{"id":58927,"date":"2000-05-26T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2000-05-25T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/surjit-singh-chowdhry-ex-major-vs-municipal-corporation-delhi-on-26-may-2000"},"modified":"2018-08-17T22:31:52","modified_gmt":"2018-08-17T17:01:52","slug":"surjit-singh-chowdhry-ex-major-vs-municipal-corporation-delhi-on-26-may-2000","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/surjit-singh-chowdhry-ex-major-vs-municipal-corporation-delhi-on-26-may-2000","title":{"rendered":"Surjit Singh Chowdhry Ex-Major vs Municipal Corporation Delhi on 26 May, 2000"},"content":{"rendered":"
Delhi High Court<\/div>\n
Surjit Singh Chowdhry Ex-Major vs Municipal Corporation Delhi on 26 May, 2000<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 2000 (54) DRJ 749<\/div>\n
Author: A Sikri<\/div>\n
Bench: A Sikri<\/div>\n<\/p>\n
<\/pre>\n
ORDER<\/p>\n
A.K. Sikri, J.<\/p>\n
1.     The  question  of law which arises in these two petitions  is  common. Dispute  is  not about the validity of the suspension  order  when  passed. However,  in  both these petitions, petitioners state  that  suspension  is unduly  prolonged and therefore continuation of such a suspension order  is challenged  as unjustified and illegal. Before delving into this aspect  it would be necessary to know the facts of each case.\n<\/p>\n
2.   Civil Writ Petition No.3598 of 1998 <\/p>\n
     Petitioner in this case was appointed as Security Officer with the MCD on 18th August, 1983. He was confirmed as Security Officer on 1st  January, 1987. However, petitioner was arrested on 24th November, 1993 in a  corruption case. F.I.R. 53\/93 was registered with Anti Corruption Department u\/S. 7\/13  of Prevention of Corruption Act. As per the FIR, petitioner  had  demanded, accepted and obtained Rs. 5000\/- as part payment of illegal  gratification  of  Rs.10,000\/- from Shri Jeet Lal Sharma,  Security  Supervisor, MCD,  I.  S.  Hospital, Kingsway Camp, New Delhi in  consideration  of  his adjustment of D.A. and pension at the time of his retirement and forwarding pension  file to Additional Commissioner (Health, MCD) for sanction.  Petitioner remained under judicial custody exceeding 48 hours and therefore  as per  provisions  of  Regulation 5 (3) of the  Delhi  Municipal  Corporation Services (Control and Appeal) Regulation, 1959, he was deemed to have  been placed under suspension w.e.f. date of his arrest i.e. 24th November, 1983. Order  to this effect was issued by the respondents on 2nd  December,  1993 placing him under deemed suspension w.e.f. 24th November, 1983.  Petitioner was initially paid 50% subsistence allowance. The case of the  petitioner’s suspension  was  renewed  in accordance with F.R. 53  and  the  subsistence allowance  was enhanced from 50% to 75% vide order dated 7th  April,  1994. After the investigation conducted by th Anti Corruption Department, challan was filed in the Court of Shri Dinesh Dayal, Additional Sessions Judge  and charges framed against the petitioner. The trial in the said criminal  case is still pending in the Court of Additional Sessions Judge. Petitioner made requests  and  representations  to the respondents for  revocation  of  his suspension  including  representation 12th May, 1997.  However,  since  the request of the petitioner was not acceded to, he has filed the present writ petition challenging the continuation of the suspension order.\n<\/p>\n
3.   Primarily it is submitted by the petitioner that the criminal trial is taking  unduly long time and in the last five years (i.e. till the date  of filing  of  the writ petition) only two witness were examined.  It  is  the submission  of the petitioner that criminal trial may not conclude  in  the near  future and may take unduly long period and petitioner cannot be  made to languish under suspension. It is further stated that in various cases of similar  nature  MCD has revoked the suspension  and  reinstated  employees after receiving no objection certificate from the investigating  authority. Similarly,  “no objection certificate” in the case of petitioner  alongwith three other similarly placed employees, which is a list of 31 such suspended person, is obtained but notwithstanding such “no objection certificiate” issued by Anti Corruption Branch on 7th September, 1995 petitioner has  not been reinstated after revoking his suspension. One Shri Devender Singh, Jr. Engineer,  who  was also suspended w.e..f. 1st November, 1993  having  been involved in criminal case by Anti Corruption Department but was allowed  to be reinstated vide order dated 9.5.1994. It is submitted that no purpose is served  in  keeping  the petitioner under suspension  and  respondents  are adopting  discriminatory attitude towards the petitioner who  is  suffering from  acute financial hardship on account of impugned order of  suspension. It is also submitted that such order of suspension has the effect of  causing social stigma on the petitioner. In support of his submission that  the criminal  trial is taking so much time, petitioner’s continuous  suspension is not justified reliance was placed upon the following judgments:-\n<\/p>\n
     i.   K. Sukhinder Reddy Vs. State of A.P. and another reported in (1996) 6 SCC 257.\n<\/p>\n
     ii.  K.K. Bhardwaj and another Vs. Delhi Vidyut Board .\n<\/p>\n
4.   The facts stated by the petitioner in the petition and recorded  above are undisputed. However, in the counter affidavit filed by the respondents, it is stressed that the charge of illegal gratification for which petitioner  was apprehended and put on trial is a serious charge. Since  the  petitioner was suspended and he remained in custody for more than 48 hours,  in terms of relevant rules he was rightly suspended. It is further stated that case of the petitioner was reviewed from time to time but the  disciplinary authority decided to continue the suspension order in view of the  seriousness  of the charges against the petitioner. Even when the Anti  Corruption Bureau  has  given  no objection certificate for considering  the  case  of municipal employees pending with them for their reinstatement by the disciplinary  authority,  it was for the disciplinary authority to arrive  at  a decision  with regard to reinstatement of the employees  after  considering the  merit of each case independently. The case of the petitioner was  also reviewed  but  disciplinary  authority did not find it fit  to  revoke  the suspension  and reinstate him as he was holding a senior post in  Municipal Corporation of Delhi and it was his primary duty to eradicate and eliminate corruption from the department but acting contrary to the said norms  petitioner  himself  indulged in the act of corruption by not  maintaining  the standard  of integrity and betraying the faith of officers reposed in  him. His  act of demanding and accepting illegal gratification from  his  junior staff  while holding a senior post was nothing short of treachery  and  was most reprehensible and totally unexpected from an officer of his rank.  All these factors were considered by the disciplinary authority while reviewing his suspension and it was decided that in such a case where petitioner  was facing  serious charge of corruption and consequently criminal  trial,  the disciplinary  authority decided not to revoke the  suspension.  Respondents have  produced  their  records also for perusal of the  Court  showing  the decision of the disciplinary authority was made with proper application  of mind.\n<\/p>\n
     Civil Writ Petition No. 5551 of 1997<\/p>\n
5.   Petitioner  in this case was recruited as Stenographer on 11th  December,  1976 in Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (hereinafter referred to  as BHEL,  for short)-respondent no.1. He was promoted as Senior Steno in  1984 and  then as Private Secretary. C.B.I. registered the case on 25th  August, 1993.  He was arrested by C.B.I. on 11th January, 1994 in a  criminal  case and was kept in police custody for more than 48 hours. Accordingly, as  per Rule  20(2)  of  the Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules of  BHEL  he  was treated as deemed to have been suspended i.e. from the date of detention  – 11th January, 1994. C.B.I. investigated the matter and ultimately  retention u\/S. 120-B  r\/w. Ss. 420, 409, 467-8 and 471 of the Indian Penal  Code  was filed  in the court on 2nd March, 1995 against five persons which  included two other officials of the BHEL alongwith the petitioner. The  allegations, as per F.I.R., are that these three employees of BHEL entered into criminal conspiracy with other unknown persons and floated a society by the name  of Mittergan  Sahakari  Awas Samiti for the purpose of purchasing land  in  or around  Noida. The society was proposed to be registered with U.P.  government under U.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1965. After floating the society the accused collected a sum of Rs.47 lakhs from the members and deposited in Canara Bank, extension counter, Lodhi Road, New Delhi. They  withdrew Rs.16  lakhs  each on 25th January, 1989 and 24th May,  1989  through  self cheques  and  later  on merged this society with another  society  by  name ‘Pushp  Enclave  Sahakari  Griha Nirman Samity Ltd’.  According  to  Deputy Registrar,  Cooperative Societies, Meerut, no such merger has  taken  place and permission of Deputy Registrar is necessary for any such merger of  one society into another society. No land was purchased in the name of  Mittergan Sahakari Awas Samiti and the amount collected from the members has been swindled.\n<\/p>\n
6.   For   period  of six months after his suspension petitioner  was  paid subsistence  allowances 50% of his salary and allowances which was  revised to  75%  w.e.f. 12th July, 1984. Infact after the arrest of  petitioner  on 13th January, 1994 he was released on bail on 25th January, 1994 and thereafter  he made representation dated 23rd February, 1994 for  revocation  of suspension which was turned down vide communication dated 2nd March,  1995. Charges were framed by the Court and criminal trial is in progress. On 13th May, 1996 petitioner again made representation for revocation of suspension which  was followed by another representation dated 26th August,  1997  and 8th  October,  1997.  However as these representations did  not  evoke  any response  petitioner sent a legal notice dated 17th November,  1997.  Still when  the  suspension  was not revoked petitioner filed  this  petition  in December 1997.\n<\/p>\n
7.   The line of argument on the basis of which suspension is challenged in this petition, is same as in the aforesaid writ petition No. 3598 of  1998. It is additionally stated that in the FIR lodged by C.B.I. nothing has been attributed  directly  to the petitioner. Although the said  case  does  not relate  to BHEL and therefore there is no reason why the petitioner  should continue to be kept under suspension. The main purpose of keeping a  person under suspension, it is contended is that he should be kept away so that he is  not able to tamper with evidence or witnesses. Such a reason  does  not exist in his case where suspension is not related to the performance of his duties.  The petitioner has also alleged discrimination on the ground  that other similarly situated persons have been reinstated and incidence of  one Shri  Jagdish Bahl who was arrested u\/S. 306 of the Indian Penal  Code  and was  reinstated once he was given bail by the Court. It is  also  mentioned that  in  case of Shri S.K. Bhatia again liniment view  was  taken  although C.B.I.’s case was pending against him. In another incident, one Shri Deepak Sharan was found involved in the case of fraud and in his case also suspension  was revoked. Petitioner has also relied upon the decision of  Central Administrative Tribunal in the case of Abullais Khan Vs. The State of  West Bengal and others reported in 1986 (3) SLR 16.\n<\/p>\n
8.   In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents BHEL it is stated that the suspension order was rightly passed in terms of Rule  20(2) of the C.D.A. Rules as the petitioner was arrested and remained in  custody exceeding  48  hours  and therefore he was deemed to  have  been  suspended w.e.f.  the date of his detention. After six months subsistence  allowance was  increased to 75% of basic pay and allowances. It is also  stated  that case of the petitioner was considered from time to time and it was  decided not  to revoke suspension of the petitioner in view of the  seriousness  of the  charges  and even C.B.I. had suggested vide letter dated  15th  March, 1995  to  continue the petitioner under suspension till the  completion  of trial  as  chargesheet had been filed against him and four  others  on  2nd March 1995 under various sections of Indian Penal Code as mentioned  above. Allegation  of discrimination of taking sympathetic view in few  cases  are denied and it is stated that these are misquoted by the petitioner as  each case is an independent case having its own facts and circumstances and  has
\nto  be considered on its own merits. The position in respect of  the  cases cited by the petitioner is explained in the following terms:-\n<\/p>\n
     “It  is  not denied that Shri Jagdish Behl was also  arrested  by Police  and suspended by BHEL. But suspension was revoked by  the Disciplinary  Authority  after he was bailed out.  There  was  no specific  recommendations  from CBI or Police not to  revoke  his suspension, and his attending office had no likelihood of intimidating  the witnesses or tempering with the evidence.  This  case pertained  to  him and family members and totally  un-related  to  BHEL or its employees.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     The  other  two cases quoted by the Petitioner have also  got  no similarity to his case. The facts of the case are as under:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     Smt. Usha Subramaniam, w\/o. Shri D. Subramaniam, employee of  the respondent  Company and Sr. Programmer of Delhi University,  Computer Centre was suspended for her alleged involvement in tampering with the marks and merit list of medical entrance examination in  respect of one Shri Arvind Bhatia, son of Shri  S.K.  Bhatia, another employee of the respondent Company. On the above  subject CBI filed a case against Smt. Usha Subramaniam (non BHEL  employee)  as well as Shri D. Subramaniam and Shri S.K.  Bhatia.  Since the criminal case was not relating to the respondent Company  and since Shri S.K. Bhatia and Shri D. Subramaniam were not  arrested by  CBI or Police, they were not placed under suspension  by  the respondent Company. Hence their case is not comparable to that of the petitioner. It is submitted that Shri S.K. Bhatia and Shri D. Subramaniam have since retired from the services of the  respondent Company.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     However  in  the case of the petitioner, since CBI  continued  to hold their views and since chargesheet was already filed by  CBI, a decision was taken by the respondent Company not to revoke  his suspension in the interest of the trial.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     The  petitioner’s  statement regarding the case  of  Shri  Deepak Dhawan is also totally misleading and invented for the purpose of this  writ. Shri Deepak Dhawan was in fact punished for  his  alleged involvement of a case of fraud in the Company, by  lowering him to next below scale for a specific period, after a departmental  enquiry  and  no  a CBI case. In  addition,  a  sum  of  Rs. 2,74,793\/-, being his portion of loss caused to the Company,  was to be refunded by him to the Company, which is being recovered in instalment basis of Rs. 1500\/- p.m. since 22.4.97″\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     The respondents have submitted that in view of the seriousness of the  charges  against the petitioner,  his  continued  suspension pending  trial is justified even if the trial is taking time  and in  support of their submission respondents have relied upon  the following judgment:-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     i.   Allahabad  Bank and another Vs. Deepak Kumar D  .\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     ii.  U.P.  Rajya  Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad  and  others  Vs. Sanjiv Rajan reported in 1993 (3) Supp.SCC 483<\/p>\n
     iii. State of Kerala Vs. W.I. Services & Estates Limited reported in 1998 (5) SCC 585.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     Legal Position:-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
9.   Suspension is defined as a State of being debarred. The employee  when he is suspended is thus debarred from any privilege, particularly from  the execution of an office. It is temporary deprivation of office. However  the suspended employee does not lose his office nor does he suffer any degradation.  He only ceases to exercise powers and discharge duties for the  time being.  Order of suspension does not pertain to his service under  his  employer he continues to be an employee\/member of service inspite of order of suspension.  In Khemchand Vs. Union of India , Supreme  Court explained the real effect of order of suspension and  clarified  that government servant when suspended continues to be  a  government employee  but he is not permitted to work and further during the period  of suspension  he is paid only some allowances – generally called  subsistence allowance  – which is normally less than salary instead of pay  and  allowances  he  would have been entitled to if he had not been  suspended.  What subsistence  allowance  is to be paid depends on the service rules  on  the subject.  Further in the case of P.L. Shah Vs. Union of India  , Supreme Court observed that the order of suspension is not an  order imposing punishment on a person. It is an order made against  him before he is found guilty to ensure smooth disposal of proceedings initiated  against  him.  Such proceedings should be  completed  expeditiously  in public interest and also in the interest of government service  concerned. There is no doubt that order of suspension, unless the departmental enquiry is concluded within a reasonable time affects a government servant  injuriously (refer O.P. Gupta Vs. Union of India ).\n<\/p>\n
10.  In both these cases, the service rules make provision regarding suspension  and the suspension was resorted to as per the said rules. Passing  of the suspension order initially, therefore, cannot be faulted with nor it is challenged  by the petitioners in the instant cases on the ground that  the suspension  order was wrongly passed. However, the dispute which is  raised is as to whether in the circumstances of this case, such a suspension could continue  indefinitely or, to put it differently, whether  continuation  of suspension has become illegal?\n<\/p>\n
11.  The  suspension can be resorted to, under the relevant rules in  these cases, in contemplation and\/or during the pendency of disciplinary proceedings  as well as during the pendency of criminal trial against the  employees. In these cases where the employee is suspended in contemplation and\/or pending disciplinary proceedings and such a suspension is prolonged, it may not cause much of a problem. If the enquiry is unduly prolonged due to  the reasons attributable to the employer e.g. delay in serving charge-sheet  or delay  in conducting enquiry, the suspension order can be interfered  with and  the department can be directed to revoke the suspension and take  back the suspended employee on duties. Reasons are obvious. Since the suspension causes  hardship  and  affects the government  servant  injuriously,  after suspending  him it is expected that departmental proceedings are  concluded expeditiously which is in public interest as well as in interest of government servant concerned. In public interest because the concerned  suspended employee  is being paid the subsistence allowance without taking work  from him and in the interest of government servant concerned because the continued suspension is causing hardship to him. For these reasons, it is  necessary  to know the outcome of the charges levelled against such an  employee which  compelled  the employer to put him under suspension in view  of  the pendency  of  departmental proceedings. Since the departmental  enquiry  is initiated by the department, and it is within the control of the department and  when delay takes place in concluding the enquiry the blame can be  put on the department for such delay and therefore it can be inferred that  the continuation of suspension is not justified. There are many instances where suspension  order\/continuation  of suspension order are  quashed  when  the departmental  enquiry is unnecessarily prolonged (refer T.S.  Guru  Siddiah Vs. State reported in AIR 1963 Mysore 109).\n<\/p>\n
12.  However,  when  the concerned employee is suspended  pending  criminal proceedings and the criminal proceedings are delayed for one reason or  the other,  whether continuation of suspension can be interfered with? In  such cases,  the  conduct  of the proceedings is not within the  powers  of  the employer\/department.   In  such  cases,  investigation  is   conducted   by police\/CBI\/vigilance  department  of  government, etc.  which  are  outside agencies.  They  may take their own time in completing  the  investigation. After the investigation if the report of such an agency is that the offence is  made out and charge-sheet is filed in the competent court of law,  than further  conduct of proceedings is under the charge of such criminal  court which may take its own time in concluding the trial. It is often seen  that these proceedings do take longer time to conclude. The departmental authorities  have generally no role to play in the conduct of  these  proceedings and  they cannot be faulted with if the proceedings are delayed. In such  a situation if the continuation of suspension is challenged as illegal on the ground that criminal proceedings are taking unduly long period, what is the course of action to be adopted by the Court in dealing with the jusitification and or otherwise of such a suspension. It is this situation with which we  are concerned in the present cases. The petitioners have raised  grievances  that  proceedings  are taking unduly long time on  the  other  hand, respondents  submission is that the charges for which the  petitioners  are
\nsuspended  are  very serious in nature and they have no  control  over  the proceedings  pending  in the criminal court and therefore  they  cannot  be faulted  with  because of the delay taking place  in  criminal  proceedings before the Courts.\n<\/p>\n
13.  Let us scan through whatever case law is available on the subject.\n<\/p>\n
14.  In  the case of K. Sukhinder
\n Reddy Vs. State of A.P. and  another   appellant and IAS officers were  placed  under suspension  under relevant rules prima facie, in view of the criminal  case registered  against  them in the police station  concerned.  Supreme  Court found  that  the case showed likelihood of many more IAS officers  some  of whom  were even senior to the appellants being involved. Investigation  was not completed till two and a half years and there was no information as  to how  long  it was to continue and in such circumstances an officer  of  the rank  of  the  appellant against whom, it was detected  belatedly  that  no departmental enquiry was contemplated, the Court held that he could not  be kept  under  suspension indefinitely. More so, when despite  likelihood  of
\ninvolvement  of many more senior officers only appellant was  placed  under suspension.\n<\/p>\n
15.  A  Division Bench of this Court in the case entitled K.K.  Bhardwaj  & another Vs. Delhi Vidyut Board and others  set aside  the  suspension  order on grounds of delay. That was  a  case  where against  the  appellants (in two separate LPAs) there were  allegations  of defalcation  by  them worth huge amount in respect of incident  alleged  to have taken place in the year 1982. Appellant no.2 was placed under  suspension by order dated 10th February, 1983 and appellant no.1 was suspended by order  dated 8th January, 1987. After investigation by CBI challan  in  the Special  Court was filed on 29th May, 1986. In the year 1987  charges  were framed  by  Special Court in the case against appellant no. 1  and  on  5th January, 1998 against appellant no.2. Since appellants continued to  remain under  suspension  they  challenged suspension orders  by  filing  separate petitions  seeking quashing of the suspension orders. Learned Single  Judge did  not accept the prayer, interalia, observing that for quashing of  suspension  orders the appellants could move for appropriate relief for  diposal  of criminal case. In these circumstances, both the appellants  filed LPAs before the Division Bench which were decided by aforesaid judgment. In para 4 of the said judgment the division bench formulated the point in  the following words :-\n<\/p>\n
     “The  short point involved in the present appeals is  whether  on the facts and circumstances of the case the appellants should  be asked  to  wait till disposal of criminal cases and  should  they remain under suspension after lapse of more than fifteen years in one case and about twelve years in the other.”\n<\/p>\n
16.  After  dealing with the submissions of both the parties the Court  set aside the orders of suspension against both the appellants in the two  LPAs and made the following observations in the process:-\n<\/p>\n
“Considering  the fact that the appellants have been put  under  suspension for  so many years and no progress has been made in the criminal cases,  we are of the view that the appellants’ prayer does not deserve to be rejected  and  they cannot be asked to await till the disposal  of  the  criminal case.  The continuance of their suspension, to our mind, is  clearly  arbitrary and unjustified. It is nobody’s case that the appellants were responsible for delay in disposal of the criminal cases.”\n<\/p>\n
17.  In  the  case of U.P. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Samiti  Vs.  Sanjeev  Rajan (supra) wherein concerned employee was suspended w.e.f. 22nd March, 1991 on the  charges of defalcation of moneys or embezzlement of funds.  He  challenged  the  suspension by filing writ petition in the High  Court  on  the ground  that some other suspended officers had been allowed join  services. High Court quashed the suspension order on the said ground. However, investigation  into defalcation was in progress for which purpose special  auditors were appointed who submitted their report in May 1991 in which it  was stated that several lakhs of rupees have been embezzled from the funds  of the  Market  Committee.  On 4th May, 1991 an order  was  passed  appointing Enquiry  Officer  to enquire into the conduct of various  officers  of  the Market Committee. On preliminary enquiry it was found that the  defalcation was  done  either with the active involvement of the employee or  with  his connivance. In any case he was guilty of dereliction of duty for not  scrutinising  the amounts of Market Committee properly. With this, prima  facie case  against the respondent-employee fresh order of  suspension  alongwith chargesheet  was  served upon him on March 26, 1992. The  respondent  again approached  the High Court and filed the writ petition. Interim  order  was passed setting aside the order of suspension on the ground that it was  not competent  on  the  part of the employer to pass the  order  of  suspension second  time in the same manner. Against this Interim Order  Special  Leave Petition  was filed in the Supreme Court and the apex Court  while  setting aside  the order of the High Court held that the ground given by  the  High Court to stay the operation of the suspension order was wrong and there was no  restriction on authority to pass the suspension order second time.  The question  of delay also came up for discussion and the Supreme Court  dealt with this aspect in the following manner:-\n<\/p>\n
     “Ordinarily,  when there is an accusation of defalcation  of  the monies,  the delinquent employees have to be kept away  from  the establishment  till the charges are finally disposed of.  Whether the charges are baseless, malicious or vindictive and are  framed only to keep the individual concerned out of the employment is  a different  matter. But even in such a case, no conclusion can  be arrived  at without examining the entire record in  question  and hence it is always advisable to allow disciplinary proceedings to continue  unhindered. It is possible that in some case,  the  authorities do not proceed with the matter as expeditiously as they ought to, which results in prolongation of the sufferings of  the  delinquent  employee. But the remedy in such cases is  either  to call  for an explanation from the authorities in the matter,  and if  it  is found unsatisfactory, to direct them to  complete  the inquiry within a stipulated period and to increase the suspension allowance  adequately. It is true that in the present  case,  the charge-sheet  was filed after almost a year of the order of  suspension.  However, the facts pleaded by the appellants show  that the  defalcations were over a long period from 1986 to  1991  and they  involved  some lakhs of rupees. It also  appears  that  the authorities have approached the police and in the police investigation,  the  amount of defalcation is found to  be  still  more. Since the matter is of taking accounts which are spread over from 1986  to  1991 and of correlating the entries with  the  relevant documents,  and several individuals are involved, the framing  of charges  was  bound to take some time. The Court has  to  examine each case on its own facts and decide whether the delay in  serving  the charge-sheet and completing the inquiry is justified  or not. However, in the present case, the High Court has not quashed  the  order  of suspension on the ground of delay in  framing  the charges. As stated earlier, it has set aside the order of suspension  on the ground that the authority had no power to  pass  the second  order of suspension in the same case. We are afraid  that the  High  Court has misconstrued the nature and purpose  of  the power of suspension vested in the management.” .\n<\/p>\n
18.  The other case which may have direct bearing for our purpose is  again another judgment of the apex Court in the case of Allahabad Bank and another  Vs.  Deepak Kumar Bhola . In this  case  also respondent-employee  was  suspended  pending criminal  trial  for  offences involving moral terpitude. Allegations against him were that of  committing forgery and wrongfully withdrawing of money from the bank which he was  not entitled  to  do. The suspension was challenged by the employee  which  was upheld  by the High Court concluding that the mere fact that a  person  had entered into criminal conspiracy, it could not be recorded that a  “offence involving  moral turpitude” have been committed and therefore bank  had  no jurisdiction  to  suspend the employee in terms of clause  19.3(a)  of  the first partite settlement, 1966 as per which suspension could be resorted to only  if  the charge related to an offence involving  moral  terpitude.  In appeal  filed  by the bank, Supreme Court reversed the  judgement  of  High Court  holding that the allegation against the employee amounted  to  moral terpitude.  It  would be apt to quote para 11 of the judgment  which  would show  that  the Supreme Court was not persuaded by the fact  that  criminal case was pending for ten years. Para 11 reads as under:-\n<\/p>\n
     “We are unable to agree with the contention of the learned  counsel for the respondent that there has been no application of mind or  the  objective consideration of the facts  by  the  appellant before  it passed the orders of suspension. As already  observed, the  very  fact that the investigation was conducted by  the  CBI which resulted in the filing of a charge-sheet, alleging  various offences having been committed by the respondent, was  sufficient for the appellant to conclude that pending prosecution the  respsondent  should  be suspended. It would be  indeed  inconceivable that  a  bank should allow an employee to continue to  remain  on duty  when he is facing serious charges of corruption and  misappropriation of money. Allowing such an employee to remain in  the seat would result in giving him further opportunity to indulge in the  acts  for which he was being prosecuted. Under  the  circumstances,  it was the bounden duty of the appellant to have  taken recourse to the provisions of clause 19.3 of the First  Bipartite Settlement, 1966. The mere fact that nearly 10 years have elapsed since  the  charge-sheet  was filed, can also be  no  ground  for allowing the respondent tos come back to duty on a sensitive post in  the  Bank, unless he is exonerated of the  charge.\n<\/p>\n
19.  In  M. Chengaiah Vs. State of Tamil Nadu represented by  Secretary  to Government, Revenue Department, Madras and another reported in 1983(2)  SLR 436, Madras High Court held that if the continued suspension pending investigation and registration of criminal case is made out to be the outcome of indifference or inaction, it would result in the order of being vitiated by failure  to exercise power justly and equitably. That case was  decided  in the light of GOMs No. 211 issued by Government of Madras wherein government had  impressed upon the concerned authorities to reduce the period of  suspension  to  the barest minimum. However, time limit in the  executive  instructions  were not applicable to cases in which criminal proceedings  had been  initiated.  The relevant portion of the judgment,  for  our  purpose, being para 10 and 11, the same are quoted hereunder:-\n<\/p>\n
      “It  is  pertinent at this juncture to take note of  the  various circulars issued by the Central Government relating to suspension of  its employees. Evidently, adopting what has been done by  it, G.O.  No.  211, had come to be passed by  State  Government.  The concerned circulars found in the book “Suspension and  Reinstatement”, V Edn. by Muthuswami, disclose that the entire emphasis is laid  on  speedy follow up action in suspension cases,  and  that every endeavour should be made to reduce the period of suspension to  the barest minimum. Neither what the Central  Government  nor the State Government thinks of its employee, the police officials in  charge of this case consider, as enabling characteristics  to safeguard them. If the Government servants are guilty they should be punished at the earliest point of time. If not, they should be restored to duty, awaiting filing of chargesheet, or on the trial being  taken  up, at which point of time they must  certainly  be placed under suspension till the case is over.\n<\/p>\n
20.  In another case entitled D. Sathya Murthy Vs. Union of India  reported (1991)  17  ATC 769, the initial  investigation  into  criminal  charges against the employee was made by Chief Vigilance Officer which took a  year and  a half to conclude the same. It took three more years to register  the crime. After further investigation the employee was arrested and put  under suspension. However, investigations were conducted for well over 18 months. The  long  time taken in completion of the criminal  investigation  coupled with  unlikelihood of evidence being tampered with rendered the  suspension unjustified and Central Administrative Tribunal quashed the same.\n<\/p>\n
21.  In  S.R.  Arya Vs. Union of India reported in (1991) 16 ATC  145  even though there was a delay of over two years and yet there was no headway  in the  trial for no fault of the employee, the suspension was not revoked  on the  ground that the authority bona fide considered that it was not in  the public interest to revoke the suspension. The Central Administrative Tribunal observed:-\n<\/p>\n
     “In  our opinion, the question whether an order of suspension  is legally sustainable or not, would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. Rule 10(1) of the CCS (CCA) Rules  empowers the competent authority to place an officer under suspension when a  case  against him in respect of a criminal  offence  is  under investigation. Whether the presence of the applicant would  hamper the  pending  proceedings in the criminal court,  is  a  question primarily to be decided by the respondents. There is an  element of public interest involved in matters of this kind.”\n<\/p>\n
22.  From  the  various judgments noted above, one can find  different  approaches  adopted  by  the Courts depending upon the facts  of  each  case. However,  after considering all these cases I have tried to deduce  principles  governing this subject and I formulate following guidelines  relating to the cases of prolonged suspension.\n<\/p>\n
     i.   It  is a clear principle of natural justice that the  delinquent officer when placed under suspension is entitled to  represent  that the departmental proceedings should be concluded  with reasonable diligence and within a reasonable period of time.\n<\/p>\n
     ii.  When  the  delinquent officer is kept  under  suspension  in contemplation or pending departmental enquiry and the enquiry  is delayed unduly by the department, the continuation of  suspension becomes  bad  and can be set aside inasmuch as such  a  delay  in enquiry shows that the suspension was not bonafide.\n<\/p>\n
     iii. Each  case will have to be examined and the legality of  the suspension  would depend on the facts and circumstances  of  each case.\n<\/p>\n
     iv.  The  principle mentioned at serial no. i above, relating  to delay in departmental enquiry cannot be ipso facto made  applicable in the cases where suspension is resorted to pending investigation\/trial of criminal offence.\n<\/p>\n
     v.   When  an  officer is suspended pending  investigation  of  a criminal  case against him and the investigation is  taking  long time or after the completion of investigation no proceedings  are initiated  either  in Court or in department and  the  suspension continues, continuation of such a suspension would be illegal.\n<\/p>\n
     vi.  When criminal trial is pending in Court of law and the  same is  taking time to conclude, in such cases also, it would  depend on  the  facts and circumstances of each case as to  whether  the continuation  of suspension should be treated as  unjustified  or not.  Various factors which should be taken  into  consideration, while  examining this question, would include the seriousness  of charges  levelled against the delinquent employee and  where  the charges are such that it would not be in the interest of  department\/institution to allow such an employee to remain in the  seat i.e. where such charges are related to the performance of  duties of the concerned official, or where charges are very serious  and have direct bearing on the performance of duties by the concerned official,  the  suspension cannot be revoked only on  the  ground that the trial is prolonged. What is to be seen is as to  whether the  authority  bonafide  considered that it was  not  in  public interest  to  revoke the suspension. If such a  consideration  is given  by  the competent authority and after due  application  of mind  competent  authority has held the view that it  is  not  in public  interest to revoke the suspension, Court will not  interfere  with  such  order of suspension. On the  other  hand  where allegations  in the charge-sheet filed in criminal Court are  not very serious and the trial is unduly delayed, the continuation of their suspension may not be justified.\n<\/p>\n
23.  What can be inferred from the approach of the Courts in such cases  is that  in those cases where Court found that the charges were  very  serious like  committing  forgery or defalcation of money, etc. and it was  not  in public  interest to allow such an employee to join back the duties when  he was facing such serious charges particularly keeping in view the nature  of duties he was performing having direct bearing on the charges he was facing in criminal Court, even long delay did not convince the Court to quash  the suspension and allow the delinquent officer to go back on duty unless he is exonerated of the charge. To put it differently, once the Court found that, keeping  in  view the nature of charges, it was not in public  interest  to revoke  the  suspension, prolongation of the criminal case did  not become determinative\/influencing  factor  to set aside the suspension  order.  Ofcourse,  interference  with such matters depends on the facts  and  circumstances  of  each case and the division bench of this Court set  aside  the suspension in the case of K.K. Bhardwaj Vs. Delhi Vidyut Board (supra) even when  the allegations of defalcation were levelled against  the  delinquent officers.  However, as against these allegations, the Court was  influenced by  three factors namely (a) delinquent officials were under suspension  for more  than 15 years and 12 years respectively; (b) the attitude of CBI  had been  absolutely callous and it had not assisted the Court inasmuch  as  no witnesses  in  the criminal trial has been examined by that time;  (c)  the allegations were in respect of incident alleged to have taken place in  the year 1982 for which charges were framed by the Special Court in one case in the  year  1989 and in another case on 5th January, 1998. It was  in  these circumstances the Court observed that considering the fact that the  appellants have been under suspension for so many years and no progress has been made  in the criminal cases, the appellants’ cannot be asked to await  till the disposal of the criminal case.\n<\/p>\n
24.  Therefore,  no hard and fast rule can be made and even where the  suspension is pending criminal trial, the Court can interefere with the  order of suspension. But this course would to be resorted to only where the Court is  convinced that such continuation of suspension is doing injury  to  the concerned  officer  and  it is not in public interest either  to  keep  the
\ndelinquent official under suspension.\n<\/p>\n
     After laying down these broad guidelines let me now examine the validity of the continuation of suspension in these writ petitions.\n<\/p>\n
     Civil Writ Petition No. 3598 of 1997<\/p>\n
25.  In  this  case the charges against the petitioner  are  nodoubt,  very serious. The criminal case registered against the petitioner is u\/S. 7  and 13 of Prevention of Corruption Act. As per the FIR, petitioner had  demanded, accepted and obtained Rs. 5000\/- as part payment of illegal  gratification  of Rs.10,000\/- from Shri J. Dalal Sharma, Security  Supervisor,  MCD, I.S. Hospital, Kingsway Camp, New Delhi in consideration of his  adjustment of  D.A. and pension at the time of his retirement and  forwarding  pension file to Additional Commissioner (Health, MCD) for sanction. In the  counter affidavit  filed by the respondent it is stated that the case of the  petitioner  has  been reviewed on many occasions but he was not found  fit  for reinstatement  by the disciplinary authority as it was observed that  while holding a senior post in Municipal Corporation of Delhi, it was the primary duty  of  the  petitioner to eradicate and eliminate  corruption  from  the department but the petitioner acting contrary to the said norms expected of an  official of his rank indulged in the act of corruption himself  by  not maintaining  the standards of integrity and betraying the evidence  of  his senior  officers reposed in him. Therefore, when the petitioner  is  facing such  type of charges in criminal case pending against him it would not  be in public interest to allow such an employee to continue to remain in  duty as  it  would result in giving him further opportunity to indulge  in  such acts  for  which he is being prosecuted. Therefore, in this case I  am  inclined  to  follow the judgments of the Supreme Court in the  case  of  All India Bank and another Vs. D kumar Bhola (supra) wherein the Court  refused to  interfere with the order of suspension even when 10 years  had  elapsed since  the charge-sheet was filed. I am quoting the  relevant  observations from the judgment once again. Speaking for the Court this is what Kirpal, J had to say:-\n<\/p>\n
     It would be indeed inconceivable that a bank should allow an  employee to continue to remain on duty when he is facing serious charges of  corruption and misappropriation of money. Allowing such an employee to remain  in the  seat would result in giving him further opportunity to indulge in  the acts for which he was being prosecuted. Under the circumstances, it was the bounden  duty of the appellant to have taken recourse to the provisions  of clause  19.3  of the First Bipartite Settlement, 1966. The mere  fact  that nearly 10 years have elapsed since the charge-sheet was filed, can also  be no ground for allowing the respondent tos come back to duty on a  sensitive post in the Bank, unless he is exonerated of the charge.\n<\/p>\n
26.  This  writ petition is accordingly dismissed. However, I may add  that the  competent authority should make periodical review of the  petitioners’ suspension. The petitioner was suspended on 2nd December, 1993. As per  the records  produced  by the respondents, which were perused  by  this  Court, petitioner’s case was reviewed on long time ago. The disciplinary authority should  again review the case after taking into consideration the  progress made  in  criminal case pending before the Additional  Sessions  Judge.  It should also take into consideration the no objection certificate issued  by Anti  Corruption  Branch and if the trial is taking unduly  long  time  and there  is no likelihood of the same being completed in near future,  disciplinary  authority  can  consider revoking the suspension  by  posting  the petitioner in a non-sensitive post. This observation is made in view of the petitioner’s  submission\/request that he may be posted in  a  non-sensitive post  if  the suspension is revoked. However, it is  for  the  disciplinary authority to take appropriate view in the matter.\n<\/p>\n
     Civil Writ Petition No. 5551 of 1997<\/p>\n
27.  In  this  case as already stated above, the  allegations  against  the petitioner  are that he alongwith two other officials of BHEL entered  into criminal conspiracy with other unknown persons and floated a Society by the name  of  Mittergan Sahakari Awas Samiti. After floating the  Society  they collected a sum of Rs.47 lakhs from memebrs and deposited in bank  account. From there they withdrew Rs. 16 lakhs each on different dates through  self drawn  cheques and later on merged the Society with another Society. As  it was  found later, no such merger had taken place, no land was purchased  in the  name  of the Society and the amount collected from there  members  had been  swindled by these persons. The charges in this case are also  serious and relate to embezzlement and defalcation of the funds. No doubt the embezzlement is not of employer’s fund in official capacity but by the petitioner  alongwith others in private capacity. However, three persons  including petitioner are employees of BHEL. The persons who were made members of  the so  called  Society from whom funds were collected were also  employees  of BHEL  iteself. Therefore in view of such serious charges against the  petitioner in the criminal case pending against him and the fact that petitioner misused his position of being an employee of BHEL, it is also not a  fit case  where  this  Court should exercise discretion  in  its  extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The discussion made above in respect of Civil Writ Petition 3598 of 1997 would be applica-\n<\/p>\n
ble in this case also. With same directions to the respondent as  contained above, namely it should undertake periodical review of petitioner’s suspension, this writ petition is also dismissed.\n<\/p>\n
28.     There shall be no order as to costs.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Delhi High Court Surjit Singh Chowdhry Ex-Major vs Municipal Corporation Delhi on 26 May, 2000 Equivalent citations: 2000 (54) DRJ 749 Author: A Sikri Bench: A Sikri ORDER A.K. Sikri, J. 1. The question of law which arises in these two petitions is common. Dispute is not about the validity of the suspension order when […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[14,8],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-58927","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-delhi-high-court","category-high-court"],"yoast_head":"\nSurjit Singh Chowdhry Ex-Major vs Municipal Corporation Delhi on 26 May, 2000 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/surjit-singh-chowdhry-ex-major-vs-municipal-corporation-delhi-on-26-may-2000\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Surjit Singh Chowdhry Ex-Major vs Municipal Corporation Delhi on 26 May, 2000 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/surjit-singh-chowdhry-ex-major-vs-municipal-corporation-delhi-on-26-may-2000\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2000-05-25T18:30:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2018-08-17T17:01:52+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@legaliadmin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@Legal_india\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"37 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/surjit-singh-chowdhry-ex-major-vs-municipal-corporation-delhi-on-26-may-2000#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/surjit-singh-chowdhry-ex-major-vs-municipal-corporation-delhi-on-26-may-2000\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\"},\"headline\":\"Surjit Singh Chowdhry Ex-Major vs Municipal Corporation Delhi on 26 May, 2000\",\"datePublished\":\"2000-05-25T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2018-08-17T17:01:52+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/surjit-singh-chowdhry-ex-major-vs-municipal-corporation-delhi-on-26-may-2000\"},\"wordCount\":7448,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"articleSection\":[\"Delhi High Court\",\"High Court\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/surjit-singh-chowdhry-ex-major-vs-municipal-corporation-delhi-on-26-may-2000#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/surjit-singh-chowdhry-ex-major-vs-municipal-corporation-delhi-on-26-may-2000\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/surjit-singh-chowdhry-ex-major-vs-municipal-corporation-delhi-on-26-may-2000\",\"name\":\"Surjit Singh Chowdhry Ex-Major vs Municipal Corporation Delhi on 26 May, 2000 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"2000-05-25T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2018-08-17T17:01:52+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/surjit-singh-chowdhry-ex-major-vs-municipal-corporation-delhi-on-26-may-2000#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/surjit-singh-chowdhry-ex-major-vs-municipal-corporation-delhi-on-26-may-2000\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/surjit-singh-chowdhry-ex-major-vs-municipal-corporation-delhi-on-26-may-2000#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Surjit Singh Chowdhry Ex-Major vs Municipal Corporation Delhi on 26 May, 2000\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"name\":\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"description\":\"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"alternateName\":\"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"alternateName\":\"Legal India\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"width\":512,\"height\":512,\"caption\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.facebook.com\\\/LegalindiaCom\\\/\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/Legal_india\"]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\",\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Legal India Admin\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/legaliadmin\"],\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/author\\\/legal-india-admin\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Surjit Singh Chowdhry Ex-Major vs Municipal Corporation Delhi on 26 May, 2000 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/surjit-singh-chowdhry-ex-major-vs-municipal-corporation-delhi-on-26-may-2000","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Surjit Singh Chowdhry Ex-Major vs Municipal Corporation Delhi on 26 May, 2000 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","og_url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/surjit-singh-chowdhry-ex-major-vs-municipal-corporation-delhi-on-26-may-2000","og_site_name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","article_published_time":"2000-05-25T18:30:00+00:00","article_modified_time":"2018-08-17T17:01:52+00:00","og_image":[{"width":512,"height":512,"url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Legal India Admin","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@legaliadmin","twitter_site":"@Legal_india","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Legal India Admin","Est. reading time":"37 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/surjit-singh-chowdhry-ex-major-vs-municipal-corporation-delhi-on-26-may-2000#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/surjit-singh-chowdhry-ex-major-vs-municipal-corporation-delhi-on-26-may-2000"},"author":{"name":"Legal India Admin","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea"},"headline":"Surjit Singh Chowdhry Ex-Major vs Municipal Corporation Delhi on 26 May, 2000","datePublished":"2000-05-25T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2018-08-17T17:01:52+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/surjit-singh-chowdhry-ex-major-vs-municipal-corporation-delhi-on-26-may-2000"},"wordCount":7448,"commentCount":0,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"articleSection":["Delhi High Court","High Court"],"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/surjit-singh-chowdhry-ex-major-vs-municipal-corporation-delhi-on-26-may-2000#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/surjit-singh-chowdhry-ex-major-vs-municipal-corporation-delhi-on-26-may-2000","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/surjit-singh-chowdhry-ex-major-vs-municipal-corporation-delhi-on-26-may-2000","name":"Surjit Singh Chowdhry Ex-Major vs Municipal Corporation Delhi on 26 May, 2000 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website"},"datePublished":"2000-05-25T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2018-08-17T17:01:52+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/surjit-singh-chowdhry-ex-major-vs-municipal-corporation-delhi-on-26-may-2000#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/surjit-singh-chowdhry-ex-major-vs-municipal-corporation-delhi-on-26-may-2000"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/surjit-singh-chowdhry-ex-major-vs-municipal-corporation-delhi-on-26-may-2000#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Surjit Singh Chowdhry Ex-Major vs Municipal Corporation Delhi on 26 May, 2000"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","description":"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"alternateName":"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization","name":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","alternateName":"Legal India","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","width":512,"height":512,"caption":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","https:\/\/x.com\/Legal_india"]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea","name":"Legal India Admin","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Legal India Admin"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com","https:\/\/x.com\/legaliadmin"],"url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/author\/legal-india-admin"}]}},"modified_by":null,"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/58927","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=58927"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/58927\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=58927"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=58927"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=58927"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}