{"id":55968,"date":"1968-09-18T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1968-09-17T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/management-shahdara-delhi-vs-s-s-railway-workers-union-on-18-september-1968"},"modified":"2015-03-24T12:57:25","modified_gmt":"2015-03-24T07:27:25","slug":"management-shahdara-delhi-vs-s-s-railway-workers-union-on-18-september-1968","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/management-shahdara-delhi-vs-s-s-railway-workers-union-on-18-september-1968","title":{"rendered":"Management Shahdara (Delhi) … vs S.S. Railway Workers’ Union on 18 September, 1968"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Management Shahdara (Delhi) … vs S.S. Railway Workers’ Union on 18 September, 1968<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1969 AIR 513, \t\t 1969 SCR (2) 131<\/div>\n
Author: Shelat<\/div>\n
Bench: Shelat, J.M.<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nMANAGEMENT SHAHDARA (DELHI) SAHARANPURLIGHT RAILWAY CO., LTD\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nS.S. RAILWAY WORKERS' UNION\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT:\n18\/09\/1968\n\nBENCH:\nSHELAT, J.M.\nBENCH:\nSHELAT, J.M.\nBHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA\nVAIDYIALINGAM, C.A.\n\nCITATION:\n 1969 AIR  513\t\t  1969 SCR  (2) 131\n CITATOR INFO :\n R\t    1970 SC  82\t (7)\n RF\t    1970 SC 512\t (5,10)\n RF\t    1972 SC1210\t (14)\n R\t    1984 SC 516\t (23)\n R\t    1984 SC1227\t (6,8)\n\n\nACT:\nIndustrial  Employment (Standing Orders) Act  (20 of  1946),\nas  amended by Act 36 of 1956, ss. 6 and  10(2)-Modification\nof existing Standing Orders-When permitted.\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\nSix  months  after  the,  appelIant's  Standing\t Orders\t  as\nmodified had come into operation, the respondent applied for\nfurther\t  modification\tof  the Standing  Orders,  under  s.\n10(2)  of the Industrial Employment (Standing  Orders)\tAct,\n1946,  'as amended in 1956.  The certifying officer  allowed\nsome  of the modifications and on appeal by the\t respondent,\nthe Appellate Authority allowed some more modifications.\n      In  appeal,  to  this  Court under  Art.\t136  of\t the\nConstitution, the appellant objected to four  modifications,\nnamely:\t (i)  that the appellant  should  give\treasons\t and\ncommunicate  them  to  the  workmen   even   in\t  cases\t  of\ndischarge  simpliciter; (ii) that appeals against  penalties\nimposed\t should\t be disposed of within 60 days;\t (iii)\tthat\nwhen a workman is removed on the ground of inefficiency\t due\nto  physical unfitness, the appellant should offer  to\tsuch\nworkman\t alternative; employment  on reasonable\t emoluments;\nand (iv) that a second show cause notice should be served on\nthe  workman  at  the  stage of taking\ta  decision  on\t the\nsuitable  punishment.\tThe  grounds  urged  were:  (1\t)The\nauthorities  under  the\t Act can  certify  modifications  of\nexisting Standing  Orders under s.  10(2) only when a change\nof  circumstances is established, because, s. 6 of  the\t Act\nconfers\t  finality   on\t  certified   Standing\t Orders\t  or\nmodifications  thereof; (2). On principles analogous to\t res\nJudicata,  the authorities had no jurisdiction to grant\t the\nmodifications in the present case; and (3) the modifications\nwere not reasonable or fair.\n    HELD:  (1) [Per Shelat and Vaidialingam, JJ.]: A  change\nof  circumstances  is  not  a  condition  precedent  to\t the\nmaintainability of an application for modification under s.\"\n10(2).\n    Under  the Act before its 'amendment in 1956, a  workman\ncould\tnot  object  that  the\tStanding  Orders  were\t not\nreasonable  or\tfair.\tHis  only remedy  was  to  raise  an\nindustrial  dispute,  but that\tremedy\twas  unsatisfactory,\nsince the dispute had to be sponsored by a union or at least\na  substantial number of workmen and even then, the  process\nwas a protracted one.  Parliament knew that the workmen\t had\nthe  right  to\traise an industrial  dispute  and  also\t the\ndefects\t in that remedy and so amended ss. 4 and 10  of\t the\nAct  by\t Act  36  of  1956.   The  amendment  conferred\t  on\nindividual  workman  the right to object to  draft  Standing\nOrders submitted by an employer on the ground that they\t are\neither\tnot fair or not reasonable, and also gave the  right\nto  apply  for\ttheir modification. Under  s.  6,  a  person\naggrieved by the order of the certifying officer  certifying\nor  modifying Standing Orders, may appeal to  the  Appellate\nAuthority  whose decision shall be final.  But the  finality\nonly  means  that  there is no further\tappeal\tor  revision\nagainst the order and that the order cannot be challenged in\n'a  civil  court.   It can, however. be\t modified  under  s.\n10(2).\tThe only limitations on the power are, (a) reason.-\n132\nableness  and fairness of the modification and\t (b)  except\non   agreement between employer and the workmen\t six  months\nmust have elapsed from the date on which the Standing Orders\nor the last modifications thereof, came into operation,\t the\nobject\tbeing  that  Standing Orders  or  the  modifications\nshould\tbe allowed to work for some time to see if they\t are\nsatisfactory.  In an application for modification the  issue\nbefore\t the authority would be not as to reasonableness  or\nfairness  of the existing Standing Orders. but\twhether\t the\nmodification  'applied for is fair and reasonable.  Such  an\napplication  is\t an   independent  application\t and  merely\nbecause\t it  could be made on the ground that  the  existing\nStanding  Orders  are discovered to be\tunsatisfactory\teven\nwithout any change in circumstances, it would not amount  to\na review of  an\t earlier  order. Further, there will not  be\na   multiplicity   of  applications  because   the   workmen\nindividually  have  the right to  apply\t for  modifications.\nFor,   unless\tthere\tis  some   justification   for\t the\nmodification, the authorities under the Act would reject the\napplications. [139 G-H; 140 C-D; 141 A-C; 142 A-C; G-H;\t 143\nA-C]\n    Bangalore Woollen Cotton & Silk Co. Ltd. v. The  Workmen<\/a>\n[1968]\tl  L.L.J. 555, Buckingham and Carnatic\tCo.  Ltd.  v\nWorkmen\t C.A.  No.  674\t of 1968  dt.  25th  July  1968\t and\nHindustan Brown Boveri Ltd. v. The Workmen C.A. No.<\/a> 1631  of\n1966 dt. 31st July 1967, referred to.\n    [Per Bhargava, J. dissenting]: When an application under\ns.   10(2)  is\tmade,  the  certifying\tofficer\t can  modify\nStanding  Orders already certified, only if the\t request  is\nnot made on the basis of the same material which existed  at\nthe earlier stage when they were certified. [155 G-H]\n    Before  the\t amendment in 1956 if the  workmen  had\t any\ngrievance on the ground of unfairness or unreasonableness of\nthe  Standing  Orders,\ttheir  only  remedy  lay  under\t the\nIndustrial  Disputes  Act. By amendment in 1956,  a  limited\nremedy was provided for them in the Act itself by conferring\non   the  certifying  officer  the  power  of  judging\t the\nreasonableness\tand fairness of the Standing Orders  and  of\nmodifying  them\t under s. 10(2).  Therefore, after 1956\t the\nworkmen have two alternative remedies for seeking alteration\nin the Standing Orders proposed or certified. Under s. 10(2)\na request for modification can only be made on\tthe basis of\nfresh  facts  or fresh circumstances arising  subsequent  to\nthe passing of the order by the Appellate Authority under s.\n6 on the limited ground of reasonableness and fairness.. The\nIndustrial Tribunal, however. can direct the alteration of a\nStanding  Order held to be reasonable and fair, without\t any\nfresh  grounds, material, or change in circumstances  if  an\nindustrial  dispute, in 'relation to it is raised, and\tthis\nis  the only remedy available if a modification\t is  desired\nwithout\t a change of circumstances. If it is held that\teven\nthe certifying officer can reconsider the reasonableness  or\nfairness of a Standing Order already certified and confirmed\nunder  s. 6 the finality envisaged by the section  would  be\nnullified.   After a period of six months had  elapsed,\t the\ncertifying  officer could set aside an order passed  earlier\nby  his\t superior, or a succeeding Appellate  Authority\t may\ninterfere  with his predecessor's order, merely because\t the\ncertifying  officer  or Appellate Authority  considers\t the\nmodification  to  be reasonable and fair even  though  there\nwas no change in the circumstances. [153 F-G;  154 A-B, D-F;\n155 C-F; 156 A-C]\n    (2)\t  [Per\tShelat\tand  VaidiaIingam,  JJ.]:   It\t  is\ndoubtful   whether principles analogous to res judicata\t can\nproperty be applied to industrial adjudication. [143 H]\n    Burn & Co. v. Their Employees,<\/a> [1956] S.C.R. 781, Guest,\nKeen,  Williams (P) Ltd. v. Sterling,<\/a>  [1960] 1\t S.C.R.\t 348\nand  Workmen  of Balmer Lawrie & Co. v. Balmer Lawrie &\t Co.<\/a>\n[1964-]\t 5  S,C.R.  344, referred to,\n133\n    [Per Bhargava, J.]: This Court bas expressed conflicting\nviews on the question of 'applying the principle  underlying\nthe rule of res judicata to industrial adjudication. [150 E]\n    Burn  & Co.'s case, [1956] S.C.R.  781,   Balmer  Lawrie\nCo.'s  case, [1964] 5 S.C.R. 344 and Associated Cement Staff\nUnion v. Associated Cement Co. [1964] 1 L.L.J. 12.  referred\nto.\n    (3)\t [Per  Shelat  and Vaidialingam,  JJ.]:\t So  far  as\nmodifications  (ii)  and (iii) are concerned, in  an  appeal\nunder  Art.  136, this Court would not\tinterfere  with\t the\nconclusion  of\tthe  authorities  under\t the  Act  since  no\nprinciple is involved. [144 F]\n    As regards modification (iv), the authorities under\t the\nAct  held that it was fair and reasonable, and there  is  no\njustification for this Court to interfere with the decision.\nIn Industrial matters, at present, the doctrine of hire\t and\nfire   is   completely\tabrogated,  because,   security\t  of\nemployment  is one of the necessities for  industrial  peace\nand   harmony.\tIf reasons for discharging an  employee\t are\nfurnished tO him he not only has the satisfaction of knowing\nwhy  his  services are dispensed with,\tbut  in\t appropriate\ncases  he can challenge it, as even when the services of  an\nemployee   are\tterminated  by\tan  order    of\t   discharge\nsimpliciter,   its legality and propriety can be  challenged\nbefore\tan  industrial\ttribunal. [145 A-E]\n    As regards modification (iv) the requirement of a second\nshow cause notice is peculiar to cases coming under Art. 311\nof  the\t Constitution and neither the ordinary law  nor\t the\nindustrial  law requires an employer to give such a  notice.\nEven in Art. 311, the requirement is now removed and so,  it\nis not necessary to import it into industrial matters.\t[145\nE-F]\n    [Per  Bhargava  J. dissenting]: The order  must  be\t set\naside  because the four modifications were not based on\t any\nfresh facts, material  or change of circumstances.  In fact,\nmodification   (i)  was,  specifically\tdisallowed  by\t the\nAppellate  Authority at an earlier stage and merely  because\nhis  successor\tconsidered  it reasonable and  fair  it\t was\npermitted without any change in the circumstances. [156 E-F,\nH]\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:  Civil Appeal No. 27 of 1968.
\n    Appeal  by special leave from the order  dated   October
\n27,  1967  of the Chief Labour\tCommissioner  (Central)\t and
\nAppellate Authority, New Delhi in No. I.E. 1 ( 11 )\/7\/66-\n<\/p>\n
    H.R.  Gokhale,  B.\tParthasarathy:\tO.C.  Mathut,\tJ.B.
\nDadachanji and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant.
\n    R.K.  Garg, S.C. Agarwala and Anil Kumar Gupta, for\t the
\nrespondent.\n<\/p>\n
    The Judgment of J.M. SHELAT and C.A. VAIDIALINGAM,\tJJ.,
\nwas  delivered\tby  SHELAT,  J.\t BHARGAVA,  J.\tdelivered  a
\ndissenting Opinion.\n<\/p>\n
    Shelat,  J.\t  This appeal, by special leave, is  by\t the
\nemployer  and  raises the question as to the scope  of\tsec.
\n10(2) of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 20
\nof  1946,  as  amended\tby  Act\t 36  of\t 1956  (referred  to
\nhereinafter as the Act).\n<\/p>\n
134<\/span><\/p>\n
      The  Standing  Orders of\tthe  Appellant-company\twere
\ncertified   on\tAugust\t7,  1962  by  the  Regional   Labour
\nCommissioner,  Central,\t under s. 4 of the  Act.   Both\t the
\ncompany and the workmen filed appeals against the said order
\nwhich  were disposed of by the Appellate authority under  s.\n<\/p>\n
6.   Sometime  thereafter the respondent-union\tapplied\t for
\ncertain modifications, some of’ which were certified by\t the
\nRegional Labour Commissioner by his order dated December 28,
\n1963.\tThe Appellant-company filed an\tappeal\tagainst\t the
\nsaid  order  which  was\t disposed of  by  the  Chief  Labour
\nCommissioner in April 1964. On April 25, 1965 the respondent
\nunion  made  a further application  for\t modifications.\t The
\nRegional Labour Commissioner by his order dated September 2,
\n1965  allowed certain modifications but rejected  the  rest.
\nThe  union thereupon appealed against the said order.  After
\nhearing\t  the parties the Chief Labour\tCommissioner  passed
\nhis   impugned\torder  dated  October  27,   1967   ordering
\ncertification\tof   certain   modifications.\tThough\t the
\nAppellant-company    objected\tat   first   to\t  all\t the
\nmodifications, counsel pressed the appeal in respect of four
\nmodifications only.  The first modification challenged is in
\nStanding  Order\t 9, clause (a)which, as unamended,  read  as
\nfollows:\n<\/p>\n
\t\t      “The   railway  under  the  terms\t  of
\n\t      employment  has  the right  to  terminate\t the
\n\t      services\t of  a\tpermanent Workman on  giving
\n\t      him  one\tmonth’s\t notice in  writing  or\t one
\n\t      month’s pay may be paid in lieu of notice.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
The  union claimed that the management should  give  reasons
\neven  when they terminated the services of an employee by  a
\ndischarge  simpliciter. The modification  allowed   directed
\nreasons\t to  be recorded in writing and communicated to\t the
\nworkman if he so desires at the time of discharge but not if
\nthe   management  considers  it\t inadvisable.\tThe   second
\nmodification  is  in  Standing\tOrder 12, clause (A), which,
\nin its unamended form,\t  read\tas  follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t\t      “When  any of the penalties  specified
\n\t      in Order 9 is imposed upon a workman an appeal
\n\t      shall  lie  to  the authority next above\tthat
\n\t      imposing the penalty.  An appeal shall lie  to
\n\t      the  Managing Agents only on  original  orders
\n\t      passed by the General Manager  …..  ”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
The union’s plea was that some time limit was necessary\t for
\nthe  disposal of the appeals as the managing agents who\t are
\nthe  appellate authority against the orders of\tthe  General
\nManager\t took  months  to dispose of  such  appeals  thereby
\ndelaying  the workman from raising an industrial dispute  in
\ntime  and seek timely relief. The modification\tallowed\t was
\nthat  every  such  appeal  shall  be  disposed,\t of  by\t the
\nappellate  authority  within 60 days from the  date  of\t its
\nreceipt.  The third modification is  in\t Standing  Order  11
\n(‘vii) which read as follows:\n<\/p>\n
       135<\/span><\/p>\n
\t\t      “Removal from service: A workman shall
\n\t      be  liable to be removed from service  in\t the
\n\t      following circumstances:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (a) Inefficiency.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      The modification allowed was as follows:
\n\t\t      “In   case  of  inefficiency  due\t  to
\n\t      physical\t unfitness  the\t workman  whom\t the
\n\t      management   considers   suitable\t  for\tsome
\n\t      alternative  employment shall be\toffered\t the
\n\t      same on reasonable emoluments having regard to
\n\t      his former emoluments.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
The   modification  contains,  it  will\t be  noticed,\tfour
\nlimitations: (1 ) it applies only to cases of removal on the
\nground\tof  physical  unfitness, (2)  the  consideration  of
\nsuitability  for  an  alternate employment is  left  to\t the
\nmanagement, (3 ) the existence of alternative post, and\t (4)
\nthe  question as to what reasonable emoluments should be  is
\nleft  to  the  management.  The fourth\tmodification  is  in
\nStanding  Order 11 (vii) (c) which, in its  unamended  form,
\nwas as follows.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t      \"Every\t person\t    against\twhom\n\t      departmental enquiry is\t    being made shall\n\t      be  supplied  with  a  copy  of  the  findings\n<\/pre>\n
\t      in  connection with his dismissal and  removal
\n\t      from ser-\t    vice.  The workman shall also be
\n\t      supplied with a copy\t of the\t proceedings
\n\t      of   the\t enquiry  committee   as   soon\t  as
\n\t      possible\tafter the conclusion of the  enquiry
\n\t      proceedings\t in his case and be  allowed
\n\t      to   defend  his\tcase  through\t     union’s
\n\t      representative.”\n<\/p>\n
\t\t The modification allowed was as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t\t       “In  case the management\t propose  to
\n\t      remove   the workman from service\t they  shall
\n\t      serve  on\t the  workmen  separate\t show  cause
\n\t      notice to that effect.”\n<\/p>\n
      Counsel for the company challenged the impugned  order
\nin its two facets: the scope of the power  of\tmodification
\nunder  s.  10(2),  and\ton merits on  the  ground  that\t the
\nmodifications  did not stand the test of reasonableness\t and
\nfairness.  On the first question his contention was that the
\njurisdiction and powers of the authorities under the Act  to
\ncertify\t modifications of the existing standing\t orders\t are
\nlimited\t to  cases  where  a  change  of  circumstances\t  is
\nestablished.   In  the course of  his\targument,   counsel,
\nhowever,  qualified the contention by conceding that  if  at
\nthe  time  of the last certification  certain  circumstances
\nwere, for one reason
\n136<\/span>
\nor   the  other,  omitted  from\t consideration\tthey   would
\nconstitute   a\tValid  reason  for  modification   and\t the
\nmodification  would  be granted even though in such a case a
\nchange of circumstances has not occurred. He next  contended
\nthat in any case though s. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure
\ndid  not apply, principles analogous to res  judicata  would
\napply  to  an  application  for\t modification  unless\tsuch
\napplication is occasioned by new circumstances having arisen
\nor  is based on new facts.  Briefly, the argument  was\tthat
\nthe  object of the Act is to have conditions of\t service  of
\nworkmen\t in  an establishment defined  with  precision,\t and
\ntherefore,  to\thave standing orders   dealing\t with\tsuch
\nconditions  certified.\tFor industrial harmony and peace  it
\nis  necessary that those conditions are stable and  do\tno.t
\nremain\tundefined  or  fluctuating.  In\t pursuance  of\tthis
\nobject the Act confers finality\t to such  certified standing
\norders or modifications thereof under s. 6.  The  contention
\nwas   that  if\tmodifications  were  allowed   without\t any
\nrestraint, there would be multiple applications specially as
\nindividual  workman have been given the right to  apply\t for
\nmodifications.\tTherefore, the word ‘final’ in s. 6, it’ was
\nargued,\t must be so read as to mean that an application\t for
\nmodification under  s, 10(2)  can only be maintainable if it
\nis  justified  on the ground of a  change  of  circumstances
\nhaving\toccurred  after the fast  certification,   which  of
\ncourse,\t according to the concession made by  counsel,\talso
\nwould  include cases where certain circumstances   were\t not
\ntaken into account at the time of the last certification.
\n    The\t  relevant   provisions\t  of   the   Act   requiring
\nconsideration  in this appeal are ss. 4, 6, 10, 11  and\t 12.
\nSection\t 4 provides that standing orders shall be  certified
\nunder  the Act if (a) a provision is made therein for  every
\nmatter\tset out in the Schedule, and (b) they are  otherwise
\nin  conformity with the provisions of the Act.\tThe  section
\nfurther\t provides  that\t it shall be the   function  of\t the
\ncertifying officer or the appellate authority to  adjudicate
\nupon  the fairness or reasonableness ‘of the’ provisions  of
\nthe  standing  orders. Section 6 provides  that\t any  person
\naggrieved  by  the order of the\t certifying  officer  passed
\nunder s. 5(2) may appeal to the appellate authority and\t the
\nappellate authority, “whose decision shall be final”,  shall
\nby  an\torder  confirm\tthe  standing  orders  in  the\tform
\ncertified  under s. 5 (2) or amend or add thereto to  render
\nthem   certifiable  under  the\tAct.   Section\t 10,   whose
\ninterpretation\tis  in\tquestion, provides by  sub-s.  1  as
\nfollows:\n<\/p>\n
\t\t    “Standing orders finally certified under
\n\t      this   Act  shall\t not,  except  on  agreement
\n\t      between  the  employer  and  the\tworkmen,  be
\n\t      liable to modification until  the expiry of  6
\n\t      months  from  the date on which  the  standing
\n\t      orders or the last modifications thereof\tcame
\n\t      into operation.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
137<\/span><\/p>\n
  Sub-s. 2 runs as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t\t   “Subject to the provisions of sub-section
\n\t      (1), an em-\n<\/p>\n
\t\tployer\t or   workman  may  apply   to\t the
\n\t      certifying officer
\n\t\tto have the standing orders modified  …..
\nSub-s.\t3 provides that the foregoing provisiOnS of the\t Act
\nshall apply in respect of an application for modification as
\nthey  apply  to\t the certification  of\tthe  first  standing
\norders.\t Section 11 empowers the certifying officer and\t the
\nappellate  authority  to correct  clerical  or\tarithmetical
\nmistakes in an order passed  by them or\t errors arising from
\nany  accidental\t slip or omission.  Lastly, s.\t12  provides
\nthat  no  oral evidence having the effect of  adding  to  or
\notherwise  varying  or\tcontradicting  standing\t orders\t  as
\nfinally\t certified  under the Act shall be admitted  in\t any
\ncourt.\n<\/p>\n
    Counsel  conceded, and did so rightly, that there is  no
\nexpress\t provision in any one of these sections\t restricting
\nthe  right  to apply for modification or the  power  of\t the
\nauthorities to allow modification only on proof of a  change
\nof circumstances.  The only limitations to the power are the
\nreasonableness\t or  fairness  which   of  course  must\t  be
\nestablished  and the expiry of six months after the date  of
\nthe standing orders or their last modifications coming\tinto
\noperation.  In the absence of any such express\t restriction
\nwe  should  then ask ourselves whether there is\t in  any  of
\nthese\tsections  anything  which  would  indicate  such   a
\nrestriction  by\t necessary implication.\t In that  connection
\nthe  only  word\t which\tcan point  to  such  a\trestriction,
\naccording  to.\tcounsel, is the word ‘final’ in sec.  6,  so
\nthat  the contention reduces itself to this that  by  making
\nthe  order  of the appellate authority final under  sec.  6,
\nParliament intended by necessary implication that the bar of
\nfinality  can  only be removed if  new\tcircumstances  arise
\nwhich necessitate or justify modification.
\n    But\t the intention of the legislature, as  observed\t  by
\nLord  Watson  in Salomon v.A. Salomon & Co.  Ltd.(1)  “is  a
\ncommon but very slippery phrase, which popularly understood,
\nmay  signify  anything from intention embodied\tin  positive
\nenactment to speculative opinion as to what the\t legislature
\nprobably   would   have meant, although there  has  been  an
\nomission  to  enact”.  It is well settled that\tthe  meaning
\nwhich  words  ought to be understood to bear is\t not  to  be
\nascertained  by\t any  process akin to  speculation  and\t the
\nprimary\t duty of a court is to find the natural\t meaning  of
\nthe  words  used in the context in which  they\toccur,\tthat
\ncontext\t including  any other phrase in the  Act  which\t may
\nthrow light on the sense in which the makers of the Act used
\nthe  words in dispute.\tIn R.v. Wimbledon Justices(2)\tLord
\nGoddard\t   said:  “Although  in\t construing   an   Act\t  of
\nParliament  the court must always try to give effect to\t the
\nintention of the Act and must look
\n(1) [1897] A.C. 22, 38.\t  (2) [1953] 1 Q.B. 380.
\n2 Sup. C.l.\/69–10
\n138<\/span>
\nnot  only  at the remedy provided but also at  the  mischief
\naimed  at,  it cannot add words to a statute or\t read  words
\ninto  it  which\t are not there\t….   “Similarly,  in\tR.v.
\nMansel Jones(1) Lord Coleridge said that it was me  business
\nof  the courts to see what Parliament had said,\t instead  of
\nreading into an Act what ought to have been said. So too, in
\nLatham\tv.  Lafone(2), Martin B. said: “I think\t the  proper
\nrule  for construing this statute is to adhere to its  words
\nstrictly;  and it is my strong belief that, by reasoning  on
\nlong-drawn  inferences and remote consequences,\t the  courts
\nhave  pronounced many judgments affecting debts and  actions
\nin a manner that the persons who originated and prepared the
\nAct never dreamed of.”\tIn the light of these principles  we
\nought, therefore, to give a literal meaning to the  language
\nused  by Parliament unless the language is ambiguous or\t its
\nliteral\t sense\tgives  rise  to an  anomaly  or\t results  in
\nsomething which\t would defeat the purpose of the Act.
\n    The Act was passed because the legislature thought\tthat
\nin many industrial establishments the conditions of  service
\nwere  not  uniform and sometimes were not  even\t reduced  to
\nwriting.   This\t led to conflicts resulting  in\t unnecessary
\nindustrial disputes.  The object of passing the Act was thus
\nto require employers to define with certainty the conditions
\nof  service in their establishments and to require  them  to
\nreduce\tthem  to  writing  and\tto  get\t them\tcompulsorily
\ncertified.   The matters in respect of which the  conditions
\nof  employment\thad to be certified were  specified  in\t the
\nschedule  to  the  Act.\t  As the  Act  stood  prior  to\t its
\namendment in 1956, sec. 3 required the employer to submit to
\nthe  certifying. officer draft standing orders\tproposed  by
\nhim  for adoption in his establishment. Section\t 4  provided
\nthat  standing orders shall be certifiable if (a)  provision
\nis  made therein for every matter set out in  the  Schedule,
\nand  (b)  that they were otherwise in  conformity  with\t the
\nprovisions  of\tthe Act.. The  section,\t however,  expressly
\nprovided that it shall not be the function of the certifying
\nofficer\t  or the appellate authority to adjudicate upon\t the
\nfairness or reasonableness of the standing orders.  Under s.
\n5, the certifying officer was required to send a copy of the
\ndraft  standing\t orders\t to the union, if  any,\t or  in\t its
\nabsence\t to  the workmen in the manner\tprescribed  together
\nwith a notice calling for objections by them, if any, and to
\ngive  opportunity to the employer and the workmen  of  being
\nheard and then to decide whether or not any modification  of
\nor  addition to the draft standing orders was  necessary  to
\nrender\tthem certifiable under the Act. Section\t 6  provided
\nfor  an appeal by any person aggrieved by the  order  passed
\nunder  s.  5.  The appellate authority, whose  decision\t was
\nmade final, had the power to confirm or amend or add to\t the
\nstanding  orders passed by the certifying officer to  render
\nthem certifiable under the Act. Though the
\n[1889]\t23Q.B.D.  29,32.\t     (2) [1867] L.R.  2\t Ex.
\n115,121.\n<\/p>\n
139<\/span><\/p>\n
order passed by the appellate authority was made final under
\ns.  6, sec. 10 provided for modification. Sub-s. 1 of s.  10
\nprovided  that standing orders finally certified under\tthis
\nAct shall not, except on agreement between the employer\t and
\nthe  workmen, be liable to modification until expiry of\t six
\nmonths from the date on which they or the last\tmodification
\nthereof came into operation. Sub-s. 2 read as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t\t      “An  employer desiring to\t modify\t his
\n\t      standing orders shall apply to the  Certifying
\n\t      Officer  in  that\t behalf
\nSub-s.\t3 provided that the foregoing provisions of the\t Act
\nshall apply in respect of an application under sub-sec. 2 as
\nthey  apply  to\t the certification  of\tthe  first  standing
\norders.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    As\tthe  Act  stood\t prior to 1956,\t there\twas  thus  a
\nprohibition  against the certifying officer going  into\t the
\nquestion of reasonableness or fairness of the draft standing
\norders submitted to him by the employer.  His only  function
\nwas to see that the draft made\t  provisions for all matters
\ncontained  in  the  Schedule and that it  D   was  otherwise
\ncertifiable under the Act.  Therefore though the     workmen
\nthrough the union or otherwise were served with\t the\tcopy
\nof  the\t draft and had the right to  raise  objections,\t the
\nobjections could be of a limited character, namely, that the
\ndraft did    not provide for all matters in the Schedule  or
\nthat it was not otherwise certifiable under the Act. Even in
\nan  appeal  under s. 6, the E  only  objections\t they  could
\nraise  were limited to the two aforesaid     questions.\t The
\nworkmen thus could not object that the draft standing orders
\nwere  not  reasonable  or fair. Under s. 10,  the  right  to
\napply  for modification was conferred on the employer  alone
\nand   in view of sub-s. 3 the only consideration  which\t the
\ncertifying   authority could apply to such modification\t was
\nthe  one  which\t he  F\t could apply  under  ss.  4  and  6.
\nTherefore, no question whether the    modification was\tfair
\nor  reasonable could be raised. It is thus clear   that\t the
\nworkman\t had very little say in the matter even if  he\tfelt
\nthat the standing orders or their modifications were  either
\nnot    reasonable or fair. They could, of course,  raise  an
\nindustrial   dispute.\t But   that   remedy   was    hardly
\nsatisfactory.  Such a  dispute\t  had to be first  sponsored
\nby  a union or at least a substantial number of workmen;  it
\nbad  next  to  go through the process  of  conciliation\t and
\nlastly\tthe  appropriate  Government  may  or  may  not\t  be
\nprepared to refer such a dispute to industrial adjudication.
\nEven   if it did, the entire process was a protracted one.
\nIn  1956, parliament effected radical changes  in  the\t Act
\nwidening its scope and altering its very complexion. Section
\n4, as  amended by Act 36 of 1956, entrusted the\t authorities
\nunder  the   Act with the duty to adjudicate  upon  fairness
\nand  reasonableness   of the standing orders.\tThe  enquiry
\nwhen such-standing’ orders
\n140<\/span>
\nare  submitted\tfor  certification is  now  two-fold:  (1  )
\nwhether the standig orders are in consonance with the  model
\nstanding   orders,  and\t (2)  whether  they  are  fair\t and
\nreasonable.  The workmen, therefore, can raise an  objection
\nas  to the reasonableness or fairness of the draft  standing
\norders\tsubmitted for certification.  By amending  s.  10(2)
\nboth  .the workmen and the employer are given the  right  to
\napply  for modification and by reason of the change made  in
\ns.  4  a  modification\thas also now to\t be  tested  by\t the
\nyardstick of fairness and reasonableness.  The Act  provides
\na  speedy     and cheap remedy available to  the  individual
\nworkman\t to  have his conditions of service  determined\t and
\nalso  for  their modifications. By amending ss. 4 and  1  O,
\nParliament  not only  broadened\t the. scope of the  Act\t but
\nalso.  gave  a\tclear  expression  to  the  change  in\t its
\nlegislative policy.  Parliament knew that the workmen,\teven
\nas  the\t unamended  Act stood, had the\tright  to  raise  an
\nindustrial  dispute, yet, not satisfied with such a  remedy,
\nit  conferred\tby  amending  ss. 4  and  10  the  right  to
\nindividual  workmen  to contest the  draft  standing  orders
\nsubmitted  by the employer for certification on\t the  ground
\nthat  they  are\t either not fair  or  reasonable,  and\tmore
\nimportant  still, the right to apply for their\tmodification
\ndespite the finality of the order of the appellate authority
\nunder s. 6. Parliament thus deliberately gave a dual  remedy
\nto the workmen both under this Act and under the  Industrial
\nDisputes  Act.\tThis  fact  has\t in  recent  decisions\tbeen
\nrecognised  by this  Court. (of Bangalore Woollen, Cotton  &
\nSilk Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen<\/a>(1), Buckingham & Carnatic Co.
\nLtd.  v. Workmen(2) and Hindustan Brown Boveri Ltd.  v.\t The
\nWorkmen<\/a>(a).\n<\/p>\n
    It\twill  be pertinent, while  examining  the   question
\nwhether there is a restriction, as suggested by counsel,  to
\nthe  right to apply for modifications, to bear in  mind\t the
\nchange in the legislative policy reflected in the amendments
\nof  ss.\t 4 and 10.  It will be noticed that s. 10  does\t not
\nstate  that  once  a standing order   is  modified  and\t the
\nmodification  is  certified,  no  further  modification\t  is
\npermissible except upon\t proof that new circumstances\thave
\narisen since the last modification.  As a matter of fact the
\nlegislature  has not incorporated any words in the  sub-sec.
\nrestricting  the right to apply for modification  except  of
\ncourse\tthe time limit of six months in sub-s. 1. Section  6
\nno doubt lays down that the order of the appellate authority
\nin  an\tappeal against the order of the\t certifying  officer
\nunder  s. 5 is final but that finality is itself subject  to
\nthe right to apply for modification under s. 10(2). Even so,
\nit  was urged that the finality of the order under s. 6\t was
\nindicative  of\ta condition precedent  to  the\tjurisdiction
\nunder\tsec.   10(2)  to  entertain   an   application\t for
\nmodification on a new set
\n(1) [1968] 1 L.LJ. 555.\n<\/p>\n
(2) C.A. No. 674 of 1968 decided oft 25th July, 1968.
\n(3) C.A. No. l631 ofl966 decided on 31st July, 1967.\n<\/p>\n
141<\/span><\/p>\n
    circumstances   having  arisen  in\tthe  meantime.\t The
\nquestion is whether such is the position.
\n    The finality to the order passed under s. 6 really means
\nthat  there  is no further appeal or revision  against\tthat
\norder and no more.  This view finds support from s. 12 which
\nlays  down  that  once\tthe  standing  orders  are   finally
\ncertified,  no oral evidence can be led in any\tcourt  which
\nhas  the  effect  of  adding  to  or  otherwise\t varying  or
\ncontradicting  such  standing orders. Section 6,  when\tread
\nwith  s.  12,  indicates  that the  finality  given  to\t the
\ncertification  by  the\tappellate authority  is\t against  a,
\nchallenge thereof in a civil court.  But the finality  given
\nto  the\t appellate  authority’s\t order\tis  subject  to\t the
\nmodification of those very standing orders certified by him.
\nAs  already  stated, s. 10 itself does not  lay\t  down\t any
\nrestriction  to the right to apply for modification-   Apart
\nfrom the right to apply for modification under the Act,\t the
\nworkmen ,can raise an industrial dispute with regard to\t the
\nstanding orders. There is nothing in the Industrial Disputes
\nAct restricting the right to raise such a dispute only\twhen
\na  new\tset of circumstances has arisen.  If that  right  is
\nunrestricted, can it be possible that the very_\t legislature
\nwhich passed both the Acts could have, while conferring\t the
\nright on the workmen individually, restricted that right  as
\nsuggested  by  counsel ?  To illustrate,  a  new  industrial
\nestablishment  is set up and workmen  are  engaged  therein.
\nEither\tthere is no union or if there is one it is  not\t yet
\nproperly organised. The standing orders of the establishment
\nare certified under the Act.  At the time of  certification,
\nthe  union  or\tthe workmen’s  representatives\t had  raised
\neither\tno  objections\tor  only   certain  objections.\t  If
\nsubsequently the workmen feel that further objections  could
\nhave  been raised and if so raised the authority  under\t the
\nAct  would have taken them into consideration, does it\tmean
\nthat because new circumstances have since then not   arisen,
\nthe workmen would be barred from applying for modification ?
\nLet us take another illustration.  Where, after the standing
\norders\tor their modifications are certified, it  strikes  a
\nworkman after they have been in operation for some time that
\na  further  improvement\t in his\t conditions  of\t service  is
\ndesirable,  would  he\tbe  debarred  from  applying  for  a
\nfurther\t modification  on  the\tground\tthat  no  change  of
\ncircumstances  in  the meantime has taken place?  Where\t the
\nstanding  orders  provide 10 festival holidays,\t if  counsel
\nwere  right, the workmen can never apply for an addition  in
\ntheir number as they would be faced with the contention that
\nthe festivals existed at the time of the last  certification
\nand there was therefore no change of circumstances.\n<\/p>\n
     The  Act  is  a beneficent\t piece\tof  legislation\t and
\ntherefore  unless compelled by any words in it we would\t not
\nbe justified in importing in s. 10 through inference only  a
\nrestriction  to the right conferred by. it on account  of  a
\nsupposed danger of multiplicity
\n153<\/span>
\nfor  the  purpose of ensuring that  conditions\tof  service,
\nwhich  the employer laid down, became known to the   workmen
\nand   the  liberty  of\tthe  employer  in  prescribing\t the
\nconditions  of service was only limited to the\textent\tthat
\nthe  Standing  Orders  had  to be  in  conformity  with\t the
\nprovisions  of\tthe  Act  and, as  far\tas  practicable,  in
\nconformity  with  Model\t Standing  Orders.   The  Certifying
\nOfficer\t or  the  Appellate  Authority\twere  debarred\tfrom
\nadjudicating upon the fairness or the reasonableness of\t the
\nprovisions of the Standing Orders.  Then, as noticed in\t the
\ncase   of   Rohtak Hissar District  Electricity\t Supply\t Co.
\nLtd.(1),   the\t Legislature made a drastic  change  in\t the
\npolicy\tof the Act  by\tamending section 4 and\tlaying\tupon
\nthe  Certifying\t Officer the duty of  deciding\twhether\t the
\nStanding Orders proposed by the employer were reasonable and
\nfair,  and  also by amending section 10(2) so as  to  permit
\neven  a workman to apply for modification of  the  certified
\nStanding  Orders, while, in the original Act,  the  employer
\nalone  had  the right to make such an application.   It\t is,
\nhowever, to be noticed that the preamble of the Act was no.t
\naltered, so that the purpose of the Act remained as  before.
\nWhile the Act was in its unamended form, if the workmen\t had
\na  grievance,  they  could not\tapply  for  modification  of
\ncertified  Standing Orders and, even at the time of  initial
\ncertification, they could only object to a Standing Order on
\nthe ground that it was not in conformity with the provisions
\nof  the Act or Model Standing Orders.  After amendment,\t the
\nworkmen were given the right to object to the draft Standing
\nOrders at the time of first certification on the ground that
\nthe  Standing Orders were not fair and reasonable and,\teven
\nsubsequently,  to  apply for modification of  the  certified
\nStanding  Orders  after expiry of the period of\t six  months
\nprescribed  under  s.  10( 1 ) of  the\tAct.   These  rights
\ngranted\t to  the  workmen and the powers  conferred  on\t the
\nCertifying  Officer  and the Appellate\tAuthority,  however,
\n,still had to be exercised for the purpose of giving  effect
\nto  the object of the Act as it continued to remain  in\t the
\npreamble,  which was not altered.  Before the  amendment  of
\nthe Act, if the workmen had any grievance on the  ground  of
\nunfairness  or\tunreasonableness  of  the  Standing   Orders
\nproposed  by the employer, their only remedy lay  under\t the
\nIndustrial  Disputes Act.  By amendment in 1956,  a  limited
\nremedy was provided for them in the Act itself by conferring
\non  the\t Certifying  Officer the  function  of\tjudging\t the
\nreasonableness and fairness of the proposed Standing Orders.
\nThese  amendments  cannot, however, affect  the\t alternative
\nremedy\twhich the workmen had of seeking redress  under\t the
\nIndustrial Disputes Act if  they  had grievance against\t any
\nof the Standing Orders certified by the Certifying   Officer
\n[See  Bangalore Woollen, Cotton and Silk Mills Company\tLtd.
\nv. Their Workmen and Another<\/a>(2), and the
\n(1)  [1966]  2 S.C.R, 863.\t\t      (2)  [1968]  1
\nL,L.J. 555.\n<\/p>\n
2 Sup. C1169–11
\n143<\/span>
\nof  applications.   The\t policy of s. 10  is  clear  that  a
\nmodification  should not be allowed within six\tmonths\tfrom
\nthe date when the standing orders or the last  modifications
\nthereof\t came into operation.  The object of  providing\t the
\ntime   limit  was  that\t the  standing\torders\t .or   their
\nmodifications  should  be allowed to work  for\tsufficiently
\nlong  time  to see whether they work properly or  not.\tEven
\nthat  time  limit is not rigid because a  modification\teven
\nbefore\tsix months is permissible if there is  an  agreement
\nbetween the parties.\n<\/p>\n
    The ground for urging that a restriction should be\tread
\nin   s.\t  10  was  the\tapprehension  that   since   workmen
\nindividually  have  the\t right to  apply  for  modifications
\nthere  would   be multiple applications\t which\tan  employer
\nwould have to face.  Secondly, that an application without a
\nchange\tof circumstances would be tantamount to a review  by
\nthe    same    authority   of\this    previous\t  order\t  of
\ncertification.\t It was said that if no restriction is\tread
\nin  s.\t10 it would mean that the same\tauthority.  who.  on
\nsatisfaction  of  the  fairness\t and  reasonableness  of   a
\nstanding  order\t or its last modification had  certified  it
\nwould  be  called upon to review his  previous\tdecision  on
\nreasonableness and fairness.  Such a review, it was  argued,
\nis  permissible only on\t well-recognised   grounds,  namely,
\ndiscovery  of  new  and important  matter  or  evidence,   a
\nmistake\t or an error apparent on the face of the  record  or
\nany other sufficient reason.\n<\/p>\n
    An\tapplication  for modification would  ordinarily\t  be
\nmade  where (1) a change of circumstances has  occurred,  or
\n(2)  where experience of the working of the standing  orders
\nlast   certified results in inconvenience  bardship  anomaly
\netc.  or (3)  where some fact was lost sight of at the\tt;me
\nof  certification, or (4) where the applicant feels  that  a
\nmodification will be more beneficial. In category (1)  there
\nwould  be  no difficulty as a change  of  circumstances\t has
\ntaken  place.  But in cases falling, under the rest  of\t the
\ncategories there will be no change of circumstances.   Does-
\nit  mean  that\tthough the implementation  of  the  standing
\norders\thas resulted. in hardship. inconvenience or  anomaly
\nno modification can be asked for because there is no  change
\nof  circumstances  ? As to multiplicity of  applications  we
\nthink\tthat  there  is\t no  justification  for\t  any\tsuch
\napprehension.  for.  unless  there in  a  justification\t for
\nmodification the authorities under the Act would reject them
\non the ground that they are frivolous and therefore  neither
\nfair nor reasonable.  Lastly as to such an application being
\na  review of the last certifying order an application  under
\ns.  10 is not a review.\t An application for review would  be
\nmade   in the  proceedings in ‘which the’ judgment or  order
\nsought to be reviewed is passed That would not be s0 in\t the
\ncase of an application under s. ’10(2);\t Such an application
\nis   independent   of\tthe  proceedings   in\twhich\tthe’
\nlast.certifying order was passed and. is made in ‘the
\n143<\/span>
\nexercise   of  an  independent\tright  conferred  upon\t the
\napplicant by s. ]0(2).\tIn an application for  modification,
\nthe  issue  before  the authority would be  not\t as  to\t the
\nreasonableness\tor fairness of the standing orders or  their
\nlast modification, but whether the modification now  applied
\nfor is fair and reasonable.  Therefore,\t the contention that
\na  change of circumstances is a condition precedent  to\t the
\nmaintainability of an application under s. 10(2) or that  an
\napplication for modification without proof of such a  change
\namounts\t to  review by the same authority  of  its  previous
\norder is not correct .\n<\/p>\n
     It\t was then argued that assuming that  a\tmodification
\nwithout\t a change of circumstances is permissible though  s.
\n11 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to industry
\nmatters,  sound policy dictates that principles analogous to
\nres judicata must be applied and it must be held that unless
\ncircumstances  have changed an application for\tmodification
\nwould be ,barred.  For this, counsel relied on Burn & Co. v.
\nTheir  Employees<\/a>(x).  There the demand was for\twage  scales
\nfixed in an award by the Mercantile Tribunal instead of\t the
\nscales\tin accordance with the scheme of the Bengal  Chamber
\nof Commerce.  In  a  dispute  previously raised by labour an
\naward  was  made  in 1950 which\t accepted  the\twage  scales
\naccording  to the scheme of the Bengal Chamber\tof  Commerce
\nand  rejected the demand for the scales according  to  those
\nawarded\t by  the  Mercantile  Tribunal\t which\t were\tmore
\nfavourable.  It was in these  circumstances that this  Court
\nexpressed the view that an award fixing wage scales   should
\nhave fairly long range operation and should not be unsettled
\nunless\ta  change of circumstances has\toccurred  justifying
\nfresh  adjudication.   But with the constant  spiralling  of
\nprices\tthe  principle would appear to have lost much of its
\nefficacy.  The trend in recent decisions is that application
\nof  technical\trules such as  res  judicata.  acquiescence,
\nestoppel   etc.\t  are\tnot   appropriate   to\t  industrial
\nadjudication.  In Guest, Keen, Williams Private Ltd.  v.P.J.
\nSterling(2)  a modification of a standing order relating  to
\nthe   age  of  superannuation  was  sought  by\traising\t  an
\nindustrial  dispute. It was contended that the reference  of
\nthat  dispute was barred by acquiescence and  laches.\tThat
\ncontention    was   rejected,  the  Court   observing\tthat
\nindustrial  tribunal  should  be  slow\tand  circumspect  in
\napplying  technical  principles such  as   acquiescence\t and
\nestoppel.  In  Workmen of Balmer Lawrie &   Co.\t v.   Balmer
\nLawrie & Co.<\/a>(3) also it was observed that the question as to
\nrevision  of wage scales must be examined on the  merits  of
\neach  individual  case and technical considerations  of\t res
\njudicata  should not be allowed to hamper the discretion  of
\nindustrial  adjudication      therefore.  doubtful   whether
\nprinciples   analogous\t to  res judicata  can\tproperly  be
\napplied to industrial adjudication.\n<\/p>\n
(1) S.C.R.781, 789.\t\t (2) [1960] l S.C.R. 348.
\n(2) [1964] 5 S.C.R. 344.\n<\/p>\n
144<\/span><\/p>\n
    On\t merits,   Mr.\t Gokhale  argued   that\t  the\tfour
\nmodifications  to  which he objected were neither  fair\t nor
\nreasonable and that therefore we should set them aside,\t The
\n,question  is, whether in an appeal under Art. 136 we  would
\nbe   justified\tin  interfering\t with  conclusions   as\t  to
\nreasonableness and fairness by authorities empowered by\t the
\nAct  to\t arrive\t at  such  conclusions.\t  In  Rohtak  Hissar
\nDistrict  Electricity  Supply  Co. Ltd. v.  State  of  Uttar
\nPradesh\t &  Ors.<\/a>(1)  this Court prevented  counsel  for\t the
\nemployer  from canvassing such a question on the Found\tthat
\nthe  matter of fairness and reasonableness was left  by\t the
\nlegislature  to the authorities constituted under  the\tAct.
\nIn Hindustan Antibiotics Ltd. v. The Workmen & Ors.<\/a>(2)\tthis
\nCourt repeated what it had earlier stated in Bengal Chemical
\n&  Pharmaceutical  Workers v. Their Workmen<\/a>(3)\tthat  though
\nArt.,  136 is couched in widest terms, it is  necessary\t to,
\nexercise  discretionary jurisdiction  of this Court only  in
\ncases  where awards are made in violation of the  principles
\nof  natural  justice or axe made in a manner  causing  grave
\ninjustice  to  parties or raise an  important  principle  of
\nindustrial  law\t requiring  elucidation\t by  this  Court  or
\ndisclose  exceptional  or Special circumstances which  merit
\nconsideration by this Court.\n<\/p>\n
    As\t aforesaid,  the  modifications\t objected   by\t the
\nappellant company are: (1 ) giving reasons and communicating
\nthem   to the workman concerned even in eases  of  discharge
\nsimpliciter,  (2) insertion of lime limit of 60 days in\t the
\ndisposal of appeals, (3) insertion in standing order 11 of a
\nclause\tthat where a workman is re. moved on the  ground  of
\ninefficiency  due  to  physical\t unfitness,  the  management
\nshould\toffer  to such a workman alternative  employment  on
\nreasonable  emoluments\tand  (4)  insertion  of\t the  clause
\nrequiring a_ second show cause notice at time stage when the
\ndecision  of  suitable punishment is to be made. So  far  as
\nmodifications  (2),  and  (3)  are  concerned,\tclearly\t  no
\nprinciple  is involved and there would be  no  justification
\nfor  us\t to interfere with the conclusion of  the  appellate
\nauthority   on\tthe  question  of  their  being\t  fair\t and
\nreasonable.    As  regards  the\t first\t modification,\t the
\ncontention was that an employer has under the law of  master
\nand  servant  the right to terminate the service`s  of\this:
\nemployee  by a discharge simpliciter after giving a  month’s
\nnotice\tor  a  month’s wages in. lieu thereof,\tand  is\t not
\nrequired to give reasons for such an order.  The  Industrial
\nDisputes Act also does not lay down any fetter to that right
\nby requiring him to give reasons  to the employee  concerned
\nand  industrial\t adjudication has so far recognized  such  a
\nright.\t  To   impose  such  a\tfetter\tby   a\t change\t  in
\norders\tis  therefore  not warranted by\t any  statute,\tand,
\ntherefore,  cannot be said to be either fair or\t reasonable.
\nIt  must,  however,  be borne. in mind\tthat  the  right  to
\ncontract in industrial
\n S.C.R. 863.\t\t  (2) [1967] 1 S.C.R. 652,
\n\t\t    supp. 2 S.C.R. 136, 140.\n<\/p>\n
145<\/span><\/p>\n
matters is no longer  an absolute right and statutes dealing
\nwith  industrial  matters abound with  restrictions  on\t the
\nabsolute fight to contract.  The doctrine of hire and  fire,
\nfor  instance, is now completely abrogated both by  statutes
\nand by industrial adjudication, and even where the  services
\nof  an\temployee  are terminated by an\torder  of  discharge
\nsimpliciter the legality and propriety of such an order\t can
\nbe  challenged in industrial tribunals.\t These\trestrictions
\non  the\t absolute right to contract  are  imposed  evidently
\nbecause\t security of employment is. more and more   regarded
\nas  one of the necessities for industrial peace and  harmony
\nand the contentment it brings about a prerequisite of social
\njustice.  During  the last decade or so statutes  have\tbeen
\npassed such as the Bihar Shops and Establishments Act,\t1953
\nwhich  require\ta reasonable cause for dispensing  with\t the
\nservices   of\tan  employee  by  an  order   of   discharge
\nsimpliciter.  If  reasons for discharging  an  employee\t are
\nfurnished  to  the employee concerned, he not only  has\t the
\nsatisfaction  of  knowing why his services   are   dispensed
\nwith-  but it becomes easy for him in appropriate  cases  to
\nchallenge  the\torder on. the ground that it is\t either\t not
\nlegal  or proper which in the absence of knowledge of  those
\nreasons\t it may be difficult, if not impossible for  him  to
\ndo.   In these circumstances, if the authorities  under\t the
\nAct have come to the conclusion that such a modification  is
\nfair  and  reasonable  we  would  hardly  be  justified\t  in
\ninterfering with such a decision.\n<\/p>\n
    As\tregards\t the modification requiting  a\tsecond\tshow
\ncause  notice, neither the ordinary law of the land nor\t the
\nindustrial  law requires an employer to give such a  notice.
\nIn  none of the decisions given by courts or  the  tribunals
\nsuch  a second\tshow cause notice m case of removal has ever
\nbeen  demanded or considered necessary.\t The only  class  of
\ncases where such a notice has been held to be necessary\t are
\nthose arising under Art. 311. Even that has now been removed
\nby  the recent amendment of that Article.  To import such  a
\nrequirement  from  Art. 311 in industrial matters  does\t not
\nappear\tto  be\teither necessary. or  proper  and  would  be
\nequating  industrial employees with civil servants.  In\t our
\nview,  there is no justification on any principle  for\tsuch
\nequation,   Besides, such a requirement would  unnecessarily
\nprolong\t disciplinary  enquiries which in the  interest\t  of
\nindustrial   peace should be disposed of in as short a\ttime
\nas possible. In our view it is not possible to consider this
\nmodification  as  justifiable either\t on  the  ground  of
\nreasonableness\tor  fairness  and should  therefore  be\t set
\naside.\n<\/p>\n
     The appeal, therefore, is partly allowed to the  extent
\naforesaid  and\tthe  impugned order to that  extent  is\t set
\naside.\tThere v,ill be
\n     Bhargava, J.  The management of the  Shahdara   (Delhi)
\nSaharnpur  Light Railway Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred  to
\nas
\n146<\/span>
\n  “the Company”) has riffled this appeal, by special  leave,
\nagainst\t       an   order  passed  by\tthe   Chief   Labour
\nCommissioner (Central)\t  under section 6 ,of the Industrial
\nEmployment  (Standing  Orders)\t   Act,\t 1946\t(hereinafter
\nreferred  to  as  “the Act”) as\t an  appellate\t  authority,
\ngranting  partially  an application made  under\t section  10
\nof the Act presented on behalf of the respondent,  Shahdara-
\nSaharanpur Railway Workers’ Union. The first draft  Standing
\nOrders\t    submitted  by  the\tCompany\t to  the  Certifying
\nOfficer\t under s. 4\tof the Act were certified by him  on
\n7\/8-8-1962, after deciding    objections that had been filed
\non  behalf  of\tthe  workmen In\t appeal,  the  Chief  Labour
\nCommissioner   (Central),    New  Delhi,    modified   those
\nStanding  Orders  to some extent by his order  dated\t12th
\nFebruary,   1963.  Subsequently, these\tcertified   Standing
\nOrders were modified by the order dated 28th December,\t1963
\npassed by the Certifying Officer, and the appeal against his
\norders\t  of modification was dismissed on the\t23rd  April,
\n1964.  Then,  on     25th April, 1965,\tan  application\t was
\npresented  under  s.  10(2)  of the Act\t on  behalf  of\t the
\nrespondent  seeking  modifications in a number\tof  Standing
\nOrders\tas  they stood after  original\tcertification\t and
\nfirst  modification.   The  Certifying\tOfficer\t passed\t his
\norders\ton this application and, against those\torders,\t the
\nrespondent  filed     an  appeal  before  the  Chief  Labour
\nCommissioner  (Central),  New\t Delhi.\t  The  Chief  Labour
\nCommissioner,  by  his order dated  27th     October,  1967,
\nallowed modifications  in a number of Standing\tOrders.\t The
\npresent\t  appeal  is  directed\tagainst\t this\torder\t and
\nchallenges  the\t modifications granted in  Standing   Orders
\nNos.\t  9(a),\t 12(A), 11(ix), 11(vii) and  13.   The\tmain
\nground urged\tby the Company before this Court in  support
\nof  this appeal was  that the Chief Labour Commissioner\t was
\nnot  justified in directing  modifications in  the  Standing
\nOrders,\t already  certified,   in   the\t absence  of   fresh
\nmaterial  or fresh facts on the basis of which\talone\t  he
\nwas entitled to grant modifications under s. 10 of the\tAct.
\nLearned\t counsel appearing on behalf of the Company  in\t the
\nalternative,  also put forward the plea that  on  principles
\nanalogous  to\tthe rule of res judicata it should  be\theld
\nthat the Chief Labour\t Commissioner had no jurisdiction to
\ngrant  these  modifications  under  s. 10  in  view  of\t the
\nprevious  decisions  given  when the  Standing\tOrders\twere
\noriginally certified and modified for the first time.\n<\/p>\n
     So far as the argument of learned counsel based on\t the
\napplicability  of  principles analogous to the rule  of\t res
\njudicata  is concerned, learned counsel conceded that  there
\nis  no\tdirect\truling of any Court laying  down  that\tsuch
\nprinciples  are\t applicable  when a  Certifying\t Officer  is
\ndealing with an application for modification\t of Standing
\nOrders\tunder s. 10 of the Act, or when\t an  appeal  against
\nsuch  an  order is being heard by  the\tAppellate  Authority
\nunder s. 6 of the Act.\tReliance was, however, placed on the
\ndecision  of  this Court in Burn & Co., Calcutta  v..  Their
\nEmplo
\n147<\/span>
\nyees(1), where this Court was dealing with the applicability
\nof  the principle analogous to the rule of res\tjudicata  to
\nproceedings  before  an Industrial Tribunal dealing  with  a
\nreference under the Industrial Disputes Act.  In that  case,
\nan earlier award had been given in an industrial dispute and
\nthe  question arose whether, in the subsequent\tdispute\t for
\nadjudication,  the  decisions  given in\t the  earlier  award
\nshould\tbe held as binding, unless it was shown\t that  there
\nhad  been  a change of circumstances. In the  appeal  before
\nthis Court, it was urged that the Appellate Tribunal was  in
\nerror  in brushing aside the earlier award and\tin  deciding
\nthe  matter  afresh as if it arose for the  first  time\t for
\ndetermination;\tand it was argued that, when once a  dispute
\nis   referred  to  a  Tribunal\tand  that  results   in\t  an
\nadjudication,  that must be taken as binding on the  parties
\nthereto, unless there was a change of circumstances, and, as
\nnone  such  had been alleged or proved,\t the  earlier  award
\nshould\thave  been accepted, as indeed it was  accepted\t  by
\nthe Adjudicator.  This Court held:\t\t     ‘
\n\t      “In  the\tinstant case, the  Labour  Appellate
\n\t      Tribunal\tdismissed  this\t argument  with\t the
\n\t      observation that that was ‘a rule of  prudence
\n\t      and  not\tof law’.  If the Tribunal  meant  by
\n\t      this  observation\t that the statute  does\t not
\n\t      enact  that an award should not  be  re-opened
\n\t      except   on   the\t  ground   of\tchange\t  of
\n\t      circumstances,  that would be  quite  correct.
\n\t      But  that\t is not decisive  of  the  question,
\n\t      because  there is no provision in the  statute
\n\t      prescribing when and under what  circumstances
\n\t      an  award could be re-opened.   Section  19(4)
\n\t      authorises the Government to move the Tribunal
\n\t      for  shortening the  period during  which\t the
\n\t      award  would  operate, if ‘there\thas  been  a
\n\t      material change in the circumstances on  which
\n\t      it was based’.  But this has reference to\t the
\n\t      period of one year fixed under section 19\t (3)
\n\t      and  if  that indicates anything, it  is\tthat
\n\t      that  would be the proper ground on which\t the
\n\t      award  could  be\t re-opened   under   section
\n\t      19(6), and that is what the learned  Attorney-
\n\t      General contends.\t But we propose to  consider
\n\t      the  question  on the footing  that  there  is
\n\t      nothing in the statute to indicate the grounds
\n\t      on which an award\t could\tbe  reopened.\tWhat
\n\t      then is the position ?  Are we to hold that an
\n\t      award  given  on\t‘a  matter  in\t controversy
\n\t      between the parties after full hearing  ceases
\n\t      to have any force if either of them repudiates
\n\t      it under section 19(6), and that the  Tribunal
\n\t      has  no  option.\twhen the   matter  is  again
\n\t      referred\tto  it\tfor  adjudication,  but\t  to
\n\t      proceed to try it de novo, traverse the entire
\n\t      ground  once  again,  land  come\tto  a  fresh
\n\t      decision.\t That would be contrary
\n(1) [1956]S.C.R 781
\n148<\/span>
\n\t      to   the\twell-recognised\t principle  that   a
\n\t      decision\t once\trendered  by   a   competent
\n\t      authority\t on  a matter in issue\tbetween\t the
\n\t      parties  after  a full enquiry should  not  be
\n\t      permitted\t to be re-agitated.  It is  on\tthis
\n\t      principle\t that  the  rule  of  res   judicata
\n\t      enacted in section 11  of\t the Civil Procedure
\n\t      Code  is based.  That section  is,  no  doubt,
\n\t      in  terms inapplicable to the present  matter,
\n\t      but  the principle underlying   it,  expressed
\n\t      in  the  maxim ‘interest rei  publica  ut\t sit
\n\t      finis   litium’,\tis rounded on  sound  public
\n\t      policy  and is of universal application.\t‘The
\n\t      rule of res  judicata is\tdictated’,  observed
\n\t      Sir  Lawrence  Jenkins,  C.J.,  in  Sheoparsan
\n\t      Singh  v.\t Ramnandan Prasad  Singh(1),  ‘by  a
\n\t      wisdom  which is for all time.’ And there\t are
\n\t      good  reasons  why this  principle  should  be
\n\t      applicable   to\tdecisions   of\t  Industrial
\n\t      Tribunals also.  Legislation  regulating\t the
\n\t      relation\t between Capital and Labour has\t two
\n\t      objects  in view.\t It seeks to ensure  to\t the
\n\t      workmen,\twho have not the capacity  to  treat
\n\t      with capital on equal terms, fair returns\t for
\n\t      their  labour.   It  also\t seeks\tto   prevent
\n\t      disputes\tbetween employer and  employees,  so
\n\t      that   production\t might\tnot   be   adversely
\n\t      affected\tand  the  larger  interests  of\t the
\n\t      society  might not suffer.  Now, if we are  to
\n\t      hold that an adjudication loses its force when
\n\t      it is repudiated under section 19(6) and\tthat
\n\t      the  whole controversy is at large,  then\t the
\n\t      result  would  be that  far  from\t reconciling
\n\t      themselves  to the award and settling down  to
\n\t      work it, either party will treat it as a\tmere
\n\t      stage  in\t the  prosecution  of  a   prolonged
\n\t      struggle,\t and  far from\tbringing  industrial
\n\t      peace,  the  awards would turn out to  be\t but
\n\t      truces  giving  the  parties  breathing\ttime
\n\t      before  resuming hostile action  with  renewed
\n\t      vigour.\tOn  the other hand, if\twe  are,  to
\n\t      regard  them  as intended to  have  long\tterm
\n\t      operation and at the same time hold that\tthey
\n\t      are  liable  to be modified by change  in\t the
\n\t      circumstances  on which they were based,\tboth
\n\t      the  purposes  of\t the  legislature  would  be
\n\t      served.\tThat  is  the  view  taken  by\t the
\n\t      Tribunals themselves in The Army & Navy Stores
\n\t      Ltd.,  Bombay  v. Their Workmen<\/a>(2),  and\tFord
\n\t      Motor  Co. o] India Ltd. v.  Their  Workmen(a)
\n\t      and  we are of opinion that they lay down\t the
\n\t\t\t    correct  principle,\t and  that  there
\n were  no
\n\t      grounds  for  the Appellate Tribunal  for\t not
\n\t      following them”.\n<\/p>\n
    As\tagainst this view expressed by this  Court,  learned
\ncounsel\t for  the respondent relied on the remarks  made  by
\nthis Court in
\n(1)  [1916].  L.R. 43 I.A., 91.\t\t      (2)  119511  2
\nL.L.J. 31, (3) [1951] 2 L.L.J. 231,
\n149<\/span>
\na  subsequent  case    Workmen of Balmer Lawrie and  Co.  v.
\nBalmer\tLawrie\tand Co.<\/a> (1).  In that case,  the  Court\t was
\ndealing\t with the question of alteration in  wage  structure
\nand  had  to consider the effect of an earlier\taward.\t The
\nCourt held:\n<\/p>\n
\t\t    “When  a wage structure is\tframed,\t all
\n\t      relevant\tfactors are taken into\taccount\t and
\n\t      normally\tit  should remain in operation for a
\n\t      fairly   long   period;  but   it\t  would\t  be
\n\t      unreasonable to introduce\t considerations\t  of
\n\t      res  judicata  as such,  because\tfor  various
\n\t      reasons\t which\t constitute   the    special
\n\t      characteristics  of  industrial  adjudication,
\n\t      the said technical considerations would be  in
\n\t      admissible.  As the Labour Appellate  Tribunal
\n\t      itself has observed, the principle of  gradual
\n\t      advance\ttowards\t  the  living\twage   which
\n\t      industrial  adjudication\tcan  never   ignore,
\n\t      itself  constitutes such a special feature  of
\n\t      industrial  adjudication that it\trenders\t the
\n\t      application  of  the  technical  rule  of\t res
\n\t      judicata\tsingularly  inappropriate.  If\t the
\n\t      paying  capacity of the employer increases  or
\n\t      the  cost of living shows an upward trend,  or
\n\t      there are other anomalies, mistakes or  errors
\n\t      in  the award fixing wage structure, Or  there
\n\t      has.  been  a rise  in  the  wage structure in
\n\t      comparable    industries\t in   the    region,
\n\t      industrial  employees  would be  justified  in
\n\t      making  a claim for the re-examination of\t the
\n\t      wage structure and if such a claim is referred
\n\t      for      industrial     adjudication,\t the
\n\t      Adjudicator would not normally be justified in
\n\t      rejecting it solely on the ground that  enough
\n\t      time  has not passed after the making  of\t the
\n\t      award,  or  that material change\tin  relevant
\n\t      circumstances had not been proved.  It is,  of
\n\t      course, not possible to lay down any hard\t and
\n\t\t\t    fast  rule in the matter.  The questio
\nn  as  to
\n\t      revision\tmust  be examined on the  merits  in
\n\t      each individual case that is brought before an
\n\t      adjudicator for his adjudication.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    Further  support was sought by learned counsel from\t the
\nremarks made by this Court in Associated Cement Staff  Union
\nand Another v.Associated Cement Company and. Others(a).\t The
\njudgment in this case was given only about a month after the
\njudgment  in the case of Workmen of Balmer Lawrie & Co.\t (1)
\nby the same Bench of this Court which held:\n<\/p>\n
\t\t    “It\t  is   true   that   too    frequent
\n\t      alterations   of\tconditions  of\tservice\t  by
\n\t      industrial  adjudication have  been  generally
\n\t      deprecated  by this Court for the reason\tthat
\n\t      it  is likely to disturb industrial peace\t and
\n\t      equilibrium.  At the same time, the Court\t has
\n\t      more than once pointed
\n(1) [1964] 5
\nS.C.R. 344.\t\t (2) [1964] 1 L.L.J. 12.\n<\/p>\n
150<\/span><\/p>\n
\t      out the importance of remembering the  dynamic
\n\t      nature\t , of industrial relations. That  is
\n\t      why  the\tCourt  has, specially  in  the\tmore
\n\t      recent   decisions,   refused  to\t  apply\t  to
\n\t      industrial  adjudications\t principles  of\t res
\n\t      judicata\t that  are  meant  and\tsuited\t for
\n\t      ordinary\t civil\t litigations.\tEven   where
\n\t      conditions of service have been changed only a
\n\t      few years before, industrial adjudication\t has
\n\t      allowed  fresh  changes if  convinced  of\t the
\n\t      necessity\t and justification of these  by\t the
\n\t      existing conditions and circumstances.  Where,
\n\t      as   in  the  present  case,  in\ta   previous
\n\t      reference the tribunal has refused the  demand
\n\t      for  change.,  there is even less\t reason\t for
\n\t      saying that that refusal should have any\tsuch
\n\t      binding  effect.\tIt is important to  remember
\n\t      in this connection that working hours remained
\n\t      unchanged\t for many years in this concern\t and
\n\t      during these years, considerable changes\thave
\n\t      taken place in the country’s economic position
\n\t      and    expectations.    With    the    growing
\n\t      realization of need for better distribution of
\n\t      national wealth has also come an understanding
\n\t      of  the need for increase in production as  an
\n\t      essential\t  prerequisite\tof   which   greater
\n\t      efforts  on the part of the labour  force\t are
\n\t      necessary.   That itself is sufficient  reason
\n\t      against  accepting  the argument\tagainst\t any
\n\t      change in working hours if found justified  on
\n\t      relevant\t considerations\t  that\t have\tbeen
\n\t      indicated above.”\n<\/p>\n
These three decisions, which have been brought to our notice
\nprima\tfacie\tindicate  that\tthe  Court   has   expressed
\nconflicting views’ on the question of applying the principle
\nunderlying  the\t rule  of res judicata\tto  proceedings\t for
\nadjudication   of  industrial  disputes\t by  an\t  Industrial
\nTribunal   under  the  Industrial  Disputes  Act.   In\t the
\ncircumstances,\tI  have felt some  hesitation  in   applying
\nthis principle in the present case as urged on behalf of the
\nCompany\t consider  that, in the present case,  it  would  be
\nmuch   more  appropriate to examine the scheme\tof  the\t Act
\nitself to find out the intention of the legislature  and  to
\narrive\tat a decision on thin basis on the question  whether
\na  modification\t on an application under s. 10\tof  the\t Act
\nshould\t only\tbe  allowed  on\t the  basis  of\t  facts\t  or
\ncircumstances\tappearing   subsequent\t to   the   previous
\ncertification of the Standing Orders, or whether, in dealing
\nwith  the  application\tfor  modification,  the\t  Certifying
\nOfficer\t and  the Appel late Authority\tcan  re-examine\t the
\nentire\tposition  even\tas it existed at  the  time  of\t the
\nprevious orders\t and  arrive  at  a  differed decision.
\n    The\t scheme\t of the Act was examined by  this  Court  in
\nRohtak Hissar District Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. v.  State
\nof Uttar Pradesh and Others<\/a>(1), where this, Court held:\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t   .\n<\/p>\n
(1) [1966] 2 S.C.R. 863.\t\t   ‘
\n\t      “The  Act was passed on the 23rd April,  1946,
\n\t      and  the\tStanding Orders framed by  the\tU.P.
\n\t      Government  under section 15 of the  Act\twere
\n\t      published on the 14th May, 1947.\tThe  Central
\n\t      Act  (the\t Industrial Disputes Act No.  14  of
\n\t      1947  )  came into force on the  I  st  April,
\n\t      1947,  whereas the U.P. Act  (U.P.  Industrial
\n\t      Disputes\tAct No. 28 of 1947) came into  force
\n\t      on  the 1st February, 1948.  It will  thus  be
\n\t      seen  that  the  Act came\t into  force  before
\n\t      either  the Central Act or the U.P.  Act\t was
\n\t      passed.  The scheme  of the Act originally was
\n\t      to    require    employers    in\t  industrial
\n\t      establishment   to  define   with\t  sufficient
\n\t      precision\t the conditions of employment  under
\n\t      them and to make the said conditions known  to
\n\t      the workmen employed by them.  The Legislature
\n\t      thought\t  that,\t   in\t many\t  industrial
\n\t      establishments,  the conditions of  employment
\n\t      were  not always uniform, and sometimes,\twere
\n\t      not  even reduced to writing, and that led  to
\n\t      considerable   confusion\t which\t  ultimately
\n\t      resulted in industrial disputes.\tThat is\t why
\n\t      the  Legislature\tpassed the  Act\t making\t  it
\n\t      compulsory  for\tthe establishments, to which
\n\t      the   Act\t applied,  to  reduce\tto   writing
\n\t      conditions   of\temployment  and\t  get\tthem
\n\t      certified as provided by the Act. The  matters
\n\t      in  respect of which conditions of  employment
\n\t      had  to  be certified were specified  ‘in\t the
\n\t      schedule\tappended to the Act.  This  Schedule
\n\t      contains\t11  matters  in\t respect  of   which
\n\t      Standing orders had to be made.  In fact,\t the
\n\t      words “Standing orders” are defined by s. 2(g)
\n\t      as  meaning rules relating to matters set\t out
\n\t      in  the  Schedule.  The  “Certifying  officer”
\n\t      appointed under the Act is defined by s. 2(c),
\n\t      whereas “Appellate Authority” is defined by s.
\n\t      2(a).\n<\/p>\n
     Originally, the jurisdiction of the Certifying  officer
\nand  the  Appellate Authority was very\tlimited;  they\twere
\ncalled\t upon  to  consider  whether  the  Standing   orders
\nsubmitted   for\t certification\tconformed   to\tthe    Model
\nStanding  orders or not.  Section 3(2) provides\t that  these
\nStanding  orders  shall\t be,  as  far  as  practicable,\t  in
\nconformity  with  such Model Standing orders.\tSection\t 15,
\nwhich deals with the powers  of the  appropriate  Government
\nto  make rules, authorises, by cl. (2)(b),  the\t appropriate
\nGovernment to set out Model Standing Orders for the purposes
\nof this Act.  That is how the original jurisdiction  of\t the
\ncertifying  authorities\t was limited to. examine  the  draft
\nStanding  Orders  submitted for certification\tand  cOmPare
\nthem with the Model.. Standing Orders.\n<\/p>\n
152<\/span><\/p>\n
\t\t    In\t1956, however, a radical change\t was
\n\t      made in the provisions of the Act.  Section 4,
\n\t      as amesded by Act 36 of 1956, has imposed upon
\n\t      the   Certifying\tOfficer\t or  the   Appellate
\n\t      Authority\t the  duty to  adjudicate  upon\t the
\n\t      fairness\t or   the  reasonableness   of\t the
\n\t      provisions  of any Standing Orders.  In  other
\n\t      words,  after the amendment was made in  1956,
\n\t      the jurisdiction of the certifying authorities
\n\t      has  become very much wider and the  scope  of
\n\t      the  enquiry also has  become  correspondingly
\n\t      wider.\tWhen  draft  Standing\tOrders\t are
\n\t      submitted\t for certification, the enquiry\t now
\n\t      has  to  be two-fold; are\t the  said  Standing
\n\t      Orders  in  conformity  with   Model  Standing
\n\t      Orders; and are they reasonable or fair ?\t  In
\n\t      dealing\twith  this  latter   question,\t the
\n\t      Certifying Officer and the Appellate Authority
\n\t      have been given powers of a Civil Court by  s.
\n\t      11  (1  ).  The decision\tof   the  Certifying
\n\t      Officer  is made appealable to  the  Appellate
\n\t      Authority\t  under\t s. 6 at  the\tinstance  of
\n\t      either party. Similatly, by an amendment\tmade
\n\t      in 1956 in s. 10(2), both the employer and the
\n\t      workmen\tare  permitted\tto  apply  for\t the
\n\t      modification of the said Standing Orders after
\n\t      the  expiration of 6 months from the  date  of
\n\t      their coming into operation.  It will thus  be
\n\t      seen  that when certification proceedings\t are
\n\t      held  before the certifying  authorities,\t the
\n\t      reasonableness\tor  the\t fairness   of\t the
\n\t      provisions  contained  in the  draft  Standing
\n\t      Orders falls to be examined.”\n<\/p>\n
It  is in the fight of this scheme of the Act  explained  by
\nthis Court that the decision has to be arrived at as to how,
\nin what manner, and under what circumstances the  Certifying
\nOfficer\t   or\t the  Appellate\t  Authority   should   grant
\nmodifications when an application under s. 10(2) of the\t Act
\nis validly made after the expiry of the period of six months
\nlaid down in s. 10 (1 ) of the Act.\n<\/p>\n
    The\t purpose of the Act, as it was originally passed  in
\n1946,\twas  merely  to\t require  employers  in\t  industrial
\nestablishments\t to  define with  sufficient  precision\t the
\nconditions   of\t employment under them and to make the\tsaid
\nconditions known to the workmen employed by them.  To.\tgive
\neffect\tto  this  purpose, s. 3 of the Act  gave  the  power
\nexclusively to the employers to submit draft Standing Orders
\nfor  certification.  The Certifying Officer had\t to  certify
\nthe Standing Orders, if provision was made in them for every
\nmatter set out in the Schedule and the Standing Orders\twere
\notherwise in conformity with the provisions of the Act.\t  In
\naddition,  sub-s. (2) of section 3 also laid down  that\t the
\nprovision  to be made was to. be, as far as practicable,  in
\nconformity  with  Model Standing Orders\t prescribed  by\t the
\nappropriate  State  Government.\t  Thus,\t the  Act,  in\t its
\noriginal form, was designed only
\n153<\/span>
\nfor  the  purpose of ensuring that  conditions\t(A  service,
\nwhich  the employer laid down, became known to\tthe  workmen
\nand   the  liberty  of\tthe  employer  in  prescribing\t the
\nconditions  of service was only limited to the\textent\tthat
\nthe  Standing  Orders  had  to be  in  conformity  with\t the
\nprovisions  of\tthe  Act  and, as  far\tas  practicable,  in
\nconformity  with  Model\t Standing  Orders.   The  Certifying
\nOfficer\t or  the  Appellate  Authority\twere  debarred\tfrom
\nadjudicating upon the fairness or the reasonableness of\t the
\nprovisions of the Standing Orders.  Then, as noticed in\t the
\ncase  of  Rohtak  Hissar  District  Electricity\t Supply\t Co.
\nLtd.(1), the Legislature made a drastic change in the policy
\nof  the\t Act  by  amending section 4  and  laying  upon\t the
\nCertifying Officer the duty of deciding whether the Standing
\nOrders\tproposed by the employer were reasonable  and  fair,
\nand  also by amending section 10(2) so as to permit  even  a
\nworkman to apply for modification of the certified  Standing
\nOrders,\t while, in the original Act, the employer alone\t had
\nthe  right to make such an application.\t It is, however,  to
\nbe noticed that the preamble of the Act was not altered,  so
\nthat  the purpose of the Act remained as before.  While\t the
\nAct  was  in  its  unamended form,  if\tthe  workmen  had  a
\ngrievance,   they  could  not  apply  for  modification\t  of
\ncertified  Standing Orders and, even at the time of  initial
\ncertification, they could only object to a Standing Order on
\nthe ground that it was not in conformity with the provisions
\nof  the Act or Model Standing Orders.  After amendment,\t the
\nworkmen were given the right to object to the draft Standing
\nOrders at the time of first certification on the ground that
\nthe  Standing Orders were not fair and reasonable and,\teven
\nsubsequently,  to  apply for modification of  the  certified
\nStanding  Orders  after expiry of the period of\t six  months
\nprescribed under s. 10(1) of the Act.  These rights  granted
\nto  the workmen and the powers conferred on  the  Certifying
\nOfficer\t and the Appellate Authority, however, still had  to
\nbe exercised for the, purpose of giving effect to the object
\nof the Act as it continued to remain in the preamble,  which
\nwas  not altered.  Before the amendment of the Act,  if\t the
\nworkmen\t had  any grievance on the ground of  unfairness  or
\nunreasonableness  of  the Standing Orders  proposed  by\t the
\nemployer,  their only remedy lay under the  Industrial\tDis-
\nputes Act.  By amendment in 1956, a limited remedy was\tpro-
\nvided  for  them  in the Act itself by\tconferring  on\tthe,
\nCertifying    Officer\tthe   function\t of   judging\t the
\nreasonableness and fairness of the proposed Standing Orders.
\nThese  amendments  cannot, however, affect  the\t alternative
\nremedy\twhich the workmen had of seeking redress  under\t the
\nIndustrial Disputes Act if they had grievance against any of
\nthe Standing Orders certified by the Certifying Officer [See
\nBangalore  Woollen,  Cotton and Silk Mills Company  Ltd.  v.
\nTheir Workmen and Another<\/a>(2), and the
\n(1) [1966] 2 S.C.R. 863.\n<\/p>\n
(2) [1968] 1 L.L.J. 555.\n<\/p>\n
2 Sup.\tCI\/69-11
\n154<\/span>
\nBuckingham  and Carnatic Co. Ltd. v. Their  Workmen(1).\t  It
\nis, therefore, clear that, after the amendment in 1956,\t the
\nworkmen\t have  now  two\t alternative  remedies\tfor  seeking
\nalterations in the Standing Orders proposed or ,already
\ncertified.  They can object to the proposed Standing  Orders
\nat  the\t time  of  first  certification,  or  can  ask\t for
\nmodification of the certified Standing Orders under s. 10(2)
\non the limited ground  of fairness  or\treasonableness. But,
\nfor the same purpose, they also have the alternative  remedy
\nof  seeking  redress under the Industrial Disputes  Act,  in
\nwhich  case the scope of their demand would be\tmuch  wider.
\nIf the proceedings go for adjudication\tunder the Industrial
\nDisputes  Act,\tthe  workmen can claim\talterations  of\t the
\nStanding  Orders  not merely on the ground  of\tfairness  or
\nreasonableness,\t  but  even  on\t other\tgrounds,   such\t  as
\nfurther,  liberalisation  of  the terms\t and  conditions  of
\nservice, even though the certified Standing Orders  may\t  be
\notherwise  fair and reasonable.\t The remedy provided by\t the
\nAct has, therefore, a limited scope only.
\n    In this background, the effect of s. 6, which lays\tdown
\nthat  when  the\t Appellate  Authority  gives  its   decision
\nconfirming the Standing Orders either in the form  certified
\nby   the  Certifying Officer or after amending the  Standing
\nOrders\t by  making  modifications,  thereof  or   additions
\nthereto,  his  decision shall be final, has  further  to  be
\nconsidered.   On   the\tface of it,  this   provision  means
\nthat,  if  the Appellate Authority confirms   the   Standing
\nOrders\tat  the time of first certification, that  order  is
\nnot  to\t  be subsequently questioned before  any  authority.
\nThere  is, of course, the provision in s.  10(2)  permitting
\neither an employer  or\ta workman to apply for\tmodification
\nof  the Standing Orders after the expiry of six months\tfrom
\nthe  date of certification.  It appears to me that,  on\t the
\nlanguage  of  s. 6, it must be held that  this\trequest\t for
\nmodification under s. 10(2) can only be made on the basis of
\nfresh facts or fresh circumstances arising subsequent to the
\npassing\t of the order by the Appellate Authority under s.  6
\nconfirming  the Standing Orders for the first time.  If,  on
\nreceiving an application for modification under s. 10(2) the
\nCertifying  Officer is held to be authorised  to  reconsider
\nthe  reasonableness or fairness of a Standing Order  already
\ncertified  and\tconfirmed  under  section  6  the   finality
\nenvisaged  under that section in respect of the decision  of
\nthe Appellate AuthOrity will be nullified.  Cases may  arise
\nwhere,\ton  first  application\tfor  certification  of\t the
\nStanding  Orders, an objection may be raised by the  workmen
\nand  a modification sought on the  ground that the  proposed
\nStanding Order is not fair or reasonable.  Such an objection
\nmay  be\t dismissed both by the Certifying  Officer  and\t the
\nAppellate  Authority. Six months after the certification,  a
\nworkman\t may  apply for the same modification  of  the\tsame
\nStanding Order without any fresh facts or circumstances.  If
\nit  be held that  the  power  of  the (1) Civil\t Appeal\t No.
\n674 of 1968 decided on 25-7-1968.\n<\/p>\n
155<\/span><\/p>\n
Certifying Officer on an application for modification is not
\nlimited\t at  all and can be exercised even on  the  material
\nwhich  was originally before the Certifying Officer and\t the
\nAppellate Authority, the Certifying Officer may, on the same
\nmaterial, come to a conclusion different from the conclusion
\narrived\t at  by the Appellate Authority at the\tfirst  stage
\nunder s. 6 of the Act.\tIn that case, the Certifying Officer
\nmay allow the modification which was previously rejected  by
\nthe Appellate Authority.  The wide interpretation, urged  by
\nlearned\t counsel  for the workmen in this  appeal  that\t the
\npower  of  a  Certifying  Officer  on  an  application\t for
\nmodification  is  not  limited at all, can  thus  result  in
\norders being made which completely negative the finality  of
\nthe decision given by an Appellate Authority under section 6
\nat  an\tearlier stage.\tIn fact, if tins  interpretation  is
\naccepted and it is held that an order of modification can be
\nmade on the identical material\twhich  was available to\t the
\nAppellate  Authority at the time of its\t earlier  order,  it
\nwould  mean that merely because a period of six\t months\t has
\nelapsed,,  a  Certifying Officer would be competent  to\t re-
\nappraise the same facts and circumstances, take a  different
\nview  and  set\taside  the  order  passed  by  his  superior
\nauthority   and,  thus,\t in effect, sit in judgment over  an
\norder made by a superior authority. of course, a  Certifying
\nOfficer,  being\t junior\t to the\t  Appellate  Authority,\t may
\nhesitate to do so; but\ta successor  Appellate Authority may
\nvery well hold views different from his predecessor and\t may
\ncome  to  a decision on identical material that\t a  Standing
\nOrder  held to be fair and reasonable by his predecessor  at
\nthe stage of appeal under s. 6 was not fair and\t reasonable;
\nand  that a modification should be allowed on the ground  of
\nbeing fair and reasonable, even though that modification was
\ndisallowed by his predecessor.\tIt is also to be noted\tthat
\nthe  right  to\tapply for modification is  not\tconfined  to
\nworkmen\t alone, but that right is granted to  the  employers
\nalso.\tThere  can, therefore, be reverse’ cases  where\t the
\ndraft  Standing\t Order\tsubmitted  by  an  employer  may  be
\nmodified  by  the Appellate Authority under s.\t6  and,\t six
\nmonths later, the employer may again apply for\tmodification
\nso as to result in restoration of his original draft in\t the
\nhope  that the successor Appellate Authority would hold\t the
\nopinion\t that the original draft Standing Order proposed  by
\nthe   employer\twas  fair  and\treasonable  and\t  that\t the
\nmodification  made  by his predecessor under s.\t 6  was\t not
\njustified.   Considering  these circumstances, I am  of\t the
\nview that, when an application under s. 10(2) of the Act  is
\nmade,  the  Certifying Officer can  modify  Standing  Orders
\nalready\t certified, only if the request is not made  on\t the
\nbasis  of  the same material which existed  at\tthe  earlier
\nstage\twhen   the  Standing Orders were  certified.   I  am
\nunable to accept an interpretation which will completely  do
\naway with the finality of orders made under s. 6 of the\t Act
\nby an Appellate Authority.\n<\/p>\n
156<\/span><\/p>\n
    This  interpretation,  of course, does  not\t affect\t the
\nright  of the workmen to seek an amendment of  the  Standing
\nOrders,\t even  if certified as reasonable and  fair  by\t the
\nAppellate    Authority\t under\t s.   6\t   by\t appropriate
\nproceedings .under  the\t Industrial Disputes Act.  In  fact,
\nit  appears to me that the power of a Tribunal dealing\twith
\nan industrial dispute under that Act relating to a  Standing
\nOrder will, of course, be wide enough to permit the Tribunal
\nto  direct  alteration\tof  a  Standing\t Order\theld  to  be
\nreasonable and fair by the Appellate Authority under s. 6 of
\nthe  Act,  in  case a dispute about it is  referred  to\t the
\nTribunal;  and that is the only remedy available  if  either
\nthe  workman  or the employer desires to  have\tmodification
\nwithout\t any fresh grounds, material or circumstances.\t The
\nvalidity  of  the order of the Appellate  Authority  in\t the
\npresent appeal has to be judged on this basis.
\n    I  have already mentioned earlier the  various  Standing
\nOrders\tin  respect of which modifications  allowed  by\t the
\nAppellate  Authority  were sought to be challenged  in\tthis
\nappeal.\t  The  objections  in  respect\tof  some  of   these
\nmodifications,\twhich were originally challenged,  were\t not
\npressed\t by  counsel during the hearing of the\tappeal\tand,
\nconsequently,  those  modifications need not  be  interfered
\nwith.\tAt the stage of final hearing, learned counsel\tonly
\npressed\t for setting aside four modifications mentioned\t  by
\nthe  Chief  Labour Commissioner in his. appellate  order  as
\nitems  Nos.  1,\t 3, 5 and 6 relating  to  modifications\t .of
\nStanding.  Orders  9(a),  12(A)\t and  11(vn).\tIt  may\t  be
\nmentioned  that\t items\t5 and 6 are  both  modifications  in
\nStanding Order 11 (vii).  In each  of these cases, the order
\npassed\tby the Chief Labour Commissioner now impugned  shows
\nthat  he  did  not rely on any\tfresh\tfacts,\tmaterial  or
\ncircumstances which were not available at the earlier  stage
\nwhen  the  Standing  Orders were first\tcertified  or  first
\nmodified.   In effect, therefore, the present order  amounts
\nto passing orders, different from earlier orders passed\t  by
\nthe   Appellate Authority, on a reconsideration of the\tsame
\nmaterial  which was available to both the  Authorities.\t  In
\nfact, the  modification at item No. 1 in Standing Order 9(a)
\nhad  been  specifically\t disallowed in appeal by  the  Chief
\nLabour Commissioner in his order dated 12th February,  1963,
\nwhen he first heard the appeal under s. 6 and confirmed\t the
\ncertification  of  the original Standing  Orders.  Thus,  in
\nrespect\t of  item  No.\t1, what\t the  present  Chief  Labour
\nCommisSioner has done is to permit the modification  because
\nhe  considered it reasonable and fair, even though,  on\t the
\nsame  material,\t his predecessor had  disallowed  this\tvery
\nmodification  on  the  basis  that,  in\t his  opinion,\t the
\noriginal. draft Standing Order was fair and reasonable.\t  On
\nthe principle enunciated above,\t it  is clear that the order
\nof  the Chief Labour Commissioner, allowing all\t these\tfour
\nmodifications,\twhich  is  not based  on  any  fresh  facts,
\nmaterial or circumstances, is liable to be set aside.
\n    As\ta  result, I would partly allow the appeal  and\t set
\naside the order of the Chief Labour Commissioner  (Central),
\npermitting  modifications mentioned by him in his  Order  at
\nitem  Nos. 1, 3, 5 and 6 relating to Standing  Orders  9(a),
\n12(A)  and  Il(vii).  In the circumstances of this  case,  I
\nwould direct parties to bear their own costs of this appeal.\n<\/p>\n
V.P.S.\t\t\t\t     Appeal allowed in part.\n158<\/span>\n\n\n\n<\/pre>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Management Shahdara (Delhi) … vs S.S. Railway Workers’ Union on 18 September, 1968 Equivalent citations: 1969 AIR 513, 1969 SCR (2) 131 Author: Shelat Bench: Shelat, J.M. PETITIONER: MANAGEMENT SHAHDARA (DELHI) SAHARANPURLIGHT RAILWAY CO., LTD Vs. RESPONDENT: S.S. RAILWAY WORKERS’ UNION DATE OF JUDGMENT: 18\/09\/1968 BENCH: SHELAT, J.M. BENCH: SHELAT, J.M. […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-55968","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nManagement Shahdara (Delhi) ... vs S.S. 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