{"id":52495,"date":"1990-05-04T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1990-05-03T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/punjab-land-development-vs-presiding-officer-labour-on-4-may-1990"},"modified":"2016-09-20T13:16:31","modified_gmt":"2016-09-20T07:46:31","slug":"punjab-land-development-vs-presiding-officer-labour-on-4-may-1990","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/punjab-land-development-vs-presiding-officer-labour-on-4-may-1990","title":{"rendered":"Punjab Land Development … vs Presiding Officer, Labour … on 4 May, 1990"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Punjab Land Development … vs Presiding Officer, Labour … on 4 May, 1990<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1990 SCR (3) 111, \t 1990 SCC (3) 682<\/div>\n
Author: K Saikia<\/div>\n
Bench: Mukharji, Sabyasachi (Cj), Ray, B.C. (J), Kania, M.H., Saikia, K.N. (J), Agrawal, S.C. (J)<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nPUNJAB LAND DEVELOPMENT ANDRECLAMATION CORPORATION LTD.,CHAN\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nPRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT,CHANDIGARH ETC.\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT04\/05\/1990\n\nBENCH:\nSAIKIA, K.N. (J)\nBENCH:\nSAIKIA, K.N. (J)\nMUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (CJ)\nRAY, B.C. (J)\nKANIA, M.H.\nAGRAWAL, S.C. (J)\n\nCITATION:\n 1990 SCR  (3) 111\t  1990 SCC  (3) 682\n JT 1990 (2)   489\t  1990 SCALE  (1)878\n\n\nACT:\nIndustrial Disputes Act 1947:\n   Section 2(oo)--\"Retrenchment\"--Interpretation  of--Wheth-\ner termination by the employer of the services of a  workman\nby employer for any reason whatsoever or termination by\t the\nemployer of the services of a workman for any reason whatso-\never  otherwise\t than as a punishment inflicted\t by  way  of\ndisciplinary action--Whether to be understood in its narrow,\nnatural\t and  contextual  meaning or in\t its  wider  literal\nmeaning.\n    Precedent--Ratio decidendi of the earlier  decision--How\nto ascertain--Major premise, minor premise and decision in a\ncase-Whether  may be narrowed or widened by  the  subsequent\ndecision.\n    Constitution of India, 1950--Article 141--Supreme  Court\nis  not bound by its earlier  decision--Stare  decisis--doc-\ntrine of.\n    Decision per incuriam--meaning and effect of non  refer-\nence  to  an  earlier  larger  bench  decision\tof   Supreme\nCourt--Subsequent  decision  of Supreme Court  will  be\t per\nincuriam  only\tif the ratio of the earlier decision  is  in\nconflict with it.\n    Interpretation\tof\tStatutes--Wider\t     literal\nconstruction--When  preferable\tto  narrower,  natural\t and\ncontextual  construction--Definition clause using  the\tword\nmeans  'instead' of 'includes'--Shows that no other  meaning\ncan be assigned.\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\n    This batch of eighteen appeals by special leave involves\na  common question of law, regarding the scope and ambit  of\nthe  word 'retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of\t the\nIndustrial Dispute Act, 1947.\n112\n    One\t of the appeals is by the workmen against the  order\nof  the High Court affirming the award of the  Labour  Court\nrefusing to interfere with the order of termination of their\nservices  by the employer for their trade  union-activities,\nwhile the rest are by the employers\/ managements against the\norders\tof  High Courts\/Industrial  Tribunal\/  Labour  Court\nsetting\t aside the orders of termination of the services  of\nthe illegal for non-compliance of the provisions of  Section\n25F of the Act.\n    While  the employers' contention is that the  word\t\"re-\ntrenchment\"  as\t defined in Section 2(oo) of the  Act  means\ntermination  of service of a workman only by way of  surplus\nlabour\tfor any reason whatsoever, the workmen contend\tthat\n\"retrenchment\" means termination of the service of a workman\nfor  any reason whatsoever, other than those  expressly\t ex-\ncluded by the definition in Section 2(oo) of the Act.\nDisposing of the appeals, this Court,\n    HELD: (1) Definition of 'retrenchment' in Section  2(oo)\nmeans termination by the employer of the service of a  work-\nman  for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a  punish-\nment  inflicted\t by  way of disciplinary  action  and  those\nexpressly  excluded  by the definition. This  is  the  wider\nliteral\t interpretation\t as distinguished from\tthe  narrow,\nnatural\t and contextual interpretation of the word  to\tmean\ntermination  by the employer of the service of a workman  as\nsurplus labour for any reason whatsoever. [156C; 131B]\n    B.N.  Mutto v. T.K. Nandi,<\/a> [1979] 2 SCR 409;  Jugal\t Ki-\nshore  Saraf  v.  Raw Cotton Co. Ltd.,<\/a> [1955]  1  SCR  1369;\nSussex\tPeerage Case, [1844] II CI & Fin 85:8 ER 1034  (HL);\nThompson v. Goold & Co., 26 TLR 526; Ealsing L.B.C. v.\tRace\nRelations Board, [1972] 1 All ER 105; Whiteley v.  Chappell,\n[1868]\tLR 4; Prince Ernest of Hanover v. Attorney  General,\n[1956] Ch D 188 and Muir v. Keay, 44 MJMC 143, referred to.\n    (2) Difficulty was created by defining 'retrenchment' to\nmean  something wider than what it naturally and  ordinarily\nmeant. Such a definition created complexity as the draftsman\nhimself in drafting the other sections using the  definition\nmay  slip into the ordinary meaning instead of\tthe  defined\nmeaning. However, a judge facing such a problem of interpre-\ntation cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman.\n[149A-B; F]\n113\n    (3)\t The  definition has used the word 'means'.  When  a\nstatute says that a word or phrase shall 'mean'--not  merely\nthat it shall 'include' certain things or acts, \"the defini-\ntion is a hard-and-fast definition, and no other meaning can\nbe  assigned to the expression than is put down\t in  defini-\ntion.\" [150F-G]\n    Queen v. Commissioners under the Boiler Explosions\tAct,\n1882,  [1891]  I  QBD 703 and Gough v. Gough,  [1891]  2  QB\n665:65 LT II; relied on.\n    (4) There are apparent incongruities when the definition\nClause\tSection\t 2(oo) is considered in the context  of\t the\nmain provisions viz. Sections 25F, 25G and 25H but there  is\nroom for harmonious construction. The definitions  contained\nin  Section 2 are subject to there being anything  repugnant\nin the subject or context. [152C-D]\n    Vishwamitra Press v. Workers, AIR<\/a> 1953 SC 41; Presidency\nJute Mills Co. Ltd. v. Presidency Juite Mills Co.  Employees\nUnion,<\/a>\t[1952] I LLJ 796 (LAT) (Cal); Iron &  Steel  Mazdoor\nUnion,\tKanpur v. J.K. Iron and Steel Co. Ltd.,<\/a>\t [1952]\t LAC\n467;  Halar  Salt and Chemical Works, Jamnagar\tv.  Workmen,<\/a>\n[1953]\t2  LLJ 39; Prakriti Bhushan Gupta  v.  Chief  Mining\nEngineer, Railway Board, [1953] LAC 373; Sudarshan  Banerjee\nv. Mcleod and C. Ltd., [1953] LAC 702; Srinivasa Enterprises\nv.  Union of India,<\/a> [1980] 4 SCC 507; Reserve Bank of  India\nv. Peerless Central Finance and Investment Co. Ltd.,<\/a>  [1987]\n2 SCR I, referred to.\n    (5)\t The express exclusion of volitional element in\t cl.\n(a)  and (b) of Section 2(oo) namely, voluntary\t retirement,\nand  retirement\t on superannuation age\timplies\t that  those\nwould otherwise have been included. If such cases were to be\nincluded,  termination on abandonment of service, on  efflux\nof time and on failure to qualify, though only consequential\nor  resultant would be included as those have not  been\t ex-\ncluded.\t Then  there appears to be a gap between  the  first\npart  and the exclusion part. When such a gap is  disclosed,\nthe remedy lies in an amending Act. The Court has to  inter-\npret a statute and apply it to the facts. [150C-E]\nDuport Steels v. Sirs, [1980] 1 All ER 529, referred to.\n    (6)\t Construing  retrenchment in its  wider\t sense,\t the\nrights\tof the employer under the standing orders and  under\ncontracts  of employment may have been affected by  Sections\n2(00) and 25F and other relevant sections. Secondly, it\t may\nbe  said that the rights as such are not affected  or  taken\naway but only additional social obligation has been\n114\nplaced on the employer so as to give retrenchment benefit to\naffected.  workmen perhaps for tiding over immediate  finan-\ncial  distress.\t Seen from this angle, there is\t implicit  a\nsocial\tpolicy. So goes the maxim-Stat Pro ratione  voluntes\npopuli--the will of the people stands in place of a  reason.\n[153E-G]\n    (7)\t In Sundara Money and subsequent cases\tthe  Supreme\nCourt has adopted wider liberal meaning rejecting the narrow\nnatural\t and contextual meaning. The question of  subsequent\ndecisions of the Supreme Court being per incuriam on grounds\nof failure to apply the earlier law laid down by the Consti-\ntution\tBench in Hariprasad Shukla case could arise only  if\nratio  in  Sunclara Money and subsequent  decisions  was  in\nconflict with the ratio in Hariprasad and Anakapalli.  Hari-\nprasad\tcase  is not an authority for the  proposition\tthat\nSection\t 2(oo)\tonly covers cases of  discharge\t of  surplus\nlabour and staff. Sundara Money and subsequent decisions  in\nthe line could not be held to be per incuriam in as much  as\nin  Hindustan  Steel and Santosh Gupta\tcases  the  Division\nBenches\t of  the Supreme Court had  referred  to  Hariprasad\ncase, and rightly held that its ratio did not extend  beyond\nthe case of termination on the ground of closure and as such\nit  would  not be correct to say  that\tsubsequent  decision\noverlooked a binding precedent. In a fast developing  branch\nof Industrial and Labour Law it may not be always of partic-\nular importance to rigidly stick to a precedent and a prece-\ndent  may need to be departed from if the basis of  legisla-\ntion changes. [143B-C; 145E]\n    L. Robert D'Souza v. Executive Engineer, Southern  Rail-<\/a>\nway and Anr., [1979] 1 LLJ 211; Rajasthan State\t Electricity\nBoard  v.  Labour Court, [1966] 1 LLJ  381  (Raj.);  Goodlas\nNerolac\t Paints v. Chief Commissioner, Delhi, [1967]  1\t LLJ\n545  (Punj.) and The Managing Director, National Garages  v.\nJ. Gonsalves, [1962] 1 LLJ 56 (Bom.), overruled.\n    Delhi  Cloth  and  General Mills Ltd.  v.  Shambhu\tNath\nMukherjee  and Ors.,<\/a> [1978] 1 SCR 591; Hindustan Steel\tLtd.\nv.  The Presiding Officer, Labour Court,<\/a> [1977] 1  SCR\t586;\nSantosh\t Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala,<\/a> [1980] 3  SCR\t884;\nGammon India Ltd. v. Niranjan Das,<\/a> [1984] 1 SCC 509 and\t Reg\nv. Home Secretary, Ex P. Khawaja, [1984] AC 74 (HL),  relied\non.\n    Pipraich  Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pipraich Sugar Mills\tMaz-<\/a>\ndoor  Union, [1956] SCR 872; Sub Nomine Barsi Light  Railway\nCo.  v.\t K.N. Joglekar, [1957] 1 LLJ  243  (SC);  Hariprasad\nShivshankar  Shukla v. A.D. Divikar,<\/a> [1957] SCR 121;  Anaka-\npalla Co-operative Agricultural\n115\nand  Industrial Society Ltd. v. Workmen.<\/a> [1963] Supp. 1\t SCR\n730 and Workmen of Subong Tea Estate v. The Outgoing Manage-<\/a>\nment  of Subong Tea Estate and Anr., [1964] 5 SCR 602,\tdis-\ntinguished.\n    Employees  v.  India  Reconstitution  Corporation  Ltd.,\n[1953] LAC 563; Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. v. Workmen,<\/a> [1960]\n2  SCR\t32; Benett Coleman and Company\tLtd.  v.  Employees,\n[1954] 1 LLJ 341 (LAT); Mahan Lal v. Bharat Electronic Ltd.,\n[1981] 3 SCR 518 and Surendra Kumar Verma v. Central Govern-\nment Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, New Delhi, [1981]\n1 SCR 789, referred to.\n    (8) Article 141 embodies, a rule of law, the doctrine of\nprecedents on which our judicial system is based. [136H]\n    (9) Per Incuriam means through inadvertance. A  decision\ncan  be\t said generally to be given per\t incuriam  when\t the\nSupreme\t Court\thas acted in ignorance of its  own  previous\ndecision  or when a High Court has acted in ignorance  of  a\ndecision  of the Supreme Court. The problem of judgment\t per\nincuriam when actually arises, should present no  difficulty\nas  the Supreme Court can lay down the law afresh if two  or\nmore of its earlier judgments cannot stand together. Article\n141, which embodies as a rule of law, the doctrine of prece-\ndents,\twas enacted to make the law declared by the  Supreme\nCourt itself. [136G; 138G; 137F]\n     Re\t Dawson's  Settlement Lloyds Bank  Ltd.\t v.  Dawson,\n[1966] 3 All ER 68 and Bengal Immunity Company Ltd. v. State\nof Bihar,<\/a> [1955] 2 SCR 603, relied upon-\n     (10)  The\tdoctrine of ratio decidendi has also  to  be\ninterpreted in the same line. To consider the ratio deciden-\ndi  Court has to ascertain the principle on which  the\tcase\nwas  decided. The ratio decidendi of a decision may be\tnar-\nrowed or widened by the judges before whom it is cited as  a\nprecedent. [139G-H]\n     State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Shikhar Misra,<\/a> [1968] 2 SCR\n154;  F.A. & AB Ltd. v. Lupton (Inspector of taxes),  [1972]\nA.C.  634;  Osborne  v. Rowlett. 13 Ch D 774  and  Quinn  v.\nLeathem. [1901] AC 495, relied on-\n     Griffiths v. J.P. Harrison (Watford) Ltd., [1963] AC 1;\nFinsbury  Securities Ltd. v. Inland  Revenue  Commissioners,\n[1966] 1 WLR 1402, referred to.\n116\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos.  3241-48
\nof 1981 Etc.\n<\/p>\n
    From  the  Judgment\t and Order dated  20.7.1983  of\t the
\nPunjab\t  &    Haryana\t High\tCourt\tin    C.W.P.\tNos.\n<\/p>\n
469,748,750,751,752 and 753 of 1981
\n    B.N. Shinghvi, V.A. Bobde, M.K. Ramamurthy, N.B.  Shetty
\nK.K.  Venugopal, Dr. Anand Prakash, S.S. JavaIi, H.S.  Gill,
\nBrij Bhushan, M.G. Ramachandran, M.C. Dhingra, A.K.  Sanghi,
\nU.A.  Rana, B.R. Agarwala, R.C. Pathak, Naresh Mathur,\tS.K.
\nSajwan.\t Baby Lal, Praveen Kumar, B.B. Singh, Vineet  Kumar,
\nB.D. Ahmed. R.S. Hegde, Parijat Singh, Mrs. Jayshree Wad, S.
\nBalakrishnan, Ms. Janani, Mrs. Urmila Kapoor, T.T. Kunhikan-
\nnan,  H.K. Puri, S. Srinivasan, Mrs. M.\t Karanjawala,  Vijay
\nKumar  Verma. Ashok Grover, V.N. Ganpule, M.A. Gagrat,\tMrs.
\nP.S. Shroff, Anil Gupta, R.A. Gupta, A.K. Ghosh, S.  Mandal,
\nRanjit Kumar, M. Veerappa, Girish Chandra, Dr. Meera  Aggar-
\nwal,  A.K.  Srivastava, K.R. Nambiar, A.G.  Ratnaparkhi,  R.
\nSatish, P.H. Parekh, S.A. Shroff and K.V. Sree Kumar for the
\nappearing parties.\n<\/p>\n
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
\n    K.N.  SAIKIA.  J. This analogous  cluster  of  seventeen
\nappeals\t by  special  leave, and a  special  leave  petition
\ninvolves  a common question of law though they arise out  of
\nthe following respective facts:\n<\/p>\n
c.A. Nos. 324 z-3248 of 1981
\n    These eight appeals by the Land Development and Reclama-
\ntion Corporation, Chandigarh are from the Judgment and Order
\nof  the\t Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissing  its\twrit
\npetitions challenging the Award dated 2.8.1980 of the Labour
\nCourt, Chandigarh holding that the respondents were entitled
\nto  reinstatement  with back wages except Yaspal  (C.A.\t No.
\n3242  of 1981) who was to get wages up to  10.10.1979,\twith
\nbenefits  of  continuity of service.  The  respondents\twere
\nworkmen\t under the management of the Corporation  and  their
\nservices were terminated on the ground that the Chairman had
\nno power to appoint them. The Labour Court in its Award held
\nthat  their services were terminated illegally without\tpay-
\nment  of  retrenchment\tcompensation  under  the  Industrial
\nDisputes Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as the Act’, and
\nthat they were entitled to reinstatement.\n<\/p>\n
117<\/span><\/p>\n
C.A. No. 686 (NL) of 1982
\n    This appeal is from the Judgment dated 9.11.1981 of\t the
\nHigh  Court of Bombay (Nagpur Bench). The  first  respondent
\nwas  an employee of the appellant’s corporation since  1972.
\nHe  was\t taken on probation in 1975 for one year  which\t was
\nextended  from time to time, lastly from 1.9.1977 to  31.10.
\n1977,  whereafter his services being not found\tsatisfactory
\nwere terminated with effect from 1.11.1977 under  Regulation
\n44(b)  of the State Transport Employees Service\t Regulations
\nof  the Corporation. The Labour Court took the view that  it
\namounted to retrenchment and the provisions of s. 25F of the
\nAct having not been complied with the termination was  ille-
\ngal. The appellant’s writ petition therefrom was dismissed.
\nC.A. No. 1817 of 1982
\n    The\t respondent  workman was employed by  the  appellant
\nBank on 3.10.1962 as a clerk and he was put on probation for
\nsix months. As allegedly there was total lack of  confidence
\nof  the\t bank in the employee it terminated his\t service  on
\n27.7.1974 on payment of three month’s salary. The industrial
\ntribunal by its award dated 3.12.1981 directed reinstatement
\nof  the workman with full back wages on the ground  of\tnon-
\ncompliance  with the provisions of s. 25F of the  Industrial
\nDisputes Act. The employer Bank now appeals from that Award.
\nC.A. No. 1898 of 1982
\n    Respondent\tNos. 2-6 were employed on probation  by\t the
\nappellant  a partnership firm on 12.6.1975. Respondent\tNos.
\n2-5  assaulted a supervisor and being afraid of\t police\t re-
\nmained\tabsent from 29.3.1976 and abandoned their  jobs\t and
\ntheir  services\t were terminated. Respondent No.  6  stopped
\nattending  duties from 9.8.1975 and he left the\t service  of
\nhis  own accord. The Labour Court by its Award\tdated  16.9.
\n1980  held that their termination amounted  to\tretrenchment
\nand was illegal for non-compliance with the provisions of s.
\n25F of the Act and they were entitled to reinstatement\twith
\nfull back wages. The Management’s writ petition\t challenging
\nthe Award having been unsuccessful, it has appealed.
\nC.A. No. 3261 of 1982
\n    Respondent Namdeo was a clerk under the appellant  Maha-
\nrashtra\t State\tRoad Transport Corporation.  Pursuant  to  a
\ndisciplinary
\n118<\/span>
\nproceeding  his\t service  was terminated  with\teffect\tfrom
\n23.4.1963  by giving him one month’s salary in lieu  of\t no-
\ntice.  Moved by the respondent, the  Assistant\tCommissioner
\nunder s. 16 of the C.P. & Berar Industrial Disputes  Settle-
\nment  Act, 1947 held the Inquiry Proceeding to be  an  empty
\npaper  formality and the termination amounted  to  dismissal
\nand  accordingly  he set aside the order  and  directed\t the
\ncorporation to reinstate and pay him his back wages  amount-
\ning  to\t Rs. 15,97 1.66 within one  month.  The\t Corporation
\nhaving\tmoved the State Industrial Court at Nagpur under  s.
\n16(5)  of the Settlement Act, that Court by its order  dated
\n29.9.1973 allowed the application and set aside the  Assist-
\nant  Labour Commissioner’s judgment and dismissed the  work-
\nman’s application holding that the acts of misconduct fairly
\nstood  proved and he deserved to be dismissed from  service.
\nThe  High Court on being moved by the workman set aside\t the
\nLabour\tCourt’s\t order and restored that  of  the  Assistant
\nLabour Commissioner. Hence this appeal.\n<\/p>\n
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3025  ……….  OF 1990
\n    The\t services  of the workman Sri Pratap  Singh,  driver
\nrespondent No. 3 were terminated with effect from 18.10.1974
\nunder clause 9(a)(i) of the DRTA (Conditions of\t Appointment
\nand  Service) Regulations 1952. As the conciliation  efforts
\nfailed, the order was placed before the Labour Court, Delhi,
\nwho set aside the order on the ground of noncompliance\twith
\nthe  provisions of s. 25F of the Act and ordered  reinstate-
\nment  with  full back wages and continuity of  service.\t The
\nHigh Court having dismissed the writ petition therefrom, the
\nappellant  seeks special leave. We grant special  leave\t and
\nhear the appeal.\n<\/p>\n
C.A. No. 885 of 1980
\n    The workmen appellants Nos. 2 and 3 were discharged on I
\n1.11.1972  for\ttheir  trade union  activities.\t The  Labour
\nCourt, Bombay by its Award dated 25.8.1977 refused to inter-
\nfere.  Challenge  to  the Award in  the\t High  Court  having
\nfailed, the workmen appealed to this Court.
\nC.A. No. 1866 of 1982
\n    The workman respondent No. 2 reported for artisan train-
\ning  on\t 25.9.1963 and was absorbed as\tartisan\t trainee  on
\n16.3.1964. He was made a skilled machine operator, under the
\nappellant  company  and\t was  discharged  with\teffect\tfrom
\n23.7.1970. The Labour Court by its
\n119<\/span>
\nAward  dated 1.8.1980 held the termination to be illegal  on
\nground\tof non-compliance of s. 25F of the Act,\t though\t the
\norder  of discharge was issued under Standing  Order  18(1).
\nThe Company has appealed against the said order.
\nC.A. No. 1868 of 1984
\n    The respondent was an employee in the appellant’s facto-
\nry  as welder and his services were terminated\twith  effect
\nfrom  21.11.1972  under Standing Order No.  28.\t The  Labour
\nCourt by its Award dated 30.12.1980 held the order of termi-
\nnation\tamounted to retrenchment and bad for  non-compliance
\nwith s. 25F and hence set it aside and ordered reinstatement
\nwith full back wages. Hence this appeal.\n<\/p>\n
C.A. No. 8456 of 1983
\n    The respondent was dismissed by the\t appellant–Corpora-
\ntion  after  disciplinary inquiry by order  dated  28.5.1971
\npaying\tone  month’s wages in advance.\tThe  workman  having
\nraised\tan industrial dispute, the Labour Court,  Aurangabad
\nby  its Award dated 9.11.1979 held the order of\t termination
\nto  be\tlegal  and proper. The\trespondent’s  writ  petition
\ntherefrom  was\tallowed and the Award was  quashed  and\t the
\nworkman\t was declared entitled t0 reinstatement. Hence\tthis
\nappeal.\n<\/p>\n
C.A. No. 10828 of 1983.\n<\/p>\n
    The\t respondent was a store keeper of  Rungta  Colliery.
\nHis  name  was\tstruck off the rolls of\t the  Colliery\twith
\neffect\tfrom 8.7.1975. He having raised an  industrial\tdis-
\npute,  the Industrial Tribunal, Jabalpur by its Award  dated
\n22.8.1977  held the striking off t0 be unjustified and\tthat
\nthe  termination  amounted to retrenchment and bad  for\t non
\npayment\t of  retrenchment  compensation.  In  the  workman’s
\nLetters\t Patent Appeal the Division Bench of the High  Court
\nalso  held  that the termination amounted  to  retrenchment.
\nHence this Management’s appeal.\n<\/p>\n
    The respective cases were argued with some dexterity  by
\nthe  learned counsel Mr. B.N. Singhvi, Mr. N.B. Shetye,\t Mr.
\nS.S.  Javali, Mr. K.K. Venugopal, Mr. V.A. Bobde,  Mr.\tM.K.
\nRamamurthy, Mr. M.G. Ramachandran & Mr. R.S. Hegde.\n<\/p>\n
     On\t the above diverse facts two rival  contentions\t are
\nraised by the parties. The learned counsel for the employers
\ncontend that the word ‘retrenchment’ as defined in s.  2(00)
\nof the Act means termination of
\n120<\/span>
\nservice\t of a workman only by way of surplus labour for\t any
\nreason\twhatsoever.  The learned  counsel  representing\t the
\nworkmen counted that ‘retrenchment’ means termination of the
\nservice\t of a workman for any reason whatsoever, other\tthan
\nthose  expressly excluded by the definition in s.  2(00)  of
\nthe Act.\n<\/p>\n
    The\t precise  question  to\tbe  decided,  therefore,  is
\nwhether\t on  a\tproper construction  of\t the  definition  of
\n“retrenchment” in s. 2(00) of the Act, it means\t termination
\nby  the\t employer  of the service of a\tworkman\t as  surplus
\nlabour for any reason whatsoever, or it means termination by
\nthe  employer  of the service of a workman  for\t any  reason
\nwhatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by\t way
\nof disciplinary action, and those expressly excluded by\t the
\ndefinition.  In other words, the question to be\t decided  is
\nwhether the word “retrenchment” in the definition has to  be
\nunderstood in its narrow, natural and contextual meaning  or
\nin its wider literal meaning.\n<\/p>\n
    Mr.\t N.B.  Shetye, Mr. K.K. Venugopal, and\tthe  learned
\ncounsel\t adopting their arguments refer to the\tintroduction
\nof the provision of “retrenchment” in the Act.\tRetrenchment
\nwas  not defined either in the repealed Trade Disputes\tAct,
\n1929, or in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as originally
\nenacted.  Owing to a crisis in the textile industry in\tBom-
\nbay,  apprehending  large scale termination of\tservices  of
\nworkmen,  the Government of India issued an Ordinance  which
\nlater  became the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act,\t1953
\n(Act 43 of 1953) which was deemed to have come into force on
\nthe  24th  day of October,  1953.  Besides  introducing\t the
\ndefinitions of “lay-off” [Clause 2 (kkk)] and “Retrenchment”
\n[Clause\t 2(oo)]\t this Amendment Act of\t1953  also  inserted
\nChapter\t VII  in  the Act which\t dealt\twith  “lay-off”\t and
\n“Retrenchment”. That Chapter contained sections 25A to\t25J.
\nSection\t 25A  provided that sections 25C  to  25E  inclusive
\nshall  not apply to certain categories of industrial  estab-
\nlishments. Section 25C dealt with right of workmen  laid-off
\ncompensation. Section 25D provided for maintenance of muster
\nrolls  of  workmen by employers and section 25E\t stated\t the
\ncases  in  which the workmen were not  entitled\t to  lay-off
\ncompensation. Section 25F dealt with conditions precedent to
\nretrenchment  of workmen. Section 25G dealt  with  procedure
\nfor retrenchment and section 25H dealt with re-employment of
\nretrenched workmen; and section 25J dealing with the  effect
\nof laws inconsistent with this Chapter said that the  provi-
\nsions  of  this Chapter shall  have  effect  notwithstanding
\nanything  inconsistent therewith contained in any other\t law
\n(including standing orders made under the Industrial Employ-
\nment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (XX of 1946);\n<\/p>\n
121<\/span><\/p>\n
provided  that\tnothing\t contained in this  Act\t shall\thave
\neffect to derogate from any fight which a workman has  under
\nany  award for the time being in operation or  any  contract
\nwith the employer.\n<\/p>\n
    The\t Statement of Objects and Reasons of  the  Amendment
\nAct, 1953 was as under:\n<\/p>\n
“The  Industrial  Disputes (Amendment) Bill, 1953  seeks  to
\nprovide for payment of compensation to workmen in the  event
\nof their lay-off or retrenchment. The provisions included in
\nthe  Bill are not new and were discussed at various  tripar-
\ntite  meetings.\t Those relating to lay-off are based  on  an
\nagreement  entered into between the representatives  of\t em-
\nployers\t and  workers who attended the 13th session  of\t the
\nStanding  Labour Committee. In regard to  retrenchment,\t the
\nBill  provides\tthat a workman who has\tbeen  in  continuous
\nemployment  for\t not less than one year\t under\tan  employer
\nshall not be retrenched until he has been given one  month’s
\nnotice\tin  writing  or one month’s wages in  lieu  of\tsuch
\nnotice\tand also a gratuity calculated at 15  days’  average
\npay for every completed year of service or any part  thereof
\nin excess of six months. A similar provision was included in
\nthe  Labour  Relations Bill, 1950, which has  since  lapsed.
\nThough compensation on the lines provided for in the Bill is
\ngiven by all progressive employers, it is felt that a common
\nstandard should be set for all employers”\n<\/p>\n
Clause 2(00) as inserted read as under:\n<\/p>\n
“‘Retrenchment’ means the termination by the employer of the
\nservice\t of  a workman for any reason  whatsoever  otherwise
\nthan  as a punishment inflicted by way of  disciplinary\t ac-
\ntion, but does not include–\n<\/p>\n
(a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or\n<\/p>\n
(b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of  super-
\nannuation if the contract of employment between the employer
\nand  the  workman concerned contains a stipulation  in\tthat
\nbehalf; or\n<\/p>\n
(c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of
\ncontinued ill health.”\n<\/p>\n
122<\/span><\/p>\n
We  are\t referred to contemporaneous interpretation  of\t the
\nword “retrenchment. In Employees of Messrs India Reconstruc-
\ntion  Corporation  Ltd., Calcutta v. Messers.  India  Recon-
\nstruction Corporation Ltd., reported in 1953 LAC 563 it\t was
\nobserved by the Calcutta High Court:\n<\/p>\n
“Ordinarily  retrenchment  means discharge from\t service  of
\nonly the surplus part of the labour force but in the case of
\nclosure\t the whole labour force is dispensed with.  In\tsub-
\nstance\tthe difference between closure and normal  retrench-
\nment  is one of degree only. As in the case of\tretrenchment
\nso  in the case of closure the workmen are  not\t responsible
\nfor  closing their jobs. In both the cases, what  is  called
\ncompensation by way of retrenchment relief should be  admis-
\nsible.”\n<\/p>\n
    In\tMessrs\tBenett\tColeman and Company  Ltd.  v.  Their
\nEmployees,  reported in 1954 LAC 24 it was observed by\tCal-
\ncutta High Court:\n<\/p>\n
“Thus whether the closure was justified or not, the  workmen
\nwho  have lost their jobs would in any event  get  compensa-
\ntion.  If it was not bona fide or not justified, it  may  be
\nthat the measure of compensation would be larger than if  it
\nwas otherwise.”\n<\/p>\n
    The\t above\talmost contemporaneous exposition  is  worth
\nconsideration, Contemporanea expositio est optima et fortio-
\nsima  in lege, (2 Inst. 11). Contemporaneous  exposition  is
\nthe  best  and strongest in the law. A statute is  best\t ex-
\nplained by following the construction put upon it by  judges
\nwho lived at the time it was made.\n<\/p>\n
    In\tPipraich  Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pipraich\tSugar  Mills
\nMazdoor\t Union,<\/a> [1956] SCR 872, the appellant company  could
\nnot work its mills to full capacity owing to short supply of
\nsugar-cane and got the permission of the Government to\tsell
\nits machinery but continued crushing cane under a lease from
\nthe purchaser. The workmen’s union in order to frustrate the
\ntransaction  resolved to go on strike and serving  a  strike
\nnotice did not cooperate with the management with the result
\nthat it lost heavily. On the expiry of the lease and closure
\nof  the\t industry,  the services of the\t workmen  were\tduly
\nterminated by the company. The workmen claimed the share  of
\nprofits on the basis of the offer earlier made by the compa-
\nny and accepted by the workers. The company having  declined
\nto pay and the dispute having been referred,
\n123<\/span>
\nthe  Industrial Tribunal held that the company was bound  to
\npay and accordingly awarded a sum of Rs.45,000\trepresenting
\ntheir share of the profits and the award was affirmed by the
\nLabour\tAppellate  Tribunal. Question before this  Court  in
\nappeal\twas  whether the termination of the workmen  on\t the
\nclosure\t of  the industry amounted to retrenchment.  It\t was
\nheld that the award was not one for compensation for  termi-
\nnation\tof  the services of the workmen on  closure  of\t the
\nindustry, as such discharge was different from the discharge
\non retrenchment, which implied the continuance of the indus-
\ntry  and discharge only of the surplusage, and\tthe  workmen
\nwere  not entitled either under the law as it stood  on\t the
\nday  of their discharge or even on merits to  any  compensa-
\ntion.\n<\/p>\n
    The\t contention of the workmen was that even before\t the
\nenactment of Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1953,\t the
\ntribunal had acted on the view that the retrenchment includ-
\ned discharge on closure of business and had awarded  compen-
\nsation on that footing and that the award of the tribunal in
\nPipraich’s  case could be supported in that view and  should
\nnot be disturbed. This was based on the decision in  Employ-
\nees of Messrs India Reconstruction Corporation Ltd. Calcutta
\nv.  Messrs India Reconstruction Corporation  Ltd.,<\/a>  (supra);
\nand Messrs Benett Coleman and Company Ltd. v. Their  Employ-
\nees, (supra). But their Lordship did not agree.\t Venkatarama
\nAyyar, J. speaking for the four Judge Bench said:
\n“Though\t there\tis discharge of workmen both when  there  is
\nretrenchment and closure of business, the compensation is to
\nbe awarded under the law, not for discharge as such but\t for
\ndischarge on retrenchment, and if, as is conceded, retrench-
\nment  means in ordinary parlance, discharge of the  surplus,
\nit cannot include discharge on closure of business.”\n<\/p>\n
    As\ta result it was held that the Award in Pipraich\t was
\nagainst\t the agreement and could not be supported as one  of
\ncompensation to the workmen.\n<\/p>\n
    Thus this Court in Pipraich (supra) was dealing with the
\nquestion whether the discharge of the workmen on closure  of
\nthe  undertaking would constitute retrenchment\tand  whether
\nthe  workmen were entitled on that account  to\tretrenchment
\ncompensation; and it was observed that retrenchment connoted
\nin  its\t ordinary acceptation that the business\t itself\t was
\nbeing continued but that a portion of the staff or
\n124<\/span>
\nthe labour force was discharged as surplusage and the termi-
\nnation\tof  services of all the workmen as a result  of\t the
\nclosure\t of the business could not, therefore,\tbe  properly
\ndescribed  as retrenchment, which in the  ordinary  parlance
\nmeant  discharge from the service and did not  include\tdis-
\ncharge on closure of business.\n<\/p>\n
    The\t same view was expressed in  Hariprasad\t Shivshankar
\nShukla\tv. A.D. Divikar,<\/a> [1957] SCR 121; also  reported\t sub
\nnomine\tBarsi Light Railway Co. v. K.N. Joglekar,  [1957]  1
\nL.L.J.\t243 (SC), wherein the Constitution Bench  heard\t two
\nappeals;  namely, Civil Appeal Nos. 103 and 105 of 1956.  In
\nCivil  Appeal  No. 105 of 1956 the main\t appellant  was\t the
\nBarsi Light Railway Company Ltd., and the principal respond-
\nent was the President of the Barsi Light Railwaymen’s Union.
\nUnder  an agreement dated August 1, 1895 between the  Secre-
\ntary of State for India in Council and the Railway  Company,
\nthe  Secretary\tof State could purchase and  take  over\t the
\nundertaking after giving Railway Company a notice. On Decem-
\nber  19, 1952 a notice was given to the Railway Company\t for
\nand on behalf of the President of India that the undertaking
\nof the Railway Company would be purchased and taken over  as
\nfrom  January  1, 1954. On November 11,\t 1953,\tthe  Railway
\nCompany served a notice on its workmen intimating that as  a
\nresult of the talking over, the services of all the  workmen
\nof the Railway Company would be terminated with effect\tfrom
\nDecember  31, 1953. The notice further stated that the\tGov-
\nernment of India intended to employ such of the staff of the
\ncompany as would be willing to serve on the railway on terms
\nand conditions which were to be notified later. About 77 per
\ncent of the staff of the Railway Company were reemployed  on
\nthe same scales of pay, about 23 per cent were reemployed on
\nsomewhat  lower scales of pay and only about 24 per cent  of
\nthe former employees of the Railway Company declined service
\nunder  the Government. Applications for compensation  having
\nbeen filed on behalf of the erstwhile workmen of the Railway
\nCompany\t under s. 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936,\t for
\npayment\t of  retrenchment compensation to the  said  workmen
\nunder  clause  (b) of s. 25F of the Act,  the  question\t was
\nwhether the erstwhile workmen were entitled to claim compen-
\nsation\tunder clause (b) of s. 25F of the Act;\tand  whether
\nthey had been retrenched by their former employer within the
\nmeaning\t of  the expression ‘retrenchment’ in  the  Act.  In
\nCivil  Appeal  No. 103 of 1956, the main appellant  was\t Sri
\nDinesh\tMills Ltd. Baroda and the principal  respondent\t was
\nDistrict  Labour Officer and Inspector under the Payment  of
\nWages Act. The appellant company was running a woollen\tmill
\nat Baroda and had abut 450 workmen and 20 clerks who  worked
\nin shifts day and night. On or about October 31,
\n125<\/span>
\n1953, the appellant put up a notice declaring its  intention
\nto  close down the entire mill. As a result of the  closure,
\nthe services of all 450 workmen and 20 clerks were terminat-
\ned  and the appellant company claimed that the\tclosure\t was
\nbona fide being due to heavy losses sustained by the  compa-
\nny. The principal respondent claimed retrenchment  compensa-
\ntion for the workmen of the appellant under clause (b) of s.
\n25F of the Act.\n<\/p>\n
Section 25F at the relevant time stood as follows:
\n“25F.  Conditions precedent to retrenchment of\tworkmen.–No
\nworkman employed in any industry who has been in  continuous
\nservice\t for not less than one year under an employer  shall
\nbe retrenched by that employer until–\n<\/p>\n
(a) the workman has been given one month’s notice in writing
\nindicating  the reasons for retrenchment and the  period  of
\nnotice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu  of
\nsuch notice, wages for the period of the notice;\n<\/p>\n
\t   Provided  that no such notice shall be  necessary
\nif the retrenchment is under an agreement which specifies  a
\ndate for the termination of service;\n<\/p>\n
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of  retrenchment,
\ncompensation  which  shall be equivalent  to  fifteen  days’
\naverage pay for every completed year of service or any\tpart
\nthereof in excess of six months; and\n<\/p>\n
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the  appro-
\npriate Government.”\n<\/p>\n
     In\t both the appeals the question before the  Constitu-
\ntion  Bench was whether the claim of the  erstwhile  workmen
\nboth  of the Railway Company and of Shri Dinesh Mills  Ltd.,
\nto the compensation under clause(b) of s. 25F of the Act was
\na  valid claim in law. Observing that the Act had a  ‘plexus
\nof  amendments’, and some of the recent amendments had\tbeen
\nquite extensive in nature and that s. 25F occurred in Ch. VA
\nof  the Act which dealt with ‘lay off and  retrenchment’  in
\nthe  Amending  Act, and analysing s. 25F as it\tthen  stood,
\nS.K.  Das, J. speaking for the Constitution  Bench  observed
\nthat  in the first part of the section both the\t words\t‘re-
\ntrenched’  and ‘retrenchment’ were used and  obviously\tthey
\nhad the same meaning except that one was verb
\n126<\/span>
\nand  the  other was a noun and that to appreciate  the\ttrue
\nscope  and effect of s. 25F one must first  understand\twhat
\nwas meant by the expression ‘retrenched’ or ‘retrenchment’-\n<\/p>\n
    Analysing  the definition of ‘retrenchment’ in s.  2(00)
\nthe Court found in it the following four essential  require-
\nments: (a) termination of the service of a workman;, (b)  by
\nthe employer; (c) for any reason whatsoever; and (d)  other-
\nwise  than as a punishment inflicted by way of\tdisciplinary
\naction. The Court then said:\n<\/p>\n
“It  must  be conceded that the definition is in  very\twide
\nterms. The question, however, before us is does this defini-
\ntion merely give effect to the ordinary, accepted notion  of
\nretrenchment in an existing or running industry by embodying
\nthe notion in apt and readily intelligible words or does  it
\ngo  so far beyond the accepted notion of retrenchment as  to
\ninclude\t the  termination of services of all workmen  in  an
\nindustry when the industry itself ceases to exist on a\tbona
\nfide  closure or discontinuance of his business by  the\t em-
\nployer?”\n<\/p>\n
The Court further said:\n<\/p>\n
“There\tis  no\tdoubt that when the act\t itself\t provides  a
\ndictionary  for the words used, we must look into that\tdic-
\ntionary first for an interpretation of the words used in the
\nstatute. We are not concerned with any presumed intention of
\nthe  legislature;  our task is to get the intention  as\t ex-
\npressed\t in  the  statute. Therefore, we  propose  first  to
\nexamine the language of the definition and see if the  ordi-
\nnary, accepted notion of retrenchment fits in, squarely\t and
\nfairly, with the language used.”\n<\/p>\n
    The\t Court\treiterated  the\t following  observations  in
\nPipraich (supra):\n<\/p>\n
“But retrenchment connotes in its ordinary acceptation\tthat
\nthe business itself is being continued but that a portion of
\nthe  staff of the labour force is discharged  as  surplusage
\nand  the  termination of services of all the  workmen  as  a
\nresult\tof the closure of the business cannot  therefore  be
\nproperly described as retrenchment.”\n<\/p>\n
127<\/span><\/p>\n
This  was the ordinary accepted notion of ‘retrenchment’  in
\nan  industry  before  addition of s. 2(oo) to  the  Act,  as
\nretrenchment  in that case took place in 1951.\tReplying  to
\nthe  argument  that by excluding the bona  fide\t closure  of
\nbusiness as one of the reasons for termination of the  serv-
\nice  of workmen by the employer, one would be  cutting\tdown
\nthe amplitude of the expression ‘for any reason\t whatsoever’
\nand  reading  into the definition the words  which  did\t not
\noccur  there,  the  Court agreed that the  adoption  of\t the
\nordinary  meaning  would  give to the  expression  ‘for\t any
\nreason whatsoever’ a somewhat narrower scope; one might\t say
\nthat  it would get a colour in the context in which  expres-
\nsion occurred; but the Court did not agree that it  amounted
\nto  importing new words in the definition and said that\t the
\nlegislature  in\t using that expression said in\teffect:\t “It
\ndoes not matter why you are discharging the surplus; if\t the
\nother requirements of the definition are fulfilled, then  it
\nis retrenchment”. In the absence of any compelling words  to
\nindicate that the intention was to include bona fide closure
\nof the whole business, it would be divorcing the  expression
\naltogether  from its context to give it such a wide  meaning
\nas was contended. About the nature of the definition it\t was
\nsaid:\n<\/p>\n
“It  is\t true that an artificial definition  may  include  a
\nmeaning different from or in excess of the ordinary accepta-
\ntion  of  the word which is the subject of  definition;\t but
\nthere  must  then be compelling words to show  that  such  a
\nmeaning different from or in excess of the ordinary  meaning
\nis  intended.  Where, within the framework of  the  ordinary
\nacceptation  of\t the word, every single requirement  of\t the
\ndefinition  clause is fulfilled, it would be wrong  to\ttake
\nthe  definition as destroying the essential meaning  of\t the
\nword defined.”\n<\/p>\n
     The  Court in Hariprasad dealt with two  other  conten-
\ntions;\tone  was that before the amending Act  of  1953\t the
\nretrenchment  had acquired a special meaning which  included
\nthe payment of compensation on a closure of business and the
\nlegislature  gave effect to that meaning in  the  definition
\nclause\tand  by inserting section 25F. The second  was\tthat
\nsection 25FF inserted in 1956 by Act 41 of 1956 was ‘Parlia-
\nmentary exposition’ of the meaning of the definition  clause
\nand of section 25F. Rejecting the contentions the Court held
\nthat retrenchment meant the discharge of surplus workmen  in
\nan  existing  or  continuing business; it  had\tacquired  no
\nspecial\t meaning  so as to include discharge of\t workmen  on
\nbona  fide  closure of business, though a number  of  Labour
\nAppellate Tribunals awarded compensation to
\n128<\/span>
\nworkmen\t on closure of business as an equitable\t relief\t for
\nvariety of reasons. The Court accordingly held:
\n“… that retrenchment as defined in s. 2(00) and as used in
\ns.  25\thas  no wider meaning than  the\t ordinary,  accepted
\nconnotation  of the word; it means the discharge of  surplus
\nlabour\tor staff by the employer for any reason\t whatsoever,
\notherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of discipli-
\nnary action, and it has no application where the services of
\nall workmen have been terminated by the employer on real and
\nbona fide closure of business as in the’ case of Shri Dinesh
\nMills  Ld.  or where the services of all workmen  have\tbeen
\nterminated  by the employer on the business  or\t undertaking
\nbeing  taken over by another employer in circumstances\tlike
\nthose of the Railway Company.”\n<\/p>\n
    It\tis interesting to note that the Amending Act No.  41
\nof 1956 inserted original section 25FF on September 4, 1956.
\nThe objects and reasons were stated thus:\n<\/p>\n
“Doubt\thas  been raised whether  retrenchment\tcompensation
\nunder  the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 becomes\t payable  by
\nreason\tmerely of the fact that there has been a  change  of
\nemployers,  even if the service of the workman is  continued
\nwithout\t interruption  and the terms and conditions  of\t his
\nservice remain unaltered. This has created difficulty in the
\ntransfer, re-constitution and amalgamation of companies\t and
\nit  is\tproposed  to make the intention\t clear\tby  amending
\nsection 25F of the Act.”\n<\/p>\n
    Hariprasad’s  case (supra) was decided on  November\t 27,
\n1956. The Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Ordinance, 1957 (4
\nof 1957) was promulgated immediately thereafter with  effect
\nfrom December 1, 1956 and that Ordinance was replaced by the
\nIndustrial  Disputes (Amendment) Act 1957 (XVIII  of  1957).
\nThe following was the Statement of Objects and Reasons:
\n“In  a\tjudgment delivered on the 27th November,  1956,\t the
\nSupreme\t Court\theld that no retrenchment  compensation\t was
\npayable\t under section 25F of the Industrial  Disputes\tAct,
\n1947,  to workmen whose services were terminated by  an\t em-
\nployer on a real and bona fide closure of business, or\twhen
\ntermination occurred as a result of transfer of owner-\n<\/p>\n
129<\/span><\/p>\n
ship  from one employer to another (see AIR 1957 SC  12\t 1).
\nThis  has  led and is likely to lead to a  large  number  of
\nworkmen\t being\trendered  unemployed without  any  compensa-
\ntion.  In  order to meet this situation\t which\twas  causing
\nhardship  to  workmen, it was considered necessary  to\ttake
\nimmediate  action  and the Industrial  Disputes\t (Amendment)
\nOrdinance, 1957 (4 of 1957), was promulgated with retrospec-
\ntive effect from 1st December, 1956.”\n<\/p>\n
“This Ordinance was replaced by an Act of Parliament  enact-
\ning  the  provisions contained in sections 25FF\t and  25FFF.
\nThese  sections provide that ‘compensation would be  payable
\nto  workmen whose services are terminated on account of\t the
\ntransfer or closure of undertakings.’ In the case of  trans-
\nfer of undertakings, however, if the workman is\t re-employed
\non  terms  and conditions which are not less  favourable  to
\nhim,  he will not be entitled to any compensation. This\t was
\nthe  position  which existed prior to the  decision  of\t the
\nSupreme Court. In the case of closure of business on account
\nof the circumstances beyond the control of the employer, the
\nmaximum compensation payable to workmen has been limited  to
\nhis  average  pay for three months. If\tthe  undertaking  is
\nengaged\t in  any  construction work and it  is\tclosed\tdown
\nwithin\ttwo years on account of the completion of its  work,
\nno compensation would be payable to workmen employed  there-
\nin.”\n<\/p>\n
     Hariprasad (supra) having accepted the ordinary contex-
\ntual meaning of retrenchment, namely, termination of surplus
\nlabour\tas the major premise it was surely open to the\tPar-
\nliament to have amended the definition of retrenchment in s.
\n2(00) of the Act. Instead of doing that the Parliament added
\ns. 25FF and 25FFF which said:\n<\/p>\n
“25FF. Compensation to workmen in case of transfer of under-
\ntakings–Where the ownership or management of an undertaking
\nis transferred, whether by agreement or by operation of law,
\nfrom the employer, in relation to that undertaking to a\t new
\nemployer,  every workman who has been in continuous  service
\nfor  not less than one year in that undertaking\t immediately
\nbefore such transfer shall be entitled to notice and compen-
\nsation in accordance with the provisions of section 25F,  as
\nif the workman had been retrenched:\n<\/p>\n
130<\/span><\/p>\n
\t Provided  that nothing in this section shall  apply
\nto  a workman in any case where there has been a  change  of
\nemployers by reason of the transfer, if–\n<\/p>\n
(a)  the service of the workman has not been interrupted  by
\nsuch transfer;\n<\/p>\n
(b)  the terms and conditions of service applicable  to\t the
\nworkman after such transfer are not in any way less  favour-
\nable to the workman than those applicable to him immediately
\nbefore the transfer; and\n<\/p>\n
(c) the new employer is under the terms of such transfer  or
\notherwise,  legally  liable to pay to the  workman,  in\t the
\nevent  of his retrenchment, compensation on the\t basis\tthat
\nhis service has been continuous and has not been interrupted
\nby the transfer.”\n<\/p>\n
“25FFF.\t Compensation to workmen in case of closing down  of
\nundertakings–(1)  Where an undertaking is closed  down\t for
\nany reason whatsoever, every workman who has been in contin-
\nuous service for not less than one year in that\t undertaking
\nimmediately before such closure shall, subject to the provi-
\nsions of sub-section (2), be entitled to notice and  compen-
\nsation in accordance with the provisions of section 25-F, as
\nif the workman had been retrenched;\n<\/p>\n
\t Provided that where the undertaking is closed\tdown
\non  account of unavoidable circumstances beyond the  control
\nof the employer, the compensation to be paid to the  workmen
\nunder clause (b) of section 25-F shall not exceed his  aver-
\nage pay for three months.”\n<\/p>\n
Thus, by this Amendment Act the Parliament clearly  provided
\nthat though such termination may not have been\tretrenchment
\ntechnically  so-called, as decided by this Court,  neverthe-
\nless the employees in question whose services were terminat-
\ned  by the transfer or closure of the undertaking  would  be
\nentitled  to  compensation, as if the said  termination\t was
\nretrenchment.  As  it has been observed, the words  “as\t if”
\nbrought\t out  the  legal  distinction  between\tretrenchment
\ndefined by s. 2(00) as it was interpreted by this Court\t and
\ntermination  of\t services consequent upon  transfer  of\t the
\nundertaking.  In other words, the provision was that  though
\ntermination of services on transfer or closure of
\n131<\/span>
\nthe  undertaking may not be retrenchment, the  workmen\tcon-
\ncerned were entitled to compensation as if the said termina-
\ntion was retrenchment.\n<\/p>\n
    Thus  we  find that till then the  accepted\t meaning  of
\nretrenchment  was ordinary, contextual and narrower  meaning
\nof termination of surplus labour for any reason whatsoever.
\n    In\tAnakapalla Co-operative Agricultural and  Industrial
\nSociety Ltd. v. Workmen,<\/a> [1963] Suppl. 1 SCR 730, a  company
\nrunning a sugar mill was suffering losses every year due  to
\ninsufficient  supply  of sugarcane and wanted to  shift\t the
\nmill.  The  cane-growers formed a co-operative\tsociety\t and
\npurchased  the mill. As agreed between the company  and\t the
\nsociety, the company terminated the services of the  employ-
\nees and paid retrenchment compensation to them under section
\n25FF  of  the  Act. This society employed some\tof  the\t old
\nemployees  and refused to absorb some of them who raised  an
\nindustrial dispute. The Industrial Tribunal having  directed
\nthe  purchaser-society by its award to re-employ  them,\t the
\nsociety contended that it was not a successor in-interest of
\nthe  company  and hence the claim of re-employment  was\t not
\nsustainable  and the services of the employees\thaving\tbeen
\nterminated upon payment of compensation by the company under
\ns. 25FF no claim could be made against the transferee socie-
\nty.  This Court held that the society was the  successor-in-
\ninterest of the company as it carried on the same or similar
\nbusiness  as was carried by the vendor company at  the\tsame
\nplace  and without substantial break in continuity.  It\t was
\nfurther\t held that the employees were not entitled  to\tboth
\ncompensation  for termination of service and  immediate\t re-
\nemployment  at the hands of the transferee and\tsection\t 25H
\nwas not applicable to the case as the termination of service
\nupon  transfer or closure was not retrenchment\tproperly  so
\ncalled and that termination of service dealt with in s. 25FF
\ncould not be equated with retrenchment covered by s. 25F. It
\nwas  observed  that  the words ‘as if’ in  s.  25FF  clearly
\ndistinguished  retrenchment under s. 2(00)  and\t termination
\nunder s. 25FF. Gajendragadkar, J., as he then was,  speaking
\nfor the five Judges Bench said that in Hariprasad this Court
\nwas called upon to consider the true scope and effect of the
\nconcept\t of retrenchment as defined in s. 2(00) and it\theld
\nthat the said definition had to be read in the light of\t the
\naccepted  connotation  of the words, and as such,  it  could
\nhave  no wider meaning than the ordinary connotation of\t the
\nword  and according to this connotation\t retrenchment  meant
\nthe discharge of surplus labour or staff by the employer for
\nany  reason  whatsoever,  otherwise’ then  as  a  punishment
\ninflicted by way of disciplinary action, and did
\n132<\/span>
\nnot  include termination of services of all workmen  on\t the
\nbona  fide closure of industry or on change of ownership  or
\nmanagement thereof. It was observed:\n<\/p>\n
”   …..  the effect of this decision was that\t though\t the
\ndefinition  of\tthe  word ‘retrenchment’  may  perhaps\thave
\nincluded  the termination of services caused by the  closure
\nof  the concern or by its transfer, these two  latter  cases
\ncould  not be held to fall under the definition\t because  of
\nthe  ordinary  accepted connotation of the said\t word.\tThis
\ndecision  necessarily meant that the word ‘retrenchment’  in
\ns. 25FF had to bear a corresponding interpretation.”\n<\/p>\n
    In Workmen of Subong Tea Estate v. The outgoing  Manage-
\nment of Subong Tea Estate and Anr., reported in [1964] 5 SCR
\n602, it was similarly observed at page 613 of the report:
\n“In  dealing with the question of retrenchment in the  light
\nof  the relevant provisions to which we have just  referred,
\nit  is, however, necessary to bear in mind that the  manage-
\nment can retrench its employees only for proper reasons.  It
\nis undoubtedly true that it is for the ‘management to decide
\nthe strength of its labour force, for the number of  workmen
\nrequired  to carry out efficiently the work involved in\t the
\nindustrial  undertaking of any employer must always be\tleft
\nto  be determined by the management in its  discretion,\t and
\nso,  occasions\tmay arise when the number of  employees\t may
\nexceed the reasonable and legitimate needs of the  undertak-
\ning. In such a case, if any workman become surplus, it would
\nbe  open  to the management to retrench\t them.\tWorkmen\t may
\nbecome\tsurplus on the ground of rationalisation or  on\t the
\nground\tof economy reasonably and bona fide adopted  by\t the
\nmanagement, or of other industrial or trade reasons. In\t all
\nthese cases, the management would be justified in  effecting
\nretrenchment in its labour force. Thus, though the right  of
\nthe  management to effect retrenchment can not\tnormally  be
\nquestioned, when a dispute arises before an Industrial Court
\nin  regard to the validity of any retrenchment, it would  be
\nnecessary  for industrial adjudication to  consider  whether
\nthe impugned retrenchment was justified for proper  reasons.
\nIt  would not be open to the management either\tcapriciously
\nor  without  any reason at all to say that  it\tproposes  to
\nreduce its labour
\n133<\/span>
\nforce  for  no\trhyme or reason. This position\tcan  not  be
\nseriously disputed”\n<\/p>\n
    In\tDelhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v.  Shambhu\tNath
\nMukherjee  and Ors.,<\/a> reported in [1978] 1 SCR 591 where\t the
\npost  of motion setter was abolished and the respondent\t was
\ngiven  a job of a trainee on probation for the post  of\t As-
\nsistant\t Line Fixer and the management found him  unsuitable
\nfor  the job even after extending his probation period\tupto
\nnine  months and offered him the post of fitter on the\tsame
\npay and the respondent instead of accepting the offer wanted
\nto be given another chance to show his efficiency in his job
\nand the management struck off his name from the rolls  with-
\nout  complying with the provisions of s. 25F(a) and  (b)  of
\nthe  Act  and  the Labour Court having given  award  in\t the
\nrespondent’s  favour and the appellant’s writ  petition\t was
\nrejected  by the High Court, Goswami, J. speaking for  three
\nJudges\tBench  said: “Striking off the name of\tthe  workman
\nfrom  the  rolls  by the management is\ttermination  of\t his
\nservice. Such termination of service is retrenchment  within
\nthe meaning of s. 2(00) of the Act. There is nothing to show
\nthat the provisions of section 25F (a) and (b) were complied
\nwith  by the management in this case. The provisions  of  s.
\n25F(a),\t the  proviso apart, and (b) are mandatory  and\t any
\norder  of retrenchment in violation of these two  peremptory
\nconditions precedent is invalid.” The appeal was accordingly
\ndismissed. The earlier decisions were not referred to.
\n    Next comes the decision in State Bank of India v.\tShri
\nN. Sundara Money,<\/a> reported [1976] 3 SCR 160, (Y.V.  Chandra-
\nchud, V.R. Krishna lyer and A.C. Gupta, JJ.). In an applica-
\ntion  under Article 226, the respondent on automatic  extin-
\nguishment  of  his  service consequent\tto  the\t pre-emptive
\nprovision  as  to  the temporariness of the  period  of\t his
\nemployment  in his appointment letter claiming to have\tbeen
\ndeemed\tto have had continuous service for one\tyear  within
\nthe  meaning of s. 25(B)(2) of the Act, the Single Bench  of
\nthe High Court having allowed his writ petition and the writ
\nappeal\tof the appellant having also failed, this  Court  in
\nappeal found as fact that the appointment was purely  tempo-
\nrary  one  for a period of 9 days but  might  be  terminated
\nearlier, without assigning any reason therefor at the  peti-
\ntioner’s  discretion; and the employment  unless  terminated
\nearlier,  would\t automatically cease at the  expiry  of\t the
\nperiod i.e. 18.11.1972. This 9 days’ employment added on  to
\nwhat  had gone before ripened to a continuous service for  a
\nyear  “on  the antecedent arithmetic of 240 days  of  broken
\nbits  of service” and considering the meaning of  ‘retrench-
\nment’ it was held that the expression for any reason whatso-
\never
\n134<\/span>
\nwas  very  wide and almost admitting of\t no  exception.\t The
\ncontention  of the employer was that when the order  of\t ap-
\npointment  carried an automatic cessatioin of  service,\t the
\nperiod\tof employment worked itself out by efflux  of  time,
\nnot  by\t act  of employer and such cases  were\toutside\t the
\nconcept\t of  retrenchment. This Court observed that  to\t re-
\ntrench\tis  to cut down and one could not  retrench  without
\ntrenching or cutting, but “dictionaries are not dictators of
\nstatutory construction where the benignant moo&of a law and,
\nmore emphatically, the definition clause furnish a different
\ndenotation.”\n<\/p>\n
Accepting the literal meaning, Krishna Iyer, J. observed:
\n“A break down of s. 2(00) unmistakably expands the semantics
\nof retrenchment. ‘Termination  …..  for any reason whatso-
\never’ are the key words. Whatever the reason, every termina-
\ntion  spells retrenchment. So the sole question is, has\t the
\nemployee’s  service been terminated? Verbal  apparel  apart,
\nthe substance is decisive. A termination takes place where a
\nterm expires either by the active step of the master or\t the
\nrunning\t out  of the stipulated term. To  protect  the\tweak
\nagainst\t the strong this policy of comprehensive  definition
\nhas  been effectuated. Termination embraces not\t merely\t the
\nact of termination by the employer, but the fact of termina-
\ntion  howsoever produced. May be, the present may be a\thard
\ncase, but we can visualise abuses by employers, by  suitable
\nverbal\tdevices, circumventing the amount of s. 25F  and  s.
\n2(00).\tWithout speculating on possibilities, we  may  agree
\nthat  ‘retrenchment’ is no longer terra incognita  but\tarea
\ncovered\t by an expansive definition. It means ‘to end,\tcon-
\nclude,\tcease.’ In the present case the\t employment  ceased,
\nconcluded,  ended on the expiration of 9 days  automatically
\nmay  be, but cessation all the same. That to write into\t the
\norder  of  appointment the date of  termination\t confers  no
\nmokshas from s. 25F (b) is inferable from the proviso to  s.
\n25F(1).\t True,\tthe section speaks of  retrenchment  by\t the
\nemployer  and it is urged that some act of volition  by\t the
\nemployer  to  bring about the termination  is  essential  to
\nattract\t s.  25F and a omatic extinguishment of\t service  by
\neffluxion of time cannot be sufficient.”\n<\/p>\n
It was further observed:\n<\/p>\n
“Words of multiple import have to be winnowed judicially
\n135<\/span>
\nto suit the social philosophy of the statute. So screened we
\nhold that the transitive and intransitive senses are covered
\nin  the\t current context. Moreover, an\temployer  terminates
\nemployment  not\t merely by passing an order as\tthe  service
\nruns. He can do so by writing a composite order, one  giving
\nemployment and the other ending or limiting it.. A separate,
\nsubsequent  determination is not the sole magnetic  pull  of
\nthe  provision.\t A  pre-emptive provision  to  terminate  is
\nstruck by the same vice as the post-appointment termination.
\nDexterity  of  diction cannot defeat  the  articulated\tcon-
\nscience of the provision.”\n<\/p>\n
    The\t precedents  including Hariprasad do not  appear  to
\nhave  been brought to the notice of their Lordship  in\tthis
\ncase.  It  may be noted that since Delhi Cloth\tand  General
\nMills (supra) a change in interpretation of retrenchment  in
\ns. 2(00) of the Act is clearly discernible.\n<\/p>\n
    Mr. Venugopal would submit that the Judgment in  Sundara
\nMoney’s case and for that matter the subsequent decisions in
\nthe  line  are per incuriam for two reasons: (i)  that\tthey
\nfailed t0 apply the law laid down by the Constitution  Bench
\nof  this Hon’ble Court in Hariprasad Shukla’s  case  (supra)
\nand (ii) for the reason that they have ignored the impact of
\ntwo  of\t the provisions introduced by the Amendment  Act  of
\n1953 along with the definition of “retrenchment” in s. 2(00)
\nand  s.\t 25F  namely, ss. 25G and 25H.\tWe  agree  with\t the
\nlearned\t counsel that the question of the  subsequent  deci-
\nsions  being per incuriam could arise only if the  ratio  of
\nSundara\t Money’s  case and the subsequent Judgments  in\t the
\nline was in conflict with the ratio in the Hariprasad  Shuk-
\nla’s case (supra) and Anakapalla’s case (supra). The  issue,
\nit is urged, was, whether it was necessary for the Court  to
\ninterpret  s.  2(00) as being restricted to  termination  of
\nservices  of  workmen  rendered surplus for  arriving  at  a
\ndecision in the case and if it was unnecessary to so  inter-
\npret  s. 2(00) for the purpose of arriving at a decision  in
\nthat case, the interpretation of s. 2(00) would\t necessarily
\nby  rendered obiter. According to counsel, the long  discus-
\nsion  on  interpretation of s. 2(00) could  not\t be  brushed
\naside  as either obiter or mere casual observations  of\t the
\nConstitution Bench.\n<\/p>\n
     It\t is urged that for the.purpose of  ratio  decidendi,
\nthe  question is not whether a subsequent Bench of  the\t Su-
\npreme Court thinks that it was necessary or unnecessary\t for
\nthe  Constitution Bench, of the earlier Bench to have  dealt
\nwith  the issue, but whether the Constitution  Bench  itself
\nthought it necessary to interpret Section 2(00) for
\n136<\/span>
\narriving at its final decision. If the smaller Bench of\t the
\nSupreme Court could ignore the earlier decision of a  larger
\nBench  of the Supreme Court by holding that in its  opinion,
\nit was not necessary for the earlier Bench to have gone into
\nthe issue, equally it would be open to a High Court to adopt
\nthe  same approach and ignore binding Judgments of  the\t Su-
\npreme Court; giving rise to judicial indiscipline. According
\nto counsel the Constitution Bench, in its unanimous verdict,
\nundoubtedly found it necessary to go into the interpretation
\nof  s. 2(00) and did so with elaborate reasoning  supporting
\nits findings, because if the contention of the Management in
\nthat  case was accepted, namely, that  “retrenchment”  would
\ncover  only  termination of surplus labour  for\t any  reason
\nwhatsoever,  the  logical result of this finding,  would  be
\ntwofold: (i) that the termination of the entirety of workmen
\nby reason of closure, would not be a termination of  workmen
\nrendered surplus and, therefore, a case of closure would  be
\noutside\t s.  2(00), and (ii) secondly, such  termination  of
\nworkmen\t rendered surplus, could arise only if the  industry
\ncontinued to be a running industry.\n<\/p>\n
    The\t question whether the positive content of  s.  2(00)
\nrestricting the definition of workmen rendered surplus,\t for
\nany reason, whatsoever, is part of the ratio or not, submits
\nMr. Venugopal, is wholly an academic question in view of the
\nfact  that  as\tmany as 9 High Courts  have  restricted\t the
\napplicability of s. 25F, 25G and 25H to only cases of termi-
\nnation of services of surplus labour for any reason  whatso-
\never and not to other types of termination, whatever may  be
\nthe  reason for such termination. Even if a Judgment was  to
\nbe based on two alternative reasons or conclusions, each one
\nof these alternative reasons or basis, would form the  ratio
\nof  the Judgment. It is also urged that the  argument  would
\nequally\t apply to the ratio of Anakapalla’s  case  rendering
\nthe Judgments in Sundra Money’s case and the later decisions
\nper  incuriam, for not having noticed or followed a  binding
\nprecedent  of the Supreme Court itself, as the\tJudgment  of
\nthe Constitution Bench binds smaller Divisions of the Court.
\n    We now deal with the question of per incuriam by  reason
\nof allegedly not following the Constitution Bench decisions.
\nThe  Latin expression per incuriam means  through  inadvert-
\nence.  A  decision  can be said generally t0  be  given\t per
\nincuriam when this Court has acted in ignorance of a  previ-
\nous  decision of its own or when a High Court has  acted  in
\nignorance of a decision of this Court. It can not be doubted
\nthat  Art. 141 embodies, as a rule of law, the\tdoctrine  of
\nprecedents on which our judicial system is based. In  Bengal
\nImmunity  Company Ltd. v. State of Bihar,<\/a> [1955] 2 SCR\t603,
\nit was held that the words of Art.\n<\/p>\n
137<\/span><\/p>\n
14 1, “binding on all courts within the territory of India”,
\nthough\twide  enough to include the Supreme  Court,  do\t not
\ninclude the Supreme Court itself, and it is not bound by its
\nown judgments but is free to reconsider them in\t appropriate
\ncases.\tThis is necessary for proper development of law\t and
\njustice.  May be for the same reasons before judgments\twere
\ngiven in the House of Lords in Re-Dawson’s Settlement Lloyds
\nBank Ltd. v. Dawson and Ors., [1966] 1 WLR 1234, on July 26,
\n1966  Lord  Gardiner, L.C. made the following  statement  on
\nbehalf of himself and the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary:
\n“Their\tLordships regard the use of precedent as  an  indis-
\npensable foundation upon which to decide what is the law and
\nits  application to individual cases. It provides  at  least
\nsome degree of certainty upon which individuals can rely  in
\nthe conduct of their affairs, as well as a basis for orderly
\ndevelopment  of\t legal rules. Their  Lordships\tnevertheless
\nrecognise that too rigid adherence to precedent may lead  to
\ninjustice in a particular case and also unduly restrict\t the
\nproper\tdevelopment of the law. They propose, therefore,  to
\nmodify\ttheir  present practice and, while  treating  former
\ndecisions of this House as normally binding, to depart\tfrom
\na previous decision when it appears right to do so.
\n\t  In  this  connection they will bear  in  mind\t the
\ndanger\tof  disturbing retrospectively the  basis  on  which
\ncontracts,  settlements of property and fiscal\tarrangements
\nhave  been entered into and also the especial need for\tcer-
\ntainty as to the criminal law.”\n<\/p>\n
    Though the above announcement was not made in the course
\nof judicial proceeding it shows that it is open to House  of
\nLords to depart from the doctrine of precedent when  consid-
\nered justified. Section 2 12 of the Government of India Act,
\n1935 and Art. 141 of the Constitution of India were  enacted
\nto make the law declared by the Supreme Court binding on all
\ncourts in the country excluding, as is now being  interpret-
\ned, the Supreme Court itself. The doctrine of ratio deciden-
\ndi has also to be interpreted in the same line. In England a
\ndecision is said to be given per incuriam when the court has
\nacted in ignorance of a previous decision of its own or of a
\ncourt  of  co-ordinate jurisdiction which covered  the\tcase
\nbefore\tit, or when it has acted in ignorance of a  decision
\nof  the\t House of Lords. In the former case it\tmust  decide
\nwhich  decision to follow, and in the latter it is bound  by
\nthe  decision of the House of Lords. It has been  said\tthat
\nthe decision of the House of
\n138<\/span>
\nLords  mentioned above, refers to a decision  subsequent  to
\nthat  of the Court of Appeal. However, “a prior decision  of
\nthe  House  of Lords inconsistent with the decision  of\t the
\nCourt  of  Appeal, but which was not cited to the  Court  of
\nAppeal\twill make the later decision of the Court of  Appeal
\nof  no value as given per incuriam.” But if the prior  deci-
\nsion  had been cited to the Court of Appeal and\t that  court
\nhad  misinterpreted  a\tprevious decision of  the  House  of
\nLords, the Court of Appeal must follow its previous decision
\nand  leave the House to rectify the mistake.  In  Halsbury’s
\nLaws of England 4th Ed. Vol. 10 para 745 it has been said:
\n“While\tformer decisions of the House are  normally  binding
\nupon it, the House will depart from one of its own  previous
\ndecisions when it appears right in the interests of  justice
\nand  of\t the proper development of the law to do  so.  Cases
\nwhere  the House may reconsider its own\t previous  decisions
\nare those involving broad issues of justice or public policy
\nand  questions of legal principle. Only in rare\t cases\twill
\nthe  House reconsider questions of construction of  statutes
\nor  other  documents.  The House is not bound  to  follow  a
\nprevious case merely because it is indistinguishable on\t the
\nfacts. ‘ ‘
\n    The\t position and experience in this Court could not  be
\nmuch different, keeping in view the need for proper develop-
\nment of law and justice.\n<\/p>\n
    As regards the judgments of the Supreme Court  allegedly
\nrendered in ignorance of a relevant constitutional provision
\nor  other  statutory provisions on the subjects\t covered  by
\nthem,  it is true that the Supreme Court may not be said  to
\n“declare  the law” on those subjects if the relevant  provi-
\nsions were not really present to its mind. But in this\tcase
\nss. 25G and 25H were not directly attracted and even if they
\ncould  be  said to have been attracted in  laying  down\t the
\nmajor premise, they were to be interpreted consistently with
\nthe subject or context. The problem of judgment per incuriam
\nwhen  actually arises, should present no difficulty as\tthis
\nCourt  can  lay down the law afresh, if two or more  of\t its
\nearlier judgments cannot stand together. The question howev-
\ner  is whether in this case there is in fact a Judgment\t per
\nincuriarn.  This raises the question of ratio  decidendi  in
\nHariprasad  and Anakapalla’s cases on the one hand  and\t the
\nsubsequent decisions taking the contrary view on the other.\n<\/p>\n
139<\/span><\/p>\n
    An\tanalysis of judicial precedent, ratio decidendi\t and
\nthe  ambit of earlier and later decisions is to be found  in
\nthe  House of Lords’ decision in F.A. & A.B. Ltd. v.  Lupton
\n(Inspector  of Taxes), [19722] AC 634, Lord Simon  concerned
\nwith  the decisions in Griffiths v. J.P. Harrison  (Watford)
\nLtd., [1963] A.C. 1, and Finsbury Securities Ltd. v.  Inland
\nRevenue Commissioners, [1966] 1 WLR 1402, with their  inter-
\nrelationship  and  with the question whether  Lupton’s\tcase
\nfell  within  the precedent established by the\tone  or\t the
\nother case, said:\n<\/p>\n
“What  constitutes binding precedent is the ratio  decidendi
\nof a case and this is almost always to be ascertained by  an
\nanalysis of the material facts of the case that is, general-
\nly,  those  facts which the tribunal whose  decision  is  in
\nquestion itself holds, expressly or implicitly, to be  mate-
\nrial.”\n<\/p>\n
It has also been analysed:\n<\/p>\n
“A  judicial decision will often be reached by a process  of
\nreasoning which can be reduced into a sort of complex syllo-
\ngism,  with the major premise consisting of  a\tpre-existing
\nrule  of law (either statutory or judge-made) and  with\t the
\nminor  premise consisting of the material facts of the\tcase
\nunder  immediate consideration. The conclusion is the  deci-
\nsion of the case, which may or may not establish new law–in
\nthe vast majority of cases it will be merely the application
\nof  existing law to the facts judicially ascertained.  Where
\nthe  decision does consititute new law, this may or may\t not
\nbe expressly stated as a proposition of law: frequently\t the
\nnew  law will appear only from subsequent comparison of,  on
\nthe  one  hand,\t the material facts inherent  in  the  major
\npremise with, on the other, the material facts which consti-
\ntute  the minor premise. As a result of this  comparison  it
\nwill  often be apparent that a rule has been extended by  an
\nanalogy expressed or implied.”\n<\/p>\n
     To\t consider  the ratio decidendi of a  case  we  have,
\ntherefore, to ascertain the principle on which the case\t was
\ndecided. Sir George Jessel in Osborne v. Rowlett, [1880]  13
\nCh.  D.\t 774,  remarked that ‘the only thing  in  a  judge’s
\ndecision binding as an authority upon a subsequent judge  is
\nthe principle upon which the case was decided’.\n<\/p>\n
     The  ratio decidendi of a decision may be\tnarrowed  or
\nwidened\t by the judges before whom it is cited as  a  prece-
\ndent. In the process the
\n140<\/span>
\nratio decidendi which the judges who decided the case  would
\nthemselves  have chosen may be even different from  the\t one
\nwhich  has been approved by subsequent judges. This  is\t be-
\ncause  Judges,\twhile deciding a case will  give  their\t own
\nreasons but may not distinguish their remarks in a rigid way
\nbetween what they thought to be the ratio decidendi and what
\nwere  their  obiter dicta, that is, things said\t in  passing
\nhaving no binding force, though of some persuasive power. It
\nis said that “a judicial decision is the abstraction of\t the
\nprinciple  from\t the facts and arguments of  the  case.”  “A
\nsubsequent  judge  may extend it to a broader  principle  of
\nwider application or narrow it down for a narrower  applica-
\ntion.” The submissions of Mr. Venugopal that for the purpose
\nof ratio decidendi, the question is not whether a subsequent
\nBench of this Court thinks that it was necessary or unneces-
\nsary  for  the Constitution Bench, or the earlier  Bench  to
\nhave  dealt  with the issue, but  whether  the\tConstitution
\nBench itself thought it necessary to interpret s. 2 (00) for
\narriving at the final decision has to be held to be  untena-
\nble in this wide and rigid form.\n<\/p>\n
    Analysing the compled syllogism of Hariprasad’s case  we
\nfind  that  its major premise was  that\t retrenchment  meant
\ntermination  of surplus labour of an existing  industry\t and
\nthe minor premise was, that the termination in that case was
\nof  all\t the  workmen on closure of business  on  change  of
\nownership. The decision was that there was no  retrenchment.
\nIn  this  context it is important to  note  what  subsequent
\nbenches\t of this Court thought to be the ratio decidendi  of
\nHariprasad, and for that matter of Anakapalla.
\n    In\tSantosh Gupta v. State Bank Of Patiala,<\/a> reported  in
\n[1980] 3 SCR 884, O. Chinnappa Reddy, J. sitting with Krish-
\nna Iyer, J. deduced the ratio decidendi of Hariprasad thus:
\n“In  Hariprasad Shivshankar Shukla v. A.D. Divikar, the\t Su-<\/a>
\npreme  Court took the view that the word  ‘retrenchment’  as
\ndefined in s. 2(00) did not include termination of  services
\nof  all workmen on a bona fide closure of an industry or  on
\nchange of ownership or management of the industry. In  order
\nto  provide for the situations which the Supreme Court\theld
\nwere  not covered by the definition of the  expression\t‘re-
\ntrenchment’,  the  Parliament  added s. 25FF  and  s.  25FFF
\nproviding for the payment of compensation to the workmen  in
\ncase  of transfer of undertakings and in case of closure  of
\nundertakings respectively.”\n<\/p>\n
141<\/span><\/p>\n
    In\tHariprasad  (supra) the\t learned  Judges  themselves
\nformulated the question before them as follows:
\n“The  question, however, before us is–does this  definition
\nmerely\tgive  effect  to the ordinary,\taccepted  notion  of
\nretrenchment in an existing or running industry by embodying
\nthe notion in apt and readily intelligible words or does  it
\ngo  so far beyond the accepted notion of retrenchment as  to
\ninclude\t the  termination of services of all workmen  in  an
\nindustry when the industry itself ceases t0 exist on a\tbona
\nfide  closure or discontinuance of his business by  the\t em-
\nployer.”\n<\/p>\n
    The\t question was answered by the learned Judges in\t the
\nfollowing words:\n<\/p>\n
“In the absence of any compelling words to indicate that the
\nintention  was\teven to include a bona fide closure  of\t the
\nwhole business, it would, we think, be divorcing the expres-
\nsion  altogether  from the context to give it  such  a\twide
\nmeaning\t as  is\t contended for by learned  counsel  for\t the
\nrespondents  …..  it would be against the entire scheme of
\nthe Act to give the definition clause relating to  retrench-
\nment  such a meaning as would include within the  definition
\ntermination  of service of all workmen by the employer\twhen
\nthe business itself ceases to exist.”\n<\/p>\n
Rejecting the submission of Dr. Anand Prakash that “termina-
\ntion of service for any reason whatsoever” meant no more and
\nno  less than discharge of a labour force which was  a\tsur-
\nplusage,  it was observed in Santosh Gupta (supra) that\t the
\nmisunderstanding  of  the  observations\t and  the  resulting
\nconfusion stem from not appreciating the lead question which
\nwas  posed and answered by the learned Judges and’ that\t the
\nreference to ‘discharge on account of surplusage’ was illus-
\ntrative and not exhaustive on account of transfer or closure
\nof business.\n<\/p>\n
     Mr. V.A. Bobde submits, and we think rightly, that\t the
\nsole reason for the decision in Hariprasad was that the\t Act
\npostulated the existence and continuance of an industry\t and
\nwhere  the industry i.e. the undertaking, itself was  closed
\ndown or transferred, the very substratum disappeared and the
\nAct could not regulate industrial employment in the  absence
\nof  an industry. The true position in that case was that  s.
\n2(00)  and  25F could not be invoked since  the\t undertaking
\nitself
\n142<\/span>
\nceased\tto exist. The ratio of Hariprasad, according to\t the
\nlearned\t counsel, is discernible from the discussion at\t pp.
\n13 1-132 of the report about the ordinary accepted notion of
\nretrenchment  ‘in an industry’ and Pipraich’s case  was\t re-
\nferred to for the proposition that continuance of the  busi-
\nness was essential; the emphasis was not on the discharge of
\nsurplus\t labour but on the fact that “retrenchment  connotes
\nin  its\t ordinary acceptation that the\tbusiness  itself  is
\nbeing  continued  ….. the termination of services  of\t all
\nthe  workmen  as  a result of the closure  of  the  business
\ncannot therefore be properly described as retrenchment.”  At
\npage  134 in the last four lines also it was said: “But\t the
\nfundamental question at issue is, does the definition clause
\ncover cases of closure of business when the closure is\treal
\nand  bona fide?” The reasons for arriving at the  conclusion
\nare  given as “it would be against the entire scheme of\t the
\nAct  to give the definition clause relating to\tretrenchment
\nsuch a meaning as would include within the definition termi-
\nnation\tof service of all workmen by the employer  when\t the
\nbusiness  itself  ceases to exist and  that  the  industrial
\ndispute\t to which the provisions of the Act applies is\tonly
\none  which  arises out of an existing industry”.  Thus,\t the
\nCourt  was neither called upon to decide nor did  it  decide
\nwhether in a continuing business, retrenchment was  confined
\nonly  to  discharge of surplus staff and  the  reference  to
\ndischarge  of surplusage was for the purpose of\t contrasting
\nthe  situation\tin that case, i.e. workmen  were  being\t re-
\ntrenched because of cessation of business and those observa-
\ntions did not constitute reasons for the decision. What\t was
\ndecided\t was  that if there was no continuing  industry\t the
\nprovision  could  not apply. In fact  the  question  whether
\nretrenchment  did or did not include other terminations\t was
\nnever  required to be decided in Hariprasad and\t could\tnot,
\ntherefore  have\t been, or be taken to have been\t decided  by
\nthis Court.\n<\/p>\n
    Lord Halsbury’s dicta in Quinn v. Leathem, [1901] AC 495
\nat page 506 is:\n<\/p>\n
”   …..  every judgment must be read as applicable to\t the
\nparticular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since\t the
\ngenerality  of the expressions which may be found there\t are
\nnot  intended to be expositions of the whole law,  but\tgov-
\nerned  and qualified by the particular facts of the case  in
\nwhich such expressions are to be found. The other is that  a
\ncase is only on authority for what it actually decides.”
\nThis Court held in State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Misra,<\/a> [1968]
\n2 SCR 154, that a decision is only an authority for what  it
\nactually decides.\n<\/p>\n
143<\/span><\/p>\n
What  is of the essence in a decision is its ratio  and\t not
\nother  observation found therein nor what logically  follows
\nfrom the various observations made in it. We agree with\t Mr.
\nBobde  when  he\t submits that Hariprasad’s case\t is  not  an
\nauthority  for\tthe proposition that s.\t 2(00)\tonly  covers
\ncases  of discharge of surplus labour and staff.  The  Judg-
\nments in Sundara Money (supra) and the subsequent  decisions
\nin the line could not be held to be per incuriam inasmuch as
\nin Hindustan Steel and Santhosh Gupta’s cases, the  Division
\nBenches of this Court had referred to Hariprasad’s case\t and
\nrightly held that its ratio did not extend beyond a case  of
\ntermination  on the ground of closure and as such  it  would
\nnot be correct to say that the subsequent decisions  ignored
\na binding precedent.\n<\/p>\n
    In Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. The Presiding Officer, Labour
\nCourt,<\/a> [1977] 1 SCR 586 the question was whether termination
\nof  service  by efflux of time was  termination\t of  service
\nwithin\tthe definition of retrenchment in section  2(oo)  of
\nthe Act. Both the earlier decisions of the Court in Haripra-
\nsad (supra) and Sundara Money (supra) were considered and it
\nwas  held  that there was nothing in  Hariprasad  which\t was
\ninconsistent  with the decision in Sundara Money’s case.  It
\nwas  observed that the decision in Hariprasad was only\tthat
\nthe words “for any reason whatsoever” used in the definition
\nof retrenchment would not include a bona fide closure of the
\nwhole business because it would affect the entire scheme  of
\nthe  Act.  The decisions in L. Robert D’Souza  v.  Executive
\nEngineer,  Southern Railway and Anr.,<\/a> [1979] 1\tL.L.J.\t211;
\nThe  Managing  Director, National  Garages  v.J.  Gonsalves,
\n[1962] 1 L.L.J. 56; Goodlas Nerolac Paints v. Chief  Commis-
\nsioner,\t Delhi,\t [1967]\t 1 L.L.J. 545  and  Rajasthan  State
\nElectricity  Board v. Labour Court, [1966] 1 L.L.J. 381,  in
\nwhich  contrary\t view was taken, were overruled\t in  Santosh
\nGupta  holding\tthat  the discharge of the  workman  on\t the
\nground\tthat  she  did not pass the test  which\t would\thave
\nenabled\t her to be confirmed was ‘retrenchment’\t within\t the
\nmeaning\t of section 2(oo) and therefore, the requirement  of
\nsection\t 25F  had to be complied with. The workman  was\t em-
\nployed in the State Bank of Patiala from July 13, 1973\ttill
\nAugust, 1974 when her services were terminated. According to
\nthe workman she. had worked for 240 days in the year preced-
\ning August 21, 1974 and the termination of her services\t was
\nretrenchment  as  it did not fall within any  of  the  three
\naccepted cases. The management’s contention was that  termi-
\nnation was not due to discharge of surplus labour but due to
\nfailure\t of  the workman to pass the test which\t could\thave
\nenabled\t her to be confirmed in the service and as  such  it
\nwas not retrenchment. This contention was repelled.\n<\/p>\n
144<\/span><\/p>\n
    Both  Mr. Shetye and Mr. Venugopal submit that  judicial
\ndiscipline required the smaller benches to follow the  deci-
\nsions in the larger benches. This reminds us of the words of
\nLord  Mailsham of Marylebone, the Lord Chancellor,  “in\t the
\nhierarchical system of courts which exists in this  country,
\nit is necessary for each lower tier  …..  to accept loyal-
\nly  the decisions of the higher tiers”. However, in view  of
\nthe ratio decidendi of Hariprasad, as we have seen, there is
\nno room for such a criticism.\n<\/p>\n
    In Management of Karnataka State Road Transport Corpora-
\ntion, Bangalore v. M. Boraiah, reported in [1984] 1 SCC 244,
\na  Division Bench of A.N. Sen and Ranganath Misra, JJ.\tfol-
\nlowing\tthe decisions in State Bank of India v.\t N.  Sundara
\nMoney,<\/a>\t(supra); Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. Presiding  Officer,
\nLabour\tCourt, Orissa,<\/a> (supra); Santosh Gupta v. State\tBank
\nof Patiala,<\/a> (supra); Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. v. Workmen,<\/a> [
\n1960]  2  SCR  32; Mohan Lal v. Management  of\tM\/s.  Bharat
\nElectronics Ltd.,<\/a> [1981] 3 SCR 518 and Surendra Kumar  Verma
\nv. Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour  Court,
\nNew  Delhi,<\/a> [1981] 1 SCR 789, held that in the above  series
\nof cases that have come later, the Constitution Bench  deci-
\nsion  in Hariprasad (supra) has been examined and the  ratio
\nindicated therein has been confined to its own facts and the
\nview  indicated by the Court in that case did not meet\twith
\nthe approval of Parliament and, therefore, the law had\tbeen
\nsubsequently amended.\n<\/p>\n
Speaking for the Court, R.N. Misra, J. significantly said:
\n“We  are now inclined to hold that the stage has  come\twhen
\nthe view indicated in Money case (supra) has been  ‘absorbed
\ninto  the consensus’ and there is no scope for\tputting\t the
\nclock back or for an anti-clockwise operation.”\n<\/p>\n
    More  than\ta month thereafter in Gammon India  Ltd.  v.
\nNiranjan Dass,<\/a> [1984] 1 SCC 509, a three Judges Bench  (D.A.
\nDesai,\tR.B. Misra and Ranganath Misra, JJ.) construing\t the
\none month’s notice of termination in that case due to reduc-
\ntion of volume of business of the company said:
\n“On a true construction of the notice, it would appeal\tthat
\nthe respondent had become surplus on account of reduction in
\nvolume of work and that constitutes retrenchment even in the
\ntraditional  sense  of the term as interpreted\tin  Pipraich
\nSugar Mills Ltd. v. Pipraich Sugar Mills Mazdoor<\/a>
\n145<\/span>
\nUnion,\tthough that view does not hold the field in view  of
\nthe recent decisions of this Court in State Bank of India v.
\nN. Sundara Money<\/a>; Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. Presiding Officer,
\nLabour Court, Orissa<\/a>; Santosh Gupta v. State Bank of  Patia-
\nla;  Delhi  Cloth  and General Mills Ltd.  v.  Shambhu\tNath
\nMukherjee<\/a>; Mohan Lal v. Management of M\/s. Bharat  Electron-<\/a>
\nics Ltd. and L. Robert D’Souza v. Executive Engineer, South-<\/a>
\nern Railway. The recitals and averments in the notice  leave
\nno  room  for doubt that the service of the  respondent\t was
\nterminated  for the reason that on account of recession\t and
\nreduction  in the volume of work of the company,  respondent
\nhas become surplus. Even apart from this, the termination of
\nservice\t for  the  reasons mentioned in the  notice  is\t not
\ncovered\t by any of the clauses (a), (b) and (c) of s.  2(00)
\nwhich  defines\tretrenchment and it is by now  well  settled
\nthat  where the termination of service does not fall  within
\nany  of\t the excluded categories, the termination  would  be
\nipso  facto  retrenchment. It was not even attempted  to  be
\nurged  that the case of the respondent would fall in any  of
\nthe excluded categories. It is therefore indisputably a case
\nof retrenchment.”\n<\/p>\n
(Emphasis supplied)
\n     In\t a fast developing branch of Industrial\t and  Labour
\nlaw it may not always be of particular importance to rigidly
\nadhere to a precedent, and a precedent may need be  departed
\nfrom if the basis of legislation changes. It was in realisa-
\ntion of the idea of a living law that in Reg v. Home  Secre-
\ntary, Ex. P. Khawaja, reported in [1984] AC 74 (H.L.) it was
\nsaid at p. 84:\n<\/p>\n
The  House will depart from a previous decision where it  is
\nright  to do so and where adherence to a  previous  decision
\nmay  lead to injustice in a particular case.  Constitutional
\nand administrative law are not fields where it is of partic-
\nular  importance to adhere to precedent. A recent  precedent
\nmay be more readily departed from than one which is of\tlong
\nstanding.  A precedent may be departed from where the  issue
\nis one of statutory construction-”\n<\/p>\n
     We\t now  take up the question of interpretation  of  s.
\n2(00) of the Act dealing with the rival contentions, namely,
\nordinary or contextual as against literal meaning.\n<\/p>\n
146<\/span><\/p>\n
    When  we  analyse  the mental process  in  drafting\t the
\ndefinition of “retrenchment” in s. 2(00) of the Act we\tfind
\nthat  firstly it is to mean the termination by the  employer
\nof  the\t service  of a workman for  any\t reason\t whatsoever.
\nHaving\tsaid  so  the Parliament proceeded to  limit  it  by
\nexcluding certain types of termination, namely,\t termination
\nas a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action. The
\nother  types  of  termination excluded\twere  (a)  voluntary
\nretrenchment; or (b) retrenchment of the workman on reaching
\nthe  age  of superannuation if the  contract  of  employment
\nbetween\t the employer and the workman concerned\t contains  a
\nstipulation on that behalf; or (c) termination of service of
\na  workman  on the ground of continued ill health.  Had\t the
\nParliament  envisaged  only the question of  termination  of
\nsurplus labour alone in mind, there would arise no  question
\nof excluding (a), (b) and (c) above. The same mental process
\nwas  evident  when s. 2(00) was\t amended  inserting  another
\nexclusion  clause (bb) by the Amending Act 49 of 1984,\twith
\neffect from 18.8.1984, “termination of the service of  work-
\nman  as a result of the non-renewal of the contract  of\t em-
\nployment  between the employer and the workman concerned  on
\nits expiry of such contract being terminated under a  stipu-
\nlation in that behalf contained therein.”\n<\/p>\n
This is literal interpretation as distinguished from contex-
\ntual interpretation.\n<\/p>\n
“The only rule of construction of Acts of Parliament”,\tsays
\nTindal,\t C.J. in Sussex Peerage case, [1844] 11 C1 & Fin  85
\n(143),\t“is that they should be construed according  to\t the
\nintent of the Parliament which passed the Act. If the  words
\nof  the statute are in themselves precise  and\tunambiguous,
\nthen no more can be necessary than to expound those words in
\ntheir natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone
\ndo, in such case, best declare the intention of the  lawgiv-
\ner.”\n<\/p>\n
In  Mutto v. T.K. Nandi,<\/a> reported in [1979] 2 SCR 409  (418)
\nit  was\t similarly  said: “The Court has  to  determine\t the
\nintention as expressed by the words used. If the words of  a
\nstatute are themselves precise and unambiguous then no\tmore
\ncan be necessary then to expound those words in their  ordi-
\nnary  and  natural sense. The words themselves alone  do  in
\nsuch a case best declare the intention of the lawgiver.”  As
\nwas stated in Thompson v. Gould, reported in [1910] A.C. 409
\n(420) “it is a wrong thing to read into an Act of Parliament
\nwords  which  are  not there, and in the  absence  of  clear
\nnecessity it is a wrong thing to do
\n147<\/span>
\nso.”  “The  cardinal rule of construction of statute  is  to
\nread  statutes\tliterally, that is, by giving to  the  words
\ntheir ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning.”  [Jugalki-
\nshore v. Ram Cotton Co. Ltd., [1955] 1 SCR 1369]
\nTo  interpret an Act of Parliament is to give effect to\t its
\nintention.  Lord  Simon in Ealing L.B.C. v.  Race  Relations
\nBoard, [1972] AC 342 (360) said:\n<\/p>\n
      “The  Court sometimes asks itself what  the  draftsman
\nmust have intended. This is reasonable enough: the draftsman
\nknows  what  is the intention of the  legislative  initiator
\n(nowadays almost always an organ of the executive); he\tknow
\nwhat  canons of construction the courts will apply;  and  he
\nwill  express himself in such a way as accordingly  to\tgive
\neffect to the legislative intention. Parliament, of  course,
\nin  enacting  legislation  assumes  responsibility  for\t the
\nlanguage  of the draftsman. But the reality is that  only  a
\nminority  of  legislators  will attend the  debates  on\t the
\nlegislation. Failing special interest in the  subject-matter
\nof the legislation, what will demand their attention will be
\nsomething  on the face of proposed legislation which  alerts
\nthem  to a questionable matter. Accordingly, such canons  of
\nconstruction  as that words in a non-technical statute\twill
\nprimarily   be\tinterpreted  according\tto  their   ordinary
\nmeaning\t …..\t”\n<\/p>\n
    According  to  Lord Simon looking into  the\t legislative
\nhistory\t or’ the preparatory works may sometimes  be  useful
\nbut  may  often lead to abuse and waste, as  “an  individual
\nlegislator may indicate his assent on an assumption that the
\nlegislation  means so-and-so and the courts may have no\t way
\nof  knowing  how far his assumption is shared  by  his\tcol-
\nleagues, even those present.” “In the absence of such  mate-
\nrial  it is said, the courts have five principal avenues  of
\napproach to the ascertainment of the legislative  intention:
\n(1)  examination of the social background,  as\tspecifically
\nproved if not within common knowledge, in order to  identify
\nthe  social  or juristic defect which is likely\t subject  of
\nremedy; (2) a conspectus of the entire relevant body of\t the
\nlaw for the same purpose; (3) particular regard to the\tlong
\ntitle of the statute to be interpreted (and where available,
\nthe  preamble), in which the general legislative  objectives
\nwill  be  stated;  (4) scrutiny of the actual  words  to  be
\ninterpreted,  in  the  light of the  established  canons  of
\ninterpretation; and (5) examination of the other  provisions
\nof  the\t statute in question (or of other statutes  in\tpari
\nmateria) for the illumination which they
\n148<\/span>
\nthrow  on  the\tparticular words which are  the\t subject  of
\ninterpretation.\n<\/p>\n
    The\t Heydon’s Rule requires that the court will look  at
\nthe Act to see what was its purpose and what mischief in the
\nearlier\t law it was designed to prevent. Four things are  to
\nbe considered: (i) What was the law before the making of the
\nAct?  (ii)  What was the mischief and defect for  which\t the
\nearlier\t law did not provide? (iii) What remedy the  Parlia-
\nment had resolved to cure? (iv) What is the true reason\t for
\nthe remedy? The Court shall make such construction as  shall
\nsuppress the mischief and advance the remedy.
\n    Where  the statute has been passed to remedy a  weakness
\nin the law, it is to be interpreted in such a way as well to
\nbring about that remedy.\n<\/p>\n
    The literal rules of construction require the wording of
\nthe  Act to be construed according to its literal and  gram-
\nmatical meaning whatever the result may be. Unless otherwise
\nprovided, the same word must normally be construed  through-
\nout the Act in the same sense, and in the case of old  stat-
\nutes regard must be had to its contemporary meaning if there
\nhas  been no change with the passage of time.  However,\t the
\nLaw  Commission 21 of England has struck a note\t of  caution
\nthat “to place undue emphasis on the literal meaning of\t the
\nwords of a provision is to assume an unattainable perfection
\nin  draftsmanship”.  In Whiteley v.  Chappelf,\t[1968-69]  4
\nL.R.Q.B.  Div. 147, a statute concerned with electoral\tmal-
\npractices made it an offence to personate ‘any person  enti-
\ntle  to vote’ at an election. The defendant was\t accused  of
\npersonating a deceased voter and the court, using the liter-
\nal rule, found that there was no offence as the\t personation
\nwas  not of person entitled to vote. A dead person  was\t not
\nentitled to vote. A deceased person did not exist and had no
\nright  to vote and as a result the decision arrived  at\t was
\ncontrary  to the intention of Parliament. As it was  pointed
\nout in Prince of Hanover v. Attorney General [1956] Ch. Div.
\n188,  the Golden Rule in the form of modified literal  Rule,
\naccording  to  which  the words of statute will\t as  far  as
\npossible be construed according to their ordinary and  plain
\nand natural meaning, unless this leads to an absurd  result.
\nWhere the conclusion reached by applying the literal rule is
\ncontrary to the intention of Parliament, the Golden rule  is
\nhelpful.  A  tested rule is that of Noscitur a\tsociis.\t The
\nmeaning\t of a word can be gathered from its  context.  Under
\nthis rule words of doubtful meaning may be better understood
\nfrom the nature of the words and phrases with which they are
\nassociated [Muir v. Keay, [1875] L.R 10 Q.B. 594]. But\tthis
\nwill not apply when the word itself has been defined.\n<\/p>\n
149<\/span><\/p>\n
    In\tthe  case before us the difficulty  was\t created  by
\ndefining ‘retrenchment’ to mean something wider than what it
\nnaturally  and ordinarily meant. While naturally  and  ordi-
\nnarily\tit  meant discharge of surplus labour,\tthe  defined
\nmeaning\t was  termination of service of a  workman  for\t any
\nreason\twhatsoever except those excluded in  the  definition
\nitself. Such a definition creates complexity as the  drafts-
\nman himself in drafting the other sections using the defined
\nword  may  slip\t into the ordinary meaning  instead  of\t the
\ndefined meaning.\n<\/p>\n
    Way\t back  in the Queen v. The Commissioners  under\t the
\nBoiler\tExplosions Act, 1882, [1891] 1 Q.B. Division 703,  a
\nboiler\tfor generating steam was situate above ground  at  a
\ncolliery, and a pipe conducted the steam down the shaft\t and
\nalong  the working to a pumping engine in the mine. A  valve
\nin  this pipe, in the mine and near the pumping engine\tblew
\noff.  The question was whether the pipe in which the  explo-
\nsion  occurred\twas  a ‘boiler’\t within\t the  interpretation
\nclause\tof the Boiler Explosions Act, 1882. Lord M.R.  Esher
\nsaid;  “If the Act had dealt with the explosion of a  boiler
\nand in some other’ section with an explosion in pipes or  in
\nany other specified thing, the matter would be easy; but the
\ndraftsman has gone upon that which to my mind is a dangerous
\nmethod\tof drawing Acts of Parliament. He has put in a\tsec-
\ntion which says that a boiler shall mean something which  is
\nin  reality not a boiler. This third section of the  Act  of
\n1882 that is the Boiler Explosions Act 1882 is a ‘peculiarly
\nbad specimen’ of the method of drafting, which enacts that a
\nword shall mean something which in fact it does not mean.”\n<\/p>\n
    However, a judge facing such a problem of interpretation
\ncan not simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman.\tLord
\nDenning in his Discipline of Law says at p. 12:
\n“Whenever  a statute comes up for consideration it  must  be
\nremembered that it is not within human powers to foresee the
\nmanifold  sets\tof facts which may arise, and,\teven  if  it
\nwere,  it is not possible to provide for them in terms\tfree
\nfrom  all ambiguity. The English language is not an  instru-
\nment of mathematical precision. Our literature would be much
\nthe  poorer if it were. This is where the draftsman of\tActs
\nof Parliament have often been unfairly criticised. A  judge,
\nbelieving  himself to be lettered by the supposed rule\tthat
\nhe must look to the language and nothing else, laments\tthat
\nthe  draftsmen have not provided for this or that,  or\thave
\nbeen guilty of some or other ambiguity. It would cer-\n<\/p>\n
150<\/span><\/p>\n
tainly\tsave the judges trouble if Acts of  Parliament\twere
\ndrafted\t with divine prescience and perfect clarity. In\t the
\nabsence\t of it, when a defect appears a judge cannot  simply
\nfold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to\twork
\non the constructive task of finding the intention of Parlia-
\nment, and he must do this not only from the language of\t the
\nstatute, but also from a consideration of the social  condi-
\ntions  which gave rise to it, and of the mischief  which  it
\nwas passed to remedy, and then he must supplement the  writ-
\nten word so as to give ‘force and life’ to the intention  of
\nthe legislature.”\n<\/p>\n
    Analysing the definition of retrenchment in s. 2(00)  we
\nfind  that termination by the employer of the service  of  a
\nworkman would not otherwise have covered the cases  excluded
\nin (a) and (b), namely, voluntary retirement and  retirement
\non reaching the stipulated age of retirement. There would be
\nno volitional element of the employer. Their express  exclu-
\nsion implies that those would otherwise have been  included.
\nAgain  if  those cases were to be included,  termination  on
\nabandonment of service, or on efflux of time, and on failure
\nto qualify, although only consequential or resultant,  would
\nbe  included  as those have not been excluded.\tThus,  there
\nappears to be a gap between the first part and the exclusion
\npart. Mr. Venugopal, on this basis, points out that cases of
\nvoluntary retirement, superannuation and tenure\t appointment
\nare  not cases of termination ‘by the employer’\t and  would,
\ntherefore,  in any event, be outside the scope of  the\tmain
\nprovisions and are not really provisos.\n<\/p>\n
    The definition has used the word ‘means’. When a statute
\nsays that a word or phrase shall “mean”–not merely that  it
\nshall “include”–certain things or acts, “the definition  is
\na  hard-and-fast  definition, and no other  meaning  can  be
\nassigned  to the expression than is put down in\t definition”
\n(per Esher, M.R., Gough v. Gough, [1891] 2 QB 665). A  defi-
\nnition is an explicit statement of the full connotation of a
\nterm.\n<\/p>\n
    Mr. Venugopal submits that the definition clause  cannot
\nbe  interpreted in isolation and the scope of the  exception
\nto the main provision would also have to be looked into\t and
\nwhen so interpreted, it is obvious that a restrictive  mean-
\ning has to be given to s. 2(00).\n<\/p>\n
    It is also pointed out that s. 25G deals with the  prin-
\nciple  of ‘last come, first go’, a principle  which  existed
\nprior to the Amendment Act
\n151<\/span>
\nof 1953 only in relation to termination of workmen  rendered
\nsurplus for any reasons whatsoever and that was followed  in
\nVishwamitra  Press, Kanpur v. Workers of Vishwamitra  Press,<\/a>
\n[1952] L.A.C. 20 at p.33\/41; Presidency Jute Mills Co.\tLtd.
\nv.  Presidency Jute Mills Co.Employees Union,<\/a> [1952]  L.A.C.
\n62;  Iron  and Steel Mazdoor Union,Kanpur v. J.K.  Iron\t and
\nSteel  Co. Ltd.,<\/a> [1952] L.A.C. 467; Halar Sali and  Chemical
\nWorks,\tJamnagar  v.  Workmen,<\/a>\t[1953]\tL.A.C.\t134;Prakriti
\nBhushan Gupta v. Chief Mining Engineer Railway\tBoard,[1953]
\nL.A.C.\t373;  Sudarshan\t Banerjee v. Mcleod  and  Co.  Ltd.,
\n[1953]\tL.A.C. 702 (7 11). Besides, it is submitted, by\t its
\nvery  nature  the wide definition of retrenchment  would  be
\nwholly inapplicable to termination simpliciter. The question
\nof picking out a junior in the same category for being\tsent
\nout in place of a person whose services are being terminated
\nsimpliciter  or otherwise on the ground that the  management
\ndoes  not want to continue his contract of employment  would
\nnot  arise. Similarly it is pointed out that starting\tfrom
\nSundara Money where termination simpliciter of a workman for
\nnot  having passed a test, or for not having  satisfactorily
\ncompleted  his\tprobation would not attract s. 25G,  as\t the
\nvery  question of picking out a junior in the same  category
\nfor being sent out instead of the person who failed to\tpass
\na  test or failed to satisfactorily complete  his  probation
\ncould  never arise. If, however, s. 25G were to be  followed
\nin  such cases, the section would itself be rendered  uncon-
\nstitutional  and  violative  of fundamental  rights  of\t the
\nworkmen under Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the  Constitu-
\ntion. It would be no defence to this argument to say that
\nthe  management\t could record reasons as to why\t it  is\t not
\nsending out the juniormost in such cases. Since in no single
\ncase  of termination simpliciter would s. 25G be  applicable
\nand  in every such case of termination simpliciter,  without
\nexception, reasons would have to be recorded- Similarly,  it
\nis  submitted, s. 25H which deals with re-employment of\t re-
\ntrenched  workmen, can also have no application\t whatsoever,
\nto  a case of termination simipliciter because of  the\tfact
\nthat the employee whose services have been terminated, would
\nhave  been holding a post which ‘eo instanti’  would  become
\nvacant\tas a result of the termination of his  services\t and
\nunder s. 25H he would have a right to be reinstated  against
\nthe very post from which his services have been\t terminated,
\nrendering  the\tprovision itself an absurdity. It  is  urged
\nthat  s. 25F is only procedural in character along with\t ss.
\n25G  and  25H and do not prohibit the substantive  right  of
\ntermination but on the other hand requires that in effecting
\ntermination of employment,notice would be given and  payment
\nof  money would be made and theater procedure under ss.\t 25G
\nand 25H would follow.\n<\/p>\n
152<\/span><\/p>\n
    Mr.\t Bobde\trefutes the above argument saying  that\t ss.
\n25F,  25G and 25H relate to retrenchment but their  contents
\nare  different. Whereas S. 25F provides for  the  conditions
\nprecedent  for effecting a valid retrenchment, S.  25G\tonly
\nprovides  the procedure for doing so. Section  25H  operates
\nafter a valid retrenchment and provides for re-employment in
\nthe circumstances stated therein. According to counsel,\t the
\nargument  is misconceived firstly for the reasons that s.  2
\nitself says that retrenchment will be understood as  defined
\nin  s. 2(00) unless there is anything repugnant in the\tsub-
\nject  or  context; secondly s. 25F clearly  applies  to\t re-
\ntrenchment  as plainly defined by s. 2(00); thirdly  s.\t 25G
\ndoes  not  incorporate in absolute terms–the  principle  of
\n‘last  come,  first go’ and provides  that  ordinarily\tlast
\nemployee is to be retrenched, and fourthly ss. 25H upon\t its
\ntrue  construction should be held to be applicable when\t the
\nretrenchment  has  occurred  on the ground  of\tthe  workman
\nbecoming  surplus to the establishment and he has  been\t re-
\ntrenched under ss. 25F and 25G on the principle ‘last  come,
\nfirst  go’. Only then should he be given an  opportunity  to
\noffer himself for re-employment- In substance it is  submit-
\nted  that there is no conflict between the definition of  s.
\n2(00)  and the provisions of ss. 25F, 25G and 25H.  We\tfind
\nthat  though there are apparent incongruities in the  provi-
\nsions,\tthere  is room for harmonious construction  in\tthis
\nregard.\n<\/p>\n
    For\t the purpose of harmonious construction, it  can  be
\nseen that the definitions contained in section 2 are subject
\nto their being anything repugnant in the subject or context.
\nIn view of this, it is clear that the extended meaning given
\nto the term ‘retrenchment’ under clause (00) of section 2 is
\nalso subject to the context and the subject matter.  Section
\n25-F  prescribed  the conditions precedent to  a  valid\t re-
\ntrenchment  of workers as discussed earlier.  Very  briefly,
\nthe  conditions\t prescribed are the giving  of\tone  month’s
\nnotice\tindicating the reasons for retrenchment and  payment
\nof  wages for the period of the notice. Section\t 25-FF\tpro-
\nvides  for  compensation to workmen in case of\ttransfer  of
\nundertakings.  Very briefly, it provides that every  workman
\nwho  has  been in continuous service for not less  than\t one
\nyear  in  an undertaking immediately  before  such  transfer
\nshall  be entitled to notice and compensation in  accordance
\nwith  the provisions of section 25F “as if the\tworkman\t had
\nbeen  retrenched”. (Emphasis supplied). Section 25-FFA\tpro-
\nvides that sixty days’ notice must be given of intention  to
\nclose  down any undertaking and section 25-FFF provides\t for
\ncompensation to workmen in case of closing down of undertak-
\nings.  Very  briefly stated section 25-FFF  which  has\tbeen
\nalready\t discussed lays down that “where an  undertaking  is
\nclosed down for any reason whatsoever, every workman who has
\nbeen in continuous service for
\n153<\/span>
\nnot  less  than\t one year in  that  undertaking\t immediately
\nbefore\tsuch  closure shall, subject to\t the  provisions  of
\nsub-section  (2), be entitled to notice and compensation  in
\naccordance  with the provisions of section 25-F, as  if\t the
\nworkman had been retrenched”. (Emphasised supplied). Section
\n25-H  provides for re-employment of retrenched\tworkmen.  In
\nbrief,\tit provides that where any workmen  are\t retrenched,
\nand  the employer proposes to take toto his  employment\t any
\nperson,\t he  shall, give an opportunity\t to  the  retrenched
\nworkmen to offer themselves for re-employment as provided in
\nthe  section  subject to the conditions as set\tout  in\t the
\nsection. In our view, the principle of harmonious  construc-
\ntion implies that in a case where there is a genuine  trans-
\nfer  of an undertaking or genuine closure of an\t undertaking
\nas  contemplated  in  the aforesaid sections,  it  would  be
\ninconsistent  to read into the provisions a right  given  to
\nworkman\t “deemed.  to be retrenched” a right  to  claim\t re-
\nemployment  as provided in section 25-H. In such  cases,  as
\nspecifically  provided in the relevant sections the  workmen
\nconcerned would only be entitled to notice and\tcompensation
\nin accordance with section 25-F. It is significant that in a
\ncase  of transfer of an undertaking or closure of an  under-
\ntaking\tin  accordance with the\t aforesaid  provisions,\t the
\nbenefit\t specifically  given to the workmen is\t“as  if\t the
\nworkmen had been retrenched” and this benefit is  restricted
\nto notice and compensation in accordance with the provisions
\nof section 25-F.\n<\/p>\n
     The  last submission is that if retrenchment is  under-
\nstood in its wider sense what would happen to the rights  of
\nthe  employer under the Standing Orders and under  the\tcon-
\ntracts of employment in respect of the workmen whose service
\nhas been terminated. There may be two answers to this  ques-
\ntion. Firstly, those rights may have been affected by intro-
\nduction\t of ss. 2(00), 25F and the other relevant  sections.
\nSecondly, it may be said, the rights as such are not affect-
\ned  or taken away, but only an additional social  obligation
\nhas been imposed on the employer so as to give the retrench-
\nment benefit to the affected workmen, perhaps for  immediate
\ntiding over of the financial difficulty. Looked at from this
\nangle,\tthere  is  implicit a social policy.  As  the  maxim
\ngoes–Stat  pro\t ratione voluntas populi; the  will  of\t the
\npeople stands in place of a reason.\n<\/p>\n
     Regarding the seeming gaps in the definition one  would
\naptly remember what Lord Simonds said against the view\tthat
\nthe court having discovered the intention of Parliament must
\nproceed to fill in the gaps and what the legislature had not
\nwritten the court must write.\n<\/p>\n
“It appears to me to be a naked usurpation of the legisla-\n<\/p>\n
154<\/span><\/p>\n
tive function under the thin disguise of interpretation. And
\nit  is the less justifiable when it is guess work with\twhat
\nmaterial  the  legislature would, if it had  discovered\t the
\ngap,  have filled it in. If a gap is disclosed,\t the  remedy
\nlies in an amending Act.”\n<\/p>\n
    The Court has to interpret a statute and apply it to the
\nfacts. Hans Kelsen in his Pure Theory of Law (P. 355)  makes
\na  distinction between interpretation by the science of\t law
\nor  jurisprudence  on the one hand and interpretation  by  a
\nlaw-applying  organ  (especially the court)  on\t the  other.
\nAccording to him “jurisprudential interpretation i.,  purely
\ncognitive  ascertainment of the meaning of legal  norms.  In
\ncontradistinction  to  the interpretation by  legal  organs,
\njurisprudential\t interpretation does not create\t law”.\t“The
\npurely\tcognitive interpretation by jurisprudence is  there-
\nfore unable to fill alleged gaps in the law. The filling  of
\na  so-called gap in the law is a law-creating function\tthat
\ncan  only  be  performed by a law-applying  organ;  and\t the
\nfunction  of creating law is not performed by  jurisprudence
\ninterpreting  law. Jurisprudential interpretation can do  no
\nmore  than  exhibit all possible meanings of a\tlegal  norm.
\nJurisprudence as cognition of law cannot decide between\t the
\npossibilities  exhibited by it, but must leave the  decision
\nto  the\t legal organ who, according to the legal  order,  is
\nauthorised to apply the law.” According to the author if law
\nis  to\tbe applied by a legal organ, he must  determine\t the
\nmeaning\t of  the norms to be applied;  he  must\t ‘interpret’
\nthose norms (P. 348). Interpretation therefore is an  intel-
\nlectual activity which accompanies the process of law appli-
\ncation in its advance from a higher level to a lower  level.
\nAccording  to him, the law to be applied is a frame.  “There
\nare  cases of intended or unintended indefiniteness  at\t the
\nlower level and several possibilities are open to the appli-
\ncation\tof  law.” The traditional theory believes  that\t the
\nstatute, applied to a concrete case, can always supply\tonly
\none correct decision and that the positive–legal  ‘correct-
\nness’ of this decision is based on the statute itself.\tThis
\ntheory\tdescribes the interpretive procedure as if  it\tcon-
\nsisted merely in an intellectual act of clarifying or under-
\nstanding;  as if the law-applying organ had to use only\t his
\nreason but not his will, and as if by a purely\tintellectual
\nactivity, among the various existing possibilities only\t one
\ncorrect\t choice\t could be made in accordance  with  positive
\nlaw.  According\t to the author: “The legal  act\t applying  a
\nlegal  norm may be performed in such a way that it  conforms\n<\/p>\n
(a)  with the one or the other of the different meanings  of
\nthe  legal  norm,  (b) with the will of\t the  norm  creating
\nauthority  that is to be determined somehow’, (c)  with\t the
\nexpression which the norm-creating authority has chosen, (d)
\nwith the one or the other of the contradictory norms; or (e)
\nthe concrete case to
\n155<\/span>
\nwhich the two contradictory norms refer may be decided under
\nthe  assumption that the two contradictory norms annul\teach
\nother. In all these cases, the law to be applied constitutes
\nonly a frame within which several applications are possible,
\nwhereby every act is legal that stays within the frame.”\n<\/p>\n
    The\t definitions  is  s. 2 of the Act are  to  be  taken
\n‘unless\t there is anything repugnant in the subject or\tcon-
\ntext’. The contextual interpretation has not been ruled out.
\nIn R.B.I. v. Peerless General Finance, reported in [1987]  2
\nSCR 1, O. Chinnappa Reddy, J. said:\n<\/p>\n
“Interpretation\t must  depend on the text and  the  context.
\nThey  are the bases of interpretation. One may well  say  if
\nthe  text is the texture, context is what gives the  colour.
\nNeither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpreta-
\ntion  is best which makes the textual  interpretation  match
\nthe  contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we\tknow
\nwhy it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be
\nread,  first as a whole and then section by section,  clause
\nby  clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a  statute
\nis  looked  at, in the context of its  enactment,  with\t the
\nglasses\t of the statutemaker, provided by such context,\t its
\nscheme,\t the sections, clauses, phrases and words  may\ttake
\ncolour and appear different than when the statute is  looked
\nat  without the glasses provided by the context. With  these
\nglasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what
\neach  section,\teach clause, each phrase and  each  word  is
\nmeant  and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of\t the
\nentire\tAct. No part of a statute and no word of  a  statute
\ncan be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed
\nso  that  every word has a place and everything\t is  in\t its
\nplace. It is by looking at the definition as a whole in\t the
\nsetting of the entire Act and by reference to what  preceded
\nthe  enactment\tand the reasons for it that the\t Court\tcon-
\nstrued the expression ‘Prize Chit’ in Srinivasa and we\tfind
\nno reason to depart from the Court’s construction.”\n<\/p>\n
    As we have mentioned, industrial and labour\t legislation
\ninvolves social and labour policy. Often they are passed  in
\nconformity with the resolutions of the International  Labour
\nOrganisation. In Duport Steels v. Sirs, [1980] 1 W.L.R. 142.
\nthe  House  of Lords observed that there  was  a  difference
\nbetween\t applying  the law and making it,  and\tthat  judges
\nought  to  avoid becoming involved in  controversial  social
\nissues, since this might affect their reputation in imparti-
\nality. Lord Diplock said:\n<\/p>\n
156<\/span><\/p>\n
“A statute passed to remedy what is perceived by  Parliament
\nto  be a defect in the existing law may in actual  operation
\nturn out t0 have injurious consequences that Parliament\t did
\nnot  anticipate\t at the time the statute was passed;  if  it
\nhad,  it would have made some provision in the Act in  order
\nto  prevent them  …..\t But if this be the case it  is\t for
\nParliament.  not  for the judiciary, to decide\twhether\t any
\nchanges should be made to the law as stated in the Acts
\n    Applying  the  above reasonings; principles\t and  prece-
\ndents,\tt0  the definition in s. 2(00) of the Act,  we\thold
\nthat “retrenchment” means the termination by the employer of
\nthe  service of a workman for any reason  whatsoever  except
\nthose expressly excluded in the section.\n<\/p>\n
    The result is that C.A. Nos. 3241-48 of 1981, 686(NL) of
\n1982,  18  17 of 1982, 1898 of 1982, 3261 of 1982,  1866  of
\n1982,  1868  of 1982, 8456 of 1983, 10828 of  1983  and\t the
\nappeal\tarising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 3149 of 1983 are\tdis-
\nmissed with costs quantified at Rs.3,000 in each appeal.  It
\nis  stated that in C.A. No. 686 of 1982 the  respondent\t has
\nalready\t  been\treinstated  pursuant  to  the  order   dated
\n24.10.1983  passed by this Court, having regard to the\tfact
\nthat  he has served since 1983, he shall be  considered\t for
\nconfirmation  with  effect from his due\t date  according  to
\nRules, if he is not already confirmed by the Corporation.
\n    In\tview of the facts and circumstances of the case,  we
\ndispose of C.A. No. 885 of 1980 with the direction that\t the
\ntwo workmen involved in this appeal be paid compensation  of
\nRs. 1,25,000 (Rupees one lakh twenty five thousand) each  in
\nfull  and final settlement of all claims including  that  of
\nreinstatement.\tThe  payment shall be spread over  a  period
\nfrom 11.11.1972 till date for the purpose of Income-tax.
\n    C.A.  No.  4116 (NL) of 1984 was on the board,  but\t the
\npaper  book is not available. Hence it is delinked from\t the
\nseries.\n<\/p>\n
    C.A.  Nos. 512-513 of 1984 and C.A No. 783 of 1984\twere
\nwrongly\t placed\t on  the board. Their  subject\tmatters\t are
\ndifferent  and\thence are delinked from this cluster  to  be
\nheard separately by an appropriate bench.\n<\/p>\n
R.N.J.\t\t\t\t\t   Appeals  disposed\nof.\n157<\/span>\n\n\n\n<\/pre>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Punjab Land Development … vs Presiding Officer, Labour … on 4 May, 1990 Equivalent citations: 1990 SCR (3) 111, 1990 SCC (3) 682 Author: K Saikia Bench: Mukharji, Sabyasachi (Cj), Ray, B.C. (J), Kania, M.H., Saikia, K.N. (J), Agrawal, S.C. (J) PETITIONER: PUNJAB LAND DEVELOPMENT ANDRECLAMATION CORPORATION LTD.,CHAN Vs. RESPONDENT: PRESIDING […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-52495","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nPunjab Land Development ... vs Presiding Officer, Labour ... on 4 May, 1990 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/punjab-land-development-vs-presiding-officer-labour-on-4-may-1990\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Punjab Land Development ... vs Presiding Officer, Labour ... on 4 May, 1990 - 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