{"id":5836,"date":"2003-02-17T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2003-02-16T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/banarsi-and-ors-vs-ram-phal-on-17-february-2003"},"modified":"2017-09-09T05:47:28","modified_gmt":"2017-09-09T00:17:28","slug":"banarsi-and-ors-vs-ram-phal-on-17-february-2003","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/banarsi-and-ors-vs-ram-phal-on-17-february-2003","title":{"rendered":"Banarsi And Ors vs Ram Phal on 17 February, 2003"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Banarsi And Ors vs Ram Phal on 17 February, 2003<\/div>\n
Bench: R.C. Lahoti, Brijesh Kumar<\/div>\n
           CASE NO.:\nAppeal (civil)  1376-77 of 2003\n\nPETITIONER:\nBANARSI AND ORS.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nRAM PHAL\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT: 17\/02\/2003\n\nBENCH:\nR.C. LAHOTI & BRIJESH KUMAR\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
JUDGMENT<\/p>\n
2003(2) SCR 22<\/p>\n
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by<\/p>\n
R.C. LAHOTI, J. Leave granted in both the SLPs.\n<\/p>\n
A suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell entered into
\nbetween the parties on 03.11.1988 and later on novated by an agreement
\ndated 15.7.1991, was filed by the respondent herein. According to the
\nlatter agreement, the consideration for sale was appointed at Rs. 2,90,000
\nout of which an amount of Rs. 2,40,000 was acknowledged by the vendor to
\nhave been received, leaving a balance of Rs. 50,000 to be received at the
\ntime of execution and registration of the sale deed. The appellants had
\nalso filed their own suit seeking cancellation of the agreement dated
\n03.11.1988 on the ground that the nature of transaction between the parties
\nwas one of loan; that the amount of loan taken by the appellants was only
\nRs. 60,000 but the respondent had added advance interest and capitalized
\nthe same; and that the amount of loan with interest was returned and yet
\nthe respondent had failed to deliver back as fully discharged the
\nagreements dated 03.11.1988 and 15.7.1991. The two suits were consolidated
\nand tried together by the learned Civil Judge. Vide the judgment and decree
\ndated 20.5.1994, disposing of both the suits, the Trial Court held that
\nlooking at the real nature of the transaction entered into between the
\nparties and the evidence adduced to show the actual amount which passed
\nfrom the respondent to the appellants it was just and proper that the
\nappellants returned the amount of Rs. 2,40,000 with interest calculated at
\nthe rate of 1% per month with effect from 3.11.1988 on Rs. 1,80,000 and
\nwith effect from 15.7.1991 on Rs. 60,000. During the course of its judgment
\nthe Trial Court recorded a specific finding that the appellants were
\ncultivating the land; that land in dispute was very necessary for the
\nmaintenance of their family; and that if execution of sale deed was
\ndirected they would suffer too much hardship. The operative part of the
\njudgment, incorporated in the decree, reads as under:-\n<\/p>\n
“The defendants Shri Banarsi etc. are hereby ordered that they should
\ndeposit the amount of Rs. 1,80,000 and Rs. 60,000 total Rs. 2,40,000 from
\n3.11.88 to 15.7.91 within two months for the plaintiff, in the court.\n<\/p>\n
The plaintiff Shri Ramphal is directed that in case the above amount is
\ndeposited during the above mentioned period, he will return the original
\nagreement after endorsing the receipt of the entire amount on the back of
\nthe original Agreement dated 15.7.91 and return this to the defendants or
\ndo the alienation at their expense in their favour and get it registered.\n<\/p>\n
If the above defendants Shri Banarsi etc. fails to deposit the above
\nmentioned entire amount in the court within a period of above two months
\ntime then thereafter the plaintiff Shri Ramphal shall have the right that
\nhe after depositing the amount of Rs. 50,000 in the court may get the sale
\ndeed executed in respect of the land in dispute in his favour or in favour
\nof the person nominated by him, from the defendants. Accordingly, the order
\nis given to the defendants that they after executing the above sale deed in
\nfavour of the plaintiff give the same to the plaintiff.\n<\/p>\n
In the land in dispute, all those lands are included which have been
\nallotted to the defendants after modification in the consolidation.\n<\/p>\n
Both the parties to bear their respective costs. Dated 20.5.94″\n<\/p>\n
The appellants herein filed two appeals in the High Court. By an interim
\norder dated 13.7.94 passed in one of the appeals, the High Court directed
\nexecution of decree under appeal to remain stayed subject to the appellants
\ndepositing an amount of Rs. 80,000 on or before 31st March, 1995. On
\n24.3.95, the appellants deposited the amount of Rs. 80,000 in the High
\nCourt. During the pendency of the first appeals, the pecuniary jurisdiction
\nof the District Courts was enhanced consequent whereupon the first appeals
\ncame to be transferred from the High Court to the District Court. Both the
\nappeals came to be heard and decided by the learned Additional District
\nJudge vide his judgment dated 21.9.99. Both the appeals were dismissed. The
\nrespondent did not prefer any appeal of his own nor filed any cross-
\nobjection. While holding the appeals preferred by the appellants liable to
\nbe dismissed, the first appellate Court framed the operative part of the
\njudgment as under-\n<\/p>\n
“both the appeals are liable to be rejected with this modification that the
\nsuit of the plaintiff Ramphal is liable to be decreed for specific relief
\nand the original suit no.63 of 1993 Banarsi Versus Ramphal is liable to be
\nrejected.\n<\/p>\n
ORDER<\/p>\n
Both the appeals, while rejecting this order passed by the Court below in
\nthe impugned judgment and decree dated 20.5.1984 that deposit the amount
\nRs. 2,40,000 with interest @ 1% within two months and after that make the
\nendorsement of the receipt of the entire money on the back of the Agreement
\ndated 15.7.1991 by the Defendant Ramphal and after confirming the remaining
\norder, modifying the impugned order and decree to that extent, are hereby
\ndismissed. In this manner the suit of the Plaintiff Ramphal for the
\nspecific relief is decreed with costs against the original Suit No. 38 of
\n1993 in the matter of the defendant Banarsi etc. and the Defendant Banarsi
\netc. are here by directed that they after receiving the balance amount of
\nRs. 50,000 as per the agreement dated 15.7.1991 within a period of one
\nmonths execute the sale deed and hand over the possession otherwise the
\nplaintiff shall be at liberty to get the above work done through Court.
\nOriginal Suit no.63 of 1993 Banarsi etc. Versus Ram Phal is dismissed with
\ncosts. Copy of this order be kept in the concerned file. Both the parties
\nwould bear their respective costs of both the appeals.”\n<\/p>\n
[emphasis supplied]<\/p>\n
The appellants preferred two second appeals before the High Court. By an
\ninterim order dated 20.12.99, the High Court directed the execution of the
\ndecrees appealed against to remain stayed subject to the appellants
\ndepositing an amount of Rs. 2,40,000, after adjusting the amount already
\ndeposited by them pursuant to the earlier order of the High Court, within a
\nperiod of eight weeks, which amount along with the amount already deposited
\nshould be kept in fixed deposit. On 10.2.2000, the appellants deposited an
\namount of Rs. 1,60,000 in the Court of Civil Judge Senior Division, Kairana
\n(M. Nagar). Both the amounts deposited by the appellants, i.e. Rs. 80,000
\nand Rs. 1,60,000, are now lying in fixed deposit. Vide the impugned common
\njudgment (in the two appeals) dated 10.8.2001, the High Court has directed
\nboth the second appeals filed by the appellants to be dismissed as raising
\nno substantial question of law. One of the pleas advanced on behalf of the
\nappellants before the High Court was that the first Appellate Court could
\nnot have, in the purported exercise of power under Order 41 Rule 33 of the
\nCPC, reversed the decree in respect of the refund of money and directed the
\nsuit for specific performance to be decreed in favour of the respondent
\nwithout there being any appeal or cross-objection preferred by the
\nrespondent. The High Court opined that it was open for the respondent not
\nto file any appeal against the Trial Court’s decree on the belief that he
\nwould either get his money back within the short time provided under the
\ndecree or would have the contract specifically performed. However, on
\naccount of the stay order obtained by the appellants, the payment of
\ndecretal amount was not made by the appellants to the respondent as per the
\nterms of the decree and in such circumstances, the first Appellate Court
\ncommitted no error of law in exercising power under Order 41 Rule 33 of the
\nCPC and passing a decree for specific performance in favour of the
\nrespondent.\n<\/p>\n
Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the High Court the
\nappellants have filed these two appeals by special leave.\n<\/p>\n
The appeals raise a short but interesting question of frequent recurrence
\nas to the power of the appellate court to interfere with and reverse or
\nmodify the decree appealed against by the appellants in the absence of any
\ncross-appeal or cross-objection by respondent under Order 41 Rule 22 of the
\nCPC and the scope of power conferred on appellate court under Rule 33 of
\nOrder 41 of the CPC.\n<\/p>\n
The first question is whether without cross objection by the respondent,
\ncould the Appellate Court have set aside the decree passed by the Trial
\nCourt and instead granted straightaway a decree for specific performance of
\ncontract? This would require reference to the principles underlying right
\nto file an appeal and right to prefer cross objection or when does it
\nbecome necessary to prefer cross objection without which decree under
\nappeal cannot be altered or varied to the advantage of the respondent
\nand\/or to the disadvantage of the appellant. Rule 22 of Order 41, as
\namended by CPC Amendment Act 104 of 1976, with effect from 1.2.1977 is
\nreproduced hereunder in juxtaposition with the text of the provision as it
\nstood prior to the amendment.\n<\/p>\n
Order 41 Rule 22<\/p>\n
Text as amended by Act 104 of 1976(w.e.f. 1-2-1977)<\/p>\n
Text pre-amendment<\/p>\n
R.22. Upon hearing, respondent may object to decree as if he had preferred
\na separate appeal.-(1)<\/p>\n
Any respondent, though he may not have appealed from any part of the
\ndecree, may not only support the decree [but may also state that the
\nfinding against him in the Court below in respect of any issue ought to
\nhave been in his favour; and may also take any cross-objection] to the
\ndecree which he could have taken by way of appeal:\n<\/p>\n
Provided he has filed such’ objection in the Appellate Court within one
\nmonth from the date of service on him or his pleader of notice of the day
\nfixed for hearing the appeal, or within such further time as the Appellate
\nCourt may see fit to allow.\n<\/p>\n
[Explanation.-A respondent aggrieved by a finding of the Court in the
\njudgment on which the decree appealed against is based may, under this
\nrule, file cross-objection in respect of the decree in so far as it is
\nbased on that finding, notwithstanding that by reason of the decision of
\nthe Court on any other finding which is sufficient for the decision of the
\nsuit, the decree, is, wholly or in part, in favour of that respondent.]<\/p>\n
R.22. Upon hearing, respondent may object to decree as if he had preferred
\na separate appeal.-(1)<\/p>\n
Any respondent, though he may not have appealed from any part of the
\ndecree, may not only support the decree on any of the grounds decided
\nagainst him in the Court below, but take any cross-objection to the decree
\nwhich he could have taken by way of appeal, provided he has filed such
\nobjection in the Appellate Court within one month from the date of service
\non him or his pleader of notice of the day fixed for hearing the appeal, or
\nwithin such further time as the Appellate Court may see fit to allow.\n<\/p>\n
(2) xxxx xxxx   xxxx                           (2) xxxx    xxxx    xxxx\n\n(3)  xxxx xxxx   xxxx                           (3) xxxx    xxxx     xxxx\n\n(4)  Where, in any case in which     (4) Where, in any case in which any\nany respondent has under this rule     respondent has under this rule filed\na filed a memorandum of objection,     memorandum of objection, the\noriginal appeal is withdrawn or     original appeal is withdrawn or is\ndismissed  for  default,  the     dismissed for default, the objection\nobjection so filed may nevertheless     so filed may nevertheless be heard\nbe heard and determined after such     and determined after such notice to\n<\/pre>\n
notice to the other parties as to the other parties as the Court thinks
\nCourt thinks fit.                               fit.\n<\/p>\n
Sections 96 and 100 of the CPC make provision for an appeal being preferred
\nfrom every original decree or from every decree passed in appeal
\nrespectively; none of the provisions enumerates the person who can file an
\nappeal. However, it is settled by a long catena of decisions that to be
\nentitled to file an appeal the person must be one aggrieved by the decree.
\nUnless a person is prejudicially or adversely affected by the decree he is
\nnot entitled to file an appeal (See Phoolchand and Anr. v. Gopal Lal,<\/a>
\n[1967] 3 SCR 153; Smt. Jatan Kanwar Golcha v. M\/s Golcha Properties (P)
\nLtd.,<\/a> [1970] 3 SCC 573; Smt. Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar and Ors.,<\/a> [1974] 2
\nSCC 393. No appeal lies against a mere finding. It is significant to note
\nthat both Sections 96 and 100 of the CPC provide for an appeal against
\ndecree and not against judgment.\n<\/p>\n
Any respondent though he may not have filed an appeal from any part of the
\ndecree may still support the decree to the extent to which it is already in
\nhis favour by laying challenge to a finding recorded in the impugned
\njudgment against him. Where a plaintiff seeks a decree against the
\ndefendant on grounds (A) and (B), any one of the two grounds being enough
\nto entitle the plaintiff to a decree and the Court has passed a decree on
\nground (A) deciding it for the plaintiff while ground (B) has been decided
\nagainst the plaintiff, in an appeal preferred by the defendant, in spite of
\nthe finding on ground (A) being reversed the plaintiff as a respondent can
\nstill seek to support the decree by challenging finding on ground (B) and
\npersuade the appellate court to form an opinion that in spite of the
\nfinding on ground (A) being reversed to the benefit of defendant-appellant
\nthe decree could still be sustained by reversing the finding on ground (B)
\nthough the plaintiff-respondent has neither preferred an appeal of his own
\nnor taken any cross objection. A right to file cross objection is the
\nexercise of right to appeal though in a different form. It was observed in
\nSahadu Gangaram Bhagade v. Special Deputy Collector. Ahmednagar and Anr.,<\/a>
\n[1971] 1 SCR 146 that the right given to a respondent in an appeal to file
\ncross objection is a right given to the same extent as is a right of appeal
\nto lay challenge to the impugned decree if he can be said to be aggrieved
\nthereby. Taking any cross objection is the exercise of right of appeal and
\ntakes the place of cross-appeal though the form differs. Thus it is clear
\nthat just as an appeal is preferred by a person aggrieved by the decree so
\nalso a cross objection is preferred by one who can be said to be aggrieved
\nby the decree. A party who has fully succeeded in the suit can and needs to
\nneither prefer an appeal nor take any cross objection though certain
\nfinding may be against him. Appeal and cross-objection – both are filed
\nagainst decree and not against judgment and certainly not against any
\nfinding recorded in a judgment. This was well-settled position of law under
\nthe unamended CPC.\n<\/p>\n
CPC Amendment of 1976 has not materially or substantially altered the law
\nexcept for a marginal difference. Even under the amended Order 41 Rule 22
\nsub-rule (1) a party in whose favour the decree stands in its entirety is
\nneither entitled nor obliged to prefer any cross objection. However, the
\ninsertion made in the text of sub-rule (1) makes it permissible to file a
\ncross objection against a finding. The difference which has resulted we
\nwill shortly state. A respondent may defend himself without filing any
\ncross objection to the extent to which decree is in his favour; however, if
\nhe proposes to attack any part of the decree he must take cross objection.
\nThe amendment inserted by 1976 amendment is clarificatory and also enabling
\nand this may be made precise by analysing the provision. There may be three
\nsituations:-\n<\/p>\n
(i) The impugned decree is partly in favour of the appellant and partly in
\nfavour of the respondent;\n<\/p>\n
(ii) The decree is entirely in favour of the respondent though an issue has
\nbeen decided against the respondent;\n<\/p>\n
(iii) The decree is entirely in favour of the respondent and all the issues
\nhave also been answered in favour of the respondent but there is a finding
\nin the judgment which goes against the respondent.\n<\/p>\n
In the type of case (i) it was necessary for the respondent to file an
\nappeal or take cross objection against that part of the decree which is
\nagainst him if he seeks to get rid of the same though that part of the
\ndecree which is in his favour he is entitled to support without taking any
\ncross objection. The law remains so post amendment too. In the type of
\ncases (ii) and (iii) pre-amendment CPC did not entitle nor permit the
\nrespondent to take any cross objection as he was not the person aggrieved
\nby the decree. Under the amended CPC, read in the light of the explanation,
\nthough it is still not necessary for the respondent to take any cross
\nobjection laying challenge to any finding adverse to him as the decree is
\nentirely in his favour and he may support the decree without cross
\nobjection; the amendment made in the text of sub-rule (1), read with the
\nexplanation newly inserted, gives him a right to take cross objection to &
\nfinding recorded against him either while answering an issue or while
\ndealing with an issue. The advantage of preferring such cross objection is
\nspelled out by sub-rule (4). In spite of the original appeal having been
\nwithdrawn or dismissed for default the cross objection taken to any finding
\nby the respondent shall still be available to be adjudicated upon on merits
\nwhich remedy was not available to the respondent under the unamended CPC.
\nIn pre-amendment era, the withdrawal or dismissal for default of the
\noriginal appeal disabled the respondent to question the correctness or
\notherwise of any finding recorded against the respondent.\n<\/p>\n
The fact remains that to the extent to which the decree is against the
\nrespondent and he wishes to get rid of it he should have either filed an
\nappeal of his own or taken cross objection failing which the decree to that
\nextent cannot be insisted on by the respondent for being interfered, set
\naside or modified to his advantage. The law continues to remain so
\npost-1976 amendment. In a suit seeking specific performance of an agreement
\nto sell governed by the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 the
\nCourt has a discretion to decree specific performance of the agreement. The
\nplaintiff may also claim compensation under Section 21 or any other relief
\nto which he may be entitled including the refund of money or deposit paid
\nor made by him in case his claim for specific performance is refused. No
\ncompensation or any other relief including the relief of refund shall be
\ngranted by the Court unless it has been specifically claimed in the plaint
\nby the plaintiff. Certainly the relief of specific performance is a larger
\nrelief for the plaintiff and more onerous to the defendant compared with
\nthe relief for compensation or refund of money. The relief of compensation
\nor refund of money is a relief smaller than the relief of specific
\nperformance. A plaintiff who files a suit for specific performance claiming
\ncompensation in lieu of or in addition to the relief of specific
\nperformance or any other relief including the refund of any money has a
\nright to file an appeal against the original decree if the relief of
\nspecific performance is refused and other relief is granted. The plaintiff
\nwould be a person aggrieved by the decree in spite of one of the
\nalternative reliefs having been allowed to him because what has been
\nallowed to him is the smaller relief and the larger relief has been denied
\nto him. A defendant against whom a suit for specific performance has been
\ndecreed may file an appeal seeking relief of specific performance being
\ndenied to the plaintiff and instead a decree of smaller relief such as that
\nof compensation or refund of money or any other relief being granted to the
\nplaintiff for the former is larger relief and the latter is smaller relief.
\nThe defendant would be the person aggrieved to that extent. It follows as a
\nnecessary corollary from the abovesaid statement of law that in an appeal
\nfiled by the defendant laying challenge to the relief of compensation or
\nrefund of money or any other relief while decree for specific performance
\nwas denied to the plaintiff, the plaintiff as a respondent cannot seek the
\nrelief of specific performance of contract or modification of the impugned
\ndecree except by filing an appeal of his own or by taking cross objection.\n<\/p>\n
We are, therefore, of the opinion that in the absence of cross appeal
\npreferred or cross objection taken by the plaintiff-respondent the First
\nAppellate Court did not have jurisdiction to modify the decree in the
\nmanner in which it has done. Within the scope of appeals preferred by the
\nappellants the First Appellate Court could have either allowed the appeals
\nand dismissed the suit filed by the respondent in its entirety or could
\nhave deleted the latter part of the decree which granted the decree for
\nspecific performance conditional upon failure of the defendant to deposit
\nthe money in terms of the decree or could have maintained the decree as it
\nwas passed by dismissing the appeals. What the First Appellate Court has
\ndone is not only to set aside the decree to the extent to which it was in
\nfavour of the appellants but also granted an absolute and out and out
\ndecree for specific performance of agreement to sell which is to the
\nprejudice of the appellants and to the advantage of the respondent who has
\nneither filed an appeal nor taken any cross objection.\n<\/p>\n
The learned counsel for the respondent forcefully argued that even in the
\nabsence of appeal preferred by the plaintiff or cross objection taken by
\nthe plaintiff-respondent the Appellate Court was not powerless to grant the
\ndecree which it has done in exercise of the power conferred by Rule 33 of
\nOrder 41 of the CPC. Rule 33 of Order 41 as also Rule 4 thereof, which have
\nto be read necessarily together, are set out hereunder:\n<\/p>\n
ORDER 41 Appeals from Original Decrees<\/p>\n
“33. Power of Court of Appeal.-The Appellate Court shall have power to pass
\nany decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and
\nto pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may
\nrequire, and this power may be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that
\nthe appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour
\nof all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or
\nparties may not have filed any appeal or objection and may, where there
\nhave been decrees in cross-suits or where two or more decrees are passed in
\none suit, be exercised in respect of all or any of the decrees, although an
\nappeal may not have been filed against such decrees:\n<\/p>\n
Provided that the Appellate Court shall not make any order under section
\n35A, in pursuance of any objection on which the Court from whose decree the
\nappeal is preferred has omitted or refused to make such order.\n<\/p>\n
Illustration<\/p>\n
A claims a sum of money as due to him from X or Y, and in a suit against
\nboth obtains a decree against X. X, appeals and A and Y are respondents.
\nThe Appellate Court decides in favour of X. It has power to pass a decree
\nagainst Y.\n<\/p>\n
4. One of several plaintiffs or defendants may obtain reversal of whole
\ndecree where it proceeds on ground common to all.-Where there are more
\nplaintiffs or more defendants than one in a suit, and the decree appealed
\nfrom proceeds on any ground common to all the plaintiffs or to all the
\ndefendants, any one of the plaintiffs or of the defendants may appeal from
\nthe whole decree, and thereupon the Appellate Court may reverse or vary the
\ndecree in favour of all the plaintiffs or defendants, as the case may be.”\n<\/p>\n
Rule 4 seeks to achieve one of the several objects sought to be achieved by
\nRule 33, that is, avoiding a situation of conflicting decrees coming into
\nexistence in the same suit. The abovesaid provisions confer power of widest
\namplitude on the appellate court so as to do complete justice between the
\nparties and such power is unfettered by consideration of facts like what is
\nthe subject matter of appeal, who has filed the appeal and whether the
\nappeal is being dismissed, allowed or disposed of by modifying the judgment
\nappealed against. While dismissing an appeal and though confirming the
\nimpugned decree, the appellate court may still direct passing of such
\ndecree or making of such order which ought to have been passed or made by
\nthe court below in accordance with the findings of fact and law arrived at
\nby the court below and which it would have done had it been conscious of
\nthe error committed by it and noticed by the Appellate Court. While
\nallowing the appeal or otherwise interfering with the decree or order
\nappealed against, the appellate court may pass or make such further or
\nother, decree or order, as the case would require being done, consistently
\nwith the findings arrived at by the appellate court. The object sought to
\nbe achieved by conferment of such power on the appellate court is to avoid
\ninconsistency, inequity, inequality in reliefs granted to similarly placed
\nparties and unworkable decree or order coming into existence. The
\noverriding consideration is achieving the ends of justice. Wider the power,
\nhigher the need for caution and care while exercising the power. Usually
\nthe power under Rule 33 is exercised when the portion of the decree
\nappealed against or the portion of the decree held liable to be set aside
\nor interfered by the appellate court is so inseparably connected with the
\nportion not appealed against or left untouched that for the reason of the
\nlatter portion being left untouched either injustice would result or
\ninconsistent decrees would follow. The power is subject to at least three
\nlimitations: firstly, the power cannot be exercised to the prejudice or
\ndisadvantage of a person not a party before the Court; secondly, a claim
\ngiven up or lost cannot be revived; and thirdly, such part of the decree
\nwhich essentially ought to have been appealed against or objected to by a
\nparty and which that party has permitted to achieve a finality cannot be
\nreversed to the advantage of such party. A case where there are two reliefs
\nprayed for and one is refused while the other one is granted and the former
\nis not inseparably connected with or necessarily depending on the other, in
\nan appeal against the latter, the former relief cannot be granted in favour
\nof the respondent by the appellate court exercising power under Rule 33 of
\nOrder 41.\n<\/p>\n
Panna Lal v. State of Bombay and Ors., [1964] 1 SCR 980 so sets out the
\nscope of Order 41 Rule 33 in the widest terms. “The wide wording of O.41
\nR.33 was intended to empower the appellate court to make whatever order it
\nthinks fit, not only as between the appellant and the respondent but also
\nas between a respondent and a respondent. It empowers the appellate court
\nnot only to give or refuse relief to the appellant by allowing or
\ndismissing the appeal but also to give such other relief to any of the
\nrespondents as “the case may require”. If there was no impediment in law
\nthe High Court in appeal could, therefore, though allowing the appeal of
\nthe defendant-appellant by dismissing the plaintiff’ s suit against it,
\ngive the plaintiff-respondent a decree against any or all the other
\ndefendants who were parties to the appeal as respondents. While the very
\nwords of the rule make this position abundantly clear the Illustration puts
\nthe position beyond argument.” The suit was filed by the plaintiff
\nimpleading the State government and the Deputy Commissioner seeking
\nrecovery of compensation for the work done under a contract and the price
\nof the goods supplied. The Trial Court held that the State was liable as it
\nhad beyond doubt benefited by the performance of the plaintiff. The suit
\nwas decreed against the State. The State preferred an appeal in the High
\nCourt. The plaintiff and other defendants including the Deputy Commissioner
\nwere impleaded as respondents. Disagreeing with the Trial Court, the High
\nCourt held that the contract entered into by the Deputy Commissioner was
\nnot binding on the State government; that the Deputy Commissioner signed
\nthe contract at his own discretion; and further, that the contract not
\nhaving been entered into in the form as required under Section 175(3) of
\nthe Government of India Act, 1935, was not enforceable against the State
\ngovernment. The High Court also held that the government could not be held
\nto have ratified the action of the contract entered into by the Deputy
\nCommissioner. The State was held also not to have benefited by the
\nperformance of the plaintiff. On this finding, the High Court set aside the
\nTrial Court’s decree passed against the State government. In an appeal to
\nthis Court, the Constitution Bench held that it was a fit case for the
\nexercise of jurisdiction under Order 41 Rule 33 of the CPC. On the findings
\narrived at by the High Court, while setting aside the decree against the
\nState, the High Court should have passed a decree against the Deputy
\nCommissioner. It was not necessary for the plaintiff to have filed any
\ncross-objection and the illustration appended to Order 41 Rule 33 was
\nenough to find solution.\n<\/p>\n
In Rameshwar Prasad and Ors. v. Shambehari Lal Jagannath and Anr., [1964] 3
\nSCR 549, the three-Judge Bench speaking through Raghubar Dayal, J. observed
\nthat Rule 33 really provides as to what the Appellate Court can find the
\nappellant entitled to and empowers the Appellate Court to pass any decree
\nand make any order which ought to have been passed or made in the
\nproceedings before it and thus could have reference only to the nature of
\nthe decree or order in so far as it affects the rights of the appellant. If
\nfurther empowers the Appellate Court to pass or make such further or other,
\ndecree or order, as the case may require. The Court is thus given wide
\ndiscretion to pass such decrees and orders as the interests of justice
\ndemand. Such a power is to be exercised in exceptional cases when its non-
\nexercise will lead to difficulties in the adjustment of rights of the
\nvarious parties, (vide Para 17, emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
In Harihar Prasad Singh and Ors. v. Balmiki Prasad Singh and Ors.,<\/a> [1975] 1
\nSCC 212, the following statement of law made by Venkatarama Aiyar, J. (as
\nHis Lordship then was) in the Division Bench decision in Krishna Reddy v.
\nRamireddi, AIR (1954) Madras 848 was cited with approval which clearly
\nbrings out the wide scope of power contained in Rule 33 and the
\nillustration appended thereto, as also the limitations on such power:\n<\/p>\n
“Though Order 41, Rule 33 confers wide and unlimited jurisdiction on Courts
\nto pass a decree in favour of a party who has not preferred any appeal,
\nthere are, however, certain well-defined principles in accordance with
\nwhich that jurisdiction should be exercised. Normally, a party who is
\naggrieved by a decree should, if he seeks to escape from its operation,
\nappeal against it within the time allowed after complying with the
\nrequirements of law. Where he fails to do so, no relief should ordinarily
\nbe given to him under Order 41, Rule 33.\n<\/p>\n
But there are well-recognised exceptions to this rule. One is where as a
\nresult of interference in favour of the appellant it becomes necessary to
\nreadjust the rights of other parties. A second class of cases based on the
\nsame principle is where the question is one of settling mutual rights and
\nobligations between the same parties. A third class of cases is when the
\nrelief prayed for is single and indivisible but is claimed against a number
\nof defendants. In such cases, if the suit is decreed and there is an appeal
\nonly by some of the defendants and if the relief is granted only to the
\nappellants there is the possibility that there might come into operation at
\nthe same time and with reference to the same subject-matter two decrees
\nwhich are inconsistent and contradictory. This, however, is not an
\nexhaustive enumeration of the class of cases in which courts could
\ninterfere under Order 41, Rule 33. Such an enumeration would neither be
\npossible nor even desirable.”\n<\/p>\n
In the words of J.C. Shah, J. speaking for a three-Judge Bench of this
\nCourt in Nirmala Bala Ghose and Anr. v. Balai Chand Ghose and Anr.,<\/a> [1965]
\n3 SCR 550, the limitation on discretion operating as bounds of the width of
\npower conferred by Rule 33 can be so formulated –\n<\/p>\n
“The rule is undoubtedly expressed in terms which are wide, but it has to
\nbe applied with discretion, and to cases where interference in favour of
\nthe appellant necessitates interference also with a decree which has by
\nacceptance or acquiescence become final so as to enable the Court to adjust
\nthe rights of the parties. Where in an appeal the Court reaches a
\nconclusion which is inconsistent with the opinion of the Court appealed
\nfrom and in adjusting the right claimed by the appellant it is necessary to
\ngrant relief to a person who has not appealed, the power conferred by O.41
\nR.33 may properly be invoked. The rule however does not confer an
\nunrestricted right to re-open decrees which have become final merely
\nbecause the appellate Court does not agree with the opinion of the Court
\nappealed from.” (Para 22)<\/p>\n
A Division Bench decision of Calcutta High Court in Jadunath Basak v.
\nMritunjoy Sett and Ors., AIR (1986) Calcutta 416 may be cited as an
\nillustration. The plaintiff filed a suit for declaration that the defendant
\nhad no right or authority to run the workshop with machines in the suit
\npremises and for permanent injunction restraining the defendant from
\nrunning the workshop. The Trial Court granted a decree consisting of two
\nreliefs: (i) the declaration as prayed for, and (ii) an injunction
\npermanently restraining the defendant from running the workshop except with
\nthe terms of a valid permission and licence under Sections 436 and 437 of
\nCalcutta Municipal Act, 1951 from the Municipal Corporation. The defendant
\nfiled an appeal. The Division Bench held that in an appeal filed by the
\ndefendant, the plaintiff cannot challenge that part of the decree which
\ngranted conditional injunction without filing the cross-objection. The
\nDivision Bench drew a distinction between the respondent’s right to
\nchallenge an adverse finding without filing any appeal or cross-objection
\nand the respondent seeking to challenge a part of the decree itself without
\nfiling the cross-objection. The Division Bench held that the latter was not
\npermissible. We find ourselves in agreement with the view taken by the High
\nCourt of Calcutta.\n<\/p>\n
In the case before us, the Trial Court found the plaintiff (in his suit)
\nnot entitled to decree for specific performance and found him entitled only
\nfor money decree. In addition, a conditional decree was also passed
\ndirecting execution of sale deed if only the defendant defaulted any paying
\nor depositing the money within two months. Thus to the extent of specific
\nperformance, it was not a decree outright; it was a conditional decree.
\nRather, the latter part of the decree was a direction in terrorem so as to
\nsecure compliance by the appellant of the money part of the decree in the
\nscheduled time frame. In the event of the appellant having made the payment
\nwithin a period of two months, the respondent would not be, and would never
\nhave been, entitled to the relief of specific performance. The latter
\ndecree is not inseparably connected with the former decree. The two reliefs
\nare surely separable from each other and one can exist without the other.
\nNothing prevented the respondent from filing his own appeal or taking
\ncross-objection against that part of the decree which refused straightaway
\na decree for specific performance in his favour based on the finding of
\ncomparative hardship recorded earlier in the judgment. The dismissal of
\nappeals filed by the appellant was not resulting in any inconsistent,
\niniquitous, contradictory or unworkable decree coming into existence so as
\nto warrant exercise of power under Rule 33 of Order 41. It was not a case
\nof interference with decree having been so interfered with as to call for
\nadjustment of equities between respondents inter se. By his failure to
\nprefer an appeal or to take cross-objection the respondent has allowed the
\npart of the Trial Court’s decree to achieve a finality which was adverse to
\nhim.\n<\/p>\n
For the foregoing reasons we are of the opinion that the first Appellate
\nCourt ought not to have, while dismissing the appeals filed by the
\ndefendant-appellants before it, modified the decree in favour of the
\nrespondent before it in the absence of cross-appeal or cross-objection. The
\ninterference by the first Appellate Court has reduced the appellants to a
\nsituation worse than in what they would have been if they had not appealed.
\nThe High Court ought to have noticed this position of law and should have
\ninterfered to correct the error of law committed by the first Appellate
\nCourt.\n<\/p>\n
During the course of hearing, the learned counsel for the appellants made a
\nstatement under instructions, that the appellants have a large family to
\nsupport which is entirely dependent on the suit land for maintaining itself
\nand they have no other means of livelihood. (This statement finds support
\nfrom the finding arrived at by the Trial Court) He further stated that, in
\nany case, to get rid of the onerous part of the decree, the appellants
\nvolunteer to pay a further amount of Rs. 1,20,000 by way of compensation to
\nthe respondent over and above the amount of Rs. 2,40,000 already deposited
\nby them in the Court pursuant to interim orders alongwith the bank interest
\naccrued thereon. That statement is taken on record and being a very fair
\nvoluntary offer deserves to be accepted and incorporated in the decree.\n<\/p>\n
The appeals are allowed. The judgment and decree of the first Appellate
\nCourt are set aside and instead those of the Trial Court restored. In view
\nof the appellants having deposited the money due and payable under the
\nmoney part of the decree, it is held that they are relieved from
\nspecifically performing the agreement and executing sale deed in pursuance
\nthereof. The delay in deposit, if any, deserves to be condoned in view of
\nthe interim orders passed by the High Court and is hereby condoned. The
\ntime for deposit, as appointed by the Trial Court, shall be deemed to have
\nbeen extended upto the dates of actual deposits made by the appellants. The
\namount of Rs. 2,40,000 lying deposited in the Court and invested in fixed
\ndeposits shall, along with the interest earned, be released to the
\nrespondents. In addition the appellants shall, as offered by them, deposit
\nwith the executing court for payment to the respondent another amount of
\nRs. 1,20,000 within a period of eight weeks from today. On that being done,
\nthe decree passed by the Trial Court shall be deemed to have been fully
\nsatisfied. The respondent shall deliver the agreements dated 03.11.1988 and
\n15.7.1991 to the appellants endorsing upon the agreements the amount of
\nmoney received and that the agreements stand discharged and need not be
\nperformed. The costs shall be borne by the parties as incurred throughout.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Banarsi And Ors vs Ram Phal on 17 February, 2003 Bench: R.C. Lahoti, Brijesh Kumar CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 1376-77 of 2003 PETITIONER: BANARSI AND ORS. RESPONDENT: RAM PHAL DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17\/02\/2003 BENCH: R.C. LAHOTI & BRIJESH KUMAR JUDGMENT: JUDGMENT 2003(2) SCR 22 The Judgment of the Court was delivered […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5836","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nBanarsi And Ors vs Ram Phal on 17 February, 2003 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/banarsi-and-ors-vs-ram-phal-on-17-february-2003\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Banarsi And Ors vs Ram Phal on 17 February, 2003 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/banarsi-and-ors-vs-ram-phal-on-17-february-2003\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2003-02-16T18:30:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2017-09-09T00:17:28+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@legaliadmin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@Legal_india\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"33 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/banarsi-and-ors-vs-ram-phal-on-17-february-2003#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/banarsi-and-ors-vs-ram-phal-on-17-february-2003\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\"},\"headline\":\"Banarsi And Ors vs Ram Phal on 17 February, 2003\",\"datePublished\":\"2003-02-16T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2017-09-09T00:17:28+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/banarsi-and-ors-vs-ram-phal-on-17-february-2003\"},\"wordCount\":6474,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"articleSection\":[\"Supreme Court of India\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/banarsi-and-ors-vs-ram-phal-on-17-february-2003#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/banarsi-and-ors-vs-ram-phal-on-17-february-2003\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/banarsi-and-ors-vs-ram-phal-on-17-february-2003\",\"name\":\"Banarsi And Ors vs Ram Phal on 17 February, 2003 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"2003-02-16T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2017-09-09T00:17:28+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/banarsi-and-ors-vs-ram-phal-on-17-february-2003#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/banarsi-and-ors-vs-ram-phal-on-17-february-2003\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/banarsi-and-ors-vs-ram-phal-on-17-february-2003#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Banarsi And Ors vs Ram Phal on 17 February, 2003\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"name\":\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"description\":\"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"alternateName\":\"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"alternateName\":\"Legal India\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"width\":512,\"height\":512,\"caption\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.facebook.com\\\/LegalindiaCom\\\/\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/Legal_india\"]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\",\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Legal India Admin\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/legaliadmin\"],\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/author\\\/legal-india-admin\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Banarsi And Ors vs Ram Phal on 17 February, 2003 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/banarsi-and-ors-vs-ram-phal-on-17-february-2003","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Banarsi And Ors vs Ram Phal on 17 February, 2003 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","og_url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/banarsi-and-ors-vs-ram-phal-on-17-february-2003","og_site_name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","article_published_time":"2003-02-16T18:30:00+00:00","article_modified_time":"2017-09-09T00:17:28+00:00","og_image":[{"width":512,"height":512,"url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Legal India Admin","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@legaliadmin","twitter_site":"@Legal_india","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Legal India Admin","Est. reading time":"33 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/banarsi-and-ors-vs-ram-phal-on-17-february-2003#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/banarsi-and-ors-vs-ram-phal-on-17-february-2003"},"author":{"name":"Legal India Admin","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea"},"headline":"Banarsi And Ors vs Ram Phal on 17 February, 2003","datePublished":"2003-02-16T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2017-09-09T00:17:28+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/banarsi-and-ors-vs-ram-phal-on-17-february-2003"},"wordCount":6474,"commentCount":0,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"articleSection":["Supreme Court of India"],"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/banarsi-and-ors-vs-ram-phal-on-17-february-2003#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/banarsi-and-ors-vs-ram-phal-on-17-february-2003","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/banarsi-and-ors-vs-ram-phal-on-17-february-2003","name":"Banarsi And Ors vs Ram Phal on 17 February, 2003 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website"},"datePublished":"2003-02-16T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2017-09-09T00:17:28+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/banarsi-and-ors-vs-ram-phal-on-17-february-2003#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/banarsi-and-ors-vs-ram-phal-on-17-february-2003"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/banarsi-and-ors-vs-ram-phal-on-17-february-2003#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Banarsi And Ors vs Ram Phal on 17 February, 2003"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","description":"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"alternateName":"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization","name":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","alternateName":"Legal India","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","width":512,"height":512,"caption":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","https:\/\/x.com\/Legal_india"]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea","name":"Legal India Admin","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Legal India Admin"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com","https:\/\/x.com\/legaliadmin"],"url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/author\/legal-india-admin"}]}},"modified_by":null,"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5836","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5836"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5836\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5836"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5836"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5836"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}