{"id":49818,"date":"2007-01-20T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-01-19T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-management-vs-the-presiding-officer-on-20-january-2007"},"modified":"2018-07-17T19:59:50","modified_gmt":"2018-07-17T14:29:50","slug":"the-management-vs-the-presiding-officer-on-20-january-2007","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-management-vs-the-presiding-officer-on-20-january-2007","title":{"rendered":"The Management vs The Presiding Officer on 20 January, 2007"},"content":{"rendered":"
Madras High Court<\/div>\n
The Management vs The Presiding Officer on 20 January, 2007<\/div>\n
       \n\n  \n\n  \n\n \n \n           IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS\n                              \n                    DATED:- 20..01..2007\n                              \n                           CORAM:\n                              \n            THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE K.CHANDRU\n                              \n               W.P.Nos.20933 & 23606 of  2006\n                             and\n                    M.P.Nos.1 & 2 of 2006\n                             and\n               W.P.Nos.22142 to 22145 of 2006,\n       M.P.Nos.1 & 2 of 2006 in W.P.No.22142 of 2006,\n       M.P.Nos.1 & 2 of 2006 in W.P.No.22143 of 2006,\n        M.P.Nos.1 & 2 of 2006 in W.P.No.22144 of 2006\n                             and\n        M.P.Nos.1 & 2 of 2006 in W.P.No.22145 of 2006\n\n\n\nW.P.No.20933\/2006\n\nThe Management\nM\/s.Hindustan Motors Earth Moving\nEquipment Division Limited,\nChennai Car Plant,\nAdhigathur Village,\nKadambathur Post,\nThiruvalloore-631 203                   ... Petitioner\n\n                            .Vs.\n\n1. The Presiding Officer,\n    Principal Labour Court,\n    Chennai.\n\n\n\n2. Mr.T.Soundrarajan,\n    C\/o Madras Chengalput General Workers Union,\n    No.3, Dr.Vasudevan Street,\n    Chennai - 600 010.\n\n3. M\/s. Catter Pillar India Private Ltd.,\n    (Erstwhile Hindustan Motors Limited\n     Earthmoving Equipment Division),\n     Thiruvallur - 602 004.                  . . Respondents<\/pre>\n
      This  Petition  is  filed under  Article  226  of  the
\nConstitution  of  India to issue a writ  of   certiorarified
\nmandamus  to call for records relating to I.A.No.117 of 2006
\nin  I.D.No.514  of 2001 on the file of the first  respondent
\nand  quash  the order dated 19.6.2006 made in I.A.No.117  of
\n2006 in I.D.No.514 of 2001 and consequently direct the first
\nrespondent to permit the petitioner to be represented by its
\ncounsel  on record in I.D.No.514 of 2001 and quash the  same
\nto  call  for  the records  of the respondent in  connection
\nwith  the  impugned  show cause notice in PR.No.E2\/CB\/PR6\/06
\ndated 22.5.2006.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
     For Petitioner  : Mr.Sanjeev Mohan for
\n                       M\/s. Ramasubramaniam & Associates<\/p>\n
     For Respondents: Mr.V.P.Rajendran, for R2<\/p>\n
W.P.No.23606\/2006<\/p>\n
The Management
\nCaterpillar India Pvt Ltd.,
\nMelnallathur
\nTiruvellore – 602 004                        … Petitioner<\/p>\n
                            .Vs.\n<\/p>\n
1. The Presiding Officer,
\n    Principal Labour Court,
\n    Chennai.\n<\/p>\n
2. Mr.T.Soundrarajan,
\n    C\/o Madras Chengalput General Workers Union,
\n    No.3, Dr.Vasudevan Street,
\n    Chennai – 600 010.\n<\/p>\n
3. The Management,
\n   Hindustan Motors  Earthmoving Equipment Division,
\n   Tiruvellore 602 004.                   … Respondents<\/p>\n
      This  Petition  is  filed under  Article  226  of  the
\nConstitution  of  India to issue a writ of   certiorari   to
\ncall  for  records  of the first respondent  and  quash  its
\norder dated 19.6.2006 in I.A.No.117 of 2006 in I.D.No.514 of
\n2001.\n<\/p>\n
          For Petitioner      : Mr. John for
\n                                Mr.T.S.Gopalan<\/p>\n
          For Respondents     : Mr.V.P.Rajendran, for R2<\/p>\n
W.P.Nos.22142 to 22145 of 2006:\n<\/p>\n
\nThe Managing Director,
\nTamil Nadu Cooperative
\nMilk Producers Federation Ltd.,
\nChamiers Road,
\nChennai-35.                   .. Petitioner in all the W.Ps.<\/p>\n
          Vs.\n<\/p>\n
The Presiding Officer,
\nII Additional Labour Court,
\nChennai.                      .. 1st respondent in  all  the
\nW.Ps.\n<\/p>\n
M.Radhakrishnan               .. R2 in Wps.22142\/2006
\n                                 & 22144\/2006<\/p>\n
P.Sundararaj                  .. R2 in WP.22143\/2006<\/p>\n
                                 & 22145\/2006<\/p>\n
       Writ  Petitions  filed  under  Article  226  of   the
\nConstitution  of  India,  all  praying  to  issue  Writs  of
\nCertiorarified Mandamus to call for the records of  the  1st
\nrespondent  respectively in I.A.No.68 of 2005 in  C.P.No.209
\nof  2004; I.A.No.69 of 2005 in C.P.No.214 of 2004; I.A.No.70
\nof  2005  in  C.P.No.455 of 2004 and I.A.No.71  of  2005  in
\nC.P.No.456  of 2004, all dated 3.3.2006, quash the  same  on
\nthe ground that Section 36(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act
\nis   ultra  vires  of  Articles  14  and  19(1)(g)  of   the
\nConstitution of India and direct the 1st respondent to allow
\nthe  writ petitioner to engage an Advocate in the above said
\nC.Ps., without the consent of the 2nd respondent.\n<\/p>\n
                            * * *
\n               For petitioner in
\n               all the W.Ps.  : Mr.P.Gunaraj<\/p>\n
               For R.2 in
\n               all the W.Ps.  : Mr.G.Muthu<\/p>\n
                            * * *<\/p>\n
                        C O M M O N    O R D E R<\/p>\n
      Writ  Petition  Nos.20933 & 23606 of  2006  have  been<\/p>\n
filed against the order of the Labour Court\/first respondent<\/p>\n
made  in  I.A.No.117\/2006 in I.D.No.514\/2001 dated 19.6.2006<\/p>\n
and  the  other four writ petitions were filed  against  the<\/p>\n
order  in I.A.Nos. 68 to 71 of 2005 in C.P.Nos.209 of  2004,<\/p>\n
214  of  2004,  455 of 2004 and 456 of 2004 respectively  to<\/p>\n
quash  the  identical  order dated  03.3.2006  and  also  to<\/p>\n
declare  Section 36(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act,  1947<\/p>\n
[for  short,  ‘I.D. Act’] as ultravires of Articles  14  and<\/p>\n
19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.<\/p>\n
      2.    It  is  seen  from the records that  the  second<\/p>\n
respondent  workman engaged an authorised representative  to<\/p>\n
defend   him  in  I.D.No.514\/2001,  relating  to  his   non-<\/p>\n
employment.  The  writ  petitioners were  represented  by  a<\/p>\n
counsel  and  they filed Vakalat as early as  on  27.3.2002.<\/p>\n
After  55  adjournments of the case, the  workman  filed  an<\/p>\n
application  in  I.A.No.117\/2006  objecting  to   the   writ<\/p>\n
petitioner\/management   being   represented   by   a   legal<\/p>\n
practitioner,  taking  advantage of  section  36(4)  of  the<\/p>\n
I.D.Act.  This was resisted by a counter affidavit filed  by<\/p>\n
the   writ  petitioner\/management  stating  that  the   fact<\/p>\n
relating  to the objection has been raised after five  years<\/p>\n
and   after  the  pleadings  were  completed  and  when  the<\/p>\n
witnesses were about to be cross-examined and  it  was  also<\/p>\n
stated  that  once  the  workman  did  not  object  to   the<\/p>\n
appearance  of  the legal practitioner on the  side  of  the<\/p>\n
management,  that would amount to implied  consent  and  the<\/p>\n
workmen has sprung a surprise after five years and has taken<\/p>\n
a  point  that he is not granting consent for appearance  of<\/p>\n
the legal practitioner.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
      3.    The  Labour  Court  technically  approached  the<\/p>\n
subject and sustained the objection raised by the workman by<\/p>\n
its  order  dated  19.6.2006 solely on the ground  that  the<\/p>\n
workman did not give consent. The Labour Court seems to have<\/p>\n
relied  on  a catena of decisions of various Courts  on  the<\/p>\n
question  of  consent.  Even though  the  restriction  under<\/p>\n
section 36(4) has been upheld by the Supreme Court,  in  the<\/p>\n
present case, we are only concerned with the application  of<\/p>\n
the  said  provision  in a given situation.  When  once  the<\/p>\n
workman  gives  up his right to object to the appearance  of<\/p>\n
the   counsel   at  the  earliest  stage  and  allowed   the<\/p>\n
proceedings  to  go on merrily for a period  of  five  years<\/p>\n
spanning over 55 adjournments as in the present case,  there<\/p>\n
is no reason as to why such an issue should be allowed to be<\/p>\n
raised at the tail end of the proceedings. A speedy trial is<\/p>\n
a  must in any proceedings and the workmen has put spokes on<\/p>\n
the  proceedings by raising frivolous objection at the  tail<\/p>\n
end of the trial. Such an objection can never be allowed and<\/p>\n
nowhere, Section 36 of the I.D. Act talks about any  written<\/p>\n
consent  of a party to be obtained in the matter of  another<\/p>\n
party  engaging a legal practitioner. In a given  situation,<\/p>\n
the  hyper technical approach of the labour Court should  be<\/p>\n
avoided.  Ultimately, the very creation  of  the  Industrial<\/p>\n
adjudication is for an early disposal of the claims  of  the<\/p>\n
workman.    But  in  the  present case,  unfortunately,  the<\/p>\n
matter  relating to non-employment of the workman is pending<\/p>\n
for more than five years at the hands of the Labour Court.<\/p>\n
     4.   Without concerning about the same, learned counsel<\/p>\n
for  the workman states that the objection relating  to  the<\/p>\n
consent for appearance can be raised at any time and he also<\/p>\n
relied  upon the decisions which were also cited before  the<\/p>\n
Labour  Court. There is not a single decision of this  court<\/p>\n
has  been cited holding the view that the objection relating<\/p>\n
to  the  consent  could  be  raised  at  any  stage  of  the<\/p>\n
proceedings. On the contrary, it must be held  that  if  the<\/p>\n
workman wants to exercise his right under section 36 of  the<\/p>\n
I.D.  Act  so  as  to prevent the employer from  engaging  a<\/p>\n
lawyer, he should raise his objection at the earliest  point<\/p>\n
of  time.    In any event, this objection seems to  be  very<\/p>\n
trivial  considering  the fact that often  the  workmen  are<\/p>\n
represented by a leader of a trade union who are well versed<\/p>\n
in Labour Laws and many times they are also Advocates and if<\/p>\n
such  objections are raised at their behest, the managements<\/p>\n
can  also get a membership from some Chamber of Commerce and<\/p>\n
can indirectly engage legal practitioners, who are otherwise<\/p>\n
office  bearers  of  such an organisation.   The  spirit  of<\/p>\n
Section 36 of the I.D. Act has been practically defeated  by<\/p>\n
the  hide  and seek game adopted by the parties  before  the<\/p>\n
Labour Court over the years.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
      5.    The second respondents in W.P.Nos.22142 to 22145<\/p>\n
of  2006 are the workmen and they have filed Claim Petitions<\/p>\n
under  Section  33 C (2) of the I.D. Act before  the  Labour<\/p>\n
Court, claiming certain amounts, which are due to them  from<\/p>\n
the  writ petitioner\/Management.  These Claim Petitions were<\/p>\n
resisted by the writ petitioner\/Management which is a  State<\/p>\n
controlled Apex Milk Federation.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
      6.  Pending  Claim  Petitions, the writ  petitioner  \/<\/p>\n
Management had filed I.A.Nos.68 to 71 of 2005 under  Section<\/p>\n
36(4)   of   the   I.D.  Act,  stating   that   the   second<\/p>\n
respondents\/workmen, though represented  by  a  Trade  Union<\/p>\n
Leader,  he is actually a legal practitioner, practicing  in<\/p>\n
High  Court and other subordinate courts and since the  writ<\/p>\n
petitioner\/Management  is defended  by  an  Officer  of  the<\/p>\n
Federation,  they  are  in  a disadvantageous  position  and<\/p>\n
therefore, they sought permission to be represented by their<\/p>\n
Standing     Counsel.     This    plea    of    the     writ<\/p>\n
petitioner\/Management was resisted by the workmen on  ground<\/p>\n
that  the Officers of the Federation themselves are the  law<\/p>\n
graduates and therefore, no such permission need be accorded<\/p>\n
and  that the Management need not be represented by a  legal<\/p>\n
practitioner  and that the request itself has been  made  at<\/p>\n
the  time  of examination of P.W.1 in the domestic  enquiry.<\/p>\n
Reliance  was  also placed to certain decisions  of  various<\/p>\n
Courts to drive home the said point.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
      7.    The  Labour  court,  by identical  orders  dated<\/p>\n
03.3.2006, sustained the objection raised on the part of the<\/p>\n
workmen stating that unless there is a consent given by  the<\/p>\n
workmen,  as  a matter of right, the Management cannot  have<\/p>\n
the services of a trained lawyer.    As the issue raised  in<\/p>\n
these  two  sets  of writ petitions are the same,  with  the<\/p>\n
consent  of  the  parties, they were taken up  together  for<\/p>\n
final disposal.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
      8.    Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India deals<\/p>\n
with  protection  against arrest and  detention  in  certain<\/p>\n
cases.    The said article is extracted below:<\/p>\n
         “22.  Protection against arrest and detention
\n         in  certain  cases  – (1) No  person  who  is
\n         arrested shall be detained in custody without
\n         being  informed, as soon as may  be,  of  the
\n         grounds  for  such arrest  nor  shall  he  be
\n         denied  the  right  to  consult,  and  to  be
\n         defended  by,  a  legal practitioner  of  his
\n         choice.”<\/p>\n
However,  there is a restriction on this right in  cases  of<\/p>\n
persons  who  are  arrested  and  detained  under  any   law<\/p>\n
providing  for  preventive detention  and  the  Constitution<\/p>\n
under Article 22(3)(b) makes it clear that this right is not<\/p>\n
available to any detenu under preventive detention.<\/p>\n
      9.    Section  11(4)  of  the  National  Security  Act<\/p>\n
specifically bars the representation of a detenu before  the<\/p>\n
Advisory  board with the assistance of a legal practitioner.<\/p>\n
But   when  this  provision was challenged,  a  Constitution<\/p>\n
Bench  of  the Supreme Court vide its decision  reported  in<\/p>\n
1982  (1)  SCC  271  [A.K.Roy    vs.   Union  of  India  and<\/p>\n
others] considered the same and upheld the said provision on<\/p>\n
the  ground  that  the said  section is in  conformity  with<\/p>\n
Article    22(3)(b)   of   the   Constitution   of    India.<\/p>\n
However, even while upholding the same, in paragraph 93, the<\/p>\n
Supreme Court held as follows:\n<\/p>\n
              “93. We must therefore hold, regretfully
\n         though,  that  the detenu  has  no  right  to
\n         appear  through a legal practitioner  in  the
\n         proceedings  before the Advisory  Board.   It
\n         is,  however,  necessary to add an  important
\n         caveat.   The  reason behind  the  provisions
\n         contained   in   Articl3  22(3)(b)   of   the
\n         Constitution   clearly  is   that   a   legal
\n         practitioner  should  not  be  permitted   to
\n         appear  before  the Advisory  Board  for  any
\n         party.  The Constitution does not contemplate
\n         that   the   detaining   authority   or   the
\n         government   should  have  the  facility   of
\n         appearing before the Advisory Board with  the
\n         aid of a legal practitioner but that the said
\n         facility should be denied to the detenu.   In
\n         any  case,  that is not what the Constitution
\n         says and it would be wholly inappropriate  to
\n         read any such meaning into the provisions  of
\n         Article   22.    Permitting   the   detaining
\n         authority or the government to appear  before
\n         the  Advisory Board with the aid of  a  legal
\n         practitioner or a legal adviser would  be  in
\n         breach  of Article 14, if a similar  facility
\n         is  denied  to the detenu.  We must therefore
\n         make it clear that if the detaining authority
\n         or  the  government takes the aid of a  legal
\n         practitioner  or a legal adviser  before  the
\n         Advisory  Board, the detenu must  be  allowed
\n         the  facility of appearing before  the  Board
\n         through   a  legal  practitioner.    We   are
\n         informed  that officers of the government  in
\n         the concerned departments often appear before
\n         the  Board  and  assist it  with  a  view  to
\n         justifying the detention orders.  If that  be
\n         so,  we  must clarify that the Boards  should
\n         not  permit  the authorities to do indirectly
\n         what  they  cannot do directly;  and  no  one
\n         should  be enable to take shelter behind  the
\n         excuse  that  such officers  are  not  “legal
\n         practitioners”  or  legal  advisers.   Regard
\n         must  be  had to the substance  and  not  the
\n         form  since, especially, in matters like  the
\n         proceedings  of  Advisory  Boards,  whosoever
\n         assistants or advises on facts or law must be
\n         deemed  to  be  in the position  of  a  legal
\n         adviser.   We  do  hope that Advisory  Boards
\n         will  take care to ensure that the provisions
\n         of  Article 14 are not violated in any manner
\n         in the proceedings before them.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                                      [Emphasis added]<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
      10.  When a matter relating to service regulation came<\/p>\n
up  before  the Supreme Court, in its judgment  reported  in<\/p>\n
(1983)  1  SCC 124 [Board of Trustees of the Port of  Bombay<\/p>\n
vs.    Dilipkumar Raghavendranath, Nadkarni and others<\/a>], the<\/p>\n
Supreme  Court had an occasion to consider the  right  of  a<\/p>\n
legal  practitioner  to  defend an employee  in  a  domestic<\/p>\n
enquiry.    In paragraphs 10 and 11, the Supreme court  held<\/p>\n
as follows:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
         “Para  10:  … The situation  is  where  the
\n         employer   has   on   his  pay-rolls   labour
\n         officers,  legal advisers –  lawyers  in  the
\n         garb  of  employees – and they are  appointed
\n         Presenting-cum-Prosecuting Officers  and  the
\n         delinquent   employee  pitted  against   such
\n         legally  trained  personnel  has  to   defend
\n         himself.   Now  if the rules  prescribed  for
\n         such  an enquiry did not place an embargo  on
\n         the  right of the delinquent employee  to  be
\n         represented  by  a  legal  practitioner,  the
\n         matter  would  be  in the discretion  of  the
\n         Enquiry  Officer  whether  looking   to   the
\n         nature  of charges, the type of evidence  and
\n         complex  or simple issues that may  arise  in
\n         the   course   of  enquiry,  the   delinquent
\n         employee  in  order  to afford  a  reasonable
\n         opportunity  to  defend  himself  should   be
\n         permitted   to   appear   through   a   legal
\n         practitioner.   Why do we say  so  ?  Let  us
\n         recall  the nature of enquiry, who  held  it,
\n         where  it  is held and what is the atmosphere
\n         ?   Domestic  enquiry  is  claimed  to  be  a
\n         managerial   function.    A   man   of    the
\n         establishment dons the robe of a  Judge.   It
\n         is  held  in  the establishment office  or  a
\n         part  of it.  Can it even be compared to  the
\n         adjudication by an impartial arbitrator or  a
\n         court  presided over by an unbiased  judge  ?
\n         The  Enquiry Officer combines the  judge  and
\n         prosecutor  rolled into one.   Witnesses  are
\n         generally  employees  of  the  employer   who
\n         directs an enquiry into misconduct.  This  is
\n         sufficient  to  raise serious  apprehensions.
\n         Add  to  these uneven scales, the  weight  of
\n         legally  trained minds on behalf of  employer
\n         simultaneously  denying that  opportunity  to
\n         delinquent  employee.   The  weighted  scales
\n         and   tilted  balance  can  only  be   partly
\n         restored if the delinquent is given the  same
\n         legal  assistance  as  the  employer  enjoys.
\n         Justice  must not only be done but must  seem
\n         to  be  done  is not a euphemism  for  courts
\n         alone,  it  applies  with  equal  vigour   an
\n         rigour  to  all those who must be responsible
\n         for  fair  play  in  action.   And  a  quasi-
\n         judicial  tribunal  cannot  view  the  matter
\n         with    equanimity    on    inequality     of
\n         representation. …”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
         Para  11:   We  are faced with the  situation
\n         where  when the enquiry commenced, the  rules
\n         neither    provided   for   permitting    the
\n         delinquent employee to be represented  by  an
\n         advocate  nor an embargo was placed  on  such
\n         appearance.   The rules were silent  on  this
\n         point.   But  the Chairman of  the  appellant
\n         while  rejecting  the  request  of  the   1st
\n         respondent  seeking  permission   to   appear
\n         through  a  legal practitioner simultaneously
\n         appointed    M\/s.R.K.   Shetty    and    A.B.
\n         Chaudhuary,   Legal   Adviser   and    Junior
\n         Assistant Legal Adviser respectively, in  the
\n         employment  of  the appellant as  Presenting-
\n         cum-Prosecuting  Officers.   What  does  this
\n         signify  ?   The  normal  inference  is  that
\n         according  to  the Chairman of the  appellant
\n         the  issues  that would arise in the  enquiry
\n         were  such complex issues involving intricate
\n         legal  propositions that the Enquiry  Officer
\n         would  need the assistance of Presenting-cum-
\n         Prosecuting Officers.  And look at the  array
\n         of  law  officers of the appellant  appointed
\n         for  this  purpose.  Now examine the approach
\n         of  the  Chairman.  While he directed two  of
\n         his  law  officers to conduct the enquiry  as
\n         prosecutor,  he  simultaneously  proceeds  to
\n         deny   such  legal  representation   to   the
\n         delinquent  employee, when  he  declined  the
\n         permission  to the 1st respondent  to  appear
\n         through  a  legal  practitioner.   Does  this
\n         disclose  a  fair attitude or  fair  play  in
\n         action ? Can one imagine how the scales  were
\n         weighted and thereby tilted in favour of  the
\n         prosecuting  officer.  In  this  enquiry  the
\n         employer would be represented by two  legally
\n         trained  minds at the cost of the Port  Trust
\n         while the 1st respondent was asked either  to
\n         fend  for  himself  in  person  or  have  the
\n         assistance  of  another  employee   such   as
\n         Nadkarni  who  is not shown to be  a  legally
\n         trained  person, but the delinquent  employee
\n         cannot  engage  a legal practitioner  at  his
\n         cost.   Can this ensure a fair enquiry ?  The
\n         answer  is not far to seek.  Apart  from  any
\n         legal  proposition  or formulation  we  would
\n         consider this approach as utterly unfair  and
\n         unjust.   More  so in absence of  rules,  the
\n         Chairman  of the appellant was not  precluded
\n         from  granting  a request because  the  rules
\n         did  not  enact  an  inhibition.   Therefore,
\n         apart  from  general  propositions,  in   the
\n         facts of this case, this enquiry would  be  a
\n         one-sided   enquiry  weighted   against   the
\n         delinquent  officer  and  would   result   in
\n         denial  of  reasonable opportunity to  defend
\n         himself.   He  was  pitted  against  the  two
\n         legally  trained minds and one  has  to  just
\n         view   the  situation  where  a  person   not
\n         admitted to the benefits of niceties  of  law
\n         is  pitted against two legally trained  minds
\n         and  then asked to fend for himself.  In such
\n         a  situation,  it  does not  require  a  long
\n         argument  to  convince  that  the  delinquent
\n         employee  was denied a reasonable opportunity
\n         to  defend himself and the conclusion arrived
\n         at  would  be  in violation  of  one  of  the
\n         essential  principles  of  natural   justice,
\n         namely,  that  a person against whom  enquiry
\n         is   held   must  be  afforded  a  reasonable
\n         opportunity to defend himself.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                                      [Emphasis added]<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
      11.   Further,  in  paragraph  13  of  the  very  same<\/p>\n
judgment, the Supreme Court held as follows:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
         “………. In fact one can go so as  to  say
\n         that  the Enquiry Officer in order to be fair
\n         and  just,  whenever  he finds  the  employer
\n         appointing   legally   trained   persons   as
\n         Presenting  –  cum Prosecuting officers  must
\n         enquire  from the delinquent employee  before
\n         commencement  of  enquiry  whether  he  would
\n         like   to   take  assistance   of   a   legal
\n         practitioner.    The option then is with  the
\n         delinquent  employee.    In this  connection,
\n         we   would   like  to  refer  to  a   weighty
\n         observation  on  this  point  where   dispute
\n         constitutional    inhibition    this    Court
\n         conceded  such  a right.    In  A.K.Roy    v.
\n         Union  of  India at page 334 (Para 93)  [1982
\n         SCC  (Cri) p.208], the learned chief  Justice
\n         while  rejecting the contention that a detenu
\n         should be entitled to appear through a  legal
\n         adviser  before  the Advisory Board  observed
\n         that  Article  22(3)(b) makes it  clear  that
\n         the   legal   practitioner  should   not   be
\n         permitted  to  appear  before  any   Advisory
\n         Board  for  any  party.   While  noting  this
\n         constitutional  mandate,  the  learned  Chief
\n         Justice  proceeded to examine, what would  be
\n         the  effect  if the department is represented
\n         before   the  Advisory  Board  by  a  legally
\n         trained person.     It was held that in  such
\n         a   situation   despite  the  inhibition   of
\n         Article   22(3)(b)  the  fair  procedure   as
\n         contemplated  by Article 21 requires  that  a
\n         detenu  be  permitted to appear  by  a  legal
\n         practitioner.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<\/blockquote>\n
                                      [Emphasis added]<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
      12.  Therefore, it is clear that the line of decisions<\/p>\n
of  the  Apex  court  makes it clear that  if  there  is  an<\/p>\n
imbalance  in the matter of defending proceedings  before  a<\/p>\n
quasi-judicial  body, then it will result  in  violation  of<\/p>\n
Article  14 of the Constitution of India.    Therefore,  the<\/p>\n
authorities  must permit the defence by a legal practitioner<\/p>\n
if  one  party  has  such a facility even  if  there  was  a<\/p>\n
constitutional \/ legal bar under a statute.   Section  36(4)<\/p>\n
of  the I.D. Act must therefore be interpreted only in  this<\/p>\n
context.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      13.  When a question came up before the Allahabad High<\/p>\n
Court, the Honourable Markandey Katju, J. (as he then  was),<\/p>\n
vide  his  decision reported in 1992 – 1 L.L.N. 972  [I.C.I.<\/p>\n
India Ltd.   vs.   Labour Court (IV) and another], held that<\/p>\n
Section 36(4) of the I.D. Act and a similar provision  i.e.,<\/p>\n
6-I  (2)  of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act are ultravires<\/p>\n
of  the  Constitution.    For holding Section 36(4)  of  the<\/p>\n
I.D.  Act  as  unconstitutional, the learned Judge  held  as<\/p>\n
follows in paragraphs 3 to 6 of the said judgment, which are<\/p>\n
usefully extracted below:\n<\/p>\n
         “…… In my opinion, S.6-1(2) of the  Uttar
\n         Pradesh Act as well as S.36(4) of the Central
\n         Industrial      Disputes Act are ultra  vires
\n         Arts. 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution  of
\n         India, and are consequently illegal.   It  is
\n         well   known  that  industrial   law   is   a
\n         complicated  branch of law, and only  persons
\n         who  have knowledge of labour laws, and  also
\n         some   practical  experience,  can   properly
\n         represent the parties before the Labour Court
\n         \/  Tribunal.   The principles of labour  laws
\n         are  quite  different from the principles  of
\n         ordinary civil law, and what to say of a  lay
\n         man even an ordinary civil lawyer, unless  he
\n         has   studied  labour  law,  cannot  properly
\n         present  the case before the Labour  Court  \/
\n         Tribunal.   For example, it is an established
\n         principle in labour law that the Labour Court
\n         has  got powers which no civil Court has got,
\n         example  to create contracts, and to  enforce
\n         contracts  of personal service.   Labour  law
\n         is  largely Judge-made law, and hence only  a
\n         person who has studied this branch of law can
\n         properly represent a party before the  Labour
\n         Court.    It  has  become a highly  technical
\n         branch, and only trained persons can properly
\n         assist  the  Labour Court \/ Tribunal  in  the
\n         matter.    Hence,  to  debar  lawyers  merely
\n         because the opposite party objects is  wholly
\n         unreasonable and arbitrary.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
         Para  4: The argument that lawyers will cause
\n         delay  is,  in my opinion, wholly  frivolous.
\n         No  doubt  the aim of industrial adjudication
\n         is  to  expeditiously  decide  an  industrial
\n         dispute  because industrial friction  affects
\n         not  only  the employer and the workmen,  but
\n         also  the  public at large, appearance  of  a
\n         lawyer  will  obstruct expeditious  disposal.
\n         On  the  contrary a lawyer who is trained  in
\n         labour law can quickly focus the attention of
\n         the  Labour Court\/Tribunal to the main points
\n         of  the  dispute,  Labour Court  can  quickly
\n         dispose of the dispute.  Hence, debarring  of
\n         lawyers, even with the proviso that a  lawyer
\n         can  appear if the other side gives  consent,
\n         is  in  my opinion, wholly arbitrary.   As  a
\n         matter  of  fact, it is well known that  this
\n         arbitrary  provision in  the  two  Industrial
\n         Disputes Act, viz., S.36(4) in the Industrial
\n         Disputes  and  S.6-I(2) of the Uttar  Pradesh
\n         Industrial Disputes Act, has led to all sorts
\n         of subterfuges. Lawyers have had to resort to
\n         creation   of   artificial   employer’s    or
\n         employees’ organisations of which they  claim
\n         to  be representatives, or appear as officers
\n         of  the  concern.  This invites all sorts  of
\n         objections and much time of the Labour  Court
\n         has   to  be  wasted  and  devoted  to  first
\n         deciding  this  matter before  proceeding  to
\n         dispose  of  the  dispute  on  merits.    The
\n         provision,  to my mind, is clearly arbitrary,
\n         and  hence  violative of Article  14  of  the
\n         Constitution of India.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
         Para  5:  The procedure in the Labour Courts,
\n         though  slightly different from those of  the
\n         civil  Court,  is still similar  to  it,  and
\n         hence  this  requires study of the  procedure
\n         also,  which  an  untrained person  does  not
\n         know.  For example, certain provisions of the
\n         Civil  Procedure  Code apply  to  the  Labour
\n         Couts also, vide S.11(3) of the Central  Act.
\n         Similarly  many  other  provisions   in   the
\n         Industrial  Disputes Act are similar  to  the
\n         provisions in the Civil Procedure  Code.   It
\n         is,  therefore, wholly unreasonable to expect
\n         a  layman to present his case properly before
\n         the  Labour  Court without  assistance  of  a
\n         specialised lawyer.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
         Para   6:    In  my  opinion,  the  aforesaid
\n         provisions  in  both the  Central  and  Uttar
\n         Pradesh   Acts   are   also   violative    of
\n         Art.19(1)(g)  of  the Constitution  of  India
\n         since they amount to unreasonable restriction
\n         on   a   lawyer’s  right  to   practise   his
\n         profession.  A whole class of labour  lawyers
\n         has   sprung  up  after  enforcement  of  the
\n         Industrial  Disputes Act, and  the  aforesaid
\n         provisions     amount    to      unreasonable
\n         restriction  on their right to practise.   To
\n         say that lawyers raise all sorts of technical
\n         objections to delay the disposal of the case,
\n         is  to my mind, a wholly frivolous objection.
\n         The   Presiding   Officer   of   the   Labour
\n         Court\/Tribunal   can   always   conduct   the
\n         proceedings firmly and in such a manner  that
\n         no  delay is caused, and he can always reject
\n         any  objection which he find to be  frivolous
\n         or  hypertechnical and which comes in the way
\n         of speedy disposal of the dispute.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                                      [Emphasis added]<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
      14.   The  learned  Judge  when  confronted  with  the<\/p>\n
judgment  of   the Supreme   Court reported   in   (1976)  1<\/p>\n
L.L.J.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
409  [ Paradip Port Trust    vs.   Their Workmen<\/a>] held  that<\/p>\n
the  said  judgment did not deal with the vires  of  Section<\/p>\n
36(4)  of  the  I.D.  Act and hence, has no  application  in<\/p>\n
deciding the vires of the provision.   In the present  case,<\/p>\n
though  in one set of writ petitions vires of Section  36(4)<\/p>\n
of  the  I.D. Act has been raised but proper parties,  i.e.,<\/p>\n
the  Union of India and State of Tamil Nadu, have  not  been<\/p>\n
made  as  parties  and hence, I am unable  to  take  up  the<\/p>\n
Constitutionality of the said provision.<\/p>\n
      15.   While striking down Section 20-A of the  Haryana<\/p>\n
Ceiling  on  Land Holdings Act which prohibited the  lawyers<\/p>\n
from  appearing before any authority or officer  functioning<\/p>\n
under that Act and  delivering the Judgment on behalf of the<\/p>\n
Full  Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in AIR 1977<\/p>\n
Punjab  &  Haryana 221 [Smt.Jaswant Kaur and  another    vs.<\/p>\n
The  State  of   Haryana and another],  Justice  O.Chinnappa<\/p>\n
Reddy  (as  he  then  was) quoted a poem  to  highlight  the<\/p>\n
distrust   shown  on  legal  practitioners’  appearance   by<\/p>\n
enacting such legislative exclusions.   In paragraph  18  of<\/p>\n
the said judgment, the following passage is found:<\/p>\n
         “Para 18:  ……. While it is not for us  to
\n         question  the legislative wisdom in  enacting
\n         S.20-A, we are unable to discover any  reason
\n         for the provision.  Perhaps it is founded  on
\n         the unfounded distrust expressed by a wit:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                    “In  the  heels  of  the  higgling
\n         lawyers,
\n               Too  many  slippery ifs  and  buts  and
\n         howevers.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
              Too much hereinbefore provided whereas,
\n              Too many doors to go in and out of,
\n                   When the lawyers are through
\n                   What is there left Bob ?\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                   Can a mouse nibble at it
\n                   And find enough to fasten a tooth
\n                   in ?”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Thus,  saying so, the Full Bench of the Punjab  and  Haryana<\/p>\n
High  Court  removed the bar imposed on Advocates  appearing<\/p>\n
before an authority or Officer functioning under that Act.<\/p>\n
      16.   This  view of the Full Bench of the  Punjab  and<\/p>\n
Haryana  High Court was subsequently approved by the Supreme<\/p>\n
Court  vide  its  decision reported  in  (1987)  2  SCC  692<\/p>\n
[H.S.Srinivasa Raghavachar    vs.   State of  Karnataka  and<\/p>\n
others<\/a>]  in  which  it was held that Section  48-A   of  the<\/p>\n
Karnataka   Land   Reforms  Act,  1961   prohibiting   legal<\/p>\n
practitioners  from  appearing in a proceedings  before  the<\/p>\n
Tribunal  constituted under that Act as  ultravires  in  the<\/p>\n
following lines:\n<\/p>\n
         “Para  9:  … We adopt the reasoning  of  the
\n         High  Court  of Punjab and Haryana and  direct
\n         that Section 48(8) will not be enforced so  as
\n         to  prevent  advocates from  appearing  before
\n         the Tribunals functioning under the Act.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Though  in the decision of the Full Bench of the Punjab  and<\/p>\n
Haryana High Court in the Haryana Land Ceiling case and  the<\/p>\n
Supreme  Court  judgment in the Karnataka Reforms  Act,  the<\/p>\n
issue  of bar on advocates was decided on the basis  of  the<\/p>\n
legislative competence of the State, these two decisions are<\/p>\n
only quoted to show the trend of judicial decision making in<\/p>\n
the matter of prohibition of legal practitioners’ appearance<\/p>\n
before quasi-judicial bodies.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
      17.  Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the<\/p>\n
respondents workmen submitted that the Division Bench of the<\/p>\n
Delhi High Court upheld the Constitution validity of Section<\/p>\n
36 in its judgment reported in 1988 – 1 – L.L.J. 135 [The Co-<\/p>\n
operative  Store Ltd., New Delhi    vs.    O.P.Dwivedi  P.O.<\/p>\n
Industrial  Tribunal II and others].    The learned  counsel<\/p>\n
for the workmen also drew the attention of this Court to the<\/p>\n
two  judgments of this court interpreting Section  36(2)  of<\/p>\n
the I.D. Act.     The first judgment  is the one reported in<\/p>\n
1998  (1) L.L.N. 712 [R.M.Duraiswamy   vs.    Labour  Court,<\/p>\n
Salem  and  others<\/a>]  where the learned Judge of  this  Court<\/p>\n
held  as to the true scope and meaning of Section 36(1)  and<\/p>\n
36(2)  of the I.D. Act.     But, however did not decide  the<\/p>\n
issue which is nhow before this Court.\n<\/p>\n
      18.   The  same  view was followed by another  learned<\/p>\n
Judge  of this Court vide his judgment reported in 2001  (2)<\/p>\n
L.L.N.  1111 [Tamil Nadu Industrial Co-operative  bank  Ltd.<\/p>\n
vs.     Presiding  Officer,  Labour  Court,  Coimbatore  and<\/p>\n
another].      Therefore,  the issue  raised  in  this  writ<\/p>\n
petition has not directly  come up for consideration  before<\/p>\n
this  Court.    However, the learned counsel  appearing  for<\/p>\n
the  workmen  submitted that several other High courts  have<\/p>\n
considered this point and this Court is bound to  take  note<\/p>\n
of  the same and adopt the reasoning which are in favour  of<\/p>\n
the workmen.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
      19.   In  this context, a reference was  made  to  the<\/p>\n
following judgments for the proposition that the consent  of<\/p>\n
the  workman  is essential for the Management  to  engage  a<\/p>\n
lawyer  and that consent cannot taken to be implied and  the<\/p>\n
question  of  consent  can be raised  at  any  time  of  the<\/p>\n
proceedings.\n<\/p>\n
         (i)  1998  (4)  L.L.N. 908 [General  Manager,
\n               National  Bank  for  Agricultural   and
\n               Rural      Development              vs.
\n               Presiding Officer,
\n              Industrial Tribunal<\/a> – I, Hyderaband  and
\n               another] – Andhra Pradesh High Court.\n<\/p>\n
         (ii) 1999  (1)  L.L.N.  983 [Prasar  Bharathi
\n               Broadcasting   Corporation   of   India
\n               vs.     Suraj Pal Sharma and others]  –\n<\/p>\n
               Delhi High Court.\n<\/p>\n
         (iii)1999   (2)  L.LN.  1070  [  Bhavani  Art
\n               Handicrafts    vs.    Gulab  Singh  and
\n               others – Rajasthan High Court\n<\/p>\n
         (iv) 1999  (4)  L.L.N.  290  [J.B.  Transport
\n               Company  and others    vs.   Shankarlal
\n               @ Mavaram Nathuji Patel] – Gujarat High
\n               Court.\n<\/p>\n
         (v)  2003    (2)    L.L.N.    773    [Lakshmi\n               Engineering Industries     vs.    State\n<\/pre>\n
               of  Rajasthan and others]  –  Rajasthan
\n               High Court.\n<\/p>\n
         (vi) 2004  Lab.  I.  C.  4035 [Management  of
\n               Muttapore   Tea  Estate,   Assam    vs.
\n               Presiding    Offcer,   Labour    Court,
\n               Dibrugarh, Assam<\/a>] – Gauhati High Court.\n<\/p>\n
         (vii)2004  (2)  SLR  665 [Grapes   Synthetics
\n               Pvt.  Ltd.    vs.    The Judge,  Labour
\n               Court,   Bhilwara]  –  Rajasthan   High
\n               Court.<\/p>\n
\n         \n         (viii)     2005  (105)  FLR 300 [Chandrakanth\n               and others     vs.   All India Reporter\n               Ltd.]  -  Bombay  High Court  -  Nagpur\n               Bench.\n<\/pre>\n
         (ix) 2005  (105) FLR 256 [Brooke Bond  Lipton
\n               India  Ltd.   vs.   Brooke Bond  Sramik
\n               Union<\/a>] – Orissa High Court.\n<\/p>\n
         (x)  2004  – 1 CLR 163 [Hindustan Motor  Ltd.\n<\/p>\n
               vs.    Presiding Officer and others]  –\n<\/p>\n
               Delhi High Court<\/p>\n
      20.  However, in none of the above decisions, there is<\/p>\n
any  reference  to the Constitution Bench  judgment  of  the<\/p>\n
Supreme  Court in A.K.Roy’s case (cited supra) wherein  even<\/p>\n
against  a  constitutional  and  statutory  bar,  the   Apex<\/p>\n
Court  observed that if one side is represented by  a  legal<\/p>\n
practitioner, then the other side cannot be denied as it  is<\/p>\n
discriminatory   and  violative  of  Article   14   of   the<\/p>\n
Constitution  of  India.    Even the  effect  of  subsequent<\/p>\n
decision  of  the  Supreme Court in Bombay Port  Trust  case<\/p>\n
(cited supra) was not considered in its real spirit.<\/p>\n
       21.   Even  though  in  the  present  petitions,  the<\/p>\n
aggrieved party is Management, we will have to consider  the<\/p>\n
case  in  all  angles.    In these days, most of  the  cases<\/p>\n
before  the  Labour Court are all matters relating  to  non-<\/p>\n
employment of individual workman filed under Section 2 A  of<\/p>\n
the  I.D.  Act or in the alternative, claim petitions  filed<\/p>\n
under  Section 33 C (2) claiming  certain amount as are  due<\/p>\n
to  the  workmen  from their employer and  it  is  a  common<\/p>\n
knowledge    that  most  of  these  cases   are   filed   by<\/p>\n
individuals,  who  are having no affiliation  to  any  trade<\/p>\n
Union.      In  that  context, if they  are  pitted  against<\/p>\n
officers  of any Management trained in law representing  the<\/p>\n
Management,  that  will  also result  in  a  disadvantageous<\/p>\n
position to the workmen.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
      22.  Further, gone are the days, to presume  that  the<\/p>\n
entry  of  the  lawyers  will  bring  in  technicalities  to<\/p>\n
industrial  adjudication, which will  result   in  delay  in<\/p>\n
disposal.      Today, notwithstanding that the  finality  is<\/p>\n
attached to the Awards of the Labour Courts, large number of<\/p>\n
matters  are  taken to High Court, first,  by  way  of  writ<\/p>\n
proceedings  and  thereafter,  by  intra-Court  appeals  and<\/p>\n
sometimes  even to the Supreme Court.   Also the  field  has<\/p>\n
become  highly  technical as pointed by the  Allahabad  High<\/p>\n
Court.   Given  a  situation when  many  technicalities  are<\/p>\n
involved  in  getting  the dispute  adjudicated,  we  cannot<\/p>\n
consider  an  individual  workman  or  an  untrained   trade<\/p>\n
representative   defending   their   case   without    legal<\/p>\n
assistance.      Today,  thanks  to  Article  39-A  of   the<\/p>\n
Constitution of  India providing for  legal  aid to poor and<\/p>\n
the Parliament has<\/p>\n
also  enacted  Legal  Aid Services Authority  Act  and  such<\/p>\n
authorities  having  been created from Taluk  level  to  the<\/p>\n
level of Supreme Court, a workman can have the assistance of<\/p>\n
a  lawyer of his choice, if those names are in the panel  of<\/p>\n
the  Legal Aid Services and such a legal assistance  can  be<\/p>\n
obtained free of cost.    We should have a new look  on  the<\/p>\n
issue relating to Section 36(4) of the I.D. Act.<\/p>\n
      23.  In the present sets of writ petitions, it is seen<\/p>\n
that  though the workmen were technically represented  by  a<\/p>\n
leader  of  the  Trade  Union to  which  they  belong,  but,<\/p>\n
however,  the said representative (G.Muthu) is  an  Advocate<\/p>\n
practising  before the High Court and the other  Subordinate<\/p>\n
Courts  and  who has rich experience in dealing with  labour<\/p>\n
laws for over 30 years.    If the same benefit is denied  to<\/p>\n
the  Management  on  the  basis of the  workmen  not  giving<\/p>\n
consent in terms of Section 36(4) of the I.D. Act, certainly<\/p>\n
it  will  result in an imbalance being created in  defending<\/p>\n
the  case  before a quasi-judicial body and it will  violate<\/p>\n
Article  14 of the Constitution of India.      This type  of<\/p>\n
withholding of consent by the workmen was never contemplated<\/p>\n
in  a  case where workmen have a trained lawyer whereas  the<\/p>\n
Management  (in  the second set of cases,  a  Public  Sector<\/p>\n
Management)  is not being allowed to defend its  case  by  a<\/p>\n
legal  practitioner.     This had resulted in  an  anamolous<\/p>\n
situation.    In fact, in the garb of exercising their right<\/p>\n
of  withholding  consent  in the first  set  of  cases,  the<\/p>\n
workman  and  his representative waited for 55  adjournments<\/p>\n
and had allowed the Management to be represented by a lawyer<\/p>\n
including  filing  vakalat at an earlier point of  time  and<\/p>\n
have raised this issue after a period of five years.<\/p>\n
      24.   In  the second set of cases involving  the  Milk<\/p>\n
Federation,  which  is  an Apex Co-operative  Society,  they<\/p>\n
themselves  were forced to file an application  seeking  for<\/p>\n
permission of the Court to engage a lawyer and the same  was<\/p>\n
resisted  by the workmen and their representative especially<\/p>\n
while deciding a claim petition filed under Section 33 C (2)<\/p>\n
of  the I.D. Act which is only in the nature of an execution<\/p>\n
petition.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
      25.  Therefore, for the aforesaid reasons, I hold that<\/p>\n
in  the case of the respondents \/ workmen engaging a trained<\/p>\n
reasoned  lawyer  in the garb of a trade union  leader,  the<\/p>\n
writ  petitioner Managements should not be denied  the  very<\/p>\n
same  right by relying upon Section 36(4) of the  I.D.  Act.<\/p>\n
This  will  result  in  grave  injustice  and  will  be   in<\/p>\n
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India in  the<\/p>\n
light  of A.K.Roy’s case  and Bombay Port Trust case  (cited<\/p>\n
supra).     Therefore,  the impugned orders  passed  by  the<\/p>\n
first respondent Labour Courts dated 03.3.2006 and 19.6.2006<\/p>\n
are  hereby set aside and it is directed that the respondent<\/p>\n
Managements  are entitled to engage a legal practitioner  of<\/p>\n
their own choice in the peculiar facts and circumstances  of<\/p>\n
the cases.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
      26.   Since  the  first set of cases  relate  to  non-<\/p>\n
employment  and  the matter is held up for five  years,  the<\/p>\n
Presiding  Officer, Labour Court, Chennai,  is  directed  to<\/p>\n
dispose  of  the same within a period of three  months  from<\/p>\n
today, which is the period contemplated under the provisions<\/p>\n
of the I.D. Act. In the second set of cases, as it is only a<\/p>\n
claim  petition,  which  is in the nature  of  an  execution<\/p>\n
petition  and it is also of the year 2004, the II Additional<\/p>\n
Labour   Court, Chennai, is directed to dispose of the  same<\/p>\n
in  accordance with law within a period of three months from<\/p>\n
today.   Both  the workmen and Management in  all  the  writ<\/p>\n
petitions are directed to co-operate in getting on with  the<\/p>\n
trial  without  putting any further  spokes  on  the  smooth<\/p>\n
progress of the trial.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
      27.   The  writ petitions are allowed with  the  above<\/p>\n
directions.       Consequently,   connected    Miscellaneous<\/p>\n
Petitions  will stand dismissed as unnecessary.     However,<\/p>\n
there will be no order as to costs.<\/p>\n
\n\n\n\n\nvsi\/rao\/gri\n\n\nTo\n\n1.   The Presiding Officer,\n     Principal Labour Court,    Chennai.\n\n2.   The Presiding Officer,\n     II Additional Labour Court,\n     Chennai.<\/pre>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Madras High Court The Management vs The Presiding Officer on 20 January, 2007 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:- 20..01..2007 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE K.CHANDRU W.P.Nos.20933 & 23606 of 2006 and M.P.Nos.1 & 2 of 2006 and W.P.Nos.22142 to 22145 of 2006, M.P.Nos.1 & 2 of 2006 in W.P.No.22142 of 2006, […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[8,13],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-49818","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-high-court","category-madras-high-court"],"yoast_head":"\nThe Management vs The Presiding Officer on 20 January, 2007 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-management-vs-the-presiding-officer-on-20-january-2007\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"The Management vs The Presiding Officer on 20 January, 2007 - 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