{"id":56539,"date":"2009-02-02T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2009-02-01T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/force-motors-limited-vs-poona-employees-union-on-2-february-2009"},"modified":"2015-04-22T17:45:36","modified_gmt":"2015-04-22T12:15:36","slug":"force-motors-limited-vs-poona-employees-union-on-2-february-2009","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/force-motors-limited-vs-poona-employees-union-on-2-february-2009","title":{"rendered":"Force Motors Limited vs Poona Employees Union on 2 February, 2009"},"content":{"rendered":"
Bombay High Court<\/div>\n
Force Motors Limited vs Poona Employees Union on 2 February, 2009<\/div>\n
Bench: Bilal Nazki, J. H. Bhatia<\/div>\n
                                          1\n\n\n\n\n                                                                             \n               IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY\n\n\n\n\n                                                     \n                         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION\n\n                       WRIT PETITION NO.  2907   OF 2006\n\n\n\n\n                                                    \n    Force Motors Limited                  )\n    (formerly known as Bajaj Tempo        )\n    Ltd.), having its office at Akurdi,   )\n\n\n\n\n                                         \n    Pune - 411 035.                       ).....      .....    Petitioner.\n\n          Versus            \n    1) Poona Employees Union,             )\n       through its President Mr.Madhav    )\n                           \n       Roham, having its registered       )\n       Office at H-89, Shastree Nagar,    )\n       Yerwada, Pune.                     )\n       \n\n\n    2) Bhartiya Kamgar Sena,             )\n       having its office at Sena Bhawan, )\n    \n\n\n\n       Shivaji Park, Dadar, Mumbai.      )\n\n    3) Shri S. M. Kolhe,                  )\n       Member,                            )\n\n\n\n\n\n       Industrial Court, Pune.            )....       ....     Respondents.\n\n                                  -: ALONG WITH :-\n\n                        WRIT PETITION NO. 2878 OF 2006\n\n\n\n\n\n    Bharatia Kamgar Sena,                 )\n    a trade Union registered under        )\n    the Trade Unions Act, 1928,           )\n    having its office at Shiv Sena        )\n    Bhavan, Shivaji Park, Dadar,          )\n    Mumbai - 400 028.                     )....       ....     Petitioner.\n\n\n\n\n                                                     ::: Downloaded on - 09\/06\/2013 14:18:01 :::\n                                             2\n\n\n\n\n                                                                                 \n          Versus\n\n\n\n\n                                                         \n    1) Poona Employees Union,               )\n       having its registered                )\n       Office at H-89, Shastri Nagar,       )\n       Yerwada, Pune - 411 006.             )\n\n\n\n\n                                                        \n    2) Bajaj Tempo Limited                  )\n       having its factory at Akurdi,        )\n       Pune - 411 035.                      )\n\n\n\n\n                                            \n    3) Shri S. M. Kolhe,                    )\n       Member, Industrial Court, \n                             ig             )\n       Pune, having his office at P.M.T.    )\n       Building, Swargate, Pune.            )....         ....     Respondents.\n                           \n    Mr. K. K. Singhavi, Sr. Counsel with Mr. S. K. Talsania, Ms.Pallavi Dhedia\n    i\/by M\/s. Sanjay Udeshi & Co., for Petitioner in WP 2907\/06 and\n    for Respondent No.2 in WP 2878\/06.\n       \n\n\n    Mr. S. G. Anney, Sr. Counsel with Mr. K. S. Bapat i\/by Mr. A. V. \n    Fatangare for the Petitioner in WP 2878\/06 and for \n    \n\n\n\n    Respondent No.2 in WP 2907\/06.\n    Ms. Gayatri Singh for Respondent No.1 in both the Petitions.\n\n\n\n\n\n                              CORAM :                BILAL NAZKI  and\n                                                                    \n                                                     J. H. BHATIA, JJ.\n\n                       RESERVED ON:                 26TH NOVEMBER, 2008.\n\n\n\n\n\n                       PRONOUNCED ON :              2ND FEBRUARY, 2009.\n                                                    (In Chamber at 5.00 p.m.)\n\n    JUDGMENT (Per Bilal Nazki,J.) :\n<\/pre>\n
          These   two   writ   petitions   have   been   filed   by   the   petitioners<\/p>\n
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\n                                                  3<\/span><\/p>\n
    challenging the same order, therefore they are being disposed of by the<\/p>\n
    common judgment and order. The Writ Petition No. 2907 of 2006 is filed<\/p>\n
    by   the   Company   while   Writ   Petition   No.   2878   of   2006   is   filed   by   the<\/p>\n
    Union.   For   the   purpose   of   reference   to   contesting   parties,   reference   is<\/p>\n
    made to the Writ Petition No. 2907 of 2006.\n<\/p>\n
    2.     The order challenged in both the petitions is dated 22nd March, 2006<\/p>\n
    passed   by   the  Industrial  Court,   Pune   on   an   application   made   by<\/p>\n
    respondent No.1 Union under Section 14 of the Maharashtra Recognition<\/p>\n
    of   Trade   Unions   &   Prevention   of   Unfair   Labour   Practices   Act,   1971<\/p>\n
    (hereinafter   referred  to as  “the   MRTU  &  PULP Act”).  By  the   impugned<\/p>\n
    order,   the   Industrial   Court   cancelled   the   status   of   recognised   Union   of<\/p>\n
    respondent   No.2   and   granted   recognition   to   respondent   No.1   Union   in<\/p>\n
    respect of the Company – Bajaj Tempo Limited, Akurdi, Pune. So the union<\/p>\n
    which was earlier recognised has filed one petition and the Company has<\/p>\n
    filed another petition.\n<\/p>\n
    3.     The Company’s
\n                        case is that it is incorporated under the Companies<\/p>\n
    Act and is engaged in manufacturing of commercial vehicles. One of the<\/p>\n
    factories   of   the   Company   is   located   at   Akurdi,  Pune  in   which   2100<\/p>\n
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\n                                               4<\/span><\/p>\n
    employees are employed. Respondent No.1, who claimed to be registered<\/p>\n
    trade union filed application under Section 14 of the MRTU & PULP Act for<\/p>\n
    cancellation of the recognition of respondent No.2. Respondent No.1 made<\/p>\n
    an application under the provisions of the MRTU & PULP Act claiming that<\/p>\n
    for the period preceding six months of the application it had membership<\/p>\n
    of   1973   employees   out   of   total   number   of   2100   employees   employed<\/p>\n
    under   the   petitioner   undertaking.   Respondent   No.1   Union,   therefore,<\/p>\n
    prayed that the recognition of Bharatiya Kamgar Sena should be cancelled<\/p>\n
    and   in   its   place   respondent   No.1   should   be   granted   recognition.   The<\/p>\n
    Company   as   well   as   respondent   No.2   Union   filed   written   statement<\/p>\n
    denying   respondent   No.1   Union’
\n                                       s   membership   as  claimed.  They   also<\/p>\n
    denied that respondent No.1 union was eligible to the grant of recognition<\/p>\n
    in respect of the undertaking. Respondent No.2 – Bharatiya Kamgar Sena<\/p>\n
    (hereinafter referred as “BKS”) claimed that it was recognized union since<\/p>\n
    1998   and   it   continued   to   enjoy   membership   of   the   employees   of   the<\/p>\n
    Company.   Even   basic   registration   of   respondent   No.1   Union   was<\/p>\n
    challenged by the BKS and the Company. The Industrial Court decided this<\/p>\n
    issue as preliminary issue by an order holding that respondent No.1 was a<\/p>\n
    registered trade union. Certain other facts have been also mentioned in the<\/p>\n
    writ petitions which are not necessary for the purpose of deciding these<\/p>\n
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\n                                                  5<\/span><\/p>\n
    writ petitions. But a development which took place during the course of<\/p>\n
    hearing before the Industrial Court needs to be mentioned as a ground<\/p>\n
    related to it had been agitated by the petitioner to challenge the order of<\/p>\n
    the   Tribunal.   On   16th  September,   2004   the   BKS   filed   an   application<\/p>\n
    alleging that respondent No.1 union had directed the employees to attend<\/p>\n
    the office of the Industrial Court and sign affidavits to the effect that they<\/p>\n
    were   members   of   respondent   No.1   union.   The   BKS   prayed   that   the<\/p>\n
    Registry should be asked not to entertain the affidavits as it was a settled<\/p>\n
    position in law that verification of membership can not be done on the<\/p>\n
    basis of such affidavits. The respondent No.1 union filed reply submitting<\/p>\n
    that   the   affidavits   were   being   filed   for   some   different   purpose   and   the<\/p>\n
    same   shall   not   be   relied   upon   for   the   purpose   of   verification   of<\/p>\n
    membership. The Industrial Court on 29th  September, 2004 rejected the<\/p>\n
    application of BKS making it clear that the affidavits would not be taken<\/p>\n
    into   consideration   for   the   purpose   of   verification   of   membership.   The<\/p>\n
    Industrial  Court  appointed   an  Investigation   Officer  and  directed  him  to<\/p>\n
    verify membership  of  respondent No.1  union  as  well as  of   BKS  for  the<\/p>\n
    period   of   six   calendar   months,   immediately   preceding   the   month   of<\/p>\n
    September,   2003.   The   Investigation   Officer   submitted   report   on   26th<\/p>\n
    October, 2004. As per the said report, BKS had exclusive  membership  of<\/p>\n
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\n                                                 6<\/span><\/p>\n
    270,   respondent   No.1   had   exclusive   membership   of   26,   whereas   1908<\/p>\n
    employees were common members. The Investigation Officer also observed<\/p>\n
    that respondent No.1 Union had never deposited any amount in the Bank.\n<\/p>\n
    Respondent   No.1   union   also   filed   an   application   along   with   a   list   and<\/p>\n
    identical affidavits  of 1556 employees on 26th  November, 2004 alleging<\/p>\n
    that they had ceased to be the members of BKS and had become members<\/p>\n
    of respondent No.1 Union from  12th December, 2002. The objections were<\/p>\n
    taken to such affidavits. But Industrial Court held that such affidavits shall<\/p>\n
    not   be   taken   into   consideration   for   the   purpose   of   verification   of<\/p>\n
    membership.   The   Industrial   Court,   however,   on   29th  November,   2004<\/p>\n
    permitted cross examination of 99 employees out of 1556 employees who<\/p>\n
    had filed their affidavits. Out of 99 employees 17 employees in their cross-\n<\/p>\n
    examination admitted that they still continued to be the members of BKS.\n<\/p>\n
    7   employees   admitted   in   their   cross-examination   that   they   had   filed<\/p>\n
    affidavits only on an assurance by respondent No.1 union that they would<\/p>\n
    be reimbursed the wages deducted on account of go-slow resorted to by<\/p>\n
    them. Having regard to the fact that 17 employees in cross-examination<\/p>\n
    had stated that they continued to be the members of BKS and 7 employees<\/p>\n
    had turned hostile, BKS applied that it should be allowed to cross-examine<\/p>\n
    all  1556  employees.  On  30th  April,  2005, however, the   Industrial Court<\/p>\n
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\n                                                 7<\/span><\/p>\n
    rejected the application.\n<\/p>\n
    4.     These facts which have been narrated are almost undisputed facts.\n<\/p>\n
    The main grounds of attack on the impugned order by the Senior Counsel<\/p>\n
    appearing for the petitioner are:- Firstly, respondent No.1 union had no<\/p>\n
    right  to  represent   the   automobile   union;  Secondly,  the   Industrial   Court<\/p>\n
    could not have relied on affidavits to come to the  conclusion as  to the<\/p>\n
    respective number of membership of the union and it had to go by the<\/p>\n
    report of the Investigation Officer who was appointed in terms of the of<\/p>\n
    the MRTU & PULP Act, and Thirdly, Section 19 of the of the MRTU & PULP<\/p>\n
    Act     was   not   complied   with.   On   all   three   grounds   the   learned   Senior<\/p>\n
    Counsel appearing for the respondents have submitted that there has been<\/p>\n
    no violation of any of the statutory provisions and there was nothing to<\/p>\n
    come to a conclusion that respondent No.1 union should not be treated as<\/p>\n
    a registered union.\n<\/p>\n
    5.     Coming   to   the   first   ground   of   attack,   elaborating   his   arguments,<\/p>\n
    learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has drawn our attention to the<\/p>\n
    constitution and rules of respondent No.1 Union. Object 2(a) of the Union<\/p>\n
    as enumerated is:\n<\/p>\n
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\n                                                 8<\/span><\/p>\n
          “To organize  and  unite  the  persons employed in the  Industry,<\/p>\n
          any Factory, any Section, any shop and any establishment within<\/p>\n
          the district of Poona as per Schedule in the ___________  and to<\/p>\n
          regulate their relations with their employers.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    With other objects, for the present, we are not concerned. The argument is<\/p>\n
    that   the   object   of   the   Union   was   to   organize   and   unite   the   persons<\/p>\n
    employed   in   the   Industry,   any   Factory,   any   Section,   any   shop   and   any<\/p>\n
    establishment within the District of Poona as per Schedule. However, since<\/p>\n
    no schedule was annexed to the constitution, it was a purposeless Union.\n<\/p>\n
    Elaborating   further,   the   learned   Senior   Counsel   submitted   that   the<\/p>\n
    recognition of respondent No.1 for its union under Section 11 of the MRTU<\/p>\n
    & PULP Act was not itself maintainable. Section 11 of the MRTU & PULP<\/p>\n
    Act lays down:\n<\/p>\n
          “Application   for   recognition   of   union:   (1)  Any   union
\n          (hereinafter referred to as “applicant-union”) which has for the
\n          whole   of   the   period   of   six   calendar   months  immediately
\n          preceding the calendar month in which it so applies under this
\n          section a membership of not less than thirty per cent of the total<\/p>\n
          number of employees employed in any undertaking may apply
\n          in   the   prescribed   form   to   the   Industrial   Court   for   being
\n          registered as a recognised union for such undertaking.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          (2) Every such application shall be disposed of by the Industrial
\n          Court as far as possible within three months from  the date  of
\n          receipt   of   the   application,   where   a   group   of   concerns   in   any
\n          industry   which   is   notified   to   be   one   undertaking   for   which<\/p>\n
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\n                                                 9<\/span><\/p>\n
          recognition is applied for is situated in the same local area; and
\n          in any other case, within four months.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    Rule 4 under the Rules famed under the MRTU & PULP Act   lays down<\/p>\n
    that the application by any union for registration under section 11 shall be<\/p>\n
    in Form A and in Form A one of the columns is Col. 5, which lays down,<\/p>\n
    “The   undertaking   for   which   this   trade   union   seeks   recognition   as   a<\/p>\n
    recognised   union   is   engaged   in   ………………   industry\/trade.   The<\/p>\n
    undertaking   is   known   as   ……………   and   is   located   at   the   following<\/p>\n
    address.” It is submitted that it was a mandatory requirement to spell out<\/p>\n
    the industry in which the union was interested. The learned Counsel for<\/p>\n
    the respondent on the other hand submits that though in the constitution it<\/p>\n
    has   been   mentioned   that   as   per   schedule,   but   since   no   schedule   was<\/p>\n
    attached to the constitution, it should be considered that the union was<\/p>\n
    interested in organising and uniting persons employed in the industry in<\/p>\n
    Poona. He also submits that this was the argument which was made for<\/p>\n
    the first time before this Court. But the learned Counsel on the other hand<\/p>\n
    submits that since it goes to the root of the matter and no disputed facts<\/p>\n
    are involved, this argument can be raised before this Court. He also relies<\/p>\n
    on the judgment of this Court in the case of Indian Express Newspapers<\/p>\n
     (BOM)  Employees
\n                      Union v\/s K. M. Desai & Ors.,
\n                                                    reported in 1995 I CLR<\/p>\n
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\n                                                10<\/span><\/p>\n
    677.  <\/p>\n
    6.       Before going to the Judgment, it will be necessary to understand the<\/p>\n
    scheme of recognition of a union and recognition of other union under the<\/p>\n
    Act. Section 11, which has been quoted above lays down the methodology<\/p>\n
    by which an application for recognition of the union can be made. Section<\/p>\n
    14 of the of the MRTU & PULP Act is reproduced below:\n<\/p>\n
         “14. Recognition of other union:-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
         (1) If any  union  makes an application to the Industrial Court
\n         for   being   registered   as   a   recognised   union   in   place   of   a
\n         recognised union already registered as such (hereinafter in this
\n         section referred to as the “recognised union”) for an undertaking,<\/p>\n
         on the ground that it has the largest membership of employees
\n         employed   in   such   undertaking,   the   Industrial   Court   shall,   if   a<\/p>\n
         period of two years has elapsed since the date of registration of
\n         the recognised union, call upon the recognised union by a notice
\n         in writing to show cause, within thirty days of the receipt of such
\n         notice,   as   to   why   the   union   now   applying   should   not   be<\/p>\n
         recognised   in   its   place.   An   application   made   under   this   sub-
\n         section shall be accompanied by such fee not exceeding rupees
\n         five as may be prescribed.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                Provided that, the Industrial Court may not entertain any<\/p>\n
         application for registration of a union, unless a period of one year
\n         has elapsed since the date of disposal of the previous application
\n         of that union.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
         (2) If, on the expiry of the period of notice under sub-section
\n         (1), the Industrial Court finds, on preliminary scrutiny, that the
\n         application made is in order, it shall cause notice to be displayed
\n         on the notice board of the undertaking, declaring its intention to<\/p>\n
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\n                                                 11<\/span><\/p>\n
        consider the said application on the date specified in the notice,
\n        and   calling   upon   other   union   or   unions,   if   any,   having<\/p>\n
        membership   of   employees   in   that   undertaking,   employer   and
\n        employees   affected   by   the   proposal   to   show   cause   within   a
\n        prescribed time as to why recognition should not be granted.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
        (3) If,   after   considering   the   objections,   if   any,   that   may   be
\n        received under sub-section (2) and if, after holding such enquiry
\n        as   it   deems   fit   (which   may   include   recording   of   evidence   of
\n        witnesses and hearing of parties), the Industrial Court comes to<\/p>\n
        the   conclusion   that   the   union   applying   complies   with   the
\n        conditions necessary for recognition specified in section 11 and
\n        that its membership was, during the whole of the period of six<\/p>\n
        calendar months immediately preceding the calendar month, in
\n        which it made the application under this section, larger than the
\n        membership of the recognised union, then the Industrial Court<\/p>\n
        shall,   subject   to   the   provisions   of   section   12   and   this   section,
\n        recognise the union applying in place of the recognised union,
\n        and   issue   a   certificate   of   recognition   in   such   form   as   may   be
\n        prescribed.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
        Explanation:- For the purpose of this sub-section, the other union<\/p>\n
        shall   be   deemed   to   have   applied   for   recognition   in   the   same
\n        calendar month as the applicant-union.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
        (5) Every application under this section shall be disposed of by<\/p>\n
        the Industrial Court as far as possible, within three months, from
\n        the date of receipt of the application, where a group of concerns
\n        in any industry which is notified to be one undertaking for which
\n        recognition is applied for is situated in same local area; and in
\n        any other case, within four months.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
        Explanation:   “local   area”  for   the   purposes   of   this   sub-section
\n        means the area which the State Government may, by notification
\n        in the Official Gazette, specify in such notification.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    These provisions enable the Industrial Court to replace a recognised union<\/p>\n
    by another union and if a union is recognised under Section 11, another<\/p>\n
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\n                                                12<\/span><\/p>\n
    union at its place can be recognised under Section 14 of the MRTU & PULP<\/p>\n
    Act. The only requirement of the Section is that the new union should have<\/p>\n
    larger  membership   of   the  employees  employed in   such  an  undertaking.\n<\/p>\n
    Such application can be made only after two years of the recognition of the<\/p>\n
    first union. Under sub-Section (3) of Section 14, the Industrial Court is<\/p>\n
    empowered to hold an inquiry, as it deems fit, which may include also the<\/p>\n
    recording of evidence of the witnesses and hearing of the parties and after<\/p>\n
    holding  inquiry  if   the   court   is   satisfied   that   the   union   satisfies   the<\/p>\n
    conditions necessary for recognition specified in Section 11 the court shall<\/p>\n
    recognise the union applying in place; of the recognised union. Therefore,<\/p>\n
    the requirements of section 14 for recognition are necessary to be fulfilled<\/p>\n
    before   an   application   under   Section   14   is   allowed.   This   question   was<\/p>\n
    considered by this Court in  Indian Express Newspapers (BOM) Employees<\/p>\n
    Union (supra).\n<\/p>\n
    7.     Now   coming   to   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in  Indian   Express<\/p>\n
    Newspapers   (BOM)   Employees   Union  (supra),  the   union   had   filed   an<\/p>\n
    application under Section 11 of the MRTU & PULP Act which was allowed<\/p>\n
    by the Industrial Court. The matter pertained to a company which was<\/p>\n
    publishing several newspapers. The petitioner before the Court was a trade<\/p>\n
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\n                                                  13<\/span><\/p>\n
    union,   registered   under   the   Trade   Unions   Act,   1926,   and   had   been<\/p>\n
    representing a working journalists and non-journalists employed with the<\/p>\n
    company   from   1953.   Another   union   which   was   also   a   trade   union,<\/p>\n
    registered   under   the   Trade   Unions   Act,   filed   an   application   before   the<\/p>\n
    Industrial Court for recognition of itself in place of the recognised union.\n<\/p>\n
    So   the   facts   are   almost   similar   to   the   facts   of   the   present   case.   The<\/p>\n
    constitution of the newly formed union  laid  down that the objects of the<\/p>\n
    union would be as mentioned in Schedule “A”. Schedule “A” did not bear<\/p>\n
    an  entry  of   the   newspaper  establishment or a  newspaper   industry.  The<\/p>\n
    claim of the applicant was contested on the ground that the constitution of<\/p>\n
    the applicant did not permit it to enroll employees from the newspaper<\/p>\n
    industry as its members. Therefore, it could not represent employees of the<\/p>\n
    company and the application for recognition was not as such maintainable.\n<\/p>\n
    Paragraph 6  of the said judgment reads thus:\n<\/p>\n
         “6.     Taking   exception   to   the   said   order,   the   petitioner   has
\n         preferred the present petition.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                 The short question that arises for consideration is whether<\/p>\n
         respondent No.2 is entitled, under the terms of its Constitution, to
\n         enroll as its members journalists and non-journalists employed by
\n         respondent No.3. A copy of the Constitution of respondent No.2 is
\n         annexed at Exhibit – A to the petition. The objects of respondent
\n         No.3, as is evident from the Constitution, is to organise and unite
\n         the   persons   employed  in   the   industries   mentioned   in  Schedule
\n         (A)   and   to   regulate   their   relations   with   their   employers.   Then
\n         follows   Schedule   `A’  which   describes   the   industries   whose<\/p>\n
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\n                                             14<\/span><\/p>\n
    employees respondent No.2 – union can seek to introduce within
\n    itself as its members in order to regulate their relations with their<\/p>\n
    employers. Amongst the industries mentioned is the industry of
\n    printing press. It is apparent that the industry of newspapers and
\n    journals is conspicuously absent. Hence the short question which
\n    falls   for   our   consideration   is   whether   respondent   No.2   can<\/p>\n
    legitimately   enroll   the   employees   of   respondent   No.3   as   its
\n    members   on   the   strength   of   the   entry   `printing   press’.    In   this
\n    context   it   has   to   be   noticed   that   respondent   No.3,   which   is   a
\n    newspaper  industry, apart from publishing daily newspapers, it<\/p>\n
    also publishes weeklies. It, no doubt, uses a printing press for the
\n    purpose of publishing. That, however, is not the entire function of
\n    respondent No.3. It is only one of its functions. Apart from the<\/p>\n
    printing press, it has journalists as  also non-journalists in their
\n    employment.   Respondent   No.3   is   a   newspaper   industry   and   it
\n    cannot   be   termed   as   part   and   parcel   of   printing   press.   In   this<\/p>\n
    context our attention is drawn to the list of industries appended
\n    to the Bombay Trade Unions Regulations, 1927.  At serial No.28,
\n    we have an entry “printing, publishing and allied industries”. It is
\n    next  pointed  out that as  far as the Constitution of Respondent<\/p>\n
    No.2 is concerned, it has included the  industry  of printing press
\n    and has omitted “publishing and allied  industries”. In our view,<\/p>\n
    the omission is significant. What has been included is merely the
\n    business of printing press. It has not included within its compass
\n    the industry of newspaper which could have fallen in the entry
\n    “printing,   publishing   and   allied   industries”.   The   publishing   of<\/p>\n
    newspapers   has   several   functions   apart   from   the   function   of
\n    printing. Hence merely because the printing press is one of the
\n    components of newspaper industry, it cannot be gainsaid that the
\n    entire newspaper industry is nothing other than a printing press.
\n    A printing press may be included in a newspaper industry. It may<\/p>\n
    be   one   of   the   functions   of   a   newspaper   industry.   However,   a
\n    newspaper industry cannot be equated with the “printing press”
\n    industry   as   publication   of   newspaper   and   periodical   involves
\n    many   more   functions  than   are  involved  in  printing.   A   printing
\n    press   industry   cannot   include   within   its   compass   all   the
\n    employees of respondent No.3 who includes journalists and non-
\n    journalists   who   may   have   no   role   to   play   in   the   printing   of
\n    newspapers and journals being published by respondent No.3. In<\/p>\n
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\n                                                  15<\/span><\/p>\n
         the   circumstances,   we   are   constrained   to   hold   that   the
\n         Constitution   of   respondent   No.2   does   not   permit   it   to   enroll<\/p>\n
         journalists and non-journalists employed by respondent No.3 as
\n         its   members.   This   being   the   position,   what   follows   is   that   the
\n         application of respondent No.2 for recognition of its union under
\n         section   11  of   the   MRTU   &  PULP  Act  is   not   maintainable.   The<\/p>\n
         impugned   order   passed   by   respondent   No.1,   taking   a   contrary
\n         view, is thus liable to be set aside. In view of our finding that the
\n         application   of   respondent   No.2,   is   not   maintainable,   the
\n         application, being Application (MRTU) No.6 of 1983 is also liable<\/p>\n
         to be dismissed.”\n<\/p>\n
    This was a case where the purpose was the persons were to be organised<\/p>\n
    and united, mentioned against an entry “printing press” in schedule but<\/p>\n
    the Court came to the conclusion that a newspaper industry could not be<\/p>\n
    equated with the printing press industry. We have a case where no purpose<\/p>\n
    is mentioned in the constitution at all.\n<\/p>\n
             There   is   another   judgment   of   this   High   Court   in   the   case   of<\/p>\n
    Maharashtra   Engg.   Plastic   &   General   Kamgar   Union   v\/s   Chamundi<\/p>\n
    Petroleum & Ors., reported in 2007 I CLR 810. In paragraph 2, the Court<\/p>\n
    held :\n<\/p>\n
         “2.    It   is   undisputed   fact   that   on   the   date   of   filing   of   the<\/p>\n
         complaint under the said Act, the petrol pump was not included
\n         in Schedule-A to the constitution of the appellant and that there
\n         is concurrent finding in that regard by the Labour Court and the
\n         Industrial Court as well as the Learned Single Judge after taking
\n         into   consideration   all   the   materials   on   record.   It   is   also
\n         undisputed fact that the petrol pump industry was sought to be
\n         included   as   forming   part   of   the   constitution   of   the   appellant-
\n         union after filing the complaint and registration in that regard<\/p>\n
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\n                                                 16<\/span><\/p>\n
         was obtained in the month of June, 2000. Section 28 read with
\n         S.   3(17)   of   the   said   Act   clearly   requires   the   Union   to   be<\/p>\n
         registered one to enable such Union to file complaint under the
\n         said Act. Considering the same, the view taken by the learned
\n         Single Judge while confirming the decision of the Labour Court
\n         and   the   Industrial   Court,   cannot   be   found   fault   with.   The<\/p>\n
         decision   of   the   Apex   Court   sought   to   be   relied   upon   by   the
\n         learned   advocate   for   the   respondents   in   the   matter   of  Indian
\n         Oxygen Ltd. v. Their Workmen,<\/a>    reported in AIR 1969 SC 306,
\n         clearly supports the view taken by the learned single Judge in<\/p>\n
         the facts and circumstances of the case.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    We   find   ourselves   in   agreement   with   the   law   laid   down   in   the   above<\/p>\n
    referred cases by the two Division Benches of this Court. Since respondent<\/p>\n
    No.1 Union had not mentioned any purpose for which the Union was being<\/p>\n
    established   in   their   constitution,   they   could   not   have   been   recognised<\/p>\n
    under Section 11 of the MRTU & PULP Act and there was no question,<\/p>\n
    therefore, of an application under Section 14 of the MRTU & PULP Act<\/p>\n
    being entertained.\n<\/p>\n
    8.     Coming   to   the   second   ground,   that   the   learned   Judge   of   the<\/p>\n
    Industrial Court accepted affidavits and decided issue on the basis of an<\/p>\n
    inquiry conducted through the Investigation Officer, it is contended by the<\/p>\n
    learned Counsel that the Industrial Court has not only violated the law but<\/p>\n
    relying   on   the   affidavits   without   rebuttal   as   no   chance   of   rebuttal   was<\/p>\n
    given is even against the rules of natural justice. In order to appreciate this<\/p>\n
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\n                                               17<\/span><\/p>\n
    argument, certain orders of the Tribunal need to be examined.   On 29th<\/p>\n
    September, 2004, when affidavits were sought to be filed by  respondent<\/p>\n
    No.1   union,   respondent   No.2   union   made   an   application   praying   that<\/p>\n
    Investigation Officer be appointed and  affidavits  be not entertained. The<\/p>\n
    Court, however, on the question of filing of affidavits noted, “Moreover,<\/p>\n
    the learned Advocate for the applicant union has made it clear that for<\/p>\n
    proving   the   membership,   the  affidavits  of   the   employees   would   not   be<\/p>\n
    filed, but for some other relevant purpose, the affidavits may be filed. In<\/p>\n
    such circumstances, I am of the opinion that the present application, vide<\/p>\n
    Exh.   NAU-14   is   premature  and   filed   on   hypothetical   basis   that   the<\/p>\n
    affidavits would be filed to prove the membership of the Union. So such an<\/p>\n
    application cannot be allowed.” Therefore, it is contended by the learned<\/p>\n
    Counsel that the Tribunal allowed those affidavits to be filed but not for<\/p>\n
    the purpose of proving the membership. But ultimately he relied on these<\/p>\n
    affidavits for proving the membership of the union. This order was also<\/p>\n
    challenged by way of writ petition being Writ Petition No. 9502 of 2004<\/p>\n
    but the writ petition was dismissed. The petitioner was granted liberty to<\/p>\n
    agitate this issue also in case the final order went against him. Again on<\/p>\n
    29th November, 2004 by an order, the Industrial Court allowed taking on<\/p>\n
    record   1556   affidavits.   This   application   was   made   by   respondent   No.1.\n<\/p>\n
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\n                                                   18<\/span><\/p>\n
    After discussing the application and objections to it by the petitioner and<\/p>\n
    referring   to   its   earlier   order,   the   Industrial   Court   passed   the   following<\/p>\n
    order:\n<\/p>\n
           “Application for production of the affidavits is allowed with condition
\n           that   these   affidavits   would   not   be   used   for   proving   the   point   of
\n           membership   of   the   applicant   Union   and   may   be   used   for   other
\n           ancillary or relevant aspect. At the same time, the Non-applicants are<\/p>\n
           at liberty to file counter affidavits or to adduce rebuttal evidence in
\n           respect of alleged ancillary or relevant aspect which emerged from
\n           the affidavits in this proceeding”.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    The  Industrial  Court allowed filing of affidavits with liberty to the other<\/p>\n
    aside to file counter affidavits or adduce rebuttal evidence. It also allowed<\/p>\n
    the cross-examination of the  persons  who filed the said affidavits. By an<\/p>\n
    order of 30th  April, 2005, the  Industrial  Court rejected the application of<\/p>\n
    the petitioner to cross-examine the persons who had filed  affidavits  and<\/p>\n
    the   reasons   given   in   the   order   are   very   interesting,   namely,   “All   the<\/p>\n
    affidavits are similar and identical. In such circumstances, opportunity to<\/p>\n
    cross-examine   100   affiants,   as   given   to   the   non-applicants,   is   quite<\/p>\n
    sufficient   and   just.   It   is   not   equitable   and   probable   to   direct   all   1556<\/p>\n
    affiants to face the cross-examination. It will take years together to decide<\/p>\n
    the matter. In fact, the non-applicants are also at liberty to file counter<\/p>\n
    affidavits.   Since   the   original   petition   is   made  time   bound  and   non-\n<\/p>\n
    applicant union is restrained from signing the settlement with the company<\/p>\n
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\n                                              19<\/span><\/p>\n
    till decision of this main petition, I am of the opinion that the prayer of<\/p>\n
    non-applicant   union   to   call   remaining   affiants   for   cross-examination<\/p>\n
    cannot be granted”. If, a person gives an  affidavit  that he  belongs to a<\/p>\n
    particular union, what type of a counter  affidavit  can be given. The only<\/p>\n
    mode to rebut such an affidavit or to demolish the assertion made in such<\/p>\n
    an affidavit, which appeals to the commons sense, is the cross-examination<\/p>\n
    of such person.  On the one hand the Court allowed 1556 affidavits to be<\/p>\n
    taken on record. On the other hand, the Court confined cross-examination<\/p>\n
    only  against  99 persons and, therefore, on the basis of these affidavits if<\/p>\n
    any  conclusions  were  drawn  about  the   membership  of  respective  union<\/p>\n
    would be clearly faulty and unfair.\n<\/p>\n
    9.     Therefore, let us now examine as to how far the court has relied on<\/p>\n
    these   affidavits   to   come   to   the  conclusion  that   respondent   No.1   was<\/p>\n
    representing the  majority of the workers as on the crucial date. Although<\/p>\n
    in its earlier orders the Industrial Court had said that the affidavits would<\/p>\n
    be only for the ancillary purposes and not for coming to a conclusion with<\/p>\n
    regard to the strength of membership of respective union, but the learned<\/p>\n
    Counsel submits that, this was the sole evidence the Industrial Court relied<\/p>\n
    upon   to   come   to   a   conclusion   that   respondent   No.1   was   the   union<\/p>\n
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\n                                                   20<\/span><\/p>\n
    representing majority of the members.\n<\/p>\n
    10.    Before going to the findings, it will also be profitable to note some<\/p>\n
    relevant findings of the Investigation Officer. About applicant union, i.e.<\/p>\n
    respondent No.1, it is stated that they claimed that 1973 workers were<\/p>\n
    there members. Out  of the  list, the  names of  12 members were shown<\/p>\n
    twice   in   the   report.   26   workers   in   the   list   of   Union   were   not   at   all<\/p>\n
    employees of the company. One more worker was also not found in the<\/p>\n
    list. Therefore, the Investigation Officer deleted 39 workers as not eligible<\/p>\n
    members. As such the claim got reduced to 1934 from 1973. In the receipt<\/p>\n
    with  regard  to  the   payment  of  the  Union’s
\n                                                      contribution,  no  dates   were<\/p>\n
    found   by   the   Investigation   Officer   on   many   of   the   receipts.   About   the<\/p>\n
    recognised   union   i.e.   one   of   the   petitioner   who  claimed  that   they   had<\/p>\n
    membership of 2166 members, it was found that 41 workers were not seen<\/p>\n
    in the list. Therefore, they were deleted and the claim was as such reduced<\/p>\n
    to   2125   from   2166.   From   January,   2003   to   December,   2003,   2166<\/p>\n
    members   were   shown   as   registered   in   their   books   but   no   responsible<\/p>\n
    officer of the union had signed on the record book. The said recording was<\/p>\n
    not maintained  as per the  provisions of the  Act. The annual fee of  the<\/p>\n
    union was Rs.60\/-. The receipts showing collection from 2166 members<\/p>\n
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\n                                                21<\/span><\/p>\n
    were submitted. The contribution of workers were reflected in cash book,<\/p>\n
    but   the   cash   book   was   not   maintained   in   the   prescribed   specimen   and<\/p>\n
    responsible officer of the union had not signed the cash book. 54 workers<\/p>\n
    had retired\/resigned and some of them had even expired. Thereafter the<\/p>\n
    Investigation Officer proceeded to verification of members. He found that<\/p>\n
    both the Unions gave the list of eligible members which was compared<\/p>\n
    with the list of the workers of the company. Out of 1934 eligible members,<\/p>\n
    there were only 26 members exclusively with respondent No.1 union. 1908<\/p>\n
    members, who were shown to be members by respondent No.1 union were<\/p>\n
    also members of the other union i.e. recognised union. So the Investigation<\/p>\n
    Officer   came   to   the   conclusion   that   1908   members   had   a   dual<\/p>\n
    membership. They were members of both the unions and ultimately he<\/p>\n
    found   that   the   recognised   union   had   217   members   which   was   the<\/p>\n
    exclusive membership of that union and only 26 persons were exclusive<\/p>\n
    member of respondent No.1 union which claimed recognition.\n<\/p>\n
    11.    In the impugned Judgment and Order, the learned Industrial Court<\/p>\n
    had   framed   Issues.   Issue   Nos.1   and   2   are   important   for   the   present<\/p>\n
    question, which read as under:\n<\/p>\n
           “1.    Whether   the   applicant   Union   proves   that   it   has<\/p>\n
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\n                                                  22<\/span><\/p>\n
           membership of not less than 30% of the total number of the
\n           employees, employed in the  undertaking  for the  whole  of the<\/p>\n
           period   of   six   months,  immediately  preceding   the   calendar
\n           month, in which it so applies?\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
           2.     Whether the membership of Applicant Union was larger<\/p>\n
           than   that   of   the   membership   of   the   Non-applicant   No.2
\n           (Recognised   Union),   during   the   whole   of   the   period   of   six
\n           months, prior to the filing of the petition?”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    Both these Issues were decided in favour of respondent No.1 Union. We<\/p>\n
    have   found   that   basically   the   approach   of   the   Industrial   Court   in<\/p>\n
    proceeding with the  controversy was defective. Respondent No.2 Union –\n<\/p>\n
    BKS was recognised union. It had not to prove any case. The onus was on<\/p>\n
    respondent   No.1   union   to   prove   that   BKS   had   lost   its   representative<\/p>\n
    character within the meaning of Section 11 of the MRTU & PULP Act and<\/p>\n
    they   were   eligible   to   be   recognised   under   Section   11   of   the   Act.   This<\/p>\n
    approach can be seen from the observations made by the Industrial Court<\/p>\n
    in paragraph 21 of the impugned Judgment. The relevant observations are<\/p>\n
    as under:\n<\/p>\n
           “At this juncture, alone, I would like to point out that the entire<\/p>\n
           record   of   B.K.S.   pertaining   to   membership   fees   as   produced
\n           before   Investigating   Officer,   is   suspicious.   I   will   point   out   the
\n           remarks of Investigating Officer as given on Page 8 of the report.
\n           Investigating   Officer   has   remarked   that   whatever   membership
\n           fees collected on 7th February, 2003 was shown as received  two
\n           days earlier i.e. on 5.2.2003 in the cash book. Similarly, whatever
\n           membership fees collected on 10th February 2003 is shown as
\n           collected two days prior i.e. on 8.2.2003 in cash book. It is very<\/p>\n
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\n                                                 23<\/span><\/p>\n
           surprised to see that on 5th February 2003 and 8th February 2003
\n           the   amounts   shown   as   collected   towards   membership   fees   by<\/p>\n
           B.K.S. were not at all collected on those respective days. So, both
\n           entries in cash book pertaining to collection of membership fees
\n           in  cash  book,  are  false  and   incorrect.  Investigating Officer  has
\n           specifically  pointed  out on page 8 of his report that cash book<\/p>\n
           maintained by B.K.S. is not in prescribed proforma and it is not
\n           signed   by   any   of   the   office  bearers  of   B.K.S.   Moreover,
\n           Investigating  Officer has  also reported on page 5 of his report
\n           that membership registers of B.K.S. for the relevant period were<\/p>\n
           not   signed   by   any   of   the   office   bearers   and   moreover,   said
\n           registers   were   not   in   prescribed   proforma   i.e.   in   Form   J   as
\n           prescribed   under   the   Act.   Such   documentary   evidence   of   cash<\/p>\n
           book and membership registers without bearing the signature of
\n           any  of the office bearers of the Union and without maintaining
\n           those   in   prescribed   proforma,   it   can   be   easily   said   that   such<\/p>\n
           documents are not authentic and authorised and cannot be relied
\n           upon. I would like to point out from oral evidence of responsible
\n           office   bearer   of   B.K.S.   i.e.   Vice   President   of   B.K.S.   namely,
\n           Deoram Bhosale that inspite of holding responsible post of B.K.S.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
           he has not yet read the constitution of B.K.S.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    We do not find from the impugned order that the onus was discharged by<\/p>\n
    respondent   No.1   to   prove   that   it   was,   at   the   relevant   point   of   time,<\/p>\n
    representing   majority   of   the   members.   In   paragraph   25   of   the   said<\/p>\n
    judgment,   the   Industrial   Court   dealt   with   the   affidavits   and   noted   the<\/p>\n
    arguments and counter arguments. The learned trial Judge was of the view<\/p>\n
    that though these affidavits could not be taken as proof of membership but<\/p>\n
    these   affidavits   could   be   taken   to   be   the   proof   of   the   Deponent’
\n                                                                                         s<\/p>\n
    declaration that he had relinquished his membership from B.K.S. Thus in<\/p>\n
    effect   was   an   attempt   to   rely   on   these  affidavits  for   proving   the<\/p>\n
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\n                                                24<\/span><\/p>\n
    membership of respondent No.1 union. The court said, “So, affidavits of<\/p>\n
    1556 employees of the Company filed on behalf of Applicant Union, can be<\/p>\n
    accepted  to   substantiate   the   point   that   they   brought   an   end   to   their<\/p>\n
    relationship with B.K.S. and had not  paid  the membership fees to B.K.S.\n<\/p>\n
    after  December, 2002.  Intention of  as  many as  1556  employees  is very<\/p>\n
    clear from their affidavits that they disconnected their tie as members with<\/p>\n
    B.K.S. and come forward to file their respective affidavits of and on behalf<\/p>\n
    of applicant union in this matter for getting the status of recognised union.\n<\/p>\n
    “This was not only against the rules of natural justice, as also about the<\/p>\n
    established law, but against the order passed by the Industrial Court itself<\/p>\n
    earlier. Even if these affidavits could have been taken into consideration,<\/p>\n
    none of the affiants, except 100 affiants for which cross-examination was<\/p>\n
    allowed,   could   have   been   taken   into   consideration.   But   admittedly   the<\/p>\n
    membership cannot be proved on the  basis of the affidavits as it is the<\/p>\n
    settled law and we will refer to the judgment in this connection shortly.\n<\/p>\n
    The conclusion drawn by the learned Judge was, “So, after comparing the<\/p>\n
    entire evidence adduced by both unions on the point of strength of their<\/p>\n
    membership   read   together   with   report   of   Investigating   Officer   as   well,<\/p>\n
    1556 affidavits of the employees filed on record by Applicant Union, I am<\/p>\n
    of  the  opinion that the Applicant Union was  having more than 30% of<\/p>\n
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\n                                                25<\/span><\/p>\n
    membership   of   the   total   employees   of   the   Company   as   well   as   larger<\/p>\n
    membership   than   the   membership   of   B.K.S.   during   the   period   of   six<\/p>\n
    months   from   the   month  of   March,   2003   till   August,   2003.”   So   the<\/p>\n
    affidavits filed by 1556 workers plays a decisive role in making the Court<\/p>\n
    to reach the  conclusion  that the applicant   Union represented more than<\/p>\n
    1556 of the total number of the workers of the undertaking. Therefore, on<\/p>\n
    this ground the petitions are required to be allowed.\n<\/p>\n
    12.    Whether the said affidavits can be taken into consideration or not, is<\/p>\n
    according   to   the   learned   Counsel   for   the   petitioner,   concluded   by   the<\/p>\n
    judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of  Automobile Products of<\/p>\n
    India   Employees’ Union   v\/s   Association   of   Engineering   Workers,<\/p>\n
    Bombay and others, reported in 1990 F.L.R. Vol.61 page 369. This was a<\/p>\n
    case   where   the   Industrial   Court   tried   to   find   out   as   to   who   was<\/p>\n
    representing   majority   of   the   members   by   adopting   a   method   of   secret<\/p>\n
    ballot with the consent of contesting parties. This was also not approved by<\/p>\n
    the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dealt with the scheme of the Act<\/p>\n
    and observed as under:\n<\/p>\n
                “The facts in the present case would reveal that what was
\n          done by the  Industrial  Court was to permit the registration of
\n          the union as a recognised one by a method which was clearly<\/p>\n
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\n                                                 26<\/span><\/p>\n
          alien   to   the   Act.   The   Court   in   effect   allowed   the   parties   to
\n          circumvent the provisions of the Act and by adopting a simplistic<\/p>\n
          method directed that whoever commanded a majority of votes
\n          of the employees voting on a particular day, would be entitled
\n          to the status of the recognised union. In effect,  therefore, the
\n          Court ignored in particular the mandatory provisions of Sections<\/p>\n
          10, 11, 12, 14 and 19 of the Act. Not only that, but by adopting
\n          this method, the Court also failed to find out whether any of
\n          those   workers,   who   voted,   were   members   of   any   of   the   two
\n          unions at any time including on the day of the ballot. This is<\/p>\n
          apart   from   the   fact   that   what   has   to   be   found   out   is   the
\n          exclusive   membership   of   the   contesting   unions   continuously
\n          over   the   specified   period,   the   overlapping   membership   being<\/p>\n
          ignored.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                   The consent of the parties to follow a procedure which is<\/p>\n
          against   the   mandatory  provisions   of   the   Act,   cannot   cure  the
\n          illegality.   For   reasons   which   we   have   indicated   earlier   the
\n          Legislature   did   not   opt   for   the   ballot   as   a   method   for
\n          determining the representative character of the union and laid<\/p>\n
          down as elaborate procedure with necessary safeguards to do
\n          so.   In   the  circumstances,   to   permit   the   parties   by   consent   to<\/p>\n
          substitute a procedure of their own is in effect to permit them to
\n          substitute the provisions of the Act.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    Following this Judgement of the Supreme Court, the impugned order of<\/p>\n
    the Industrial Court cannot be sustained.\n<\/p>\n
    13.           Coming to the third ground, which challenges the order of the<\/p>\n
    Tribunal on the ground that respondent No.1 union had not complied with<\/p>\n
    the requirement under Section 19(4) of the MRTU   & PULP Act, we feel<\/p>\n
    that since we are allowing the writ petition on other two grounds, it may<\/p>\n
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\n                                            27<\/span><\/p>\n
    not be necessary to go into that question.\n<\/p>\n
    14.         For   the   reasons   aforestated,   both   the   writ   petitions   are<\/p>\n
    allowed. The impugned order of the Industrial Court is quashed and set<\/p>\n
    aside. However, respondent No.1 if, feels, that it deserves to be recognised<\/p>\n
    in terms of law, it can make a fresh application in accordance with law.\n<\/p>\n
    15.<\/p>\n
                Rule made absolute in terms aforesaid.\n<\/p>\n
    16.         There shall be no order as to costs.\n<\/p>\n
                                                           Sd\/-\n<\/p>\n
                                                   (BILAL NAZKI, J.)<\/p>\n
                                                           Sd\/-\n<\/p>\n
                                                    (J. H. BHATIA,J.)<\/p>\n
                                                         ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:18:01 :::<\/span>\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Bombay High Court Force Motors Limited vs Poona Employees Union on 2 February, 2009 Bench: Bilal Nazki, J. H. Bhatia 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION NO. 2907 OF 2006 Force Motors Limited ) (formerly known as Bajaj Tempo ) Ltd.), having its office at Akurdi, ) […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[11,8],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-56539","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bombay-high-court","category-high-court"],"yoast_head":"\nForce Motors Limited vs Poona Employees Union on 2 February, 2009 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/force-motors-limited-vs-poona-employees-union-on-2-february-2009\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Force Motors Limited vs Poona Employees Union on 2 February, 2009 - 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