{"id":59281,"date":"1992-11-03T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1992-11-02T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/krishna-bhimrao-deshpande-vs-land-tribunal-dharwad-and-ors-on-3-november-1992"},"modified":"2017-11-20T03:33:30","modified_gmt":"2017-11-19T22:03:30","slug":"krishna-bhimrao-deshpande-vs-land-tribunal-dharwad-and-ors-on-3-november-1992","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/krishna-bhimrao-deshpande-vs-land-tribunal-dharwad-and-ors-on-3-november-1992","title":{"rendered":"Krishna Bhimrao Deshpande vs Land Tribunal, Dharwad And Ors on 3 November, 1992"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Krishna Bhimrao Deshpande vs Land Tribunal, Dharwad And Ors on 3 November, 1992<\/div>\n
Bench: [Lalit Mohan Reddy, Jj.]<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nKRISHNA BHIMRAO DESHPANDE\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nLAND TRIBUNAL, DHARWAD AND ORS.\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT03\/11\/1992\n\nBENCH:\n[LALIT MOHAN SHARMA AND K. JAYACHANDRA REDDY, JJ.]\n\n\n\n\nACT:\n     Constitution of India, 1950:\n     Article 252  read with  Schedule VII,  List n Entry 18-\nLegislation by Parliament Requirement-Central Law on ceiling\non urban  immovable   property in pursuance of Resolution of\nState Legislature  State Laws  on other\t matters relating to\nthe subject-matter of resolution-Legality of.\n     Constitution of India, 1950:\n     Article 252, Schedule VII, list II, Entry 18-Urban Land\n(Ceiling and   Regulation)  Act,  1976\tand  Karnataka\tLand\nReforms Act  as amended\t in 1974  Object and application of-\nWhether any conflict between the Acts.\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\nIn the\tyear 1972  the Karnataka  Legislature passed  a\nresolution under  Article 252 of the Constitution imposing a\nceiling on  urban immovable  property and the acquisition of\nsuch property  in excess  of the ceiling is limit for public\npurposes and  all the  matters connected  therewith shall be\nregulated in the State by Parliament by law.\nOn 1.4.74  the Karnataka  Land Reforms\t(Amendment) Act\nwas enacted and under the Act the tenant of the land covered\nby the\tAct was\t entitled to  the grant\t of occupancy rights\nafter making  an application   under  the Act.\tThe Act came\nInto force  with effect\t from 2.1.85. But for the purpose of\ngrant of occupancy rights, 1.4.74 was the relevant date.\nIn the\tyear 1975  the\tKarnataka  Urban  Agglomeration\nOrdinance was  passed,\twhereunder  all\t lands\tbetween\t the\nperiphery of  8 K.Ms.  of the\tmunicipal  limits  of  Hubli\nDharwad were declared as urban agglomeration land.\nThe Parliament\tpassed\tthe  Urban  Land  (Ceiling  and\nRegulation) Act,  1976 for  imposition of  ceiling on  urban\nproperties and\tthe  Ceiling  Act  was\tmade  applicable  to\nKarnataka also in view of the resolution passed by the State\nGovernment.\nThe lands involved in the present cases were covered by\nthe development\t plan by  the  Belgaum\tCity  Town  Planning\nauthority as  per the Master Plan and they were included and\ndeclared as  urban agglomeration  in the City of Hubli under\nthe provisions of the Ceiling Act.\nThe owners  of the  agglomeration lands\t challenged the\norder of  the Land  Tribunal  under  the  Land\tReforms\t Act\nconferring occupancy  rights on\t the tenants before the High\nCourt. They  contended that  the lands involved in the cases\nwere within  the purview  of the  Ceiling Act and  therefore\nthe provisions of the Land Reforms Act had no application to\nsuch lands  on the ground that the provisions of the Ceiling\nAct.\nThe writ  petitions were  dismissed by\tthe High Court.\nThe owner's  writ appeals  were also  dismissed by  a common\njudgment by  the Division  Bench  of  the  High\t Court.\t The\nDivision Bench\theld that  there was no conflict between the\ntwo enactments.\nThe judgment  of the  Division Bench  was challenged in\nS.L.P. (Civil) No. 16041-42\/88.\nMany of\t the similar  writ petitions  that were pending\nbefore the  High Court\twere transferred to the Land Reforms\nAppellate Tribunal.\nThe Appellate  Tribunal dismissed  the petitions  by  a\ncommon order following the judgment of the Division Bench of\nthe High  Court. Several  Civil revision  petitions filed by\nthe land  owners against the order of the Appellate Tribunal\nwere dismissed\tby the High Court. Some of the special leave\npetitions were\tfiled against the order of the High Court in\nthe said civil revision petitions.\nThe petitioners-land  owners  contended\t that  when  in\npursuance of  the resolution of the State Legislature passed\nunder  Article\t 252  of  the  Constitution  the  Parliament\nlegislated  in\t respect  of   the  topic   covered  by\t the\nresolution. The Parliamentary law repealed or superseded the\nexisting State\tlegislation on\tthe topic and therefore such\nlaw could  not be  enforced thereafter;\t and that vesting of\ntenanted land  in the  State  and  conferment  of  occupancy\nrights under  the provisions  of the State Act directly fall\nunder the  subject of  imposing ceiling\t on land holding and\nother matters  incidental or  ancillary to the main topic of\nimposing ceiling  and therefore\t they were  fully covered by\nthe Ceiling  Act passed\t by the\t Parliament and\t   the\tsame\nsuperseded the State enactment in respect of such lands.\nThe respondents\t submitted that \"imposition of ceiling\"\nwas a  distinct and  separately identifiable subject and the\nParliament was empowered to legislate; that the power of the\nState to  legislate in\trespect of the remaining part of the\nsubject-matter was  unaffected;\t that  when  two    distinct\npowers came into existence, vesting law making competence in\nthe State and Parliament, the pith and substance of the laws\nmade by\t each of  them had to be examined to see whether any\none of them encroached the field set apart as falling within\nthe competence\tof the\tother body;  that in  any event\t the\nprovisions of Chapter III of the Karnataka Land Reforms\t Act\nhad nothing  to do  with the  imposition of  ceiling on\t the\nurban land  and that  conferring of occupancy rights etc. to\nthe tenants  under Chapter III of the Karnataka Land Reforms\nAct  did  not  come  under  the\t category  of  \"the  matters\nconnected  therewith  or  ancillary  or\t incidental  to\t the\nimposition of ceiling\" on urban immovable property.\nDismissing the special leave petitions, this Court,\nHELD: 1.01.  Article 252  empowers  the\t Parliament  to\nlegislate for  two or more States on any of the matters with\nrespect of  which the  Parliament has  no power\t to make law\nexcept as provided under Articles 249 and 250. This power to\nlegislate is  vested in\t the Parliament only if two  or more\nState  Legislatures think it desirable to have a law enacted\nby  Parliament on such matters in List II, i.e. with respect\nto which  the Parliament  has no  power to  make law for the\nState.\tThe   passing  of   the\t resolutions  by  the  State\nLegislatures  is  a  condition\tprecedent  for\tvesting\t the\nParliament with such power. [339-C-D]\n1.02. The  scope of  Entry 18 is very wide and the land\nmentioned therein  may be  agricultural or  non-agricultural\nand may\t be rural or urban. The subject-matter carved out of\nEntry 18  under the  resolutions passed by The various State\nLegislatures related  to only \"urban immovable property\" and\nby virtue  of the  resolution the law that can be enacted by\nthe Parliament\tshould be  a law \"imposing a ceiling on such\nurban immovable property.\" [340-B, C]\n1.03. From the resolution it is clear that the subject-\nmatter that  was resolved  to be entrusted to the Parliament\nwas the\t one imposing  a ceiling on urban immovable property\nand acquisition\t of such  property in excess of the ceiling.\nThis subject-matter  is the topic that falls within Entry 18\nof List\t II of\tSchedule VII  to the  Constitution  and\t the\nsubject-matter of  Entry 18  has been  originally kept apart\nfor the\t State Legislature to make law and Parliament had no\ncompetence in  respect of  those matters  falling under\t the\nwide scope  of Entry 18. By virtue of this resolution a part\nof the\tarea falling  under Entry  18 is  transferred to the\ndomain of  Parliament to  make law  relating to\t the matters\nwithin the transferred area. [339-G, H; 341-A]\n2.01. The  primary object  and the purpose of the Urban\nLand (Ceiling  and Regulation)\tAct, 1976  is to provide for\nthe  imposition\t  of  ceiling\ton  vacant   land  in  urban\nagglomeration and  for acquisition  of such lands in  excess\nof the\tceiling limit  and to  regulate the  construction of\nbuildings on such lands and for matters connected therewith.\n[340-H; 341-A]\n2.02. The Karnataka Land Reforms Act as amended in 1974\nis a  welfare legislation. The object of the Act was to have\na uniform  law in  the\t  State\t of  Karnataka\trelating  to\nagrarian  reforms,   conferment\t of  ownership\ton  tenants,\nceiling on  land holdings  and\tfor  certain  other  matters\ncontained therein. [342-D]\n2.03. In  respect of imposing ceiling on the land under\nurban agglomeration  the provisions of the Ceiling Act alone\nare applicable\tand to that extent the provisions of Chapter\nIV of  the Karnataka  Land Reforms  Act which also deal with\nthe imposition of ceiling would not be applicable.\n[344-C]\n2.04. The  land in  the instant\t case comes  under  the\nurban agglomeration  the imposition  of the  ceiling  should\nnaturally be  under the\t provisions of the Urban Ceiling Act\nand not under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act. [344-B, C]\n2.05. Imposition of ceiling on urban land is a distinct\nand independent subject as compared to imposition of ceiling\non owning  or to hold agricultural land or any other kind of\nproperty which\tdo not\tattract the Urban Ceiling Act. These\nare  two  distinct  powers  and\t therefore  the\t law  making\ncompetence can\tbe  in\ttwo  different\tlegislative  bodies.\nConsequently it\t is difficult to hold that the provisions of\nChapter III  of the  Karnataka Land  Reforms Act are outside\nthe legislative competence of the State\t Legislature.\n[350-C, D]\n2.06.  The   one  topic\t that  is  transferred\tin  the\nresolution  passed    under  Article  252  as  distinct\t and\nseparately identifiable\t and does  not include the remaining\ntopics under  Entry 18\tin respect  of which the State alone\nhas the power to legislate. [351-D]\n2.07. The  legislative power  of the  State has\t to  be\nreconciled with\t that of  the Parliament  and that  in their\nrespective fields  each is  supreme. Even  assuming that the\nState  enactment  has  same  effect  on\t the  subject-matter\nfalling within\tthe Parliament's legislative competence that\nby itself  will not  render such law invalid or inoperative.\n[350-G-H]\n2.08. There  is no conflict between the Ceiling Act and\nthe State  Act. The imposition of ceiling on urban immovable\nproperty is an independent topic  and cannot be construed as\nto nullify the other subject left in the domain of the State\nLegislature under Entry 18 inasmuch as imposition of ceiling\nis a  distinct and  separately identifiable subject and does\nnot  cover   the  other\t  measures  such  as  regulation  of\nrelationship of\t landlord and tenant in respect of which the\nState Legislature has competence to legislate. [351-C-D]\n2.09. There  is a ceiling provision under Section 45(2)\nof the\tKarnataka Land Reforms Act providing for computation\nof the\tarea in\t respect of  which the tenant may be granted\noccupancy rights. But it is clear that ceiling on the\narea in\t this context is only for the purpose of Section 45.\n[351-F]\n2.10. Provisions  in the  Chapters II, III, V, VI to XI\nof the\tKarnataka Land\tReforms Act deal with the conferment\nof occupancy  rights on\t the respective\t tenants and they do\nnot in\tany way conflict with the subject matter transferred\nto the\tParliament by  the resolution  passed under  Section\n252. [351-E,F]\nThumati Venkaiah  and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh\nand of\tothers<\/a>, [1980]\t4 SCC 295; Union of India and others\nv. Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary and others<\/a>, [1979] 3 SCC 324;\nCalcutta Gas  Company (Proprietory)  Ltd. v.  State of\tWest\nBengal and  others<\/a>, AIR\t 1962 SC 1044 and Kannan Devan Hills\nProduce Company Ltd. v. The State of Kerala<\/a> etc., AIR\n1972 SC 2301 referred to.\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
     CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Special  Leave  Petition
\n(Civil) Nos. 16041-42\/88.\n<\/p>\n
     From the  Judgment and  Order dated  27.7.1988  of\t the
\nKarnataka   High Court\tin  W.P.  No  9173\/86  and  W.A.  No
\n2707\/85.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t    WITH
\n     SLP (C) Nos. 12258, 12254, 12260\/90 & 8608\/91
\n     R.N. Narasimhamurthy,  S.S. Javali,  S.N. Bhat and Ravi
\nP. Wadhwani for the Petitioners.\n<\/p>\n
     M.S.  Nesargi,   R.  Jagannath  Goulay,  M.K.  Dua,  M.
\nVeerappa, K.H. Nobin Singh, S.K. Kulkarni and Surya Kant for
\nthe Respondents.\n<\/p>\n
     The following Order of the Court was delivered by
\n     K. JAYACHANDRA  REDDY, J.\tIn all\tthese special  leave
\npetitions the  common question that arises for consideration
\nis whether the provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act,
\n1961 as\t amended in  1974 (`Act’  for  short)  cease  to  be
\napplicable in all respects to the lands which came within
\nthe purview  of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act,
\n1976 (‘Ceiling\tAct’ for short). The lands involved in these
\nmatters are  covered by\t the development plan by the Belgaum
\nCity Town  Planning authority as per the Master Plan for the
\nsaid City  and they  are  included  and\t declared  as  urban
\nagglomeration in  the City  of Hubli under the provisions of
\nthe Ceiling  Act. In the year 1972 the Karnataka Legislature
\npassed a resolution under Article 252 of the Constitution to
\nthe effect  that  imposing  a  ceiling\ton  urban  immovable
\nproperty and  the acquisition of such property in excess  of
\nthe ceiling  limit for\tpublic purposes\t and all the matters
\nconnected therewith  shall be  regulated  in  the  State  by
\nParliament Qby\tlaw. The  State\t Legislature  thus  divested
\nitself of the legislative competence to enact law in respect
\nof subject-matter of the resolution. On 1.4.74 the amended
\nKarnataka Land\tReforms Act  was enacted  and under the said
\nAct the tenant of the land covered by the Act is entitled to
\nthe grant  of occupancy\t rights after  making an application
\nunder the  Act. This  Act came\tinto force  with effect from
\n2.1.85. But  for the  purpose of  grant of  occupancy rights
\n1.4.74 was  the relevant date. While so in the year 1975 the
\nGovernor  of   Karnataka  passed   the\tUrban  Aggolmeration
\nOrdinance whereunder  all lands\t between the  periphery of 8
\nK.Ms. of the municipal limits of Hubli Dharwad were declared
\nas urban agglomeration land. In the year 1976 the Parliament
\npassed the  Ceiling Act\t for imposition\t of ceiling on urban
\nproperties and the Act was made applicable to Karnataka also
\nin view\t of the\t resolution passed  by the  State Government
\nreferred to  above. The order of the Land Tribunal under the
\nAct  conferring\t  occupancy  rights   on  the\ttenants\t was
\nchallenged before  the High  Court contending that the lands
\ninvolved in  these cases  were within  the  purview  of\t the
\nCeiling Act and therefore the provisions of the Land Reforms
\nAct had\t no application to such lands on the ground that the
\nprovisions of the State Act were repugnant to the provisions
\nof the Central Act namely the Ceiling Act. The writ petition
\nwas dismissed  by the  High Court. The owners preferred writ
\nappeals and they were also dismissed by a common judgment in
\nWrit Appeal  Nos. 2707\tand 2361\/85  etc. The Division Bench
\nheld that  there is no conflict between the two enactment in
\ncertain respect i.e. atleast so far as the implementation of
\nthe provisions\tof Chapter  III of the Act are concerned and
\nthat provisions\t of this  Chapter of the Act do not cease to
\napply to the agricultural lands coming within the meaning of
\nurban agglomeration  in the Ceiling Act. The judgment of the
\nDivision Bench\tis challenged  in S.L.P.(Civil)\t No.  16041-
\n42\/88. Many  of the similar writ petitions that were pending
\nbefore the  High Court\twere transferred to the Land Reforms
\nAppellate Tribunal.  The Appellate  Tribunal  dismissed\t the
\npetitions by  a common\torder following\t the judgment of the
\nDivision Bench\tof the\tHigh Court in Writ Appeal No.2707\/85
\nand connected  matters. Several\t civil\trevisions  petitions
\nfiled by  the land owners against the order of the Appellate
\nTribunal were  dismissed by  the High  Court.  Some  of\t the
\nspecial leave  petitions are  filed against the order of the
\nHigh Court  in the  said civil revision petitions. Therefore
\nall these  special leave  petitions can\t be disposed of by a
\ncommon order.\n<\/p>\n
     It was urged before us that the resolution of the State
\nLegislature passed  under Article  252 of  the\tConstitution
\nshifted the  topic covered by the resolution from List II of
\nSchedule VII  to the  Constitution and vested the competence
\nto make\t the law  in  respect  of  the\tsaid  topic  in\t the
\nParliament and that thereafter the State enactment ceased to
\nhave efficacy in respect of said topic. Alternatively it was
\nurged  that,   when  in\t pursuance  of\tthe  resolution\t the
\nParliament legislates in respect of the topic covered by the
\nresolution, the Parliamentary law, repeals or supersedes any
\nexisting State\tlegislation on\tthe topic and therefore such
\nlaw cannot be enforced\tthereafter.\n<\/p>\n
     We shall  first extract some of the relevant provisions
\nof the\tConstitution of India and the respective enactments.
\nArticle 246 of the Constitution\t reads thus:\n<\/p>\n
     “246. Subject-matter  of laws  made
\n     by\t  Parliament   and   by\t     the
\n     Legislatures     of      States-(l)
\n     Notwithstanding\t anything     in
\n     clauses (2) and (3), Parliament has
\n     exclusive power  to make  laws with
\n     respect  to   any\tof  the\t matters
\n     enumerated\t in   List    I\t in  the
\n     Seventh\tSchedule     (in    this
\n     Constitution referred  to\t as  the
\n     “Union List”).\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (2) xx    xx\t\t   xx
\n     (3) Subject to clauses (1) and (2),
\n     the Legislature  of any   State has
\n     exclusive power  to make  laws  for
\n     such State\t or   any  part\t thereof
\n     with respect  to any of the matters
\n     enumerated\t in   List  II\t in  the
\n     Seventh\tSchedule     (in    this
\n     Constitution  referred  to\t as  the
\n     “State List”).\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (4)xx\t     xx\t\txx “<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
2<\/span><\/p>\n
     Entry 18  in List\tII namely  the State List of the VII
\nSchedule to the Constitution is in the following terms:\n<\/p>\n
     “18. Land,\t that is  to say, rights
\n     in\t or   over  land,  land\t tenures
\n     including the  relation of landlord
\n     and tenant,  and the  collection of
\n     rents, transfer  and alienation  of
\n     agricultural land; land improvement
\n     and       agricultural\t  loans;
\n     colonization.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Article 252  of the  Constitution  reads
\nthus:\n<\/p>\n
     “252.  Power   of\t Parliament   to
\n     legislate for  two or  more  States
\n     by consent\t and  adoption\tof  such
\n     legislation by any\t other State-(1)
\n     If it  appears to\tthe Legislatures
\n     of\t two  or    more  States  to  be
\n     desirable that  any of  the matters
\n     with   respect to\twhich Parliament
\n     has no  power to make laws for  the
\n     States  except   as   provided   in
\n     Articles  249  and\t 250  should  be
\n     regulated\t in   such   States   by
\n     Parliament\t  by\tlaw,   and    if
\n     resolutions  to   that  effect  are
\n     passed by\tall the\t Houses\t of  the
\n     Legislatures of  those  States,  it
\n     shall be  lawful for  Parliament to
\n     pass an  Act  for\tregulating  that
\n     matter accordingly,  and any Act so
\n     passed shall  apply to  such States
\n     and to  any other State by which it
\n     is adopted afterwards by resolution
\n     passed in\tthat behalf by the House
\n     or, where\tthere are two Houses, by
\n     each   of\t the   Houses\tof   the
\n     Legislature of that State.
\n     (2) Any Act so passed by Parliament
\n     may be  amended or\t  repealed by an
\n     Act of Parliament passed or adopted
\n     in like   manner  but shall not, as
\n     respects  any  State  to  which  it
\n     applics, be  amended or repcaled by
\n     an Act  of the  Legislature of that
\n     State.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     Article 252  empowers the\tParliament to  legislate for
\ntwo or\tmore States  on any  of the  matters with respect of
\nwhich the  Parliament has  no power  to make  law except  as
\nprovided under Articles 249 and 250. This power to legislate
\nis vested  in the  Parliament only  if\ttwo  or\t more  State
\nLegislatures think  it desirable  to have  a law  enacted by
\nParliament on  such matters  in List II i.e. with respect to
\nwhich the Parliament has no power to make law for the State.
\nThe passing  of the resolutions by the State Legislatures is
\na condition  precedent for  vesting the Parliament with such
\npower. The  relevant portion of the resolution passed by the
\nState Legislature under Article 252 reads thus:\n<\/p>\n
     “Now, therefore,  in  pursuance  of
\n     clause (1)\t of Article  252  of the
\n     Constitution, this\t Assembly hereby
\n     resolves that  the\t imposition of a
\n     ceiling on urban immovable property
\n     and F  acquisition of such property
\n     in excess\tof the\tceiling and  all
\n     matters  connected\t  therewith   or
\n     ancillary and  incidental\t thereto
\n     should be regulated in the State of
\n     Karnataka by  Parliament by law.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     The resolution states that the imposition of ceiling on
\nurban immovable\t   property  and  the  acquisition  of\tsuch
\nproperty in  excess of\tthe ceiling  limit with\t a  view  to
\nutilising such excess property for public purposes and all
\nother matters  connected therein or incidental thereto shall
\nbe regulated  in this  State by Parliament by law. The basic
\nquestion that  arises is  what is  the actual content of the
\nsubject-matter\tthat   was  resolved   to  be  entrusted  to
\nParliament by the State Legislature under Article 252 of the
\nConstitution. From  the resolution  it\tis  clear  that\t the
\nsubject-matter that  was resolved  to be  entrusted  to\t the
\nParliament was the one imposing a ceiling on urban immovable
\nproperty and  acquisition of  such property in excess of the
\nceiling. It  is true  that this\t subject-matter is the topic
\nthat falls within Entry 18 of List 11 of Schedule VII to the
\nConstitution and  the said  subject-matter of  Entry 18\t has
\nbeen originally kept apart for the State Legislature to make
\nlaw and\t Parliament had\t no competence\tin respect  of those
\nmatters falling\t under the  wide scope\tof Entry  18. Now by
\nvirtue of  this resolution  a part of the area falling under
\nEntry 18  is transferred to the domain of Parliament to make
\nlaw relating to the matters within the transferred area. The
\nscope of  Entry 18  is very  wide  and\tthe  land  mentioned
\ntherein may  be agricultural  or non-agricultural and may be
\nrural or  urban. The  subject-matter carved  out of Entry 18
\nunder  the   resolutions  passed   by  the   various   State
\nLegislatures related to only- “urban immovable property” and
\nby virtue  of the  resolution the law that can be enacted by
\nthe Parliament\tshould be  a law “imposing a ceiling on such
\nurban\timmovable property.  The  learned  counsel  for\t the
\npetitioners, however, urged that vesting of tenanted land in
\nthe State  and conferment  of  occupancy  rights  under\t the
\nprovisions of  the State Act directly fall under the subject
\nof  imposing  ceiling  on  and\tholding\t and  other  matters
\nincidental or  ancillary  to  the  main\t topic\tof  imposing
\nceiling and  therefore they are fully covered by the Ceiling
\nAct passed  by the  Parliament and  the same  supersedes the
\nState enactment in respect of this land. The learned counsel
\nappearing for the respondents on the contrary submitted that
\n“imposition  of\t  ceiling”  is\ta  distinct  and  separately
\nidentifiable subject and is the power carved out of Entry 18
\nand vested in the Parliament to legislate and that the power
\nof the\tState to  legislate in respect of the remaining part
\nof the\tsubject-matter\t is unaffected\tand  that  when\t two
\ndistinct powers have come into existence, vesting law making
\ncompetence  in\tthe  State  and\t Parliament,  the  pith\t and
\nsubstance of  the laws\tmade by\t each  of  them\t has  to  be
\nexamined to see whether any one of them encroaches the field
\nset apart  as falling  within the  competence of  the  other
\nbody. The  learned counsel  for\t the  respondents,  however,
\nsubmitted that in any event the provisions of Chapter III of
\nthe Act have nothing to do with the imposition of ceiling on
\nthe urban  land and that conferring of occupancy rights etc.
\nto the\ttenants under  Chapter 111  of the  Act do  not come
\nunder the  category of\t“the matters  connected therewith or
\nancillary or  incidental to  the imposition  of ceiling”  on
\nurban immovable property.\n<\/p>\n
     Now we  shall refer  to the  provisions  of  the  Urban
\nCeiling Act.  The Statement  of Objects\t and  Reasons  under
\nPreamble to  the said Act would show that the primary object
\nand the\t purpose is to provide for the imposition of ceiling
\non vacant land in urban agglomeration and for acquisition of
\nsuch lands  in excess  of the  ceiling limit and to regulate
\nthe
\n     Marwaha and  others. [1974]  1  SCR
\n     165; Miss Neelima\tShangla v. State
\n     of Haryana and others<\/a>, [1986] 4 SCC
\n     268, or  Jitendra Kumar  and others
\n     v.\t State\tof  Punjab  and\t others:\n<\/p>\n
     [1985] 1 SCR 899.”\n<\/p>\n
     If we  have regard\t to the\t above\tenunciation  that  a
\ncandidate who  finds  a\t place\tin  the\t select\t list  as  a
\ncandidate selected for appointment to a civil post, does not
\nacquire an  indefeasible  right\t to  be\t appointed  in\tsuch
\nposting the  absence of\t any specific Rule entitling him for
\nsuch appointment  and he  could be  aggrieved  by  his\tnon-
\nappointment only  when the  Administration  does  so  either
\narbitrarily or\tfor no\tbona fide  reasons, it\tfollows as a
\nnecessary concomitant  that such  candidate even  if  has  a
\nlegitimate expectation\tof being appointed in such posts due
\nto  his\t  name\tfinding\t a  place  in  the  select  list  of
\ncandidates, cannot  claim to have a right to be heard before
\nsuch select  list is  cancelled\t for  bona  fide  and  valid
\nreasons and not
\narbitrarily:  In  the  instant\tcase,  when  the  Chandigarh
\nAdministration\twhich  received\t the  complaints  about\t the
\nunfair and  injudicious\t manner\t in  which  select  list  of
\ncandidates for appointment as conductors in CTU was prepared
\nby the\tSelection Board\t constituted for  the purpose, found
\nthose complaints  to be\t well founded on an enquiry got made
\nin that\t regard, we  are unable\t to find that the Chandigarh
\nAdministration had  acted either arbitrarily or without bona
\nfide and  valid reasons\t in cancelling\tsuch 0dubious select
\nlist. Hence,  the contentions of the learned counsel for the
\nRespondents as\tto the sustainability of the Judgment of CAT
\nunder  appeal\ton  the\t  ground  of   non-affording  of  an
\nopportunity of hearing to the Respondents (candidates in the
\nselect list)  is a  misconceived  one  and  is\tconsequently
\nrejected.\n<\/p>\n
     In the  result, we\t allow this  appeal, set  aside\t the
\nJudgment under\t appeal, and reject the applications made by
\nRespondents before  CAT, Chandigarh.  However, in  the facts
\nand circumstances  of this  appeal, we\tmake no\t order as to
\ncosts.\n<\/p>\n
 G.N.\t\t\t\t      Appeal allowed.\n<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
FOOD CORPORATION OF INDIA
\nV.\n<\/p>\n
KAMDHENU CATTLE FEED INDUSTRIES
\nNOVEMBER<\/p>\n
<\/a> 3, 1992
\n[J.S. VERMA, YOGESHWAR DAYAL AND
\n N. VENKATACHALA, JJ.]
\nConstitution of India, 1950:<\/p>\n
Article\t 14-Contractual\t  transactions\tof   State  or\t its
\ninstrumentality-Essential      requisites-Non-arbitrariness,
\nfairness in  action  and  due  consideration  of  legitimate
\nexpectation-Ignoring  the   highest  bid-  Negotiations\t for
\nhigher offer and acceptance thereof-Validity of.
\n Administrative Law:\n<\/p>\n
Doctrine  of   legitimate  expectation-Forms   part  of\t non
\narbitrariness and  Rule of  Law- To  be\t determined  in\t the
\nlarger public interest Open to judicial review.\n<\/p>\n
     The appellant-Corporation\tinvited tenders\t for sale of
\nstocks of  damaged food-grains. The respondent’s bid was the
\nhighest. Since\tthe appellant  was not\tsatisfied about\t the
\nadequacy of  the amount\t offered even in the highest tender,
\nit  invited   all  the\t tenders  to   participate  in\t the
\nnegotiations,  instead\tof  accepting  the  highest  tender.
\nDuring the course of negotiations, the respondent refused to
\nrevise the  rates in  its offer. On the basis of the highest
\nbid made  during the negotiations, the appellant disposed of
\nthe stocks of damaged foodgrains, rejecting the highest
\ntenders. The  respondent,  whose  tender  was  the  highest,
\nchallenged the\tdecision of  the appellants by filing a Writ
\nPetition before\t the High  Court. It  was contended that the
\naction of the appellant was arbitrary and hence violative of
\nArt. 14\t of the\t Constitution. The  High Court\taccepted the
\ncontention and allowed the Writ Petition. Being aggrieved by
\nthe  High   Court’s   decision\t the   appellant-Corporation
\npreferred the present appeal.\n<\/p>\n
     It was  contended on behalf of the appellant that there
\nbeing no  right in  the person submitting the highest tender
\nto claim  acceptance thereof,  and since  all tenderers were
\ngiven equal  opportunity to  participate in the negotiations
\nand to\trevise the  bid before acceptance, the action of the
\nappellant was not arbitrary.\n<\/p>\n
     The Respondent  contended that  since no cogent reasons
\nwere  indicated\t for  rejecting\t all  the  tenders  and\t for
\ndeciding to  dispose of\t the stock  by negotiating  with the
\ntenderers for  procuring a higher price, such a decision was
\narbitrary.\n<\/p>\n
     Allowing the appeal, this Court,
\n     HELD: 1.1.\t In contractual sphere as in all other State
\nactions, the  State and\t all its  instrumentalities have  to
\nconform to  Article 14\tof the\tConstitution of\t which\tnon-
\narbitrariness is a significant facet. There is no unfettered
\ndiscretion in  public  law.  A\tpublic\tauthority  possesses
\npowers\t only to  use them for public good. This imposes the
\nduty to\t act fairly  and  to  adopt  a\tprocedure  which  is
\n`fairplay in action’. Due observance of this obligation as a
\npart  of   good\t administration\t  raises  a   reasonable  or
\nlegitimate expectation in every citizen to be treated fairly
\nin his interaction with the State and its instrumentalities,
\nwith this  element forming  a\tnecessary component  of\t the
\ndecision making\t process in  all State\tactions. To  satisfy
\nthis requirement  of non-arbitrariness in a State action, it
\nis  necessary  to  consider  and  give\tdue  weight  to\t the
\nreasonable-or legitimate  expectations of the persons likely
\nto be  affected by  the decision  or else that unfairness in
\nthe exercise  of the  power may amount to an abuse or excess
\nof power apart from affecting the bona fides of the decision
\nin a  given case.   The decision so made would be exposed to
\nchallenge on  the ground  of arbitrariness. Rule of law does
\nnot completely\teliminate  discretion  in  the\texercise  of
\npower, as it is unrealistic, but provides for control of its
\nexercise by judicial review. [328-A-D]\n<\/p>\n
     12. The  mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a
\ncitizen, in  such a  situation,\t may  not  by  itself  be  a
\ndistinct enforceable right, but failure to consider and give
\ndue weight to it may render the decision arbitrary, and this
\nis how\tthe requirement of due consideration of a legitimate
\nexpectation  forms   part   of\t the   principle   of\tnon-
\narbitrariness, a  necessary concomitant\t of the rule of law.
\nEvery legitimate expectation is a  relevant factor requiring
\ndue consideration in a fair decision making process. Whether
\nthe expectation\t of the claimant is reasonable or legitimate
\nin the\tcontext is a question of fact in each case. Whenever
\nthe question arises, it is to be determined not according to
\nthe claimant’s\tperception but\tin  larger  public  interest
\nwherein other  more important  considerations  may  outweigh
\nwhat would otherwise have been the legitimate expectation of
\nthe claimant.  A bona  fide decision of the public authority
\nreached in this manner would satisfy the requirement of non-
\narbitrariness and withstand judicial scrutiny. [328-E-G]
\n     2.1. Even\tthough the  highest tenderer  can  claim  no
\nright to  have his   tender  accepted, there  being a  power
\nwhile inviting\ttenders to  reject all the tenders, yet that
\npower cannot  be exercised  arbitrarily and  must depend for
\nits validity  on the  existence of  cogent reasons  for such
\naction. The  object of\tinviting tenders  for disposal\tof a
\ncommodity is to procure the highest price while giving equal
\nopportunity to\tall  the  intending  bidders  to    compete.
\nProcuring the highest price for the commodity is undoubtedly
\nin public interest since the amount so collected goes to the
\npublic fund. Accordingly, inadequacy of the price offered in
\nthe highest  tender would be a cogent ground for negotiating
\nwith the  tenderers giving  them equal opportunity to revise
\ntheir bids  with a  view to  obtain  the  highest  available
\nprice. Retaining the option to accept the highest tender, in
\ncase the   negotiations\t do not yield a significantly higher
\noffer would  be fair to the tenderers besides protecting the
\npublic interest.  A  procedure\twherein\t resort\t is  had  to
\nnegotiations   with    the   tenderers\t for   obtaining   a
\nsignificantly higher  bid during  the period when the offers
\nin the\ttenders remain\topen for acceptance and rejection of
\nthe tenders  only in  the event\t of a significant higher bid
\nbeing obtained\tduring negotiations would ordinarily satisfy
\nthis requirement.  This procedure involves giving due weight
\nto the\tlegitimate expectation of the highest bidder to have
\nhis tender  accepted unless  outbid by\ta higher  offer,  in
\nwhich case  acceptance of  the highest offer within the time
\nthe offers  remain open\t would be  a reasonable\t exercise of
\npower for public good. [329-E-H; 330-A]
\n     Shanti Vijay  & Co.  etc. v.  Princess Fatima  Fouzia &
\nOrs. etc., [1980] I S.C.R. 459, relied on.\n<\/p>\n
     Council of\t Civil Service Unions and Others v. Minister
\nfor the\t Civil Service,\t 1985 A.C.  374 (H.L.),\t and  In  re
\nPreston, 1985 A.C. 835 (H.L.), referred to.\n<\/p>\n
     22. In  the  instant  case,  the  respondent’s  highest
\ntender was  super seded\t only by  a significantly higher bid
\nmade during  the negotiations with all tenderers giving them
\nequal opportunity  to compete  by revising  their bids.\t The
\nfact that  it was  a significantly  higher bid\tobtained  by
\nadopting the  right course is sufficient to demonstrate that
\nthe action  of the  appellant satisfied\t the requirement  of
\nnon-arbitrariness, and it was taken for the cogent reason of
\ninadequacy of the price offered in the highest tender, which
\nreason was  evident to\tall tenderers invited to participate
\nin the negotiations and to revise their bids. The High Court
\nwas in error in taking the contrary view. [330-D-E]
\n     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4731 of
\n 1992.\n<\/p>\n
     From the Judgment and Order dated 21.7.92 of the C.W.N.
\n7419 of 1992.\n<\/p>\n
     Y.P. Rao for the Appellant.\n<\/p>\n
     Ashok Sen,\t H.L. Aggarwal,\t and K.K. Gupta (NP) for the
\nRespondent.\n<\/p>\n
     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
\n     VERMA, J. Leave granted.\n<\/p>\n
     The appeal\t by special  leave under  Article 136 of the
\nConstitution is against the judgment and order dated 21.7.92
\nby which  the Civil Writ  Petition No. 7419 of 1992 has been
\nallowed by  the Punjab\t& Haryana  High Court  directing the
\nappellant  Food\t  Corporation  of  India  to  allot  to\t the
\nrespondent the\tnecessary stocks  of damaged  rich for which
\nthe tenders  had been  invited by  the appellant,  since the
\nrespondent was the highest bidder.\n<\/p>\n
     The appellant  invited tenders  for sale  of stocks  of
\ndamaged\t foodgrains   in  accordance   with  the  terms\t and
\nconditions contained  in the  tender notice  (Annexure `A’).
\nThe tenders  were required to be submitted upto 2.45 p.m. on
\n18.5.92; the  tenders were  to be  opened on 18.5.92 at 3.00
\np.m.; and offers were to remain open for acceptance upto and
\ninclusive of  17.7.92. The  respondent submitted  its tender
\nfor a  stock of damaged rice  within the time specified, but
\nthe respondent’s  tender was conditional and the full amount
\nof  earnest  money  required  by  the  terms  was  also\t not
\ndeposited. It  is, however,  not necessary  to\tmention\t the
\nparticulars of these two deficiencies in respondent’s tender
\nsince they  appear to  have been waived by the appellant and
\nare not\t relied on  before us  to  support  the\t appellant’s
\naction. The  respondent’s bid  in the  tender was admittedly
\nthe highest  as found  on opening,  the tenders.  lt appears
\nthat the  appellant was\t not satisfied about the adequacy of
\nthe amount  offered in\tthe highest  tenders for purchase of
\nthe stocks  of damaged foodgrains and, therefore. instead of
\naccepting  any\tof  the\t tenders  submitted,  the  appellant
\ninvited all  the tenderers to participate in the negotiation
\non 9.6.92.  The\t respondent  refused  to  revise  the  rates
\noffered in  its tender.\t It was\t Rs.  245  per\tquintal\t for
\ncertain lots  of this  stock;, while  the highest offer made
\nduring\tthe   negotiations  was\t  Rs.  275.72  per  quintal.
\nSimilarly, as  against the respondent’s offer of Rs. 201 per
\nquintal in  respect of\tsome other  lots, the  highest offer
\nmade during  the negotiation  was Rs. 271.55 per quintal. On
\nthis basis,  the appellant  was\t to  receive  an  additional
\namount of  Rs. 8  lakhs by  accepting the highest offer made
\nduring the negotiations over the total amount offered by the
\nrespondent for\tthe stock  of  damaged\trice.  Overall,\t the
\nappellant was  offered an  excess amount of Rs. 20 lakhs for
\nthe entire  stock of damaged foodgrains in the highest offer
\nmade during  the negotiations, inasmuch as against the total
\namount\t Rs.90 lakhs which the appellant would have received
\nby acceptance  of the  highest tenders, the appellant was to
\nreceive the  amount of Rs. 1 crore 10 lakhs by accepting the
\nhighest offers made during the negotiations in which all the
\ntenderers,  including\tthe  respondent,  were\tgiven  equal
\nopportunity to participate.\n<\/p>\n
     The respondent  filed the\tabove Writ  Petition in\t the
\nHigh Court challenging the appellant’s refusal to accept the
\nhighest tender submitted by it for the stock of damaged rice
\nclaiming that the appellant having chosen to invite tenders,
\nit could  not thereafter  dispose of  the stocks  of damaged
\nfoodgrains by subsequent negotiations rejecting the highest
\ntenders on  the ground\tthat a\thigher bid  was obtained  by
\nnegotiations. This  action of  the appellant, was alleged to
\nbe arbitrary  and, therefore,  in  substance,  violative  of
\nArticle 14  of the  Constitution.  The\tHigh  Court  by\t its
\nimpugned order\taccepted this  contention of  the respondent
\nand allowed the Writ Petition. Hence, this appeal.\n<\/p>\n
     It is  not disputed  that according  to the  terms\t and
\nconditions on  which the  appellant had invited tenders, the
\nappellant had  reserved the  right to reject all the tenders
\nand, therefore,\t the highest  tender was  not  bound  to  be
\naccepted. Learned  counsel for\tthe appellant submitted that
\nthere being  no right  in the  person submitting the highest
\ntender to claim acceptance of the tender, in a case like the
\npresent. where\tall the\t tenderers including the respondent,
\nwere invited  for negotiation and given equal opportunity to
\nparticipate and\t to revise  the bid before acceptance of the
\nhighest bid  offered during  negotiation which\tresulted  in
\nobtaining an  additional amount of Rs. 8 lakhs for the stock
\nrelating to  respondent’s tender  and an overall gain of Rs.
\n20  lakhs  in  disposal\t of  the  entire  stock\t of  damaged
\nfoodgrains, the\t action of the appellant could not be termed
\narbitrary. In  reply, Shri A.K. Sen, learned counsel for the
\nrespondent contended  that even though the appellant had the
\nright to  reject any  tender, including\t the highest tender,
\nand thereafter\tnegotiate with\tall the tenderers to procure
\nthe highest  price for\tthe commodity, yet this right has to
\nbe exercised  reasonably and not arbitrarily, otherwise, the
\ncredibility of\tthe procedure  of sale\tby inviting  tenders
\nwould be  lost. Shri Sen submitted that the  decision not to
\naccept any  tender and to negotiate thereafter for obtaining
\na higher  price than  that quoted in the highest bid, cannot
\nbe taken  on the whim and caprice of the concerned authority
\nand can\t be only  for cogent  reasons indicated while taking
\nthe decision,  or else,\t the decision would be arbitrary. On
\nthis basis,  Shri Sen  further submitted that in the present
\ncase, no cogent reasons were indicated for rejecting all the
\ntenders\t and   deciding\t to  dispose  of  the  commodity  by
\nnegotiation with the tenderers for procuring a higher price.
\nHe also\t added that  the mere  fact that  a higher price was
\nobtained by negotiation would not justify the decision if it
\nwas not\t taken in  the manner permissible. This was the only
\nsubmission of  Shri Sen\t to support the decision of the High
\nCourt.\n<\/p>\n
     In our  view, Shri\t A.K. Sen is right in the first part
\nof  his\t submission.  However,\tin  the\t present  case,\t the
\nrespondent does\t not get  any benefit  therefrom.  The\tHigh
\nCourt’s decision  is based  on the  only  ground  that\tonce
\ntenders have  been invited  and the  highest bidder has come
\nforward to  comply with\t the conditions\t stipulated  in\t the
\ntender notice,\tit is  not permissible\tto  switch  over  to
\nnegotiation with  all the  tenderers and  thereby reject the
\nhighest\t tender.   According  to  the  High  Court,  such  a
\nprocedure is  not countenanced\tby the\trule of law. This is
\nnot the same, as the submission of Shri Sen which is limited
\nto permissibility  of such  a course  only on cogent grounds
\nindicated while\t deciding to switch over to the procedure of
\nnegotiation after  receiving  the  tenders  to\tsatisfy\t the
\nrequirement of non arbitrariness, a necessary concomitant of
\nthe rule  of law.  The proposition  enunciated by  the\tHigh
\nCourt which forms the sole basis of its decision is too wide
\nto be  acceptable and  has  to\tbe  limited  in\t the  manner
\nindicated hereafter.\n<\/p>\n
     In contractual  sphere as\tin all\tother State actions,
\nthe State  and all  its instrumentalities have to conform to
\nArticle 14 of the Constitution of which non-arbitrariness is
\na significant  facet. There  is no  unfettered discretion in
\npublic law:  A public authority possesses powers only to use
\nthem for public good. This impose the duty to act fairly and
\nto adopt  a procedure  which is\t `fairplay in  action’.\t Due
\nobservance  of\t this  obligation   as\ta   part   of\tgood
\nadministration raises a reasonable or legitimate expectation
\nin every  citizen to  be treated  fairly in  his interaction
\nwith the  State and its instrumentalities, with this element
\nforming a necessary component of the decision making process
\nin all\tState actions.\tTo satisfy  this requirement of non-
\narbitrariness in a State action, it is, therefore, necessary
\nto consider  and  give\tdue  weight  to\t the  reasonable  or
\nlegitimate expectations of the persons likely lo be affected
\nby the\tdecision or  else that unfairness in the exercise of
\nthe power  may amount  to an  abuse or excess of power apart
\nfrom affecting\tthe bona  fides of  the decision  in a given
\ncase. The  decision so made would be exposed to challenge on
\nthe ground of arbitrariness. Rule of law does not completely
\neliminate discretion  in the  exercise of  power, as  it  is
\nunrealistic, but  providers for\t control of  its exercise by
\njudicial review.\n<\/p>\n
     The mere  reasonable or  legitimate  expectation  of  a
\ncitizen, in  such a  situation,\t may  not  by  itself  be  a
\ndistinct enforceable  right, but  failure to   consider\t and
\ngive due weight to it may render the decision arbitrary, and
\nthis is\t how the  requirement  of  due\tconsideration  of  a
\nLegitimate expectation\tforms part  of the principle of non-
\narbitrariness, a  necessary concomitant\t of the rule of law.
\nEvery legitimate  expectation is a relevant factor requiring
\ndue consideration  a fair  decision making  process. Whether
\nthe expectation\t of the claimant is reasonable or legitimate
\nin the\tcontext is a question of fact in each case. Whenever
\nthe question arises, it is to be determined not according to
\nthe claimant’s\tperception but\tin  larger  public  interest
\nwherein other  more important  considerations  may  outweigh
\nwhat would otherwise have been the legitimate expectation of
\nthe claimant.  A bona  fide decision of the public authority
\nreached in  this manner\t would satisfy\tthe   requirement of
\nnon-arbitrariness  and\t withstand  judicial  scrutiny.\t The
\ndoctrine of  legitimate expectation  gets assimilated in the
\nrule of\t law and operates in our legal system in this manner
\nand to this extent.\n<\/p>\n
     In Council\t of  Civil  Service  Unions  and  Others  v.
\nMinister for  the Civil\t Service, 1985\tA.C. 374  (H.L.) the
\nHouse of  Lords indicated the extent to which the legitimate
\nexpectation  interfaces\t  with\texercise   of  discretionary
\npower. The impugned action was upheld as reasonable, made on
\ndue consideration  of all  relevant  factors  including\t the
\nlegitimate  expectation\t  of  the   applicant,\twherein\t the
\nconsiderations of  national security  were found to outweigh
\nthat  which   otherwise\t would\t have  been  the  reasonable
\nexpectation of\tthe applicant. Lord Scarman pointed out that
\n`the controlling  factor in determining whether the exercise
\nof prerogative\tpower is  subject  to judicial review is not
\nits source  but its  subject-matter’. Again in In re preston
\n1985 A.C. 835 (H.L.) it was stated by Lord Scarman that `the
\nprinciple of  fairness has  an important place in the law of
\njudicial review’  ant `unfairness  in the purported exercise
\nof a  power can\t be such  that it  is an  abuse of excess of
\npower’. These decisions of the House of Lords give a similar
\nindication of the significance of the doctrine of legitimate
\nexpectation. Shri  A.K. Sen  referred to  Shanti Vijay & Co.
\netc. v.\t Princess Fatima Fouzia & Ors. etc., [1980] 1 S.C.R.
\n459,  which   holds  that   court  should   interfere  where
\ndiscretionary power  is not exercised reasonably and in good
\nfaith.\n<\/p>\n
     From the  above, it  is  clear  that  even\t though\t the
\nhighest tenderer  can claim  no right  to  have\t his  tender
\naccepted, there\t being a  power while  inviting\t tenders  to
\nreject all  the tenders,  yet the  power to  reject all\t the
\ntenders cannot\tbe exercised arbitrarily and must depend for
\nits validity  on the  existence of  cogent reasons  for such
\naction. The  object of\tinviting   tenders for disposal of a
\ncommodity is to procure the highest price while giving equal
\nopportunity  to\t  all  the  intending  bidders\tto  compete.
\nProcuring the highest price for the commodity is undoubtedly
\nin public interest since the amount so collected goes to the
\npublic fund. Accordingly, inadequacy of the price offered in
\nthe highest  tender would be a cogent ground for negotiating
\nwith the  tenderers giving  them equal opportunity to revise
\ntheir bids  with a  view to  obtain  the  highest  available
\nprice. The  inadequacy may  be for  several reasons known in
\nthe commercial field. Inadequacy of the prince quoted in the
\nhighest tender\twould be  a question  of fact  in each case.
\nRetaining the  option to  accept the highest tender, in case
\nthe negotiations  do not  yield a significantly higher offer
\nwould be fair to the tenderers besides protecting the public
\ninterest. A  procedure wherein resort is had to negotiations
\nwith the  tenderers for obtaining a significantly higher bid
\nduring the period when the offers in the tenders remain open
\nfor acceptance\tand rejection  of the  tenders only  in\t the
\nevent of  a significant\t higher bid  being  obtained  during
\nnegotiations would ordinarily satisfy this requirement. This
\nprocedure involves  giving  due\t weight\t to  the  legitimate
\nexpectation  of\t the  highest  bidder  to  have\t his  tender
\naccepted unless\t outbid by  a higher  offer, in\t which\tcase
\nacceptance of  the highest  offer within the time the offers
\nremain open would be a reasonable exercise  power for public
\ngood.\n<\/p>\n
     In the present case, the last date upto which the offer
\nmade in\t the tender  was to  remain open  for acceptance was
\n17.7.92. After opening the tenders on 18.5.92, the appellant
\ndecided to  negotiate with  all the tenderers on 9.6.92 when
\nsignificantly  higher  amount,\tas  indicated  earlier,\t was
\noffered above  the amount  quoted in  the highest tender. In
\nsuch a\tsituation, if  the negotiations\t did not  yield\t the
\ndesirable result  of obtaining a significantly higher price,
\nthe appellant  had the\toption to  accept the highest tender
\nbefore the  last date,\tviz., 17.7.92  upto which  the offer
\nmade therein  was to  remain open  for acceptance.  In\tthis
\nmanner, the  respondent’s higher  tender was superseded only
\nby a  significantly higher  bid made during the negotiations
\nwith all  tenderers giving them equal opportunity to compete
\nby revising their bids. The fact that it was a significantly
\nhigher bid obtained by adopting this course is sufficient in
\nthe facts of the present case to demonstrate that the action
\nof  the\t  appellant  satisfied\t the  requirement   of\tnon-
\narbitrariness, and  it was  taken for  the cogent  reason of
\ninadequacy of the price offered in the highest tender, which
\nreason was  evident to all  tenderers invited to participate
\nin the negotiations and to revise their bids. The High Court
\nwas in error in taking the contrary view.
\nConsequently, this  appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment
\nof the\tHigh Court  is set  aside, resulting in dismissal of
\nthe respondent’s writ petition, No costs,
\n G.N.\t\t\t\t\t   Appeal allowed.\n<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
KRISHNA BHIMRAO DESHPANDE
\nv.\n<\/p>\n
LAND TRIBUNAL, DHARWAD AND ORS.\n<\/p>\n
NOVEMBER<\/p>\n
<\/a> 3, 1992
\n[LALIT MOHAN SHARMA AND K. JAYACHANDRA REDDY, JJ.]
\n     Constitution of India, 1950:<\/p>\n
     Article 252  read with  Schedule VII,  List n Entry 18-
\nLegislation by Parliament Requirement-Central Law on ceiling
\non urban  immovable   property in pursuance of Resolution of
\nState Legislature  State Laws  on other\t matters relating to
\nthe subject-matter of resolution-Legality of.\n<\/p>\n
     Constitution of India, 1950:\n<\/p>\n
     Article 252, Schedule VII, list II, Entry 18-Urban Land
\n(Ceiling and   Regulation)  Act,  1976\tand  Karnataka\tLand
\nReforms Act  as amended\t in 1974  Object and application of-
\nWhether any conflict between the Acts.\n<\/p>\n
     In the  year 1972\tthe Karnataka  Legislature passed  a
\nresolution under  Article 252 of the Constitution imposing a
\nceiling on  urban immovable  property and the acquisition of
\nsuch property  in excess  of the ceiling is limit for public
\npurposes and  all the  matters connected  therewith shall be
\nregulated in the State by Parliament by law.\n<\/p>\n
     On 1.4.74\tthe Karnataka  Land Reforms  (Amendment) Act
\nwas enacted and under the Act the tenant of the land covered
\nby the\tAct was\t entitled to  the grant\t of occupancy rights
\nafter making  an application   under  the Act.\tThe Act came
\nInto force  with effect\t from 2.1.85. But for the purpose of
\ngrant of occupancy rights, 1.4.74 was the relevant date.\n<\/p>\n
     In the  year 1975\tthe  Karnataka\tUrban  Agglomeration
\nOrdinance was  passed,\twhereunder  all\t lands\tbetween\t the
\nperiphery of  8 K.Ms.  of the\tmunicipal  limits  of  Hubli
\nDharwad were declared as urban agglomeration land.\n<\/p>\n
     The Parliament  passed  the  Urban\t Land  (Ceiling\t and
\nRegulation) Act,  1976 for  imposition of  ceiling on  urban
\nproperties and\tthe  Ceiling  Act  was\tmade  applicable  to
\nKarnataka also in view of the resolution passed by the State
\nGovernment.\n<\/p>\n
     The lands involved in the present cases were covered by
\nthe development\t plan by  the  Belgaum\tCity  Town  Planning
\nauthority as  per the Master Plan and they were included and
\ndeclared as  urban agglomeration  in the City of Hubli under
\nthe provisions of the Ceiling Act.\n<\/p>\n
     The owners\t of the\t agglomeration lands  challenged the
\norder of  the Land  Tribunal  under  the  Land\tReforms\t Act
\nconferring occupancy  rights on\t the tenants before the High
\nCourt. They  contended that  the lands involved in the cases
\nwere within  the purview  of the  Ceiling Act and  therefore
\nthe provisions of the Land Reforms Act had no application to
\nsuch lands  on the ground that the provisions of the Ceiling
\nAct.\n<\/p>\n
     The writ  petitions were  dismissed by  the High Court.
\nThe owner’s  writ appeals  were also  dismissed by  a common
\njudgment by  the Division  Bench  of  the  High\t Court.\t The
\nDivision Bench\theld that  there was no conflict between the
\ntwo enactments.\n<\/p>\n
     The judgment  of the  Division Bench  was challenged in
\nS.L.P. (Civil) No. 16041-42\/88.\n<\/p>\n
     Many of  the similar  writ petitions  that were pending
\nbefore the  High Court\twere transferred to the Land Reforms
\nAppellate Tribunal.\n<\/p>\n
     The Appellate  Tribunal dismissed\tthe petitions  by  a
\ncommon order following the judgment of the Division Bench of
\nthe High  Court. Several  Civil revision  petitions filed by
\nthe land  owners against the order of the Appellate Tribunal
\nwere dismissed\tby the High Court. Some of the special leave
\npetitions were\tfiled against the order of the High Court in
\nthe said civil revision petitions.\n<\/p>\n
     The petitioners-land  owners  contended  that  when  in
\npursuance of  the resolution of the State Legislature passed
\nunder  Article\t 252  of  the  Constitution  the  Parliament
\nlegislated  in\t respect  of   the  topic   covered  by\t the
\nresolution. The Parliamentary law repealed or superseded the
\nexisting State\tlegislation on\tthe topic and therefore such
\nlaw could  not be  enforced thereafter;\t and that vesting of
\ntenanted land  in the  State  and  conferment  of  occupancy
\nrights under  the provisions  of the State Act directly fall
\nunder the  subject of  imposing ceiling\t on land holding and
\nother matters  incidental or  ancillary to the main topic of
\nimposing ceiling  and therefore\t they were  fully covered by
\nthe Ceiling  Act passed\t by the\t Parliament and\t   the\tsame
\nsuperseded the State enactment in respect of such lands.\n<\/p>\n
     The respondents  submitted that “imposition of ceiling”
\nwas a  distinct and  separately identifiable subject and the
\nParliament was empowered to legislate; that the power of the
\nState to  legislate in\trespect of the remaining part of the
\nsubject-matter was  unaffected;\t that  when  two    distinct
\npowers came into existence, vesting law making competence in
\nthe State and Parliament, the pith and substance of the laws
\nmade by\t each of  them had to be examined to see whether any
\none of them encroached the field set apart as falling within
\nthe competence\tof the\tother body;  that in  any event\t the
\nprovisions of Chapter III of the Karnataka Land Reforms\t Act
\nhad nothing  to do  with the  imposition of  ceiling on\t the
\nurban land  and that  conferring of occupancy rights etc. to
\nthe tenants  under Chapter III of the Karnataka Land Reforms
\nAct  did  not  come  under  the\t category  of  “the  matters
\nconnected  therewith  or  ancillary  or\t incidental  to\t the
\nimposition of ceiling” on urban immovable property.\n<\/p>\n
     Dismissing the special leave petitions, this Court,
\n     HELD: 1.01.  Article 252  empowers\t the  Parliament  to
\nlegislate for  two or more States on any of the matters with
\nrespect of  which the  Parliament has  no power\t to make law
\nexcept as provided under Articles 249 and 250. This power to
\nlegislate is  vested in\t the Parliament only if two  or more
\nState  Legislatures think it desirable to have a law enacted
\nby  Parliament on such matters in List II, i.e. with respect
\nto which  the Parliament  has no  power to  make law for the
\nState.\tThe   passing  of   the\t resolutions  by  the  State
\nLegislatures  is  a  condition\tprecedent  for\tvesting\t the
\nParliament with such power. [339-C-D]
\n     1.02. The\tscope of  Entry 18 is very wide and the land
\nmentioned therein  may be  agricultural or  non-agricultural
\nand may\t be rural or urban. The subject-matter carved out of
\nEntry 18  under the  resolutions passed by The various State
\nLegislatures related  to only “urban immovable property” and
\nby virtue  of the  resolution the law that can be enacted by
\nthe Parliament\tshould be  a law “imposing a ceiling on such
\nurban immovable property.” [340-B, C]
\n     1.03. From the resolution it is clear that the subject-
\nmatter that  was resolved  to be entrusted to the Parliament
\nwas the\t one imposing  a ceiling on urban immovable property
\nand acquisition\t of such  property in excess of the ceiling.
\nThis subject-matter  is the topic that falls within Entry 18
\nof List\t II of\tSchedule VII  to the  Constitution  and\t the
\nsubject-matter of  Entry 18  has been  originally kept apart
\nfor the\t State Legislature to make law and Parliament had no
\ncompetence in  respect of  those matters  falling under\t the
\nwide scope  of Entry 18. By virtue of this resolution a part
\nof the\tarea falling  under Entry  18 is  transferred to the
\ndomain of  Parliament to  make law  relating to\t the matters
\nwithin the transferred area. [339-G, H; 341-A]
\n     2.01. The\tprimary object\tand the purpose of the Urban
\nLand (Ceiling  and Regulation)\tAct, 1976  is to provide for
\nthe  imposition\t  of  ceiling\ton  vacant   land  in  urban
\nagglomeration and  for acquisition  of such lands in  excess
\nof the\tceiling limit  and to  regulate the  construction of
\nbuildings on such lands and for matters connected therewith.
\n[340-H; 341-A]
\n     2.02. The Karnataka Land Reforms Act as amended in 1974
\nis a  welfare legislation. The object of the Act was to have
\na uniform  law in  the\t  State\t of  Karnataka\trelating  to
\nagrarian  reforms,   conferment\t of  ownership\ton  tenants,
\nceiling on  land holdings  and\tfor  certain  other  matters
\ncontained therein. [342-D]
\n     2.03. In  respect of imposing ceiling on the land under
\nurban agglomeration  the provisions of the Ceiling Act alone
\nare applicable\tand to that extent the provisions of Chapter
\nIV of  the Karnataka  Land Reforms  Act which also deal with
\nthe imposition of ceiling would not be applicable.
\n[344-C]
\n     2.04. The\tland in\t the instant  case comes  under\t the
\nurban agglomeration  the imposition  of the  ceiling  should
\nnaturally be  under the\t provisions of the Urban Ceiling Act
\nand not under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act. [344-B, C]
\n     2.05. Imposition of ceiling on urban land is a distinct
\nand independent subject as compared to imposition of ceiling
\non owning  or to hold agricultural land or any other kind of
\nproperty which\tdo not\tattract the Urban Ceiling Act. These
\nare  two  distinct  powers  and\t therefore  the\t law  making
\ncompetence can\tbe  in\ttwo  different\tlegislative  bodies.
\nConsequently it\t is difficult to hold that the provisions of
\nChapter III  of the  Karnataka Land  Reforms Act are outside
\nthe legislative competence of the State\t Legislature.
\n[350-C, D]
\n     2.06.  The\t  one  topic  that  is\ttransferred  in\t the
\nresolution  passed    under  Article  252  as  distinct\t and
\nseparately identifiable\t and does  not include the remaining
\ntopics under  Entry 18\tin respect  of which the State alone
\nhas the power to legislate. [351-D]
\n     2.07. The\tlegislative power  of the  State has  to  be
\nreconciled with\t that of  the Parliament  and that  in their
\nrespective fields  each is  supreme. Even  assuming that the
\nState  enactment  has  same  effect  on\t the  subject-matter
\nfalling within\tthe Parliament’s legislative competence that
\nby itself  will not  render such law invalid or inoperative.
\n[350-G-H]
\n     2.08. There  is no conflict between the Ceiling Act and
\nthe State  Act. The imposition of ceiling on urban immovable
\nproperty is an independent topic  and cannot be construed as
\nto nullify the other subject left in the domain of the State
\nLegislature under Entry 18 inasmuch as imposition of ceiling
\nis a  distinct and  separately identifiable subject and does
\nnot  cover   the  other\t  measures  such  as  regulation  of
\nrelationship of\t landlord and tenant in respect of which the
\nState Legislature has competence to legislate. [351-C-D]
\n     2.09. There  is a ceiling provision under Section 45(2)
\nof the\tKarnataka Land Reforms Act providing for computation
\nof the\tarea in\t respect of  which the tenant may be granted
\noccupancy rights. But it is clear that ceiling on the
\narea in\t this context is only for the purpose of Section 45.
\n[351-F]
\n     2.10. Provisions  in the  Chapters II, III, V, VI to XI
\nof the\tKarnataka Land\tReforms Act deal with the conferment
\nof occupancy  rights on\t the respective\t tenants and they do
\nnot in\tany way conflict with the subject matter transferred
\nto the\tParliament by  the resolution  passed under  Section\n<\/p>\n
252. [351-E,F]
\n     Thumati Venkaiah  and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh
\nand of\tothers<\/a>, [1980]\t4 SCC 295; Union of India and others
\nv. Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary and others<\/a>, [1979] 3 SCC 324;
\nCalcutta Gas  Company (Proprietory)  Ltd. v.  State of\tWest
\nBengal and  others<\/a>, AIR\t 1962 SC 1044 and Kannan Devan Hills
\nProduce Company Ltd. v. The State of Kerala<\/a> etc., AIR
\n 1972 SC 2301 referred to.\n<\/p>\n
     CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Special  Leave  Petition
\n(Civil) Nos. 16041-42\/88.\n<\/p>\n
     From the  Judgment and  Order dated  27.7.1988  of\t the
\nKarnataka   High Court\tin  W.P.  No  9173\/86  and  W.A.  No
\n2707\/85.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t    WITH
\n     SLP (C) Nos. 12258, 12254, 12260\/90 & 8608\/91
\n     R.N. Narasimhamurthy,  S.S. Javali,  S.N. Bhat and Ravi
\nP. Wadhwani for the Petitioners.\n<\/p>\n
     M.S.  Nesargi,   R.  Jagannath  Goulay,  M.K.  Dua,  M.
\nVeerappa, K.H. Nobin Singh, S.K. Kulkarni and Surya Kant for
\nthe Respondents.\n<\/p>\n
     The following Order of the Court was delivered by
\n     K. JAYACHANDRA  REDDY, J.\tIn all\tthese special  leave
\npetitions the  common question that arises for consideration
\nis whether the provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act,
\n1961 as\t amended in  1974 (`Act’  for  short)  cease  to  be
\napplicable in all respects to the lands which came within
\nthe purview  of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act,
\n1976 (‘Ceiling\tAct’ for short). The lands involved in these
\nmatters are  covered by\t the development plan by the Belgaum
\nCity Town  Planning authority as per the Master Plan for the
\nsaid City  and they  are  included  and\t declared  as  urban
\nagglomeration in  the City  of Hubli under the provisions of
\nthe Ceiling  Act. In the year 1972 the Karnataka Legislature
\npassed a resolution under Article 252 of the Constitution to
\nthe effect  that  imposing  a  ceiling\ton  urban  immovable
\nproperty and  the acquisition of such property in excess  of
\nthe ceiling  limit for\tpublic purposes\t and all the matters
\nconnected therewith  shall be  regulated  in  the  State  by
\nParliament Qby\tlaw. The  State\t Legislature  thus  divested
\nitself of the legislative competence to enact law in respect
\nof subject-matter of the resolution. On 1.4.74 the amended
\nKarnataka Land\tReforms Act  was enacted  and under the said
\nAct the tenant of the land covered by the Act is entitled to
\nthe grant  of occupancy\t rights after  making an application
\nunder the  Act. This  Act came\tinto force  with effect from
\n2.1.85. But  for the  purpose of  grant of  occupancy rights
\n1.4.74 was  the relevant date. While so in the year 1975 the
\nGovernor  of   Karnataka  passed   the\tUrban  Aggolmeration
\nOrdinance whereunder  all lands\t between the  periphery of 8
\nK.Ms. of the municipal limits of Hubli Dharwad were declared
\nas urban agglomeration land. In the year 1976 the Parliament
\npassed the  Ceiling Act\t for imposition\t of ceiling on urban
\nproperties and the Act was made applicable to Karnataka also
\nin view\t of the\t resolution passed  by the  State Government
\nreferred to  above. The order of the Land Tribunal under the
\nAct  conferring\t  occupancy  rights   on  the\ttenants\t was
\nchallenged before  the High  Court contending that the lands
\ninvolved in  these cases  were within  the  purview  of\t the
\nCeiling Act and therefore the provisions of the Land Reforms
\nAct had\t no application to such lands on the ground that the
\nprovisions of the State Act were repugnant to the provisions
\nof the Central Act namely the Ceiling Act. The writ petition
\nwas dismissed  by the  High Court. The owners preferred writ
\nappeals and they were also dismissed by a common judgment in
\nWrit Appeal  Nos. 2707\tand 2361\/85  etc. The Division Bench
\nheld that  there is no conflict between the two enactment in
\ncertain respect i.e. atleast so far as the implementation of
\nthe provisions\tof Chapter  III of the Act are concerned and
\nthat provisions\t of this  Chapter of the Act do not cease to
\napply to the agricultural lands coming within the meaning of
\nurban agglomeration  in the Ceiling Act. The judgment of the
\nDivision Bench\tis challenged  in S.L.P.(Civil)\t No.  16041-
\n42\/88. Many  of the similar writ petitions that were pending
\nbefore the  High Court\twere transferred to the Land Reforms
\nAppellate Tribunal.  The Appellate  Tribunal  dismissed\t the
\npetitions by  a common\torder following\t the judgment of the
\nDivision Bench\tof the\tHigh Court in Writ Appeal No.2707\/85
\nand connected  matters. Several\t civil\trevisions  petitions
\nfiled by  the land owners against the order of the Appellate
\nTribunal were  dismissed by  the High  Court.  Some  of\t the
\nspecial leave  petitions are  filed against the order of the
\nHigh Court  in the  said civil revision petitions. Therefore
\nall these  special leave  petitions can\t be disposed of by a
\ncommon order.\n<\/p>\n
     It was urged before us that the resolution of the State
\nLegislature passed  under Article  252 of  the\tConstitution
\nshifted the  topic covered by the resolution from List II of
\nSchedule VII  to the  Constitution and vested the competence
\nto make\t the law  in  respect  of  the\tsaid  topic  in\t the
\nParliament and that thereafter the State enactment ceased to
\nhave efficacy in respect of said topic. Alternatively it was
\nurged  that,   when  in\t pursuance  of\tthe  resolution\t the
\nParliament legislates in respect of the topic covered by the
\nresolution, the Parliamentary law, repeals or supersedes any
\nexisting State\tlegislation on\tthe topic and therefore such
\nlaw cannot be enforced\tthereafter.\n<\/p>\n
     We shall  first extract some of the relevant provisions
\nof the\tConstitution of India and the respective enactments.
\nArticle 246 of the Constitution\t reads thus:\n<\/p>\n
     “246. Subject-matter  of laws  made
\n     by\t  Parliament   and   by\t     the
\n     Legislatures     of      States-(l)
\n     Notwithstanding\t anything     in
\n     clauses (2) and (3), Parliament has
\n     exclusive power  to make  laws with
\n     respect  to   any\tof  the\t matters
\n     enumerated\t in   List    I\t in  the
\n     Seventh\tSchedule     (in    this
\n     Constitution referred  to\t as  the
\n     “Union List”).\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (2) xx    xx\t\t   xx
\n     (3) Subject to clauses (1) and (2),
\n     the Legislature  of any   State has
\n     exclusive power  to make  laws  for
\n     such State\t or   any  part\t thereof
\n     with respect  to any of the matters
\n     enumerated\t in   List  II\t in  the
\n     Seventh\tSchedule     (in    this
\n     Constitution  referred  to\t as  the
\n     “State List”).\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (4)xx\t     xx\t\txx “<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
2<\/span><\/p>\n
     Entry 18  in List\tII namely  the State List of the VII
\nSchedule to the Constitution is in the following terms:\n<\/p>\n
     “18. Land,\t that is  to say, rights
\n     in\t or   over  land,  land\t tenures
\n     including the  relation of landlord
\n     and tenant,  and the  collection of
\n     rents, transfer  and alienation  of
\n     agricultural land; land improvement
\n     and       agricultural\t  loans;
\n     colonization.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Article 252  of the  Constitution  reads
\nthus:\n<\/p>\n
     “252.  Power   of\t Parliament   to
\n     legislate for  two or  more  States
\n     by consent\t and  adoption\tof  such
\n     legislation by any\t other State-(1)
\n     If it  appears to\tthe Legislatures
\n     of\t two  or    more  States  to  be
\n     desirable that  any of  the matters
\n     with   respect to\twhich Parliament
\n     has no  power to make laws for  the
\n     States  except   as   provided   in
\n     Articles  249  and\t 250  should  be
\n     regulated\t in   such   States   by
\n     Parliament\t  by\tlaw,   and    if
\n     resolutions  to   that  effect  are
\n     passed by\tall the\t Houses\t of  the
\n     Legislatures of  those  States,  it
\n     shall be  lawful for  Parliament to
\n     pass an  Act  for\tregulating  that
\n     matter accordingly,  and any Act so
\n     passed shall  apply to  such States
\n     and to  any other State by which it
\n     is adopted afterwards by resolution
\n     passed in\tthat behalf by the House
\n     or, where\tthere are two Houses, by
\n     each   of\t the   Houses\tof   the
\n     Legislature of that State.
\n     (2) Any Act so passed by Parliament
\n     may be  amended or\t  repealed by an
\n     Act of Parliament passed or adopted
\n     in like   manner  but shall not, as
\n     respects  any  State  to  which  it
\n     applics, be  amended or repcaled by
\n     an Act  of the  Legislature of that
\n     State.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     Article 252  empowers the\tParliament to  legislate for
\ntwo or\tmore States  on any  of the  matters with respect of
\nwhich the  Parliament has  no power  to make  law except  as
\nprovided under Articles 249 and 250. This power to legislate
\nis vested  in the  Parliament only  if\ttwo  or\t more  State
\nLegislatures think  it desirable  to have  a law  enacted by
\nParliament on  such matters  in List II i.e. with respect to
\nwhich the Parliament has no power to make law for the State.
\nThe passing  of the resolutions by the State Legislatures is
\na condition  precedent for  vesting the Parliament with such
\npower. The  relevant portion of the resolution passed by the
\nState Legislature under Article 252 reads thus:\n<\/p>\n
     “Now, therefore,  in  pursuance  of
\n     clause (1)\t of Article  252  of the
\n     Constitution, this\t Assembly hereby
\n     resolves that  the\t imposition of a
\n     ceiling on urban immovable property
\n     and F  acquisition of such property
\n     in excess\tof the\tceiling and  all
\n     matters  connected\t  therewith   or
\n     ancillary and  incidental\t thereto
\n     should be regulated in the State of
\n     Karnataka by  Parliament by law.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     The resolution states that the imposition of ceiling on
\nurban immovable\t   property  and  the  acquisition  of\tsuch
\nproperty in  excess of\tthe ceiling  limit with\t a  view  to
\nutilising such excess property for public purposes and all
\nother matters  connected therein or incidental thereto shall
\nbe regulated  in this  State by Parliament by law. The basic
\nquestion that  arises is  what is  the actual content of the
\nsubject-matter\tthat   was  resolved   to  be  entrusted  to
\nParliament by the State Legislature under Article 252 of the
\nConstitution. From  the resolution  it\tis  clear  that\t the
\nsubject-matter that  was resolved  to be  entrusted  to\t the
\nParliament was the one imposing a ceiling on urban immovable
\nproperty and  acquisition of  such property in excess of the
\nceiling. It  is true  that this\t subject-matter is the topic
\nthat falls within Entry 18 of List 11 of Schedule VII to the
\nConstitution and  the said  subject-matter of  Entry 18\t has
\nbeen originally kept apart for the State Legislature to make
\nlaw and\t Parliament had\t no competence\tin respect  of those
\nmatters falling\t under the  wide scope\tof Entry  18. Now by
\nvirtue of  this resolution  a part of the area falling under
\nEntry 18  is transferred to the domain of Parliament to make
\nlaw relating to the matters within the transferred area. The
\nscope of  Entry 18  is very  wide  and\tthe  land  mentioned
\ntherein may  be agricultural  or non-agricultural and may be
\nrural or  urban. The  subject-matter carved  out of Entry 18
\nunder  the   resolutions  passed   by  the   various   State
\nLegislatures related to only- “urban immovable property” and
\nby virtue  of the  resolution the law that can be enacted by
\nthe Parliament\tshould be  a law “imposing a ceiling on such
\nurban\timmovable property.  The  learned  counsel  for\t the
\npetitioners, however, urged that vesting of tenanted land in
\nthe State  and conferment  of  occupancy  rights  under\t the
\nprovisions of  the State Act directly fall under the subject
\nof  imposing  ceiling  on  and\tholding\t and  other  matters
\nincidental or  ancillary  to  the  main\t topic\tof  imposing
\nceiling and  therefore they are fully covered by the Ceiling
\nAct passed  by the  Parliament and  the same  supersedes the
\nState enactment in respect of this land. The learned counsel
\nappearing for the respondents on the contrary submitted that
\n“imposition  of\t  ceiling”  is\ta  distinct  and  separately
\nidentifiable subject and is the power carved out of Entry 18
\nand vested in the Parliament to legislate and that the power
\nof the\tState to  legislate in respect of the remaining part
\nof the\tsubject-matter\t is unaffected\tand  that  when\t two
\ndistinct powers have come into existence, vesting law making
\ncompetence  in\tthe  State  and\t Parliament,  the  pith\t and
\nsubstance of  the laws\tmade by\t each  of  them\t has  to  be
\nexamined to see whether any one of them encroaches the field
\nset apart  as falling  within the  competence of  the  other
\nbody. The  learned counsel  for\t the  respondents,  however,
\nsubmitted that in any event the provisions of Chapter III of
\nthe Act have nothing to do with the imposition of ceiling on
\nthe urban  land and that conferring of occupancy rights etc.
\nto the\ttenants under  Chapter 111  of the  Act do  not come
\nunder the  category of\t“the matters  connected therewith or
\nancillary or  incidental to  the imposition  of ceiling”  on
\nurban immovable property.\n<\/p>\n
     Now we  shall refer  to the  provisions  of  the  Urban
\nCeiling Act.  The Statement  of Objects\t and  Reasons  under
\nPreamble to  the said Act would show that the primary object
\nand the\t purpose is to provide for the imposition of ceiling
\non vacant land in urban agglomeration and for acquisition of
\nsuch lands  in excess  of the  ceiling limit and to regulate
\nthe
\nconstruction of\t buildings on  such lands  and\tfor  matters
\nconnected therewith.  Section 21(n) of the Urban Ceiling Act
\ndefines “urban\tagglomeration” and  the material  part of it
\nreads thus:\n<\/p>\n
     “(n) “urban agglomeration”
\n     (A) in  relation to  any  State  or
\n     Union territory specified in column
\n     (1) of  Schedule 1,  means (i)  the
\n     urban  agglomeration  specified  in
\n     the corresponding\tentry in  column
\n     (2)  thereof   and\t  includes   the
\n     peripheral area  specified\t in  the
\n     corresponding entry  in column  (3)
\n     thereof; and
\n     xx\t\t       xx\t xx”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     Section 2(o) defines “urban land” which reads thus:
\n     “(o) “urban land” means, –\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (i) any  land situated  within  the
\n     limits of\tan  urban  agglomeration
\n     and referred  to  as  such\t in  the
\n     master plan; or\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (ii) in  a case  where there  is no
\n     master plan,  or where  the  master
\n     plan does\tnot refer to any land as
\n     urban land,  any  land  within  the
\n     limits of\tan  urban  agglomeration
\n     and situated  in any  area included
\n     within  the   local  limits   of  a
\n     municipality  (by\t whatever   name
\n     called), a notified area committee,
\n     a town  area committee,  a city and
\n     town  committee,\ta   small   town
\n     committee, a  cantonment board or a
\n     panchayat,
\n     but does  not include any such land
\n     which  is\t mainly\t used\tfor  the
\n     purpose of agriculture.
\n     Explanation-  For\tthe  purpose  of
\n     this clause and clause (q)-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (A)   xx\t    xx\t      xx
\n     (B) land  shall not be deemed to be
\n     used  mainly  for\tthe  purpose  of
\n     agriculture, if  such land\t is  not
\n     entered  in  the  revenue\tor  land
\n     records before the appointed day as
\n     for the purpose of agriculture;
\n     xx\t     xx\t\txx
\n     (C)    notwithstanding\tanything
\n     contained in  clause  (B)\tof  this
\n     Explanation,  land\t  shall\t not  be
\n     deemed to\tbe mainly  used for  the
\n     purpose of\t agriculture if the land
\n     has been  specified in  the  master
\n     plan  for\t a  purpose  other  than
\n     agriculture;”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     For the  purpose of  the instant  case it\tis enough to
\nnote that  Hubli-Dharwad is  shown in the Schedule and there
\nis also\t a master plan prepared for the area and the land in
\nquestion also  is undoubtedly within the urban agglomeration
\nand  therefore\t there\tis  no\tdoubt  that  in\t respect  of
\nimposition of  ceiling on this area comes within the purview
\nof the\tUrban Ceiling  Act.  But  the  question\t is  whether
\ngranting occupancy  rights under  Chapter III of the Act are
\nin any\tmanner affected.  The Karnataka\t Land Reforms Act as
\namended in  1974 is a welfare legislation. The object of the
\nAct was\t to have  a uniform  law in  the State\tof Karnataka
\nrelating to  agrarian reforms,\tconferment of  ownership  on
\ntenants, ceiling  on land  holding  and\t for  certain  other
\nmatters contained  therein. Section  34 of  the Act  defines
\n“tenant” thus:\n<\/p>\n
     “(34)     “tenant”\t    means     an
\n     agriculturist    who     cultivates
\n     personally the  land  he  holds  on
\n     lease   from    a\t landlord    and
\n     includes,-\n<\/p>\n
     (i) a  person who is deemed to be a
\n     tenant under Section 4;\n<\/p>\n
     (ii) a  person  who  was  protected
\n     from eviction  from any land by the
\n     Karnataka\t  Tenants     (Temporary
\n     Protection\t from\tEviction)   Act,
\n     1961;\n<\/p>\n
     (iia)  a\tperson\twho   cultivates
\n     personally any  land on lease under
\n     a lease  created  contrary\t to  the
\n     provisions of  section 5 and before
\n     the date  of  commencement\t of  the
\n     Amendment Act;\n<\/p>\n
     (iii) a  person who  is a permanent
\n     tenant; and\n<\/p>\n
     (iv) a  person who\t is a  protected
\n     tenant.\n<\/p>\n
     Explanation- A  person who takes up
\n     a contract\t to  cut  grass,  or  to
\n     gather the\t fruits or other produce
\n     of any  land,  shall  not\ton  that
\n     account only  be  deemed  to  be  a
\n     tenant.”\n<\/p>\n
     The provisions  of Chapter\t III of\t the Karnataka\tLand
\nReforms Act  deal with\tconferment of  ownership on tenants.
\nSection 45  occurring in  this Chapter\tin particular  deals
\nwith conferring\t of occupancy  rights on the tenants subject
\nto certain  conditions. The  relevant portion  of Section 45
\nreads as under:\n<\/p>\n
     “45. Tenants  to be  registered  as
\n     occupants\tof   land   on\t certain
\n     conditions-(1)   Subject\tto   the
\n     provisions\t  of\tthe   succeeding
\n     sections  of  this\t Chapter,  every
\n     person who\t was a permanent tenant,
\n     protected tenant or other tenant or
\n     where a tenant has lawfully sublet,
\n     such sub-tenant  shall with  effect
\n     on and  from the date of vesting be
\n     entitled to  be  registered  as  an
\n     occupant in respect of the lands of
\n     which he  was a  permanent\t tenant,
\n     protected tenant or other tenant or
\n     sub-tenant\t before\t  the  date   of
\n     vesting  and   which  he  has  been
\n     cultivating personally.
\n     (2) If  a tenant  or  other  person
\n     referred to in sub-section (1)-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (i) holds\tland partly as owner and
\n     partly as\ttenant but  the area  of
\n     the land  held by\thim as\towner is
\n     equal to  or exceeds a ceiling area
\n     he shall  not  be\tentitled  to  be
\n     registered as  an occupant\t of  the
\n     land held by him as a tenant before
\n     the date of vesting;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (ii) does\tnot hold  and  cultivate
\n     personally any  land as  an  owner,
\n     but holds\tland as tenant, which he
\n     cultivates personally  in excess of
\n     a\tceiling\t  area,\t he   shall   be
\n     entitled to  be  registered  as  an
\n     occupant to the extent of a ceiling
\n     area;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (iii)    holds    and    cultivates
\n     personally as  an owner of any land
\n     the area  of which\t is less  than a
\n     ceiling area,  he shall be entitled
\n     to be  registered as an occupant to
\n     the extent\t of such area as will be
\n     sufficient to  make up  his holding
\n     to the extent of a ceiling area.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     xx\t\t  xx\t\t xx
\n     The provisions under Chapter III which exclusively deal
\nwith conferment\t of occupancy rights on tenants have nothing
\nto  do\twith  the  imposition  of  ceiling  on\tholdings  of
\nagricultural land  under the  Act. It  is only Chapter IV of
\nthe said  Act which deals with ceiling on land holdings. Now
\nthat the  land in  the instant\tcase comes  under the  urban
\nagglomeration the imposition of the ceiling should naturally
\nbe under  the provisions  of the  Urban Ceiling\t Act and not
\nunder the  Karnataka  Land  Reforms  Act.  The\tHigh  Court,
\nhowever, did  not deal\twith  this  aspect.  Perhaps  it  is
\nnecessary for  us to  make  it\tclear  that  in\t respect  of
\nimposing ceiling  on the  land under urban agglomeration the
\nprovisions of  the Ceiling  Act alone  are applicable and to
\nthat extent  the provisions  of Chapter\t IV of the Act which
\nalso deal  with the  imposition\t of  ceiling  would  not  be
\napplicable. As\ta matter  of fact  in Thumati  Venkaiah\t and
\nOthers v.  State of  Andhra Pradesh and Others,<\/a> [1980] 4 SCC
\n295 to\twhich we will refer to at a later stage in detail on
\nthe main point, this Court observed thus:\n<\/p>\n
     “It is  no doubt  true that  if the
\n     Andhra Pradesh  Act seeks to impose
\n     ceiling on\t land falling  within an
\n     urban agglomeration,  it  would  be
\n     outside the area of its legislative
\n     competence, since it cannot provide
\n     for imposition  of ceiling on urban
\n     immovable property.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     However, the  crucial  question  in
\n     the instant  case with which we are
\n     concerned is whether the provisions
\n     of Chapter\t III  of  the  Act  also
\n     become inoperative by virtue of the
\n     resolution passed under Article 252
\n     and particularly on the ground that
\n     it is  a matter  of  imposition  of
\n     ceiling  on  urban\t land  or  other
\n     matters  connected\t  therewith   or
\n     ancillary and incidental thereto.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     A\tplain\treading\t of  the  above\t provisions  in\t the
\nbackground of  the objects  underlying these  two enactments
\nclearly shows  that the\t two Acts  operate in  two different
\nfields to  a large  extent. This  Court had  an occasion  to
\nconsider these aspects in a few cases. In Union of India and
\nothers v.Valluri  Basavaiah Chowdhary  and others,  [1979] 3
\nSCC 324\t this Court,  in respect  of  effect  of  passing  a
\nresolution under  Article 252  of the  Constitution  by\t the
\nAndhra Pradesh Legislature, observed thus:\n<\/p>\n
     “The effect  of the  passing  of  a
\n     resolution\t under\t clause\t (1)  of
\n     Article  252   is\tthat  Parliament
\n     which has\tno  power  to  legislate
\n     with respect to the matter which is
\n     the  subject   of\tthe  resolution,
\n     becomes entitled  to legislate with
\n     respect to\t it. On\t the other hand,
\n     the  State\t Legislature  ceases  to
\n     have a power to make a law relating
\n     to that matter.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     It was further observed that:<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     “….It is\t not disputed  that  the
\n     subject-matter of Entry 18, List II
\n     of the Seventh Schedule i.e. `land’
\n     covers  `land  and\t buildings’  and
\n     would,    therefore,    necessarily
\n     include\t`vacant\t   land’.    The
\n     expression\t    `urban     immovable
\n     property’\tmay   mean,   land   and
\n     buildings\t or    `buildings’    or
\n     `lands’. It  would take in lands of
\n     every\t description\t   i.e.,
\n     agricultural land,\t urban\tland  or
\n     any other\tkind and  it necessarily
\n     includes vacant land.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     With regards  the concept of ceiling on urban immovable
\nproperty and the object underlying in passing the resolution
\nby the\tseveral State  Governments under  Article 252 it was
\nfurther observed in the above judgment thus:\n<\/p>\n
     “….A    Working\t   Group     was
\n     constituted under\tthe Chairmanship
\n     of\t the   Secretary,  Ministry   of
\n     Works,    Housing\t   and\t   Urban
\n     Development.  The\t report\t of  the
\n     Working  Group   shows   that   the
\n     proposal was to impose a ceiling on
\n     urban immovable  property.\t In  the
\n     report  the   said\t Working   Group
\n     defined `urban area’ to include the
\n     area within  the territorial limits
\n     of municipalities\tor  other  local
\n     bodies and also the peripheral area
\n     outside  the   said  limits.   Such
\n     inclusion of  the peripheral limits
\n     in an  urban area\twas accepted  by
\n     the Government  and  a  model  bill
\n     prepared in  pursuance thereof also
\n     contained such a definition. A copy
\n     of\t each\tof  the\t report\t of  the
\n     Working Group  and the  Model  Bill
\n     referred to was placed on the table
\n     of the  Parliament on  December 15,
\n     1970    and    March    22,    1972
\n     respectively.  The\t said  documents
\n     were   forwarded\tto   the   State
\n     Government\t  of   Andhra\tPradesh,
\n     besides  other  State  Governments,
\n     for  consideration\t  by  the  State
\n     Legislatures before  they passed  a
\n     resolution\t    authorising\t     the
\n     Parliament to make a law in respect
\n     of urban  immovable property. Their
\n     intention was  to include the lands
\n     within the\t territorial area  of an
\n     urban area\t and also its peripheral
\n     areas. The\t concept of  ceiling  on
\n     urban immovable  property\tand  the
\n     nature   and   content   of   urban
\n     agglomeration ultimately defined by
\n     Section 2(n)  of the  impugned  Act
\n     was, therefore,  fully, under stood
\n     by the State Governments.”\n<\/p>\n
     Some more observations in the above judgment read thus:<\/p>\n
     “It is  but axiomatic that once the
\n     legislatures of two or more States,
\n     by a resolution in terms of Article
\n     252(1),   abdicate or surrender the
\n     area,   i.e.    their   power    of
\n     legislation on a State subject, the
\n     Parliament is  competent to  make a
\n     law relating  to  the  subject.  It
\n     would indeed  be  contrary\t to  the
\n     terms of Article 252(1) to read the
\n     resolution\t passed\t  by  the  State
\n     legislature    subject    to    any
\n     restriction.    The     resolution,
\n     contemplated under\t Article  252(1)
\n     is not  hedged in\twith conditions.\n<\/p>\n
     In\t  making   such\t  a   law,   the
\n     Parliament was not bound to exhaust
\n     the whole\tfield of legislation. It
\n     could make\t a law, like the present
\n     Act, with\trespect\t to  ceiling  on
\n     vacant    land    in    an\t   urban
\n     agglomeration,  as\t  a  first  step
\n     towards the  eventual imposition of
\n     ceiling on\t immovable  property  of
\n     every other description.”\n<\/p>\n
     One other\tdecision also  arose from  State  of  Andhra
\nPradesh. In  Thumati Venkaiah’s\t case  Andhra  Pradesh\tLand
\nReforms (Ceiling  on Agricultural  Holdings)  Act  which  is
\nanalgous to Karnataka Land Reforms Act was challenged on the
\nground that  the subject  matter of the said law was covered
\nby the topic of the legislation transferred to Parliament by
\nthe resolution\tunder  Article\t252  passed  by\t the  Andhra
\nPradesh Legislative  Assembly and  that\t provisions  of\t the
\nCeiling Act  alone covered that subject and therefore Andhra
\nPradesh Land  Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act
\nwas unenforceable.  In\tthis  context  Supreme\tCourt  again
\nreiterated  the\t same  in  the\tsaid  decision.\t This  Court
\nproceeded to observe as under:\n<\/p>\n
     “The   effect    of   passing    of
\n     resolutions  by   the   Houses   of
\n     Legislature of  two or  more States
\n     under this constitutional provision
\n     is\t that\tParliament   which   has
\n     otherwise\tno  power  to  legislate
\n     with respect to a matter, except as
\n     provided in  Articles 249\tand 250,
\n     becomes entitled  to legislate with
\n     respect  to  such\tmatter\tand  the
\n     State  legislatures   passing   the
\n     resolutions cease\tto have power to
\n     make law  relating to  that matter.\n<\/p>\n
     The    resolutions\t   operate    as
\n     abdication\t or   surrender\t of  the
\n     powers of\tthe  State  legislatures
\n     with respect to the matter which is
\n     the subject  of the resolutions and
\n     such matter  is placed  entirely in
\n     the   hands   of\tParliament   and
\n     Parliament alone can then legislate
\n     with respect  to it.  It is  as  if
\n     such matter  is lifted  out of list
\n     II and  placed in\tList  I\t of  the
\n     Seventh\t Schedule     to     the
\n     Constitution.”\n<\/p>\n
     It was further observed that:\n<\/p>\n
     “The result  was that  at the  date
\n     when the  Andhra  Pradesh\tAct  was
\n     enacted,\tParliament   alone   was
\n     competent to legislate with respect
\n     to\t ceiling   on  urban   immovable
\n     property and  acquisition\tof  such
\n     property in  excess of  the ceiling
\n     and  all  connected,  ancillary  or
\n     incidental matters,  and the Andhra
\n     Pradesh Legislature  stood\t denuded
\n     of its  power to  legislate on that
\n     subject.”\n<\/p>\n
     On the effect of ceiling this Court
\n     stated thus:<\/p>\n
     “It will  thus  be\t seen  that  the
\n     Central Act  imposes a  ceiling  on
\n     holding   of    land    in\t   urban
\n     agglomeration other than land which
\n     is mainly\tused for  the purpose of
\n     agriculture and agriculture in this
\n     connection\t includes  horticulture,
\n     but   does not  include raising  of
\n     grass,   dairy   farming,\t poultry
\n     farming, breeding of live-stock and
\n     such cultivation  or the growing of
\n     such plants as may be prescribed by
\n     the Rules,\t and moreover,\tin order
\n     to fall  within the  exclusion, the
\n     land must be entered in the revenue
\n     or land record before the appointed
\n     day for  the purpose of agriculture
\n     and  must\t also  not   have   been
\n     specified in  the master plan for a
\n     purpose other than agriculture.”\n<\/p>\n
     Considering the  contention that  the whole  of  Andhra
\nPradesh Land  Reforms Act  was ultra  vires this  Court held
\nthus:\n<\/p>\n
     “The argument  of\tthe  landholders
\n     was that  the  Andhra  Pradesh  Act
\n     sought to impose ceiling on land in
\n     the   whole   of\tAndhra\t Pradesh
\n     including\tland  situate  in  urban
\n     agglomeration  defined  in\t Section
\n     2(n) of  the  Central  Act\t was  an
\n     expansive concept and any area with
\n     an existing or future population of
\n     more  than\t  one  lakh   could   be
\n     notified\t to    be    an\t   urban
\n     agglomeration,  the  whole\t of  the
\n     Andhra Pradesh  Act was ultra vires
\n     and  void\t as  being  outside  the
\n     legislative   competence\tof   the
\n     Andhra  Pradesh  Legislature.  This
\n     argument, plausible  though it  may
\n     seem,   is\t   in\t our\topinion,
\n     unsustainable. It is not doubt true
\n     that  if  the  Andhra  Pradesh  Act
\n     seeks to  impose  ceiling\ton  land
\n     falling\t within\t    an\t   urban
\n     agglomeration, it\twould be outside
\n     the   area\t  of   its   legislative
\n     competence, since it cannot provide
\n     for imposition  of ceiling on urban
\n     immovable property.  But  the  only
\n     urban agglomerations  in the  State
\n     of Andhra Pradesh recognised in the
\n     Central Act  were those referred to
\n     in Section 2(n)(A)(i) and there can
\n     be no  doubt that,\t so far as these
\n     urban agglomerations are concerned,
\n     it was  not within\t the legislative
\n     competence of  the\t Andhra\t Pradesh
\n     Legislature    to\t  provide    for
\n     imposition\t of   ceiling  on   land
\n     situate\twithin\t  these\t   urban
\n     agglomerations.  It   is,\thowever,
\n     difficult to  see\thow  the  Andhra
\n     Pradesh Act  could be  said  to  be
\n     outside the  legislative competence
\n     of the  Andhra Pradesh  Legislature
\n     insofar  as  land\tsituate\t in  the
\n     other areas  of the State of Andhra
\n     Pradesh is concerned. We agree that
\n     any other\tarea  in  the  State  of
\n     Andhra Pradesh with a population of
\n     more  than\t  one  lakh   could   be
\n     notified as  an urban agglomeration
\n     under Section  2(n) (A) (ii) of the
\n     Central Act,  but until  it  is  so
\n     notified it  would not  be an urban
\n     agglomeration   and    the\t  Andhra
\n     Pradesh  Legislature   would   have
\n     legislative competence  to\t provide
\n     for imposition  of ceiling\t on land
\n     situate within such area. No sooner
\n     such area\tis  notified  to  be  an
\n     urban  agglomeration,  the\t Central
\n     Act would apply in relation to land
\n     situate within such area, but until
\n     that happens,  the\t Andhra\t Pradesh
\n     Act would continue to be applicable
\n     to determine the ceiling on holding
\n     of land  in such  area. It\t may  be
\n     noted that\t the Andhra  Pradesh Act
\n     came into\tforce on January 1, 1975
\n     and it  was with  reference to this
\n     date that\tthe surplus  holding  of
\n     land in  excess of the ceiling area
\n     was required  to be  determined and
\n     if there was any surplus, it was to
\n     be\t  surrendered\tto   the   State
\n     Government. It  is therefore  clear
\n     that in  an area  other  than  that
\n     comprised\t   in\t   the\t   urban
\n     agglomerations   referred\t to   in
\n     Section 2(n)(A)(i),  land held by a
\n     person in\texcess\tof  the\t ceiling
\n     area  would   be\tliable\t to   be
\n     determined as  on January\t1,  1975
\n     under the\tAndhra Pradesh\tAct  and
\n     only land\twithin the  ceiling area
\n     would be  allowed\tto  remain  with
\n     him. It  is only in respect of land
\n     remaining with a person, whether an
\n     individual or  a family unit, after
\n     the operation of the Andhra Pradesh
\n     Act, the  Central Act  would apply,
\n     if and when the area in question is
\n     notified\t to    be    an\t   urban
\n     agglomeration     under\t Section
\n     2(n)(A)(ii) of  the Central Act. We
\n     fail to  see how  it can  at all be
\n     contended that  merely  because  an
\n     area may  possibly in the future be
\n     notified as  an urban agglomeration
\n     under Section  2(n)(A)(ii)\t of  the
\n     Central  Act,  the\t Andhra\t Pradesh
\n     Legislature  would\t cease\tto  have
\n     competence\t  to\tlegislate   with
\n     respect to\t ceiling on land situate
\n     in such  area, even  though it  was
\n     not an  urban agglomeration  at the
\n     date of  enactment\t of  the  Andhra
\n     Pradesh Act.  Undoubtedly, when  an
\n     area  is\tnotified  as   an  urban
\n     agglomeration     under\t Section
\n     2(n)(A)(ii), the  Central Act would
\n     apply to  land situate in such area
\n     and the  Andhra Pradesh  Act  would
\n     cease to  have application,  but by
\n     that time\tthe Andhra  Pradesh  Act
\n     would  have   already  operated  to
\n     determine the ceiling on holding of
\n     land falling  within the definition
\n     of Section\t 3(j) and situate within
\n     such  area.  It  is  therefore  not
\n     possible to  uphold the  contention
\n     of the  landholders that the Andhra
\n     Pradesh Act is ultra vires and void
\n     as being  outside\tthe  Legislative
\n     competence of  the\t Andhra\t Pradesh
\n     Legislature.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     The above\tobservations throw  a flood  of light on the
\nquestion involved  before us.  It can  be seen\tthat  entire
\npower to  legislate in\trespect of  several matters  falling
\nunder the wide scope of Entry 18 List II is not transferred.
\nThe power  transferred is  only in  respect of imposition of
\nceiling on  urban immovable  property. There  can be several
\ntopics in  respect of  the  subject  matters  of  regulatory
\nlegislations  governing\t  the  lands   or  other   immovable
\nproperties. The\t imposition of ceiling on owning property is
\none such  topic and  there can be laws regulating ceiling on
\nowing the  property,  relationship  of\tlessor\tand  lessee,
\npayment of rent, manner of granting the lease, conferment of
\nownership on  the lessee etc. It is the concept of a welfare
\nState  which  is  the  underlying  object  in  such  welfare
\nlegislations. When  viewed from\t that angle  it is axiomatic
\nthat imposition\t of ceiling  on urban land is a distinct and
\nindependent subject  as compared to imposition of ceiling on
\nowning or  holding agricultural\t land or  any other  kind of
\nproperty  which\t do  not  attract  the\tUrhan  Ceiling\tAct.
\nLikewise it  cannot be\tsaid that  the pith and substance of
\nthe law governing the conferment of ownership of land on the
\ntenant is a law regulating the imposition of ceiling on land
\nholding. Equally  it  cannot  be  said\tthat  the  pith\t and
\nsubstance of  the law  imposing the  ceiling on land holding
\ncovers the  subject of\tconferring ownership  of land on the
\ntenant. These  are two distinct powers and therefore the law
\nmaking\tcompetence  can\t be  in\t two  different\t legislative
\nbodies. Consequently  it  is  difficult\t to  hold  that\t the
\nprovisions of  Chapter III of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act
\nare  outside   the  legislative\t  competence  of  the  State
\nLegislature. In\t Calcutta Gas  Company (Proprietory) Ltd. v.
\nState of West Bengal and others<\/a>, AIR 1962 SC 1044 this Court
\nobserved as under:\n<\/p>\n
     “The entries in the three Lists are
\n     only legislative heads or fields of
\n     legislation;  they\t  demarcate  the
\n     area  over\t which\tthe  appropriate
\n     Legislatures  can\toperate.  It  is
\n     also  well\t  settled  that\t  widest
\n     amplitude should  be given\t to  the
\n     language of  the entries.\tBut some
\n     of the  entries  in  the  different
\n     Lists 1  or in  the same  Lists may
\n     overlap  and   sometimes  may  also
\n     appear to\tbe  in\tdirect\tconflict
\n     with each\tother. It  is  then  the
\n     duty of this Court to reconcile the
\n     entries  and  bring  about\t harmony
\n     between them.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     It is  well settled  that the  legislative power of the
\nState has  to be  reconciled with that of the Parliament and
\nthat in\t their\trespective  fields  each  is  supreme.\tEven
\nassuming that  the State  enactment has\t same effect  on the
\nsubject matter\tfalling within\tthe Parliament’s legislative
\ncompetence, that  by itself will not render such law invalid
\nor inoperative.\t In Kannan  Devan Hills Produce Company Ltd.
\nv. The\tState of  Kerala<\/a> etc.,\tAIR 1972  SC 2301 this Court
\nheld as under:\n<\/p>\n
     “It seems\tto  us\tclear  that  the
\n     State has legislative competence to
\n     legislate on  Entry 18, List II and
\n     Entry  42\t List  III.  This  power
\n     cannot be denied on the ground that
\n     it has  some effect  on an industry
\n     controlled under  Entry 52\t List 1.
\n     Effect is\tnot the\t same  thing  as
\n     subject matter.  If  a  State  Act,
\n     otherwise valid,  has effect  on  a
\n     matter in\tList I it does not cease
\n     to be a legislation with respect to
\n     an entry in List II or List III.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     However, in  the instant  case, we\t are clearly  of the
\nview that there is no conflict. The imposition of ceiling on
\nurban immovable\t property is an independent topic and cannot
\nbe construed  as to  nullify the  other subject\t left in the
\ndomain of  the State  Legislature under Entry 18 inasmuch as
\nimposition  of\t ceiling  is   a  distinct   and  separately
\nidentifiable subject  and does\tnot cover the other measures
\nsuch as regulation of relationship of landlord and tenant in
\nrespect of  which the  State Legislature  has competence  to
\nlegislate. Thus\t the one  topic that  is transferred  in the
\nresolution  passed   under  Article   252  is  distinct\t and
\nseparately identifiable\t and does  not include the remaining
\ntopics under  Entry 18\tin respect  of which the State alone
\nhas the power to legislate. An examination of the various
\nprovisions of  the State  Act makes  this aspect  clear. The
\nobject underlying  the Act  is to  make a uniform law in the
\nState  of   Karnataka  relating\t  to   agrarian\t  relations,
\nconferment of ownership on tenants, ceiling on land holdings
\netc. Chapter  II of  the  Act  contains\t general  provisions
\nregarding   tenancy,\tdeemed\t tenancy,    regulation\t  of
\nrelationship between landlord and tenant etc. Sections 44 to
\n62 of  Chapter III  provide for vesting of tenanted lands in
\nthe State  Government with effect from 1.3.74 and conferment
\nof occupancy  rights on\t the tenants. Chapter V controls the
\neligibility  to\t purchase  or  possess\tagricultural  lands.
\nChapters VI  to XI  have  many\tother  provisions  regarding
\nagrarian reforms.  We, however,\t find  a  ceiling  provision
\nunder Section 45(2) providing for computation of the area in
\nrespect of which the tenant may be granted occupancy rights.
\nBut it\tis clear that ceiling on the area in this context is
\nonly for  the purpose  of Section  45. These  are all topics
\nregarding  the\t conferment  of\t  occupancy  rights  on\t the
\nrespective tenants  and they do not in any way conflict with
\nthe subject  matter transferred\t to the\t Parliament  by\t the
\nresolution passed  under  Section  252.\t Consequently  these
\nSpecial Leave Petitions are dismissed.
\nPetitions dismissed.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Krishna Bhimrao Deshpande vs Land Tribunal, Dharwad And Ors on 3 November, 1992 Bench: [Lalit Mohan Reddy, Jj.] PETITIONER: KRISHNA BHIMRAO DESHPANDE Vs. RESPONDENT: LAND TRIBUNAL, DHARWAD AND ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT03\/11\/1992 BENCH: [LALIT MOHAN SHARMA AND K. JAYACHANDRA REDDY, JJ.] ACT: Constitution of India, 1950: Article 252 read with Schedule […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-59281","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nKrishna Bhimrao Deshpande vs Land Tribunal, Dharwad And Ors on 3 November, 1992 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/krishna-bhimrao-deshpande-vs-land-tribunal-dharwad-and-ors-on-3-november-1992\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Krishna Bhimrao Deshpande vs Land Tribunal, Dharwad And Ors on 3 November, 1992 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/krishna-bhimrao-deshpande-vs-land-tribunal-dharwad-and-ors-on-3-november-1992\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"1992-11-02T18:30:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2017-11-19T22:03:30+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@legaliadmin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@Legal_india\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"75 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/krishna-bhimrao-deshpande-vs-land-tribunal-dharwad-and-ors-on-3-november-1992#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/krishna-bhimrao-deshpande-vs-land-tribunal-dharwad-and-ors-on-3-november-1992\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\"},\"headline\":\"Krishna Bhimrao Deshpande vs Land Tribunal, Dharwad And Ors on 3 November, 1992\",\"datePublished\":\"1992-11-02T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2017-11-19T22:03:30+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/krishna-bhimrao-deshpande-vs-land-tribunal-dharwad-and-ors-on-3-november-1992\"},\"wordCount\":13354,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"articleSection\":[\"Supreme Court of India\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/krishna-bhimrao-deshpande-vs-land-tribunal-dharwad-and-ors-on-3-november-1992#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/krishna-bhimrao-deshpande-vs-land-tribunal-dharwad-and-ors-on-3-november-1992\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/krishna-bhimrao-deshpande-vs-land-tribunal-dharwad-and-ors-on-3-november-1992\",\"name\":\"Krishna Bhimrao Deshpande vs Land Tribunal, Dharwad And Ors on 3 November, 1992 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"1992-11-02T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2017-11-19T22:03:30+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/krishna-bhimrao-deshpande-vs-land-tribunal-dharwad-and-ors-on-3-november-1992#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/krishna-bhimrao-deshpande-vs-land-tribunal-dharwad-and-ors-on-3-november-1992\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/krishna-bhimrao-deshpande-vs-land-tribunal-dharwad-and-ors-on-3-november-1992#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Krishna Bhimrao Deshpande vs Land Tribunal, Dharwad And Ors on 3 November, 1992\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"name\":\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"description\":\"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"alternateName\":\"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"alternateName\":\"Legal India\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"width\":512,\"height\":512,\"caption\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.facebook.com\\\/LegalindiaCom\\\/\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/Legal_india\"]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\",\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Legal India Admin\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/legaliadmin\"],\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/author\\\/legal-india-admin\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Krishna Bhimrao Deshpande vs Land Tribunal, Dharwad And Ors on 3 November, 1992 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/krishna-bhimrao-deshpande-vs-land-tribunal-dharwad-and-ors-on-3-november-1992","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Krishna Bhimrao Deshpande vs Land Tribunal, Dharwad And Ors on 3 November, 1992 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","og_url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/krishna-bhimrao-deshpande-vs-land-tribunal-dharwad-and-ors-on-3-november-1992","og_site_name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","article_published_time":"1992-11-02T18:30:00+00:00","article_modified_time":"2017-11-19T22:03:30+00:00","og_image":[{"width":512,"height":512,"url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Legal India Admin","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@legaliadmin","twitter_site":"@Legal_india","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Legal India Admin","Est. reading time":"75 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/krishna-bhimrao-deshpande-vs-land-tribunal-dharwad-and-ors-on-3-november-1992#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/krishna-bhimrao-deshpande-vs-land-tribunal-dharwad-and-ors-on-3-november-1992"},"author":{"name":"Legal India Admin","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea"},"headline":"Krishna Bhimrao Deshpande vs Land Tribunal, Dharwad And Ors on 3 November, 1992","datePublished":"1992-11-02T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2017-11-19T22:03:30+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/krishna-bhimrao-deshpande-vs-land-tribunal-dharwad-and-ors-on-3-november-1992"},"wordCount":13354,"commentCount":0,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"articleSection":["Supreme Court of India"],"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/krishna-bhimrao-deshpande-vs-land-tribunal-dharwad-and-ors-on-3-november-1992#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/krishna-bhimrao-deshpande-vs-land-tribunal-dharwad-and-ors-on-3-november-1992","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/krishna-bhimrao-deshpande-vs-land-tribunal-dharwad-and-ors-on-3-november-1992","name":"Krishna Bhimrao Deshpande vs Land Tribunal, Dharwad And Ors on 3 November, 1992 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website"},"datePublished":"1992-11-02T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2017-11-19T22:03:30+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/krishna-bhimrao-deshpande-vs-land-tribunal-dharwad-and-ors-on-3-november-1992#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/krishna-bhimrao-deshpande-vs-land-tribunal-dharwad-and-ors-on-3-november-1992"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/krishna-bhimrao-deshpande-vs-land-tribunal-dharwad-and-ors-on-3-november-1992#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Krishna Bhimrao Deshpande vs Land Tribunal, Dharwad And Ors on 3 November, 1992"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","description":"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"alternateName":"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization","name":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","alternateName":"Legal India","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","width":512,"height":512,"caption":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","https:\/\/x.com\/Legal_india"]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea","name":"Legal India Admin","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Legal India Admin"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com","https:\/\/x.com\/legaliadmin"],"url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/author\/legal-india-admin"}]}},"modified_by":null,"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/59281","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=59281"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/59281\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=59281"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=59281"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=59281"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}