{"id":53474,"date":"1963-12-03T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1963-12-02T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/vriddhachalam-pillai-vs-chaldean-syrian-bank-ltd-on-3-december-1963"},"modified":"2016-08-25T06:59:57","modified_gmt":"2016-08-25T01:29:57","slug":"vriddhachalam-pillai-vs-chaldean-syrian-bank-ltd-on-3-december-1963","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/vriddhachalam-pillai-vs-chaldean-syrian-bank-ltd-on-3-december-1963","title":{"rendered":"Vriddhachalam Pillai vs Chaldean Syrian Bank Ltd., … on 3 December, 1963"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Vriddhachalam Pillai vs Chaldean Syrian Bank Ltd., … on 3 December, 1963<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1964 AIR 1425, \t\t 1964 SCR (5) 647<\/div>\n
Author: N R Ayyangar<\/div>\n
Bench: Ayyangar, N. Rajagopala<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nVRIDDHACHALAM PILLAI\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nCHALDEAN SYRIAN BANK LTD., ANANOTHER\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT:\n03\/12\/1963\n\nBENCH:\nAYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA\nBENCH:\nAYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.\nSUBBARAO, K.\nWANCHOO, K.N.\n\nCITATION:\n 1964 AIR 1425\t\t  1964 SCR  (5) 647\n CITATOR INFO :\n R\t    1978 SC1791\t (13)\n\n\nACT:\nHindu\tLaw-Partition-If  bonafide-Onus\t of   proof-Father's\ndebt--Liability\t of  joint family  property  for  antecedent\ndebt-Personal  law and lex situs-Which applicable ?\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\nKalayanasundaram  and  the members of his family  were\tper-\nmanent residents of Palghat in the then State of Madras. and\nhis son, the appellant, formed members of an undivided\tHind\nfamily.\t  The family had properties not only in Palghat\t but\nalso in Cochin.\nIn  1945, Kalayanasundaram entered into many contracts\twith\nthe Government of India for the supply of black pepper As he\nhad  no\t ready money to implement those contracts,  he\tapp-\nroached\t the  Respondent  Bank for funds  to  finance  those\ncontract  For  that purpose, he\t executed  three  promissory\nnotes  in favour the bank for a total sum of  Rs.  1,10,000.\nHe  also  deposited title deeds of his properties  with\t the\nBank  as  security.   As Kalayanasudaram  did  not  pay\t the\nborrowed  amount, the Bank filed a suit against him on\tJune\n17,  1948.  But even before that date, a deed  of  partition\nwas executed on June 3, 1948 between Kalayanasundaram a\t the\nappellant, his son, by which the properties of the family in\nthe  Cochin  State were divided into two  equal\t parts,\t the\nfather\ttaking over himself the liability to pay the  amount\ndue  to\t the Bank.  It was stated in the deed  of  partition\nthat  the  debt due to the bank was a personal debt  of\t the\nfather and hence was not binding on the son.\nTo the mortgage suit filed by the Bank, several defences  we\nraised.\t  However, the trial court decreed the suit  against\nthe  father and there was no appeal against  that.   Against\nthe  decision of the trial Judge that the Bank had no  right\nto  obtain a mortgage decree against the appellant  and\t his\nhalf share in the family property an appeal was filed by the\nBank which was accepted by the High Court which modified the\ndecree\tby passing a mortgage decree against  the  appellant\nqua his share as well.\tThe appellant came to this court  in\nappeal after obtaining a certificate of fitness.\nThe  contentions raised by the appellant in this Court\twere\nth  the finding of the High Court that the partition of\t the\nfamily\tproperties  effected between the appellant  and\t his\nfather was not bona- fide was not justified on the  admitted\nfacts and was based ON\n648\nerroneous  reasoning, that the High Court erred\t in  holding\nthat  the Hindu Law as understood and applied by the  Courts\nin  the previous Cochin State could determine the  liability\nof the appellant who was a resident of Palghat and that\t the\nHigh  Court erred in holding that the mortgage evidenced  by\nEx.  'E' was to any extent I for the discharge of antecedent\ndebts.\tDismissing the appeals,\nHeld:\t  (i)  The  finding  of\t the  High  Court  that\t the\npartition   of\tfamily\tproperties  effected   between\t the\nappellant  and\this father was not bona-fide,  was  correct.\nThe partition deed did not set apart sufficient property for\nthe  share of the father to enable him to discharge all\t his\ndebts.\t Moreover, onus should have been placed on  the\t ap-\npellant\t to  establish that the nature\tof  the\t arrangement\nunder  the  partition was such as made proper  and  adequate\nprovision  for the discharge of the debt, but  actually\t the\nonus was wrongly placed on the Bank.\n(ii) The  view of the High Court that when the\ttransactions\ntook place, British India and Cochin State were\t independent\nsovereign states and according to Private International Law,\nit  was\t the law of the situs of the  property\tthat  should\ngovern\tthe contracts relating to it, was not correct.\t The\nrule was not any statutory law which was binding on  parties\nwho  had dealings in regard to land in that  State.   Taking\nthe Cochin State itself, the power of a person to dispose of\nproperty  or  to encumber it depends upon whether  he  is  a\nHindu, Muslim or Christian and in each case the right of the\nowner  to dispose of the property depends upon his  personal\nlaw as modified by any statute applicable to that  community\nto which he belongs.  There is no situs which can be applied\nirrespective  of the personal law governing the\t owner.\t  In\nthe  present  case,  Kalayanasundaram and  his\tfamily\twere\npermanent residents of Palghat.\t The law applicable was\t the\nlaw laid down by the Privy Council and accepted by the\tFull\nBench  decisions of the Madras High Court and  finally\tlaid\ndown  by  the  Supreme\tCourt.\tWhen  the  Bank\t dealt\twith\nKalayanasundaram,  it must be taken to have contracted\twith\nhim  on\t the  basis of such a law being\t applicable  to\t the\ntransaction.\n(iii)\t  There\t was a real and factual antecedency  between\nthe  loan  of Rs. 80,000 for which the draft  was  given  on\nNovember 16, 1945, and the previously existing\tindebtedness\nof  Rs. 1,09,000, and odd in the over drafts account  No.  1\nand  2 of Kalayanasundaram to the Bank which was  discharged\nthereby.\nA  father can by incurring a debt, even though the  same  be\nnot  for any purpose necessary or beneficial to the  family,\nso  long as it is not for illegal or immoral  purposes,\t lay\nthe entire joint family property including the interests  of\nhis  sons open to be taken in execution proceedings  upon  a\ndecree for the payment of debt.\t The father can, so long  as\nthe family continues undivided, alienate the entirety of the\nfamily property for the discharge of his antece-\n649\ndent  personal debts subject to their not being\t illegal  or\nimmoral.   In  other  words,  the power\t of  the  father  to\nalienate  for satisfying his debts is co-extensive with\t the\nright of the creditors to obtain satisfaction out of  family\nproperty  including the share of the sons in such  property.\nWhere  a father purports to burden the estate by a  mortgage\nfor purposes not necessary and beneficial to the family, the\nmortgage  qua  mortgage\t would not be binding  on  the\tsons\nunless the same was for the discharge of an antecedent debt.\nWhere  there  is no antecedency, a mortgage  by\t the  father\nwould  stand in the same position as an out and out sale  by\nthe  father of family property for a purpose not binding  on\nthe  family under which he receives the sale price which  is\nutilised for his personal needs.  After the joint status  of\nthe  family is disrupted by a partition, the father  has  no\nright  to deal with the family property by sale or  mortgage\neven  to discharge an antecedent debt, nor is the son  under\nany  legal or moral obligation to discharge the\t post-parti-\ntion  debt of the father.  Antecedent debt in  this  context\nmeans  a  debt antecedent in fact as well as in\t time.\t The\ndebt must be truly independent and not part of the  mortgage\nwhich  is impeached.  The prior debt must be independent  of\nthe  debt  for\twhich the mortgage is created  and  the\t two\ntransactions must be dissociated in fact so that they cannot\nbe regarded as part of the same transaction.\nBrij Narain v. Mangal Prasad, 51 I.A. 129, Panna Lal v. Mst.\nNaraini,  [1952] S.C.R. 544, Chidambara Mudaliar  v.  Rootha\nPerumal,   I.L.R.   27\tMad.  326  and\t Vankataramayya\t  v.\nVankataramana, 29 Mad. 200, referred to.\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.547 of 1961.
\nAppeal\tfrom the judgment and decree dated October 16,\t1956
\nof the Kerala High Court in Appeal Suit No. 135 of 1953.
\nT.N.  Subramania lyer, M.S. Narasimhan and M.S. Sastri,\t for
\nthe appellant.\n<\/p>\n
A.V. Viswanatha sastri, T.S. Venkateswara Iyer, K.     Jayaram
\nand R. Ganapathy Iyer, for respondent No.    1.
\nDecember  3, 1963.  The Judgment of the Court was  delivered
\nby
\nAYYANGAR J.-This appeal is directed against the judgment  of
\nthe High Court of Kerala and has been filed on the  strength
\nof a certificate of fitness
\n650<\/span>
\ngranted\t by  the  High Court under  Art.  133(1)(a)  of\t the
\nConstitution.\n<\/p>\n
The appeal arises out of a suit filed by the  respondent-The
\nChaldean Syrian Bank Ltd.-which for shortness we shall refer
\nto  as the Bank, for the recovery of certain sums due  on  a
\nmortgage   by\tdeposit\t  of   title   deeds   executed\t  by
\nKalayanasundaram  Pillai-the  appellant’s  father  who\t was
\nimpleaded as the 1st defendant and is now the 2nd respondent
\nbefore us.\n<\/p>\n
The mortgage on which the Bank laid this suit was  evidenced
\nby  Ex.\t  ‘E’-a memorandum recording the  deposit  of  title
\ndeeds of certain properties in the former princely State  of
\nCochin.\t  The debt for which the said deposit was  made\t was
\nthe  principal and interest due on two promissory notes\t for
\nRs. 50,000 and Rs. 30,000 respectively which were marked  as
\nExs.   A  & B in the case.  It was not in dispute  that\t the
\nproperty  which was the subject of mortgage belonged to\t the
\njoint  family composed of the 1st defendant and his  son-the
\nappellant.   The  appellant was a minor on the date  of\t the
\nsuit-transaction  and even at the date of the suit.  To\t the
\nsuit   that   it  filed\t the  Bank  impleaded\tnot   merely
\nKalyanasundaram and his minor son, but the latter’s  sisters
\nand  mother and even the lessees of the mortgaged  property.
\nThese were defendants 3 to 11.\tThey, however, have  dropped
\nout  of\t the  proceedings at earlier  stages  and  the\tonly\n<\/p>\n
-parties  to  the appeal whose rights we are  called  on  to
\nadjudicate are the Bank and the appellant.  The Bank’s\tsuit
\nwas  decreed  by  the trial  court  against  the  father-Ist
\ndefendant and there was no appeal against it and that decree
\nis  no\tlonger in challenge.  The trial Judge  however\theld
\nthat  the  Bank\t had no right to obtain\t a  mortgage  decree
\nagainst\t the  appellant\t and his half share  in\t the  family
\nproperty,  but\ton appeal by the Bank,\tthe  learned  Judges
\nallowed\t the  appeal and modified the decree  by  passing  a
\nmortgage decree against the appellant qua his share as well.
\nIt  is the correctness of this variation that is  questioned
\nin this appeal.\n<\/p>\n
651<\/span><\/p>\n
The  execution\tof the promissory notes and the\t receipt  of
\nconsideration therefore as recited therein were admitted  by
\nthe  1st defendant, as also the creation of the security  by
\nthe  deposit of the title deeds of properties  and  whatever
\ncontentions  were  raised  in respect of  these\t matters  on
\nbehalf of the appellant have now been abandoned.  Some point
\nwas made on behalf of the appellant regarding the suit\tdebt
\nbeing avyavaharika, but this also has been found against and
\ngiven  up.  The only question that survives is\twhether\t the
\nmortgage evidenced by Ex.  ‘E’ is binding on the  appellant.
\nHere  again  it is now common ground, that the\tdebt  was  a
\npersonal  borrowing  by\t the father,  not  for\tany  purpose
\nbinding on the joint family.\n<\/p>\n
A few more facts have to be stated in order that the precise
\nrange  of the controversy in this appeal might\tbe  properly
\nunderstood.   That  Kalyanasundaram and the members  of\t his
\nfamily were permanent residents of Palghat in the then State
\nof  Madras that he with the appellant formed members  of  an
\nundivided  Hindu family and that the properties\t which\twere
\nthe  subject of the mortgage were joint\t family\t properties,
\nnone   of  these  were\tin  dispute  The  family   possessed
\nproperties not merely in Cochin but also in Palghat.
\nWe  shall now proceed to detail the circumstances  in  which
\nthe borrowings which has given rise to this litigation\twere
\nmade.\tIn or about May 1945 Kalyanasundaram entered into  a
\ncontract with the Government of India for the supply of\t 100
\ntons of black pepper and also into further contracts of\t the
\nsame  type  later in the year.\tHe had apparently  no  ready
\ncash  to implement these contracts and approached  the\tBank
\nfor  funds for financing the undertaking.  For this  purpose
\nhe executed three promissory notes in favour of the Bank for
\na  total  of  Rs. 1,10,000.   The  promissory  notes  marked
\nExhibits A and B for Rs. 50,000 and Rs. 30,000\trespectively
\nalready referred to, were executed on November 14, 1945\t and
\nthe  debt  evidenced by them was secured by  a\tmortgage  by
\ndeposit of
\n652<\/span>
\ntitle-deeds  of properties in the Cochin State and  this  is
\nthe  subject-matter of the proceedings giving rise  to\tthis
\nappeal.\t  A  few  months  later, on  February  20,  1946  he
\nexecuted another promissory note which is marked as Ex.\t ‘C’
\nfor  Rs.  30,000.  That also was accompanied  by  a  further
\ndeposit\t of title deed which is recorded in Ex.\t ‘F’  ,\t but
\nthat  was  in part in relation to the family  properties  in
\nPalghat\t in  the State of Madras.  As the amount  due  under
\nthese  notes was not repaid at the time promised,  the\tBank
\nfiled  the suit out of which the present appeal\t arises,  in
\nthe Court of the Subordinate Judge, Chittur, which is in the
\nCochin\tState, for a mortgage decree in its favour  for\t the
\namount\tof all the three promissory notes with the  interest
\ndue  thereon,  though  a mortgage  decree  was\tsought\tonly
\nagainst\t the properties in Cochin which were set out in\t the
\nSchedule to the plaint.\n<\/p>\n
This  suit was filed on June 17, 1948 but before the  filing
\nof  the\t suit certain events happened to which it  would  be
\nconvenient  to\trefer  at this stage,  because\tthey  figure
\nlargely\t in  the defences that were raised in  the  suit  on
\nbehalf of the appellant who was represented by his mother as
\nguardian  ad  litem.   On  March 23,  1948  a  petition\t for
\npermission to file a suit in form pauperis was filed in\t the
\ncourt  of the Subordinate Judge at Palghat on behalf of\t the
\nappellant  by  his uncle as his next friend.  To  that\tsuit
\nwere impleaded as defendants Kalyanasundaram, the father, as
\nwell  as  the mother and as many as 31\tother  creditors  of
\nKalyanasundaram\t including the respondent Bank.\t The  relief
\nsought\tin the suit was the effecting of a Partition of\t the
\nfamily\tproperties situated in Palghat and for the  delivery
\nof the half-share therein to the minor plaintiff.  With this
\nwas  coupled  a\t prayer for the\t setting  aside\t of  certain
\ndecrees which had been obtained by certain of the  creditors
\nwho were impleaded as defendants, on the ground either\tthat
\nthe promissory notes or other documents on which the decrees
\nhad been passed were not supported by consideration, or that
\nthese debts were tainted with illegality or immorality,\t the
\nallegation being that
\n653<\/span>
\nthe  father was leading a reckless and immoral life and\t was
\naddicted  to women.  So far as the debt due to the Bank\t was
\nconcerned,  the\t allegation was, though not  expressed\tvery
\nclearly,  that\tit was a borrowing for a  personal  business
\nnewly  started by the father and would not, therefore,\tbind
\nthe  minor’s  share in the family  properties.\t As  already
\nstated,\t the relief for partition in that suit was  confined
\nto  the properties at Palghat in Madras.  While this  appli-
\ncation\tfor  leave to sue in forma pauperis  was  pending  a
\nnotice\twas  issued  on\t May  27,  1948\t through  a   lawyer
\npurporting  to act on behalf of the appellant, addressed  to
\nhis father, in which the partition of the properties of\t the
\nfamily situated in the Cochin State was demanded This notice
\nwas  followed, by a deed of partition dated June 3, 1948  by
\nwhich the properties of the family in the Cochin State\twere
\npurported  to  be divided into two equal parts,\t the  father
\nbeing  directed to pay the debts borrowed by him out of\t the
\nshare  allotted to him, the deed reciting an agreement\twith
\nthe father that the minor should be free from any obligation
\ndischarge  those debts.\t The debt due to the Bank  which  is
\nthe subject of the present proceedings, was among those\t the
\ndischarge  of  which the father under took under  this\tdeed
\nmarked\tas Ex.\tVI.  The deed recited that this debt  was  a
\npersonal debt of the father and was therefore not binding on
\nthe  son  and  this  was assigned  as  the  reason  for\t the
\nprovision  made for its discharge by the father without\t any
\nobligation  being laid upon the son in that behalf.  One  of
\nthe questions arising in the appeal is as regards the effect
\nof  this partition on the rights of the Bank to realise\t the
\nmoneys\tdue to it from the share allotted to the son in\t the
\nCochin properties which were mortgaged under Ex.  ‘E.’
\nReverting to the proceedings giving rise to this appeal,  to
\nthe  mortgage suit filed by the Bank several  defences\twere
\nraised\ton behalf of the appellant.  It is not necessary  to
\nset  out all of them but it would sufficient if those  which
\nhave a bearing on the points urged before us are  mentioned.
\nBefore dealing with
\n654<\/span>
\nthe controversial issues we may state that there were a\t few
\nto  which  it  is sufficient to make  a\t passing  reference.
\nThere  was a formal denial of the truth and validity of\t the
\npromissory notes and the passing of consideration thereunder
\nand  also  about  the sufficiency or  admissibility  of\t the
\nmemorandum Ex.\t‘E’ to create a mortgage by deposit of title
\ndeeds.\t These do not appear to have been seriously  pressed
\nand have been found in favour of the plaintiff-bank.   There
\nwas  also  an  issue that the  suit-debt  was  tainted\twith
\nillegality  and immorality, but on the facts it was such  an
\nuntenable plea that it was easily found against.\n<\/p>\n
\t      Issue no 2 ran:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “Whether the trade mentioned in the plaint was
\n\t      a new trade started by the 1st defendant or an
\n\t      ancestral\t  trade\t and  are  not\t the   debts
\n\t      contracted by the father-the 1st defendant-for
\n\t      purposes of the trade binding on defendant no.
\n\t      2 even if the said trade be not ancestral?”\n<\/p>\n
This issue, at least the first part of it has been found  in
\nfavour\tof the appellant that the trade viz., the supply  of
\nblack  pepper to the Government was a new trade\t started  by
\nthe  1st defendant and was not an ancestral trade  and\tthat
\nfinding has not been disturbed by the High Court and being a
\nconcurrent  finding on a question of fact was not  naturally
\nchallenged  before us. Closely related to this is issue\t no.
\n14 which ran:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “Are  the\t debts sued on incurred\t for  family
\n\t      necessity and binding upon the 2nd defendant?”
\nThe  learned trial Judge recorded a finding that  the  debts
\nsued  on were not incurred for family necessity nor for\t the
\nbenefit\t of the family.\t These findings also which were\t not
\nvaried\tby  the High Court were not  questioned\t before\t us.
\nIncidentally  it should be mentioned that the learned  trial
\nJudge  found,  when  dealing with issue no. 9  which  was  a
\ngeneral issue relating
\n655<\/span>
\nto the binding character of the debt on the appellant,\tthat
\nthe  mortgage was not for securing an antecedent  debt,\t but
\nthis  finding  was reversed by the High Court,\tthe  learned
\nJudges holding that to the extent of Rs. 59,000 the mortgage
\nloan went in discharge of antecedent debts and we shall have
\noccasion  to deal with this matter in detail later  in\tthis
\njudgment.\n<\/p>\n
\t      The 13th issue ran:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “Is  the\tpartition set.up by  the  defendants
\n\t      true  and\t bona  fide  and  binding  upon\t the
\n\t      family?”\n<\/p>\n
This  was answered in the affirmative and in favour  of\t the
\nappellant  by the learned trial Judge but that\tfinding\t has
\nbeen  reversed\tand the partition has been found not  to  be
\nbona fide by the High Court and that is one of the points in
\ncontroversy  in the appeal before us.  Issue no. 1 0 was  in
\nthese terms:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “Are  the\t Defendants Cochin  domiciles?\t Are
\n\t      they  not\t governed by the law of\t the  Indian
\n\t      Union being permanent residents of the  Indian
\n\t      Union?”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
An  issue in this form arose because of the different  views
\nentertained  of\t the Hindu law as regards the scope  of\t the
\npious  obligation  of a son to discharge the  debts  of\t the
\nfather\twhich  are not illegal or immoral.  In the  view  of
\nHindu  lawyers the repayment of a debt was conceived of\t not
\nmerely as a legal obligation which had been undertaken\twhen
\nthe  debt  was incurred but non-repayment was  considered  a
\nsin.   The  duty of relieving the debtor from this  sin\t was
\nfastened  on his male descendents to the third degree.\t The
\nduty  being thus religious, it was held not attracted if  in
\nits  nature it was illegal, or immoral\ti.e.,  avyavaharika.
\nWhatever  might have been the extent of the son’s  liability
\naccording to the Hindu law givers, under the Mitakshara\t law
\nas administered in all the States, the liability of the son,
\ngrandson,  great  grand\t son  etc., was\t not  treated  as  a
\npersonal liability but as dependent on his becoming entitled
\nto
\n656<\/span>
\nfamily\tassets and that it extended to the entirety  of\t his
\ninterest therein, but no more.\n<\/p>\n
The authorities to which it is wholly unnecessary to  refer,
\nhave  firmly established the following and the\tposition  is
\nnot in doubt:\n<\/p>\n
(1)  A father can by incurring a debt, even though the\tsame
\nbe not for any purpose necessary or beneficial to the family
\nso  long as it is not for illegal or immoral  purposes,\t lay
\nthe entire joint family property including the interests  of
\nhis  sons open to be taken in execution proceedings  upon  a
\ndecree for the payment of that debt.\n<\/p>\n
(2)  The  father  can,\tso  long  as  the  family  continues
\nundivided  alienate the entirety of the family property\t for
\nthe  discharge of his antecedent personal debts\t subject  to
\ntheir not being illegal or immoral.\n<\/p>\n
In  other  words, the power of the father  to  alienate\t for
\nsatisfying his debts, is co-extensive with the right of\t the
\ncreditors  to  obtain satisfaction out\tof  family  property
\nincluding the share of the sons in such property.
\n(3)  Where  a  father  purports to burden the  estate  by  a
\nmortgage  for purposes not necessary and beneficial  to\t the
\nfamily,\t the mortgage qua mortgage would not be\t binding  on
\nthe  sons  unless  the\tsame was for  the  discharge  of  an
\nantecedent debt.  Where there is no antecedency, a  mortgage
\nby the father would stand in the same position as an out and
\nout sale by the father of family property for a purpose\t not
\nbinding on the family under which he receives the sale price
\nwhich is utilised for his personal needs.\n<\/p>\n
It  need hardly be added that after the joint status of\t the
\nfamily is disrupted by a partition, the father has. no right
\nto deal with the family property by sale or mortgage even to
\ndischarge an antecedent debt, nor is the son under any legal
\nor moral obligation to discharge the post-partition debts of
\nthe father.\n<\/p>\n
(4)  Antecedent debt in this context means a debt antecedent
\nin fact as well as in time, i.e., the
\n657<\/span>
\ndebt must be truly independent and not part of the  mortgage
\nwhich is impeached.  In other words, the prior debt must  be
\nindependent  of the debt for which the mortgage\t is  created
\nand the two transactions must be dissociated in fact so that
\nthey cannot be regarded as part of the same transaction.
\nThe latest of the rulings of the Privy Council in which\t the
\nlaw  as\t stated\t above was expounded is\t reported,  as\tBrij
\nNarain v. Mangla Prasad(1) and this Court in Panna Lal ‘I v.
\nMst.   Naraini(2)  has expressly approved  and\tadopted\t the
\nsame.\n<\/p>\n
in  Cochin and Travancore, however, the law  was  understood
\nsomewhat  differently.\tBoth the High Courts of\t Cochin\t and
\nTravancore when these States were under princely rule, held,
\nfollowing  what\t they considered as the\t logical  result  of
\ncertain\t earlier  decisions  of the Privy  Council,  that  a
\nmortgage executed by a father, notwithstanding that the debt
\nsecured\t thereby  be not incurred for  family  necessity  or
\nbenefit\t but were purely personal, would be binding  against
\nthe  joint family property in the hands of the son  even  if
\nthe  debt be not antecedent to the creation of the  mortgage
\non  the\t doctrine  of  the  latter’s  pious  obligation\t  to
\ndischarge  them.   This was on the principle  enunciated  by
\nBashyam Ayyangar in Chidambara Mudaliar v. Kootha Perumal(3)
\n(a decision, however, subsequently overruled by a Full Bench
\nof   the   Madras   High   Court   in\tVenkataramayya\t  V.
\nVenkataramana(4) on the ground that it was inconsistent with
\nseveral\t earlier rulings of the Privy Council) that  it\t was
\ndifficult to make any distinction between a mortgage created
\nfor  the  discharge  of an antecedent debt  and\t a  mortgage
\ncreated\t for  a debt then incurred, for in either  case\t the
\ndebt not being avyavaharika is binding upon the son and\t the
\nenforcement  of\t the security exonerates the  son  from\t the
\nburden of the father’s debt.\n<\/p>\n
(1)  51 I.A. 129.\n<\/p>\n
(3)  I.L.R. 27 Mad. 326.\n<\/p>\n
(2)  [1952] S.C.R. 544
\n(4) I.L.R. 29 Mad 200.\n<\/p>\n
1\/SCI\/64-42
\n658<\/span>
\nIt would, therefore, be seen that if it were found that\t the
\ndebt to the Bank was not incurred for purposes necessary  or
\nbeneficial to the family, the question whether the Hindu law
\nrule  applicable  was the one as understood and\t applied  in
\nCochin\tor  that expounded in Brij  Narain(1)  would  assume
\ngreat\timportance,  and  for  the’  ascertainment  of\t the
\nparticular  law which applied; the place of domicile of\t the
\nfamily would have relevance.\n<\/p>\n
The  learned Subordinate Judge found that the family of\t the
\nfather-\t 1st  defendant-was a resident of and  domiciled  in
\nPalghat and that therefore would not be governed by the rule
\nof Hindu law as understood and applied by the High Courts of
\nTravancore and Cochin.\tThe learned Judges of the High Court
\nwhile  affirming the finding that the defendants were  domi-
\nciled  in  and\tresidents  of  Palghat\tand  were  not\teven
\nresidents  of Cochin, were still of the opinion that as\t the
\nproperties  which were the subject of the mortgage  were  in
\nCochin, the Cochin view’ of the Hindu law was applicable  to
\ndetermine  the\trights of the parties on the basis  of\tthat
\ninterpretation of the law- being the lex situs and  applying
\nthat  law  came\t to  the  conclusion  that  eve\t a  if\t the
\nmortgage–Ex.  ‘E’ was concurrent with and part of the\tsame
\ntransaction as the debts which it secured, the mortgage\t was
\nbinding on the appellant’s share in the family property.  It
\nwas on this line of reasoning that the learned Judges  held-
\nthat  even though of the mortgage debt under Ex.   ‘E,\tonly
\nRs.  59,000  was found by them as having been  utilised\t for
\ndischarging  the antecedent debts of the father,  still\t the
\nBank was entitled to a mortgage decree against the share  of
\nthe  appellant to the extent of the entire  mortgage  money.
\nThis  was one of the points which was canvassed\t before\t us,
\nwhich. we shall deal with in its proper place.
\nPausing here and before setting out the points urged  before
\nus  by\tthe appellant, there is one matter that\t has  to  be
\nmentioned  merely  for\tthe purpose  of\t clarification.\t  As
\nalready stated, the suit as originally
\n(1)  51 1. A. 129.\n<\/p>\n
659<\/span><\/p>\n
filed  was  for the recovery of the debt due under  all\t the
\nthree  promissory  notes-Exs.\tA, B & C  and  the  interest
\naccrued thereon which totalled over Rs. 1,27,000 though\t the
\nproperty  against which the mortgage decree was\t sought\t was
\nconfined  to  the Cochin property which was covered  by\t the
\nmemorandum   of\t deposit-Ex.   E.  The\tlearned\t  Sub-Judge,
\nhowever, held that the suit in so for as the debt under\t the
\npronote\t Ex.  C. for which properties in Palghat were  given
\nas  security  could  not  be  sued  for\t in  his  Court\t and
\ndisallowed the Bank’s claim to that extent.  That portion of
\nthe  decree has become final and was not challenged  by\t the
\nBank  on  appeal.  It might be mentioned that  the  Bank  is
\nstated to have subsequently filed a suit for that sum in the
\ncourt in Palghat and has obtained a decree thereon.  We\t are
\nsetting\t out these matters for pointing out that the  appeal
\nis  practically\t confined to the binding  character  of\t the
\nmortgage–ExE  in so for as it secured the repayment of\t the
\ndebts evidenced by. Exs.  A & B.\n<\/p>\n
Learned\t counsel  for  the  appellant  urged  the  following
\ncontentions in support of the appeal:\n<\/p>\n
(1) The finding by the High Court that the partition of\t the
\nfamily\tproperties  effected between the appellant  and\t his
\nfather\twas  not  bona,’  fide was  not\t justified  on\tthe,
\nadmitted facts and was based on erroneous reasoning.
\n(2)  The learned Judges erred in holding that the Hindu\t Law
\nas  understood\tand applied by the Courts  in  the  previous
\nCochin State could determine the liability of the  appellant
\nwho was a resident of Palghat.\n<\/p>\n
(3)  The  learned  Judges erred in their  finding  that\t the
\nmortgage  evidenced  Sy Ex.  ‘E’ was to any extent  for\t the
\ndischarge of antecedent debts.\n<\/p>\n
The first question that falls for decision and of which\t the
\nlearned\t Judges of the High Court difference from the  trial
\nJudge  was in relation to the nature of the partition  which
\nwas  evidenced by the registered instrument marked Ex.\t VI-
\nwhether\t it  was  such\tas could be  termed  bona  fide\t and
\nsatisfied the
\n660<\/span>
\nrequirements  of  a  partition\twhich  would  preclude\t the
\ncreditor of the father from having recourse to the share  of
\nthe family property in the hands of the son.
\nBefore\twe  deal with the facts relevant to that  matter  we
\nconsider  it would be convenient to focus attention  on\t the
\nreal  points for determination in that context and for\tthat
\npurpose we shall extract a passage from the judgment of this
\nCourt  in  Pannalal v. Mst. Naraini<\/a>(1) where this  is  dealt
\nwith.  Mukherjea, J. explained the law on the point in these
\nterms:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “The  sons are liable to pay these debts\teven
\n\t      after   partition\t  unless   there   was\t  an
\n\t      arrangement for payment of these debts at\t the
\n\t      time\twhen\t the\t partition\ttook
\n\t      place……………… The question now comes
\n\t      as  to  what is meant by\tan  arrangement\t for
\n\t      payment of debts.\t The expressions ‘bona fide’
\n\t      and  ‘mala fide’ partition seem to  have\tbeen
\n\t      frequently used in this connection in  various
\n\t      decided  cases.  The use of  such\t expressions
\n\t      far from being useful does not unoften lead to
\n\t\t\t    error and confusion.  If by mala fide
\npartition
\n\t      is meant a partition the object of which is to
\n\t      delay  and  defeat the  crediditors  who\thave
\n\t      claims   upon  the  joint\t  family   property,
\n\t      obviously\t  this\t would\t be   a\t  fraudulent
\n\t      transaction not binding in law and it would be
\n\t      open  to the creditors to avoid it  by  appro-
\n\t      priate  means.   So  also\t a  mere  colourable
\n\t      partition\t not  meant to operate\tbetween\t the
\n\t      parties  can be ignored and the  creditor\t can
\n\t      enforce  his remedies as if the parties  still
\n\t      continued\t to be joint.  But a partition\tneed
\n\t      not  be  mala  fide  in  the  sense  that\t the
\n\t      dominant\tintention  of  the  parties  was  to
\n\t      defeat  the  claims of the  creditors;  if  it
\n\t      makes  no\t arrangement or\t provision  for\t the
\n\t      payment  of the just debts payable out of\t the
\n\t      joint  family property, the liability  of\t the
\n\t      sons for payment of the pre-partition debts of
\n\t      the\t  father\t will\t       still
\n\t      remain ……………….. An arrangement for
\n\t      payment of debts does not necessarily imply
\n\t      (1).  [1952] S.C.R. 544.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      661<\/span><\/p>\n
\t      that  a separate fund should be set apart\t for
\n\t      payment  of these debts before the net  assets
\n\t      are divided,, or that some additional property
\n\t      must be given to the father over and above his
\n\t      legitimate   share  sufficient  to  meet\t the
\n\t      demands of his creditors.\t Whether there is  a
\n\t\t\t    proper arrangement for payment of the
\ndebts  or
\n\t      not, would have to be decided on the facts and
\n\t      circumstances of each individual case.  We can
\n\t      conceive of cases where the property  allotted
\n\t      to the father in his own legitimate share\t was
\n\t      considered,  more\t than  enough  for  his\t own
\n\t      necessities  and he- undertook to pay off\t all
\n\t      his  personal debts and release the sons\tfrom
\n\t      their  obligation\t in respect there  That\t may
\n\t      also be considered to be a proper\t arrangement
\n\t      for   payment   of   the\t creditor   in\t the
\n\t      circumstance of a particular case.  After\t all
\n\t      the  prima liability to pay his debts is\tupon
\n\t      the father himself and the sons should not  be
\n\t      made  liable if the property in the  hands  of
\n\t      the  father  is  more  the  adequate  for\t the
\n\t      purpose.\tIf the arrangement made at the\ttime
\n\t      of  partition  is\t reasonable  a\tproper,\t  an
\n\t      unsecured\t creditor cannot have an  reason  to
\n\t      complain.\t  The  fact that he is no  party  to
\n\t      such arrangement is, in our opinion immaterial
\n\t      of course, if the transaction is fraudulent or
\n\t      is  not  meant to be operative,  it  could  be
\n\t      ignored or set aside; but otherwise it is\t the
\n\t      duty of unsecured creditor to be on his  guard
\n\t      lest  any family property over which he ha  no
\n\t      charge  or  hen is diminished for\t purpose  of
\n\t      realization  of his dues………… Thus,  in
\n\t      our  opinion,  a\tson is\tliable,\t even  after
\n\t      partition\t for the pre-partition debts of\t his
\n\t      father  which are not immoral or\tillegal\t and
\n\t      for  the payment of which no  arrangement\t was
\n\t      made at the date of the partition.”\n<\/p>\n
There  are one or two observations which it is necessary  to
\nmake before applying the law as here laid down to the  facts
\nof the present case.  In the
\n662<\/span>
\nfirst place we are here concerned primarily with the  rights
\nof  the\t Bank as a secured creditor to proceed\tagainst\t the
\nsecurity,  ignoring the partition.  To such a situation\t the
\nlaw  as\t explained in the judgment in  Pannalal’s  case\t (1)
\nwould  not  have immediate relevance, for Mukherjea  J.\t was
\ndealing\t with  the rights of an unsecured  creditor  of\t the
\nfather\tto  proceed against the shares of the sons  after  a
\npartition.  In other words, the nature and bona fides of the
\npartition  and the right of the creditor to proceed  against
\nthe share allotted to the son in such partition would  arise
\nfor consideration only if the Bank were unable to  establish
\nthat the mortgage was as such not binding on the son.\tThis
\nwas  the situation of the Bank when the learned trial  Judge
\nfound  that the mortgage was not binding on the\t appellant’s
\nshare  in  the family property.\t If, however,  the  mortgage
\nwere  binding  on the son either because it was\t created  to
\nraise money for purposes binding on the family as  necessary
\nor  beneficial\tthere  for  or\twas  executed  in  order  to
\ndischarge  an antecedent debt of the father, the bona  fides
\nof  the partition and the allotment of property to the\tsons
\ncannot affect the rights of the secured creditor to  proceed
\nagainst\t the  properties allotted to the son which  are\t the
\nsubject of mortgage.  In the present appeal, in view of\t the
\nconclusion  we\thave  reached, for reasons  which  we  shall
\ndiscuss\t later in the judgment, that the mortgage under\t Ex.
\n‘E’  was for securing the repayment of an  antecedent  debt,
\nthe  bona  fides of the partition would not have  a  crucial
\nsignificance.  Since however the question of the reality  or
\nthe binding nature of the partition would arise in the event
\nof the mortgaged, property being found in sufficient to dis-
\ncharge\tthe  decree and the creditor or\t the  decree  holder
\nthereafter  seeks to proceed against properties allotted  to
\nthe  share of the appellant which were not included  in\t the
\nmortgage, we have thought it necessary and proper to examine
\nit.\n<\/p>\n
Proceeding  then  to  deal with the matter,  we\t must  first
\nobserve that the onus of proving that
\n(1)  [1952] S.C.R. 544.\n<\/p>\n
663<\/span><\/p>\n
the partition arrangement is fair and bonafide in the  sense
\nexplained by this Court in Panna Lal’s case(,,) was upon the
\nappellant, and that the approach of the learned trial  Judge
\nto the question is vitiated by casting the burden of proving
\nthat  the  arrangement was mala fide on the  creditor  Bank.
\nAnd for this reason.\t At  the  moment the  liability\t was
\nincurred by the\t    father  the\t creditor  had\ta  right  to
\nproceed against\t    the entirety of the joint family  estate
\nincluding  the\tshare of the son since, the debt  not  being
\navyavaharika,  the  son\t was under  a  pious  obligation  to
\ndischarge  it out of family property.  Subsequent thereto  a
\npartition  takes place by which the share of the son in\t the
\nproperty  is  separated\t and vested in him,  free  from\t the
\nrights and powers of the father.  It is the plea of the\t son
\nthat  by reason of an arrangement which he has entered\tinto
\nor  which  has\tbeen  entered into on  his  behalf,  he\t has
\ndischarged  himself  from  liability  to  the  creditor\t  an
\narrangement  to which the creditor is not a party but  which
\nunder  the  law\t is binding on\tthe  creditor  provided\t the
\narrangement fulfils certain conditions.\t From this it  would
\nseem to follow logically that the onus would be upon the son
\nto  establish that the nature of the arrangement  under\t the
\npartition  was such, as made proper and\t adequate  provision
\nfor  the discharge of the debt, for that is the\t basis\tupon
\nwhich his own discharge from liability depends.\t The learned
\ntrial  Judge framed an issue regarding the  partition  being
\nfair  and bona fides and binding on the Bank but the  entire
\ndiscussion  on\tthe facts relating to it  proceeded  on\t the
\nfooting\t that the onus was upon the Bank to  establish\tthat
\nthe partition was mala fide.\n<\/p>\n
The,next  error of the learned trial Judge lay\tin  ignoring
\nthe  circumstance that the partition did not make  provision
\nfor  the  discharge  of the entirety of\t the  debts  of\t the
\nfather, nor did it take into account, all the properties  of
\nthe  family.   The partition was evidenced by  a  registered
\ninstrument dated June 3, 1948 The first feature of this deed
\nis that though the,
\n(1) [1952] S.C.R. 544.\n<\/p>\n
664<\/span><\/p>\n
family\thad properties both at Palghat in the then State  of
\nMadras,\t as well as in the Cochin State, the partition\tdeed
\nwhich  has  been  marked  as Ex.  VI  dealt  only  with\t the
\nproperties  in Cochin.\tThese properties were  divided\tinto
\ntwo  parts which were stated to be equal in value  and\tthey
\nwere allotted respectively to the father and the minor\tson.
\nIt contained a recital that the father acknowledged that the
\ndebts incurred by him were for his own personal purposes and
\nwere  not  binding on the son and that as a  consequence  of
\nthis state of affairs the debt due to the Bank was  directed
\nto  be\tdischarged  by the father-a direction  to  which  he
\nexpressed his agreement.  The learned trial Judge found that
\nthe total property at Cochin was fetching an income of about
\n18  to\t19 thousand rupees a year and computing\t the  market
\nvalue of the property on that basis considered that it. made
\nample  provision  for the discharge of the debt due  to\t the
\nBank.  But he paid no attention to the fact that besides the
\ndebts  for the discharge of which provision was made in\t Ex.
\nVI,  the father had incurred several debts to  creditors  in
\nPalghat\t and which the son was under a pious  obligation  to
\nreply  but  to this we shall revert after  setting  out\t the
\ngrounds on which the learned Judges of the High Court  based\n<\/p>\n
-their finding.\n<\/p>\n
As  stated  earlier, the learned Judges of  the\t High  Court
\nreversed  the  finding of the learned trial  Judge  on\tthis
\npoint.\tBriefly stated their reasons were two fold: (f) That
\nthe  partition was brought about in order to  forestall\t the
\naction of the creditors of the father, who sought to proceed
\nagainst\t the family properties and so the  transaction\tbore
\nthe  stamp of mala fides.  We have already referred  to\t the
\nsuit in forma paupereis filed at the Sub-Court, Palghat\t for
\nthe  partition of the Palghat properties.  In  that  plaint,
\nand  this also has already been adverted to a arg number  of
\ndebts  were  set  out  and in regard to\t some  of  them\t the
\nplaintiff claimed the relief of having them set aside on the
\nground\tthat  they  were incurred  for\tillegal\t or  immoral
\npurposes and so were not binding on him.  The allegations in
\nthat plaint, therefore,
\n665<\/span>
\nmade it clear that there were a number of creditors who\t had
\nfiled suits against the father and that was heavily  pressed
\nfor  discharging  them.\t It was in that situation  that\t the
\nsuit  in  Palghat was filed And it was when things  were  in
\nthis  state that the partition of the Cochin properties\t was
\nbrought about This necessarily showed that the partition was
\nnot  bona fide. (2) In the deed of partition-Ex. there is  a
\nrecital that the debt due to the Bank was not binding on the
\nappellant.  There was thus a repudiation of liability on the
\npart  of  the son and the learned Judges held  that  such  a
\nrepudiation  would  by itself negative the  partition  being
\nbona fide and binding on the creditor.\tLearned counsel\t for
\nthe appellant submitted that of the two reasons assigned  by
\nthe  learned Judges for their conclusion that the  partition
\nwas  not bonafide the first was insufficient and the  second
\nirrelevant and immaterial.  As regards the first ground,  he
\nurged  that at the most, it would occasion greater  scrutiny
\nand provided that, as found by the learned trial Judge,\t the
\nproperties  allotted to the share of the father were  fairly
\nsufficient  for\t the discharge of the debts binding  on\t the
\nson, the circumstances relied on would not per se render the
\narrangement mala fide.\tRegarding the 2nd ground, he pointed
\nout  that the fact that the father took over  the  liability
\nfor the reason that the debt was not binding on the son, was
\na  matter  of legitimate arrangement inter  se\tbetween\t the
\ncoparceners  and  would have no bearing on the\tfairness  or
\nbona  fides of the partition with was concerned really\twith
\nascertaining  whether the property set apart for the  father
\nwas  or\t was  not  sufficient  for  the\t discharge  of\t the
\nindebtedness which he undertook.  We see considerable  force
\nin the submission of the learned counsel., particularly\t was
\nthe criticism of the second of the above reasons The recital
\nas  to\tthe character of the debt as against the  son  is  a
\nrecital\t in a document to which the father and the son-\t are
\nparties\t and if between them the son repudiates the debt  as
\nbinding on him, that is no reason by itself for holding\t the
\npartition to be mala fide.\n<\/p>\n
666<\/span><\/p>\n
We  agree that the real question for consideration  in\tsuch
\ncases is whether sufficient property has been set apart\t for
\nthe share of the father to enable him to discharge the debts
\nwhich  he has undertaken to discharge.\tExamined  from\tthis
\npoint  of  view\t we are ,,clearly of the  opinion  that\t the
\npartition  deed-Ex.  VI does not satisfy this test.  In\t the
\nfirst  place,  we  agree with the learned  Counsel  for\t the
\nrespondent in his criticism that the learned trial Judge had
\nreally\tno basis in the evidence for recording\this  finding
\n;is regards the income from the property.  That finding\t was
\nbased not on any evidence adduced directed to that point but
\nby  taking into account certain statements made to the\tBank
\nby  Kalyanasundaram at the time the loan was raised.   As  a
\nmatter\tof fact the 1st defendant in his  cross\t examination
\nstated:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “The properties partitioned and allotted to me
\n\t      (under Ex. 6) will fetch a pattom of 2,000 and
\n\t      odd (paras of paddy).  I have got debt to\t the
\n\t      extent  of Rs. 80,000.  It is the\t debt  under
\n\t      Exs.   A & B. I have to pay other\t amounts  to
\n\t      the  bank.  I have to pay a debt of about\t Rs.
\n\t      2,00,000\tto the bank.  In addition to that  I
\n\t      have  also  got other debts to the  extent  of
\n\t      more  than  rupees  one  lakh.   The   decrees
\n\t      obtained against me will come to more than Rs.
\n\t      50,000-60,000.   They  are  decrees   obtained
\n\t      against me.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
This would disclose two infirmities in the appellant’s case:
\n(1)  No provision was admittedly made under Ex. VI  for\t the
\npayment\t of  all  the debts of the  father  and\t there\twere
\nconsiderably more debts payable by him than those for  which
\nprovision  was\tmade  for the discharge\t out  of  properties
\nallotted  to  him.  (2) There  was  no\tacceptable  evidence
\nregarding  the\tvalue  of  the\tproperties  in\tPalghat\t and
\ntherefore one cannot proceed on the basis that the share  of
\nthe father in the Palghat properties would be sufficient  to
\ndischarge the debts not provided for under Ex.\tVI.  Learned
\ncounsel\t for  the  appellant  faintly  suggested  that\t for
\nconsidering  the bona fides of the partition under  Ex.\t  VI
\nonly the debts incurred in Cochin and
\n667<\/span>
\non which suits could be laid in Cochin should be  considered
\nbut  this is obviously incorrect because even assuming\tthat
\nin  regard to each one of those debts, a suit could  not  be
\ninstituted  in the Courts in the Cochin\t State,\t undoubtedly
\nthe   decrees  obtained\t in  the  Madras  State\t  could\t  be
\ntransferred  for  execution to Cochin and  vice\t versa.\t  In
\nthese  circumstances,  unless  the  entirety  of  the  debts
\npayable by the father were taken into account and sufficient
\nand adequate provision made for the discharge of these debts
\nfrom and out of the share allotted to the father-either\t his
\noriginal  share or any added assets to enable him to  do  so\n<\/p>\n
-the  partition\t cannot be held to be bona fide\t within\t the
\nmeaning of the decisions.  We therefore agree with the\tHigh
\nCourt, though not for the same reasons, in its finding\tthat
\nthe  partition\tunder Ex.  VT is not such as to\t be  binding
\nagainst the Bank.\n<\/p>\n
We  shall next deal with the second point which\t relates  to
\nthe reasoning on the strength of which the learned Judges of
\nthe  High Court granted a decree to the bank for the  entire
\nsum  of\t Rs. 80,000 and odd covered by\tthe  two  promissory
\nnotes ‘A’ & ‘B’ notwithstanding their finding that only\t Rs.
\n50,000\tand odd out of the loan of Rs. 80,000  went  towards
\nthe  discharge of antecedent debts.  We should add  that  we
\nare reserving for later consideration the correctness of the
\ngrounds\t for  holding that to the extent of Rs.\t 59,000\t the
\nmortgage was for discharge of antecedent debts which is\t the
\nsubject\t matter\t of the third of the points  raised  by\t the
\nAppellant.\n<\/p>\n
Their reasoning may be set out in their own words:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “When  the  plaint  transactions\ttook   place
\n\t      British\tIndia\tand   Cochin   State\twere
\n\t      independent sovereign states and according  to
\n\t      Private International law it is the law of the
\n\t      situs  of\t the  property\tthat  should  govern
\n\t      contracts relating to it.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
On this principle they applied the Hindu Law as administered
\nin Cochin State to determine the rights of the creditor\t and
\nunder,\tthat law even a mortgage, which was  contemporaneous
\nwith the debt would
\n668<\/span>
\nbe binding on the sons, provided the same was not illegal or
\nimmoral,  though the debt was not for a purpose\t binding  on
\nthe  family either by way of necessity or benefit.  On\tthis
\nbasis  they  held that the bank was entitled to\t a  mortgage
\ndecree for the entire sum even though Rs. 20,000 and odd  of
\nit  was held not to be for the discharge of  any  antecedent
\ndebt.\tLearned\t counsel for the  appellant  challenged\t the
\ncorrectness  of\t this reasoning and the application  of\t the
\nrule of the lex situs to a case like the present.  We  agree
\nthat  the  learned Judges were not right in  the  view\tthey
\nexpressed  about the applicability of this rule\t of  Private
\nInternational Law.  The rule that they applied to  determine
\nthe  rights  to\t immovable property in Cochin  was  not\t any
\nstatutory law which was binding on parties who had  dealings
\nin  regard  to\tland  in that State  in\t which\tevent  their
\nreasoning  was\tunexceptional.\t Taking\t the  Cochin   State
\nitself,\t the power of a person to dispose of property or  to
\nencumber it would have depended upon whether he was a  Hindu
\nor a Muslim or a Christian and in each case the right of the
\nowner  to  dispose  of the property would  depend  upon\t his
\nPersonal  Law as modified by any statute applicable to\tthat
\ncommunity to which he belonged.\t There was in the matter  of
\ndispositions of the type we have to deal with in this  case,
\nno  lex\t situs\twhich could be\tapplied\t irrespective  of  a
\npersonal law governing the owner.  By way of example, let us
\ntake  the case of a testamentary power of  disposition\tover
\nimmovable  property  in\t that State.  If the  owner  were  a
\nChristian he might be entitled to dispose of property to the
\nfull  extent.  If he were a Muslim, there would be  a  limi-
\ntation\ton such a power based upon the rules of\t Muslim\t Law
\napplicable  to\thim  subject, of course,  to  any  statutory
\nmodifications thereof.\tIn the case of a Hindu, his power to
\ndispose\t of by will would depend upon whether  the  property
\nwas self-acquired or joint and whether he was a member of  a
\nJoint Hindu Fami the existence of coparceners and the  like.
\nThe Cochin law itself, therefore, recognised that Hindu\t Law
\nwas  a\tPersonal  Law and that the rights  of  dealing\twith
\nproperty flowed from the Personal
\n669<\/span>
\nLaw of the owner.  It is hardly necessary to cite  authority
\nfor  the  position that Hindu Law is a\tPersonal  Law.\t The
\nmatter\tmight  be further illustrated  by  another  example.
\nEven  among  the Hindus, there are persons governed  by\t the
\nDayabhaga  system  of  Hindu Law.  If such  a  one  acquired
\nproperty  in Cochin it could not be that the  Dayabhaga\t not
\nbeing  prevalent  in  Cochin  some  system  of\tlaw-not\t the
\nDayabhaga  but either the Mitakshara or some  other  system-
\nwould apply in the absence of course of some valid statutory
\nprovision to determine either the rights to property or\t its
\ndevolution.  The reasoning of the learned Judges, therefore,
\nproceeds  upon a basic wrong assumption that the  Mitakshara
\nlaw as understood and administered in Cochin State was\tsome
\nsort of lex situs which would apply to determine the  rights
\nof  parties whatever might be their Person Law i.e.,  Hindus
\nfollowing  either the Mitakshara as understood elsewhere  or
\ngoverned  by  some system other than the Mitakshara  or\t not
\nbeing  Hindus  governed\t by some other system  of  law.\t  As
\nstated\tin  Mayne’  Hindu  , Law(1)  though  in\t a  slightly
\ndifferent context
\n\t      “Prima   facie   any  Hindu  residing   in   a
\n\t      particular  province  of India is held  to  be
\n\t      subject  to the particular doctrines of  Hindu
\n\t      Law  recognised in  that\tprovince…………
\n\t      This law is not merely a local law, it becomes
\n\t      a\t personal  law and a part of the  status  of
\n\t      every    family\twhich\tis    governed\t  by
\n\t      it……………..  In this respect the\trule
\n\t      seems an exception to the usual principle, the
\n\t      lex loci governs matters relating to land\t and
\n\t      that  the law of the domicil governs  personal
\n\t      relations.  The same rule as above would apply
\n\t      to  any  family  which, by  local\t usage,\t had
\n\t      acquired any special custom of succession,  or
\n\t      the like, peculiar to itself, though differing
\n\t      from that either of its original, or  acquired
\n\t      domicile The reason is that in India there  is
\n\t      no  lex loci, every person being\tgoverned  by
\n\t      the law of his personal status.”\n<\/p>\n
\t       (1)  Mayne’s Hindu Law, 11th Edn. para 56.\n<\/p>\n
\t      670<\/span><\/p>\n
In  the\t present case on the concurrent finding of  the\t two
\ncourts\tthat  the family of the\t defendants  were  permanent
\nresidents  of and domiciled in Palghat it would follow\tthat
\nthe  binding character of the father’s alienation by way  of
\nmortgage quoad the son had to ‘be judged in the light of the
\nprinciples  laid  down from very early times  by  the  Privy
\nCouncil\t and  accepted by the Full Bench  decisions  of\t the
\nMadras\tHigh Court and finally authoritatively expounded  in
\nBrij  Narain  v.  Mangla Prasad(1) which  has  received\t the
\napproval  of this Court.  When the Bank dealt with  the\t 1st
\ndefendant,  it must be taken to have contracted with him  on
\nthe basis of such a law being applicable to the transaction,
\nso  that there is no question of hardship arising  from\t the
\napplication of the British Indian Law to determine the scope
\nof the father’s powers.\n<\/p>\n
This  leads  us\t to the third and last point  urged  in\t the
\nappeal as regards whether and to what extent the debt  under
\nthe mortgage evidence by Ex.  ‘E’ went towards the discharge
\nof  the\t antecedent debts of the father for it is  only\t for
\nsuch  amount  that  the Bank can  claim\t a  mortgage  decree
\nagainst the share of the appellant in the family properties.
\nBefore\texamining  the\tfacts in  relation  thereto,  it  is
\nnecessary  to  narrate\tbriefly\t the  manner  in  which\t the
\nattention of the Courts were directed to this point.  In its
\nplaint\tthe  Bank averred that the debt was incurred  for  a
\nfamily\tpurpose, it being stated to be in connection with  a
\nfamily\tbusiness.   This  was denied and it  is\t now  common
\nground that the debt was incurred merely for the starting of
\na  new business by the father and was not for any  ancestral
\nfamily business.  So far as the plaint went, the Bank had no
\ncase  that the debt secured by the mortgage was one  binding
\non  the\t family as being for a necessary purpose.   Also  in
\nterms there was no plea that the mortgage was binding on the
\nson’s share by reason of the debt being for the discharge of
\nthe  antecedent indebtedness of the father.  The defence  on
\nbehalf of the appellant was threefold:\tBesides\t the   usual
\nformal denial of the
\n(1) 51 I.A. 129.\n<\/p>\n
mortgage   not\t being\tsupported  by\tconsideration,\t the
\ncontentions raised were: (1) That the mortgage debt was\t not
\nbinding\t on the appellant’s share of the  family  properties
\nfor  the reason that the debt was not incurred for  purposes
\nwhich in law were either necessary or binding on the family,
\nand  (2)  that\tthe debts were tainted\twith  illegality  or
\nimmorality.  The findings which were recorded on these three
\ndefenses  were concurrent and are no longer in\tcontroversy.
\nIt  was\t found\tthat the mortgage  was\tfully  supported  by
\nconsideration,\tthat  the  debt was  not  incurred  for\t any
\nnecessary  or  beneficial purpose of the family\t and  lastly
\nthat the purpose for which the debt was incurred was neither
\nillegal\t  nor  immoral.\t  In  this  context  it\t should\t  be
\nremembered  that the suit was filed by the bank on June\t 17,
\n1948 before Cochin became part of the Indian Union.  At that
\ndate  there could be no doubt that if the Courts  at  Cochin
\napplied\t the Hindu Law as understood by’ the High  Court  of
\nthat  State disregarding the circumstance arising  from\t the
\ndomicile  of the mortgagors, the question whether  the\tdebt
\nsecured\t by the mortgage was or was not for  discharging  an
\nearlier antecedent indebtedness of the father was immaterial
\nand nothing more was needed for the plaintiff to succeed  in
\nobtaining  a  mortgage decree as against the  entire  family
\nproperty including the son’s share therein than a finding by
\nthe  Court  that the debt was not illegal  or  immoral.\t  In
\nfact, even the allegation in the Bank’s plaint that the debt
\nwas  for  the  purpose\tof  financing  a  family  trade\t was
\nsuperfluous,  and  the negativing of its  averment  in\tthat
\nregard would not have affected its rights in any manner.  In
\nthe circumstances, the Bank could not be seriously blamed if
\nit  considered\tthat the question whether there was  not  an
\nantecedent  debt which the mortgage under Ex.  E  discharged
\nwas not relevant at all and made no averment asserting\tsuch
\na  fact.   Accordingly no attention was apparently  paid  by
\neither party to this question.\tBy the date, however, of the
\narguments before the learned trial Judge the princely  State
\nof  Cochin had acceded to the Indian Union and had become  a
\nPart ‘B’ State under the
\n672<\/span>
\nConstitution.  Founding himself on this circumstance as also
\nthe fact that the defendants were permanent residents of and
\ndomiciled  at  Palghat\tlearned,counsel\t for  the  appellant
\nsubmitted  to  the  trial  Judge  that\tthe  Hindu  Law\t  as
\nunderstood and expounded in Brij Narain v. Mangla Prasad (1)
\nwould  apply to determine the rights of the parties  to\t the
\ntransaction  and  if that law were applied, on\tthe  finding
\nthat  there  had been a partition in the  family  which\t was
\nstated\tto be fair under which a proper provision  had\tbeen
\nmade  for the discharge of the debts of the father,  coupled
\nwith  the  finding  that debts under Exs.  A &\tB  were\t not
\nincurred  for a family trade or for a purpose  binding\tupon
\nthe  family,  the  mortgagee was not entitled  to  a  decree
\nagainst\t the security under Ex.\t ‘E’ which could not  extend
\nto the share allotted to the appellant under the  partition-
\nEx.   VI.   The\t learned  trial\t Judge\tmade  an  incidental
\nfinding,  or more correctly an observation which it must  be
\ntaken  to be on the state of the pleadings, that  the  debts
\nevidenced  by  Exs.   A\t & B did not  go  to  discharge\t any
\nantecedent liability of the father.  When the matter went up
\nin   appeal  before  the  High\tCourt  the  learned   Judges
\nconsidered that even if Brij Narain v. Mangla Prasad(1)\t was
\napplied\t and  even  if the finding that there  had  been  no
\nancestral trade and that the debt had not been incurred\t for
\na family purpose were accepted, there would still be need to
\nascertain  whether  there  was any antecedent  debt  of\t the
\nfather\twhich  had been discharged by the execution  of\t the
\npromissory notes Exs.  A and B and the mortgage deed Ex.  E.
\nFor  this  purpose  they  called  for  a  finding  from\t the
\nSubordinate Judge under O. XLI. r. 25, Civil Procedure Co-de
\nand  having  regard to the state of the\t pleadings  and\t the
\nevidence  they\traised a specific issue on  that  point\t and
\ndirected  the  Subordinate  Judge to afford  the  parties  a
\nfurther\t opportunity  of  adducing  such  evidence  as\tthey
\ndesired\t on the matter.\t The Subordinate  Judge\t accordingly
\nheard further evidence and recorded a specific, finding that
\nthe  debts under Exs.  A and B were not for the\t purpose  of
\ndischarging any antecedent debts which
\n(1)  51 I.A. 129.\n<\/p>\n
673<\/span><\/p>\n
could really be termed to be independent transactions.\t The
\nappeal\twas thereafter heard and the learned  Judges,  after
\nconsidering  this  finding, dissented from  the\t view  there
\nexpressed and held that out of the Rs. 80,000 which were the
\nprincipal  amounts covered by the two promissory  notes-Exs.
\nA  & B, there was, an antecedent debt to the extent  of\t Rs.
\n59,000 and odd.\t Though on this finding, if the decision  in
\nBrij Narain v. Mangla Prasad(1) were applied, the bank would
\nhave  been entitled to a mortgage decree only in respect  of
\nthe  principal sum of Rs. 59,000 and odd and to\t a  personal
\ndecree\tfor the balance to be recovered out of the share  of
\nthe appellant in the family property on the finding that the
\npartition Ex. VI was not bonafide and therefore not impeding
\nthe rights of the creditor, they, nevertheless proceeded  to
\ngrant a decree to the Bank for the entire sum due on the two
\npromissory  notes-Exs.\t A and B for the  reason  that\tthey
\nconsidered  that the law applicable to determine the  rights
\nof  the\t Bank was not the Mitakshara law as  understood\t and
\nexplained  in  Brij  Narain’s Case(1) but  the\tlaw  as\t was
\nunderstood and applied in the decisions of the High Court of
\nCochin\tprior  to the Constitution.  We have  already  dealt
\nwith  the correctness of the view of the High Court on\tthis
\npoint.\n<\/p>\n
What  we  are  here concerned with is  the  finding  by\t the
\nlearned Judges of the High Court that out of the sum of\t Rs.
\n80,000 covered by Exs.\tA and B a sum of Rs. 59,000 and\t odd
\nreally\twent in discharge of an antecedent debt and that  to
\nthat extent, even applying the law as understood in what was
\nformerly  British India, the Bank would have the right to  a
\nmortgage  decree  as  against the  appellant.\tThe  learned
\ncounsel\t for  the appellant has strenuously  contended\tthat
\nthis finding of the High Court is wrong and that the  entire
\ntransaction  by\t which\tthe  father  obtained  finances\t for
\nimplementing  the  pepper contract with\t the  Government  of
\nIndia was one single and entire transaction and that it\t was
\nnot capable of being split up, as the learned Judges of\t the
\nHigh Court had done
\n(1) 511.  A. 129.\n<\/p>\n
674<\/span><\/p>\n
in  order to record a finding of antecedency for a  part  of
\nthe  suit-mortgage  debt.  On the other\t hand,\tthe  learned
\ncounsel for the respondent has submitted to us that not only
\nwere  the learned Judges of the High Court right in  holding
\nthat Rs. 59,000 and odd was an antecedent debt but that\t the
\nlearned\t Judges should have gone further and held  that\t the
\nentire\tsum of Rs. 80,000 covered by Exs.  A and B  was\t for
\nthe discharge of antecedent debts.\n<\/p>\n
This  question of fact was the principal matter\t of  contest
\nbefore\tus.   We  shall start  by  briefly  summarising\t the
\ntransactions between the 1st defendantfather’ and the  Bank.
\nThe  first  defendant  entered\tinto  a\t contract  with\t the
\nGovernment of India for the supply to them of 2000 Cwts.  of
\npepper\tin  or\tabout May 7, 1945.  The total  cost  of\t the
\nsupply was Rs. 1,37,000.  He entered into similar  contracts
\nlater in October and November 1945 and under these the value
\nof  the goods to be supplied was respectively  Rs.  1,23,000
\nand  Rs. 3,63,000.  Even for implemening the first  contract
\nof  May\t 1945, the first defendant apparently  had  need  to
\nborrow.\t An application for a loan was made on or about\t the
\n4th or 5th of June 1945 and then the 1st defendant sent\t the
\ndocuments of title that he held in respect of his properties
\nin Cochin and ‘desired accommodation by way of an over-draft
\nfor  Rs.  50,000  from\tthe Bank.  The\tletter\tby  the\t 1st
\ndefendant  to the Bank is not on the record but it  is\tseen
\nthat  these documents were sent to the legal Advisor of\t the
\nBank  on  June\t6,  1945 and  the  latter  was\tdirected  to
\nscrutinise  them and inform the Bank whether  the  documents
\nwere  complete.\t They were returned on the same day  with  a
\nnote stating that the Bank should satisfy itself whether the
\nparticulars set out in the letter were true and if this were
\nso  the\t amount could be paid on a mortgage  by\t deposit  of
\ntitle deed.  This letter of the Legal Adviser as well as the
\nrequest of the 1st defendant was circulated to the directors
\nof the plaintiff-bank and the loan asked for was  sanctioned
\nby  the President of the Bank on June 11, 1945 and the\tsame
\nwas passed.by the
\n675<\/span>
\ndirectors  on  the same day with a limit up to\tRs.  50,000.
\nBut  this was to be on a mortgage of the Cochin\t properties.
\nHowever\t even  before  the request  for\t the  overdraft\t was
\ncirculated to the directors and their sanction obtained, the
\nofficers of the Bank, apparently acting on the\tinstructions
\nof the Secretary gave him loans to the extent of Rs. 45,000.
\nA loan of Rs. 30,000 on a promissory note carrying  interest
\nat 6 1\/4 % was granted on June 6, 1945 and two days later on
\na  further promissory note Rs. 15,000 was lent.\t The sum  of
\nRs. 45,000 and interest thereon was carried to the debit  of
\nwhat  is termed as a No. 1 account at the Palghat branch  of
\nthe Bank which was an overdraft account with a limit of\t Rs.
\n50,000.\t  It  should  be noticed that the  creation  of\t the
\nmortgage  was long after this.\tApparently,  this  overdraft
\naccount\t was opened under the directions of the Bank’s\thead
\noffice at Trichur by a letter dated June 18, 1945  (referred
\nto in the opening entry) carrying out the directions of\t the
\nPresident of the Bank dated June 11, 1945 to which reference
\nhas already been made.\tThe amount due on the two promissory
\nnotes  with  interest due up to June 19, 1945  came  to\t Rs.
\n45,054\/11   and\t this was the debit with which\tthe  account
\nopened.\t Subsequently there were operations in this  account
\neither\ti.e.,  both  by way of payment in,  as\twell  as  of
\nwithdrawal  from this account and on November 14,  1945\t the
\ndate  of  the promissory notes Exs.  A & B  the\t amount\t due
\nunder  this  account  was  Rs.\t50726\/15\/4.   We  shall\t  be
\nreferring  to how this account was squared on  November\t 20,
\n1945  after referring to the history of the No. 2  overdraft
\naccount of the 1st defendant with the Bank.
\nThe  1st defendant made a second application for a  loan  on
\nOctober\t 8, 1945 to the Bank for overdraft accommodation  up
\nto  a limit of Rs. 3,00,000.  The security that\t he  offered
\nfor  the  fresh advance that he required was  the  contracts
\nentered into by the Government of India which he said  would
\nbe pledged with the Bank and he suggested that the  advances
\nmight be made to him on the security of the Inspection Notes
\nof the goods that he would be supplying
\n676<\/span>
\nto  Government.\t He also promised that the receipt  for\t Rs.
\n50,000 which had either been or would be deposited with\t the
\nGovernment  of India as security for the due fulfillment  of
\nthe contract, would be pledged with them, so that they would
\nbe  in\ta position to obtain  payment of that sum  from\t the
\nGovernment themselves.\tThe Bank, however, demanded that  in
\naddition  to  pledging the amounts which would\tbe  received
\nfrom  the Government under the contract, the  1st  defendant
\nshould also create a mortgage by deposit of title deeds\t ‘of
\nproperties  in\tPalomar for the loan that he  desired.\t The
\nproposal by the 1st defendant was considered at a meeting of
\nthe  Board  of Directors of the plaintiff-bank\tand  it\t was
\nresolved  to give him additional overdraft facility  to\t the
\nextent of Rs. 60,000 which was split into two parts (1)\t Rs.
\n30,000 on the security of properties at Palghat in regard to
\nwhich  a  mortgage  was to be created by  deposit  of  title
\ndeeds, and (2) a further sum of Rs. 30,000 to be advanced by
\nan  increase  in the overdraft limit of Rs.  50,000  on\t the
\nCochlea properties.  This resolution was passed on  November
\n4,  1945.   But even before this resolution was\t passed\t and
\nobviously  in anticipation of the decision of the  Directors
\nthe  overdraft account No. 2 of the, 1st defendant with\t the
\nBank at Palghat was opened on October 24, 1945 with a  limit
\nof  Rs.\t 30,000.   It would be seen that Exs.  A  &  B\twere
\nexecuted on November 19, 1945 and the deposit of title deeds
\nand  the memorandum in connection therewith was also on\t the
\nsame  date.  Between the 24th October 1945 and the  11th  of
\nNovember  the  1st  defendant had operated  on\tthis  No.  2
\naccount\t both by payment in, as well as by withdrawing\tfrom
\nit and as a result of these transactions the amount owed  by
\nhim  to the bank on the 19th November 1945 was a sum of\t Rs.
\n59,952\/12\/5.   The  position on November 19, 1945  when\t the
\nloan  under Exs.  A & B was raised and the mortgage  Ex.   E
\nwas  executed was therefore this.  Under the No.  1  account
\nthe 1st defendant owed the Bank Rs. 50,726\/15\/4.  On the No.
\n2  account  the amount due to the Bank was  Rs.\t 59952\/12\/5.
\nIt, was with this state of the account
\n677<\/span>
\nthat  Exs.   A & B were executed and the loan  of  Rs.80,000
\nsecured\t by the suit mortgage was raised.  This sum  of\t Rs.
\n80,000\twas made available to the 1st defendant, not by\t the
\nBank  itself  adjusting the newly granted loan\tagainst\t the
\namounts\t due up to that date and keeping the Rs. 29,000\t odd
\nthat  would  still have remained due to it as  an  unsecured
\ndebt  due from him.  On the other hand, the head  office  of
\nthe Bank at Trichur handed over to the 1st defendant a draft
\nfor  Rs. 80,000 made out in favour of the 1st  defendant  on
\nits  branch at Palghat.\t That the draft was handed  over  to
\nthe 1st defendant is admitted.\tIt was handed over at a time
\nwhen so far as the previous indebtedness was concerned,\t the
\nbank held no security though there might have been a promise
\nto create one.\tThis draft was taken by the 1st defendant to
\nPalghat\t and  was paid by him into his No. 2  account  which
\ntherefore became reduced from a debit of Rs. 59,952 and\t odd
\nto a credit of over Rs. 20,000.\t It was on this feature\t and
\nthis operation on the account that the learned Judges of the
\nHigh  Court  relied  on for their conclusion  that  the\t Rs.
\n59,000\todd was an antecedent debt which was  discharged  by
\nthe draft of Rs. 80,000 handed over by the Bank when Exs.  A
\n& B were executed.  It now remains to narrate how the No.  1
\naccount\t under which the 1st defendant was a debtor  to\t the
\nextent\tof  Rs. 50,726 and odd became discharged.   The\t 1st
\ndefendant drew a cheque in his own name on November  20,1945
\nfrom his No. 2 account in which he had an overdraft limit to
\nthe  extent of Rs. 50,000 and paid this cheque into his\t No.\n<\/p>\n
1. account.  There was a small balance of Rs. 726\/15,\/4\t due
\nwhich  was  paid  in cash and that  account  was  closed  on
\nNovember  20,  1945.  On these. facts the question  now\t for
\nconsideration  is whether this loan of Rs. 80,000 is  or  is
\nnot  sufficiently dissociated from the liability of the\t 1st
\ndefendant  under the No. 1 and No. 2 accounts which  existed
\nbefore that date, for admittedly the entire sum was utilised
\nto discharge the debt remaining due to the Bank on  November
\n20, 1945.\n<\/p>\n
678<\/span><\/p>\n
Learned\t  counsel  for\tthe  appellant\traised\ta  sort\t  of
\npreliminary  objection that the learned Judges of  the\tHigh
\nCourt\thaving\tcategorically  found  that  there   was\t  an
\nantecedent  debt which was discharged by  the  suit-mortgage
\nloan  only  to the extent of Rs. 59,000 and  odd  and  there
\nbeing  no  appeal by the Bank against the finding  that\t the
\nbalance\t of the Rs. 80,000 had not gone in discharge  of  an
\nantecedent  debt, the respondent was precluded from  putting
\nforward\t a  contention\tthat the entire sum  of\t Rs.  80,000
\ncovered by Exs.\t A & B went for the discharge of  antecedent
\ndebts.\t We  do\t not see any substance\tin  this  objection,
\nbecause\t  the\trespondent  is\tentitled  to   canvass\t the
\ncorrectness  of findings against it in order to support\t the
\ndecree that has been passed against the appellant.
\nComing now to the merits of the controversy, the matter\t may
\nbe  viewed  thus.  We are now concerned\t with  the  question
\nwhether Rs. 80,000 which were borrowed under Exs.  A & B and
\nin  respect  of which a crossed draft for that sum  made  in
\nfavour\tof the 1st defendant was handed over to him went  in
\ndischarge  of antecedent debts.\t If the previously  existing
\ndebt  on 14.11.1945 of over Rs. 1,09,000 being the total  of
\nthe  amount due under the No. 1 and 2 accounts was one\towed
\nto  a third party and that debt had in part been  discharged
\nby a demand draft issued on the execution of Exs.  A & B and
\nthe creation of a mortgage by virtue of Ex.  E, there  could
\nbe  no\tdoubt that it would be an  antecedent  debt.   That,
\nhowever, was not the case but the original indebtedness\t was
\nto the Bank itself and that was discharged by the  suit-loan
\nfrom the Bank.\tLearned counsel for the appellant laid great
\nstress\ton  the fact that the entirety of  the\ttransactions
\nwhich resulted in the grant of an overdraft facility of\t Rs.
\n1,10,000  covered  by Exs.  A, B & C should be viewed  as  a
\nsingle\tand entire transaction commencing from the grant  of
\nthe loans on June 6, 1945 in anticipation of security  being
\nfurnished,  right  up to the date when\tthe  suit-promissory
\nnotes were executed and the mortgages by deposit
\n679<\/span>
\nof  title deeds was created.  We are, unable to accept\tthis
\nsubmission in its entirety.  It is, no doubt, true that\t the
\ntransaction  with  the\tBank,  so  far\tas  the\t debtor\t was
\nconcerned, was one by which he obtained a loan for financing
\nthe  implementation of his contract with the  Government  of
\nIndia  for  the supply of black pepper but  that  by  itself
\nwould  not be sufficient to negative such a financing  being
\ncomposed of independent transactions, though directed to the
\nsame  end.  Learned counsel for the appellant did  not\tdeny
\nthat this was possible nor did he contest the position\tthat
\nif  there was a real dissociation in fact, the\tcircumstance
\nthat  the  creditor was the same or that the  several  loans
\nthat were made, were for fulfilling the same purpose of\t the
\nborrower  would not by themselves detract from\tthere  being
\nreal  antecedence for a later borrowing.  It is,  therefore,
\nessentially  a\tquestion of fact and the matter\t has  to  be
\nviewed with reference (a) to the nature of the transactions,
\nand (b) the intention of the parties, and (c) the inferences
\nto  be\treasonably  drawn from the form\t which\tthe  parties
\nadopted\t for putting through their intention.  It is in\t the
\ncontext of these considerations that we are inclined to hold
\nthat  there was a real and factual antecedency\tbetween\t the
\nloan of Rs. 80,000 for which the draft was given on November
\n16, 1945 and the previously existing indebtedness of Rs.  1,
\n09,000 and odd in the overdrafts account No. 1 and 2 of\t the
\n1st defendant to the Bank which was discharged thereby.\t  On
\nNovember  16, 1945 when the draft was handed over there\t was
\nadmitted  a  debt  of over Rs. 1, 09,000 due  from  the\t 1st
\ndefendant  to the Bank.\t Though there had been an  agreement
\nthat   the  title  deeds  of  the  1st\tdefendant’s   Cochin
\nproperties would be deposited with the Bank a security,\t the
\nsame  had  not yet been done and the  loan  therefore  still
\ncontinued  to  be  a loan on the personal  security  of\t the
\ndebtor.\t  At  that date this bank draft for Rs.\t 80,000\t was
\nhanded over to the debtor for the purpose of discharging the
\nprevious  loans due to the Bank.  Learned counsel  might  be
\nright  in saying that the previous loan of Rs. 1,09,000\t and
\nodd
\n680<\/span>
\nmight have been granted in anticipation of the execution  of
\nthe  mortgage and the final determination of the  amount  of
\nthe overdraft that should be permitted to the 1st  defendant
\nbut  that  does\t not by itself\tconclude  the  matter.\t The
\nlearned\t trial\tJudge negatived the plea of  the  respondent
\nthat  the  Rs.\t80,000 went in discharge  of  an  antecedent
\nliability  to  the  Bank by reason of the  evidence  of\t the
\nSecretary  of the Bank in which he stated that this  sum  of
\nRs. 80,000 was adjusted towards the earlier debts  statement
\nwhich  was repeated by the 1st defendant himself  as  P.W.3.
\nLearned counsel for the appellant drew our attention to this
\nportion of the evidence and repeated the same arguments.  In
\nour  opinion,  however,\t this statement or  this  manner  of
\ndescribing  how\t the draft was utilised does not  by  itself
\nmilitate  against  this loan of Rs.  80,000  discharging  an
\nantecedent debt.  Factually that the loan of Rs. 80,000\t was
\nadjusted   by  the  Bank  towards  the\t1   st\t defendant’s
\nindebtedness  is not correct, though it is possible that  if
\nthe  transaction took that form the submission on behalf  of
\nthe appellant would have greater force and substance.\tThat
\nhowever, was not the form which the transaction took, and we
\ncannot\tbut assume that the form reflected the intention  of
\nthe  parties.  If instead of handing over a demand draft  to
\nthe 1st defendant, which has actually happened, the Bank had
\ncredited  the amount to the 1 st defendant in his  overdraft
\naccount\t then  there would have been an\t unity\tbetween\t the
\ntransaction  which  started  on\t June  6,  1945\t and   which
\nculminated in the execution of the two promissory notes-Exs.
\nA and B and the security for the repayment thereof Ex.\tE so
\nas to render all of them a single transaction, but that\t was
\nnot the method adopted by the creditor or the debtor.\tWhen
\na fresh loan of Rs. 80,000 was granted under Exs.  A & B and
\na  bank draft for that amount was handed over, it  was\tdone
\nwithout\t taking into account the preexisting  liability\t for
\nRs. 1,09,000 and odd owed by the 1st defendant to the  Bank,
\nso  that  when the draft was handed over there was  a  total
\nliability  of Rs. 1,89,000 payable by the 1st  defendant  to
\nthe Bank.  If the appellant’s father had failed to credit
\n681<\/span>
\nthe  demand draft into his No. 2 overdraft account which  it
\nwas   undoubtedly  within  his\tpower  to   do,\t his   total
\nindebtedness would have been Rs 1,89,000.    He however paid
\nthe   draft  into  his\tNo.  account  so  that\t the   total
\nindebtedness  to  the  Ban on the two  accounts\t became\t Rs.
\n109,000.   From No. 2 account a sum of Rs. 5,000 he drew  to
\ndischarge  ,a  liability  of  Rs. 50,000  under\t the  No.  1
\naccount.  so  that in effect No. 1 and No. 2  accounts\twere
\nfully  discharged and Rs. 29,000 became\t thereafter  outside
\nthe  security created under Ex.\t E by the 1st  defendant  in
\nfavour\tof the Bank.  In the circumstances we consider\tthat
\nthe  entire  loan  of  Rs.  80,000  went  in  discharge\t  of
\nantecedent  debts  though  the same was\t owned\tby  the\t 1st
\ndefendant to the same creditor.\n<\/p>\n
Before\tconcluding  it is necessary to\trefer  to  variation
\nwhich the High Court made as regards amount recoverable from
\nthe properties of the family in Cochin.\t This was because of
\nthe  construction  and\teffect\tof  Ex.\t  J  which  was\t the
\nmemorandum which evidenced the deposit of the title deeds of
\nthe  Palgh  properties\tand  which  was\t executed  on  April
\n23,1946.  Under Ex.  J the property mortgaged was not merely
\nthe  properties in Palghat but the equity of  redemption  of
\nthe Cochin properties which had been the subject of mortgage
\nunder  Ex.   F\tfor, Rs. 80,000.  In  other  words,  Ex.   E
\ncreated also a second mortgage on the Cochin properties.  On
\na  construction of Ex.\tJ. the High Court held that the\t 1st
\nmortgage    of\tthe  Palghat properties was  limited  to  the
\nexcess over Rs. 30,000 in the overdraft account It  followed
\nfrom  this  that  the Bank could recover  from\tthe  Chinese
\nproperties  that  excess and this was found to\tbe,  looking
\ninto  the  debits of the account of the\t 1st  defendant,  to
\namount\tto  Rs.\t 3,792\/2\/1 The learned Judges  of  the\tHigh
\nCourt, therefore, granted in addition to the amounts covered
\nby  Exs A and B a decree for Rs. 3792 \/211 recoverable\tfrom
\nthe Cochin properties.\tIn view of the fact that a suit\t had
\nalready\t been  instituted in the Palghat Sub Court  for\t the
\nentirety of the amount due to the extent
\n682<\/span>
\nof Rs. 30,000 and interest due under Ex.  C & F, the learned
\njudges\tadded  in  their judgment a  reservation  which\t was
\nincorporated in the decree that was drawn up in these terms:
\n “If  in the suit instituted by the  plaintiff
\n\t      in the Palghat Sub-court the plaintiff obtains
\n\t      a decree for the whole amount due under Ex.  C
\n\t      and realises the same, the plaintiff will\t not
\n\t      be entitled to ignore the decree in this\tcase
\n\t      in respect of the above sum Rs. 3,792\/2\/1\t and
\n\t      interest thereon”.\n<\/p>\n
Learned\t counsel for the appellant -faintly  suggested\tthat
\nthe  learned  Judges were in error in passing a\t decree\t for
\nthis  further  sum  of Rs. 3792\/2\/1 in this  suit.   It\t is,
\nhowever,  unnecessary  for us to go into the  merits  as  to
\nwhether the learned Judges were right in the construction of
\nEx.   J\t and the legal results flowing therefrom as  we\t are
\nsatisfied  that the appellant is not entitled to raise\tthis
\npoint.\tThis was not one of the points raised in the grounds
\nof appeal to this Court when an application was made for the
\ngrant of a certificate of fitness, nor is this objection  to
\nthe  decree to be found in the statement of the case  filed.
\nIn the circumstances, we need say no more about it.
\nIn the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
\nAppeal dismissed.\n<\/p>\n
683<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Vriddhachalam Pillai vs Chaldean Syrian Bank Ltd., … on 3 December, 1963 Equivalent citations: 1964 AIR 1425, 1964 SCR (5) 647 Author: N R Ayyangar Bench: Ayyangar, N. Rajagopala PETITIONER: VRIDDHACHALAM PILLAI Vs. RESPONDENT: CHALDEAN SYRIAN BANK LTD., ANANOTHER DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03\/12\/1963 BENCH: AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA BENCH: AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-53474","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nVriddhachalam Pillai vs Chaldean Syrian Bank Ltd., ... on 3 December, 1963 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/vriddhachalam-pillai-vs-chaldean-syrian-bank-ltd-on-3-december-1963\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Vriddhachalam Pillai vs Chaldean Syrian Bank Ltd., ... on 3 December, 1963 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/vriddhachalam-pillai-vs-chaldean-syrian-bank-ltd-on-3-december-1963\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"1963-12-02T18:30:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2016-08-25T01:29:57+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@legaliadmin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@Legal_india\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"66 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/vriddhachalam-pillai-vs-chaldean-syrian-bank-ltd-on-3-december-1963#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/vriddhachalam-pillai-vs-chaldean-syrian-bank-ltd-on-3-december-1963\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\"},\"headline\":\"Vriddhachalam Pillai vs Chaldean Syrian Bank Ltd., … on 3 December, 1963\",\"datePublished\":\"1963-12-02T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2016-08-25T01:29:57+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/vriddhachalam-pillai-vs-chaldean-syrian-bank-ltd-on-3-december-1963\"},\"wordCount\":11918,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"articleSection\":[\"Supreme Court of India\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/vriddhachalam-pillai-vs-chaldean-syrian-bank-ltd-on-3-december-1963#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/vriddhachalam-pillai-vs-chaldean-syrian-bank-ltd-on-3-december-1963\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/vriddhachalam-pillai-vs-chaldean-syrian-bank-ltd-on-3-december-1963\",\"name\":\"Vriddhachalam Pillai vs Chaldean Syrian Bank Ltd., ... on 3 December, 1963 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"1963-12-02T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2016-08-25T01:29:57+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/vriddhachalam-pillai-vs-chaldean-syrian-bank-ltd-on-3-december-1963#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/vriddhachalam-pillai-vs-chaldean-syrian-bank-ltd-on-3-december-1963\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/vriddhachalam-pillai-vs-chaldean-syrian-bank-ltd-on-3-december-1963#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Vriddhachalam Pillai vs Chaldean Syrian Bank Ltd., … on 3 December, 1963\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"name\":\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"description\":\"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"alternateName\":\"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"alternateName\":\"Legal India\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"width\":512,\"height\":512,\"caption\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.facebook.com\\\/LegalindiaCom\\\/\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/Legal_india\"]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\",\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Legal India Admin\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/legaliadmin\"],\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/author\\\/legal-india-admin\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Vriddhachalam Pillai vs Chaldean Syrian Bank Ltd., ... on 3 December, 1963 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/vriddhachalam-pillai-vs-chaldean-syrian-bank-ltd-on-3-december-1963","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Vriddhachalam Pillai vs Chaldean Syrian Bank Ltd., ... on 3 December, 1963 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","og_url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/vriddhachalam-pillai-vs-chaldean-syrian-bank-ltd-on-3-december-1963","og_site_name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","article_published_time":"1963-12-02T18:30:00+00:00","article_modified_time":"2016-08-25T01:29:57+00:00","og_image":[{"width":512,"height":512,"url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Legal India Admin","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@legaliadmin","twitter_site":"@Legal_india","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Legal India Admin","Est. reading time":"66 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/vriddhachalam-pillai-vs-chaldean-syrian-bank-ltd-on-3-december-1963#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/vriddhachalam-pillai-vs-chaldean-syrian-bank-ltd-on-3-december-1963"},"author":{"name":"Legal India Admin","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea"},"headline":"Vriddhachalam Pillai vs Chaldean Syrian Bank Ltd., … on 3 December, 1963","datePublished":"1963-12-02T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2016-08-25T01:29:57+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/vriddhachalam-pillai-vs-chaldean-syrian-bank-ltd-on-3-december-1963"},"wordCount":11918,"commentCount":0,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"articleSection":["Supreme Court of India"],"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/vriddhachalam-pillai-vs-chaldean-syrian-bank-ltd-on-3-december-1963#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/vriddhachalam-pillai-vs-chaldean-syrian-bank-ltd-on-3-december-1963","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/vriddhachalam-pillai-vs-chaldean-syrian-bank-ltd-on-3-december-1963","name":"Vriddhachalam Pillai vs Chaldean Syrian Bank Ltd., ... on 3 December, 1963 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website"},"datePublished":"1963-12-02T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2016-08-25T01:29:57+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/vriddhachalam-pillai-vs-chaldean-syrian-bank-ltd-on-3-december-1963#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/vriddhachalam-pillai-vs-chaldean-syrian-bank-ltd-on-3-december-1963"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/vriddhachalam-pillai-vs-chaldean-syrian-bank-ltd-on-3-december-1963#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Vriddhachalam Pillai vs Chaldean Syrian Bank Ltd., … on 3 December, 1963"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","description":"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"alternateName":"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization","name":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","alternateName":"Legal India","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","width":512,"height":512,"caption":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","https:\/\/x.com\/Legal_india"]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea","name":"Legal India Admin","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Legal India Admin"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com","https:\/\/x.com\/legaliadmin"],"url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/author\/legal-india-admin"}]}},"modified_by":null,"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/53474","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=53474"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/53474\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=53474"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=53474"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=53474"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}