{"id":5863,"date":"1971-02-01T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1971-01-31T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/municipal-corporation-of-delhi-vs-shiv-shankar-on-1-february-1971"},"modified":"2015-08-31T11:20:49","modified_gmt":"2015-08-31T05:50:49","slug":"municipal-corporation-of-delhi-vs-shiv-shankar-on-1-february-1971","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/municipal-corporation-of-delhi-vs-shiv-shankar-on-1-february-1971","title":{"rendered":"Municipal Corporation Of Delhi vs Shiv Shankar on 1 February, 1971"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Municipal Corporation Of Delhi vs Shiv Shankar on 1 February, 1971<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1971 AIR 815, \t\t 1971 SCR (3) 607<\/div>\n
Author: I Dua<\/div>\n
Bench: Dua, I.D.<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nMUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nSHIV SHANKAR\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT01\/02\/1971\n\nBENCH:\nDUA, I.D.\nBENCH:\nDUA, I.D.\nSIKRI, S.M. (CJ)\nBHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA\n\nCITATION:\n 1971 AIR  815\t\t  1971 SCR  (3) 607\n 1971 SCC  (1) 442\n\n\nACT:\nRepeal-Implied-Prevention  of Food Adulteration\t Act,  1954-\nFruit  Products\t Order, 1955-Sale  of  adulterated  Vinegar-\nProsecution   under  Adulteration  Act-Competence-If   Fruit\nProducts Order impliedly repeals Adulteration Act.\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\nThe  respondent,  who was selling Vinegar  under  a  license\ngranted\t under the Fruit Products Order, 1955, made  by\t the\nCentral\t Government under s. 3 of the Essential\t Commodities\nAct,   was   prosecuted\t under\tthe   Prevention   of\tFood\nAdulteration Act. 1954, for selling adulterated vinegar.  He\npleaded\t that vinegar, whether brewed or synthetic, being  a\nfood  product  and standard specification for  such  vinegar\nbeing tabulated in Part XIV attached to the Second  Schedule\nof  the\t Fruit\tOrder,\tpersecution  without  the   previous\nsanction  of the licensing Officer as required by clause  15\nof the said order was incompetent.  The trial judge rejected\nthe contention.\t But the High Court quashed the proceedings.\nIt  was\t observed that the special provisions of  the  Fruit\nOrder had overriding effect and therefore a manufacturer  of\nfruit products could only be prosecuted under the provisions\nof the Fruit Order.\nIn  the\t appeal\t to  this Court it  was\t contended  for\t the\nrespondent that there was an irreconcilable conflict between\nthe two statutory provisions, and the Fruit Order being, not\nonly  of a date later than the Adulteration.  Act  but\talso\nhaving,\t by virtue of s. 3(6) of the  Essential\t Commodities\nAct  overriding effect over all other laws, it must  prevail\nover  the Adulteration Act and the rules.  On  the  question\nwhether\t the Fruit Order impliedly repeals the\tAdulteration\nAct,\nHELD : The plea of implied repeal must fail and the  appeals\nmust be allowed.\nTo  determine  if  a later statutory  provision\t repeals  by\nimplication an earlier one it is necessary to scrutinise and\nconsider the true meaning and effect both of the earlier and\nthe  later  statute.  If the objects of\t the  two  statutory\nprovisions are different and the language of each statute is\nrestricted  to\tits  own object or subject,  then  they\t are\ngenerally intended to run in parallel lines without  meeting\nand there would be no real conflict though apparently it may\nappear to be so on surface. [611 D-G]\nThe provisions of the Adulteration Act and the Fruit  Order,\nfor  effectuating  their respective objects,  have  imposed,\ndifferent  restrictions\t in  the  manufacture  and  sale  of\nvinegar\t whether  brewed or synthetic. in  the\tinterest  of\npublic\thealth\tthe  respondent\t has  to  comply  with\t the\nprovisions  of\tthe Adulteration Act and Rules\tand  in\t the\ninterests of equitable distribution of essential commodities\nincluding  the\tarticles of food covered  by  the  Essential\nCommodities Act and the Fruit Order they have to comply with\nthe provisions of the fruit Order.  Both the provisions\t are\nsupple-\n608\nmentary\t and cumulative in their operation and no  provision\nof the Fruit Order is shown to be destructive of or fatal to\nany  provision\tof the Adulteration Act or  the\t Rules\tmade\nthereunder  so\tas  to compel the court to  hold  that\tthey\ncannot\tstand  together.  If the Adulteration Act  or  Rules\nimpose\tsome  restrictions on the manufacturer,\t dealer\t and\nseller\tof  vinegar,  then they have  to  comply  with\tthem\nirrespective  of  the  fact that the  Fruit  ,Order  imposes\nlesser\tnumber of restrictions in respect of these  matters.\nThe  former  do\t not  render  compliance  with\tthe   latter\nimpossible, nor does compliance with the former\t necessarily\nand automatically involve violation ,of the latter.  Even if\nboth  'statutes\t to some extent overlap, section 26  of\t the\nGeneral\t Clauses  Act  fully  protects\tthe  guilty  parties\nagainst double jeopardy or double penalty. [618 C-H]\nOm Prakash Gupta V., State of U.P., [1957] S.C.R. 423, T. S.\nBaliali\t v.  T. S. Rengachari, 1969 3 S.C.R.  65,  State  v.\nGurcharan Singh, A.I.R.<\/a> 1952 Punjab 89, and Paine v. Stater,\n[1883] 11 Q.B.D. 120. ,referred to.\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:, Criminal Appeals Nos.\t 151
\nto 158 of 1966.\n<\/p>\n
Appeals from the judgment and order dated December 30.\t1964
\nof the Punjab High Court, Circuit Bench at Delhi in Criminal
\nRevisions  Nos.\t 81-D to 83-D, 107-D and 129-D to  132-D  of
\n1964.\n<\/p>\n
Bishan\tNarain,\t B. P. Maheshwari and N. K.  Jain,  for\t the
\nappellant (in all the appeals).\n<\/p>\n
C. K. Daphtary, N. N. Goswami, K. L. Mehta and S. K.  Mehta,
\nthe respondent (in Cr.\tA. No. 151\/1966).\n<\/p>\n
K.  L. Gossain, N. N. Goswami, K. L. Mehta and S. K.  Mehta,
\nthe respondent (in Cr.\tAs.  Nos. 152 to 158 of 1966).
\nS. K. Mehta for the intervener.\n<\/p>\n
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
\nDua,  J.-These\teight appeals with certificate\t(Crl.\tAl)-
\npeals  Nos. 151 to 158 of 1966) raise a common\tquestion  of
\nlaw  and  would,  therefore,  be disposed  of  by  a  common
\njudgment.  In-deed, all the appeals in the Punjab High Court
\nwere  also  disposed of by a learned single  Judge  of\tthat
\nCourt  sitting on circuit at Delhi by a common judgment\t and
\nanother\t learned  single Judge of the same  Court  similarly
\ncertified the cases to be fit for ,appeal to this Court by a
\ncommon order.\n<\/p>\n
The only question canvassed at the bar requiring  determina-
\ntion  by  us  is  whether the respondent  is  liable  to  be
\nprosecuted under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 37
\nof 1954 (hereafter called the Adulteration Act) for  selling
\nadulterated  vinegar when the vinegar is being sold under  a
\nlicence\t granted  under\t the  Fruit  Products  Order,\t1955
\n(hereafter  called  the\t Fruit Order) made  by\tthe  Central
\nGovernment under s. 3 of the Essen-\n<\/p>\n
 609<\/span><\/p>\n
tial Commodities Act.  The High Court has relying on an\t un-
\nreported Bench decision of the Punjab High Court in State v.
\nRaJ Kumar (Crl.\t A. 996 f 1961 decided on October 29,  1962)
\nheld  that they cannot be prosecuted.  It was argued in\t the
\nHigh  Court that the rules made under the  Adulteration\t Act
\nhad come into force after the enforcement of the Fruit Order
\nand  vinegar being mentioned as an article of food in  those
\nrules,\tprosecution  under both the provisions\tof  law\t was
\npermissible.  Reliance in support of this argument was\talso
\nplaced\ton s. 26 of the General Clauses Act.  This  argument
\nwas  not  accepted  and it was\tobserved  that\tthe  special
\nprovisions  of\tthe Fruit Order had overriding\teffect\tand,
\ntherefore,  a manufacturer of Fruit Products could  only  be
\nprosecuted under the provisions of the Fruit Order.   Prayer
\nfor  reference to a larger Bench for reconsideration of\t Raj
\nKumar’s\t case (supra) did not find favour with\tthe  learned
\nsingle Judge.\n<\/p>\n
In this Court the view taken in Raj Kumar’s case (supra) was
\nsought\tto  be\tsupported by the learned  counsel  for\tthe,
\nrespondent.   The provisions of the Fruit Order and  of\t the
\nAdulteration  Act, it was contended, could not\tharmoniously
\nco-exist on the statute book, as compliance with one  would,
\nin  certain contingencies, result in violation of the  other
\nsome respects.\tWith respect to the particular charges tried
\nin  the\t cases in appeal, however, no attempt  was  made  on
\nbehalf\tof the respondents to show that there was any  fatal
\nconflict  or inconsistency between the two provisions.\t The
\nquestion  before  us accordingly lies within a\tvery  narrow
\ncompass.   The\tappellant  urged that there  is\t no  implied
\nrepeal of the Adulteration Act by the Fruit Order in so\t far
\nas the sale of vinegar is concerned, whereas the case of the
\nrespondent  is\tthat  there is an  implied  repeal  and\t the
\nrespondents  are  not  liable to  be  prosecuted  under\t the
\nAdulteration Act for violating its provisions.\tShri  Bishan
\nNarain\tsought\tsupport for his submission from\t Om  Prakash
\nGupta  v.  State  of  U.P.<\/a> (1) and T. S.  Baliah  v.  T.  S.
\nRangachari  (2).   In the former case S. 5 (1 ) (c)  of\t the
\nPrevention  of Corruption Act was held not to repeal s.\t 409
\nI.P.C.\tThe  decision of the Punjab High Court\t(Khosla\t and
\nFalshaw, JJ.) in State v. Gurcharan Singh<\/a>(3) holding to\t the
\ncontrary  was  overruled.  In the latter case s. 52  of\t the
\nIncome tax Act, 1922 was held not to repeal s. 177, T.P.C.
\nIt is unnecessary to refer in detail to the facts of all the
\neight  cases  separately as no such reference  was  made  by
\neither\tside  at  the  bar.   Shri  Bishan  Narain  for\t the
\nappellant, by way of illustra-\n<\/p>\n
(1) [1957] S.C.R. 423\t\t(2) [1969] 3 S.C.R. 65.
\n(3) A.I.R. 1952 Punjab 89.\n<\/p>\n
610<\/span><\/p>\n
tion  made a passing reference to the facts of Crl.   Appeal
\nNo.  155  of 1966.  From the record of that appeal  we\tfind
\nthat  samples  of (i) sugar cane juice\tvinegar,  (ii)\tvine
\n(pure) vinegar and (iii) pure jaman vinegar, were takes by a
\nFood  Inspector from the shop of the respondent\t on  October
\n17,  1960  and\ton  the\t ‘same\thaving\tbeen  found   highly
\nadulterated  and unfit for human consumption because of\t the
\npresence  of sulphuric acid which is prohibited,  complaints
\nunder  ss. 7\/16 of the Adulteration Act were  instituted  by
\nthe  Municipal\tProsecutor  in December,  1960.\t  After\t the
\nprosecution evidence was recorded, the respondent Shiv Shan-
\nker applied to the trial magistrate in October, 1963 praying
\nthat the prosecution be dropped.  In this application it was
\nadmitted that the prosecution had arisen out of a raid dated
\nOctober\t 17,  1960  at the promises  of\t the  accused  “when
\nallegedly samples of vinegar were taken which are stated  to
\nbe  adulterated because of the presence of sulphuric  acid”.
\nIt  was pleaded that-the petitioning accused had secured  in
\n1960  a\t licence under the Fruit Order and  vinegar  whether
\nbrewed\tor  synthetic  being a\tfood  product  and  standard
\nspecification  for such vinegar being tabulated in Part\t XIV
\nattached  to  the  Second  Schedule  of\t the  Fruit   Order,
\nprosecution without the, previous sanction of the  Licensing
\nOfficer\t as  required  by  cl. 15  of  the  said  Order\t was
\nunauthorised.  Prosecution under the Adulteration Act was on
\nthis  ground pleaded to be incompetent.\t In the\t application
\nreliance  in  support  of  this\t plea  was  placed  on\t the
\nunreported  Bench decision of the Punjab High Court  in\t Raj
\nKumar’s\t case in which according to the accused it had\tbeen
\nheld  that  a licensee under the Fruit Order  could  not  be
\nprosecuted  for\t any contravention of that Order or  of\t the
\nAdulteration  Act  without  the\t previous  sanction  of\t the
\nLicensing  Authority appointed under the Fruit\tOrder.\t The
\ntrial  magistrate  basing himself on  an  unreported  single
\nBench decision of the Punjab High Court and on s. 26 of\t the
\nGeneral Clauses Act rejected this application.\tOn revision,
\nthe Additional Sessions Judge relying on the decision in Raj
\nKumar’s,  case\t(supra) made a reference to the\t High  Court
\nrecommending  that the proceedings be quashed.\tJ. S.  Bedi,
\nJ.,  relying  on Raj Kumar’s case (supra) quashed  the\tpro-
\nceedings.  S. K. Kapur J., who certified the case to be\t fit
\nfor  appeal  after quoting a passage from Raj  Kumar’s\tcase
\n(supra)\t considered  the  question raised  to  be  important
\nenough for appeal to this Court.\n<\/p>\n
The general principles governing implied repeal appear to us
\nto have long since been settled.  The difficulty is normally
\nexperienced in their application to a given case.  From\t the
\npassage\t quoted\t by  Kapur J.,\tfrom  the  unreported  Bench
\ndecision in Raj’ Kumar’s case (supra) upholding the  implied
\nrepeal\tof the Adulteration Act by the Fruit Order it  seems
\nto  us that the Division Bench did not correctly  and  fully
\ngrasp them.  We accordingly,
\n 611<\/span>
\nconsider it proper to broadly restate the general rule.\t  It
\nwas  laid  in  Paine v. Stater(1) that\twhen  two  Acts\t are
\ninconsistent  or repugnant the later will be read as  having
\nimpliedly repealed the earlier.\t As the legislature must  be
\npresumed in deference to the rule of law to intend to  enact
\nconsistent  and\t harmonious  body  of  laws,  a\t  subsequent
\nlegislation may not be too readily presumed to effectuate  a
\nrepeal of existing statutory laws in the absence of  express
\nor at least clear and unambiguous indication to that effect.
\nThis   is  essential  in  the  interest\t of  certainty\t and
\nconsistency in the laws which the citizens are enjoined\t and
\nexpected to. obey.  The legislature, which may generally  be
\npresumed to know the existing law, is not expected to intend
\nto create confusion by its omission to express its intent to
\nrepeal\tin. clear terms.  The courts, therefore, as a  rule,
\nlean against implying a repeal unless the two provisions are
\nso  plainly repugnant to each other that they  cannot  stand
\ntogether and it is not possible on any reasonable hypothesis
\nto  give effect to both at the same time.  The repeal  must,
\nif not express, flow from necessary implication as the\tonly
\nintendment.  The provisions must be wholly incompatible with
\neach  other  so that the two provisions\t operating  together
\nwould lead to absurd consequences, which intention could not
\nreasonably be imputed to the legislature.  It is only when a
\nconsistent   body  of  law  cannot  be\tmaintained   without
\nabrogation  of\tthe previous law that the  plea\t of  implied
\nrepeal\tshould\tbe  sustained.\t To  determine\tif  a  later
\nstatutory provision repeals by implication an earlier one it
\nis accordingly necessary to closely scrutinise and  consider
\nthe  true  meaning and effect both of the  earlier  and\t the
\nlater\tstatute.    Until  this\t is  done   it\t cannot\t  be
\nsatisfactorily ascertained if any fatal inconsistency exists
\nbetween\t them.\t The meaning, scope and effect\tof  the\t two
\nstatutes,   as\tdiscovered  on\tscrutiny,   determines\t the
\nlegislative intent as to whether the earlier law shall cease
\nor  shall only be supplemented.\t If the objects of  the\t two
\nstatutory provisions are different and the language of\teach
\nstatute\t is restricted to its own objects or  subject,\tthen
\nthey are generally intended to run in parallel lines without
\nmeeting\t  and  there  would  be\t no  real  conflict   though
\napparently it may appear to be so on the surface.   Statutes
\nin pari materia although in apparent conflict should also so
\nfar  ,is reasonably possible, be construed to be in  harmony
\nwith   each  other  and\t it  is\t only  when  there   is\t  an
\nirreconcilable\tconflict between the new provision  and\t the
\nprior statute relating to the same subject matter, that\t the
\nformer,\t being the later expression of the legislature,\t may
\nbe held to prevail, the prior law yielding to the extent  of
\nthe  conflict.\tThe same rule of  irreconcilable  repugnancy
\ncontrols implied repeal of ‘a general by a special  statute.
\nThe subsequent provision treating a phase of the same genera
\nsubject matter in a more minute way may be intended to imply
\nrepeal pro-tanto of the
\n(1)  [1883] 11 Q.B.D. 120.\n<\/p>\n
612<\/span><\/p>\n
Repugnant general provision with which it cannot  reasonably
\nco,exist.   When  there\t is  no\t inconsistency\tbetween\t the
\ngeneral\t and  the  special statute the latter  may  well  be
\nconstrued as supplementary.\n<\/p>\n
In  the light of these broad guidelines we may\tnow  examine
\nthe  two  statutes as they stood in 1960 because  the  cases
\nwith  which  we\t are concerned relate  to  that\t year.\t The
\nhistory and the scheme of the two statutory provisions would
\nbe  helpful  in discovering the legislative  intent  on\t the
\nquestion   of\timplied\t repeal.   Turning  first   to\t the
\nAdulteration  Act, it was enacted by the Parliament to\tmake
\nprovision for the prevention of adulteration of food and  it
\ncame  into force on June 1, 1955.  Previously  corresponding
\nlaws  on  adulteration\tof  foodstuffs\twere  in  force\t  in
\ndifferent  States, having been enacted by  their  respective
\nlegislatures.  All those laws were repealed by s. 25 of\t the
\nAdulteration  Act.   It may be pointed ,out that  under\t the
\nGovernment  of India Act, 1935 “adulteration  of  foodstuffs
\nand other goods” was a provincial subject whereas under\t the
\nConstitution it is included in the Concurrent List.  Section
\n2(i)  of this Act which defines the word “adulterated”\tcon-
\nsists  of several sub-clauses.\tOne of these sub-clauses  is
\n(1)  according to which “an article of food shall be  deemed
\nto  be adulterated if the quality or purity of\tthe  article
\nfalls below the prescribed standard or its constituents\t are
\npresent in quantities Which are in excess of the  prescribed
\nlimits\tof variability”.  Clause (v) of s. 2 defines  “food”
\nto  mean  “any\tarticle\t used as food  or  drink  for  human
\nconsumption  other than drugs and water and includes  :\t (a)
\nany  article which ordinarily enters into or is used in\t the
\ncomposition  or\t preparation  of human\tfood,  and  (b)\t any
\nflavouring  matter or condiments.  According to cl. (ix)  an
\narticle\t of  food shall be deemed to be “misbranded”  if  it
\nfalls  within an) one of the sub-clauses (a) to (k).  It  is
\nnot  necessary to reproduce all these  sub-clauses.   “Pack-
\nage”  has’ been defined in cl. (X) to mean “a  box,  bottle,
\ncasket, tin, barrel, case, receptacle, sack, bag, wrapper or
\nother  thing  in  which\t an article of\tfood  is  placed  or
\npacked”.    We\t have  referred\t to   the   definitions\t  of
\n“misbranded” and ” package” because one of the cases  before
\nus (Crl.  A. 154 of 1966) is a case of alleged\tmisbranding,
\nthe  remaining seven cases being ,of  alleged  adulteration.
\nSection\t 5 prohibits import of, inter alia, adulterated\t and
\nmisbranded food and all articles of food in contravention of
\nany  provision of the Act or of any rules  made\t thereunder.
\nSection\t 7 prohibits manufacture for sale or store and\talso
\nsale  and  distribution\t of,  inter  alia,  adulterated\t and
\nmisbranded  food land of articles of food, in  contravention
\nof  the\t Adulteration  Act and the  Rules  made\t thereunder.
\nSection 8 provides for appointment of Public Analysts and s.
\n9  for\tthe appointment of Food Inspectors.  The  powers  of
\nFood  Inspectors are contained in S. 10.  He possesses\tvery
\nwide powers for the purpose of effectively achiev-\n<\/p>\n
 613<\/span><\/p>\n
ing the statutory object of preventing the manufacture, sale
\nand distribution etc., of adulterated articles of food.\t The
\nprocedure  for taking samples of food by the Food  Inspector
\nfor  analysis is prescribed in s. 11 and the report  of\t the
\nPublic Analyst is made admissible by s. 13.  The proviso  to
\nsub-s.\t(5)  of s. 15 makes the certificate  signed  by\t the
\nDirector  of  Central Food Laboratory final  and  conclusive
\nproof  of  the\tfacts  stated  therein.\t  The  Central\tFood
\nLaboratory is established by the Central Government under s.
\n4  for the purpose of carrying on functions entrusted to  it
\nby  the\t Adulteration Act or by the Rules  made\t thereunder.
\nSection\t 16  provides for penalties for offences  under\t the
\nAdulteration  Act  and\tcl. (a) of sub-s. (1)  makes  it  an
\noffence for any person, whether by himself or by any  person
\non  his behalf to import into India or manufacture for\tsale
\nor  to\tstore,\tsell or distribute any article\tof  food  in
\ncontravention of any of the provisions of the Act or of\t any
\nrules  made thereunder.\t In the prosecution for\t an  offence
\npertaining  to\tthe  sale of an\t adulterated  or  misbranded
\narticle\t of food s. 19 makes impermissible the defence\tthat
\nthe vendor was ignorant of the nature, substance or  quality
\nof  the\t food  sold  by him or\tthat  the  purchaser  having
\npurchased an article for analysis was not prejudiced by\t the
\nsale.  Section 20 prohibits cognizance and trial of offences
\nunder  the Act except when prosecution is instituted  by  or
\nwith the written consent of the State Government or a  local
\nauthority  or  a person authorized in this  behalf  by\tsuch
\nGovernment or authority.  Under the proviso to this  section
\na purchaser referred to in s. 12, is, however, empowered  to
\ninstitute  a prosecution if he produces in court a  copy  of
\nthe  report of the Public Analyst along with the  complaint.
\nSection\t 21  overrides\ts.  32, Cr.P.C.\t in  the  matter  of
\nsentence  to  be  passed under this Act\t by  the  Presidency
\nMagistrates or Magistrates of 1 Class, trying offences under
\nthe Act.  Section 23 confers on the Central Government\twide
\npowers\tto  make rules under the Act  after  consulting\t the
\nCentral\t Committee  for\t Food  Standards  appointed  by\t the
\nCentral Government under s. 3. Section 24 empowers the State
\nGovernment,  (after consultation with the Central  Committee
\nfor  Food Standards and with previous publication)  to\tmake
\nrules  for  giving effect to the provisions of\tthe  Act  in
\nmatters\t not covered by s. 23. Various States have  actually
\nframed rules under this section.\n<\/p>\n
We may now briefly refer to the Prevention of Food Adultera-
\ntion Rules, 1955 (hereafter called the\tAdulteration.Rules).
\nThese  rules  were made by the Central Government  under  s.
\n4(2) and s. 23(1) of the Adulteration Act and were published
\nin the Official Gazette as per notification dated  September
\n12, 1955.  The rules other than those contained in Part III-
\nAppendix  B-Item A.12 Margarine, Part VI and Part  VII\tcame
\ninto force on the date of
\n614<\/span>
\ntheir  publication  in\tthe Official  Gazette  :  the  rules
\ncontained in Part III, Appendix B, Item A.12 Margarine\tcame
\ninto  force on June 1, 1956 and the rules contained in\tPart
\nVI  and Part VII came into force on December 1, 1956-:\tvide
\nr.  1(3).  Under S. 23(2) (prior to its amendment  in  1964)
\nall  rules made under sub-s. (1) had to be laid as  soon  as
\npossible before both Houses of Parliament. By Act 49 of 1964
\nsub-s. (2) was amended so as to provide for every rule\tmade
\nunder sub-s. (1) to be laid before each House of  Parliament
\nwhile in session, for a total period of 30 days in order  to
\nafford\tan  opportunity to the two Houses to  study  and  to
\nmodify or annul it for, future if both Houses so agree.\t  We
\nhave  referred to this amendment as some of the\t rules\twere
\namended thereafter.  The effect of the subsequent  amendment
\nof  some  of  the rules will be noticed\t later.\t  The  Adul-
\nteration  Rules\t clearly  bring out  the  anxiety  of  their
\nauthors to see that wholesome food is sold to the  citizens.
\nThe duties and powers of Food Inspectors as contained, inter
\nalia,  in  rr. 9 and 1 3, broadly illustrate  this  anxiety.
\nThese rules also indicate that the framers of the Rules were
\nnot unaware of the different provisions of the Fruit  Order.
\nBy way of illustration reference may be made to r. 50  which
\nprescribes  conditions\tof  licence  to\t manufacture,  sell,
\nstock,\tdistribute or exhibit certain articles of food.\t  In
\ncl.  (1)  of  sub-r. (1) of  this  rule\t the  fruit-products
\ncovered\t under the Fruit Order and some other articles\thave
\nbeen excluded from the operation of this rule.\tThis  clause
\nwas  amended  twice,  once in November, 1956  and  again  in
\nApril,\t1960.  Had the Adulteration Act been intended to  be
\nimpliedly repealed by the Fruit Order (which would also mean
\nimplied repeal of the rules) it would have been\t unnecessary
\nto expressly exclude such fruit-products from the  operation
\nof  this  rule.\t Rule 5 and Appendix B of these\t Rules\tcame
\ninto force on December 1, 1956 after the promulgation of the
\nFruit  Order.  According to r. 5 the standard of quality  of
\nthe various articles of food specified in Appendix B are  as
\nspecified  therein.   In Appendix B item at  sl.  no.\tA.16
\ndeals  with  “fruit products”.\tBut the\t articles  of  fruit
\nproducts  dealt\t with in A. 16.01 to A. 16.12  clearly\tshow
\nthat  vinegar  is  not included\t in  the  expression  “fruit
\nproducts”.   Vinegar  is dealt with in\tA.20  and  synthetic
\nvinegar\t in A.20.01. Both these items were added  in  April,
\n1960.\n<\/p>\n
We may now turn to the Essential Commodities Act, 10 of 1955
\nand  the  Fruit Order.\tThe Essential  Commodities  Act\t was
\nenacted\t in  1955  with\t the object  of\t providing,  in\t the
\ninterests  of  the general public, for the  control  of\t the
\nproduction,  supply  and  distribution\tof,  and  trade\t and
\ncommerce  in,  certain commodities.  It came into  force  on
\nApril 1, 1956 repealing the Essential Commodities Ordi-\n<\/p>\n
 615<\/span><\/p>\n
nance No. 1 of 1955 which had been promulgated with the same
\nobject\tand  enforced on January 26,1955, the  date  of\t the
\nexpiry\tof the Essential Supplies (Temporary) Powers Act  26
\nof  1946.   The last named Act had  replaced  the  Essential
\nSupplies  (Temporary  Powers) Ordinance No.  XVIII  of\t1946
\nwhich  had  come  into\tforce  on  October  1,\t1946.\tThat
\nOrdinance  was\tpromulgated with the object  of\t continuing,
\nduring\ta limited period, powers to control the\t production,
\nsupply\tand  distribution  of, and trade  and  commerce\t in,
\nfoodstuffs  and certain other commodities.  To\tempower\t the
\nIndian\tLegislature to enact law on this subject matter\t the
\nBritish Parliament had passed India (Central Government\t and
\nLegislation) Act, 1946(9 and 10 Geo.  Vl, c.39). The  lndian
\nLegislature   not  being  in  session  the   Ordinance\t was
\npromulgated  to meet the emergency and this was replaced  by
\nAct 26 of 1946.\t Reference has been made by us to this\tpast
\nhistory for the purpose of indicating the different  objects
\nand purposes intended to be achieved by the two\t legislative
\nmeasures.  Section 2 of the Essential Commodities Act  which
\nis  the\t definition section defines in\tcl.  (a)  “essential
\ncommodity  to mean any of the classes of commodities  stated
\nin   sub-cls.  (i)  to\t(xi).\tSub-clause  (v)\t refers\t  to
\n“foodstuffs,  including edible oil-seeds and oils”  and\t cl.\n<\/p>\n
(xi) confers power on the Central Government to declare by a
\nnotified  order\t any  other  class of  commodity  to  be  an
\nessential  commodity  for the purposes of the Act,  being  a
\ncommodity with respect to which Parliament has power to make
\nlaws  by virtue of Entry 33 in List III in the 7th  Schedule
\nto  the Constitution.  Section 3 of the Act confers  on\t the
\nCentral\t Government  power to  control\tproduction,  supply,
\ndistribution etc., of essential commodities by providing, by
\nan  order,  for regulating or  prohibiting  the\t production,
\nsupply\tand distribution of those commodities and trade\t and
\ncommerce  therein.  Every order made under this section\t has
\nto  be laid before both Houses of Parliament as soon as\t may
\nbe after it is made.  By virtue of s. 6 Orders made under s.
\n3  have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent  there-
\n,with  contained in any enactment other than  the  Essential
\nCommodities  Act.   Section  7 provides\t for  penalties\t for
\ncontravention of orders made under s. 3. Under s. 11  courts
\nare prohibited from taking cognizance of offences punishable
\nunder  this Act except on a report in writing of  the  facts
\nconstituting  such  an\toffence made by a person  who  is  a
\npublic\tservant\t as defined in s. 21, I.P.C. Section  12  of
\nthis Act vests in the Presidency Magistrates and Magistrates
\nof  1 Class power to pass sentences of fines  exceeding\t Rs.
\n1,000\/- on convicted persons notwithstanding the restriction
\nin this respect imposed on their powers by s. 32, Cr.P.C. As
\nalready noticed earlier, an ordinance called the,  Essential
\nCorn  modifies Ordinance, 1 of 1955 had been promulgated  on
\nthe  expiry of the Essential Commodities (Temporary  Powers)
\nAct  and  the  present\tAct  was  passed  to  replace\tthat
\nOrdinance.\n<\/p>\n
6 16
\nIt  may appropriately be pointed out at this stage  that  it
\nwas not the respondent’s case that the Essential Commodities
\nAct  had the effect of impliedly repealing the\tAdulteration
\nAct  for  the purposes of these cases.\t The  only  argument
\nurged  was  that  the Fruit Order had that  effect  and\t its
\noverriding effect by virtue of S. 3 of the Act was  strongly
\nemphasised.  We may now turn to the Fruit Order (S.R.O. 1052
\ndated 3rd May, 1955 published in the Gazette of India  dated
\n14th May, 1955) which was made by the Central Government  in
\nexercise  of  the  powers, conferred on it by s.  3  of\t the
\nEssential Commodities Act.  Clause (2) of this Order,  which
\nis  the\t definition clause, defines  the  expression  “fruit
\nproduct”  in  sub-cl. (d) and “vinegar,\t another  brewed  or
\nsynthetic”  is included in this expression as per item\t(ii)
\nof this sub-clause.  “Licensing Officer” as defined in\tsub-
\ncl.  (g)  means the Agricultural Marketing  Adviser  to\t the
\nGovernment  of\tIndia  and it  includes\t any  other  Officer
\nempowered  in  this behalf by him with the approval  of\t the
\nCentral\t Government.  “Manufacturer” as defined\t in  sub-cl.\n<\/p>\n
(h)   means   a\t licensee  engaged  in\t the   business\t  of
\nmanufacturing  in  fruit products for sale  and\t includes  a
\nperson purchasing such fruit products in bulk and  repacking
\nthem  for  sale either by himself or through  someone  else.
\nClause 4 prohibits all persons from carrying on business  of
\nmanufacture  except and in accordance with the terms  of  an
\neffective  licence granted to him under this Order  in\tForm
\n“B”.  Clause 5 prescribes procedure for applications for the
\ngrant  of  a  licence  under cl. 4.  Clause  7\tenjoins\t the
\nmanufacturers  to manufacture fruit products  in  conformity
\nwith the sanitary requirements and the appropriate  standard
\nof quality and composition specified in the Second  Schedule
\nto  the\t Order and cl. 8 lays down the\trequirements  to  be
\ncomplied with by the manufacturers in regard to the packing,
\nmarketing  and labelling of containers, of  fruit  products.
\nClause\t10  prohibits sale, exposure for sale,\tdespatch  or
\ndelivery to any agent or broker for the purpose of sale, any
\nfruit  products\t which\tdo not conform to  the\tstandard  of
\nquality and composition specified in the Second Schedule  or
\nwhich  are  not ,packed, marked and labelled in\t the  manner
\nlaid down in the Order: ,the proviso to this clause contains
\ndirections  for fruit products imported into India.   Clause
\n12 contains a mandate for every manufacturer to comply\twith
\nthe directions and orders issued to him and failure to do so
\nis  to be deemed to be a contravention of the provisions  of
\nthe   Order.   According  to  cl.  15  no  prosecution\t for
\ncontravention  of any of the provisions of this Order is  to
\nbe instituted without the previous sanction of the Licensing
\nOfficer.\n<\/p>\n
The  object  and  purpose  of the  Adulteration\t Apt  is  to
\neliminate the danger to human life and health from the\tsale
\nof unwholesome articles of food.  It is covered by Entry 18,
\nList  III  of  the 7th Schedule to  the\t Constitution.\t The
\nEssential Commodi-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t    617<\/span><\/p>\n
ties  Act on the other hand has for its object the,  control
\nof the production, supply and distribution of, and trade and
\ncommerce in,. essential commodities and is covered by  Entry
\n33  of List III.  In spite of this difference in their\tmain
\nobjects, control of production and distribution of essential
\ncommodities may, to an extent from a. broader point of\tview
\ninclude control of the quality of the essential articles  of
\nfood  and, thus considered, it may reasonably be urged\tthat
\nto some extent it covers the same field as is covered by the
\nprovisions of the Adulteration Act.  The two provisions may,
\ntherefore,  have  within  these\t narrow\t limits\t co-terminus
\nfields of operation.  On this premise we have to see if\t the
\ntwo  provisions can stand together having cumulative  effect
\nand in case they cannot, which provision has the  overriding
\nor  controlling\t effect.  It is needless to point  out\tthat
\nthey  can  stand together if the powers are intended  to  be
\nexercised for different purposes without fatal inconsistency
\nor repugnancy.\n<\/p>\n
At  the\t bar Shri Daphtary in his  usual  persuasive  manner
\nargued that there is an irreconcilable conflict between\t the
\ntwo statutory provisions and the Fruit Order being, not only
\nof  a date later than the Adulteration Act but also  having,
\nby  virtue  of\ts. 3(6) of the\tEssential  Commodities\tAct,
\noverriding effect over all other laws, it must prevail\tover
\nthe  Adulteration Act and Rules.  He pointed out that  under
\nthe Fruit Order the prosecution can be instituted only\twith
\nthe previous sanction of the Licensing Officer whereas under
\nthe Adulteration Act even a purchaser may, without any\tsuch
\nsanction, institute a prosecution merely by producing  along
\nwith  his complaint a certificate from the  Public  Analyst.
\nHe  also drew our attention to s. 20-A of  the\tAdulteration
\nAct  according to which, unlike the Fruit Order,  the  Court
\ntrying an offence under that Act is empowered to implead the
\nmanufacturer, distributor or dealer of any article of  food,
\nit  is\tsatisfied  that\t he is\talso  concerned\t with,\tthat
\noffence,  and proceed against him as though the\t prosecution
\nhad  been  instituted-against him under s. 20.\t We  do\t not
\nthink  this  section  in any way  reflects  the\t legislative
\nintention  of implied repeal of the Adulteration Act by\t the
\nFruit  Order.\tThe  two statutory  provisions\tcan  operate
\nwithin\ttheir respective spheres without giving rise to\t any
\nabsurdity  or  such grave inconvenience as would  impel\t the
\ncourt  to sustain the plea of implied repeal.,\tIncidentally
\nit  may also be pointed out that this section was  added  by
\nAct  49 of 1964 which came into force on March 1, 1965\tlong
\nafter  1960  when  the present\tcases  were  started.\tShri
\nDaphtary  developed  his  argument by  adding  that  if\t the
\nrespondents have manufactured for sale and have sold vinegar
\nin accordance with the terms of the licence granted to\tthem
\nunder\tthe   Fruit  Order  then   imposition\tof   further
\nrestrictions  under  the Adulteration Act and Rules  with  a
\nthreat\tof severe penal consequences for violation of  those
\nprovisions would
\n618<\/span>
\nbe  in direct conflict with the mandate or directions  under
\nthe  Fruit Order.  The counsel contended that at  least\t the
\nfreedom to manufacture and sell vinegar as permitted by\t the
\nFruit  Order  is curtailed or further circumscribed  by\t the
\nAdulteration  Act  and Rules and this must  necessarily\t cut
\nacross\tthe provisions of the Fruit Order.   He\t illustrated
\nhis  point by submitting that under the Fruit Order  use  of
\ncolouring matter is more liberal than under the Adulteration
\nAct and Rules.\tIn view of these conflicting provisions\t the
\nAdulteration Act and Rules, according to Shri Daphtary\tmust
\nbe held to have been impliedly repealed by the Fruit  Order.
\nWe  are\t unable\t to agree with\tthis  submission.   The\t two
\nstatutory provisions, for the purpose of effectuating  their
\nrespective objects, have imposed ,different restrictions  on
\nthe  respondents  when\tthey manufacture  and  sell  vinegar
\nwhether brewed or synthetic.  We are, however, ‘.Informed at
\nthe  bar  that in the present case the disputed\t vinegar  is
\nsynthetic.  In the interest of public health the respondents
\nhave  to comply with the provisions of Adulteration Act\t and
\nRules  and  in the interests of\t equitable  distribution  of
\nessential commodities including the articles of food covered
\nby  Essential Commodities Act and the Fruit Order they\thave
\nto  comply  with  the provisions of the\t Fruit\tOrder.\t The
\nprovisions of the Adulteration Act and of the Fruit Order to
\nwhich  our attention was drawn seem to be supplementary\t and
\ncumulative in their operation and no provision of the  Fruit
\nOrder  is  shown  to  be destructive  of  or  fatal  to\t any
\n,provision  of\tthe  Adulteration  Act\tor  the\t Rules\tmade
\nthereunder  So\tas  to compel the court to  hold  that\tthey
\ncannot\tstand  together.  If the Adulteration Act  or  Rules
\nimpose\tsome restrictions on. the manufacturer,\t dealer\t and
\nseller\tof  vinegar  then  they have  to  comply  with\tthem
\nirrespective of the fact that the Fruit Order imposes lesser
\nnumber\tof  restrictions in respect of these  matters.\t The
\nformer do not render compliance with. the latter impossible,
\nnor   does  compliance\twith  the  former  necessarily\t and
\nautomatically involve violation of the latter.\tIndeed,\t our
\nattention was not drawn to any provision of the Adulteration
\nAct and Rules, compliance with which would result in  breach
\nof  any\t mandate, whether affirmative or  negative,  of\t the
\nFruit  Order.  We are, therefore, unable to find any  cogent
\nor  convincing\treason\tfor  holding  that  the\t  Parliament
\nintended  by enacting the Essential Commodities Act  or\t the
\nFruit  Order  to  implidely repeal  the\t provisions  of\t the
\nadulteration  Act and the Rules in respect the statutes\t can
\nfunction  with\tfull the provisions of the Adultera  of\t the
\nvinegar\t in dispute.  Both vigour side by side in their\t own
\nparallel  channels.  Even if they happen to some  extent  to
\noverlap. s. 26 of the General Clauses Act fully protects the
\nguilty\tparties against double jeopardy or  double  penalty.
\nThis  section  lays  down  that where  an  Act\tor  omission
\nconstitutes  an,’ offence under two or more enactments\tthen
\nthe  offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and  punished
\nunder either or any of those enactments but shall not
\n 619<\/span>
\nbe  liable to be punished twice for the same  offence.\t If,
\ntherefore, the provisions of the Adulteration Act and  those
\nof  Fruit Order happen to constitute offences  covering\t the
\nsame  acts  or\tomissions  then it would  be,  open  to\t the
\nprosecuting authorities to punish the offender under  either
\nof  them subject to the only condition that a guilty  person
\nshould not be punished twice over.\n<\/p>\n
There  is also another aspect which has to be kept in  view.
\nBoth the Adulteration Act and the Essential Commodities\t Act
\nhave  been amended from time to time after their  enactment.
\nBeing  governed by Entries in List III of the  7th  Schedule
\neven  the  States have power to amend these  enactments\t and
\nindeed\tthey  have  been so amended  in\t some  States.\t The
\nsubsequent  amendments\tof the Adulteration Act and  of\t the
\nEssential   Commodities\t Act  by  the  Parliament  and\t the
\namendment  of  the  Adulteration Rules would  also  tend  to
\nnegative any legislative intendment of implied repeal of the
\nAdulteration  Act  by the Essential Commodities Act  or\t the
\nFruit Order.  It may be recalled that cl. (1) of sub-r.\t (1)
\nof  r. 50 of the Adulteration Rules was amended in 1956\t and
\nagain  in 1960 and the amended clause is indicative  of\t the
\nrule making authority being conscious of both the  statutory
\nprovisions being operative in their respective fields at the
\nsame time, thereby negativing implied repeal.  A.20  dealing
\nwith  “vinegar”\t was  also  added  in  Appendix\t B  of\t the
\nAdulteration  Rules  in\t 1956 and A. 20.01  dealing  with  ”
\nsynthetic  vinegar”  was added in April,  1960.\t  A  passing
\nreference  may\talso  be  made\tto  some  of  the   relevant
\namendments in some rules made subsequent to the\t enforcement
\nof  the\t amended section 23 (2).  In r. 55 in items  at\t sl.
\nnos. 19 and 20, dealing with pickles and chutnies made\tfrom
\nfruit  or  vegetables  and with\t tomato\t and  other  sauces,
\nrespectively,  the  preservatives mentioned in\tcl.  2\twere
\namended.   Similarly  in  r.  51(2)  the  table\t  containing
\narticles  like fruit and vegetable juices including  tomato-
\njuice  was amended.  Both the above amendments were made  in
\nDecember,  1965.  It may here be pointed out  that  pickles,
\nchutnies,  tomato products, kutchups, sauces and also  other
\nunspecified  items  relating  to fruits\t or  vegetables\t are
\nincluded  in  the definition of “fruit\tproduct”  under\t the
\nFruit  Products Order.\tThese amendments, though made  after
\n1960, do seem to further negative the intendment of  implied
\nrepeal\tas argued on behalf of the respondent.\tIn  view  of
\nthe  foregoing\tdiscussion  it\tseems to  us  that  the\t two
\nstatutory   provisions\tcan  harmoniously  operate   without
\ncausing\t confusion or resulting in absurd consequences’\t and
\nthe  scheme  of the Adulteration Act and Rules\tcan  without
\ndifficulty fit into the scheme of the Fruit Order under\t the
\nEssential  Commodities Act.  The challenge on the ground  of
\nimplied repeal must, therefore, be rejected.
\nIncidentally we may note that the view taken by the  learned
\nsingle\tJudge  in this case was later overruled\t by  a\tFull
\nBench of the
\n918 Sup.  C.I.\/71
\n620<\/span>
\nDelhi High Court in Municipal corporation v. Harnarain (Crl.
\nA. No. 163 of 1967 decided in May, 1969).\n<\/p>\n
Shri Daphtary, as a last resort, tried to press into service
\nArt.  14  in  his  challenge  to  the  prosecution  of\t the
\nrespondent.   According to him the  prosecuting\t authorities
\nhave an unguided licence to prosecute his clients under\t one
\nor  the\t other\tstatute\t and since  the\t penalty  under\t the
\nAdulteration  Act is more severe than that under  the  Fruit
\nOrder  the principle of equality before the law is  violated
\nAs  this point was not taken in any of the courts  below  we
\ndid  not  permit him to raise it in this Court.\t  It  would,
\nhowever, be open to the respondent, if so advised, to  raise
\nthis  point  in\t accordance with law  in  the  court  below,
\nbecause\t the  cases have not yet been finally  disposed\t of.
\nThe competence of the prosecution having been challenged  at
\nan intermediate stage, the cases will have to go back to the
\ntrial  court.  As these cases have been pending\t since\t1962
\nthe trial court should dispose them of with due dispatch and
\nwithout any further avoidable delay.\n<\/p>\n
The  appeals are accordingly allowed and the cases  remitted
\nto the trial court for further proceedings according. to law
\nin the light of the observations made above.\n<\/p>\n
R.K.P.S.\t\t\t       Appeals allowed.\n621<\/span>\n\n\n\n<\/pre>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Municipal Corporation Of Delhi vs Shiv Shankar on 1 February, 1971 Equivalent citations: 1971 AIR 815, 1971 SCR (3) 607 Author: I Dua Bench: Dua, I.D. PETITIONER: MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI Vs. RESPONDENT: SHIV SHANKAR DATE OF JUDGMENT01\/02\/1971 BENCH: DUA, I.D. BENCH: DUA, I.D. SIKRI, S.M. (CJ) BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA CITATION: 1971 […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5863","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nMunicipal Corporation Of Delhi vs Shiv Shankar on 1 February, 1971 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/municipal-corporation-of-delhi-vs-shiv-shankar-on-1-february-1971\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Municipal Corporation Of Delhi vs Shiv Shankar on 1 February, 1971 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/municipal-corporation-of-delhi-vs-shiv-shankar-on-1-february-1971\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"1971-01-31T18:30:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2015-08-31T05:50:49+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@legaliadmin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@Legal_india\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"33 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/municipal-corporation-of-delhi-vs-shiv-shankar-on-1-february-1971#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/municipal-corporation-of-delhi-vs-shiv-shankar-on-1-february-1971\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\"},\"headline\":\"Municipal Corporation Of Delhi vs Shiv Shankar on 1 February, 1971\",\"datePublished\":\"1971-01-31T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2015-08-31T05:50:49+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/municipal-corporation-of-delhi-vs-shiv-shankar-on-1-february-1971\"},\"wordCount\":5871,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"articleSection\":[\"Supreme Court of India\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/municipal-corporation-of-delhi-vs-shiv-shankar-on-1-february-1971#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/municipal-corporation-of-delhi-vs-shiv-shankar-on-1-february-1971\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/municipal-corporation-of-delhi-vs-shiv-shankar-on-1-february-1971\",\"name\":\"Municipal Corporation Of Delhi vs Shiv Shankar on 1 February, 1971 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"1971-01-31T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2015-08-31T05:50:49+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/municipal-corporation-of-delhi-vs-shiv-shankar-on-1-february-1971#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/municipal-corporation-of-delhi-vs-shiv-shankar-on-1-february-1971\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/municipal-corporation-of-delhi-vs-shiv-shankar-on-1-february-1971#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Municipal Corporation Of Delhi vs Shiv Shankar on 1 February, 1971\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"name\":\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"description\":\"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"alternateName\":\"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"alternateName\":\"Legal India\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"width\":512,\"height\":512,\"caption\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.facebook.com\\\/LegalindiaCom\\\/\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/Legal_india\"]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\",\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Legal India Admin\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/legaliadmin\"],\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/author\\\/legal-india-admin\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Municipal Corporation Of Delhi vs Shiv Shankar on 1 February, 1971 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/municipal-corporation-of-delhi-vs-shiv-shankar-on-1-february-1971","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Municipal Corporation Of Delhi vs Shiv Shankar on 1 February, 1971 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","og_url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/municipal-corporation-of-delhi-vs-shiv-shankar-on-1-february-1971","og_site_name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","article_published_time":"1971-01-31T18:30:00+00:00","article_modified_time":"2015-08-31T05:50:49+00:00","og_image":[{"width":512,"height":512,"url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Legal India Admin","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@legaliadmin","twitter_site":"@Legal_india","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Legal India Admin","Est. reading time":"33 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/municipal-corporation-of-delhi-vs-shiv-shankar-on-1-february-1971#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/municipal-corporation-of-delhi-vs-shiv-shankar-on-1-february-1971"},"author":{"name":"Legal India Admin","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea"},"headline":"Municipal Corporation Of Delhi vs Shiv Shankar on 1 February, 1971","datePublished":"1971-01-31T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2015-08-31T05:50:49+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/municipal-corporation-of-delhi-vs-shiv-shankar-on-1-february-1971"},"wordCount":5871,"commentCount":0,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"articleSection":["Supreme Court of India"],"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/municipal-corporation-of-delhi-vs-shiv-shankar-on-1-february-1971#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/municipal-corporation-of-delhi-vs-shiv-shankar-on-1-february-1971","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/municipal-corporation-of-delhi-vs-shiv-shankar-on-1-february-1971","name":"Municipal Corporation Of Delhi vs Shiv Shankar on 1 February, 1971 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website"},"datePublished":"1971-01-31T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2015-08-31T05:50:49+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/municipal-corporation-of-delhi-vs-shiv-shankar-on-1-february-1971#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/municipal-corporation-of-delhi-vs-shiv-shankar-on-1-february-1971"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/municipal-corporation-of-delhi-vs-shiv-shankar-on-1-february-1971#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Municipal Corporation Of Delhi vs Shiv Shankar on 1 February, 1971"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","description":"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"alternateName":"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization","name":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","alternateName":"Legal India","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","width":512,"height":512,"caption":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","https:\/\/x.com\/Legal_india"]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea","name":"Legal India Admin","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Legal India Admin"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com","https:\/\/x.com\/legaliadmin"],"url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/author\/legal-india-admin"}]}},"modified_by":null,"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5863","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5863"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5863\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5863"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5863"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5863"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}