  notices under section 8B of the Act  and the order of the  commission dated 7-7-1982.\n<\/p>\n
 4.   The learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. Gururaja Rao, Submits that the commission of Inquiry is not competent to go into the  questions of title to the property and can only go into the conduct and reputation of any person.  But,  argues the learned counsel that the three notices under  section 8B of the Act issued by the commission dated 24-6-1982,  26-6-1982  and 26-6-1982  really raised questions of title to the  immoveable property.  The learned counsel further  pleads that no enquiry by the  commission is called for  nor permissible, in respect of the   land known as ‘Makta Madar Shah’ which the Government have admittedly taken possession of on 2-5-1982   and a civil suit  filed by the petitioner and an appeal filed under the hyderabad land revenue Act are already pending in respect of the same  property.\n<\/p>\n
 5.  The learned  counsel in support of  his submission placed reliance on a decision of the delhi High Court  in dhirendra Brahmachari v. Union of India,  AiR  1979  NoC 91 (Delhi) wherein  it was observed:\n<\/p>\n
  “A commission should not deal with a  matter if a civil or criminal Court is already seized of it”.\n<\/p>\n
 6.  On the other  hand, the learned Advocate General appearing for the  state Government submits that the  enquiry by the commission is into a matter a public importance, namely systematic large scale grabbing of Government lands, the  commission is only a  fact finding body and questions of title are not decided.  According tot he learned Advocate General the enquiry relates only to the conduct  and  reputation of  the  petitioners.  The  allegations against the petitioner relate to large scale  tampering of revenue records showing  survey Numbers which  for the  purpose of land grab, were never in existence.  In an enquiry into such allegations according to him, the questions of title might incidentally arise and the commission being only a fact finding body, it will only help  the Government to form its opinion for  further action.\n<\/p>\n
 7.  It is true that the only power of the commission is to enquire and  make a report  and  embody therein its recommendations.  The  commission has no power of adjudication of any questions of title or dispute and  pass a decree which can be enforced proprio vigore.  There is no charge as such against any  personl not is there any  accused or accusor.  There is  neither a plaintiff nor a defendant.  There are no pleadings raising  issues to be tried.  No one is  punished.  No serious disability or disqualification is incurred by the  findings.  The enquiry made by the  commission differs from a criminal trial.  The commission is only a machinery set up to enquire into a definite matter of public importance  and to make a report so as  to enable the Government to take such action as the Government may deem fit.  Therefore,  there is  no definite judgment in the  enquiry, nor is there any  usurpation of judicial  functions.  The Supreme Court  in Ram krishna Dalmia v. S.R. Tendolkar,AIR  1958  (at P. 546 )  has observed:\n<\/p>\n
  “…………………..the only power that hte commission has is to enquire and  make  a report and embody therein its recommendations.  The commission has no  power of adjudication in the sense of passing  an order which can be enforced proprio vigore.  A clear distinction must on hte  authorities be drawn between a decision which by itself has no force and no  penal effect and a decision which becomes enforceable immediately or which may become  enforceable by some  action being  taken.  Therefore as the commission we are concerned with is merely to investigate and  record its findings and recommendations without having  any power  to enforce them the inquiry or report cannot be looked upon as a judicial inquiry in the  sense of its being an exercise of judicial function  properly so called and consequently the  question of usurpation by parliament or the Government of the powers of the  judicial organs of the Union of India cannot  arise on the facts of this case………”\n<\/p>\n
 8.  Again the Supreme Court in P. V. Jagannath Rao v. State of Orissa,<\/a> , dealing with the  question whether the appointment of commission of Inquiry under  commissions of  Inquiry Act, during the pendency of civil  litigation would  amount to contempt of Court, held (at p. 226):-\n<\/p>\n
  “The  inquiry cannot  be looked upon as a judicial inquiry and the order ultimately passed cannot be  enforced proprio vigore.   The inquiry and the investigation by the  commission do not therefore amount to usurpation of the function of the courts of law.  The scope of the trial by the courts of law and the  commission of Inquiry is altogether different.”\n<\/p>\n
 9.  Therefore,the  grievance of the petitioner that  the  commission is going to inquire and  decide questions of title of immovable property is wholly unfounded.\n<\/p>\n
 10.  Before  embarking on a consideration of the question relating to the   propriety of the procedure  adopted by the commissionone other submissionof hte learned counsel relating to the legality of  the  privilege claimed on behlaf of the Government and  upheld by the  commission under sections 123 and 124 of the Evidence  Act by the  order dated 7-7-82  in respect of certain documents requested for inspection by the petitioner, may be considered.\n<\/p>\n
 11.  It is true that the  privilege claimed on behalf of the  Revenue Department in respect of four  documents was   upheld  by the  commission in its order dated 7-7-82. The commission opined that the  disclosure of those documents is  against public interest.  The  learned counsel submits that the commission decided the matter in a mechanical way without  scrutinising  the true nature of the documents .  the  rejection  of the request of the  petitioner to inspect those documents argues the counsel, will result in the  denial of  a reasonable opportunity of  being  heard to the petitioner.  The  learned advocate General has stated before  us  from the Bar that the  privilege claimed has been waived and the petitioner will be permitted to peruse the said documents also and make  copies thereof.  Therefore  it  is unnecessary to go into the question of legality of the claim of privilege.\n<\/p>\n
 12.  Then there remains the really complex and vexed question whether the  procedure  to the  principles of natural justice.  The  learned counsel for the  petitioner argues that   on a proper construction of the provisions  of secs. 8B and 8C of the Act and the rules  made thereunder, the  right procedure to be adopted by the commission is to make the persons who have given affidavit evidence available  for cross-examination by the  petitioner and the rejection of such request is contrary to the provisions of the Act and the fundamental principles  of natural justice applicable to quasi  judicial inquiries.  It is  therefore, necessary to  read the  provisions of the Act  relating to the  procedure to be  followed by the  commission:\n<\/p>\n
 “Section 8: procedure to be followed by the commission:- The commission shall, subject to any rules that  may be made in  this  behalf have power to regulate  its own procedure (including the fixing  of places and times of its sitting   and deciding whether to  sit  in public or in  private).\n<\/p>\n
 8-A. ………………..\n<\/p>\n
 8B: persons likely to be prejudicially affected to be heard. If at any stage of inquiry, the commission:-\n<\/p>\n
 (a) considers it necessary to inquire into the  conduct of any person; or   <\/p>\n
 (b)  is of opinion that  the reputation of any person is likely to be prejudicially affected   by the inquiry.\n<\/p>\n
 The commission shall  given to that person a reasonable opportunity of being  heard in the inquiry and to produce evidence in his defence;\n<\/p>\n
 Provided that nothing  in this section shall  apply where the  credit of a witness is being  impeached.\n<\/p>\n
 8C.  Right of cross-examination and representation by legal practitioner:  The appropriate Government  every person referred to  in section 8 (b) and,  with the  permission of the commission, any other person whose evidence is recorded by the commission.\n<\/p>\n
 (a)  may cross-examine a witness other than a witness produced by it or him;\n<\/p>\n
 (b)  may address the commission: and  <\/p>\n
 (c)  may be represented before the  commission by a legal practitioner or with the  permission of the  commission by  any other  person.”\n<\/p>\n
 13.  Rules 4 and 5 of the central commissions of Inquiry (procedure) Rules, 1960 reads as follows.\n<\/p>\n
 ‘4.  If at any stage of the inquiry the commission:-\n<\/p>\n
 (a)  considers it necessary  to inquire into the  conduct  of any person or   <\/p>\n
 (b)  is of the opinion that the reputation of any person is likely to be prejudically affected by the  inquiry.\n<\/p>\n
 The commission shall give to that  person a reasonable opportunity of being  heard in  the  inquiry and to produce evidence in  his  defence.\n<\/p>\n
 5.  The central Government every person referred to in Rule 4 and with  the  permission of the commission any other person whose evidence is recorded under Rule 3:\n<\/p>\n
 (a)  may cross-examine a witness other than witness produced by  it or him;\n<\/p>\n
 (b)  may address the Court; and  <\/p>\n
 (c)  may be represented before the commission by a legal practitioner or with the  consent of the commission. By any other  person.”\n<\/p>\n
 14.  Now the relevant  Rules of the Andhra pradesh commissions of inquiry rules  may be looked into-\n<\/p>\n
 Rule 5.  Recording of  evidence: (1) The  commission shall examine all the  statements furnished to it  under Rule 4 and if, after such examination the commission considers it  necessary to record evidence, it shall first record the evidence if any.  Produced by the  state Government  and may thereafter record in such order as it may deem fit:\n<\/p>\n
 (a)  the evidence  of any person who has  furnished a statement under Rule 4 and whose evidence the commission having regard to the  statement considers relevant for the  purpose of the  inquiry.\n<\/p>\n
 (b) the evidence  of any other person whose  evidence, in the opinion of the commission, is relevant to the inquiry:\n<\/p>\n
 Provided that the commission may dispense with the  attendance of any  person for the  purpose of giving evidence before it, if in its opinion-\n<\/p>\n
 (i) such  attendance cannot be enforced except without causing undue hardship or inconvenience to that  person;  or  <\/p>\n
 (ii) such attendance should be dispensed with  for any other sufficient reason to be recorded by it in writing.\n<\/p>\n
 (2) & (3)  xx             xx     xx      xx\n\n \n\n 6.  Persons likely to be prejudicially affected to be heard:- \n\n \n\n If, at any stage of the inquiry the commission: \n\n   \n\n (a) considers it necessary to inquire into the  conduct of any person; or   \n\n \n\n (b)  is of the  opinion that the reputation of any person is likely to be prejudicially affected by the   inquiry, the commission shall give to that  person an opportunity of being  heard in the  inquiry and to produce evidence in  his  evidence.  \n\n \n\n 7.  Right of cross-examination and representation by legal practitioner: the  state Government , every person referred  to in Rule 6 and with the permission of the commission, any other person whose evidence is recorded under Rule 5- \n\n   \n\n (a) may cross-examine a witness other than a witness produced by it or him; \n\n \n\n (b) may address the Court; and  \n\n \n\n (c)  may be represented  before the  commission by a legal practitioner or with the consent of the  commission by any other person\".   \n\n \n\n<\/pre>\n
 15.  It may at once be seen that  the  provisions of Rr. 4 and 5 of the  central commissions of Inquiry Rules 1960 as well as those of Rr. 6 and 7 of the  Andhra pradesh commissions of Inquiry Rules are identical to Ss. 8B and 8C of the Act.  Unless S. 8 of the Act, the  commission is entitled to regulate its  own procedures subject to any rules that may be made in that behalf Under S. 8B of the Act reasonable  opportunity of being heard  in the inquiry is required to be given to every person whose conduct the commission considers it necessary to inquire into and whose reputation in the opinion of the commission, is likely to be prejudicially affected by the inquiry.\n<\/p>\n
 On a scrutiny of the several statements,   affidavits and  reports received in response to the notices and notification  issued under Rule 4 (1)  (a) (b)  of the Rules, the commission was of the opinion that  the  reputation of the petitioner was likely to be  prejudicially affected by the  allegations made  in the  said  affidavits and reports.  Therefore the commission issued the three impugned notices under S. 8  (b) of the  Act affording an opportunity of being  heard to the petitioner in his defence and  requiring  the petitioner to produce the necessary material  in the form of affidavits accompanied by authenticated documents touching the matters  raised in the affidavits and the report of the collector and  the joint collector.  Hyderabad  District.\n<\/p>\n
 16.  The learned counsel Sri Gururaja Rao, however, submits that a reasonable opportunity of being  heard envisages communication of clear, precise and  unambiguous charge and includes an indefeasible   rights to have persons who have given evidence against hte person on affidavit summoned, for the  purpose of cross-examination.  According to the learned counsel any  opinion  formed by the commission can only be on legal evidence  and the evidence  which is not subject to cross-examination is no legal evidence as  it is vitiated by the  breach of natural Justice.\n<\/p>\n
 17.  The learned counsel placed reliance in support of his submission on the texts on Administrative Law and Judicial precedents.  S.A. De. Smith in his  standard  well-known work ‘Judicial review of Administrative Action’ (3rd Edition) says at page 177 under the heading ‘Form of hearing’:\n<\/p>\n
 ‘It must be pointed out, however that  when the  words “hearing” or “opportunity to be heard” are used in legislation,  they nearly always  denote a hearing at  which oral submissions and evidence may be tendered.  In some legislative contexts the term “hearing” is used in contrast to “inquiry”:  in practice a hearing  may be held  in  private though members of the general public are not necessarily excluded; the  conduct  of both hearings and inquiries in town planning  matters is oral and is now governed by similar procedural  rules.\n<\/p>\n
 In the absence of clear statutory guidance on  the matter, one who is  entitled to the  protection of  the audi  alteram parterm rule is now  prima facie entitled  to put his case  orally but in a number of contexts the courts have held natural justice to have been satisfied by an opportunity to make  written representations  to the  deciding body and there are  still many situations where a person will be able  to present his case adequately in this way”.\n<\/p>\n
 18.  Reference is also made to a passage occurring at page 188 wherein it is stated:\n<\/p>\n
  “Refusal to permit cross-examinations of witnesses at an administrative hearing will usually be a denial of natural justice”.\n<\/p>\n
 But  the author again at page 189  said:\n<\/p>\n
  “Again, deprivation of the  opportunity to test evidence by cross-examination is not a violation of natural justice if the tribunal can and does   decide merely on the strength of an inspection or oral or written submissions supplemented by its  own local or specialised knowledge or if  the  proceedings before  an investigating  body are only for the  purpose of collecting information…..”\n<\/p>\n
 19.  In this case there can be no dispute that  the commission is only an investigating body; it collects information and sends up the  report to the  Government and helps  the Government to form its opinion.\n<\/p>\n
 20.  In Halsbury’s  laws of England, IV Edition, under the heading Evidence on Affidavit”; the following passage occurs at page 215;\n<\/p>\n
  “A deponent may be ordered to attend for cross-examination on his affidavit before  a Judge master  or  examiner of the Court, and the Court may refuse to Act on an affidavit where the deponent cannot be cross-examined”.\n<\/p>\n
 21.  There the  author was dealing with the  proceedings in a Court  and not before  any commission of Inquiry.\n<\/p>\n
 22.  The learned counsel then relied on the  decision of the Supreme Court in the state of  Punjab v. Dewan Chuni<\/a> lal,   wherein it was held that refusal of the right to cross-examine the witnesses who have made  general remarks against the character of the delinquent sub-Inspector of Police,  amounted to denial of a reasonable opportunity.  That was a case of dismissal of a sub-Inspector  of police on ht charges of inefficiency and dishonesty  based on adverse reports of  superior  officers.  In the departmental enquiry against the sub-inspector of police, charges were  framed against him for  inefficiency and dishonesty on the basis of adverse confidential reports of superior officers.  Such officers though available  were not  examined  during  the course ofthe enquiry and the charged-officer was not given an opportunity to cross-examine  them. R. 16 (24) of the punjab police Rules  clearly provides for the  examination of witnesses whenever possible in the presence of the charged-officer and for the cross-examination of hte witnesses.\n<\/p>\n
 23.  In Smt.  Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India.   the Supreme Court<\/a> observed (at page 628):\n<\/p>\n
  “The law must, Therefore now be taken to be well settled that even in an administrative proceeding, which in volves civil consequences the doctrine of natural justice mustbe held  to be applicable”.\n<\/p>\n
 24.  Reliance was also placed on the  decisions of the Supreme Court  in Khandesh spinning & Weaving  Millsa v. R.G.K. Sangh, AIR  1960  Supreme Court 517  and B.E.  supply co. V. The workmen,   Wherein it was  pointed out that  no materials  can be  relied upon  to establish  a  contested fact which are  not spoken to by persons who are competent to speak about them and  are  subjected to cross-examination by the  person against  whom they are sought to be used.  They are cases arising  under the Industrial disputes Act wherein  a  dispute had been referred by the  state Government for adjudication by the  industrial Tribunal and the industrial  Tribunal had passed an award after enquiry.\n<\/p>\n
 25.  Strong  reliance was placed on the  decision of the Supreme Court  in state of kerala v. K.T. Shaduli Grocery Dealer,  Wherein the question whether opportunity of being  heard includes the  right to cross-examine a witness, under S. 17 (3) of  the kerala General sales Tax Act, fell for consideration Bhagwati, J. Speaking for the  Court observed (at Pp. 1629-30 of AiR):\n<\/p>\n
  “Once of the  rules which constitutes a part of the principles of natural justice is the rule of audi alteram  partem  which requires that no man should be condemned unheard.  It is indeed a requirement of the duty to Act fairly which lies on all quasi-judicial authorities and  this  duty has been extended also  to the authorities holding administrative enquiries involving civil consequences or  affecting rights of parties because as pointed out by this Court in A.K. Kraipak. V. Union of India.<\/a>  ‘ the   aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put in negatively, to prevent miscarriage of justice and  justice, in a society which has  accepted socialism as its Article of faith in  the   Constitution is dispensed  not only by judicial or quasijudicial authorities but also by authorities discharging administrative functions.   This rule which requires an opportunity  to be heard is to be given to a person likely to be affected by a  decision is also like  the genus of which it is a species,  not  an inflexible rule having a fixed connotation.  It has a variable content depending  on the nature  of  the  enquiry the frame work of the  law under which it is held  the Constitution of the authority holding  the inquiry the nature  and character of the rights affected and consequences flowing from the   decision”.\n<\/p>\n
 26.  In that case, the  sales Tax officer had made a best Judgment assessment under S. 17, best-sec.  (3) of the  kerala General  sales Tax Act, 1963  S. 17 (3) reads:\n<\/p>\n
 “If no return is submitted by the dealer under sub-section (1) within the prescribed period or if the return  submitted by him appears  to the assessing  authority to be incorrect or incomplete the assessing authority shall after making such inquiry as it may consider necessary and after taking into account all relevant materials  gathered by it , assess the dealer to the best of its judment:\n<\/p>\n
 Provided that before taking action under this  sub-section the dealer shall be given a reasonable opportunity of being  heard and, where  a return has been submitted, to prove the correctness or completeness of such return”.\n<\/p>\n
 27.  The assessee in that case had submitted his sales tax returns before  the sales Tax Officer who on an examination of the accounts  found that the returns submitted by the assessee were both incorrect  and  incomplete  inasmuch  as  certain  entries in the books of account of Haji   P.K. usmankutty revealed certain transactions which were not accounted for  in the assessee’s books of account.  The sales Tax Officer, after hearing the assessee, made an assessment to the best of his  judgment under S. 17 (3) of the  Act read with R. 15  made under the Act.  When the assessee sought  an opportunity to cross-examine haji Usmankutty with respect tot he correctness of  his accounts which were relied upon  by the  sales Tax officer the sales Tax Officer refused the   request of the assessee.  Therefore the question that arose was whether the opportunity of being  heard under S. 17 (3)   of the  Act would include within its sweep the right of cross-examination of  a  third party whose accounts were the  basis of the  best Judgment assessment made by the  sales Tax. Officer.  The Supreme Court construing S. 17 (3) of the Act held:\n<\/p>\n
  “………the  inescapable  conclusion would be  that  the  assessee has been given a statutory right to prove the correctness of  his  return by showing  that the matterials on the basis of which  his  return  is   found to be incorrect or incomplete are wrong  and if  for this  purpose the assessee makes an express prayer for cross-examining the  wholesale dealers whose accounts formed the sheet-anchor of the notice issued  to the assessee he is  undoubtedly entitled to cross-examine such wholesale dealers.  In view of the  language  in which the Rules are couched it  seems  to us that  a determinative issuearises in this  case the  department taking the  stand  that   the returns filed by  the assessees are incorrect and incomplete, whereas the assessees contend that their  returns are correct and  that the accounts of the wholesale dealers which  formed the basis  of the  information of the sales Tax authorities were  wrong and  incorrect and such an issue can only be determined after examination of the accounts of both the  parties and after affording  the assessee the rights to cross examine  the wholesale dealers concerned, particularly when the assessee makes a specific prayer to this  effect.”\n<\/p>\n
 28.  But this is a case  of inquiry  under  the commissions of Inquiry Act.  The commission is purely a fact finding  body and it performs no judicial or quasi-judicial functions.  There is  no  lis to be decided.  The decision does not  prejudically affect rights.  Therefore, the  use of the  accolade judicial or quasi-judicial to such inquiries is inappropriate.\n<\/p>\n
 29.  Natural justice is really nothing more than fair play in action.  But rules of fair play differ from Court to  Court they certainly do  differ in  their  applicability to different  legislative and factual situations,  the fundamental  rule, to put  it in a simple form is that the citizen should  be  entitled to a  ‘hearing’ free of bias before   any decision, which will  prejudicially affect his  right, is taken.  This rule  of fairness does not  mean  that a citizen should in all circumstances, be  entitled to a traditional,  elaborate, time-consuming  process of a trial in a law Court; but merely that he should be afforded  an opportunity to present his version of the  issue in a manner  appropriate to the  particular exercise of power.\n<\/p>\n
 30.  The idea of natural  justice is by no means modern.  It  has  an impressive ancestry.  Prof De smith pointed out in  his standard work ‘Judicial Review of  Administrative Action’, Fourth edition, at pages 157  and 158:\n<\/p>\n
  “That no man is to be judged unheard was a  precept known to the  Greeks, inscribed in ancient times upon images in places where justice  was administered, proclaimed in seneca’s medes, enshrined in the scriptures, mentioned by st. Augustine, embodied in Germanic as well as African proverbs ascribed in the year books to the law of nature asserted by coke to be a  principle of divine  justice, and  traced by an eighteenthcentury  judge to the events in the Garden of Eden.\n<\/p>\n
 31.  In modern times and  especially during the  past two decades  the precept has been invoked and applied by  bold administrators as well as quasi-judicial bodies to a provess of fair decision making.  But the sweep of the  precept should  not be allowed to frustrate prompt action.\n<\/p>\n
 32.  One of  us (chennakesav Reddi, J.)  dealing with the  scope of the  expression ‘reasonable opportunity of being  heard’ employed in S. 6-B of the Essential commodities Act, observed in Dharani Trading company v. State of A.P.,  (1974) 2 APLJ 166.\n<\/p>\n
  “The procedure prescribed under section 6-B of the Act is based upon expediency and policy necessitating speedy  and prompt action.  If the  authorities under the Act were to go in for the traditional, elaborate and time -consuming process of trial in a law Court,  the very purpose of the object to take ready and immediate action either to quell some prejudicial activity or to  palliate some measure economic or otherwise  would be frustrated……….the rules of natural justice vary with the varying  Constitution of statutory bodies and the  rules prescribed by the  Act under which they function and the  question whether  or not rules of natural justice  had been contravened,  should be decided not under any preconceived notions but in  the light of the  statutory rules and provisions”.\n<\/p>\n
 After referring to the several  decisions on the  question, the following  propositions were enunciated:-\n<\/p>\n
 “1.  The scope and extent of reasonable opportunity must be judged in the light of the Constitution  of  the  statutory body which has to  function in accordance with  the  rules laid down by the legislature;\n<\/p>\n
 2.  Whether an  opportunity has been afforded and whether that opportunity was or was not reasonable in a given case should be ascertained by the  Court  on encyclopaedic view of  all the  material in the case;\n<\/p>\n
 3.  In every case the minimum requirement of  hearing must be satisfied and there  must be a fair and  honest determination of the question.\n<\/p>\n
 4.  The test for the minimum requirement is satisfied if the  person concerned was given proper  opportunity of making  a representation or statement that would   dissipate the suspicion of the  authority competent to take action; and   <\/p>\n
 5.  Whether the representation dispelled or confirmed, the  suspicion was of no consequence.\n<\/p>\n
 33.  Again, the  Supreme Court in state of Karnataka v. Union of India,   on a  critical scrutiny of the  provisions of the commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952  observed at page  699 (of SCC) : (at pp.  137-38 of AIR):\n<\/p>\n
  “it is clear from the  provisions and the general scheme of the Act that a  commission  of Inquiry appointed under the Act  is a  purely  fact-finding  body  which has no power to  pronounce  a binding or definitive judgment.  It has to collect facts through the evidence led  before it and  on a consideration thereof it is required to submit  its report which the appointing authority may or may not accept.  There are sensitive matters of public  importance which, if left to the normal  investigational  agencies can create needless controversies and generate an atmosphere of suspicion the larger interests of the  community require  that such matters should be inquired into by high-powered commissions consisting of persons whose findings can  command the confidence of the people…………………………    it is  only be establishing the truth that the  purity and integrity of public life  can be preserved and that  is the object which the commissions of Inquiry Act seeks to achieve”.\n<\/p>\n
 It is no  doubt observed at page 742  (of SCC) : (at p. 171 of AIR).\n<\/p>\n
  “Reading the Act as whole the commission is given wide powers of inquiry compelling   the  attendance of witnesses  and persons who are  likely to be prejudicially affected giving  them a right of cross-examination when a report is submitted by the commission, sec, 3 (4) contemplates action to be taken by the  appropriate Government”.\n<\/p>\n
 As observed by the Supreme Court a witness may be compelled to attend the inquiry.  To compel or not is purely vested in the discretion of hte commission.  If a witness is not compelled to attend and  is allowed by the  commission to give affidavit evidence then the question  of right to cross-examine him by the person prejudically affected cannot  arise under S. 8-B of the Act.  He is  also entitled to an apportunity to give affidavit evidence.\n<\/p>\n
 34.    The Supreme Court in  Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyoti<\/a> narain, , dealing with the powers of a commission appointed under the public  servants (Inquiries) Act ( 37 of 1959).  Observe:\n<\/p>\n
 “As the commissioner has to form his opinion upon legal evidence he has been given the  power to summon witnesses,  administer oath to them and also compelproduction of relevant documents.  These may be some of the trapping of a judicial tribunal but they cannot make the proceeding anything more than a mere fact  finding enquiry …..   at the close of the enquiry, the commission has to  submit a  report  to the Government regarding his finding on each one of the  charges made.  This  is a mere expression of opinion and it lacks both finality and authoritativeness which are the essential tests of a  judicial pronouncement.  The opinion is not even binding on the Government.\n<\/p>\n
 We are unable  to appreciate  how this decision renders any support  to the contention of the learned counsel.\n<\/p>\n
 35.  Support was sought to be gathered from the decision in Re. W.L.W., (1972) 2 All ER 433, Wherein Goff. J.,  of   the  chancery Court allowed cross-examination by the  parties of lord  chancellor’s visitor whose report was in conflict with the  affidavit evidence given by  another medical practitioner in  support of the application filed by a mental patient for discharge of receiver and  restoration to the  management of own affairs.  This does deal with the  proceedings in a Court which  adjudicates finally on  the  matter and not a  mere investigating body.\n<\/p>\n
 36.  In S.K. Segar v. P.G. Karnik, , the  question again  was to who should lead the evidence first before the commission appointed to inquire into the incidents of violence leading  to firing by the  police.  The main question was  whether  the firing  was justified or whether it was excessive.  Therefore, the  question of right of cross-examination by the  person prejudicially affected did not  arise   in  that case.\n<\/p>\n
 37.  It is then submitted that the  commission of Inquiry is a quasi-judicial body and therefore,  the general right of cross-examination of witnesses accrues to the petitioner.  Therefore refusal to permit to cross-examine the witness will amount to denial of reasonable opportunity.  Reference is made to a passage contained in the foreword by Mr. Justice krishna Iyer, to the commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952  by K.A. Ramasubramaniam.  At page (vi)  the learned Judge observed:\n<\/p>\n
  “We in this country, currently live in  an era of commissions and have accumulated sufficient experience of  the  utility and futility the processual failing and political fall-outs and a host of other facets  of  these  quasi-judicial though purely recommendatory operations.  The  time  is ripe for a  social functional audit  of  the Act in depth with the critical yet constructive purpose of  modifying its structure and restyling its   engineering so that the statute may be able to fill the bill”.\n<\/p>\n
 Again the learned Judge said  at page 8.\n<\/p>\n
  “These commissions, more or less function as a Court of law statements of person are recorded either by an affidavit or viva voce and   in any case under oath.  There is a public hearing appearing on behalf of all those concerned, including  witnesses.  Affected parties whose reputation is likely to be prejudicially affected are  given an opportunity to be heard to cross examine the witnesses appearing against them and to adduce evidence in their  defence, by and large, the Rules of the Evidence Act are followed.  It is clothed with the  essential powers of a Court of law and  is always presided over by a high judicial dignitary”.\n<\/p>\n
 But again the learned Judge said at page (ix):-\n<\/p>\n
  “………..Yet, the pronouncements of this commission are not binding on any one.  It is most essential there should be written  into the Act, and  perhaps even in the  Representation of the people’s Act that a person whose conduct has been adversely reported upon by a  commission of enquiry should suffer some legal disqualification.  He should be debarred from holding any elective office or contesting  any election for a period and, if  he is a civil servant, it should  automatically spell his removal from public service.  Otherwise these commissions become  an expensive luxury ending  in futility.  If the  object is to ultimately cleanse public  life and cleanse the Augean stables, they should be invested with some  sanctions”.\n<\/p>\n
 38.  Mr.  Krishna Iyer.  Therefore  deeply regrets that the reports of  the commissions are not  binding on any one.\n<\/p>\n
 39.  The Delhi High Court  in P.R. Nayak v. Union  of India, ILR<\/a> (1973)  1 Delhi 747 also held that the  proceedings before the  commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952  were quasi-judicial in nature.\n<\/p>\n
 40.  The question whether a person prejudicially affected gets a right to cross-examine the witnesses who have not been summoned and who have given affidavit evidence, did not arise.\n<\/p>\n
 41.  Quasi-judicial decision equally pre-supposes as a true judicial decision the existence of a dispute between  two or more parties.  It involves: (I) presentation of thier cases by the parties; (ii) the ascertainment of any disputed facts by the evidence adduced by the  parties; (iii)  submission of arguments; and (iv) a declaration of the liabilities of the  parties.  In an inquiry before the commission, there is neither a dispute nor a decision which prejudicially affects any right.  There is an investigation and a mere report of the facts ascertained.  There is no decision  therefore use of the accolade judicial or   quasi-judicial  to inquiries before a commission of  Inquiry appointed under the commissions of Inquiry  Act  is inappropriate the commission is not an adjudicating body but an assisting body that assesses the facts and assists the Government in the  arrival at an appropriate decision.\n<\/p>\n
 42.  The Supreme Court  in state of  Karnataka v. Union of India .  Observed that the commission is only  fictionally a civil Court for the  limited purposes enumerated in s. 5 (4) of the Act, that there is no  accuser no accused and no specific charges for trial before the  commission, not is the Government under  the law, required to pronounce one way or the other  on  the findings of the commission.  Therefore, the  enquiry under the commissions of  Inquiry is not  quasi-judicial in  nature.\n<\/p>\n
 43.  Now let us turn to look at the domain of ‘natural justice’ from the other side of the spectrum.  The wellknown author, S.A. de Smith in his standard text book on ‘Judicial Review of Administrative Action’ (III  Edition) says at page 203  under the heading ‘ Hearing without  Deciding”:\n<\/p>\n
  “In what circumstances must the rules of natural justice be observed by persons entrusted  with the   conduct of an investigation but having no power to give a binding  decision!  This is one of the most  troublesome problems  in the whole of administrative law.  The authorities often appear to be, and sometimes are, in conflict  with one another.  When one comes across a judicial  formulation  of general legal principle it is  not infrequently misleading because the Court  has in mind only a  limited range of contexts in which the problem arises.  Again  some of the best known dicta have been uttered in cases where no allegation of breach of natural justice was made and one  can never be certain that the same words would have been used if that issue had been  before the Court.  Nor is it always possible to assess how far the  form  of the  proceedings has influenced the  approach adopted by the Court…….”\n<\/p>\n
 Having said so the  author observed at page 205:\n<\/p>\n
  “In a number of cases in which the proceedings  of investigating bodies have been impugned (mainly on grounds other than non-compliance with natural justice)  the courts have refused to  intervence unless the investigation does or can  culminate in a determination or order  which has binding force or will itself acquire binding force upon confirmation or promulgation by another body or which otherwise control the  decision of that  other body.  To put the matter in another way, an investigating body is under  no duty to Act judicially if it cannot  do  more than recommend or advise on action which another body may take in its own name  and in its own discretion……”\n<\/p>\n
 The law commission  of India, in its 24th Report observed at page 12, after extracting  Rules 4 and 5 made by the central Government under section 12 of the Act.\n<\/p>\n
  “We think that since these rules,  embody the fundamental principles of  natural justice and safeguard the rights of individuals, they should  be incorporated in the  Act itself”.\n<\/p>\n
 In pursuance of the recommendations of the law commission Rules (4)  and (5)  have been inserted as section 8B and 8C of the  Act by clause 12 of Act 79 of 1971.\n<\/p>\n
 44.  The very same rules of natural justice fell  for consideration before the Supreme Court in state of  J. & K.V. Bakshi Gulam Mohammad.  .  Section 10 of the Jammu and Kashmir  commissions of Inquiry Act is in pari materia with sections 8B and 8C of the Act.  The  Supreme Court speaking through sarkar, C.J. observed (at pp. 131-32):-\n<\/p>\n
  “The next point is as to the right of cross-examination.  This  claim was first based on the  rules of natural justice.  It was said that these rules require that Bakshi Gulam Mohammad should have been given a  right to cross-examine all those  persons who had sworn affidavits supporting the allegations against him.  We are not aware of any such rule of natural  justice.  No authority has been cited in support of it.  Our  attention was drawn to meenglas Tea Estate v. Their workmen, .  But there all that was said was that when evidence is given viva voce against a person he must have the opportunity to hear it and to put the witnesses questions in cross-examination.  That is not our case.  Furthermore, in meenglas Tea Estate case , the  Court was not dealing with a fact finding body as we are.  Rules of natural justice require that a party whom  an allegation is being  inquired into should  be given a hearing.  Bakshi Gulam Mohammad was certainly given  that.  It was said that the right to the hearing included a right to cross-examine.  We are unable to agree that that  is so.  The right must depend upon the circumstances  of each case and must also depend on the statute under  which the allegations are being enquired into.  This Court in nagendra nath Bora v. Commr. Of Hills division,  said that “the  rules  of  natural justice vary with the varying Constitution of statutory bodies and the  rules prescribed by the Act under  which they function and  the  question whether or not  any rules of natural justice had been contravened should be  decided not under any pre-conceived notions   but in the light of the  statutory rules and  provisions.”  We have to remember  that  we  are dealing  with a statute which permits a commission of  Inquiry to be set up for fact-finding purposes.  The  report of the commission has no force proprio vigore.  This aspect of the  matter  is  important in deciding the rules  of ntural justice reasonably applicable  in the proceedings of the  commissions of Inquiry under the Act.  Then  we find  that section 10 to which we have earlier referred gives a right to be heard but only a restricted right of cross-examination.  The later right is confined only to the witnesses called to depose against the person demanding the right.  So the  Act did not  contemplate a right of hearing to include a right to cross-examine.  It will be natural to think that the statute did not  intend that in  other cases a party appearing  before the commission should have any further  right of cross-examination.  We,  therefore, think that no case has been made out by Bakshi Gulam Mohammad that he rules of natural justice require that  he  should have a right to cross-examine all the  persons who had sworn affidavits supporting the allegations made aginst him”\n<\/p>\n
 45.  No dissent or dissatisfaction with the ratio in the ruling in Bakshi Gulam Mohammad’s case (supra) has been expressed in any subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court.\n<\/p>\n
 46.  The Supreme Court in Union of India v. J.N. Sinha<\/a> , observed (para 7):-\n<\/p>\n
  Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules  nor can they be elevated to the position of fundamental rights.  As observed by this Court in kraipak v.  Union of India, , “the aim of rules of Natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice.  These rules can  operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made.  In other words they do not supplant the law but  supplement it”.\n<\/p>\n
 47.  In an enquiry before a commission, the procedure is governed by sections 8-B and 8-C  of the Act and the Rules made by the  state Government under section 12 of the Act.  Only when a witness is examined viva voce before the commission the right to cross-examine that witness accrues under section 8-C to the  person likely to be prejudicially  affected.  No such right arises when  evidence is given on affidavits.\n<\/p>\n
 48.  The Supreme Court in Chairman Board  of Mining Examination v. Ramjee,<\/a>  dealing  with the meaning and scope of natural justice observed: (at p. 969) <\/p>\n
  “Natural justice is no unruly horse no lurking  land mine, nor a judicial cureall.  If fairnesss is  shown by the  decisionmaker to the  man proceeded against the form features and the fundamentals of such essential processual propriety being  conditioned by the  facts and circumstances of each situation no breach of natural justice can be complained of Unnatural expansion of natural  justice, without reference to the  administrative realities and other factors of a given case, can be  exasperating.  We can neither be finical nor fanatical but should  be flexible yet firm in this  jurisdiction.\n<\/p>\n
 49.  In Maneka Gandhi’s  case.  , Bhagwati, J., speaking  for the Supreme Court observed (at p. 629).\n<\/p>\n
  “The audi alteram partem rule  is intended to inject justice into the law and it cannot be applied to defeat the  ends  of  justice, or to make  the law ‘lifeless,  absurd, stultifying self-defeating  or plainly  contrary to the  common sense  of the situation.’ Since the life of the law is not logic but experience and very  legal proposition must in the ultimate analysis, be tested on the touchstone of  pragmatic realism, the audi  alteram  partem rule would but the  experimental test,  be excluded if importing the right to be excluded  if importing  the right to be  heard has the effect of paralysing  the administrative process or the  need for promptitude  or the urgency of  the  situation so demands”.\n<\/p>\n
 It can thus be seen that the  rules of natural justice ought not to be allowed undue expansion without regard or reference to the administrative realities or the needs for promptitude or urgency of the matter.\n<\/p>\n
 50.  It is clear from chapter 3  of the Extract from the  Report of the  commission of Inquiry headed by Justice H.R. Khanna that the  right to cross-examine  under the  Act and  the Rules accrues only when  a witness gives oral testimony.  So also sarkaria commission of Inquiry laid down in  the  regulations of procedure  to be followed by the commissions  of  Inquiry that  only in case on oral evidence is recorded, cross-examination shall be allowed to all  parties and persons as indicated  in section 8C of the  Act.  A commission may, at its discretion,  refuse to call any person for oral examination or cross-examination and, instead,  allow him to be examined on affidavit through interrogatories delivered to him.\n<\/p>\n
 51.  But the learned counsel  for the petitioner placed reliance on the  recommendations of the Royal commission on Tribunals of Inquiry 1966 Wherein the Royal  commission recommended that before any person who is involved in an inquiry should have the  opportunity of testing by cross-examination conducted by his own solicitor or counsel  any evidence which  may affect him.\n<\/p>\n
 52.  But combined reading  of se.  8  of the Act and Rule 9 of the Rules would make it abundantly clear that the  commission is vested with full discretion to regulate its own proceedings in respect of any matter for which no procedure has been made in the  Act or  the Rules.\n<\/p>\n
 53.  We may now sum up our conclusions:\n<\/p>\n
 (i) the use of the accolade judicial or quasi-judicial to inquiries under the  commissions of Inquiry Act, Strictly  speaking is inappropriate.\n<\/p>\n
 (ii)  A quasi-judicial inquiry equally presupposes like a judicial  inquiry  the existence of a dispute between two or more parties and investigates and declares the liabilities.\n<\/p>\n
 (iii)  Before a commission of Inquiry  appointed under the Act, there is no lis between the  parties and no decision  prejudicially affecting  the rights of parties by the commission, is given.  The function of the  commission is purely to investigate, assess the ascertained facts  and report.  That is the  purpose and the  end.  The report of the commission is not  binding on the Government.\n<\/p>\n
 (iv)  the procedure to  be followed by the commission has been laid  down in  sections 8B and 8C of the  Act. The  basic  rules of natural justice have been incorporated in  sections  8B and 8C of  the Act and the  commisssion is invested with the  power to regulate its own procedure  subject to the provisions of the Act and the rules  made thereunder.\n<\/p>\n
 (v)  the provisions of sections 8B and 8C of the Act do not confer the right to summon parties who have given  evidence on affidavit for cross-examination .  The general right to cross-examine a  witness will accrue only when the  evidence is  recorded viva voce.\n<\/p>\n
 (vi)   Rules of natural justice do not  supplant but only supplement the law.\n<\/p>\n
 54.  The commission in the notice issued under Rule 4 (1)   of the rules directed all  persons  who in the  opinion of the commission could  furnish information relating to the  14 cases  described in the Annexure to G.O.  Ms. No. 208  to furnish statements relating tothe 14  cases in question accompanied by affidavits and documents.  In response  to  the  above notice  and the  Notification issued  under Rule 4 (1) (b)  of the Rules, several persons filed statemetns and affdavits along with certain documents.  No person was proposed to be examined orally by the  commission.  Therefore, in the  absence of any person being  examined orally by the commission the  petitioner cannot  get any right  under  section 8B of the Act.\n<\/p>\n
 55.  Under section 8B of the Act, as already held by the Supreme Court  in Bakshi Gulam Mohammad’s case   (supra)  the right of cross-examination accrues to the petitioner only if any oral evidence is recorded by the commission.  In the absence of any oral examination of a witness, the petitioner gets no right to summon a witness who  has given only   affidavit  evidence for  cross-examination.\n<\/p>\n
 56.  The learned counsel, however, invited our attention to a passage from seervai’s constitutional law of  India (second Edition).  At page 803  of  volume II, the author said:\n<\/p>\n
  “Assuming that the requirements  of natural justice have not been expressly or impliedly  waived,   what is the  legal effect  of a decision rendered in violation of natural justice?  In Ridge v. Baldwin (1964 Ac 40)  it was held by  a majority that the decision  was void, and not merely voidable.  Lord Reid and Lord  Hodson held that  according to the  authorities, a decision rendered contrary to the principles of natural justice was void and   that in wood v. Woad.  (1874)  LR 9 Ex. 190, it was expressly so decided”.\n<\/p>\n
 57.  There  is no  question of violation of natural justice in this  case.  Principles of  natural justice as stipulated in the statute and the Rules have been complied with  by the  commission.\n<\/p>\n
 58.  Lastly a submission is made that the terms of reference to  the  commission are very bague and speculative in character.  The reference according to the learned counsel,  should confine to investigation of a definite matter.  The learned counsel placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court  in krishna Ballabh sahay v. Commission of Inquiry, .  The Supreme Court  no  doubt, observed (para 12):-\n<\/p>\n
  “If  the charges were vague or speculative suggesting a fishing  expedition we would have paused to consider whether such  have paused to consider whether such an inquiry should be allowed to proceed.  Aperusal of the grounds assures us that the charges are specific, and  that  records rather than oral testimony will be used to establish them.  We agree with the High Court that the affidavit in opposition makes out  a sufficient  case for inquiry”.\n<\/p>\n
 59.  Firstly the Constitution of commission itself has  not been questioned in this case; and secondly we are unable to agree with the submission of the learned counsel that the reference is very vague and speculative in character.  A perusal of the terms of reference clearly shows that the allegations are quite specific and the revenue records alone will be used to prove them.  We, therefore see no real substance in the contention of the  learned counsel.\n<\/p>\n
 60.  Reference is also made to a decision of the Allahabad  High Court in Niranjan prasad v. State, .  In that case, the learned  Judge was dealing with the dismissal of a Government servant.  There is a Government servant who was asked to show  cause why he should not be dismissed for having  accepted bribes was not supplied with  particulars of any specific acts of misconduct.  It was held that delinquent officer would  not be deemed to have been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause as required by Article 311 (2)  of the Constitution.  We  do not see any relevancy of that case to the facts of the present case which arises under the commissions of Inquiry Act.\n<\/p>\n
 61.  In the upshot, the  writ petition fails and  it is  accordingly dismissed with costs.  Advocate’s fee Rs. 250\/-\n<\/p>\n
 ORAL  LEAVE  APPLICATION   <\/p>\n
 62.  Learned counsel  for the  petitioner makes an oral application for  leave to appeal  tothe Supreme Court .  In our opinion no  substantial question of law of general importance which requires to be considered by the Supreme Court, arises in this case.  Leave sought for is therefore, refused.\n<\/p>\n
 63. Petition dismissed.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Andhra High Court Md. Ibrahim Khan vs Susheel Kumar And Anr. on 27 August, 1982 Equivalent citations: AIR 1983 AP 69 Author: C Reddy Bench: C Reddy, Kodandaramayya JUDGMENT Chennakesav Reddy, J. 1. Mohammad Ibrahim Khan, now know to the public as the ‘King of Land Grabbers’ is the petitioner in this writ petition. He […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10,8],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-48564","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-andhra-high-court","category-high-court"],"yoast_head":"\nMd. 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