{"id":55234,"date":"1975-08-11T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1975-08-10T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/dwarka-prasad-vs-dwarka-das-saraf-on-11-august-1975"},"modified":"2018-10-22T02:04:50","modified_gmt":"2018-10-21T20:34:50","slug":"dwarka-prasad-vs-dwarka-das-saraf-on-11-august-1975","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/dwarka-prasad-vs-dwarka-das-saraf-on-11-august-1975","title":{"rendered":"Dwarka Prasad vs Dwarka Das Saraf on 11 August, 1975"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Dwarka Prasad vs Dwarka Das Saraf on 11 August, 1975<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1975 AIR 1758, \t\t 1976 SCR (1) 277<\/div>\n
Author: V Krishnaiyer<\/div>\n
Bench: Krishnaiyer, V.R.<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nDWARKA PRASAD\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nDWARKA DAS SARAF\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT11\/08\/1975\n\nBENCH:\nKRISHNAIYER, V.R.\nBENCH:\nKRISHNAIYER, V.R.\nRAY, A.N. (CJ)\nMATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN\nFAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA\n\nCITATION:\n 1975 AIR 1758\t\t  1976 SCR  (1) 277\n 1976 SCC  (1) 128\n CITATOR INFO :\n D\t    1981 SC 537\t (13)\n R\t    1985 SC 582\t (40)\n D\t    1989 SC  93\t (4,10)\n\n\nACT:\n     U.P.(Temporary) Control  of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947\ns. s(a)\t -Scope of - Test to determine what is accommodation\nwhere the lease is composite.\n     Interpretation-Proviso-How could be read\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\n     The term  \"accommodation\" is  defined by s. 2(a)- Scope\nof the\tU.P. (Temporary)  Control of  Rent and Eviction Act,\n1947 to\t mean residential  and non-residential accommodation\nin any\tbuilding or  part of  a building  and includes among\nothers any  furniture supplied\tby the\tlandlord for  use in\nsuch building or part of a building and any fittings affixed\nto such\t building  or  part  of\t a  building  for  the\tmore\nbeneficial enjoyment  thereof. A proviso was added to clause\n(a) by\tthe Amending  Act XVII\tof 1954 which says \"but does\nnot include  any accommodation\tused as\t a factory or for an\nindustrial purpose  where the business carried on in or upon\na building  is also  leased out\t to the\t lessee by  the same\ntransaction.\"\n     The respondent  took on  lease the\t cinema\t theatre  of\nwhich the appellant was the owner. The lease deed provided a\nrent of\t Rs. 400  p.m. for  the building simpliciter and Rs.\n1000 for  the projector\t fittings, fans\t and other fixtures.\nThe suit  for eviction\tfiled by the appellant was dismissed\nby the\ttrial court  holding that  the suit properly was not\naccommodation within  the meaning of the Act. The High Court\nupheld the view of the trial court.\n     On appeal\tto this\t Court it  was\tcontended  that\t the\ndominant purpose or real subject of the lease was the cinema\napparatus   and\t  fittings,   including\t  subsidiarily\t and\nincidentally the building.\n     Allowing the appeal,\n^\n     HELD: The\tlease sued on does not fall within the scope\nof accommodation  The appellant\t is entitled  to a decree of\neviction. [290B]\n     (1) (a)  The lease of an accommodation must essentially\nbe of  a building-  not a business or industry together with\nthe building in which it is situated.[82B-C]\n     (b) Where the lease is composite and has a plurality of\npurposes, the  decisive test  is the dominant purpose of the\ndemise. The  additions such  as\t gardens  grounds  and\tout-\nhouses, if  any, appurtenant to such building, any furniture\nsupplied by  the   by the  landlord  for  the  use  in\tsuch\nbuilding, electrical  fittings, sanitary fittings, and so on\nare subservient\t and beneficial to the building itself. They\nmake occupation of the building more convenient and pleasant\n`when the  principal thing  demised is\tthe building and the\nadditions  are\t auxiliary.  The   furniture  and   fittings\nvisualised in  the concept  of building\t are  calculated  to\nimprove the  beneficial enjoyment  of the  premises  leased.\n[282D-E]\n     (c) The  legislative policy  is to\t control  rents\t and\nevictions of  buildings, rack-renting  and  profiteering  by\nindiscriminate eviction from buildings, residential and non-\nresidential. The  law sought  to rescue exploited tenants of\nbuilding. It  is, therefore, fair to hold that the protected\ncategory  of   accommodation  was   residential\t  and\tnon-\nresidential buildings and not business houses. [283A-B]\n     (d) It  would be  a travesty  of language to speak of a\nlease of  a building when what is substantially made over is\na business  or industrial  plant. If  a\t business  were\t the\nsubject matter\tof the lease, the prominent thing win be not\nwhat houses  the  business  but\t the  business\titself.\t The\nbuilding becomes secondary since clearly\n278\nbusiness  or   industry\t has  to  be  accommodated  in\tsome\nenclosure or  building. In  all such  cases the lessor makes\nover possession\t of the\t building as  part and parcel of the\ntransfer of possession of the business. [283E-F]\n     In the instant case a conspectus of factors settles the\nissue in  favour of  the landlord that the real intention of\nthe parties  to the lease was to demise primarily the cinema\nequipment and  secondarily the\tbuilding, the  lease  itself\nbeing a composite one. [284B-C]\n     (2) If  on a fair construction, the principal provision\nis clear,  a proviso  cannot expand or limit it. Sometimes a\nproviso is  engrafted by an apprehensive draftsman to remove\npossible  doubts,   to\tmake  matters  plain,  to  light  up\nambiguous edges.  A proviso  ordinarily\t is  but  a  proviso\nalthough the  golden rule  is to  read\tthe  whole  sections\ninclusive of  the proviso, in such manner that they mutually\nthrow light  on\t each  other  and  result  in  a  harmonious\nconstruction. The  Amending Act\t in this case clarified what\nwas implicit earlier and expressly carved out what otherwise\nmonth be  mistakenly covered  by the  main  definition.\t The\nproviso does  not expand  by implication, the protected area\nof building tenancies to embrace business leases.[284F-G]\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
     CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION Civil  Appeal No.  210 of
\n1973.\n<\/p>\n
     From the  Judgment and Decree dated 13th March, 1972 of
\nthe Allahabad High Court in First Appeal No. 448 of 1968.\n<\/p>\n
     R. K.  Garg, S.  C. Agarwalla  V. J.  Francis and Madho
\nPrasad, for the appellant.\n<\/p>\n
     V. M.  Tarkunde, Hardayal\tHardy and  P. P. Juneja, for
\nrespondent No. 1.\n<\/p>\n
     The Judgment of the Cort was delivered by
\n     KRISHNA IYER,  J.-The rent\t control law has been a rich
\nsource of  lengthy litigation in the country and the present
\nappeal,\t by   certificate  under   Art.\t 133(1)(a)   of\t the
\nconstitution, at  the instance\tof the appellant landlord is
\ninustrative of\tone reason  for such proliferation of cases,
\nnamely, the  lack of  clarity in  legislative  drafting\t and
\ndovetailing of\tamendments  which  have\t the  potential\t for
\ncreating interpretative confusion.\n<\/p>\n
     The facts\tare few and may be stated briefly, although,
\nat a  later stage,  further details may have to be mentioned
\nat relevant places to inumine the arguments advanced on both
\nsides by  counsel, Shri\t R. K.\tGarg (for the appellant) and
\nShri V.\t M. Tarkunde  (for the respondent). Shortly put, the
\nlegal issues  are only\tthree:\t(A)  Is\t a  cinema  theatre,
\nequipped with  projectors and other fittings and ready to be
\nlaunched as  an entertainment  house, an  ‘accommodation’ as
\ndefined in.  s. 2(1)  (d) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of
\nRent and  Eviction Act,\t 1947 (U.P.  Act III  of 1947)\t(for
\nshort, the  Act)? (B)  If it  is  an  ‘accommodation  as  so
\ndefined, what  is the  impact of  the proviso  brought in by
\namendment in  1954  (Act  XVII\tof  1954)  (for\t short,\t the
\nAmending Act)?\t(C) If\tthe Act\t barricades eviction  by the
\nlandlord   because   the   permises   let   constitutes\t  an
\n‘accommodation’, does the repeal of the Act and exclusion of
\ncinema houses  altogether from\tthe operation o the 1972 Act
\n(U.P.. Act 13 of 1972) (for short, the later Act) rescue the
\nright  of   the\t appellant-landlord   to  eject\t the  tenant
\nrespondent?\n<\/p>\n
279<\/span><\/p>\n
     The building  covered by  the suit\t is  admittedly\t one
\nbuilt and  adapted for\tscreening films.  The plaintiff\t had
\nbeen carrying  on cinema business in this theatre for a long
\nnumber of  years but,  when he\tdiscontinued, the  defendant
\napproached him\tin January  1952 for the grant of a lease of
\nthe  building  with  all  the  equipment  and  fittings\t and
\nfurniture  necessary  for  his\toperating  the\tcinema.\t The
\nnecessary   certificates,    sanctions\t and\tpermissions,
\npreliminary to\tthe conduct  of cinema\tshows, stood  in the
\nname of\t the  plaintiff,  including  water-pipe\t connection,
\nelectricity   supply\tand   structural   fitness.   Before
\ncommencement of\t cinema shows,\ta licence is necessary under
\nthe U.P\t Cinemas (Regulation) Act and this licence has to be
\ntaken out  by the  actual operator  of the cinema and not by
\nthe landlord  of the theatre and equipments. Therefore, once
\nthe lease  for the  entire building  and  cinema  projector,
\naccessories and\t the like  was finalised, the deed of demise
\nwas  actually\texecuted,  it\tbeing  provided\t  that\t the
\ncommencement  of   the\tlease  would  synchronize  with\t the
\ninaugural cinema  show on March 25, 1953. It was provided in
\nthe lease deeds that the rent for the building, simpliciter,
\nmay be\tshown separated from that attributable to the costly
\nequipments, for\t the purposes  of  property  tax  and  other
\ntaxes. By  this apportionment,\tthe building, as such was to
\nbear a\tburden of  Rs. 400\/- per mensem by way of rent and a
\nmonthly sum   of Rs. 1,000\/- was fixed for the projector and
\nall other  items fixed\tin the\tbuilding.  The\tleases\twere
\nrenewed from  time to  time tin\t 1959. The suit for eviction
\nwas based on these leases which formed the foundation of the
\naction.\n<\/p>\n
     At this  stage it\tmay  be\t noticed  that\tthe  learned
\ncounsel for  the  defendant-tenant  ‘did  not  dispute\tthat
\nrunning a  cinema  business  did  constitute  an  industrial
\npurpose so that the accommodation was used for an industrial
\npurpose’.  Another   significant  fact\t admitted   by\t the
\ndetendant’s counsel  before the\t High Court was that for the
\npurpose of  this case,\tin spite  of  there  being  separate
\ndocuments of  lease in\trespect of the demised properties as
\nreferred to above, these sets of contracts may be treated as
\na  single   transaction\t each  time’.  On  these  facts\t and
\ncircumstances, we  have to decide whether the subject matter
\nof the\tdemise is  an ‘accommodation’  within the meaning of
\nthe Act.  After settling  this issue,  the other  two points
\nadverted to above may have to be considered. While the trial
\nJudge held that the suit property was not ‘an accommodation’
\nwithin the  sweep of  the Act.\tthe High  Court,  on  appeal
\nbefore a  Division Bench,  could not  are and, on account of
\nthe difference\tof opinion  between the two Judges who heard
\nthe appeal,  the case  was posted  before a  third Judge who
\ntook the  view that  the  subject  matter  of  the  case  in
\nquestion was  an ‘accommodation’  within the  meaning of the
\nAct The\t suit, on  this\t view,\thad  to\t be  dismissed.\t The
\naggrieved landlord has come up to challenge this judgment.\n<\/p>\n
     Let us  now  take\ta  close-up  of\t the  definition  of
\n‘accommodation’ in  the Act  and apply\tit to  the  admitted
\nfacts here.  Section 2(a),  as it  stood at  the time of the
\nfirst lease ran thus:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “Accommodation”   means   residential\t  and\tnon-
\n     residential accommodation\tin any building or part of a
\n     building and includes,
\n280<\/span>\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (i)  gardens,\t grounds  and  out  houses,  if\t any
\n\t       appurtenant to  such building  or part  of  a
\n\t       building;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (ii) any  furniture supplied\tby the\tlandlord for
\n\t       use in such building or part of a building;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (iii)any fitting  affixed to such building or part
\n\t       of  a   building\t for   the  more  beneficial
\n\t       enjoyment thereof.’
\n     The Amending Act added a clause reading thus:
\n     “but does\tnot include  any  accommodation\t used  as  a
\n     factory or for an industrial purpose where the business
\n     carried on\t in or\tupon the building is also leased out
\n     to the lessee by the same transaction.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
at the\tend of\tclause (a).  We have  to go  by the  amended
\ndefinition in  the present  case. Since\t the basic fabric of
\nthe  demise   remained\tthe   same  notwithstanding  several
\nrenewals its  terms have  a bearing  on the  decision of the
\ncase. So we may reproduce it (relevant part) at this stage:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “We have  taken a  Cinema  hall  known  at  Dwarka
\n     Prasad Theatre  Hall …  for running  a cinema… On a
\n     monthly  rent   of\t Rs.  200\/-  commencing\t from  March
\n     25.1953.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     To complete  the picture,\twe quote  from\tthe  factual
\nsumming up  by Satish Chandra J.. since it is convenient and
\nuncontested .\n<\/p>\n
\t  “The same day the defendants executed another case
\n     deed stating  that they  had taken\t the Dwarka  Theatre
\n     Hall on a rent of Rs. 2000\/- per month and that in this
\n     building there  is new  furniture fitted for about 5000
\n     seats with\t ceiling and  fittings of electric light and
\n     fans, complete  machinery, ceiling\t fans and  operating
\n     machine together  with all articles present in the hall
\n     of the  theatre a\tlist whereof has been duly signed by
\n     the executant  and that  they had\ttaken this also on a
\n     monthly  rent  of\tRs.  1,100\/-  besides  rent  of\t the
\n     building. The lease deed dated 1-4-1954 executed by the
\n     defendants stated that whereas besides the cinema house
\n     popularly known  as Dwarka\t Theatre Hall which has been
\n     taken on  hire of\tRs. 2000\/- per month, the defendants
\n     had also  taken on\t rent of Rs. 800\/- per month the new
\n     furniture with tapestry about 500 seats and ceiling and
\n     complete electric\tfittings including  fans and machine
\n     and ceiling  fans and  operating machine  together with
\n     the entire\t paraphernalia present\tin the theatre hall.
\n     The defendants  in this lease deed stated that they had
\n     taken the\tbuilding  on  rent  to\tcontinue  running  a
\n     cinema. The  lease deed  of 10th  January\t1956  was  a
\n     confirmation of  the same\tsubject matter of the lease.
\n     It appears that by now the landlord was fitting
\n281<\/span>
\n     new furniture  in the hall and for that reason the rent
\n     was increased  to Rs.  1200\/- per\tmonth. Similarly, in
\n     the lease\tdeed dated  26th May,  1959  the  defendants
\n     stated that  they have  taken a  cinema hall  known  as
\n     Dwarka Theatre  Hall on a monthly rent of Rs. 400\/- and
\n     the furniture  of about  500; seats,  ceiling, electric
\n     fittings, with  fans, complete  machine, ceiling  fans,
\n     operating machine\tand other  articles present  ill the
\n     theatre hall, a list whereof was attached, on a monthly
\n     rent of Rs. 1000\/-.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     Let us  revert to\tthe law.  ‘Accommodation’, in  plain
\nEnglish may  cover cinema  houses with\tor without fittings.
\nBut legislative.  drafting does not always leave things that
\neasy.  Had   there  been   a   definition   of\t ‘controlled
\naccommodation’, he  who runs  and reads\t would have gathered
\nthe  intendment\t  of  the   statute.  Here   is\t a   further
\ncomplication introduced\t by the\t addition of  a\t proviso  of
\nsorts by the amending Act and a whole host of authorities on
\nthe canons  of constriction and functional role of a proviso
\nand its\t indirect impact  on the  main\tprovision  has\tbeen
\nbrought to  our notice.\t Does a\t proviso carve out something
\nfrom the  whole?  Does\tit  serve  an  independent  enacting
\npurpose? We  do not think that legislative simplicity is all
\nabstruse art,  provided we  reform our drafting methodology.
\nThe Renton  Committee in England high-lighted the importance
\nof easy comprehensibility of law and wrote:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “There is  hardly any part of our national life or
\n     of our  personal lives  that is  not  affected  by\t one
\n     statute or\t another. The  affairs of local authorities,
\n     nationalised  industries.\t public\t corporations,\t and
\n     private commerce are regulated by Legislation. The life
\n     of\t the   ordinary\t citizen.  is  affected\t by  various
\n     provisions of the statute book from cradle to grave.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     The  instant   case  which\t deals\twith  a\t legislation
\naffecting the  shelter. of  common people brings up the same
\nproblem.\n<\/p>\n
     The main  definition  of  ‘accommodation’\tin  the\t Act
\nbrings within  its sweep  not all kinds of buildings nor all
\ntypes of  realty leases.  The protected category is confined
\nto those  species of leases whose purpose and subject matter
\nanswer the  statutory  prescriptions.  More  explicitly\t the
\nwider connotation  or dictionary  meaning of ‘accommodation’
\nmust yield to the definitional delimitation. The core of the
\ncontroversy  here  is  (a)  whether  the  lease\t is  of\t the
\nbuilding, the  fittings and other fixtures merely making for
\nthe beneficial\tenjoyment of  and ancillary to the building,
\nas urged  by the  tenant or  whether the building provides a
\nbare, though  appropriately designed,  enclosure to house an
\nenterprise, dominant  purpose or  real subject\tof the lease
\nbeing  the   cinema,  apparatus\t  and  fittings,   including
\nsubsidiarily  and   incidentally,  though  necessarily.\t the
\nstructure of  brick and\t mortar. and (b) whether the cinema,
\nto fall within the exclusionary clause added by the Amending
\nAct, must  be actually a going concern with all the licenses
\nfor showing  films and running the theatre being in the name
\nof the\tlessor. Lastely, the effect of the repeal of the Act
\nand the\t opening provision  of the later Act putting cinemas
\nout of its application, has been debated at the bar.\n<\/p>\n
282<\/span><\/p>\n
     The Central  Act (The  Cinematograph Act) and the State
\nAct   The U.P.\tCinema Regulation Act) govern the exhibition
\nof films  and it is not in dispute that the theatre had been
\nbuilt for  and used  as a cinema house even before the first
\nlease to  the respondent  in 1953.  The further agreed facts
\nare that  when the  last renewed lease of 1953 with which we
\nare directly  concerned was  executed, there  was a  running
\ncinema business\t and further  that the\trent apportioned for
\nthe building  qua building  was only  a fraction of the rent
\n‘for the costly fixtures intended for the cinema business’.\n<\/p>\n
     Looking at\t the three  problems posed,  unaided by\t the
\nmany decisions cited by counsel, we are inclined to the view
\nthat a\tlease Of an ‘accommodation’ must essentially be of a
\nbuilding not  a\t business  or  industry\t together  with\t the
\nbuilding in  which it  is situated.  of course,\t a  building
\nwhich is  ordinarily let,  be  it  for\tresidential  or\t non
\nresidential purposes,  will not be the bare walls, floor and
\nroof, but  will have  necessary amenities to make habitation
\nhappy. That  is why  the  legislature  has  fairly  included
\ngradens, grounds and out houses, if any, appurtenant to such
\nbuilding. Likewise,  leases  some  times  are  of  furnished
\nbuildings and  that is\twhy ‘any  furniture supplied  by the
\nlandlord for use in such building’ is treated as part of the
\nbuilding. In  the same strain, we may notice, as a matter of
\ncommon\toccurrence,   many  fittings   ‘such  as  electrical
\nfittings, sanitary  fittings, curtains\tand venetian  blinds
\nand air-conditioning  equipment being  fixed to the building
\nby the\tlandlord so  that  the\ttenant’s  enjoyment  of\t the
\ntenement may  be more  attractive. The crucial point is that
\nthese additions\t are appurtenant, subservient and beneficial
\nto the building itself. They make occupation of the building
\nmore convenient and pleasant but the principal thing demised
\nis the\tbuilding and the additives are auxiliary. ‘Where the
\nlease is  composite and\t has a\tplurality of  purposes,\t the
\ndecisive test is the dominant purpose of the demise.\n<\/p>\n
     Forgetting for  a moment  the clause  introduced by the
\namending Act,  it is  plain that  the furniture and fittings
\nvisualized in  the concept  of ‘accommodation’ are calculate
\nto improve  the beneficial enjoyment of the premises leased.
\nCounsel for  the tenant has countered this interpretation by
\nan ingenious  and plausible submission. He emphasis that the
\npresent building  was  conceived,  designed  and  structured
\nexpressly as a cinema house conforming to the regulations in
\nthis behalf  and the  purpose of  the owner  was to  use the
\nauditorium and\tannexes purely\tas a cinema house. According
\nto him, when a cinema theatre is erected, it becomes useless
\nunless the necessary equipment for exhibiting films are also
\nfitted up.  In this  view, the relative cost of the fixtures
\nis immaterial  and all\tthese  items,  however\tcostly,\t are
\ncalculated to  fulfil the very object of the construction of
\nthe cinema theatre. In short, the fittings and furniture and
\nlike items  are beneficial  to and  enhance the worth of the
\nbuilding and  cannot be divorced or dissected from the whole
\nobject\twhich\tanimated  the\tproject\t of   the   building
\nconstruction qua  a cinema  house. So  presented, there is a
\ncertain attractiveness\tin the\targument, although this fact
\nof interpretation does not find a place in the submission on
\nbehalf of the respondent in the High Court.\n<\/p>\n
283<\/span><\/p>\n
     What then\tis the\tflaw in this submission, or merit in
\nthe earlier  one ?  The legislative policy, so far as we can
\nglean from  the scheme\tof the\tAct, is to control rents and
\nevictions of  buildings, rack-renting  and  profiteering  by
\nindiscriminate eviction from buildings, residential and non-
\nresidential, being the evil sought to be suppressed. The law
\nsought to  rescue exploited tenants of buildings. If this be
\na sound reading of the mind of the legislature it is fair to
\nhold  that  the\t protected  category  of  accommodation\t was
\nresidential and\t non-residential buildings  and not business
\nhouses.\n<\/p>\n
     We have  been at  pains to\t explain  that\tthe  subject
\nmatter\tof   the  leases   covered  by\t the  definition  of
\n‘accommodation’ is  ‘any building or part of a building’. We
\nhave carefully\tanalyses the  inclusive expressions  in\t the
\noriginal definition  such as appurtenant gardens grounds and
\nout-houses, furniture  for use\tin the building and fittings
\naffixed to the building. In this statutory context, gardens,
\nout houses,  furniture and  fittings mean  annexures for the
\nbetter\tenjoyment  of  the  building.  In  this\t sense,\t the
\ndominant  intention  must  be  to  lease  the  building\t qua
\nbuilding. If  that be  the intention  the rent\tcontrol\t law
\nprotects. On  the other hand, if a going undertaking such as
\na running or ready-to-launch and fully equipped cinema house
\nis covered  by the provision, the emphasis is not so much on
\nthe building  but of the business, actual or imminent. There
\nis nothing  in the present definition which helps this shift
\nin accent.\n<\/p>\n
     We may  reinforce our  view from  the expressions used,
\nbecause all  the three categories included as additions play
\na subservent  role, while  if a\t business were\tthe  subject
\nmatter of  the lease,  the prominent  thing will be not what
\nhouses the  business but  the business\titself. The building
\nbecomes secondary since every business or industry has to be
\naccommodated in\t some enclosure\t or building.  In  all\tsuch
\ncases. the  lessor makes  over possession of the building as
\npart and  parcel  of  the  transfer  of\t possession  of\t the
\nbusiness. It  would be\ta travesty of language to speak of a
\nlease of a building when what is substantially
\n made over is a business or industrial plant.
\n     How then  do  we  distinguish  between  a\tlease  of  a
\nbusiness or  industry housed  in a  building from a building
\nwhich has fixtures for more beneficial enjoyment? The former
\nis a  protected ‘accommodation’ while the latter is left for
\nfree market  operation. In  the\t present  case\twe  have  to
\nvisualize what was the dominant or decisive component of the
\ntransaction between the parties, the tenancy of the building
\nqua building  or the  taking over  of a\t cinema house  as  a
\nbusiness, the  projectors, furniture,  fittings and  annexes
\nbeing the  moving factor,  the\tbuilding  itself  playing  a
\nsecondary, though necessary, role in the calculations of the
\nparties. Going\tby the\trental apportioned,  it is   obvious
\nthat the parties stressed the cinema equipment as by far the
\nmore important.\t Judging by  the fact that there had already
\nbeen a\tcinema in  this house  for several  years, with\t the
\nnecessary  certificates\t  under\t the  various  statutes\t for
\nrunning a  cinema theatre obtained by  the landlord and that
\nthe lease itself was to commence only from the . date of the
\nfirst show of the films, doubts regarding the essential
\n284<\/span>
\nObject and  subject of\tthe bargain said dispelled. The mere
\ncircumstance that the licence for showing films was taken by
\nthe tenant  is of  little  consequence\tas  the\t law  itself
\nrequires it to be in his name. The further circumstance that
\nthe term  of the  lease in  one case may vary from the other
\nalso where,  as here,  two deeds  are  executed,  is  not  a
\ntelling factor,\t in view  of the  clear admission by counsel
\nfor  the  respondent  that  the\t two  lease  deeds  together
\nconstituted a single transaction and that the lease was l`or
\nan industrial purpose, to wit running a cinema business. The
\nconspectus of  factors no  one circumstance  taken by itself
\nthus settles  the issue\t in  favour  of\t the  land-lord\t who
\ncontends that  what has\t been granted is a lease of a cinema
\nbusiness and,  at any  r ate, the real intent of the parties
\nto the\tlease was  to demise  primarily the cinema equipment
\nand secondarily.  the building,\t the lease  itself  being  a
\ncomposite one.\n<\/p>\n
     Social justice,  legislative policy,  legal phraseology
\nand presidential  wisdom converge to the same point that the
\nscheme of  control .  includes, as its beneficiary, premises
\nsimpliciter  and   excludes  from   its\t  ambit\t  businesses
\naccommodated in\t buildings. To\thold otherwise is to pervert
\nthe purpose and distort the language of s.2(a).\n<\/p>\n
     The amending  clause, argues  Shri Tarkunde”  strikes a
\ncontrary note.\tFor, if the main definition in itself fences
\noff leases  of business\t and industry,\twhy this superfluous
\nproviso expressly excluding accommodation ‘used as a factory
\nor for\tan industrial  purpose where the business is carried
\non in or upon the building is also leased out to a lessee by
\nthe same  transaction’?\t The  whole  section  must  be\tread
\nharmoniously, each  part throwing  light on  the  other\t and
\nredundancy being  frowned upon.\t A proviso  carves out\tof a
\nlarger concept\tand the\t argument is  that the\tneed for the
\nexclusionary clause  itself shows  that otherwise  factories
\nand businesses\tare within  the operational area of the main
\ndefinition.\n<\/p>\n
     There is  same validity in this submission but if, on a
\nfair constriction.  the\t principal  provision  is  clear,  a
\nproviso cannot\texpand or  limit it.  Sometimes a proviso is
\nengrafted by  an apprehensive  draftsman to  remove possible
\ndoubts, to  make matters plain, to light up ambiguous edges.
\nHere, such  is the  case. In  a country\t where factories and
\nindustries may\tstill be  in the  developmental stage, It is
\nnot unusual  to come across several such units which may not
\nhave  costly   machinery   `or\t plant\t or   fittings\t and
\nsuperficially consist of bare buildings plus minor fixtures.
\nFor example, a beedi factory or handicraft or carpentry unit
\na few  tools,  some  small  contrivances  or  connection  of
\nmaterials housed in a building, will superficially look like
\na mere\t‘accommodation’ but actually be a humming factory or
\nbusiness with  a goodwill  as business,\t with  a  prosperous
\nreputation and\ta name\tamong  the  business  community\t and
\ncustomers. Its\tvalue is  qua business,\t although it  has  a
\nhabitation or building to accommodate it. The personality of
\nthe thing  let out  is a going concern or enterprise, not a:
\nlifeless  edifice.   The  legislature,\t quite\tconceivably,
\nthought that a marginal, yet substantial, class of buildings
\nwith minimal equipments may still be good businesses and did
\nnot require  protection as  in the case of ordinary building
\ntenancies. So, to dispel confusion from this region and to
\n285<\/span>
\nexclude what seemingly might be leases only of buildings but
\nin truth  might\t be  leases  of\t business,  the\t legislature
\nintroduced the exclusionary proviso.\n<\/p>\n
     While rulings  and\t text  books  bearing  on  statutory
\nconstruction have  assigned many  functions for provisos, we
\nhave to\t be selective, having regard to the text and context
\nof a  statute. Nothing is  gained by extensive references to
\nluminous classics  or supportive  case law. Having explained
\nthe approach  we make to the specific ‘proviso’ situation in
\ns. 2(a)\t of the\t Act, what  strikes us as meaningful here is
\nthat the legislature by the amending Act classified what was
\nimplicit earlier  and expressly\t carved out  what  otherwise
\nmight be  mistakenly covered  by the  main  definition.\t The
\nproviso does  not. in this case, expand, by implication, the
\nprotected area\tof building  tenancies to embrace ‘business’
\nleases.\n<\/p>\n
     We may  mention fairness to counsel that the following,
\namong other  decisions, were cited at the bar bearing on the
\nuses of provisos in statutes: Commissioner of Income-tax  v.
\nIndo-Mercantile Bank  Ltd.<\/a>(1); M\/s.  Ram Narain Sons Ltd. v.
\nAsst. Commissioner  of Sales Tax<\/a>(2); Thompson v. Dibdin (8);
\nRex v.\tDibdin (4)  and Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P.(5).
\nThe law\t is trite.  A proviso must be limited to the subject
\nmatter of  the enacting\t clause. It  is a  settled  rule  of
\nconstruction that  a proviso  must prima  facie be  read and
\nconsidered in  relation to  the principal matter to which it
\nis a proviso. It is not a separate or independent enactment.
\n‘Words are  dependent on  the principal\t enacting words,  to
\nwhich they  are tacked\tas a proviso. They cannot be read as
\ndivorced from their context’ (1912 A.C. 544). If the rule of
\nconstruction is that prima facie a proviso should be limited
\nin its\toperation to  the subject  matter  of  the  enacting
\nclause, the  stand we  have taken  is sound.  To expand the`
\nenacting clause,  inflated by  the proviso, sins against the
\nfundamental rule  of construction  that a  proviso  must  be
\nconsidered in  relation to  the principal matter to which it
\nstands as  a proviso. A proviso ordinarily is but a proviso,
\nalthough the  golden rule  is to  read\tthe  whole  section,
\ninclusive of  the proviso, in such manner that they mutually
\nthrow light  on\t each  other  and  result  in  a  harmonious
\nconstruction.\n<\/p>\n
\t  “The proper  course is  to apply the broad general
\n     rule  of  construction  which  is\tthat  a\t section  or
\n     enactment must  be construed  as a\t whole each  portion
\n     throwing light if need be on the rest.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  The true  principle undoubtedly is, that the sound
\n     interpretation and meaning of the statute, on a view of
\n     the enacting  clause, saving clause, and proviso, taken
\n     and construed together is to prevail.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
(Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes 10th Edn. P. 162)
\n286<\/span>
\n     We now  move on  to `dominant  intent’ as the governing
\nrule. In  our view,  the dominant intent is found in leading
\ndecision of  this Court.  Indeed, some\tState  Legislatures,
\naccepting the  position that where the dominant intention of
\nthe lease  is the  enjoyment of\t a cinema,  as distinguished
\nfrom the  building, have deliberately amended the definition
\nby suitable  changes (e.g.  Kerala and Andhra Pradesh) while
\nother Legislatures,  on the  opposite policy  decision, have
\nexpressly excluded  he rent  control  enactment\t (e.g.,\t the
\nlatter Act).\n<\/p>\n
     In Uttam  Chand   v. S. M. Lalwani(1) this Court had to
\nconsider  analogous   position\tunder\tthe  Madhya  Pradesh
\nAccommodation\tControl\t   Act\t where\t  also\t the\tterm
\n‘accommodation’\t was   defined\tsubstantially  in  the\tsame
\nlanguage. The  Court was  considering the grant of the lease
\nof a  Dal Mill\tvis a vis ‘accommodation’, as defined in Act
\n. Gajendragadkar,  CJ., elucidated  the legal  concept which
\nreinforces our\t stand,\t if we\tmay say so with respect. The
\nlearned Chief Justice. Observed:\n<\/p>\n
\t  ‘What then  was  the\tdominant  intention  of\t the
\n     parties   which   they   entered\tinto   the   present
\n     transaction)? We  have already  set  out  the  material
\n     terms of  the lease  and it  seems to us plain that the
\n     dominant intenion\tof he  appellant  in  accepting\t the
\n     lease from the respondent was to use the 1) building as
\n     a Dal Mill. It is true that the document purports to be
\n     a lease  in respect  of the  Dal Mill building, but the
\n     said description  is not decisive of the matter because
\n     even if the intention of the parties was to let out the
\n     Mill to the appellant, the building would still have to
\n     be described as the Dal Mill building. It is not a case
\n     where the\tsubject matter\tof the lease is the building
\n     and along\twith the leased building incidentally passes
\n     the fixture  of the machinery in regard to the Mill, in
\n     truth, it\tis the\tMill which  is the subject matter of
\n     the lease,\t and it was because the Mill was intended to
\n     be let  out that  the building had inevitably to be let
\n     out along\twith the  Mill. The  fact that the appellant
\n     contends that  the machinery  which was  transferred to
\n     him  under\t  the  lease   was  found  to  be  not\tvery
\n     serviceable and  that  he\thad  to\t bring\tin  his\t own
\n     machinery,\t would\t not  after  the  character  of\t the
\n     transferred. This\tis  not\t a  lease  under  which\t the
\n     appellant entered\tinto possession\t for the  purpose of
\n     residing the  building at all; this is a case where the
\n     appellant entered\tinto the  lease for  the purpose  of
\n     running the Dal Mill which was located in the building.
\n     It is  obvious that a Mill of this kind will have to be
\n     located in\t some building\tor another, and so, the mere
\n     fact that\tthe lease  purports to\tbe in respect of the
\n     building will  not make  it a  base in  respect of\t all
\n     accommodation as  defined by s. 3(a)(y)(3). he fixtures
\n     described in  the schedule to the lease arc in no sense
\n     intended\tfor the\t more beneficial  enjoyment  of\t the
\n     building. The fixtures are the primary object which the
\n     lease was intended to cover. and the building  in which
\n     the fixtures are located comes in incidentally. That
\n287<\/span>
\n     is why  we think  the High Court was right in coming to
\n     the conclusion  that the  rent which  the appellant had
\n     agreed to\tpay to\tthe respondent under the document in
\n     question cannot  he said  to be  rent payable  for\t any
\n     Accommodation to which the Act applies.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
The ratio of that case is that the Court must apply the test
\nof dominant  intention\tof  the\t parties  to  determine\t the
\ncharacter of the lease i.e., what was the primary purpose of
\nthe parties  in executing the ‘document ? the mere fact that
\nthe demise  deals with\ta building  does not bring it within
\nthe ambit  of accommodation.  In  the  case  before  us\t the
\nfixtures are  not for  the more\t beneficial enjoyment of the
\nbuilding. On  he contrary, the possession of the building is
\nmade over  as an  integral part\t of, and  incidental to? the
\nmaking over  of the  cinema apparatus and costly appliances.
\nIn the\tlanguage of the learned Chief Justice in Uttam Chand
\ncase (supra), the ‘fixtures are the primary object which the
\nlease was  intended to\tcover and  the building in which the
\nfixtures are located comes in incidentally’.\n<\/p>\n
     The following decisions were relied on, or referred to,
\nby   counsel\tfor   the   appellant:\t Raje\tChettty\t  v.
\nJagannathadas(1);  Molld.   jaffer  Ali\t v.  S.\t R.  Rao(2);
\nGovindan  v.Kunhilekshmi Amma(3)
\n     Rajamannar, C.J.,\tspeaking for  the Division  Bench in
\nRaja Chetty’s case (supra) dealt with the case of a lease of
\na cinema  theatre in  Madras in relation to the rent control
\nlaw as\tit obtained  in that State then. In that connection,
\nthe learned Chief Justice observed:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “We have  come to the conclusion that the Lessors’
\n     application in  this case\tis not maintainable on other
\n     grounds as\t well. In  our opinion the lease in question
\n     is not  governed by the provisions of Madras  Act XV of
\n     1946.  That   Act\tregulates   only  the\tletting\t  of
\n     residential and  non-residential buildings.  In  s.  2,
\n     building has  been defend\tas to  include\tthe  garden,
\n     grounds and  out-houses appurtenant to the building and
\n     furniture supplied\t by the\t landlord for  use  in\tsuch
\n     building. In the case before us, there is no lease of a
\n     mere     building\tor  a  building\t with  compound\t and
\n     furniture of  the. sort  covered by the definition. The
\n     Lease is  of land\tand building  together with fixtures
\n     fittings, cinematographic\ttalkie equipments, machinery
\n     and other\tarticles The lessors, evidently aware of the
\n     composite nature  of the  demise, have  prayed in their
\n     petition for  eviction of the Lessees from the land and
\n     buildings only.  On behalf\t of the respondent Mr. K. V.
\n     Ramachandra lycr  relied strongly\ton the\tprovision in
\n     the ‘deed\twhich splits up the monthly rent and hire of
\n     Rs. 3,200\/-  into Rs.1600\/-  being rent  for the ground
\n     and   superstructure Rs.  800\/- being hire of furniture
\n     Rs..  800\/-   being  hire\t of  talkie  equipments\t and
\n     machinery. fittings  and lessors’\tfixtures. We have no
\n     hesitation in
\n288<\/span>
\n     holding that  this splitting  is  purely  notional\t and
\n     nominal and  intended probably for purposes relating to
\n     the   municipal   assessment   and\t  other\t  extraneous
\n     considerations. When we asked Mr. Ramachandra lyer what
\n     would happen, in this case when there is an eviction of
\n     the lessees  from the  land building,  to the machinery
\n     and  equipments   etc.,  and   whether  there  was\t any
\n     provision in  the deed  relating to  them, he confessed
\n     that there\t was no\t specific pro  vision in  the  deed.
\n     Obviously they  cannot be\tgoverned by Madras Act XV of
\n     1946 and  so he  said they\t must  be  governed  by\t the
\n     general law  of contract.\tHe also conceded that if the
\n     lessees paid  Rs. 1,600\/-\tbut defaulted in the payment
\n     of the  balance which  is due as hire, the lessors have
\n     no right  to ask  for eviction  under the\tRent Control
\n     Act. We  think that the attempted division of the lease
\n     and separation  of rights\tin regard  to two classes of
\n     property is  in the  highest degree  artificial,  never
\n     contemplated by  the parties.  Here is  a\tlease  of  a
\n     talkie house  with everything  that is necessary to run
\n     cinema shows.  To split  up such  a compo site lease as
\n     this into\tseparate contracts  of lease  and hire is to
\n     destroy it altogether. Mr. Ramachandra Iyer argued that
\n     the furniture  which was covered by the lease fell with
\n     in the  definition of s. 2 of the Act. We do not agree.
\n     The observations  of the learned Judges in App. No. 590
\n     of 1945 (Patanjali Sastri and Bell JJ.) in dealing with
\n     the plant,\t machinery and\tother moveables\t which\twere
\n     demised along  with a factory are very apposite in this
\n     connection:<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  No doubt  in one  sense the buildings comprised in
\n     the  lease\t  deed\tcontain\t articles  supplied  by\t the
\n     landlord; but we cannot agree that what was so supplied
\n     can  be   considered  in  any  modern  sense  as  being
\n     furniture.’
\n\t  Though  in  that  case  the  learned\tJudges\twere
\n     dealing with the lease of factory called the West Coast
\n     Match  Co.,  which\t consisted  of\tland  and  buildings
\n     including a  bungalow  used  for  residential  purposes
\n     together with  plant, machinery and moveables contained
\n     therein, we  think the principle of that decision would
\n     apply equally to the case before us in which there is a
\n     lease not\tmerely of a building but of a cinema theatre
\n     with all necessary equipment far the exhibition of
\n     It is  true that in Jaffer Ali’s Case and in Govindan’s
\ncase (supra)  (the Andhra  and Kerala  decisions referred to
\nabove) cinema  theatres have  been held\t to fall  within the
\ndefinition of  building, under the relevant rent control law
\nof those  States. A bare reading of the two cases would show
\nthat certain amendments had been made to the parent statutes
\nwhereby the  definition was  expanded and its wide range was
\nmale to\t include all  tenancies relating  to all structures,
\neven though  accessories, furniture  and fittings for use in
\nthe house were
\n289<\/span>
\nalso made  over. There\tis no  doubt that the word fittings’
\nmay take in a projector or other apparatus used for a cinema
\nbut it\tis one\tthing to  say that  apparatus is  filed in a
\nbuilding and  it is  another to\t say that  such\t fixture  or
\napparatus is  for the  beneficial enjoyment of the building.
\nTherefore it  depends  on  the\twords  used  reflecting\t the
\nlegislative policy  of each  state  Legislature.  Indeed  in
\nVenkayya v.  Venkata Subba  Rao(1) a  Division Bench  of the
\nAndhra Pradesh\tHigh Court considered whether the lease of a
\nfixture comprising  buildings and  machinery came within the
\nsweep of the rent control law. The court held that the lease
\nof a  running factory,\tcomprising costly machinery intended
\nto  be\tused  for  manufacture,\t did  not  fall\t within\t the
\ndefinition. The\t question, in  each case, the learned Judges
\npointed out,  would be\twhat is\t the dominant  part  of\t the
\ndemise and  what the main purpose for which the building was
\nlet out\t is. In Amritlal N. Shah v. Annapurnamma(2) the same
\ncourt held that the lease of  cinema did not come within the
\npurview of Madras Act 25 of 1949. Definitional ramifications
\nneed not detain us nor decisions turning on them.\n<\/p>\n
     Shri Tarkunde pressed upon us the decision in Karsandas
\nv.  Karanji(3)\t and  Karnani\tProperties  Ltd.   v.\tMiss
\nAugustine(4). One of them did refer to a cinema theatre with
\nfittings and  generators. Certain  Calcutta  decisions,.Kali
\nProsad v.  Jagadish Pada(6)  and D.  S.\t Jain  v.  Meghamale
\nRoy(6) were.  also cited  before us.   all  these cases, the
\ndecisions turned on the precise language used. We do not see
\nany need  to discuss  these and\t the other  decisions  cited
\nbefore us  because we  have explained  why the conclusion we
\nhave reached  is in  consonance with  the sense, purpose and
\nlanguage  of  the  Act.\t For  the  same\t reason\t we  content
\nourselves  with\t merely\t mentioning  that  in  Harisingh  v.
\nRatanlal(7) a  Division Bench  of the  Madhya  Pradesh\tHigh
\nCourt held  that a fully equipped cinema theatre let out for
\nshowing films  on a  commercial basis.\tbeing of  a  running
\ncinema theatre fell out of the scope of accommodation on the
\nscore that costly fittings, fixtures and equipment could, in
\nno sense, be regarded and meant for the beneficial enjoyment
\nof the\tbuilding in which the cinema theatre was housed. The
\nprimary object and the definitional language used  dctermine
\nthe issue.\n<\/p>\n
     Respondent’s  counsel   did  try\tto  approximate\t the
\ndefinition in  the Act\tto that found in the enactments with
\nreference   to\twhich  decisions  in  his  favour  had\tbeen
\nrendered. We  do not  agree. To\t hair-split  is\t an  unhappy
\ninterpretative exercise.  Here the  plain intendment  is  to
\nencompass leases of building only (inclusive of what renders
\nthem more  congenial) but  not of businesses accommodated in
\nbuildings nor  of permises  let\t out  with  the\t predominant
\npurpose of  running a  business.  A  lease  of\ta  lucrative
\ntheatre\t with\texpensive  cinema  equipment,  which  latter
\npressed the
\n290<\/span>
\nlessee to  go into  the transaction,  cannot  reasonably  be
\nreduced into  ; mere  tenancy of  a building  together\twith
\nfittings which but make the user mole comfortable.\n<\/p>\n
     For these\treasons we  hold that the lease sued on does
\nnot  fall   within  the\t  scope\t  of   the   definition\t  of
\n‘accommodation’. The  appellant is,  therefor, entitled to a
\ndecree for eviction, in allowance of his appeal.\n<\/p>\n
     The further question is as to whether the new Act which
\ncame  into  force  in  July  1972  applies  to\tthe  present
\nproceedings does  not arise,  although Shri  R. K. Garg, for
\nthe appellant,\trelied upon  express exclusion of cinemas by
\nthe new\t enactment. He\talso relied  upon the ruling of this
\nCourt in Qudratullah v. Bareilly Municipality(1). We are not
\nconsidering this argument or the counter-submissions made by
\nShri Tarkunde  in this connection because the old Act itself
\ndoes not cover the suit lease.\n<\/p>\n
     The short\tsurviving point\t that remains  is about\t the
\nmense profits.\tlt is admitted by the respondent that he has
\nbeen making  a net income of Rs. 2,000\/-. Adding Rs. 1,400\/-
\nwhich is  the net rent under the Lease, mense profits at Rs.
\n3,400\/- have   been  claimed  by   the appellant. It may not
\nbe quite  correct to  read into the admission a ‘net income’
\nalthough Shri  Garg would  have us  do so.  It may  be\tmore
\nappropriate to\tdirect the  trial court\t to  fix  the  mense
\nprofits to be decreed from the date of the suit.\n<\/p>\n
     In the  circumstances of  the case\t we direct  that  on
\naccount of  the uncertain  position of the law and devergent
\ndecisions of  courts, the  parties do  pay  and\t bear  their
\nrespective costs throughout.\n<\/p>\n
     A\tlong-standing\trunning\t cinema\t  with\t outstanding
\ncontracts  with\t  film\tdistributors   cannot  be   uprooted
\novernight without considerable financial and business trauma
\nto the\taffected party.\t It is\tbut fair  that we  grant one
\nyear’s time for the respondent to vacate the premises.\n<\/p>\n
P.B.R.\t\t\t\t\t      Appeal allowed\n291<\/span>\n\n\n\n<\/pre>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Dwarka Prasad vs Dwarka Das Saraf on 11 August, 1975 Equivalent citations: 1975 AIR 1758, 1976 SCR (1) 277 Author: V Krishnaiyer Bench: Krishnaiyer, V.R. PETITIONER: DWARKA PRASAD Vs. RESPONDENT: DWARKA DAS SARAF DATE OF JUDGMENT11\/08\/1975 BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. RAY, A.N. (CJ) MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-55234","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nDwarka Prasad vs Dwarka Das Saraf on 11 August, 1975 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/dwarka-prasad-vs-dwarka-das-saraf-on-11-august-1975\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Dwarka Prasad vs Dwarka Das Saraf on 11 August, 1975 - 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