{"id":55822,"date":"1957-02-06T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1957-02-05T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/manak-lal-vs-dr-prem-chand-on-6-february-1957"},"modified":"2019-02-12T14:15:36","modified_gmt":"2019-02-12T08:45:36","slug":"manak-lal-vs-dr-prem-chand-on-6-february-1957","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/manak-lal-vs-dr-prem-chand-on-6-february-1957","title":{"rendered":"Manak Lal vs Dr. Prem Chand on 6 February, 1957"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Manak Lal vs Dr. Prem Chand on 6 February, 1957<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1957 AIR 425, \t\t 1957 SCR 575<\/div>\n
Author: P Gajendragadkar<\/div>\n
Bench: Gajendragadkar, P.B.<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nMANAK LAL\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nDR. PREM CHAND\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT:\n06\/02\/1957\n\nBENCH:\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.\nBENCH:\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.\nAIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA\nDAS, S.K.\n\nCITATION:\n 1957 AIR  425\t\t  1957 SCR  575\n\n\nACT:\nTribunal-Member\t having bias against Party-Whether  tribunal\nimproperly  constituted-Waiver-What  amounts  to-Effect\t  of\nwaiver--Failure to examine a witness-Witness no better\tthan\naccomplice-Effect-Professional\t misconduct   by   advocate-\nMeasure of punishment.\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\nP filed a complaint of professional misconduct against M, an\nadvocate of the High Court of Rajasthan.  The Chief  justice\nappointed a tribunal under the Bar Councils Act for  enquiry\ninto  the  complaint.  C, a senior advocate,  was  appointed\nchairman of the tribunal.  C had appeared once for P  before\nthe  trial  Court  in the case out of  which  the  complaint\narose.\t No  objection\twas raised as  to  its\tconstitution\nbefore- the tribunal.  The tribunal found M guilty of having\ngot  a false stay order in favour of his clients written  by\nthe  clerk of the Court by improper means.  The\t High  Court\nconcurred  in this finding and directed the removal  of\t M's\nname  from the rolls.  It was contended on behalf of M\tthat\nthe tribunal was not properly constituted.\nHeld, that the constitution of the tribunal suffered from  a\nserious\t infirmity  in that C was appointed its\t member\t and\nacted as its chairman.\tIt is well settled that every member\nof a tribunal that is called upon to try issues in  judicial\nor   quasi-judicial   proceedings  must\t be  able   to\t act\njudicially;  and it is of the essence of judicial  decisions\nand  judicial administration that judges should be  able  to\nact impartially, objectively and without any bias.  In\tsuch\ncases  the test is not whether in fact a bias  has  affected\nthe  judgment;\tthe  test always is and must  be  whether  a\nlitigant could reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable\nto a member of the tribunal might have operated against\t him\nin the final decision of the tribunal.\tIt is in this  sense\nthat it is often said that justice must not only be done but\nmust also appear to be done.\nFrome  United  Breweries Co. v. Bath justices [1926]  A.  C.\n586, Rex v. Sussex justices, Exparte Mc Carthy [1924] I.  K.\nB. 256, Rex. v. Essex justices, Ex parte Perkins [1927] 2 K.\nB. 475, followed.\nRex  v.\t Williams, Ex Parte Phillips [1914] I.\tK.  B.\t6o8,\nexplained.\nThe  objection to the constitution of., the tribunal can  be\nwaived.\t  Waiver  can be inferred from the  failure  of\t the\nparty  to take the objection only if and after it  is  shown\nthat the party\n74\n576\nknew about the relevant facts and was aware of his right  to\ntake the objection.  Since M knew that C had appeared for  P\nand  must  be  deemed to have been conscious  of  his  legal\nrights,\t his  failure  to  take\t the  objection\t before\t the\ntribunal creates an effective bar of waiver against him.\nVyuyan v. Vyuyan (186I) 30 Beav. 65; 54 E. R. 8I3 relied on.\nEven in quasi-criminalproceedings all important and relevant\nevidence  must\tbe  laid  before the  tribunal,\t but  it  is\ngenerally for the prosecutor to decidewhich witnesses  are\nnecessary  for\tthe  unfolding\tof  the\t case.\tNo   adverse\ninference  can\tbe drawn against the  complaint's  case\t for\nfailure\t to  examine  a witness who was no  better  than  an\naccomplice.\nThe order of the High Court removing M's name from the\troll\nof  advocates is fully justified.  The misconduct proved  is\nof  a very serious character.  Disapproval of such  unworthy\nconduct\t  must\tbe  expressed  emphatically  as\t the   legal\nprofession  must be saved from persons who do not  feel\t any\nhesitation  in\tcorrupting public officers by  unworthy\t and\nillegal means for the benefit of their clients.\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION.  Civil Appeal No. 246 of 1956.
\nAppeal\tby special leave from the judgment and order  dated-
\nthe November 11, 1955, of the Rajasthan High Court in  Civil
\nMisc.  Case No. 3 of 1952.\n<\/p>\n
C.K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, Veda Vyasa, S.
\nK. Kapur and N. H. Hingorani, for the appellant
\nH.J. Umrigar and T.  M. Sen, for the respondent No. 2.
\n1957.\tFebruary 6. The Judgment of the Court was  delivered
\nby
\nGAJENDRAGADKAR\tJ.-The\tappellant  Sri\tManak  Lal  was\t  an
\nadvocate practising at Soiat.  A complaint was filed against
\nhim  under s. 13 of the Legal Practitioners Act by Dr.\tPrem
\nChand Singhvi.\tIt was alleged that the appellant was guilty
\nof  professional  misconduct and the  complainant  requested
\nthat  suitable action be taken against him in  that  behalf.
\nSince the appellant was not a pleader or a mukhtear but\t an.
\nadvocate  of the High Court of Rajasthan, the complaint\t was
\nsent  for  enquiry to the tribunal nominated  by  the  Chief
\njustice’ of the High Court of Rajasthan under S. 10(2)
\n577<\/span>
\nof  the\t Bar  Councils Act.  The tribunal  held\t an  enquiry
\nrecorded evidence and came to the unanimous conclusion\tthat
\nthe  appellant\t“was guilty of\tprofessional  misconduct  in
\nhaving\tgot  a\tfalse stay order written  by  the  clerk  by
\nimproper means and thereby he managed to take an illegal and
\nundue advantage for his clients and therefore deserves to be
\npunished for the same.” When this report was received by the
\nHigh Court, the matter was argued before the Court.  In\t the
\nresult\tthe High Court agreed with the findings made by\t the
\ntribunal  and directed that the appellant should be  removed
\nfrom  practice.\t  It is against this order that\t by  Special
\nLeave the appellant has come to this Court.\n<\/p>\n
The facts giving rise to the complaint against the appellant
\nare  very  few.\t  It  appears  that  there  was\t a   dispute
\nconcerning  Jhalra  well  and  certain\tagricultural   plots
\nsurrounding  the well between Pukhraj and others on the\t one
\nhand  and  Dr. Prem Chand and others on\t the  other.   These
\nparties were described in the said proceedings as Party\t No.
\n1  and\tParty  No. 2 respectively.  The\t appellant  was\t the
\ncounsel\t for  Party No. r. As a result of this\tdispute\t the
\npolice presented a report in the court of the Sub-Divisional
\nMagistrate,  Sojat,  that the dispute was  likely  to  cause
\nbreach of peace and suggested that proceedings under s.\t 145
\nof the Code of Criminal Procedure should be taken.  The Sub-
\nDivisional Magistrate drew out, a preliminary order on\tJuly
\n5,  1951  (Ex.\tA-1).  By this order both the  parties\twere
\ncalled\tupon to put in their written statements\t as  regards
\ntheir claims to possession of the property in dispute.\t The
\nlearned\t Magistrate  also  passed  an  order  attaching\t the
\nproperty in dispute pending the decision of the\t proceedings
\nunder s. 145.  This was followed by another order passed  on
\nAugust 9, 1951,,that the crop which was on the field  should
\nbe  auctioned,\tits price deposited in court  and  the\tland
\nitself should be given for cultivation to the highest bidder
\nfor the next year.  It appears that the hearing of the\tcase
\nwas  fixed for August 21 1951.\tMembers of Party No. 1\twere
\naggrieved by these orders and on their behalf the’ appellant
\npreferred a revision application against these orders in the
\ncourt of the Sessions Judge, Pali, on August 13,
\n578<\/span>
\n1951.\tThe appellant presented another petition before\t the
\nlearned Sessions judge on August 29, 195 1. In this petition
\nit  was alleged that the crop which stood on the  fields  in
\nquestion belonged to the cultivators Described as Party\t No.
\n1,   that  the\tcrop  was  getting  spoiled  and  that\t the
\ncultivators  would be considerably prejudiced if  they\twere
\ndispossessed-  from  their lands at that  stage.   On  these
\nallegations  the application prayed that an order should  be
\npassed\tnot  to\t auction the crop as well as  the  right  of
\nfuture\tcultivation and that liberty should be given to\t the
\ncultivators  to\t go to the well and to look after  the\tcrop
\npending\t the  final disposal of their  revision\t application
\nbefore\tthe learned Sessions Judge.  The  learned  Sessions,
\nJudge was not apparently inclined to grant ex parte  interim
\nstay  and so on the same day he directed that notice of\t the
\nrevision application should be given to the other party\t and
\ncalled upon the applicants to furnish talbana and a copy  of
\nthe application.  The case then stood adjourned for  hearing
\non  September 6, 1951. On September 6, 1951, when  the\tcase
\nwas  called  out  before the  learned  Sessions\t Judge,\t the
\nappellant  was\tpresent.  The learned Sessions\tJudge  found
\nthat  the  appellant  had  not\tsubmitted  a  copy  of\t his
\napplication  as\t already directed but he was told  that\t the
\nappellant  was submitting a copy on the same day.   That  is
\nwhy  the learned Judge ordered that notice should be  issued
\nafter the said copy was filed.\tThe hearing of the case\t was
\nthen  adjourned to September 12, 1951.\tSo far there  is  no
\ndispute\t about\tthe  facts.  There is,\thowever,  a  serious
\ndispute\t  as  to  other\t events\t which,\t according  to\t the
\ncomplainant,   happened\t  on   September   6,\t1951.\t The
\ncomplainant’s  case is that, after the hearing of  the\tcase
\nwas  adjourned\tto’ September 12, 1951, and  notice  of\t the
\napplication  was  ordered to be issued to Party No.  2,\t the
\nappellant prevailed upon Shri Maghraj, clerk of the Sessions
\nJudge’s Court to prepare an actual stay order, that the said
\nstay  order was accordingly prepared and was got  signed  by
\nthe  Reader of the Court.  Then the appellant  obtained\t the
\nstay  order from Shri Sheolal the despatch clerk to whom  it
\nwas  entrusted\tby the Reader.\tArmed with  this  order\t the
\nappellant personally took
\n579<\/span>
\nthe order to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate and presented  it
\nto him the next day.  In due course the revision application
\nwas  taken up for hearing on September 12, 1951.   Since  no
\nnotice had been served on Party No. 2 the hearing was  again
\nadjourned  to September 22, 1951.  It is common ground\tthat
\non  September 22, 1951, it was discovered that a  fraudulent
\nstay  order had been issued from the office of\tthe  learned
\nSessions  Judge’s  Court.  The learned Sessions\t Judge\tthen
\ncalled\tfor explanation from Shri Maghraj and  directed\t the
\nSub-Divisional\tMagistrate to treat the letter of  September
\n6, 1951, containing the alleged order of stay as  cancelled.
\nIt  appears  that  as a result of the enquiry  held  by\t the
\nlearned\t Sessions  Judge,  he found that  Shri\tMaghraj\t had
\ncommitted  a grave mistake and held that it would be  enough
\nif Shri Maghraj was fined Rs.  II\/and administered a  severe
\nwarning to behave properly in future.  The complaint against
\nthe  appellant is that the appellant took an active part  in
\nthe  commission\t of  the  fraud\t and  was  thus\t guilty\t  of
\nfraudulent and grossly improper conduct in the discharge  of
\nhis  professional duty.\t A false order had been obtained  by
\nhim  by\t unfair means and so he was guilty  of\tprofessional
\nmisconduct.   That  in\tsubstance is the  case\tagainst\t the
\nappellant.\n<\/p>\n
As we have already indicated, many of ‘the facts alleged  in
\nthe complaint against the appellant are not in dispute.\t The
\nappellant  admits  that he was present\tbefore\tthe  learned
\nSessions  Judge on September 6, 1951.  It is not  denied  by
\nhim  that  he  took the envelope  from\tthe  despatch  clerk
\naddressed-to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sojat, and\tthat
\nhe  in\tfact handed over the envelope the next\tday  in\t the
\noffice\t of  -the  Sub-Divisional  Magistrate.\t His   case,
\nhowever,  is that he never approached Shri Maghraj  in\tthis
\nmatter\tand that he was not in any way instrumental in\tget-
\nting  the  draft  prepared.   In  fact,\t according  to\t the
\nappellant, he did not know the contents of the envelope\t and
\nit was only on September 22, 1951, that he knew that a false
\norder of stay had been issued by the office.of the  Sessions
\nJudge by mistake.  Before the tribunal, (evidence was led by
\nboth the parties The
\n580<\/span>
\ncomplainant Dr. Prem Chand himself gave evidence and on\t his
\nbehalf\tShri  Maghraj and Shri Sheolal were  examined.\t The
\nappellant  Manak  Lal gave evidence on his behalf  Both\t the
\nmembers\t of the tribunal and the learned Judges of the\tHigh
\nCourt  of  Rajasthan  have,  on\t the  whole,  accepted\t the
\ncomplainants  version  rejected\t the  pleas  raised  by\t the
\nappellant  and\thave held that the appellant  is  guilty  of
\ngross professional misconduct.\tIt is this finding which, on
\nthe  merits, is challenged before us by Shri C. K.  Daphtary
\non behalf of the appellant.  Shri Dal phtary has also raised
\ntwo points of law in support of his argument that the  order
\npassed against the appellant must be set aside.\t It -will be
\nconvenient to deal with these points first.
\nShri  Daphtary contends that the tribunal appointed  by\t the
\nlearned\t Chief\tJustice of the High Court  of  Rajasthan  to
\nenquire\t into  the alleged misconduct of the  appellant\t was
\nimproperly constituted and all proceedings taken before\t the
\ntribunal,  the\treport made by it and the  subsequent  order
\npassed\tby  the High Court pursuant to this report  are\t all
\ninvalid.   This\t point\tarises in this\tway.   The  tribunal
\nconsisted  of  three  members with Shri\t Changani  as  it,-,
\nChairman.  It is common ground that Shri Chhangani had filed
\nhis vakalat on behalf of Dr. Prem Chand in proceedings under
\ns. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on August 23, 1952,
\nand had in fact argued the case on that date.  Shri Daphtary
\ncontends  that\tsince  Shri Chhangani had  appeared  in\t the
\ncriminal  proceedings  in question for the opponent  he\t was
\ndisqualified  from  acting as a member of the  tribunal\t and
\nthis  disqualification introduces a fatal infirmity  in\t the
\nconstitution  of the tribunal itself There is some force  in
\nthis  argument.\t It is well settled that every member  of  a
\ntribunal  that is called upon to try issues in\tjudicial  or
\nquasi-judicial\tproceedings must be able to act\t judicially;
\nand it is of the essence of judicial decisions and  judicial
\nadministration\t that\tjudges\tshould\tbe   able   to\t act
\nimpartially,  objectively  and without any  bias.   In\tsuch
\ncases  the test is not Whether in fact a bias  has  affected
\nthe judgment; the test
\n581<\/span>
\nalways\tis and must be whether a, litigant could  reasonably
\napprehend  that\t a  bias attributable to  a  member  of\t the
\ntribunal  might\t have  operated against\t him  in  the  final
\ndecision  of the tribunal.  It is in this sense that it,  is
\noften said that justice must not only be done but must\talso
\nappear\tto be done.  As Viscount Cave L. C. has observed  in
\nFrom  United Brewerses Co. v. Bath Justices (1) ” this\trule
\nhas been asserted not only in the case of Courts of Justices
\nand other judicial tribunals but in the case of\t authorities
\nwhich,\tthough in no sense to be called Courts, have to\t act
\nas  judges of the rights of others “. In dealing with  cases
\nof bias attributed to members constituting tribunals, it  is
\nnecessary  to make a distinction between pecuniary  interest
\nand  prejudice so attributed.  It is obvious that  pecuniary
\ninterest, however small it may be in a subject-matter of the
\nproceedings, would wholly disqualify a member from acting as
\na judge.  But where pecuniary interest is not attributed but
\ninstead\t a bias is suggested, it often becomes necessary  to
\nconsider  whether there is a reasonable ground for  assuming
\nthe  possibility  of  a bias and whether  it  is  likely  to
\nproduce in the minds of the litigant, or the public at large
\na reasonable doubt about the fairness of the  administration
\nof  justice.   It would always be a question of fact  to  be
\ndecided in each case.  ” The principle says Halsbury,  “nemo
\ndebet  esse judex in causaproprta sua precludes\t a  justice,
\nwho  is interested in the subjectmatter of a  dispute,\tfrom
\nacting as a justice therein ” (2).  In our opinion, there is
\nand can be no doubt about the validity of this principle and
\nwe  are prepared to assume that this principle\tapplies\t not
\nonly  to  the justices as mentioned by Halsbury but  to\t all
\ntribunals  and\tbodies\twhich  are  given  jurisdiction\t  to
\ndetermine judicially the rights of parties.
\nIn support of his argument, Shri Daphtary referred us to the
\ndecision  in Rex v. Sussex Justices, Ex parte McCarthy\t(3).
\nIn this case, the Court was dealing with a case &rising\t out
\nof a collision between a motor
\n(1)  [1926] A.C. 586, 590.\n<\/p>\n
(2)  Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol- XXI, P- 535, para 952.
\n(3)  [1924] 1.\tK. B. 256,
\n582<\/span>
\nvehicle\t belonging to the applicant and one belonging to  W.
\nAt  the\t hearing  of the summons the  acting  clerk  to\t the
\njustices  was  a member of the firm of solicitors  who\twere
\nacting\tfor W in a claim for damages against  the  applicant
\nfor injuries received in the collision.\t After the  evidence
\nwas recorded the justices retired to consider their decision
\nand  the  acting clerk also retired with them in  case\tthey
\nshould desire to be advised on any point of law.  The appli-
\ncant  was  convicted  in  the  case.   This  conviction\t was
\nchallenged  by\tthe  applicant on the  ground  that  it\t was
\nvitiated by the improper conduct of the justices in allowing
\nthe  acting  clerk  to be associated  with  them  when\tthey
\ndeliberated about the merits of the case.  An affidavit\t was
\nfiled  on  behalf of the justices that\tthey  reached  their
\ndecision  without consulting the acting clerk and  that\t the
\nacting\tclerk  had in fact abstained from referring  to\t the
\ncase.\tThis  affidavit\t was accepted as  true\tby  all\t the
\nlearned judges who heard the case and yet the conviction was
\nquashed.   “The\t question  is”\tobserved  Lord\tHewart\tC.J.
\nwhether\t the acting clerk was so related to the case in\t its
\ncivil  aspect,\tas  to be unfit to act as  a  clerk  to\t the
\njustices in the criminal matter” and the learned judge added
\nthat  “the  answer to that question depends  not  upon\twhat
\nexactly’was  done  but upon what might appear  to  be  done.
\nNothing\t is to be done which creates even a  suspicion\tthat
\nthere  has  been an improper interference in the  course  of
\njustice.” Lush J. who agreed with Lord Hewart C.J.  likewise
\naccepted  the affidavit made on behalf of the  justices\t but
\nobserved, “that they have placed themselves in an impossible
\nposition  by  allowing the clerk in those  circumstances  to
\nretire\twith  them into their consultation room.”  The\tsame
\nprinciple  was\tenunciated. with equal emphasis\t in  Rex  v.
\nEssex  Justices, Ex parte Perking (1).\tThis was  a  dispute
\nbetween a husband and his wife and it appeared that the wife
\nhad  consulted the solicitor’s clerk in their  office  about
\nthe preparation of a deed of separation from her husband and
\nthe  lawyer acted in the matter for a time after  which\t she
\nceased to consult him.\tNo mention of
\n(1)  (1927] 2 K.B. 475.\n<\/p>\n
583<\/span><\/p>\n
the matter was made to the solicitor himself except one very
\nshort  reference  to it in a weekly report from\t his  clerk.
\nSubsequently the solicitor acted as a clerk to the  justices
\nwho  tried the case.  He stated in his affidavit that,\twhen
\nacting\tas  a  clerk  to the justices  on  the\toccasion  in
\nquestion,  he had no knowledge that his firm had  acted\t for
\nthe  wife and that he was in no way adverse to the  husband.
\nIt was urged that the decision of the justices should be set
\naside  as the justices were not properly constituted and  it
\nappears also to have been suggested that the decision might,
\nperhaps,   have\t been  influenced  by  a  prejudice   though
\nindirectly  and\t to  a very  small  extent.   Rejecting\t the
\nargument  that\tthe  decision  of  the\tjustices  had\tbeen
\ninfluenced  even remotely by the impropriety alleged,  Avory
\nJ.  stated  that “though the clerk to the justices  and\t the
\n‘justices  did\tnot  know that his firm had  acted  for\t the
\napplicant’s wife, the necessary, or at least the reasonable,
\nimpression,  on\t the  mind of the applicant  would  be\tthat
\njustice was not done seeing that the solicitor for his\twife
\nwas acting with the justices and advising’ them on the hear-
\ning of the summons which she had taken against him.”
\nIt  has, however, been urged before us by Shri\tUmrigar,  on
\nbehalf\tof the Advocate-General, that this principle  should
\nnot  be\t applied  to the  proceedings  before  the  tribunal
\nappointed under the Bar Councils Act.  He contends that\t the
\ntribunal  is  not  empowered to. pass final  orders  on\t the
\nenquiry\t and  that the report made by the  tribunal  is,  in
\nevery case, to be submitted to the High Court for the  final
\ndecision of the High Court.  We are not impressed with\tthis
\nargument.  If it is true that in judicial or  quasi-judicial
\nproceedings justice must not only be done but must appear to
\nbe  done to the litigating public, it is equally  true\tthat
\nwhen a lawyer is charged for professional misconduct and  is
\ngiven the privilege of being tried by a tribunal of the\t Bar
\nCouncil, the enquiry before the tribunal must leave no\troom
\nfor a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the lawyer that
\nthe tribunal may have been even indirectly influenced by any
\nbias in the mind of any of the members of the tribunal.\t  In
\nthe  present  case, we have no hesitation in  assuming\tthat
\nwhen
\n75<\/span>
\n584<\/span>
\nShri  Chhangani\t agreed\t to  work as  the  Chairman  of\t the
\ntribunal,  he did not remember that he had appeared  against
\nthe appellant’s clients in the criminal proceedings under s.\n<\/p>\n
145.  We are told that Shri Chhangani is a senior member  of
\nthe  Bar and was once Advocate-General of the High Court  of
\nRajasthan.   Besides he had not appeared in the case at\t all
\nstages\tbut  had appeared only once as a senior\t counsel  to
\nargue  the  matter.  It is, therefore, not at  all  unlikely
\nthat Shri Chhangani had no personal contact with the  client
\nDr. Prem Chand and may not have been aware of the fact that,
\nin the case from which the present proceedings arose, he had
\nappeared at any stage for Dr. Prem Chand.  We are,  however,
\ninclined  to hold that this fact does not in any way  affect
\nthe legal argument urged before us by Shri Daphtary.  It  is
\nnot Shri Daphtary’s case that Shri Chhangani actually had  a
\nbias  against  the  appellant and that\tthe  said  bias\t was
\nresponsible for the final report made against the appellant.
\nIndeed\tit is unnecessary for Shri Daphtary to advance\tsuch
\nan  argument.\tIf  Shri  Chhangani  was  disqualified\tfrom
\nworking\t as a member of the tribunal by reason of  the\tfact
\nthat  he  had appeared for Dr.’ Prem Chand in  the  criminal
\nproceedings  under s. 145 in question, then it would not  be
\nnecessary  for Shri Daphtary to prove that any prejudice  in
\nfact  had  been\t caused or that\t Shri  Chhangani  improperly
\ninfluenced the final decision of the tribunal.\tActual proof
\nof  prejudice in such cases may make the,  appellant’s\tcase
\nstronger  but such proof is not necessary in order that\t the
\nappellant  should effectively raise the argument  that\tthe,
\ntribunal was not properly constituted.\n<\/p>\n
Shri  Umrigar, however, contended that unless  prejudice  is
\nactually  proved  the  challenge  to  the  validity  of\t the
\nconstitution of the tribunal cannot be upheld and he  sought
\nto  rely  upon\tthe decision in Rex v.\tWilliams,  Ex  parts
\nPhillips(1) in support of this contention.  In this case the
\ncourt  was  dealing  with  an  application  for\t a  writ  of
\ncertiorari.   A baker had been charged under s. 4  of  Bread
\nAct of 1836.  It was
\n(1)  [1914] 1 K.B. 608.\n<\/p>\n
585<\/span><\/p>\n
alleged that he had sold bread otherwise than by weight\t and
\nwas liable to be convicted under s. 15 of the Act.  In\tfact
\nhe was so convicted.  Thereupon he obtained a rule nisi\t for
\na  writ of certiorari to quash the conviction on the  ground
\nthat  one  of  the justices was a person  concerned  in\t the
\nbusiness  of  a\t baker.\t  Section  15  disqualified  persons
\nconcerned in the business of a baker to act as a justice  in
\nthe  trial of such cases.  This application for a  writ\t was
\nultimately  rejected  by  the Court.  The  decision  of\t the
\nCourt,\thowever,  was based substantially  on  two  grounds.
\nChannel\t J.,  who delivered the principal  judgment  of\t the
\nCourt,\tobserved  that ” when objection to a  conviction  is
\ntaken  merely by a member of the public and not by  a  party
\nmore particularly aggrieved the granting of a certiorari’ is
\ndiscretionary.\tWhere the objection is by a party aggrieved,
\nthen,  as  a rule, a writ is issued  ex\t debito.  justitiae.
\nThis  position, however, is subject to the exception that  a
\nparty  aggrieved  may by his conduct preclude  himself\tfrom
\ntaking\tobjection to the jurisdiction of an inferior  Court.
\n” But it is significant that the second ground on which\t the
\njudgment proceeded clearly indicates that the justice  whose
\npresence  at the hearing was challenged under s.  15 of\t the
\nAct  by\t the petitioner did not apparently  appear  to\tfall
\nwithin\tthe mischief of s. 15 of the Act at all.  “I do\t not
\nsay”,  observed Channel J., ” whether the facts shown  would
\nbe enough to make him a person following or concerned in the
\nbusiness  of  a baker within the meaning of s.\t15  “.\tThis
\nconclusion was accepted by the two other learned judges.  It
\nwould  thus appear that the decision in this case  does\t not
\njustify\t  Shri\tUmrigar’s  contention  that,  even  if\t the
\nconstitution  of  the tribunal is held to  be  defective  or
\nimproper, the proceedings taken before the tribunal and\t the
\norders subsequently passed in pursuance of the report cannot
\nbe  successfully  challenged  unless it is  shown  that\t the
\ndefective  constitution of the tribunal had in fact  led  to
\nthe prejudice of the appellant.\t We would,, therefore,\thold
\nthat  Shri  Daphtary  is right when  he\t contends  that\t the
\nconstitution of” the tribunal appointed by the Chief Justice
\nof the High Court of
\n586<\/span>
\nRajasthan  suffered  from a serious infirmity in  that\tShri
\nChhangani,  who\t had  appeared for Dr.\tPrem  Chand  in\t the
\ncriminal proceedings in question, was appointed a member  of
\nthe tribunal and in fact acted as its Chairman.
\nThe next question which falls to be considered is whether it
\nwas  open  to the appellant to take this objection  for\t the
\nfirst  time before- the High Court.  In other words, has  he
\nor  has he not waived his objection to the presence of\tShri
\nChhangani in the tribunal?  Shri Daphtary does not seriously
\ncontest\t the  position that the objection  could  have\tbeen
\neffectively  waived.   The alleged bias in a member  of\t the
\ntribunal  does not render the proceedings invalid if  it  is
\nshown that the objection against the -presence of the member
\nin question had not been their by the party even though\t the
\nparty  knew  about  the circumstances  giving  rise  to\t the
\nallegations  about  the alleged bias and was  aware  of\t his
\nright  to  challenge  the  presence of\tthe  member  in\t the
\ntribunal.  It is true that waiver cannot always and in every
\ncase  be  inferred merely from the failure of the  party  to
\ntake the objections Waiver can be inferred only if and after
\nit is shown that the party knew about the relevant facts and
\nwas  aware of his right to take the objection  in  question.
\nAs  Sir John Romilly M. R. has observed in Vyvyan v.  Vyvyan
\n(1)  ”\twaiver or acquiescence, like  election,\t presupposes
\nthat  the  person  to be bound is  fully  cognizant  of\t his
\nrights, and, that being so, he neglects to enforce them,  or
\nchooses\t one  benefit instead of another,  either,  but\t not
\nboth, of which he might claim “. If, in the present case, it
\nappears\t that  the appellant knew all the  facts  about\t the
\nalleged disability of Shri Chhangani and was also aware that
\nhe  could effectively request ‘the learned Chief Justice  to
\nnominate  some other member instead of Shri  Chhailgani\t and
\nyet  did  not  adopt that course, it may  well\tbe  that  he
\ndeliberately took a chance to obtain a report in his  favour
\nfrom  the tribunal and when he came to know that the  report
\nhad  gone  against him he thought better of his\t rights\t and
\nraised this point before the High Court for the first
\n(1)  (1861) 30 Beav, 65, 74 54 ER. 813, 817.\n<\/p>\n
587<\/span><\/p>\n
time.\tIn  other words, though the point of law  raised  by
\nShri  Daphtary\tagainst the competence of the,\ttribunal  be
\nsound, it is still necessary for us to consider whether\t the
\nappellant  was precluded from raising this point before\t the
\nHigh Court by waiver or acquiescence.\n<\/p>\n
From the record it is clear that the appellant never  raised
\nthis point before the tribunal and the manner in which\tthis
\npoint  was  raised  by him even before\tthe  High  Court  is
\nsomewhat  significant.\tThe first ’round of objection  filed
\nby the appellant against the tribunal’s report was that Shri
\nChhangani  had\tpecuniary  and\tpersonal  interest  in\t the
\ncomplainant, Dr. Prom Chand.  The learned Judges of the High
\nCourt  have found that the allegations about  the  pecuniary
\ninterest  of Shri Chhangani in the present  proceedings\t are
\nwholly\tunfounded and this finding has not  been  challenged
\nbefore us by Shri Daphtary.  The learned Judges of the\tHigh
\nCourt  have also found that the objection was raised by\t the
\nappellant  before them only to obtain an order for  a  fresh
\nenquiry and thus gain time.  It may be conceded in favour of
\nShri  Daphtary that the judgment of the High Court does\t not
\nin terms find against the appellant on the ground of  waiver
\nthough\tthat no doubt appeare to be the substance  of  their
\nconclusion.  We have, however, heard Shri Daphtary’s case on
\nthe question of waiver and we have no hesitation in reaching
\nthe  conclusion\t that  the appellant  waived  his  objection
\ndeliberately  and cannot now be allowed to raise  it.\tShri
\nDaphtary  does\tnot contend that at the\t material  time\t the
\nappellant did not remember the fact that Shri Chhangani\t had
\nappeared  for  Dr. Prem Chand in the  criminal\tproceedings.
\nIndeed such a plea cannot be raised by the appellant in view
\nof the affidavit which the appellant sought to place  before
\nus  in\tthe  present  appeal.  -Under  this  affidavit,\t the
\nappellant’s  case  appears  to be that\tuntil  lie  met\t his
\nadvocate  Shri\tMurli Manohar for filing objections  to\t the
\nreport of the tribunal, the appellant did not know that Shri
\nChhangani  was legally disqualified from acting as a  member
\nof the tribunal.  It is obvious that this ground necessarily
\nimplies that the appellant knew about the facts giving
\n588<\/span>
\nise to the alleged disqualification of Shri Chhangani to act
\nas  a member of the tribunal.  In substance, the  Contention
\nis  that though the appellant knew that Shri  Chhangani\t had
\nappeared  for Dr. Prem Chand in the criminal proceedings  in
\nquestion,  he  was  not aware  that,  in  consequence,\tShri
\nChhangani  was\tdisqualified  to  act as  a  member  of\t the
\ntribunal.  It is this limited aspect of the matter which  is
\npressed before us by Shri Daphtary.  Shri Daphtary  contends
\nand  no\t doubt\trightly that if we are\tsatisfied  that\t the
\nappellant did not know about the true legal position in this
\nmatter\tand  his rights arising therefrom,  his\t failure  to
\nchallenge the appointment of Shri Chhangani on the  tribunal
\nwould  not raise an effective plea of waiver.\tHowever,  in
\nour opinion, it is very difficult to accept Shri  Daphtary’s
\nargument  that\this  client  did not  know  the\t true  legal
\nposition or his rights until he met Shri Murli Manohar.\t  No
\ndoubt  the appellant is a junior at the Bar but even  so  he
\ncan  claim ten years’ standing at the Bar.  Besides, he\t had
\nthe  assistance of a lawyer in defending him in the  present
\nproceedings  and  it appears extremely difficult  to  assume
\nthat  neither  the appellant nor his lawyer  knew  that\t the
\npresence  of  Shri  Chhangani  in  the\ttribunal  could\t  be
\neffectively  challenged by them.  We are disposed  to  think
\nthat  even a layman, not familiar with legal  technicalities
\nand   equitable\t principles  on\t which\tthis   doctrine\t  of
\ndisability   has   been\t based,\t  would\t  have\t immediately
\napprehended  that the lawyer who had appeared for  Dr.\tPrem
\nChand was authorised to sit in judgment over the conduct  of
\nthe  appellant\tand that might cause  embarassnient  to\t the
\nappellant  and might lead to prejudice against him.  From  a
\npurely common sense point of view of a layman, the  position
\nwas  patently  awkward,\t and  so,  the\targument  that\t the
\nappellant  was\tnot conscious of his legal  rights  in\tthis
\nmatter\tappears\t to  us to be an  afterthought.\t  Since\t the
\nappellant was driven to adopt this untenable position before
\nthe High Court in seeking to raise this point for the  first
\ntime at that stage, we are not surprised that the High Court
\ntook the view that the plea had been taken late in order, to
\ngain time and to secure a fresh enquiry in
\n589<\/span>
\nthe matter.  Since we have no doubt that the appellant\tknew
\nthe material facts and must be deemed to have been conscious
\nof his legal rights in that matter, his failure to take\t the
\npresent plea at the earlier stage of the proceedings creates
\nan effective bar of waiver against him.\t It seems clear that
\nthe appellant wanted to take a chance to secure a favourable
\nreport, from the tribunal which was constituted and when  he
\nfound that he was confronted with an unfavourable report, he
\nadopted the device of raising the present technical point.
\nThen  Shri Daphtary sought to challenge the main  conclusion
\nof  the\t High  Court  that  the\t appellant  was\t guilty\t  of
\nprofessional   misconduct  on  a  preliminary  ground.\t  He
\ncontended  that\t the  High Court  judgment  shows  that\t the
\nlearned Judges had considered some inadmissible evidence  in
\nthe  absence  of  the appellant and without  giving  him  an
\nopportunity  to be heard on the said evidence and  that\t had
\nintroduced an infirmity in the judgment which vitiated their
\nfinal conclusions.  It appears from the judgment of the High
\nCourt  that the learned Judges sent for and looked into\t the
\nrecord\tof Revision Application No. 31 of 1951 in the  Court
\nof the Sessions Judge, Pali, and the record of Case No.\t 134
\nof  1951  in  the Court of  the\t Sub-Divisional\t Magistrate,
\nSojat.\tShri Daphtary has made pointed reference to the fact
\nthat the record in Case No. 134 of 1951 was sent for by\t the
\nHigh  Court after this matter had been argued  before  them.
\nIf we had been satisfied that the learned Judges of the High
\nCourt had taken into consideration material documents  which
\nwere not before them at the time the case was argued  before
\nthem,  we  would certainly have considered  Shri  Daphtary’s
\ngrievance  more seriously.  We are, however,  not  satisfied
\nthat  the  grievance  made by  Shri  Daphtary  against\tthis
\nalleged\t irregularity is really justified.  The\t High  Court
\njudgment  shows\t that the appellant argued before  the\tHigh
\nCourt  that  he\t could\tnot have  been\tconcerned  with\t the
\nfabrication  of\t the  false  order  because  his  subsequent
\nconduct\t showed that he was not at all interested in  seeing
\nthat the said order was implemented.. In fact, this argument
\nhas been characterised
\n590<\/span>
\nby  the High Court as plausible but not sound.\tIt was\tthis
\nargument  which provoked the reply from the other side\tthat
\nin  fact  the fabricated order had been implemented  and  in
\nsupport of this reply reference was made to the\t application
\nmade  by  Dr. Prem Chand and his men in which  it  had\tbeen
\nspecifically alleged that the appellant’s clients had  taken
\npossession of the crops and that they had also removed them.
\nThis application had been made on September 24, 1951, and it
\nrequested  the\tSub-Divisional\tMagistrate  to\tprevent\t the
\nappellant’s  clients from taking illegal possession  of\t the
\nland  and  removing  the  crops.   It  is  these  two  rival
\ncontentions  which the learned Judges of the High Court\t had
\nto  examine.  The judgment shows that it  was  substantially
\nwith  a\t view  to satisfy themselves  that  the\t application
\nreferred  to by the respondent before the High Court in\t the
\ncourse\tof the argument had in fact been made that the\tHigh
\nCourt  subsequently  called for and  examined  the  relevant
\nrecords.  It may be that in the earlier part of the judgment
\nthe learned Judges have stated somewhat generally that\tthey
\nhad looked at the records of both the cases; but it is clear
\nfrom  the  reasons  given by the  learned  Judges  that\t the
\nperusal\t of the records in the said two cases had played  no
\npart  in  the  final decision of the High  Court.   We\tare,
\ntherefore,  not satisfied that the procedure adopted by\t the
\nHigh  Court  in dealing with this matter  suffers  from\t any
\nserious irregularity as a result of which their final orders
\nshould be set aside and a fresh hearing of the matter should
\nbe ordered.\n<\/p>\n
Then  remains  the  question of the merits  of\tthe  finding
\nrecorded by the High Court.  Shri Daphtary himself was aware
\nthat this part of his case is bound to be weak in an  appeal
\nwhich  has been admitted on Special Leave under Art. 136  of
\nthe Constitution.  Both the tribunal and the High Court have
\nmade  concurrent findings of fact against the appellant\t and
\nit is difficult to accept the argument that this finding  of
\n‘fact  should  be  re-examined on the merits by\t us  in\t the
\npresent\t appeal.   We may, however, incidentally  point\t out
\nthat  there  are  some salient features of  the\t case  which
\nunequivocally support the view taken by the High
\n591<\/span>
\nCourt  against the appellant.  It is common ground that\t the
\nappellant’s  clients  were not present before  the  Sessions
\nJudge  on  September  6,  1951.\t It  is\t admitted  that\t the
\nappellant  was\tpresent\t and  that  he\ttook  the   envelope
\ncontaining  the order to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate.\t  It
\nmay be that, in the State of Jodhpur, lawyers practising  in
\nsubordinate courts sometimes assisted the court officers  by
\ntaking packets containing judicial orders from one court  to
\nanother; but, if the appellant’s clients were not present in
\nthe court, it is difficult to understand how the  fabricated
\norder  came  to\t be prepared  without  instigation  by\tthe,
\nappellant.   It is inconceivable that officers of the  court
\nwould  suo motu think of fabricating the order.\t  The  order
\nwas intended to benefit the appellant’s clients and, on\t the
\nwhole,\tit is an irresistible inference that  the  appellant
\nmust  have corrupted the officers of the court by the  offer
\nof  illegal consideration and induced them to fabricate\t the
\norder.\tShri Daphtary attempted to rely on the view taken by
\nthe learned Sessions Judge in the enquiry which he held soon
\nafter  he learnt about the issue of this  fabricated  order.
\nWe are free to confess that we are not at all satisfied with
\nthis  enquiry  and  its final decision.\t  However.,  we\t are
\nreally not concerned to consider the merits of this  enquiry
\nand we cannot attach any importance to an argument based  on
\nthe  view  taken  by  the learned  Sessions  Judge  in\tthis
\nenquiry.   The High Court has taken the view, and  we  think
\nrightly,  that\tthe  conduct of Shri  Loya  should  also  be
\nexamined  as  it  is obvious that both Shri  Loya  and\tShri
\nMaghraj were interested in persuading the Sessions Judge  to
\ntake the view that the fabrication of the order was due to a
\nmistake committed by Shri Maghraj.  The theory of a  mistake
\ncommitted  by  Shri  Maghraj  is,  in  our  opinion,  wholly
\nunreasonable,  if  not fantastic.  The order passed  by\t the
\nlearned Sessions Judge on September 6, 1951, is clear beyond
\nany doubt.  Shri Maghraj read this order and it is suggested
\nthat  he  misconstrued its effect.  How an  order  directing
\nnotice of the application to the opponent along with a\tcopy
\nof  the application to be served on the opponent could\tever
\nhave been construed to mean an order
\n76<\/span>
\n592<\/span>
\nDirecting the issue of stay, it is impossible to understand.
\nThen  again, the order actually issued is elaborate  in\t its
\nterms  and  its\t object\t clearly was  to  require  the\tSub-
\nDivisional Magistrate to give effect to the prayers made  by
\nthe   appellant\t in  his  application  without\tany   delay.
\nBesides,  the endorsement made by Shri Maghraj showing\tthat
\nthe  order  had\t been  complied\t with  and  his\t silence  on
\nSeptember  12, 1951, when the learned Sessions\tJudge  found
\nthat  notice had not been served are very eloquent. If\tShri
\nMaghraj\t had  committed\t an honest mistake,  he\t would\thave
\nimmediately  reported  to the learned  Sessions\t Judge\tthat
\nnotice had not been issued and instead erroneously an  order
\nof  stay  had been sent in the said  proceedings.   Besides,
\nwhen Shri Maghraj gave evidence in the present\tproceedings,
\nhe  did\t not adhere to the theory of mistake.\tHis  present
\nversion is that he prepared the draft order at the  instance
\nof  the\t appellant before the case was argued  and  when  he
\nreceived it back duly signed by the Reader Shri Loya, it was
\ngiven to the despatcher and from him it reached the hands of
\nthe  appellant.\t There is no doubt that Shri Maghraj  is  an
\naccomplice  and,  so like all accomplices, he has  tried  to
\nminimise the part played by him in this transaction.  It  is
\ntrue   that   the   evidence  against\tthe   appellant\t  is
\nsubstantially  circumstantial and there is no a\t doubt\tthat
\nthe  finding  against the appellant cannot be made  on\tsuch
\ncircumstantial evidence unless the evidence is wholly incon-
\nsistent\t with  his innocence and leads irresistibly  to\t the
\ninference  of  his guilt.  The judgment of  the\t High  Court
\nshows  that the learned judges were fully conscious of\tthis
\nlegal  position.  They have held that, having regard to\t all
\nthe circumstances of the case it is impossible to hold\tthat
\nthe  fabricated\t order could have come into  existence.\t and
\nwould  have  been despatched hurriedly\twithout\t the  active
\nassistance and collaboration of the appellant.
\nShri   Daphtary\t then  argued  that  the  failure   of\t the
\ncomplainant to examine Shri Loya, the Reader, was deliberate
\nand   he  suggested  that  adverse  inference  against\t the
\ncomplainant should be drawn in consequence.  Indeed this was
\nthe only point which Shri
\n593<\/span>
\nDaphtary placed before us seriously in regard to the  merits
\nof  the\t finding  recorded by the  High\t Court\tagainst\t the
\nappellant.   It may be conceded in favour of  Shri  Daphtary
\nthat,  even in quasi-criminal proceedings like the  present,
\nall important and relevant evidence must be laid before\t the
\ntribunal;  but\tthis requirement is always  subject  to\t the
\nproviso\t that it is generally for the prosecutor who  is  in
\ncharge\tof  the case to decide which of\t the  witnesses\t are
\nnecessary for the unfolding of the case.  The prosecutor  no
\ndoubt  must  act bona fide and fairly by the court  and\t the
\nperson\tagainst\t whom  the proceedings\thave  been  started.
\nActing\tbona  fide, if the prosecutor takes  the  view\tthat
\ncertain witnesses need not be examined, generally the  court
\nwould be reluctant to draw an adverse inference against\t the
\nprosecution.   Besides,\t in the present case,  there  is  no
\njustification for drawing any such adverse inference against
\nthe  complainant  because  Shri Loya is no  better  than  an
\naccomplice and it is difficult to assume that the failure of
\nthe complainant to examine an accomplice can ever give\trise
\nto an adverse inference against the complainant’s case.\t  If
\nthat be the true position, it would be idle to contend\tthat
\nthe  finding of the High Court is vitiated by reason of\t the
\nfact that the High Court did not consider the effect of\t the
\ncomplainant’s  failure\tto  examine  Shri  Loya\t before\t the
\ntribunal.   Incidentally this point does not appear to\thave
\nbeen pressed before the High Court.  In the result, we\thave
\nno hesitation in holding that no case has been made out\t for
\nour  interference  with the conclusions of  the\t High  Court
\nunder Art. 136 of the Constitution.\n<\/p>\n
That  leaves  only  one point to consider and  that  is\t the
\ncorrectness or the propriety of the order passed by the High
\nCourt directing the removal of the appellant’s name from the
\nroll  of legal practitioners.  Shri Daphtary  contends\tthat
\nthis  order  is unduly severe and he has appealed to  us  to
\nconsider the fact that the appellant was a junior at the Bar
\nand  the  removal  of  his  name  from\tthe  roll  of  legal
\npractitioners  would  deprive  him  of\tthe  source  of\t his
\nlivelihood.  We are not impressed with this argument at all.
\nUnfortunately
\n594<\/span>
\nit  appears  that  this,  is not the  first  time  that\t the
\nappellant   has\t  come\tinto  trouble  on  the\t ground\t  of
\nprofessional  misconduct.   In 1952 he was suspended  for  a
\nperiod\tof two months for misappropriating some money  given
\nto him by his clients for the payment of court fee.  This is
\none  fact  which  is against the  appellant.   Besides,\t the
\nmisconduct which is proved in this case is, in our  opinion,
\nof  a very serious character.  In the administration of\t law
\nand  justice, lawyers have to play an important part.\tThey
\nare, in a sense, officers of the court and as such they\t are
\ngiven special rights and privileges.  The profession of\t law
\nenjoys\thigh and respected status and reputation of its\t own
\nand  this status carries with it corresponding\tobligations.
\nNaturally  the\tBar  must zealously  safeguard\tthe  highest
\nstandards  of  professional  morality  and  integrity.\t  In
\nfairness  to  the Bar, we ought to add that  cases  of\tthis
\nnature are very rare but unfortunately when such cases\tcome
\nbefore\tthe courts, the courts must take a serious  view  of
\nsuch  reprehensible lapses and must pass  deterrent  orders.
\nIt  is our duty to express our disapproval of such  unworthy
\npractices  as  emphatically  as we  can\t because  the  legal
\nprofession  must be saved from persons who do not  feel\t any
\nhesitation  in\tcorrupting public officers by  unworthy\t and
\nillegal\t considerations\t for  the  temporary  and  immediate
\nbenefit of their clients.  We must, therefore, hold that the
\norder passed by the High Court directing the removal of\t the
\nappellant’s name from the rolls is fully justified.  In\t the
\nresult, the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs.
\nAppeal dismissed.\n<\/p>\n
595<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Manak Lal vs Dr. Prem Chand on 6 February, 1957 Equivalent citations: 1957 AIR 425, 1957 SCR 575 Author: P Gajendragadkar Bench: Gajendragadkar, P.B. PETITIONER: MANAK LAL Vs. RESPONDENT: DR. PREM CHAND DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06\/02\/1957 BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA DAS, S.K. CITATION: 1957 AIR 425 […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-55822","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nManak Lal vs Dr. Prem Chand on 6 February, 1957 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/manak-lal-vs-dr-prem-chand-on-6-february-1957\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Manak Lal vs Dr. Prem Chand on 6 February, 1957 - 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