{"id":50634,"date":"2009-02-03T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2009-02-02T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/shri-prabhakar-vs-the-state-of-maharashtra-on-3-february-2009"},"modified":"2015-07-23T09:36:48","modified_gmt":"2015-07-23T04:06:48","slug":"shri-prabhakar-vs-the-state-of-maharashtra-on-3-february-2009","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/shri-prabhakar-vs-the-state-of-maharashtra-on-3-february-2009","title":{"rendered":"Shri Prabhakar vs The State Of Maharashtra on 3 February, 2009"},"content":{"rendered":"
Bombay High Court<\/div>\n
Shri Prabhakar vs The State Of Maharashtra on 3 February, 2009<\/div>\n
Bench: R. C. Chavan<\/div>\n
                                           1\n                      IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,\n\n\n\n\n                                                                                \n                              NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR\n\n\n\n\n                                                        \n                             Criminal Appeal No.25 of 2007\n                                       With\n                             Criminal Appeal No.28 of 2007\n\n\n\n\n                                                       \n                             Criminal Appeal No.25 of 2007\n\n    Shri Prabhakar s\/o Gangadhar Hejib,\n    Aged about 73 years,\n\n\n\n\n                                              \n    Occupation : Retired,\n    R\/o 160, Bajiprabhu Nagar, \n    Nagpur.                                               ... Appellant\n\n             Versus\n                              \n    The State of Maharashtra,\n    through Police Station Officer,\n    Police Station Sitabuldi, Nagpur.                     ... Respondent\n           \n\n\n    S\/Shri S.S. Voditel and P.P. Kotwal, Advocates for Appellant.\n        \n\n\n\n    Shri S.S. Doifode, Additional Public Prosecutor for Respondent.\n\n\n                             Criminal Appeal No.28 of 2007\n\n\n\n\n\n    Laxmikant s\/o Shankarrao Zade,\n    Aged about 31 years,\n    Occupation : At present Nil,\n    R\/o Plot No.317,\n\n\n\n\n\n    Jawaharnagar, Nagpur.\n    (Presently lodged at Central Prison,\n    Nagpur).                                              ... Appellant\n\n             Versus\n\n\n\n\n                                                        ::: Downloaded on - 09\/06\/2013 14:18:33 :::\n                                           2\n    State of Maharashtra,\n\n\n\n\n                                                                                      \n    through Police Station Officer,\n    Police Station Sitabuldi,\n\n\n\n\n                                                              \n    Nagpur.                                                     ... Respondent\n\n    Shri J.M. Gandhi, Advocate for Appellant.\n    Shri S.S. Doifode, Additional Public Prosecutor for the Respondent.\n\n\n\n\n                                                             \n                    CORAM : R.C. Chavan, J.\n<\/pre>\n
                   Date of Reserving the Judgment : 19-1-2009.\n<\/p>\n
                   Date of Pronouncing the judgment : 3-2-2009<\/p>\n
        Judgment :\n<\/p>\n
        1.          These    appeals    are        directed    against        appellants’<\/p>\n
        conviction for various offences and sentences imposed upon them<\/p>\n
        for those offences by the learned 2nd Additional Chief Judicial<\/p>\n
        Magistrate, Nagpur, in Criminal Case No.374 of 2002.\n<\/p>\n
        2.          In the year 1999, a scandal of bogus degrees,<\/p>\n
        mark-sheets and unwarranted increase of marks in revaluation at<\/p>\n
        various examinations conducted by the Nagpur University<\/p>\n
        surfaced. The University authorities reported the matter to police,<\/p>\n
        whereupon       Crime    No.194       of     1999     was      registered         on<\/p>\n
        24-3-1999 on the complaint of Shri Prakash Mistry. Two other<\/p>\n
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\n                                   3<\/span>
\n    crimes were also reported.     In course of investigation of these<\/p>\n
    crimes, some more matters surfaced. On 21-6-1999, on a report<\/p>\n
    by Shri Prakash Mistry, Crime No.346 of 1999 was registered<\/p>\n
    against some students of the University.      Eventually, in Crime<\/p>\n
    No.348 of 1999, Shri Prakash Mistry was himself arrested by the<\/p>\n
    police. Investigation into the crimes was conducted by PI Sayyad<\/p>\n
    and after him by PSI Anil Lokhande. Originally one chargesheet<\/p>\n
    was filed bearing Regular Criminal Case No.387 of 1999 and after<\/p>\n
    separate trials were ordered, separate supplementary chargesheets<\/p>\n
    for various offences came to be filed against various offenders.\n<\/p>\n
    3.        Facts, which led to prosecution and conviction of the<\/p>\n
    appellants are as under :\n<\/p>\n
              Appellant Laxmikant Zade in Criminal Appeal No.28 of<\/p>\n
    2007, who was accused No.1 before the Court, was a student, who<\/p>\n
    had appeared at Part I of BE Examination in Winter 1998. He<\/p>\n
    failed in some of the subjects at the said examination. The Nagpur<\/p>\n
    University permitted revaluation of answer books in terms of<\/p>\n
    Ordinance No.159 at the instance of such failed candidates.\n<\/p>\n
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\n                                   4<\/span><\/p>\n
    Therefore, accused No.1 Laxmikant Zade applied for revaluation<\/p>\n
    of his papers of Physics and Electrical Engineering by paying<\/p>\n
    requisite fees.\n<\/p>\n
    4.         Procedure for conduct of examinations is prescribed in<\/p>\n
    Ordinance No.9 issued by the Nagpur University.           It provides,<\/p>\n
    among other things, from Clause 57 onwards, for appointment of<\/p>\n
    tabulators, scrutineers, etc., and their respective roles.\n<\/p>\n
                            ig                                            This<\/p>\n
    ordinance did not provide for revaluation, which facility was<\/p>\n
    introduced by Ordinance No.159. Ordinance No.159 providing for<\/p>\n
    revaluation merely gives sketchy procedure about revaluation. It<\/p>\n
    does not lay down the procedure to be followed internally by the<\/p>\n
    University administration.   Therefore, it may be taken that the<\/p>\n
    provisions of Ordinance No.9 would apply mutatis mutandis to<\/p>\n
    revaluation as well.\n<\/p>\n
    5.         The practice, which was followed by the University<\/p>\n
    officials for such revaluation has been deposed to by PW 2<\/p>\n
    Narayan Ghatole, an employee of the University in the<\/p>\n
    Revaluation Section. According to him, after a candidate applied<\/p>\n
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\n                                    5<\/span>
\n    for revaluation after paying the prescribed fee, an entry used to be<\/p>\n
    taken in the Revaluation Tabulation Register (hereinafter referred<\/p>\n
    to as “the RTR” for the sake or brevity). The RTR contains the<\/p>\n
    following columns :\n<\/p>\n
    I)    Sr.No.                       VIII) Original Marks\n\n\n\n\n                                       \n    II)   Roll No.         ig          IX) Marks of 1st examiner in\n                                           revaluation\n\n    III) Date and amount               X)   Marks of 2nd examiner in\n                         \n                                            revaluation\n\n    IV) Name of candidates             XI) Average marks in both\n       \n\n\n    V)    Case No.\/Code No.            XII) Result\/change or no change\n    \n\n\n\n    VI) Subject paper                  XIII) % increase or decrease\n\n    VII) Maximum marks                 XIV) Signature of scrutineer\n\n\n\n\n\n                                       XV) Remarks\n\n\n\n\n\n<\/pre>\n
    The Clerks in the Revaluation Section used to fill up column<\/p>\n
    nos.(I) to (IV) and (VI) to (VIII) on the basis of the material which<\/p>\n
    they already had. Requisition for relevant answer books used to<\/p>\n
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\n                                   6<\/span>
\n    be sent to the godown. After the answer books were received, the<\/p>\n
    portion of the answer book containing roll number of the<\/p>\n
    candidate and marks obtained by him in the original valuation<\/p>\n
    used to be masked. A code number used to be printed on the<\/p>\n
    answer book by using a numbering machine.\n<\/p>\n
    6.        According to Shri Ghatole, earlier the University used to<\/p>\n
    maintain a register, where roll number of the candidate and the<\/p>\n
    code number allotted to his answer books used to be recorded.\n<\/p>\n
    However, since it was found that students could trace out the<\/p>\n
    place where papers were sent for revaluation from this register,<\/p>\n
    this practice was discontinued.\n<\/p>\n
    7.        The answer books of students in the Engineering faculty<\/p>\n
    used to be taken by a special messenger to the examiners<\/p>\n
    appointed for the purpose of revaluation. Normally, the answer<\/p>\n
    book used to be taken to a College in another University, where<\/p>\n
    the Principal or the Head of the Department in the College<\/p>\n
    concerned, used to assign the task of revaluation to the examiners<\/p>\n
    in the said College or University. They were not supposed to write<\/p>\n
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\n                                   7<\/span>
\n    the marks on the answer sheets itself.       These examiners were<\/p>\n
    provided with “revaluation sheets”.      These revaluation sheets<\/p>\n
    contained columns of code number and marks assigned to each<\/p>\n
    answer, with a column of total at the end. The revaluation sheet<\/p>\n
    also provided for recording the subject of the question paper and<\/p>\n
    its date. The revaluation sheet was to be signed by the revaluator.\n<\/p>\n
    One revaluation sheet ordinarily contained 9 to 10 rows so that<\/p>\n
    information in respect of 9 to 10 answer sheets revalued would be<\/p>\n
    filled in. Since the examiners, who revalued the papers, had no<\/p>\n
    access to the roll number, they would mention the code number<\/p>\n
    and then fill up the marks allotted by them for each answer. Since<\/p>\n
    the revaluation of each answer book used to be done by two<\/p>\n
    revaluators, there used to be two such revaluation sheets (for the<\/p>\n
    sake of easy reference, they would be hereinafter refered to as<\/p>\n
    “R1” and “R2” sheets corresponding to revaluation done by the<\/p>\n
    first and the second revaluator).    The messenger, who took the<\/p>\n
    papers for revaluation, used to bring back the answer books along<\/p>\n
    with revaluation sheets to the University.\n<\/p>\n
                                                  ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:33 :::<\/span>
\n                                   8<\/span><\/p>\n
    8.        After receipt of answer books and revaluation sheets in<\/p>\n
    the Revaluation Section of the University, the University<\/p>\n
    employees used to de-mask the roll number on the answer sheet<\/p>\n
    and used to fill up column no.(V) in the RTR by recording the<\/p>\n
    relevant code number against the name of the student, his roll<\/p>\n
    number and subject of the paper sent for revaluation.\n<\/p>\n
    9.        After this was done by the University employees, the<\/p>\n
    RTR along with R1 and R2 sheets used to be handed over to<\/p>\n
    scrutineers. The scrutineers were select Professors of affiliated<\/p>\n
    Colleges, who were assigned the task of entering marks obtained<\/p>\n
    upon revaluation. The scrutineers used to work in pairs. Two<\/p>\n
    Professors would be working as a team for entering marks in<\/p>\n
    respect of one or more students. Column nos.(IX) and (X) for<\/p>\n
    marks assigned by the two examiners used to be filled in by the<\/p>\n
    scrutineers. They then calculated average marks and filled them<\/p>\n
    up in column no.(XI). In column no.(XII), the scrutineers would<\/p>\n
    mention whether there was a change or no change or an adverse<\/p>\n
    change. In column no.(XIII), they were supposed to mention the<\/p>\n
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\n                                  9<\/span>
\n    percentage of increase or decrease and were expected to sign the<\/p>\n
    entry in column No.(XIV).   If there was a change of 5% or more<\/p>\n
    over the original marks then the result of the candidate would<\/p>\n
    change.\n<\/p>\n
    10.       It is not in dispute that there is no authentic document<\/p>\n
    to describe this procedure or to discern as to what was the<\/p>\n
    standard procedure to be followed. However, according to Shri<\/p>\n
    Ghatole, after the RTR was filled up, a notification was expected<\/p>\n
    to be issued about change in the result upon revaluation. After<\/p>\n
    this notification, necessary changes were made in the Final<\/p>\n
    Tabulation Register (for short, hereinafter referred to as “the<\/p>\n
    FTR”). The FTR in respect of an examination conducted by the<\/p>\n
    University used to be drawn up after evaluation of answer books<\/p>\n
    at the examination was over, and the result used to be declared on<\/p>\n
    the basis of the FTR.   The FTR is in the form of a computer<\/p>\n
    printout since the record was computerised. Thereafter the<\/p>\n
    students used to apply for revaluation. After revaluation, change,<\/p>\n
    if any, in the marks used to be noted in hand in the FTR by the<\/p>\n
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\n                                  10<\/span>
\n    same set of scrutineers.\n<\/p>\n
    11.       Accused No.2 Madhukar Smarth and accused No.3<\/p>\n
    Prabhakar Hejib were the pairs of scrutineers, who were entrusted<\/p>\n
    with the task of entering marks of accused No.1 Laxmikant Zade<\/p>\n
    in the RTR as well as the FTR. Accused No.4 Shyamrao Kalamkar<\/p>\n
    was the Assistant Register, Incharge of Revaluation Section at the<\/p>\n
    relevant time.\n<\/p>\n
    12.       In this case, Laxmikant Zade, accused No.1, had initially<\/p>\n
    secured 17 marks each out of 80 in the subjects of Physics and<\/p>\n
    Electrical Engineering. He applied for revaluation. Examiner-I for<\/p>\n
    the subject of Electrical Engineering had assigned him 3 marks<\/p>\n
    and Examiner-II had assigned 5 marks, thus average of marks<\/p>\n
    came to 4. This was rightly recorded in the RTR. It was also<\/p>\n
    mentioned in the column of average that the average marks<\/p>\n
    were 4 and the result was shown in Column No.(XII) as adverse<\/p>\n
    change.   These marks were then changed to 25 and 26 with<\/p>\n
    average as 26 in Column No.(XI) of the RTR. In the FTR also,<\/p>\n
    original 17 marks had been initially changed to 4, showing the<\/p>\n
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\n                                   11<\/span>
\n    total of 18 after adding up 14 marks of practicals. These figures<\/p>\n
    were scored and the marks obtained in theory were shown as 26,<\/p>\n
    and the total was changed to 40.\n<\/p>\n
    13.       In the subject of Physics, the marks obtained by the<\/p>\n
    student upon revaluation were 28 and 29 about which there<\/p>\n
    appears to be no dispute.\n<\/p>\n
    14.       It is the case of the prosecution that accused No.1<\/p>\n
    Laxmikant Zade approached accused Nos.2 to 4 in order to get his<\/p>\n
    marks changed and accused Nos.2 to 4 changed the marks in<\/p>\n
    order to favour accused No.1, either actively indulging in making<\/p>\n
    such changes or conniving at such changes or contriving to bring<\/p>\n
    about changes by abetment, by engaging in conspiracy. It was<\/p>\n
    further alleged that accused No.1 Laxmikant Zade used the said<\/p>\n
    falsely prepared mark-list for getting admission to higher class, i.e.<\/p>\n
    BE IInd Year. It was, therefore, alleged that accused No.1 had<\/p>\n
    committed offence punishable under Section 420 of the Penal<\/p>\n
    Code; accused Nos.2 to 4 had committed offences punishable<\/p>\n
    under Sections 468 and 471 read with Section 34 of the Penal<\/p>\n
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\n                                      12<\/span>
\n    Code, and all the accused persons had committed offences<\/p>\n
    punishable under Sections 420, 468 and 471 read with Section<\/p>\n
    109 of the Penal Code.\n<\/p>\n
    15.       In course of investigation, the Investigating Officer<\/p>\n
    secured the necessary record from the University, recorded<\/p>\n
    statements of witnesses, had the disputed and admitted<\/p>\n
    handwriting sent to the Examiner of Questioned Documents, State<\/p>\n
    CID, Pune, and after getting an opinion from the said Expert, and<\/p>\n
    finding   that   the   accused    persons   were    involved        in the<\/p>\n
    aforementioned offences, chargesheeted them.\n<\/p>\n
    16.       The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nagpur, charged<\/p>\n
    the appellants, as also the original accused No.2 Madhukar<\/p>\n
    Smarth and accused No.4 Shamrao Kalamkar, of offences<\/p>\n
    punishable under Sections 420, 468 and 471 read with Sections<\/p>\n
    34 and 109 of the Penal Code.         It appears that subsequently<\/p>\n
    charge of offences punishable under Section 120-B and 409 of the<\/p>\n
    Penal Code was also added. They pleaded not guilty to the said<\/p>\n
    charge and hence were put on trial, at which the prosecution<\/p>\n
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\n                                  13<\/span>
\n    examined in all 10 witnesses in its attempt to bring home the guilt<\/p>\n
    of the accused. They are : PW 1 Gangaram Meshram was the<\/p>\n
    Assistant Register (Revaluation) from June 1999 (i.e. after the<\/p>\n
    offence was noticed), PW 2 Narayan Ghatole was serving as<\/p>\n
    Senior Grade Clerk in the Revaluation Section from the year 1995,<\/p>\n
    PW 3 Uday Gadkari was Principal of the College where accused<\/p>\n
    No.1 Laxmikant Zade was studying, PW 4 Prof. Kalyan<\/p>\n
    Veeramanja and PW 5 Prof.              Shivzanna Devru serving in<\/p>\n
    Jayachamerajendra College of Engineering, Mysore revalued the<\/p>\n
    papers, PW 6 Deorao took over as the Controller of Examinations<\/p>\n
    in the year 1999 and had sent a report dated 16-7-1999 to the<\/p>\n
    police, PW 7 Vishwas Rajangaonkar, the State Examiner of<\/p>\n
    Questioned Documents had examined the questioned documents<\/p>\n
    in these cases, PW 8 Shri Jageshwar Saharia was acting as Vice<\/p>\n
    Chancellor and claimed to have accorded sanction for prosecution<\/p>\n
    of the University employees involved in the scam, PW 9 API<\/p>\n
    Laxman Khobragade registered the offence, and PW 10 PSI Anil<\/p>\n
    Lokhande, the Investigation Officer.\n<\/p>\n
                                                  ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:33 :::<\/span>
\n                                  14<\/span><\/p>\n
    17.      After considering the evidence tendered before him, the<\/p>\n
    learned 2nd Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nagpur, who<\/p>\n
    eventually tried the case, held that the charges against accused<\/p>\n
    No.2   Madhukar Smarth and accused No.4 Shamrao Kalamkar<\/p>\n
    were not proved and acquitted them. The State has not preferred<\/p>\n
    any appeal against their acquittal.        He held accused No.1<\/p>\n
    Laxmikant Zade and accused No.3 Prabhakar Hejib guilty and<\/p>\n
    convicted and sentenced them as under :\n<\/p>\n
             (a) For offence punishable under Section 420 read<\/p>\n
                  with Sections 34 and 109 of the Penal Code, they<\/p>\n
                  were         sentenced             to              rigorous<\/p>\n
                  imprisonment    for   four    years      and       fine     of<\/p>\n
                  Rs.15,000\/- each, or in default RI for two months.<\/p>\n
             (b) For offence punishable under Section 468 read<\/p>\n
                  with Sections 34 and 109 of the Penal Code, they<\/p>\n
                  were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for three<\/p>\n
                                                 ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                   15<\/span>
\n                    years and fine of Rs.10,000\/- each, or in default RI<\/p>\n
                    for one month.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
              (c) For offence punishable under Section 471 read<\/p>\n
                    with Sections 34 and 109 of the Penal Code, they<\/p>\n
                    were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one<\/p>\n
                    year and fine of Rs.5,000\/- each, or in default RI<\/p>\n
                    for one month.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
              (d) For offence punishable under Section 120-B of the<\/p>\n
                    Penal Code, rigorous imprisonment for six months<\/p>\n
                    and fine of Rs.2,000\/- each.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    18.       In addition, accused No.3 was convicted and sentenced<\/p>\n
    to suffer rigorous imprisonment for four years and fine of<\/p>\n
    Rs.15,000\/-, or in default RI for two months for offence<\/p>\n
    punishable under Section 409 of the Penal Code.\n<\/p>\n
    19.       The    learned   counsel   for   original      accused        No.3<\/p>\n
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\n                                   16<\/span>
\n    Prabhakar     Hejib   submitted    that   the   Investigating         Officer<\/p>\n
    committed gross error in taking cognizance of the matter without<\/p>\n
    there being a report from the competent authority. He submitted<\/p>\n
    that the Investigating Officer had no business to suo motu take<\/p>\n
    cognizance of an alleged offence, which had not been referred to<\/p>\n
    him by the authorities under the Maharashtra Universities Act.\n<\/p>\n
    The FIR in this case is at Exhibit 83. It is filed by Dr. Prakash<\/p>\n
    Mistry, who was the Controller of Examinations.              This was in<\/p>\n
    respect of mark-lists\/degrees of four students, namely Philip<\/p>\n
    Verghese, Bharadwaj Girdhar, Md. Ghouse Irshad and D. Sameer<\/p>\n
    Kumar, which were found to be forged. On this report, Crime<\/p>\n
    No.346 of 1999 was registered at Police Station Sitabuldi. The<\/p>\n
    learned counsel for the appellant pointed out that this report does<\/p>\n
    not make any reference to appellant Laxmikant Zade or any<\/p>\n
    malpractice in respect of result of said Laxmikant Zade.\n<\/p>\n
    20.         The learned counsel submitted that Section 18 of the<\/p>\n
    Maharashtra Universities Act defines the duties of Controller of<\/p>\n
    Examinations. Clause (e) of sub-section (3) of the said Section<\/p>\n
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\n                                  17<\/span>
\n    empowers the Controller of Examinations and vests him with the<\/p>\n
    responsibility to postpone or cancel examinations, in part or in<\/p>\n
    whole, in the event of malpractices, or, if the circumstances so<\/p>\n
    warrant, and take disciplinary action or initiate any civil or<\/p>\n
    criminal proceedings against any person or a group of persons, or<\/p>\n
    a college, or an institution, alleged to have committed<\/p>\n
    malpractices.   Section 32 of the Maharashtra Universities Act<\/p>\n
    enumerates powers and duties of the Board of Examinations in<\/p>\n
    respect of the University examinations. In view of clause 5(b) of<\/p>\n
    the said Section, the Controller of Examinations acts as Secretary<\/p>\n
    of the Board. Clause 6(a) of the said Section empowers the Board<\/p>\n
    of Examinations to constitute a committee of not more than five<\/p>\n
    persons to investigate into and to take disciplinary action for,<\/p>\n
    malpractices or lapses on the part of candidates, paper-setters,<\/p>\n
    examiners, moderators, referees, teachers or any other persons<\/p>\n
    connected with the conduct of examinations including the<\/p>\n
    pre-examination and post-examination stages. Clause (b) of sub-\n<\/p>\n
    section (6) requires such committee to submit its report and<\/p>\n
                                                ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                    18<\/span>
\n    recommendations to the Board of Examinations, which is expected<\/p>\n
    to take disciplinary action in the matter as it deems fit.\n<\/p>\n
    21.        The learned counsel submitted that if any malpractice<\/p>\n
    in respect of examination at which Laxmikant Zade appeared was<\/p>\n
    noticed, it ought to have been investigated by a committee<\/p>\n
    constituted under Section 32(6)(a) and report of such committee<\/p>\n
    ought to have been considered by the Board of Examinations<\/p>\n
    under Section 32(6)(b).        Only thereafter, the Controller of<\/p>\n
    Examinations, as Secretary of the Board, would have been entitled<\/p>\n
    to report the matter to police. He submitted that these provisions<\/p>\n
    of the Maharashtra Universities Act override the provisions<\/p>\n
    pertaining to taking cognizance, which are generally applicable to<\/p>\n
    crimes.   For this purpose, he relied on a number of decisions,<\/p>\n
    namely, Ratan Lal Adukia v. Union of India,<\/a> reported at (1989) 3<\/p>\n
    SCC 537, State of M.P. v. Kedia Leather & Liquor Ltd. and others<\/a>,<\/p>\n
    reported at (2003) 7 SCC 389, Maharashtra State Board of<\/p>\n
    Secondary and Higher Secondary Education and another v. Paritosh<\/p>\n
    Bhupeshkumar Sheth and others, reported at (1984) 4 SCC 27,<\/p>\n
                                                   ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                    19<\/span><\/p>\n
    Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon and others v. State of Gujarat,<\/a><\/p>\n
    reported at (1988) 2 SCC 271, Jasbir Singh v. Vipin Kumar Jaggi<\/p>\n
    and others<\/a>, reported at (2001) 8 SCC 289, Gaziabad Zila Sahkari<\/p>\n
    Bank Ltd. v. Additional Labour Commissioner and others<\/a>, reported<\/p>\n
    at (2007) 11 SCC 756, U.P. State Electricity Board v. Banaras<\/p>\n
    Electric Light and Power Co. Ltd.,<\/a> reported at (2001) 7 SCC 117,<\/p>\n
    Kunwar Pal Singh (Dead) by LRs. v. State of U.P. and others,<\/p>\n
    reported at (2007) 5 SCC 85, and Home Secretary, U.T. of<\/p>\n
    Chandigarh and another v. Darshjit Singh Grewal and others,<\/p>\n
    reported at (1993) 4 SCC 25.\n<\/p>\n
    22.       The refrain of the learned counsel for accused No.3 is<\/p>\n
    that a special procedure is prescribed by the Maharashtra<\/p>\n
    Universities Act, which is irreconcilable with the procedure for<\/p>\n
    taking cognizance by police and, therefore, Section 18(3)(e) of the<\/p>\n
    Maharashtra Universities Act completely repeals the provisions of<\/p>\n
    Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. According to him,<\/p>\n
    in view of the decisions referred to above, since there is a direct<\/p>\n
    conflict between the two provisions and since it is clear that the<\/p>\n
                                                 ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                  20<\/span>
\n    Legislature intended to lay down an exhaustive code for<\/p>\n
    malpractices at University examinations, and since the two laws<\/p>\n
    occupy the same field, there is an implied repeal of the provisions<\/p>\n
    of Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the<\/p>\n
    provisions of Section 18(3)(e) of the Maharashtra Universities Act.\n<\/p>\n
    He further submitted that when a special enactment provides a<\/p>\n
    special procedure, it would prevail over the general law contained<\/p>\n
    in the Code of Criminal Procedure.        Therefore, the learned<\/p>\n
    Magistrate could not have taken cognizance on a report by police<\/p>\n
    in respect of alleged fraudulent preparation of documents, and<\/p>\n
    that cognizance of such offence could have been taken only upon<\/p>\n
    a complaint to Magistrate by authorized officer, namely Controller<\/p>\n
    of Examinations. For this purpose, he relied on judgment in State<\/p>\n
    of Kerala v. V.P. Enadeen, reported at AIR 1971 Kerala 193.\n<\/p>\n
    23.       In Union of India and others v. L.D. Balam Singh,<\/a><\/p>\n
    reported at (2002) 9 SCC 73, relied on by Advocate Shri Voditel, it<\/p>\n
    was held in the context of a court marshal that if the court<\/p>\n
    marshal was in relation to an offence punishable under the NDPS<\/p>\n
                                                 ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                  21<\/span>
\n    Act, safeguards contained in the said Act could not be diluted.\n<\/p>\n
    The learned counsel, therefore, submitted that safeguards in the<\/p>\n
    Maharashtra Universities Act prescribing an enquiry before<\/p>\n
    criminal action could be initiated would have to be applied to the<\/p>\n
    present case.\n<\/p>\n
    24.       In State Inspector of Police, Vishakhapatnam v. Surya<\/p>\n
    Sankaram Karri,<\/a> reported at 2007 ALL MR (Cri) 555, the Supreme<\/p>\n
    Court held that the requirement of an authorization by a<\/p>\n
    Superintendent of Police in favour of an officer for conducting<\/p>\n
    investigation into an offence under Section 17(1)(e) of the<\/p>\n
    Prevention of Corruption Act was of a mandatory character and<\/p>\n
    the burden was on the prosecution to prove that the investigation<\/p>\n
    was carried on by the proper authority.\n<\/p>\n
    25.       The learned APP contested this proposition.                   He<\/p>\n
    submitted first, that there is no question of the provisions of<\/p>\n
    Section 18(3)(e) of the Maharashtra Universities Act operating in<\/p>\n
    the same field or occupying the same field as Section 190 of the<\/p>\n
    Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 190 of the Code of Criminal<\/p>\n
                                                ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                  22<\/span>
\n    Procedure pertains to taking cognizance by Criminal Courts. It<\/p>\n
    does not lay down the procedure to be followed by a complainant<\/p>\n
    in the position of Controller of Examinations before a complaint is<\/p>\n
    filed.   He further submitted that Section 18(3)(e) of the<\/p>\n
    Maharashtra Universities Act      empowers the Controller                 of<\/p>\n
    Examinations to initiate civil or criminal proceedings. This does<\/p>\n
    not imply that criminal proceedings must be initiated only by a<\/p>\n
    complaint to Magistrate and not by making a report to police.\n<\/p>\n
    26.       I have carefully considered the rival contentions. It may<\/p>\n
    be seen that Section 18(3)(e) of the Maharashtra Universities Act<\/p>\n
    read with Section 32 of the said Act, which provides for an<\/p>\n
    enquiry by a Committee and a report to the Board of<\/p>\n
    Examinations, do not necessarily exclude a report by the<\/p>\n
    University authorities to the police or investigation by the police<\/p>\n
    into such complaints. It may be seen that Section 18(3)(e) does<\/p>\n
    not restrict the powers of a Criminal Court to take cognizance<\/p>\n
    upon a police report by prescribing that cognizance shall not be<\/p>\n
    taken unless the steps contemplated by the Maharashtra<\/p>\n
                                                 ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                    23<\/span>
\n    Universities Act are first taken.     Therefore, since the relevant<\/p>\n
    provisions of the Maharashtra Universities Act and those under the<\/p>\n
    Code of Criminal Procedure occupy different fields and control<\/p>\n
    different aspects, there is no conflict and, therefore, no implied<\/p>\n
    repeal. Consequently, there is no warrant for holding that the<\/p>\n
    Controller of Examinations was not entitled to approach the police<\/p>\n
    or police was not entitled to investigate or to file a report or that a<\/p>\n
    Magistrate was not entitled to take cognizance on such a report.\n<\/p>\n
    The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that when<\/p>\n
    a special law prescribes a special procedure, it eclipses general<\/p>\n
    provisions, is unexceptionable, but it has to be noted that the<\/p>\n
    Maharashtra Universities Act does not prescribe any special<\/p>\n
    procedure for carrying out investigation into the complaints about<\/p>\n
    offences concerning the University examinations or for enquiries<\/p>\n
    or trials for offences arising therefrom. Section 18(3)(e) of the<\/p>\n
    Act on which much emphasis has been laid, is only an enabling<\/p>\n
    provision, which would enable the Controller of Examinations to<\/p>\n
    initiate criminal proceedings. Therefore, since there is no special<\/p>\n
                                                   ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                   24<\/span>
\n    procedure prescribed for investigation or trial of offences relating<\/p>\n
    to examinations and since the procedure prescribed is only in<\/p>\n
    relation to conducting an internal enquiry for the purpose of<\/p>\n
    enabling the University authorities to decide appropriate course of<\/p>\n
    action, it cannot be said that the report could not have been made<\/p>\n
    by the Controller of Examinations.\n<\/p>\n
    27.       Reliance on judgment of the Supreme Court in P.\n<\/p>\n
    Sirajuddin etc v. The State of Madras etc, reported at AIR 1971 SC<\/p>\n
    520, regarding necessity of a preliminary enquiry before lodging<\/p>\n
    FIR against a public servant charged of serious misconduct, is<\/p>\n
    misplaced. In that case, the Court considered the necessity of a<\/p>\n
    preliminary enquiry into the allegations against a person holding a<\/p>\n
    top position in the department by a responsible officer, since<\/p>\n
    lodging of a report on baseless allegations would do incalculable<\/p>\n
    harm not only to the officer but to the department he belonged to.\n<\/p>\n
    There can be no doubt that when a department decides to lodge a<\/p>\n
    report, it must first satisfy itself about existence of ingredients of<\/p>\n
    crime, which is sought to be reported. In this case, it has to be<\/p>\n
                                                   ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                   25<\/span>
\n    seen that Dr. Prabhakar Mistry did not file a report particularly<\/p>\n
    against appellant Prabhakar Hejib.       As already recounted, his<\/p>\n
    report was in respect of four students and University employees.\n<\/p>\n
    The names of appellants Prabhakar Hejib and Laxmikant Zade<\/p>\n
    were not even mentioned in the report. The complicity of the<\/p>\n
    appellants came to light when the Investigating Officer and the<\/p>\n
    University authorities started examining the University record<\/p>\n
    once a fraud had come to light. Since the learned counsel for the<\/p>\n
    appellants could not show any rule of law, either in the form of<\/p>\n
    enactment or a judgment holding the field, for the proposition<\/p>\n
    that a police officer is obliged to shut his eyes and fold his arms<\/p>\n
    even after coming to know that a cognizable offence has taken<\/p>\n
    place till somebody wakes him up by filing a report, the action by<\/p>\n
    the Investigating Officer in investigating into the complicity of the<\/p>\n
    present appellants cannot be faulted. However, he should have<\/p>\n
    followed   the   procedure   of    registering    a     separate        crime,<\/p>\n
    investigating it independently and filing a separate final report in<\/p>\n
    respect of each malpractice. In view of this, the objections of the<\/p>\n
                                                     ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                  26<\/span>
\n    appellants on the ground of first, lack of competence in<\/p>\n
    Dr. Prakash Mistry to make a report and secondly, absence of<\/p>\n
    names of the appellants in the said FIR, cannot be upheld.\n<\/p>\n
    28.       The learned counsel for accused No.3 next submitted<\/p>\n
    that accused No.3 Prabhakar Hejib was appointed as Scrutineer by<\/p>\n
    the University. He was not directly an employee of the University.\n<\/p>\n
    Yet, since he was appointed as Scrutineer, he could not have been<\/p>\n
    prosecuted without the sanction from the authority competent to<\/p>\n
    appoint him. He submitted that PW 8 Shri Jageshwar Saharia,<\/p>\n
    who was given an additional charge of the post of Vice Chancellor<\/p>\n
    of Nagpur University at the relevant time, had stated that<\/p>\n
    permission had been asked from him to prosecute, among others,<\/p>\n
    Prabhakar Hejib. He stated that he had not granted permission in<\/p>\n
    respect of Prabhakar Hejib and others, who were not University<\/p>\n
    employees and had granted permission in respect of Dr. Prakash<\/p>\n
    Mistry, Yadav Kohchade, Hemant Thakre, Shamrao Kalamkar, and<\/p>\n
    Dinkar Ingle, who were not the employees of the University. He<\/p>\n
    proved a communication to this effect by the Registrar of the<\/p>\n
                                                ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                      27<\/span>
\n    University, Dr. S.S. Dara, who is no more. The learned counsel for<\/p>\n
    accused No.3 submitted that if the Vice Chancellor was not an<\/p>\n
    appointing authority in respect of Prabhakar Hejib, he was also<\/p>\n
    not an appointing authority in respect of Hemant Thakre, the<\/p>\n
    accused in another case, who was the elected Dean of Engineering<\/p>\n
    Faculty and not appointed by the Vice-Chancellor.\n<\/p>\n
    29.          The learned APP submitted that Section 10 of the<\/p>\n
    Maharashtra Universities Act enumerates the officers of the<\/p>\n
    University    and   Deans   of    Faculties   are   included        in     this<\/p>\n
    enumeration, and that such is not the case of Scrutineers. It is<\/p>\n
    difficult to contemplate that because persons performing duties in<\/p>\n
    the University in connection with the examination are actually<\/p>\n
    employees of the affiliated Colleges, they cease to be public<\/p>\n
    servants in respect of duties which they perform in the University.\n<\/p>\n
    However, this question need not detain the Court since the<\/p>\n
    conduct attributed to the scrutineer in this case is not one, which<\/p>\n
    he could be said to have performed in course of his duty, but one<\/p>\n
    which amounts to subversion and a criminal activity. Therefore,<\/p>\n
                                                    ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                       28<\/span>
\n    the question as to whether the sanction from the Vice Chancellor<\/p>\n
    was necessary or whether it was at all given or given after<\/p>\n
    appropriate application of mind, are not relevant.\n<\/p>\n
    30.        Coming to the evidence, PW 3 Uday Gadkari, Principal<\/p>\n
    of Priyadarshini College, Nagpur, stated that Laxmikant Zade was<\/p>\n
    a student of his College. Laxmikant Zade appeared for BE Part I<\/p>\n
    Examination in Summer 1998 and failed.\n<\/p>\n
                            ig                                He applied for<\/p>\n
    revaluation in English and Social Science, which were cleared in<\/p>\n
    revaluation.     Laxmikant Zade again appeared for BE Part I<\/p>\n
    Examination in Winter 1998 and since he failed again, he applied<\/p>\n
    for revaluation of Physics theory and Electrical Engineering theory<\/p>\n
    papers, which he cleared in revaluation. On the basis of this result<\/p>\n
    of revaluation, Laxmikant Zade was eligible for admission to BE<\/p>\n
    IInd Year, since he was allowed to keep terms having cleared ten<\/p>\n
    out of fifteen subjects. He applied for admission for BE IInd Year<\/p>\n
    Course annexing the mark sheets after revaluation showing that he had<\/p>\n
    cleared the subjects of Physics theory and Electrical Engineering theory. The<\/p>\n
    admission form and the mark sheets were proved by Shri Gadkari,<\/p>\n
                                                       ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                   29<\/span>
\n    which are at Exhibits 41 and 42. Laxmikant Zade then appeared<\/p>\n
    for BE IInd Year Examination, but failed, as could be seen from<\/p>\n
    the copy of the FTR, which is at Exhibit 43.\n<\/p>\n
    31.       The learned counsel for appellant Laxmikant Zade<\/p>\n
    submitted that PW 3 Uday Gadkari brought and was allowed to<\/p>\n
    prove documents which were given to accused after the<\/p>\n
    examination-in-chief was over. This was thoroughly undesirable.\n<\/p>\n
    However, since the appellant had an opportunity to cross-examine<\/p>\n
    the witness thereafter, it cannot be held that the appellant was<\/p>\n
    prejudiced<\/p>\n
    32.       Laxmikant Zade had admitted in his statement under<\/p>\n
    Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that he had<\/p>\n
    appeared for the two out of six papers from Priyadarshini College.\n<\/p>\n
    The cross-examination of Shri Gadkari on behalf of appellant<\/p>\n
    Laxmikant Zade does not show that Laxmikant Zade had disputed<\/p>\n
    his having appeared for BE Part I Examination, and having failed<\/p>\n
    thereat, having applied for revaluation, and having been cleared<\/p>\n
    in two subjects and having applied for admission to BE Part II on<\/p>\n
                                                   ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                  30<\/span>
\n    the basis of revaluation result,   since he was allowed to keep<\/p>\n
    terms. Thus, these aspects cannot be taken to be disputed.\n<\/p>\n
    33.       The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that<\/p>\n
    merely because the appellant applied for revaluation and was<\/p>\n
    declared to have cleared two subjects at revaluation, it does not<\/p>\n
    follow that he had indulged in any malpractice.\n<\/p>\n
    34.       PW 1 Shri Gangaram Meshram was the Assistant<\/p>\n
    Registrar, Revaluation, after the scandal came to light. Various<\/p>\n
    documents were made available by him to the investigating<\/p>\n
    machinery. He had stated in his deposition that the revaluation<\/p>\n
    sheets by Revaluators 1 and 2 used to be sent along with<\/p>\n
    revaluation tabulation register to the Scrutineers. The Scrutineers<\/p>\n
    used to work in team of two. On the basis of R1 and R2 sheets,<\/p>\n
    one of the Scrutineers used to dictate the marks obtained in the<\/p>\n
    revaluation and the other Scrutineer used to note down the marks<\/p>\n
    in the tabulation register. Laxmikant Zade had originally secured<\/p>\n
    17 out of 80 marks in the paper of Electrical Engineering. He had<\/p>\n
    secured 14 out of 20 marks in the sessional examination. Thus the<\/p>\n
                                                 ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                  31<\/span>
\n    total marks obtained were 31 out of 100.          Since the marks<\/p>\n
    required for passing were 40, Laxmikant Zade had failed. On his<\/p>\n
    application for revaluation, the answer books were sent to the<\/p>\n
    Revaluators.\n<\/p>\n
    35.       Revaluator 1 K.T. Veeramanja was examined was<\/p>\n
    PW 4. He stated that he had received the answer paper of BE Ist<\/p>\n
    Year Electrical Engineering Winter 1998 Examination bearing<\/p>\n
    Code No.1015 for revaluation. After assessment of the paper, he<\/p>\n
    allotted 3 marks to the candidate. He proved R1 sheet, which was<\/p>\n
    in his handwriting at Exhibit 16. On the basis of Code No.1015<\/p>\n
    printed on the answer sheet, he stated that Exhibit 25 may be the<\/p>\n
    answer sheet evaluated by him. PW 4 Professor Veramanja was<\/p>\n
    cross-examined as to whether he could say that Exhibit 16 was the<\/p>\n
    same sheet which had gone to the scrutineers for the purpose of<\/p>\n
    entering marks in the RTR. Obviously, PW 4 Veeramanja could<\/p>\n
    not have stated as to which sheet was handed over to the<\/p>\n
    Scrutineers for the purpose of entering marks.\n<\/p>\n
    36.       PW 5 Shivanna also likewise stated that he had<\/p>\n
                                                ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                   32<\/span>
\n    examined the paper bearing Code No.1015 and stated that he had<\/p>\n
    allotted 5 marks to the candidate as per R2 sheet at Exhibit 17,<\/p>\n
    which he proved to be in his handwriting. He could not state as to<\/p>\n
    when R2 sheet was prepared, but denied in cross-examination that<\/p>\n
    he had prepared the sheet at the Police Station in the year 2001.\n<\/p>\n
    He admitted that his specimen signatures were not obtained by<\/p>\n
    the Nagpur University.ig\n<\/p>\n
    37.       PW 1 Gangaram further stated that after receiving the<\/p>\n
    sheets, they were handed over to the Scrutineers as per the<\/p>\n
    prescribed procedure. In the RTR, initially 3 and 5 marks were<\/p>\n
    entered against the name of Laxmikant Zade in his paper of<\/p>\n
    Electrical Engineering. Those marks were then scored out and 25<\/p>\n
    and 26 marks were entered. Average marks were changed to 26<\/p>\n
    from 4, and the percentage change was shown at 12%. Initially in<\/p>\n
    the remark column, the change was shown to be adverse by<\/p>\n
    adding the letters ‘Ad’. But these letters were cut. In the FTR also,<\/p>\n
    the four marks upon revaluation were changed to 26 and initial<\/p>\n
    total of 18 was changed to 40, and thus the candidate was shown<\/p>\n
                                                  ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                   33<\/span>
\n    to have passed in that subject.\n<\/p>\n
    38.        PW 1 Gangaram Meshram also stated about the change<\/p>\n
    in marks in the subject of Physics, where 28 and 29 marks were<\/p>\n
    shown to have been entered in R1 and R2 columns with average<\/p>\n
    of 29 marks.    Marks for sessional assessment were 12. In the<\/p>\n
    FTR, original marks 17 were changed to 29 and after adding 12<\/p>\n
    marks of sessional assessment, total 41 marks were shown to have<\/p>\n
    awarded.\n<\/p>\n
    39.        PW 2 Narayan Ghatole had also stated about the change<\/p>\n
    in marks. He stated that the change in the subject of Physics was<\/p>\n
    in the handwriting of accused No.2 Madhukar Smarth. Change<\/p>\n
    and percentage of increase or decrease were shown to be in the<\/p>\n
    handwriting of accused No.3 Prabhakar Hejib.            In respect of<\/p>\n
    subject of Electrical Engineering, originally 3, 5 and 4 marks were<\/p>\n
    entered in the RTR in the handwriting of accused No.2 Madhukar<\/p>\n
    Smarth along with adverse change. They were changed to 25, 26<\/p>\n
    and 26 by accused No.3 Prabhakar Hejib under his signature. He<\/p>\n
    stated that in the FTR also, the changes are in the handwriting of<\/p>\n
                                                 ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                   34<\/span>
\n    accused No.3 Prabhakar Hejib. In the FTR, initial total of 473 was<\/p>\n
    scored out and some figure like 400 was written, which was not<\/p>\n
    clear and it was then changed to 494 in the handwriting of<\/p>\n
    accused No.3 Prabhakar Hejib.\n<\/p>\n
    40.       PW 2 Narayan Ghatole had stated that since he was<\/p>\n
    working in Revaluation Section and since there were only six<\/p>\n
    Scrutineers, he had the occasion to see their handwritings and<\/p>\n
    signatures frequently and, therefore, could identify the signatures<\/p>\n
    and handwritings of all the six Scrutineers. Thus he identified the<\/p>\n
    handwritings of accused No.2 Madhukar Smarth and accused No.3<\/p>\n
    Prabhakar Hejib on account of his having seen their handwritings.\n<\/p>\n
    It has, however, to be noted that he does not state that he had<\/p>\n
    actually seen Prabhakar Hejib making the changes in marks of<\/p>\n
    Laxmikant. His conclusions are inferential, on the basis of his<\/p>\n
    being conversant with writing of Prabhakar.           It is an opinion<\/p>\n
    expressed on the basis of photographic similarity. Therefore, it<\/p>\n
    could be relied on if corroborated by an Expert’s examination, but<\/p>\n
    may not, in itself, be conclusive of the matter.\n<\/p>\n
                                                   ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                   35<\/span><\/p>\n
    41.         PW 6 Deorao Kumbhare was the Controller of<\/p>\n
    Examinations.        He    stated   having   furnished          requisite<\/p>\n
    information\/documents to the Police.\n<\/p>\n
    42.         PW 10 PSI Lokhande had conducted investigation in the<\/p>\n
    matter. He stated in para 5 of his deposition about change of<\/p>\n
    marks in the case of Laxmikant Zade. By panchanama Exhibit 15,<\/p>\n
    he claims to have seized 168 R1 and R2 sheets including Exhibits<\/p>\n
    16 and 17, which pertain to the present case. In para 10 of his<\/p>\n
    deposition, he stated that he had caused specimen handwriting of<\/p>\n
    Scrutineers Madhukar Smarth and Prabhakar Hejib to be<\/p>\n
    obtained.    He had also caused handwriting of other persons<\/p>\n
    involved in the scandal to be collected and sent to the Examiner of<\/p>\n
    Questioned Documents.\n<\/p>\n
    43.         PW 7 Vishwas Ranjangaonkar is the State Examiner of<\/p>\n
    Questioned Documents, who stated about examination of<\/p>\n
    documents referred to him. Specimen handwriting and signature<\/p>\n
    of Prabhakar Hejib were marked by him as E-1 to E-12<\/p>\n
    corresponding to Investigating Officer’s marking 5S-1 to 5S-6 and<\/p>\n
                                                 ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                  36<\/span>
\n    5S-1-1 to 5S-1-6. The natural handwriting of Prabhakar Hejib was<\/p>\n
    marked by him as EN-1 and EN corresponding to Investigating<\/p>\n
    Officer’s marking of 5-N-1 and 5-N-2. The questioned writing at<\/p>\n
    Q-18 and Q-19 was identified by him to be written by the writer,<\/p>\n
    who wrote E-1 to E-12 and EN-1.           Thus he identifies the<\/p>\n
    questioned writing to be that of accused No.3 Prabhakar Hejib.\n<\/p>\n
    44.       The witness was cross-examined at length on behalf of<\/p>\n
    accused No.3 Prabhakar Hejib.       The witness had proved his<\/p>\n
    reasoning at Exhibit 73 and his opinion at Exhibit 70. The cross-\n<\/p>\n
    examination of this witness does not show that there is any reason<\/p>\n
    for him to come to wrong conclusions about the writing of accused<\/p>\n
    No.3 Prabhakar Hejib.     He admitted that while examining a<\/p>\n
    document, similarities and dissimilarities are to be taken into<\/p>\n
    consideration and added that he did not mention about<\/p>\n
    dissimilarities because dissimilarities were not found. The length<\/p>\n
    to which the cross-examining counsel proceeded could be gauged<\/p>\n
    by the fact that the witness was also asked to state whether he had<\/p>\n
    a certificate with him to show that the lenses which he had used<\/p>\n
                                                 ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                   37<\/span>
\n    for magnifying the document were approved by the Government<\/p>\n
    Bureau of Standard!<\/p>\n
    45.       It was argued on behalf of the accused that the<\/p>\n
    conclusions drawn by the learned Trial Magistrate on the basis of<\/p>\n
    evidence of PW 2 Narayan Ghatole and PW 7 Vishwas<\/p>\n
    Ranjangaonkar are not correct.      Relying on a judgment of the<\/p>\n
    Supreme Court in Sukhvinder Singh and others v. State of Punjab,<\/a><\/p>\n
    reported at (1994) 5 SCC 152, it was contended that the accused<\/p>\n
    could not be compelled to give specimen handwriting when the<\/p>\n
    case is still under investigation. In that case, the specimen writing<\/p>\n
    was taken under the direction of Shri S.P. Garg, Tahsildar-\n<\/p>\n
    Executive Magistrate.    The Court observed in para 21 of the<\/p>\n
    judgment that no enquiry or trial was admittedly pending in the<\/p>\n
    Court of Tahsildar or Executive Magistrate. The enquiry or trial in<\/p>\n
    the case was pending before the designated Court under TADA<\/p>\n
    and, therefore, the direction given by the Tahsildar to Sukhdev<\/p>\n
    Paul to give his specimen writing was held to be unwarranted.\n<\/p>\n
    The Court had considered the provisions of Sections 45 and 73 of<\/p>\n
                                                  ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                   38<\/span>
\n    the Evidence Act.     The observations, as to who could take<\/p>\n
    specimen writing, came in the context of the provisions of Section<\/p>\n
    73 of the Evidence Act, which enable a Court to compare a<\/p>\n
    writing, and for this purpose, direct any person present in Court to<\/p>\n
    write any words or figures. The Court held that such comparison<\/p>\n
    could be carried out not only by the Court itself, but also with the<\/p>\n
    help of an Expert and, therefore, it was felt that it was necessary<\/p>\n
    for the Court concerned, and not an Executive Magistrate, to issue<\/p>\n
    direction for getting a specimen handwriting.\n<\/p>\n
    46.       In Guru Pal Singh v. State of U.P. and another, reported<\/p>\n
    at 2002 Cri.L.J. 1517, the Allahabad High Court held that the<\/p>\n
    Court cannot compel accused to give his specimen handwriting to<\/p>\n
    police for comparison at the stage of investigation.\n<\/p>\n
    47.       In State (Delhi Administration) v. Pali Ram,<\/a> reported at<\/p>\n
    AIR 1979 SC 14, the Supreme Court held that the Court could<\/p>\n
    direct an accused to give his specimen handwriting for enabling it<\/p>\n
    to be compared by even Handwriting Expert.\n<\/p>\n
    48.       The learned APP submitted that there can be no doubt<\/p>\n
                                                  ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                  39<\/span>
\n    that the power to compare handwriting under Section 73 of the<\/p>\n
    Evidence Act can be exercised only by the Court, which is seised of<\/p>\n
    the matter and, therefore, only such Court could ask any person<\/p>\n
    present in the Court to write words or figures for the purpose of<\/p>\n
    enabling a Court to compare the words either by itself or through<\/p>\n
    an Expert. The learned APP submitted that this, however, did not<\/p>\n
    preclude examination of natural or admitted handwriting and the<\/p>\n
    questioned handwriting of a suspect during the course of<\/p>\n
    investigation and tendering evidence about such examination. He<\/p>\n
    pointed out that in the present case, accused No.3 Prabhakar Hejib<\/p>\n
    had not been directed by any Executive Magistrate to give the<\/p>\n
    specimen of his handwriting.      The learned APP submitted that<\/p>\n
    even if the specimen writings collected in course of investigation<\/p>\n
    are excluded, still the Expert has come to the conclusion that the<\/p>\n
    disputed writings are of the same person who wrote the admitted<\/p>\n
    writings. Apart from this, the learned APP pointed out that PW 2<\/p>\n
    Narayan Ghatole, who was conversant with the handwriting of<\/p>\n
    accused No.3 Prabhakar Hejib had duly identified the said writing<\/p>\n
                                                 ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                  40<\/span>
\n    and there is no reason to disbelieve the word of PW 2 Narayan<\/p>\n
    Ghatole. The learned APP also pointed out that the evidence that<\/p>\n
    Scrutineers in this case were accused No.2 Madhukar Smarth and<\/p>\n
    accused   No.3   Prabhakar    Hejib   cannot    be      discarded         as<\/p>\n
    unbelievable. He pointed out that the evidence of PW 2 Narayan<\/p>\n
    Ghatole also shows as to how the tabulation registers and R1 and<\/p>\n
    R2 sheets used to be handled during the course of process of<\/p>\n
    noting of result of revaluation. Therefore, according to him, there<\/p>\n
    was no scope for concluding that the changes in the marks of<\/p>\n
    accused No.1 Laxmikant Zade were made by anyone else, but<\/p>\n
    accused No.3 Prabhakar Hejib. He submitted that since as per the<\/p>\n
    evidence of PW 1 Gangaram Meshram, one of the Scrutineers used<\/p>\n
    to dictate the marks and others used to write, both accused No.2<\/p>\n
    Madhukar Smarth as also accused No.3 Prabhakar Hejib are<\/p>\n
    involved in recording incorrect marks against the name of accused<\/p>\n
    No.1 Laxmikant Zade.\n<\/p>\n
    49.       The learned counsel for the appellants drew my<\/p>\n
    attention to a judgment of the Supreme Court in S. Gopal Reddy v.\n<\/p>\n
                                                 ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                   41<\/span><\/p>\n
    State of A.P., reported at (1996) 4 SCC 596, where the Court had<\/p>\n
    observed that Expert’s evidence under Section 45 of the Evidence<\/p>\n
    Act is a weak type of evidence, which cannot be safely relied upon<\/p>\n
    without independent and reliable corroboration. The Court had<\/p>\n
    considered the various modes of proof of writing of a document by<\/p>\n
    a person and the relevance of opinion of an Expert in such<\/p>\n
    situation. There can be no doubt about the proposition that the<\/p>\n
    evidence of an Expert is a weak type of evidence, in the sense that,<\/p>\n
    in itself, it is not clinching.    But it does not follow when<\/p>\n
    corroborated with the evidence of witness who had occasion to<\/p>\n
    see the person’s writing or circumstance to show that it could be<\/p>\n
    writing of none else, it could be discarded. There is nothing to<\/p>\n
    show that PW 7 Vishwas Ranjangaonkar had any reason to falsely<\/p>\n
    implicate accused No.3 Prabhakar Hejib.       He had not showed<\/p>\n
    ineptitude inexperience or lack of expertise in dealing with the<\/p>\n
    matter, which was referred to him.\n<\/p>\n
    50.       The learned counsel for the appellant had also placed<\/p>\n
    reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Gulzar Ali v.\n<\/p>\n
                                                 ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                  42<\/span><\/p>\n
    State of H.P., reported in (1998) 2 SCC 192, where the Court<\/p>\n
    observed that the modes of proof envisaged in Sections 45 and 47<\/p>\n
    of the Evidence Act are not exhaustive for proving the genuineness<\/p>\n
    or authorship of the document. It is not clear as to what the<\/p>\n
    appellant gains by placing reliance on this judgment.                 Non-\n<\/p>\n
    exhaustive nature of modes of proof of authorship enumerated in<\/p>\n
    Sections 45 and 46 cannot be equated to such modes bring<\/p>\n
    inconclusive or being inadequate in themselves to prove the<\/p>\n
    authorship. The observations of the Supreme Court would only<\/p>\n
    mean that authorship could be proved by even modes which are<\/p>\n
    not enumerated or included in Sections 45 and 47 of the<\/p>\n
    Evidence Act.    In Mobarik Ali Ahmed v. State of Bombay,<\/a><\/p>\n
    reported at AIR 1957 SC 857, on which reliance was placed by<\/p>\n
    the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, the Court was<\/p>\n
    considering the question of proof of authorship of the document<\/p>\n
    in relation to Section 45 of the Evidence Act and the Court held<\/p>\n
    that    authorship     may        be   proved        by        reference<\/p>\n
    to internal   evidence    furnished     by    the contents of the<\/p>\n
                                                 ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                   43<\/span>
\n    document as well. It is, however, not clear as to how this would<\/p>\n
    help the prosecution in the present case.\n<\/p>\n
    51.       In Jagmal Singh Yadav v. Aimaduddin Ahmed Khan,<\/a><\/p>\n
    reported at 1994 Supp (2) SCC 308, on which the learned counsel<\/p>\n
    for the appellant placed reliance, it has been observed that sole<\/p>\n
    testimony of Handwriting Expert would not be enough to hold the<\/p>\n
    writing as proved in the context of an election dispute based on<\/p>\n
    corrupt practices.\n<\/p>\n
    52.       In Alamgir v. State (NCT, Delhi),<\/a> reported at (2003) 1<\/p>\n
    SCC 21, the Supreme Court held that opinion of Handwriting<\/p>\n
    Expert can be relied on when supported by other evidence, though<\/p>\n
    there was no rule of law that without corroboration the evidence<\/p>\n
    could not be accepted.\n<\/p>\n
    53.       In Chandrakant Chimanlal Desai v. State of Gujarat,<\/a><\/p>\n
    reported at (1992) 1 SCC 473, the Court observed that the<\/p>\n
    evidence of Handwriting Expert could not be decisive of the<\/p>\n
    matter unless the prosecution version inspired confidence or was<\/p>\n
    otherwise believable. In that case, the High Court had referred to<\/p>\n
                                                ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                   44<\/span>
\n    the evidence of handwriting without examining the veracity of<\/p>\n
    other prosecution evidence.\n<\/p>\n
    54.       The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that<\/p>\n
    PW 2 Narayan Ghatole, on whose evidence prosecution relies for<\/p>\n
    proving handwriting of Prabhakar Hejib, had resiled from such a<\/p>\n
    stand when he was examined as a witness in Criminal Case<\/p>\n
    No.356 of 2002, arising out of the same scandal. He sought to<\/p>\n
    produce for my perusal a certified copy of deposition of Narayan<\/p>\n
    Ghatole examined as PW 1 Regular Criminal Case No.356 of 2002<\/p>\n
    at Exhibit 20. Narayan did state that he had no occasion to see<\/p>\n
    the writing of any Scrutineer, which obviously includes accused<\/p>\n
    Prabhakar Hejib. He was declared hostile and cross-examined by<\/p>\n
    the Special Public Prosecutor in an attempt to control the damage.\n<\/p>\n
    The learned counsel submitted that thereafter, without allowing<\/p>\n
    the defence to cross-examine the witness, the Special Public<\/p>\n
    Prosecutor withdrew the prosecution under Section 321 of the<\/p>\n
    Code of Criminal Procedure and the learned Magistrate allowed<\/p>\n
    the withdrawal and acquitted the accused in the said case.\n<\/p>\n
                                                ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                  45<\/span><\/p>\n
    Therefore, according to him, except for evidence of Handwriting<\/p>\n
    Expert PW 7 Vishwas Ranjangaonkar, there is no evidence to show<\/p>\n
    that changes in marks were indeed made by accused Prabhakar<\/p>\n
    Hejib.\n<\/p>\n
    55.       The learned APP countered by submitting that volte face<\/p>\n
    by PW 2 Narayan Ghatole in a subsequent case may be for a<\/p>\n
    variety of reasons. This does not denude his deposition in the<\/p>\n
    present case of its evidentiary value. Narayan Ghatole may have<\/p>\n
    lied in Criminal Case No.356 of 2002 and that need not result in<\/p>\n
    washing away the evidence in this case. He further submitted that<\/p>\n
    the question whether change in marks of accused Laxmikant Zade<\/p>\n
    was in the handwriting of accused Prabhakar Hejib or not, ought<\/p>\n
    to be decided by referring to all the relevant factors. He rightly<\/p>\n
    pointed out that the fact that accused Prabhakar Hejib was the<\/p>\n
    Scrutineer (along with acquitted accused Madhukar Smarth),<\/p>\n
    assigned the work of filling up marks scored upon revaluation by<\/p>\n
    Laxmikant Zade is duly established by the evidence of PW 2<\/p>\n
    Narayan Ghatole. Viewed in this context, it would be illogical to<\/p>\n
                                                ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                  46<\/span>
\n    hold that the change in marks noted against paper of Electrical<\/p>\n
    Engineering of accused Laxmikant Zade is not in the handwriting<\/p>\n
    of accused Prabhakar Hejib, in spite of PW 7 Handwriting Expert<\/p>\n
    Vishwas Ranjangaonkar’s so concluding.       Let the Society not<\/p>\n
    gather an impression that the conclusions drawn in a Court of Law<\/p>\n
    have to be “against the common reason of mankind”, or “that<\/p>\n
    springs of decision making in Judges are different from those of<\/p>\n
    the common man”.\n<\/p>\n
    56.       The learned counsel for appellants also raised a<\/p>\n
    grievance about non-seizure of computer record and not taking<\/p>\n
    help of a Cyber Expert, since the FTR is maintained in the<\/p>\n
    University’s computer. This grievance has to be rejected, since<\/p>\n
    there is no complaint about tampering of electronic record. The<\/p>\n
    record tampered is physical document.\n<\/p>\n
    57.       From the evidence on record, it may thus be held as<\/p>\n
    proved that Laxmikant Zade had failed in the examination, he<\/p>\n
    applied for revaluation, his paper of Electrical Engineering was<\/p>\n
    sent, among others, for revaluation, the result of revaluation was<\/p>\n
                                                ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                 47<\/span>
\n    adverse, he had been allotted only 3 and 5 marks by the two<\/p>\n
    examiners, and thus he was entitled to only 4 marks. However,<\/p>\n
    these 4 marks were changed by accused Prabhakar Hejib to 26<\/p>\n
    marks and total of 18, which had been worked out after<\/p>\n
    revaluation was changed to 40 by adding 14 marks of sessional<\/p>\n
    examination or internal assessment, and thus the candidate was<\/p>\n
    shown to have passed in that subject. According to the learned<\/p>\n
    APP, this was sufficient to justify conviction of both Laxmikant<\/p>\n
    Zade as well as Prabhakar Hejib.\n<\/p>\n
    58.       His learned adversaries, however, submitted that the<\/p>\n
    conviction could not have been based only upon proof of these<\/p>\n
    facts. It was first submitted that there is nothing to show that<\/p>\n
    Prabhakar Hejib had in fact been provided with R1 and R2 sheets,<\/p>\n
    Exhibits 16 and 17.   According to the learned counsel for the<\/p>\n
    appellants, if some different R1 and R2 sheets were provided to<\/p>\n
    Prabhakar Hejib by some mischief monger in the Revaluation<\/p>\n
    Section, and if Prabhakar Hejib accordingly entered marks in the<\/p>\n
    RTR and FTR, he could not be blamed. It was submitted that<\/p>\n
                                               ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                   48<\/span>
\n    unless evidence is tendered to show that R1 and R2 sheets at<\/p>\n
    Exhibits 16 and 17 were provided to Prabhakar Hejib and in spite<\/p>\n
    of that he entered wrong marks, it could not be said that<\/p>\n
    Prabhakar Hejib had played any mischief. Relying on a judgment<\/p>\n
    of the Supreme Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of<\/p>\n
    Maharashtra,<\/a> reported at AIR 1984 SC 1622. The learned counsel<\/p>\n
    submitted that in a case resting on circumstantial evidence, every<\/p>\n
    circumstance has to be fully established and the circumstances so<\/p>\n
    established must form a chain so complete as to leave no other<\/p>\n
    conclusion but that of guilt of the accused. The observations in<\/p>\n
    Sharad’s case by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 152 of the<\/p>\n
    judgment may be usefully reproduced as under :\n<\/p>\n
              “152.     A close analysis of this decision would show<\/p>\n
              that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a
\n              case against an accused can be said to be fully established:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                  (1)     the circumstances from which the conclusion of
\n              guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                  It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the
\n              circumstances concerned ‘must or should’ and not ‘may be’
\n              established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal
\n              distinction between ‘may be proved’ and ‘must be or<\/p>\n
                                                   ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                    49<\/span><\/p>\n
             should be proved’ as was held by this Court in Shivaji<\/p>\n
             Sahebrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra,<\/a> (1973) 2 SCC
\n             793 : (AIR 1973 SC 2622) where the following<\/p>\n
             observations were made :\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                “certainly, it   is a primary principle that the accused
\n             must be and not     merely may be guilty before a Court can<\/p>\n
             convict and the     mental distance between ‘may be’ and
\n             ‘must be’ is long   and divides vague conjectures from sure
\n             conclusions.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                (2)     the facts so established should be consistent
\n             only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is<\/p>\n
             to say, they should not be explainable on any other
\n             hypothesis except that the accused is guilty.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                (3)    the circumstances should be of a conclusive
\n             nature and tendency.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                 (4)    they should exclude every possible hypothesis
\n             except the one to be proved, and<\/p>\n
                (5)     there must be a chain of evidence so complete
\n             as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion
\n             consistent with the innocence of the accused and must<\/p>\n
             show that in all human probability the act must have
\n             been done by the accused.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    59.      In Jaharlal Das v. State of Orissa,<\/a> reported at AIR 1999<\/p>\n
    SC 1388, on which the learned counsel for the accused placed<\/p>\n
    reliance, the Supreme Court had held that the circumstances from<\/p>\n
                                                  ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                   50<\/span>
\n    which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn must be cogently<\/p>\n
    and firmly established, those circumstances should be of a definite<\/p>\n
    tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused, and<\/p>\n
    the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so<\/p>\n
    complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within<\/p>\n
    all human probability the crime was committed by the accused<\/p>\n
    and none else, and it should also be incapable of explanation on<\/p>\n
    any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused.\n<\/p>\n
    60.       In Abdulla Mohammed Pagarkar etc. v. State (Union<\/p>\n
    Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu), reported at AIR 1980 SC 499,<\/p>\n
    the Court held that even strong      suspicion created against the<\/p>\n
    accused, and failure of the accused to repel the same, is not<\/p>\n
    sufficient to convict the accused of offences punishable under<\/p>\n
    Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Sections<\/p>\n
    420 and 471 of the Penal Code.\n<\/p>\n
    61.       In Harendra Narain Singh, etc. v. State of Bihar, reported<\/p>\n
    at AIR 1991 SC 1842, the Supreme Court held that in a murder<\/p>\n
    case resting on circumstantial evidence, if, upon appreciation of<\/p>\n
                                                  ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                    51<\/span>
\n    evidence, two views are possible, one pointing to the guilt of the<\/p>\n
    accused and another to the innocence of the accused, the Court<\/p>\n
    should adopt the latter view, since it is the basic rule of criminal<\/p>\n
    jurisprudence.\n<\/p>\n
    62.       In State of A.P. v. I.B.S.P. Rao, reported at AIR 1970 SC 648,<\/p>\n
    on which the learned APP relied, the Court was considering<\/p>\n
    involvement of an accused in offence punishable under Section 120-B<\/p>\n
    and 420 of the Penal Code. In that context the Court observed in<\/p>\n
    relation to circumstantial evidence, in paragraph 7 of the judgment, as<\/p>\n
    under :\n<\/p>\n
              “7. In regard to the question of the effect and sufficiency of<\/p>\n
              circumstantial evidence for the purpose of conviction, it is now<\/p>\n
              settled law that before conviction based solely on such evidence<\/p>\n
              can be sustained, it must be such as to be conclusive of the<\/p>\n
              guilt of the accused and must be incapable of explanation on<\/p>\n
              any hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the accused.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
              But this does not mean that before the prosecution can succeed<\/p>\n
              in a case resting upon circumstantial evidence alone, it must<\/p>\n
              meet any and every hypothesis suggested by the accused,<\/p>\n
                                                     ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                            52<\/span>
\n     however extravagant and fanciful it might be.             Before an<\/p>\n
     accused can contend that a particular hypothesis pointing to<\/p>\n
     his innocence has remained unexcluded by the facts proved<\/p>\n
     against him, the Court must be satisfied that the suggested<\/p>\n
     hypothesis is reasonable and not far-fetched. Further, it is not<\/p>\n
     necessary that every one of the proved facts must in itself be<\/p>\n
     decisive of the complicity of the accused or point conclusively<\/p>\n
     to his guilt. It may be that a particular fact relied upon by the<\/p>\n
     prosecution may not be decisive in itself, and yet if that fact,<\/p>\n
     along with other facts which have been proved, tends to<\/p>\n
     strengthen the conclusion of his guilt, it is relevant and has to<\/p>\n
     be considered. In other words, when deciding the question of<\/p>\n
     sufficiency, what the Court has to consider is the total<\/p>\n
     cumulative effect of all the proved facts each one of which<\/p>\n
     reinforces the conclusion of guilt, and if the combined effect of<\/p>\n
     all those facts taken together is conclusive in establishing the<\/p>\n
     guilt of the accused, the conviction would be justified even<\/p>\n
     though it may be that any one or more of those facts by itself<\/p>\n
     is not decisive.”\n<\/p>\n
                                             ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                   53<\/span><\/p>\n
    63.       There can be no doubt about the propositions which<\/p>\n
    have been reiterated by the Apex Court from time to time in order<\/p>\n
    to guide all the Criminal Courts while considering when<\/p>\n
    conviction could be based on circumstantial evidence.                   The<\/p>\n
    learned APP, however, rightly pointed out that human probability<\/p>\n
    is important catchword in the judgment of Jaharlal Das, on which<\/p>\n
    the learned counsel for the appellants placed reliance.\n<\/p>\n
                          ig                                                  He<\/p>\n
    submitted that the probabilities to be considered are not<\/p>\n
    hypothetical probabilities or strained imaginative probabilities, but<\/p>\n
    those, which would, in the circumstances established, normally be<\/p>\n
    available. The learned APP submitted that the possibility of some<\/p>\n
    other R1 and R2 sheets having been provided to Prof. Prabhakar<\/p>\n
    Hejib is not only remote, but also ruled out. He pointed out that if<\/p>\n
    different R1 and R2 sheets were provided to Prof. Prabhakar Hejib<\/p>\n
    from which he noted the marks, then the marks in respect of other<\/p>\n
    students in the same R1 and R2 sheets would also be different.\n<\/p>\n
    Since the marks in respect of other students are not shown to be<\/p>\n
    different from those in the R1 and R2 sheets at Exhibits 16 and<\/p>\n
                                                  ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                  54<\/span>
\n    17, the possibility that Prabhakar Hejib was provided with<\/p>\n
    something else than what is produced before the Court is ruled<\/p>\n
    out.\n<\/p>\n
    64.       The learned counsel for the appellants submitted first,<\/p>\n
    that the University had not kept any record of specimen signatures<\/p>\n
    of Revaluators to enable the Scrutineers to tally those signatures<\/p>\n
    before transcribing marks from R1 and R2 sheets in the RTR.\n<\/p>\n
    Therefore, according to the learned counsel, the possibility that<\/p>\n
    the doctored R1 and R2 sheets were provided to Prof. Prabhakar<\/p>\n
    Hejib cannot be ruled out. They submitted that a person copying<\/p>\n
    the marks could have maintained the marks in respect of other<\/p>\n
    students and could have changed the marks only in respect of said<\/p>\n
    Laxmikant Zade. Now, this hypothesis first assumes that there<\/p>\n
    was someone, who was interested in changing the marks of<\/p>\n
    Laxmikant Zade alone in order to favour him.             Secondly, it<\/p>\n
    assumes that such person would have had access to R1 and R2<\/p>\n
    sheets and also an opportunity to prepare a copy with altered<\/p>\n
    marks of Laxmikant Zade. It is true that the evidence tendered<\/p>\n
                                                ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                   55<\/span>
\n    shows that the blank R1 and R2 sheets were available in the<\/p>\n
    University office aplenty and no account was kept of these sheets.\n<\/p>\n
    However, it does not follow, as rightly submitted by the learned<\/p>\n
    APP, that person interested in Laxmikant Zade, other than the<\/p>\n
    Scrutineers or person in charge of Revaluation Section would have<\/p>\n
    had access to R1 and R2 sheets received from the Revaluators, as<\/p>\n
    also to the blank R1 and R2 sheets, and would have had time to<\/p>\n
    carry out the manipulations without being noticed by anyone.\n<\/p>\n
    65.        As rightly submitted by the learned APP, in this case, it<\/p>\n
    has to be seen that originally Prof. Smarth had entered correct<\/p>\n
    marks 3, 5 and 4, not only in the RTR, but also had entered 4<\/p>\n
    marks in the FTR. This was later changed by Prof. Hejib to 26<\/p>\n
    marks. Thus the story that a wrong RTR sheet has been provided<\/p>\n
    to Prof. Prabhakar Hejib and, therefore, he made wrong entries, is<\/p>\n
    debunked. Ordinarily when marks already entered are changed<\/p>\n
    by a Scrutineer, he would question the necessity to change such<\/p>\n
    marks. He would also be suspicious as to how wrong marks came<\/p>\n
    to be recorded initially.\n<\/p>\n
                                                  ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                  56<\/span><\/p>\n
    66.       In C.R. Alimchandani and others v. T.K. Shah and<\/a><\/p>\n
    another, reported at 1999(1) Mh.L.J. 825, on which the learned<\/p>\n
    counsel for the accused relied, this Court held that in order to<\/p>\n
    implicate an accused for commission of offences under Sections<\/p>\n
    465 and 466 of the Penal Code, it is incumbent on the part of the<\/p>\n
    complainant to plead the role of each accused in the making or<\/p>\n
    manufacturing of the document in question.\n<\/p>\n
                         ig                                 A wholesale<\/p>\n
    statement that the accused have committed offences under<\/p>\n
    Sections 465 and 466 of the Penal Code was held to be<\/p>\n
    inadequate.    These observations came in the context of a<\/p>\n
    complaint case, which was filed before a Metropolitan Magistrate.\n<\/p>\n
    The learned counsel submitted that since one Scrutineer used to<\/p>\n
    dictate makes and other used to take them down, there was a<\/p>\n
    possibility of human error in wrongly hearing or taking down<\/p>\n
    marksand since roles of each Scrutineer is not defined, accused<\/p>\n
    Prabhakar Hejib could not be held guilty.\n<\/p>\n
    67.       The theory propounded by the defence that since the<\/p>\n
    Scrutineers were working in pairs and since one Scrutineer used<\/p>\n
                                                ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                   57<\/span>
\n    to dictate marks while the other noted them down and, therefore,<\/p>\n
    there was a possibility of wrong marks being dictated by the first<\/p>\n
    Scrutineer, has also to be rejected. If such an explanation were to<\/p>\n
    be accepted, everybody would escape liability and everybody<\/p>\n
    would pass on the buck to the others. It is not shown that there is<\/p>\n
    any rule or a practice direction issued by the University authorities<\/p>\n
    that the Scrutineers must work in pairs or that one Scrutineer<\/p>\n
    must dictate marks while the other takes them down. This may be<\/p>\n
    a practice developed by the Scrutineers for their own convenience.\n<\/p>\n
    Therefore, if a Scrutineer enters the marks believing in his<\/p>\n
    colleague’s dictation, then he must bear the responsibility of any<\/p>\n
    mistake committed by his colleague in dictating marks. It would<\/p>\n
    not be open for him to allege that wrong marks were dictated and<\/p>\n
    so he took down incorrect marks and, therefore, he is not<\/p>\n
    responsible. Therefore, since the marks are shown to have been<\/p>\n
    changed in the handwriting of Prof. Prabhakar Hejib, he must take<\/p>\n
    the responsibility of having entered wrong marks. He must also<\/p>\n
    take the responsibility of having done so in spite of the fact that he<\/p>\n
                                                   ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                   58<\/span>
\n    was provided with the correct R1 and R2 sheets as may be seen<\/p>\n
    from the marks initially entered in the register.\n<\/p>\n
    68.       The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants<\/p>\n
    that after the Scrutineers entered the marks, the RTR and the FTR<\/p>\n
    are in the custody of the Assistant Registrat (Revaluation) and,<\/p>\n
    therefore, the subsequent changes could have been done in the<\/p>\n
    office of the Assistant Registrar, and not necessarily by Prof.<\/p>\n
    Prabhakar Hejib, has to be rejected in this case, because the<\/p>\n
    Handwriting Expert has identified those changes to be in the<\/p>\n
    writing of Prof. Prabhakar Hejib, and the Expert had absolutely no<\/p>\n
    reason to falsely implicate Prof. Prabhakar Hejib.             Therefore,<\/p>\n
    considering the human probabilities, the conclusion is inescapable<\/p>\n
    that Prof. Prabhakar Hejib did enter incorrect marks against the<\/p>\n
    name of student Laxmikant Zade in order to favour him and to<\/p>\n
    make him clear the subject of Electrical Engineering in which he<\/p>\n
    had otherwise failed.\n<\/p>\n
    69.       The learned counsel for appellant Laxmikant Zade<\/p>\n
    submitted that there is no evidence that Laxmikant Zade had ever<\/p>\n
                                                   ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                   59<\/span>
\n    approached Prof. Prabhakar Hejib or that Prof. Prabhakar Hejib<\/p>\n
    changed the marks to the advantage of Laxmikant Zade at the<\/p>\n
    instance of Laxmikant Zade.        They submitted that it may be<\/p>\n
    possible that the change was unintentional, that is, without any<\/p>\n
    motivation to make such a change, or could also have been at the<\/p>\n
    instance of someone else and not necessarily Laxmikant Zade.\n<\/p>\n
    Therefore, according to the learned counsel, since the nexus is not<\/p>\n
    established, it would be wrong to hold that the accused persons<\/p>\n
    had engaged in any conspiracy or that Laxmikant Zade had<\/p>\n
    abetted in forgery or falsification of record by Prof. Prabhakar<\/p>\n
    Hejib, or that Laxmikant Zade had indulged in cheating by using<\/p>\n
    as genuine, a mark-list, which was false. Reliance was placed on<\/p>\n
    the following judgments :\n<\/p>\n
    70.       In State (Delhi Admn.) v. V.C. Shukla and another,<\/p>\n
    reported in 1980 Cri.L.J. 965(1), while considering the case of<\/p>\n
    conspiracy, the Court held that it was well settled that in order to<\/p>\n
    prove a criminal conspiracy, there must be direct or circumstantial<\/p>\n
    evidence to show that there was an agreement between two or<\/p>\n
                                                 ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                   60<\/span>
\n    more persons to commit an offence and that this clearly envisages<\/p>\n
    that there must be a meeting of minds resulting in an ultimate<\/p>\n
    decision taken by the conspirators regarding the commission of an<\/p>\n
    offence. The Court observed that it was true that in most cases, it<\/p>\n
    will be difficult to get direct evidence of an agreement to conspire<\/p>\n
    but a conspiracy can be inferred even from circumstances giving<\/p>\n
    rise to a conclusive or irresistible inference of an agreement<\/p>\n
    between two or more persons to commit an offence.\n<\/p>\n
    71.       In Hari Ram v. State of H.P., reported at 1982 Cri.L.J.\n<\/p>\n
    294, a Division Bench of Himachal Pradesh High Court was<\/p>\n
    considering conspiracy in the context of offence punishable under<\/p>\n
    Section 467 of the Penal Code and reiterated that in case of<\/p>\n
    conspiracy based on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances<\/p>\n
    should be incapable of being reasonably explained on any other<\/p>\n
    hypothesis than the guilt of the accused.\n<\/p>\n
    72.       On the question of elements of conspiracy the learned<\/p>\n
    Additional Public Prosecutor placed reliance in K. Hashim v. State<\/p>\n
    of T.N., reported at (2005) 1 SCC 237, the Court was considering<\/p>\n
                                                 ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                  61<\/span>
\n    ‘conspiracy’ in the context of circulating counterfeit currency. In<\/p>\n
    this context the Court observed in paragraph 22 of the judgment<\/p>\n
    as under :\n<\/p>\n
                    “22. It would be appropriate to deal with<\/p>\n
         the question of conspiracy. Section 120-B IPC is the
\n         provision which provides for punishment for criminal
\n         conspiracy. Definition of ‘criminal conspiracy” given
\n         in Section 120-A reads as follows :\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                    “120-A. When two or more persons agree<\/p>\n
         to do, or cause to be done –\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                    (1) an illegal act, or
\n                    (2) an act which is not illegal by illegal<\/p>\n
                    means, such an agreement is designated a
\n                    criminal conspiracy ;<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<\/blockquote>\n
                    Provided that no agreement except an
\n         agreement to commit an offence shall amount to a<\/p>\n
         criminal conspiracy unless some act besides the<\/p>\n
         agreement is done by one or more parties to such
\n         agreement in pursuance thereof.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
         The elements of a criminal conspiracy have been<\/p>\n
         stated to be (a) an object to be accomplished, (b) a
\n         plan or scheme embodying means to accomplish the
\n         object, (c) an agreement or understanding between
\n         two or more of the accused persons whereby, they
\n         become definitely committed to cooperate for the<\/p>\n
         accomplishment of the object by the means embodied
\n         in the agreement, or by any effectual means, and (d)
\n         in the jurisdiction where the statute required an overt
\n         act. The essence of a criminal conspiracy is the
\n         unlawful combination and ordinarily the offence is<\/p>\n
                                                  ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                      62<\/span><\/p>\n
          complete when the combination is framed. From this,<\/p>\n
          it necessarily follows that unless the statute so
\n          requires, no overt act need be done in furtherance of<\/p>\n
          the conspiracy, and that the object of the combination
\n          need not be accomplished in order to constitute an
\n          indictable offence. Encouragement and support which
\n          co-conspirators give to one another rendering<\/p>\n
          enterprises possible which, if left to individual effort,
\n          would have been impossible, furnish the ground for
\n          visiting conspirators and abettors with condign
\n          punishment. The conspiracy is held to be continued<\/p>\n
          and renewed as to all its members wherever and
\n          whenever any member of the conspiracy acts in<\/p>\n
          furtherance of the common design. (See American
\n          Jurisprudence, Vol.II, Section 23, p.559). For an<\/p>\n
          offence punishable under Sction 120-B the
\n          prosecution need not necessarily prove that the
\n          perpetrators expressly agree to do or cause to be done
\n          illegal act; the agreement may be proved by necessary<\/p>\n
          implication. Offence of criminal conspiracy consists
\n          not merely in the intention of two or more, but in the<\/p>\n
          agreement of two or more to do an unlawful act by
\n          unlawful means. So long as such a design rests in
\n          intention only, it is not indictable. When two agree to
\n          carry it into effect, the very plot is an act in itself, and<\/p>\n
          an act of each of the parties, promise against promise,
\n          actus contra capable of being enforced, if lawful,
\n          punishable if for a criminal object or for use of
\n          criminal means.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    73.        In this judgment reliance is placed on earlier judgment<\/p>\n
    of the Supreme Court in Ramnarayan Popli v. CBI, reported at<\/p>\n
                                                      ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:34 :::<\/span>
\n                                  63<\/span><\/p>\n
    (2003) 3 SCC 641, which too was made available for my perusal<\/p>\n
    by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor. In that case a three<\/p>\n
    Judge Bench of the Supreme Court was considering the<\/p>\n
    ingredients of the criminal conspiracy amongst other things,<\/p>\n
    though the Judges were divided on the complicity of some of the<\/p>\n
    accused persons.    According to the learned A.P.P., as far as<\/p>\n
    ingredients of conspiracy comes, observations of minority judge<\/p>\n
    Hon’ble Shri Justice Shah as well as majority judgment written by<\/p>\n
    Hon’ble Shri Justice Pasayat and Hon’ble Shri Justice Agrawal<\/p>\n
    would be helpful in bringing out as to what would constitute<\/p>\n
    conspiracy as also concepts of making false documents defrauding<\/p>\n
    dishonestly and fraudulently. I have carefully gone through the<\/p>\n
    judgment. In that case the Court was considering the cases which<\/p>\n
    were not of conventional or traditional type. The case pertained<\/p>\n
    to the famous security scam where the ultimate objective was to<\/p>\n
    use public money in carefully planned manner for personal use<\/p>\n
    with no right to it. The Court held that in the last few years the<\/p>\n
    country has seen an alarming rise in white-collar crimes which has<\/p>\n
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\n                                      64<\/span>
\n    affected the fiber of the country’s economic structure. These cases<\/p>\n
    are nothing but private gain at the cost of the public, and lead to<\/p>\n
    economic disaster.\n<\/p>\n
    74.       The    learned    A.P.P.    submitted,     relying        on     the<\/p>\n
    observations of these cases that the duty cast on the scrutineers<\/p>\n
    and University officers in respect of filling in the marks secured by<\/p>\n
    the   candidates     was
\n                          ig    an    entrustment      which        they      had<\/p>\n
    misappropriated by vending the marks to willing studetns by<\/p>\n
    engaging in a conspiracy.\n<\/p>\n
    75.       In Esher Singh v. State of A.P., reported at (2004) 11<\/p>\n
    SCC 585, in relation to offence under the TADA the Court was<\/p>\n
    considering the ingredients of ‘criminal conspiracy’.           The Court<\/p>\n
    observed that direct independent evidence of criminal conspiracy<\/p>\n
    is jointly not available and in force have to be normal duties from<\/p>\n
    the acts of the parties. The Court had referred to earlier judgment<\/p>\n
    in V.C. Shukla v. State (Delhi Admn.) [(1980) 2 SCC 665]. The<\/p>\n
    Court observed that privacy and secrecy are more characteristics<\/p>\n
    of conspiracy and therefore, agreements have to be proved only by<\/p>\n
                                                    ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:35 :::<\/span>
\n                                  65<\/span>
\n    necessary implication.\n<\/p>\n
    76.       The learned APP submitted, and rightly in my view, that<\/p>\n
    it would be too far fetched to imagine that Prof. Prabhakar Hejib<\/p>\n
    would increase the marks of Laxmikant Zade for no apparent<\/p>\n
    reason, or without being approached by Laxmikant Zade or merely<\/p>\n
    because he took a fancy for the name. Even if it is presumed that<\/p>\n
    somebody on behalf of Laxmikant Zade had approached Prof.<\/p>\n
    Prabhakar Hejib, such approach would obviously be at the<\/p>\n
    instance of Laxmikant Zade. It may not be permissible to allow<\/p>\n
    imagination to run wild and imagine all sorts of possibilities and<\/p>\n
    overlooking natural course of human conduct. Therefore, it would<\/p>\n
    not be permissible to hold that the nexus between benefit accrued<\/p>\n
    to Laxmikant Zade and change of marks made by Prof. Prabhakar<\/p>\n
    Hejib is not established. Conspiracy is not something, which is<\/p>\n
    indulged in by calling witnesses. It would have to be inferred<\/p>\n
    from the facts established by the evidence tendered by the<\/p>\n
    prosecution.   It would be impermissible to conclude that since<\/p>\n
    there was no evidence of communication between the two<\/p>\n
                                                ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:35 :::<\/span>
\n                                   66<\/span>
\n    appellants, the offence is not proved.\n<\/p>\n
    77.       It was next submitted on behalf of appellant Laxmikant<\/p>\n
    Zade that he had been issued a mark-list after the revaluation<\/p>\n
    process was over and this mark-list was not shown to have been<\/p>\n
    cancelled by the University when he applied for admission to the<\/p>\n
    next stage of his academic career. Therefore, he could not be held<\/p>\n
    guilty of forgery of cheating. The learned counsel for the accused<\/p>\n
    relied on the following judgments :\n<\/p>\n
    78.       In K. Prasantha Kumar v. State of Andhra Pradesh,<\/p>\n
    reported at 2004 DGLS(Cri.) Soft 546, the Andhra Pradesh High<\/p>\n
    Court held in connection of offences punishable under Sections<\/p>\n
    465, 417 and 193 of the Penal Code arising out of an allegation<\/p>\n
    that the accused had obtained admission by producing a forged<\/p>\n
    document, that conviction could not be handed down unless it<\/p>\n
    was shown that the document was forged by the accused and<\/p>\n
    none else, merely because the forged document is in the name of<\/p>\n
    the accused, the accused could not be convicted.\n<\/p>\n
    79.       In Nand Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, reported at AIR<\/p>\n
                                                ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:35 :::<\/span>
\n                                    67<\/span><\/p>\n
    1992 SC 1939, it was held that unless it was established that<\/p>\n
    forging of documents was within the knowledge and consent of<\/p>\n
    the accused, the accused is entitled to acquittal of charge of<\/p>\n
    forgery as well as cheating.\n<\/p>\n
    80.       In Chatt Ram v. State of Haryana, reported in AIR 1979<\/p>\n
    SC 1890, the Court held that merely because the accused<\/p>\n
    presented a forged lottery ticket for claiming special prize, it could<\/p>\n
    not be held that the accused was concerned in forging the ticket or<\/p>\n
    had the requisite guilty knowledge of its forged character.\n<\/p>\n
    81.       In Shyamsunder s\/o Madanlal Khandelwal v. Dashrath<\/p>\n
    s\/o Kisan Bondade and others, reported at 2006 ALL MR (Cri) 801,<\/p>\n
    this Court held that basic minimum requirement for conviction<\/p>\n
    under Section 417 of the Penal Code would be that the<\/p>\n
    complainant states on oath that he was induced to part with his<\/p>\n
    goods with fradulent and dishonest intention by the accused and<\/p>\n
    in absence of such basic averment, it is impermissible to convict<\/p>\n
    the accused.\n<\/p>\n
    82.       The learned counsel for the accused also relied on the<\/p>\n
                                                   ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:35 :::<\/span>
\n                                  68<\/span><\/p>\n
    judgments in N.P. Chhabaria v. M\/s. Jyoti Wire Industries and<\/p>\n
    others<\/a>, reported at 2003 ALL MR (Cri) 2304, and Sharad<\/p>\n
    Prabhakar Ambadkar and another v. Arun Sharadram Deshpande<\/p>\n
    and another, reported at 2005 ALL MR (Cri) 601, to support the<\/p>\n
    contention that for proving cheating, it is necessary to prove that<\/p>\n
    the accused has deceived or induced a person with fradulent or<\/p>\n
    dishonest intention and that the person so induced has delivered<\/p>\n
    or consented to retain some property or induced to act or omit to<\/p>\n
    do something or some act or omission causes or is likely to cause<\/p>\n
    damage or harm to that person in body, mind or reputation.                 It<\/p>\n
    was submitted that it could not, therefore, be said that Laxmikant<\/p>\n
    Zade had indulged in cheating by submitting a forged mark-list.\n<\/p>\n
    83.       In A.S. Krishnan v. State of Kerala, reported at 2004 AIR<\/p>\n
    SCW 3066, on which the learned APP relied, there was a similar<\/p>\n
    case of forged mark sheet got by father of the student so as to<\/p>\n
    secure admission for the student in medicine course. There was<\/p>\n
    revaluation even in that case. The Court considered as to how the<\/p>\n
    candidate could not have secured the marks which were shown in<\/p>\n
                                                 ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:35 :::<\/span>
\n                                  69<\/span>
\n    the mark sheet even in revaluation. The observations of the Court<\/p>\n
    in paragraph 8 and 9 of the judgment regarding ingredients of<\/p>\n
    Section 471 of the Penal Code and the concepts of intention,<\/p>\n
    knowledge, reason to believe may be usefully reproduced as<\/p>\n
    under :\n<\/p>\n
         “8. The essential ingredients of Section 471 are : (i)<\/p>\n
         fraudulent or dishonest use of document as genuine,\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
         (ii) knowledge or reasonable belief on the part of<\/p>\n
         person using the document that it is a forged one,
\n         Section 471 is intended to apply to persons other than
\n         forger himself, but the forger himself is not excluded<\/p>\n
         from the operation of the Section. To attract Section
\n         471, it is not necessary that the person held guilty
\n         under the provision must have forged the document
\n         himself or that the person independently charged for<\/p>\n
         forgery of the document must of necessity be<\/p>\n
         convicted, before the person using the forged
\n         document, knowing it to be a forged one can be
\n         convicted, as long as the fact that the document used
\n         stood established or proved to be a forged one. The<\/p>\n
         act or acts which constitute the commission of the
\n         offence of forgery are quite different from the act of
\n         making use of a forged document. The expression
\n         ‘fraudulently and dishonestly’ are defined in Sections
\n         25 and 24, IPC respectively. For an offence under<\/p>\n
         Section 471, one of the necessary ingredients is
\n         fraudulent and dishonest use of the document as
\n         genuine. The act need not be both dishonest and
\n         fraudulent. The use of document as contemplated by
\n         Section 471 must be voluntary one. For sustaining<\/p>\n
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\n                                     70<\/span><\/p>\n
          conviction under Section 471 it is necessary for the<\/p>\n
          prosecution to prove that accused knew or had reason
\n          to believe that the document to be a forged one.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          Whether the accused knew or had reason to believe
\n          the document in question to be a forged has to be
\n          adjudicated on the basis of materials and the finding
\n          recorded in that regard is essentially factual.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          9. Under the IPC, guilt in respect of almost all the
\n          offences is fastened either on the ground of “intention”
\n          or “knowledge” or “reason to believe. We are now<\/p>\n
          concerned with the expressions “knowledge” and
\n          “reason to believe. “Knowledge is an awareness on<\/p>\n
          the part of the person concerned indicating his state of
\n          mind. “Reason to believe” is another fact of the state<\/p>\n
          of mind. “Reason to believe” is not the same thing as
\n          “suspicion” or “doubt” and mere seeing also cannot be
\n          equated to believing. “Reason to believe” is a higher
\n          level of state of mind. Likewise “knowledge” will be<\/p>\n
          slightly on higher plane than “reason to believe”. A
\n          person can be supposed to know where there is a<\/p>\n
          direct appeal to his senses and a person is presumed
\n          to have a reason to believe if he has sufficient cause to
\n          believe the same. Section 26, IPC explains the
\n          meaning of the words “reason to believe” thus :\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          26. “Reason to believe”. A person is said to have
\n          ‘reason to believe’ a thing, if he has sufficient cause to
\n          believe that thing but not otherwise”.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    84.        The argument that Laxmikant did not indulge in<\/p>\n
    cheating would have been available had Laxmikant Zade’s marks<\/p>\n
    not been changed to his advantage by the Scrutineers. Since the<\/p>\n
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\n                                  71<\/span>
\n    knowledge that the marks were so changed is attributable to<\/p>\n
    Laxmikant Zade, it has to be inferred that Laxmikant Zade<\/p>\n
    knowingly submitted a mark-list which depicted marks which he<\/p>\n
    had not earned. It was this mark-list, which induced the College<\/p>\n
    to admit Laxmikant Zade for BE Part II Course under the scheme<\/p>\n
    of “Allowed To Keep Terms”. Therefore, it has to be held that the<\/p>\n
    charge of cheating simpliciter against Laxmikant Zade was rightly<\/p>\n
    held as proved.\n<\/p>\n
    85.       The learned counsel for both the appellants submitted<\/p>\n
    that drawing too many inferences based on too many assumptions<\/p>\n
    amounts to entering into the area of conjectures and surmises. In<\/p>\n
    Sarwan Singh Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab,<\/a> reported at AIR<\/p>\n
    1957 SC 637, the Court held that mere suspicion, however strong,<\/p>\n
    cannot take the place of proof. They, therefore, submitted that<\/p>\n
    such conclusions are not permissible. While it would have indeed<\/p>\n
    eminently desirable that the prosecution should have tendered<\/p>\n
    evidence in respect of each aspect of the matter and should have<\/p>\n
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\n                                  72<\/span>
\n    even found out as to how Laxmikant Zade and Prof. Prabhakar<\/p>\n
    Hejib met or communicated, absence of such evidence, in itself,<\/p>\n
    would not permit the Court to shut its eyes, again, to the normal<\/p>\n
    course of human conduct. The learned APP brought to my notice<\/p>\n
    the observations of the Supreme Court in Dhanaj Singh v. State of<\/p>\n
    Punjab,<\/a> reported at (2004) 3 SCC 654, to the effect that if primacy<\/p>\n
    is given to such designed or negligent investigation, to omissions<\/p>\n
    or lapses by perfunctory investigation or omissions, the faith and<\/p>\n
    confidence of the people would be shaken not only in the Law<\/p>\n
    enforcing agency but also in the admistration of justice. It would<\/p>\n
    not be permissible to conclude that Laxmikant Zade was benefited<\/p>\n
    by change in his marks without any initiation from him or that<\/p>\n
    Prof. Prabhakar Hejib innocently changed these marks without<\/p>\n
    any motive. Therefore, the conclusions drawn cannot be faulted.\n<\/p>\n
    86.       The learned counsel for appellant Laxmikant Zade<\/p>\n
    stated that Laxmikant had stated that he wanted to examine<\/p>\n
    defence witnesses.   An application was filed vide Exhibit 106<\/p>\n
    indicating that the accused wanted to examine Commissioner of<\/p>\n
                                                 ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:35 :::<\/span>
\n                                   73<\/span>
\n    Police as regards initial investigation and authority of PSI<\/p>\n
    Lokhande to investigate into the matter; Principal of Priyadarshini<\/p>\n
    College (i.e. Professor of PW 3 Gadkari); Vice Chancellor of<\/p>\n
    Nagpur    University,   regarding       powers   and       procedure          of<\/p>\n
    revaluation; and the Secretary, Ministry of Education.                     This<\/p>\n
    application was rejected by the learned Trial Magistrate observing<\/p>\n
    that it amounted to dilatory tactics.\n<\/p>\n
    87.       The learned counsel submitted that examination of<\/p>\n
    prosecution witnesses, which commenced on 24-1-2006, had<\/p>\n
    dragged on for a full year.     Therefore, the learned Magistrate<\/p>\n
    should not have held that the application dated 17-1-2007 for<\/p>\n
    examining defence witnesses was unduly delayed and need not<\/p>\n
    have precipated the matter by pronouncing the judgment on<\/p>\n
    25-1-2007 in spite of the fact that an application for transfer of the<\/p>\n
    case was filed. While it was thoroughly undesirable on the part of<\/p>\n
    the learned Trial Magistrate to have shut out defence so<\/p>\n
    summarily, the record shows that delay in completion of recording<\/p>\n
    evidence was not attributable to the learned Magistrate.                   The<\/p>\n
                                                     ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:35 :::<\/span>
\n                                  74<\/span>
\n    lawyers on both the sides seem to have participated in the trial as<\/p>\n
    and when they found time.\n<\/p>\n
    88.       The question is whether prejudice is caused to the<\/p>\n
    appellant on account of refusal to examine defence witnesses. An<\/p>\n
    acting Vice Chancellor was already examined as prosecution<\/p>\n
    witness, so examining another Vice Chancellor about powers and<\/p>\n
    procedure was not necessary. In any case, this is more a matter of<\/p>\n
    record and cannot be within personal knowledge of individual.\n<\/p>\n
    Same would hold good about the three other witnesses sought to<\/p>\n
    be examined. Therefore, it cannot be held that any prejudice was<\/p>\n
    caused or failure of justice occurred on account of the course<\/p>\n
    adopted by the learned Magistrate (which cannot at all be<\/p>\n
    approved or commended). Attempt of the learned counsel for the<\/p>\n
    appellants to take advantage of acquittal of co-accused indicating<\/p>\n
    absence of conspiracy was repelled by the learned APP by relying<\/p>\n
    on the judgment in Anicete Lobo v. State (Goa, Daman & Diu),<\/a><\/p>\n
    reported at AIR 1994 SC 1613, in which while considering the<\/p>\n
    involvement of accused in offences punishable under Sections<\/p>\n
                                                 ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:35 :::<\/span>
\n                                   75<\/span>
\n    467, 468, 420 and 120-B of the Penal Code, arising out of<\/p>\n
    encashment of a forged bank draft, the Court held that acquittal of<\/p>\n
    one of the accused would be of no consequence on the complicity<\/p>\n
    of the other accused persons, all of whom were allegedly involved<\/p>\n
    in the conspiracy.\n<\/p>\n
    89.       Relying on judgment In Hardeep Singh and others v.\n<\/p>\n
    State of Haryana, reported at AIR 1008 SC 3113, where while<\/p>\n
    considering the provision of Section 34 of the Penal Code, the<\/p>\n
    Court observed that the provision is intended to meet a case in<\/p>\n
    which it may be difficult to distinguish between acts of individual<\/p>\n
    members of a party who act in furtherance of the common<\/p>\n
    intention of all or to prove exactly what part was played by each<\/p>\n
    of them, the learned counsel for the appellants assailed conviction<\/p>\n
    by resorting to Section 34 of the Penal Code. In that case, the<\/p>\n
    Court further held that for applying Section 34, it is not necessary<\/p>\n
    to show that there was some overt act on the part of the accused.\n<\/p>\n
    In Shiv Prasad Chuni Lal Jain and another v. State of Maharashtra,<\/p>\n
    reported at AIR 1965 SC 264, the Court held that when an accused<\/p>\n
                                                 ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:35 :::<\/span>
\n                                   76<\/span>
\n    person was not present when various offences were committed by<\/p>\n
    the co-accused, he could not be convicted with the help of Section<\/p>\n
    34 of the Penal Code.\n<\/p>\n
    90.       The learned APP relied on a judgment in                N.M.M. Y<\/p>\n
    Momin v. State of Maharashtra, reported at AIR 1971 SC 885,<\/p>\n
    where the Supreme Court had considered the distinction between<\/p>\n
    Sections 34,   109 and 120-B of the Penal Code for fastening<\/p>\n
    liability of a crime on a person who may not have actually done<\/p>\n
    the act which constitutes an offence.          In paragraph 7 of the<\/p>\n
    judgment the Supreme Court held as under :\n<\/p>\n
              “7. So far as S. 34, Indian Penal Code is concerned, it<\/p>\n
              embodies the principle of joint liability in the doing of a
\n              criminal act, the essence of that liability being the
\n              existence of a common intention.        Participation in the<\/p>\n
              commission of the offence in furtherance of the common
\n              intention invites its application.     Section 109, Indian
\n              Penal Code on the other hand may be attracted even if the<\/p>\n
              abettor is not present when the offence abetted is
\n              committed     provided   that   he     has     instigated        the
\n              commission of the offence or has engaged with one or<\/p>\n
                                                    ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:35 :::<\/span>
\n                          77<\/span><\/p>\n
     more other persons in a conspiracy to commit an offence<\/p>\n
     and pursuant to that conspiracy some act or illegal<\/p>\n
     omission takes place or has intentionally aided the
\n     commission of an offence by an act or illegal omission.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     Turning to the charge under Section 120-B, Indian Penal<\/p>\n
     Code criminal conspiracy was made a substantive offence
\n     in 1913 by the introduction of Chapter V A in the Indian<\/p>\n
     Penal Code. Criminal conspiracy postulates an agreement
\n     between two or more persons to do, or cause to be done,<\/p>\n
     an illegal act or an act which is not illegal, by illegal<\/p>\n
     means.    It differs from other offences in that mere
\n     agreement is made an offence even if no step is taken to
\n     carry out that agreement.          Though there is close<\/p>\n
     association of conspiracy with incitement and abetment<\/p>\n
     the   substantive   offence   of   criminal     conspiracy        is
\n     somewhat wider in amplitude thatn abetment by
\n     conspiracy as contemplated by Sec. 107, I.P.C.                     A<\/p>\n
     conspiracy from its very nature is generally hatched in
\n     secret. It is, therefore, extremely rare that direct evidence
\n     in proof of conspiracy can be forthcoming from wholly<\/p>\n
     disinterested quarters or from utter strangers. But, like
\n     other offences, criminal conspiracy can be proved by
\n     circumstantial evidence. Indeed in most cases proof of<\/p>\n
                                          ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:35 :::<\/span>
\n                                  78<\/span><\/p>\n
              conspiracy is largely inferential though the inference must<\/p>\n
              be founded on solid facts.    Surrounding circumstances<\/p>\n
              and antecedent and subsequent conduct, among other
\n              factors, constitute relevant material. In fact because of
\n              the difficulties in having direct evidence of criminal<\/p>\n
              conspiracy, once reasonable ground is shown for believing
\n              that two or more persons have conspired to commit an<\/p>\n
              offence then anything done by anyone of them in
\n              reference to their common intention after the same is<\/p>\n
              entertained becomes according to the law of evidence,<\/p>\n
              relevant for proving both conspiracy and the offences
\n              committed pursuant thereto. ….”\n<\/p>\n
    91.       It is true that for invoking Section 34 of the Penal Code,<\/p>\n
    it would be necessary to at least show presence of both the<\/p>\n
    appellants when the criminal acts were committed. Laxmikant<\/p>\n
    was not shown to be present when forgery was committed and<\/p>\n
    Prabhakar Hejib was not shown to be present when Laxmikant<\/p>\n
    Zade allegedly cheated by seeking admission on forged mark-list.\n<\/p>\n
    Therefore, conviction by resorting to Section 34 of the Penal Code<\/p>\n
    cannot be sustained.\n<\/p>\n
                                                  ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:35 :::<\/span>
\n                                   79<\/span><\/p>\n
    92.       The learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate has<\/p>\n
    convicted the appellants of various offence with the aid of<\/p>\n
    Sections 34 and 109 of the Penal Code.       As already observed,<\/p>\n
    Section 34 is not attracted. However, resort to Section 109 of the<\/p>\n
    Penal Code may be justified, since Section 107 of the Penal Code<\/p>\n
    provides that a person abets doing of a thing if he engages with<\/p>\n
    one or more persons for the doing of that thing and Section 109 of<\/p>\n
    the Penal Code makes such abetment punishable with the<\/p>\n
    punishment, which is provided for the offence, which committed<\/p>\n
    as a consequence of abetment.\n<\/p>\n
    93.       The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that<\/p>\n
    conviction for offence punishable under Section 420 of the Penal<\/p>\n
    Code is not justified, since there is no delivery of any property or<\/p>\n
    valuable security.\n<\/p>\n
    94.       The learned APP submitted that the conviction under<\/p>\n
    Section 420 (as also under Section 409) of the Penal Code is<\/p>\n
    justified, since the word “property” need not be given a restricted<\/p>\n
    meaning to money or other tangible property. For this purpose,<\/p>\n
                                                 ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:35 :::<\/span>
\n                                  80<\/span>
\n    he cited some decisions of the Supreme Court.\n<\/p>\n
    95.       In R.K. Dalmia v. Delhi Administration,<\/a> reported in AIR<\/p>\n
    1962 SC 1821, on which the learned A.P.P. relied, the Court had<\/p>\n
    considered the meaning of the word ‘property’ used in Sections<\/p>\n
    405 and 409 of the Penal Code. The Court observed that the<\/p>\n
    word ‘property’ is used in the Penal code in a much wider sense<\/p>\n
    than the expression ‘movable property’. The Court observed that<\/p>\n
    there was no good reason to restrict the meaning of the ‘property’<\/p>\n
    to movable property only.     The Court held that whether the<\/p>\n
    offence defined in a particular section of the Penal Code can be<\/p>\n
    committed in respect of any particular kind of property will<\/p>\n
    depend not on the interpretation of the word ‘property’ but on the<\/p>\n
    fact whether that particular kind of property can be subject to the<\/p>\n
    acts covered by that section. The learned A.P.P. submitted that in<\/p>\n
    view of this judgment, the marks earned by the appellant-student<\/p>\n
    and the mark-sheet issued to him would be a sort of property and<\/p>\n
    therefore, the offence punishable under Section 420 of the Penal<\/p>\n
    Code as also 409 of the Penal Code would be attracted. It is not<\/p>\n
                                                 ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:35 :::<\/span>
\n                                   81<\/span>
\n    possible to accept this submission. In the case, which the Supreme<\/p>\n
    Court was considering, the question was of entrustment that<\/p>\n
    dominion over funds of Bharat Insurance Company and in that<\/p>\n
    context the observations came. It cannot be held that the property<\/p>\n
    for the purpose of Section 420 or 405 of the Penal Code would be<\/p>\n
    non-corporeal property.     It will have to be either movable or<\/p>\n
    immovable property or the property which is transferable,<\/p>\n
    consumable or capable of being spent and not one of the type of<\/p>\n
    mark-sheet    which   is   intangible,   non-transferable        or    non-\n<\/p>\n
    expendable.\n<\/p>\n
    96.       In Shivnarayan v. State of Maharashtra, reported at AIR<\/p>\n
    1980 SC 439, the Supreme Court again considered what<\/p>\n
    constitutes ‘property’ for the purpose of Section 409 of the Penal<\/p>\n
    Code and held that chose in action is ‘property’. This cannot help<\/p>\n
    the prosecution in branding the registers which the scrutineers<\/p>\n
    were supposed to fill up or the mark sheets which are appellant-\n<\/p>\n
    students got to be property since the chose in action is indeed<\/p>\n
    property recognised as such in law and is also transferable.\n<\/p>\n
                                                  ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:35 :::<\/span>
\n                                   82<\/span><\/p>\n
    97.       As far as forgery is concerned, Clause Secondly of<\/p>\n
    Section 464 of the Penal Code makes dishonest or fraudulent<\/p>\n
    alteration of a document without lawful authority to be forgery.\n<\/p>\n
    The learned Trial Magistrate has convicted the appellants for<\/p>\n
    offences punishable under Sections 468 and 471 of the Penal Code<\/p>\n
    holding that the appellants are guilty of forgery for the purpose of<\/p>\n
    cheating, as also of using as genuine a document, which he knows<\/p>\n
    or has reason to believe to be forged. No fault can be found with<\/p>\n
    this conclusion.\n<\/p>\n
    98.       In State v. Savithiri and others, reported at 1976 Cri.L.J.\n<\/p>\n
    37, a Division Bench of Madras High Court held that when the<\/p>\n
    accused was convicted for offences punishable under Section 302<\/p>\n
    read with Section 109 of the Penal Code, he could not be<\/p>\n
    simultaneously convicted and sentenced for offence punishable<\/p>\n
    under Section 120-B of the Penal Code, though abetment could be<\/p>\n
    by conspiracy. In view of the appellants’ conviction with the aid of<\/p>\n
    Section 109 of the Penal Code, there was no warrant to resort to<\/p>\n
    Section 120-B of the Penal Code. The conviction and sentence<\/p>\n
                                                  ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:35 :::<\/span>
\n                                   83<\/span>
\n    inflicted on this count cannot, therefore, be sustained.\n<\/p>\n
    99.       As regards the direction of the learned Additional Chief<\/p>\n
    Judicial Magistrate that the sentences shall run consecutively, the<\/p>\n
    learned counsel for the appellants placed reliance on a Full Bench<\/p>\n
    judgment of this Court in Queen-Empress v. Malu Argun and<\/p>\n
    another, reported at 1 BLW 1899.       In that case, a person had<\/p>\n
    committed house-breaking in order to commit theft. The Court<\/p>\n
    held that while awarding punishment under the provisions of<\/p>\n
    Section 71 of the Penal Code, the Court should pass one sentence<\/p>\n
    for either of the above offences and not a separate one for each<\/p>\n
    offence. The Court also added that if two sentences were passed<\/p>\n
    and the aggregate of them did not exceed the punishment<\/p>\n
    provided by law for any one of the offences, or the jurisdiction of<\/p>\n
    the Court, that would be an irregularity only, and not an illegality.\n<\/p>\n
    100.      A Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in Kitabdi v.\n<\/p>\n
    Emperor, reported at AIR 1931 Calcutta 450, held that when a<\/p>\n
    person is charged with rioting under Section 147 of the Penal<\/p>\n
    Code and then by reason merely of being a party to the riot or the<\/p>\n
                                                  ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:35 :::<\/span>
\n                                   84<\/span>
\n    unlawful assembly becomes liable under Section 304 of the Penal<\/p>\n
    Code, separate sentences under the two charges were forbidden.\n<\/p>\n
    101.      In view of this, separate sentences for offences<\/p>\n
    punishable under Sections 468 and 471 of the Penal Code cannot<\/p>\n
    be sustained.     Also, since ingredients of offence of cheating<\/p>\n
    punishable under Section 417 of the Penal Code are included in<\/p>\n
    offence of forgery for the purpose of cheating under Section 468<\/p>\n
    of the Penal Code, separate sentence for this offence too is not<\/p>\n
    warranted.      Consequently, direction that sentences shall run<\/p>\n
    consecutively is thoroughly unjustified. It seems that the learned<\/p>\n
    Magistrate   overlooked     the    necessity    of     maintaining           a<\/p>\n
    proportionality in the matter of sentence and inflicted a harsh<\/p>\n
    sentence for offences, which though unpardonable, are not ones,<\/p>\n
    which call for exemplary sentence. One of the appellants is an old<\/p>\n
    man of 73 years and has already paid dearly for his indiscretion by<\/p>\n
    suffering incarceration and resultant loss of face and esteem at the<\/p>\n
    end of a long academic career. The other is a young man on the<\/p>\n
    threshold of embarking upon career in Engineering, who would<\/p>\n
                                                   ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:35 :::<\/span>
\n                                   85<\/span>
\n    find all doors shut upon him due to stigma of conviction.\n<\/p>\n
    Appellant Prabhakar Hejib has been in jail for about 8 months and<\/p>\n
    appellant Laxmikant Zade has been in jail for 21 days.\n<\/p>\n
    102.      The learned APP submitted that considering the harm<\/p>\n
    that the activities of these persons has caused to the reputation of<\/p>\n
    the Nagpur University, no leniency should be shown. He relied on<\/p>\n
    the judgment of the Supreme Court in Beena Philipose & anr. v.\n<\/p>\n
    State of Kerala, reported at (2006) 7 SCC 414, in relation to the<\/p>\n
    offences punishable under Sections 420, 421, 466, 468, 471, 465<\/p>\n
    and 120-B of the Penal Code, arising out of forgery in securing<\/p>\n
    admission on the basis of forged mark sheets, where sentence of<\/p>\n
    imprisonment for three months was passed against the student<\/p>\n
    and six months against her father.        Considering her health<\/p>\n
    condition of her health, the Supreme Court had enhanced the fine<\/p>\n
    to Rs. Five Lakhs while reducing the sentence to that already<\/p>\n
    undergone, since substantial portion of the sentence had been<\/p>\n
    undergone.\n<\/p>\n
    103.      The learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that<\/p>\n
                                                 ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:35 :::<\/span>
\n                                   86<\/span>
\n    if any indulgence is to be shown to the appellants then heavy fine<\/p>\n
    should be imposed.\n<\/p>\n
    104.      I have considered this submission. While there can be<\/p>\n
    no doubt that crime of this type ought to be dealt with sternly, it<\/p>\n
    cannot be overlooked that appellant Laxmikant Zade had<\/p>\n
    committed the offence by being lured into the prospect of getting<\/p>\n
    a quick degree when he was in his immature youth. It would be<\/p>\n
    wrong to stigmatize him for his whole life on account of one<\/p>\n
    indiscretion in which he indulged about 10 years ago.                   Also<\/p>\n
    considering the age of appellant Prabhakar Hejib, who is 73 years<\/p>\n
    old, it may not be necessary to impose exemplary sentence.\n<\/p>\n
    Reduction of substantive sentence with increase in fine would<\/p>\n
    meet the ends of justice.\n<\/p>\n
    105.      In view of this, the appeals are partly allowed.\n<\/p>\n
              The conviction and sentence of the appellants for<\/p>\n
    offence punishable under Section 120-B of the Penal Code are set<\/p>\n
    aside and the appellants are acquitted of the said offence.\n<\/p>\n
              The conviction of the appellants for offence punishable<\/p>\n
                                                  ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:35 :::<\/span>
\n                                   87<\/span>
\n    under Section 420 read with Sections 34 and 109 of the Penal<\/p>\n
    Code and the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for four years<\/p>\n
    and fine of Rs.15,000\/- each or in default RI for two months<\/p>\n
    imposed upon them, are set aside. Instead they are convicted for<\/p>\n
    offence punishable under Section 417 read with Section 109 of<\/p>\n
    the Penal Code and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for<\/p>\n
    the period already undergone, if any, and fine of Rs.25,000\/-\n<\/p>\n
    each or in default RI for one month more.\n<\/p>\n
              The conviction of the appellants for offences punishable<\/p>\n
    under Section 468 read with Sections 34\/109 and 471 read with<\/p>\n
    Section 34\/109 is altered to one for offences punishable under<\/p>\n
    Section 468 and 471 read with Section 109 of the Penal Code and<\/p>\n
    they are sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for the period<\/p>\n
    already undergone, if any, and fine of Rs.25,000\/- each or in<\/p>\n
    default RI for one month more together on both the counts, i.e. no<\/p>\n
    separate sentence is inflicted for these two offences.\n<\/p>\n
                                              Judge<\/p>\n
                                                  ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:35 :::<\/span>\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Bombay High Court Shri Prabhakar vs The State Of Maharashtra on 3 February, 2009 Bench: R. C. Chavan 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY, NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR Criminal Appeal No.25 of 2007 With Criminal Appeal No.28 of 2007 Criminal Appeal No.25 of 2007 Shri Prabhakar s\/o Gangadhar Hejib, Aged about 73 years, […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[11,8],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-50634","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bombay-high-court","category-high-court"],"yoast_head":"\nShri Prabhakar vs The State Of Maharashtra on 3 February, 2009 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/shri-prabhakar-vs-the-state-of-maharashtra-on-3-february-2009\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Shri Prabhakar vs The State Of Maharashtra on 3 February, 2009 - 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