{"id":60773,"date":"1995-03-10T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1995-03-09T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-municipal-corporation-for-vs-bharat-forge-co-ltd-ors-on-10-march-1995"},"modified":"2015-07-31T22:16:11","modified_gmt":"2015-07-31T16:46:11","slug":"the-municipal-corporation-for-vs-bharat-forge-co-ltd-ors-on-10-march-1995","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-municipal-corporation-for-vs-bharat-forge-co-ltd-ors-on-10-march-1995","title":{"rendered":"The Municipal Corporation For … vs Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. & Ors on 10 March, 1995"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
The Municipal Corporation For … vs Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. & Ors on 10 March, 1995<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1995 SCC (3) 434, \t JT 1995 (3)\t312<\/div>\n
Author: H B.L.<\/div>\n
Bench: Hansaria B.L. (J)<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nTHE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION FOR CITY OF PUNE AND ANR.\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nBHARAT FORGE CO. LTD. & ORS.\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT10\/03\/1995\n\nBENCH:\nHANSARIA B.L. (J)\nBENCH:\nHANSARIA B.L. (J)\nKULDIP SINGH (J)\nMAJMUDAR S.B. (J)\n\nCITATION:\n 1995 SCC  (3) 434\t  JT 1995 (3)\t312\n 1995 SCALE  (2)245\n\n\nACT:\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
HANSARIA, J.:\n<\/p>\n
1.  The jouney to decide the fate of these  appeals  has  to
\nstart from 1881 as it was on
\n314<\/span>
\n12th  March  of\t that  Notification  No.  165  was  gazetted
\nstarting    inter     alia  that  octroi   duties   in\t the
\nCantonment of Poona would be, imposed at the rates “for\t the
\ntime being” leviable and in respect of the several  articles
\n“for time being” dutiable in the Municipality of Poona, when
\nsuch  articles\twould enter in to the  cantonment  from\t any
\nplace  situate without the limits of the said  Municipality,
\nThe  Poona  Cantonment Bowl authorised the  Municipality  to
\ncollect\t the  octroi  which  had  become  so  leviable\t and
\nthereafter  to\tdivide\tthe proceeds as\t agreed\t upon.\t The
\nMunicipality of Poona having become a Corporation under\t the
\nMunicipal  Corporation 1950, it continued to collect  octroi
\non the strength of the aforesaid Notification and agreement.
\nThe  respondents challenged the legality, of the  collection
\nof the octroi made as per 1963 Schedule to the Octroi  Rules
\nframed\tby  the appellant This was done by  approaching\t the
\nBombay\tHigh Court by filing petitions under Article 226  of
\nthe  Constitution  which  have come to\tbe  allowed  by\t the
\nimpugned  judgment.   Hence these appeals by  the  Municipal
\nCorporation  for the City of Pune, hereinafter\treferred  as
\nthe Municipal Corporation.\n<\/p>\n
2.The challenge to the collection was broadly on two counts:
\n(1)The\t 1881  Notification  does  not\tinfact\tpermit\t the
\ncollection; and
\n(2)even if factually the Notification were to so permit, the
\nappellant could not have done so in law..\n<\/p>\n
3.The\tHigh  Court  accepted  both  the  contentions,\t the
\ncorrectness of which has been assailed in these appeals.
\nFactual matrix\n<\/p>\n
4.   Poona  Cantonment (the Cantonment) came into  existence
\nin 1817.  The Bombay Municipal Act, 1872, provided for\tlevy
\nof  taxes  including octroi.  Similar was the  provision  in
\nBombay\t District   Municipal\tAct,   1873.\tPoona\tCity
\nMunicipality started levy and recovery of octroi from  1875-\n<\/p>\n
76.  The Cantonments Act, 1880 was enacted on 5th  February,
\n1980.\tSection 21 of this Act permitted imposition  by\t the
\nLocal\tGovernment,  with  the\tprevious  sanction  of\t the
\nGovernor-General in Council, by notification in the Official
\nGazette,  any tax which could be imposed in a  Municipality.
\nSection\t 22  of this Act permitted the Local  Government  by
\nnotification  in Official Gazette to apply and adapt to\t any
\ncantonment provisions and rules in force under any enactment
\nfor assessment and recovery, of any tax in Municipality.\n<\/p>\n
5.   The  Government  of Bombay by its\tResolution  No.\t 234
\nadopted\t on  26.1.1881 approved the levy of  octroi  in\t the
\nCantonment  on\tthe same articles and the same\trate  as  in
\nPoona  City;  and  it approved the proposal  to\t divide\t the
\nproceeds  on  some  terms,  the details\t of  which  are\t not
\nrequired to be noted.  The Government of India conveyed\t its
\nsanction  to  the levy of octroi in the\t Cantonment  by\t its
\ntelegram  dated\t 4.3.1881.  Thereafter\tcame  the  aforesaid
\nNotification  of  12th\tMarch,\t1881  and  the\tMunicipality
\nstarted collection of octroi duties for the Cantonment\tfrom
\nthat year itself.\n<\/p>\n
6.   The aforesaid arrangement smoothly continued till\t1912
\nby  which  year the Cantonment Act of 191 0  had  come\tinto
\nforce.\t  The  Cantonment  then\t wanted\t a  new\t method\t  of
\napportionment as it thought that
\n315<\/span>
\nthe existing agreement relating to apportionment was  unjust
\nto it, The State Government did not, however, agree and\t the
\ndisagreement   was   conveyed  to   the\t  Cantonment.\t The
\nMunicipality proposed to revise its Schedule of Octroi Rules
\nin  1917  by enhancing the same, which was  opposed  by\t the
\nCantonment  Committee.\tOn the matter being examined by\t the
\nGovernment  it\tapproved  the  revised\tOctroi\tSchedule  as
\nmentioned  in its Order No.6649 dated 25th September,  1918.
\nThis  Order required the General Officer Commanding  of\t the
\nCantonment to be informed that the Government saw no  reason
\nto modify its earlier decision.\n<\/p>\n
7.   In\t the  meantime,\t the  Government  had  issued\tfour
\nnotifications  bearing\tNos. 4160 to 4163 dated\t 17th  June,
\n1918 which were gazetted on June 20, 1918.  Notification No-
\n4160  had  been issued in exercise of  powers  conferred  by
\nsection\t 15(1) of the Cantonments Act, 1910 and\t it  imposed
\ntaxes  mentioned in this Notification in the  Cantonment  of
\nPoona\t“in  supersession  of  the  notifications   of\t the
\nGovernment  noted on the margin and all other  notifications
\non  the same subject.” Notification No. 4162 had  also\tbeen
\nissued in exercise of the same power and it dealt inter alia
\nwith octroi duties.  Notification No. 4163 was, however\t  in
\nexercise  of  powers  conferred\t by  section  15(2)  of\t the
\naforesaid  Act and applied to the Cantonment of Poona in  an
\nadapted\t form  the  rules of  the  Poona  City\tMunicipality
\nmentioned in Notification relating to assessment  collection
\nand recovery of octroi duties.\n<\/p>\n
8.   After  the\t aforesaid  Notifications  had\tbean  issued
\nCantonment Act. 1924 was enacted.  Chapter V of this Act  is
\non the subject of ‘Taxation’; and sections 60 to 63 of\tthis
\nChapter\t set out the power and procedure of  imposition,  of
\nany tax in any cantonment. (A part of this Act was  repealed
\nin 1927).\n<\/p>\n
9.   In 1963 new Octroi Ruts were tamed by   the   appellant
\nwhich enhanced the rates of   octroi   and   included\t new
\narticles  in the schedule and it started  collecting  octroi
\naccordingly from all concerned.\n<\/p>\n
Submissions\n<\/p>\n
10.  In\t  the  backdrop\t of  aforesaid\tbroad\tfacts,\t the
\nrespondents  challenged\t the  collection of  octroi  by\t the
\nappellant as per revised Rules of 1963 contending that\tnei-
\nther in fact nor in law the appellant had ‘authority of law’
\nrequired by Article 265 of the Constitution to carry on\t the
\nwork of collection of octroi from them as per 1963  schedule
\nwhich enhanced the rates of octroi and included new articles
\nin the schedule.\n<\/p>\n
11.  The factual aspects of the submission were:-
\n(1)  The 1881 Notification having stated that octroi  duties
\nat the rates “for the time being” dutiable, are imposed, the
\nrates  which  were prevailing on 12th March,  1881  and\t the
\narticles  on  which octroi was leviable on that\t date  alone
\ncould  be collected by the appellant; and not at  the  rates
\nmentioned  in  the  Schedule of 1963 Octroi  Rules,  nor  on
\narticles added by those Rules.\n<\/p>\n
(2)  The 1881 notification in any Case, stood superseded  by
\nthe fasiculus of Notifications dated June 18, 1918 which had
\nbeen duly gazetted.\n<\/p>\n
316<\/span><\/p>\n
(3)if  the, later Notifications did not supersede  the\t1881
\nNotification, the same, in any case, impliedly repealed\t the
\nformer.\n<\/p>\n
12.  The legal affirmity of the collection was\t  assailed
\non these counts :-\n<\/p>\n
(1)  The  appellants  not having entered into  an  agreement
\nwith  the Cantonment as required by Section 45(1)(b) of\t the
\nCantonments  Act,  1924,  so also by section  32(4)  of\t the
\nBombay\tProvincial Municipal Corporations Act,\t1949,  after
\nnew Octroi Rules were framed in 1963, it had no authority to
\ncollect octroi on behalf of the Cantonment.
\n(2)  If\t the Notification of 1881 were to be held to  permit
\nlevy  and  collection of octroi not only on  the  rates\t and
\narticles  as prevailing on 12th March, 1881 but on  articles
\nother  than  those and\/or at rates higher  than\t those,\t the
\nnotification   is   unsustainable   being   a\tproduct\t  of
\nimpermissible delegation.\n<\/p>\n
(3)  The  procedure  contemplated  by  section\t62  of\t the
\nCantonments  Act,  1924\t having\t not  been  followed   while
\nenhancing  the\trates of octroi duties by 1963\tRules,\tcol-
\nlection\t of the same at the enhanced rate would\t be  against
\n‘authority of law.’\n<\/p>\n
13.  We propose to deal with the submissions seriatim.
\nReach of the 1881 Notification\n<\/p>\n
14.  The  basic point which would need our consideration  to
\nanswer\tthis question is to find out what was meant  by\t the
\nexpression “for die time being” used twice in the  aforesaid
\nNotification.\tAccording to S\/Shri Shanti Bhusan  and\tAnil
\nDivan\tlearned\t  Senior   Advocates   appearing   for\t the
\nrespondents,  this expression refers to the rates of  octroi
\nwhich were prevailing at the time when the notification\t was
\nissued;\t and  octroi on the articles or at the\trates  which
\nbecame effective after the Notification saw the light of day
\ncannot\tbe  imposed or collected with the aid  of  this\t no-
\ntification.\n<\/p>\n
15.  In support of this submission, reliance has been placed
\non  a  judgment of this Court, to which one  of\t us  (Kuldip
\nSingh,\t J.)  was  it  pang,  in  Jivendra  Nath   Kaul\t  v.
\nCollector\/District Magistrate and<\/a> another, 1992 (3) SCC 576.
\nIn  that  case,\t this Court was concerned to  find  out\t the
\npurport\t of  this expression used in section  28(1)  of\t the
\nconcerned  provisions, which dealt with the question  as  to
\nwhen  a\t motion of no confidence can be said to\t be  carried
\nout.  The section required support of more than half of\t the
\ntotal number of members “for the time being.” The contention
\nadvanced was that as the Zila Parishad was constituted of 62
\nmembers,  but as 31 valid votes had been cast in  favour  of
\nthe no-confidence motion, which number was not was not\tmore
\nthan  half of 62, the motion could not be said to have\tbeen
\ncarried\t out as required by the statutory  provision.\tThis
\nCourt stated that die expression “for the time being ” meant
\n“at the moment or existing position”; and as at the time no-
\nconfidence motion was taken up, the total number of  members
\nof  the\t Zila  Parishad\t was  56,  it  was  held  that\t the
\nrequirement of law was satisfied.\n<\/p>\n
16.  Learned  Advocate General of Maharastra  appearing\t for
\nthe  appellant,\t however, contends that\t the  aforesaid\t ex-
\npression  has  no  fixed  connotation  and  is\tcapable\t  of
\ndifferent interpretation accord-\n<\/p>\n
317<\/span><\/p>\n
ing  to the context.  This is was what been stated  at\tpage
\n257  of\t Volume 2 of “Words and Phrases”  (Second  Edition).
\nAccording  to the statement made there, this  expression  in
\none context may point to “one single period of time”; and in
\nanother context to “succession of periods.”\n<\/p>\n
17.  That   the\t aforesaid  expression\tmeans,\tas  is\t the
\ncontention on behalf of the appellant receives support\tfrom
\nwhat was pointed out by a Constitution Bench in the case  of
\nMadhav\tRao Scindia Bahadur v. Union of India, 1971 (1)\t SCC\n<\/p>\n
85.   In that case, to which our attention has been  invited
\nby  the\t learned  Advocate General, while  dealing  with  be
\nmeaning\t of the word “Ruler” as defined by Article 366\t(22)
\nof  the Constitution, which had stated at that time that  it
\nincluded  any person “for the time being” recognized by\t the
\nPresident  as  the  successor of the  Ruler  with  whom\t any
\nagreement  had\tbeen  entered  into  and  who  had  been  so
\nrecognized by the President it was observed in paragraph 112
\nthat  the  expression “for the time being”  predicates\tthat
\nthere shall be a Ruler of Indian State and that if the first
\nrecognised Ruler dies, or ceases to be a Ruler, a  successor
\nshall  be appointed, and that there shall not be more  Ruler
\nthan  one at a given time.  This observation indicates\tthat
\nthe  recognition  given\t by the President is  not  one\ttime
\nrecognition, but the same could be bout time to time.\n<\/p>\n
18.  That  die intention of the concerned authorities  while
\nissuing\t the  Notification at hand was not confined  to\t the
\nrates prevailing or articles subjected to octroi on the date
\nof  Notification  is  apparent,\t according  to\tthe  learned
\nAdvocate-General,  from what has been  recorded\t contempora-
\nneously\t in  the Government file, a zerox copy\tof  relevant
\nnothings of which has been made available to us by him.\t  At
\npage 13 of this collection we find mention of the fact\tthat
\nrates  of  octroi duties to be imposed and the\tarticles  on
\nwhich  octroi is to be imposed in the Cantonment were to  be
\nso  as\tenforced in the Municipality “from  time  to  time”,
\nThere is also enough material on record to show that  octroi
\nat  rates  prevailing subsequent to the\t date  of  aforesaid
\nnotification had come to be collected by the Municipality on
\nbehalf of the Cantonment for a sufficient long period  after
\nthe  issuance  of 1881 Notification.   Thus,  all  concerned
\npersons had accepted the aforesaid Notification to mean that
\nthe  rates  (so also the articles) need not be\tthose  which
\nprevailed when the Notification was issued.\n<\/p>\n
19.  In\t view  of  all\tthe above, we  hold  that  the\t1881
\nNotification was meant to impose octroi duties, not only  at
\nthe  rates prevailing when the Notification was issued,\t nor
\nwas  confined  to  the articles on  which  octroi  was\tlien
\nleviable, but these could be collected at rates higher\tthan
\nthose\tprevailing   at\t the  time  of\t issuance   of\t the
\nNotification,  or  could  be levied  on\t articles  then\t not
\nsubject to octroi.\n<\/p>\n
Supersession of 1881 Notification\n<\/p>\n
20.  The submission relating to supersession is advanced  on
\nthe strength of what was stated in Notifications Nos.  4160-
\n4163  dated 17th June, 1918.  Shri Divan was  very  emphatic
\nthat  if  these four notifications are read as a  whole,  as
\nthey  are required to be, there would be no manner of  doubt
\nthat   the  1881  Notification\trelating  to  octroi   stood
\nsuperseded.    This  contention\t is   equally\temphatically
\nchallenged by the learned Advocate General.\n<\/p>\n
318<\/span><\/p>\n
21.  We have closely perused the aforesaid Notification\t and
\nwe do agree with Shri Divan that they form a complete scheme
\nin  themselves relating to tax in the Cantonment  of  Poona;
\nand  what  has\tbeen stated  in\t these\tNotifications  would
\nprevail insofar as taxes to be imposed in the Cantonment  is
\nconcerned,  in\tpreference of earlier Notifications  on\t the
\nsubject.  Question, however, is whether I can be said on the
\nlanguage   of\tthe  1918  Notifications,  that\t  the\t1881
\nNotification  relating\tto  octroi  stood  superseded.\t ‘it
\ndeserves  mention that Notification No. 4160 alone,  of\t the
\nfour  Notifications, expressly stated about supersession  of
\nthe-Notifications   mentioned\tin  the\t  margin   of\tthis
\nNotification.\tShri Divan draws our attention that  of\t the
\nfour   Notifications  mentioned\t in  the  margin,   one\t  is
\nGovernment Notification No, 481 dated 18th September,  1891,
\nwhich had superseded Government Notification No. 574 of\t 5th
\nDecember,   1883,   which  in  its   turn   had\t  superseded
\nNotification  No.  165 of 2th March, 1881. Relying  on\tthis
\nhistorical  setting, it is urged that Notification No.\t4160
\nmust  be  held to have superseded the Notification  of\t12th
\nMarch, 1881 relating to octroi also.\n<\/p>\n
22.  The  learned Advocate General joins issue\tand  submits
\nthat Notification No. 4160 having not dealt with the subject
\noctroi, what can reasonably be said to have been  superseded
\nby  this  Notification qua the Notification of\t12th  March,
\n1881  which  had dealt not only with the octroi\t duties\t but
\nProperty  Rates\t also,\tI that\tdie  supersession  of  which
\nNotification  No.  4160 mentioned, is of those\ttaxes  which
\nWere the subject of that Notification.\tIt is contended that
\nthis Notification stated about suppression of  notifications
\n“on   the,  same  subject”,  which,  according\tto   learned
\nAdvocate,  General,  means the subject dealt  with  by\tthat
\nNotification.\n<\/p>\n
23.  We\t do  find sufficient force in this  submission\tand,
\naccording  to  us,  it would not be  a\tcorrect\t reading  of
\nNotification  Nos.  4160 to hold that  it  superseded  Noti-
\nfication on 12th March, 1881 in its entirety.  In our  view,
\nthe  supersession has to be confined to taxes  mentioned  in
\nNotification  No.4160. Octroi being not one of these  taxes,
\nwe   hold   that  Notification\tdid   not   supersede\t1881
\nNotification  qua octroi.  This conclusion of ours  receives
\nsupport\t from what has been stated in  Notification  No.4162
\nwhich  has  specifically  dealt with  imposition  of  octroi
\nduties and trade registration fees.\n<\/p>\n
Implied repeal of 1881 Notification relating to octroi\n<\/p>\n
24.  The alternative submission of Shri Divan\t  in\tthis
\ncontext\t is that, in any case, Notification No. 4162 has  to
\nbe  read  to have impliedly repeated 1881  Notification\t re-
\nlating to octroi duties.  We find no difficulty in accepting
\nthis  submission, because Notification 14a 4162 which is  on
\nthe  subject  of  imposition  of  octroi  duties  has\tbeen
\nsupplemented   by   Notification  No.  4163   dealing\twith
\nassessment collection and recovery, of octroi duties.\tThis
\naspect\thas  been  dealt  with\tby  section  15(2)  of\t the
\nCantonments Act, 1910; the imposition being covered by\tsub-
\nsection\t (1) of this section.  As these\t Notifications\twere
\nissued with the previous sanction of the Governor-General in
\nCouncil,  we have no hesitation in stating that\t by  issuing
\nNotifications  No.4162 and 4163, the issuing  authority\t did
\nimpliedly repeal Notification of 1881 dealing with octroi.\n<\/p>\n
319<\/span><\/p>\n
25.  The  learned Advocate General does not  really  contest
\nthe  legal  position, What, however, has been urged  by\t him
\nthat   the  Notification  No.  of  1918\t dealing  with\t the
\nimposition  of octroi and rates thereof had not\t been  acted
\nupon and a decision had in act been taken to formally cancel
\nthese  Notifications,  which,  however,\t did  not   actually
\nhappen.\t Despite non-cancellation of these Notifications  as
\nrequired  by section 21 of the General Clauses Act,  as\t per
\nwhich  provision  any  addition,  amendment,  variation\t  or
\nrescission  of\tany  notification has to  be  “in  the\tlike
\nmanner”\t and “subject to the like sanction” as the  issuance
\nof  notification, the contention is that if we were to\tbear
\nin   mind   the\t practical  construction  given\t  to   these
\nNotifications,\tit  would  be apparent that  they  were\t not
\nsought to be acted upon.  Another related submission is that
\nthese  Notifications should be deemed to have  good  effaced
\nbecause of disuse for almost 50 years by 1963, as  permitted
\nby the legal process known as “desuetude”\n<\/p>\n
26.  Shri Divan and Shri Shanti Bhushan would not agree with
\nthe  learned Advocate General, because, according to them  a
\nstatutory  notification\t could\tnot be\tset  at\t naught\t any
\nexecutive  decision,  which  is\t the  basis  of\t the   first
\nsubmission  of\tthe learned Advocate  General  relatable  to
\npractical construction.\t The learned counsel for respondents
\nsubmit that the Local Government knew that even an amendment
\nof these Notifications could be made only by publication  in
\nofficial gazette, because of which the little omission which
\nhad  occurred in the Notification No.4163 had been  supplied
\nby   a\tcorrigendum  published\tin  official  gazette,\t Our
\nattention  is invited to what was stated on this subject  in
\nMahender Lal Jaine v.  State of Uttar Pradesh, 1963  (Suppl)
\n1  SCR 912 at page 951.\t In the written submissions  of\t the
\nrespondent-:, filed on 31st January, it has been  mentioned,
\nand  rightly,  that administrative practice  (and  for\tthat
\nmatter,\t administrative order) cannot supersede or  override
\nstatutory  rule or Notification.  Some decisions  have\talso
\nbeen mentioned in this regard to which we are not adverting,
\nbecause this legal proposition is well settled.\n<\/p>\n
27.  As\t we  are agreeing with the learned counsel  for\t the
\nrespondents on the legal aspect we do not propose to  burden
\nthe judgment with the long factual facts, highlighted by the
\nlearned\t Advocate General by referring to  Government  Order
\nNo. 6649 dated 25th September, 1918 (at pages 472 to 482  of
\nPart-II\t of the Paper Book) that die Notifications  of\tJune
\n1918  relating\tto octroi duties were not  acted  upon.\t  We
\nwould not be justified in allowing the Local Government,  or
\neven the Governor-in Council, to undo a notification  issued
\nwith  the previous sanction of Governor-General in  Council.
\nAccording  to us, the only legal way in which  Notifications
\nNo.4162 and 4163 could have been reminded was by issuance of
\nanother Notification in the like manner and subject to\tlike
\nsanction  prevailing  as when those were issued.   It  would
\nalso  be  hazardous  to\t allow\tan  executive  authority  to
\nobliterate  a  statutory Notification.\tWe would  take\tthis
\nview,  more so, being concerned with a subject\twhich  fell,
\nnot within the domain of the Provincial Government, but\t the
\nCentral Government, as did the subject of cantonment.\n<\/p>\n
28.  What   has\t  been\t stated\t  relating   to\t  “executive
\nconstruction”  or  “practical  construction”  in  Crawford’s
\n‘Interpretation of Laws at pages 393 to 401, watch has been
\n320<\/span>
\nrelied\ton  by\tthe  learned  Advocate\tGeneral,  would\t not
\npersuade us to agree with him in this submission, though  it
\nmay be permissible to take note of post-enactment history to
\nfind  out  as  to how an enactment  was\t understood  on\t the
\nprinciple  of  “contemporanea expositio”, of  which  mention
\nhave  been made at pages 551 et. seq. of  Francis  Bennions’
\n“Statutory  Interpretation”  (1984).  The  learned  Advocate
\nGeneral\t is  not  relying  on the  statements  made  in\t the
\naforesaid  Government Order for the purpose of\tinterpreting
\nthe   two  Notifications,  but\tfor  contending\t  that\t the
\nNotifications  had  stood effaced because of what  had\tbeen
\nstated therein.\n<\/p>\n
29.  On\t the  principle of ‘contemporanea  expositio’  also,
\nwhich is available to find out how a statutory provision has
\nbeen  understood  by  those whose duty it  is  to  construe,
\nexecute and apply, as mentioned at pages 659-60 of  Polestar
\nElectronics  (P)  Ltd. v. Addl.\t  Commissioner,\t Sales\tTax,<\/a>
\n1978-1 SCC 636 and at page 383 of Deshbandhu Gupta v.  Delhi
\nStock  Exchange, 1979-3 SCR 373 (to which our attention\t has
\nbeen  invited  by the Advocate General through\this  written
\nArguments filed on 21 1 A 995), we have two observations  to
\nmake.  First, this principle is not decisive or\t controlling
\nof  the\t question of construction; it  has  only  persuasive
\nvalue.\tIf occasion arises, such interpretation may be\teven
\ndisregarded and in a clear case of error court would without
\nhesitation  refuse to follow such construction. (See  obser-
\nvations\t of Mukherji J. in Balaeswar v. Bhagirathi,  ILR  35
\nal.701\tnoted in Deshbandhu’s Case).  Secondly,\t as  already
\nstated, reliance is being placed on the nothings in the file
\nnot  to\t interpret  the Notifications in  question,  but  to
\ndeclare\t then as dead.\tThis is not permissible.   Not\tonly
\nthis,  Shri  Divan  has objection to  the  reliance  on\t the
\nnotings\t  made\tin  the\t file  even  for  the\tpurpose\t  of
\ninterpretation\tof  the Notifications, in support  of  which
\nsubmission he has referred to what was stated in para 39  of
\nDoypack\t Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India,<\/a> 1988\t (2)
\nSCC  299.   As to the reliance on the decision\tin  Polestar
\nElectronics’  case,  it has been mentioned  in\tthe  written
\nsubmissions filed on behalf of the respondents that in\tthat
\ncase  itself it was stated at page 660 that the view of\t the
\nDepartment as to the meaning of a statute administered by it
\nis  not admissible as an aid to construction because  “wrong
\npractice does not make the law.” It has been further  argued
\nthat the present was, in any case, not a case of a statutory
\nprovision  being  interpreted by, the Department,  in  which
\ncase it may be that the interpretation put upon it has\tsome
\nsanction, if there be long acquiescence by the legislature,,
\nas  mentioned in Maxwell’s Interpretation of  the  Statutes,
\nnoted in the aforesaid decision at page 660.
\nQuasi-repeal of 1918 Notifications due to desuetude.\n<\/p>\n
30.  Learned Advocate-General’s another submission  relating
\nto implied repeal is that the 1918 Notifications having\t not
\nbeen  acted upon must be taken to have become a dead  letter
\nbecause\t of  its  long disuse and the  same  stood  repealed
\nbecause\t of the legal process known as desuetude.  He  draws
\nour  attention\tto what has been stated in  this  regard  in
\nFrancis\t Bennion’s  ‘Statutory\tInterpretation’\t where\tthis
\nmatter has been dealt at pages 441 and 442 of 1984  Edition.
\nIt  is\tstated there that desuetude is a  legal\t process  by
\nwhich,\tthrough disobedience and lack of enforcement over  a
\nlong period, a statute may loose its force with-\n<\/p>\n
321<\/span><\/p>\n
out  express  or  implied repeal.   This  doctrine  has\t not
\nhowever, been accepted in United Kingdom for the reason that
\notherwise  an  inquiry would be needed\tbefore\tthe  subject
\ncould  know  whether  or not an enactment  would  bind\thim.
\nUnder  Scots Law, however, this doctrine has  been  applied.
\nAs to the English Law the further commentary is that  though
\nthis doctrine has no application, an Act may in practice  be
\n‘dead  letter’,\t which\twould be so if the  Act\t falls\tinto
\ndisuse\tor is not applied as intended.\tIn  this  connection
\nBacon’s\t dictum: ‘ ………….let penal laws, if they\t had
\nbeen  sleepers\tfor long be confined in\t the  execution’  is
\nquoted.\t  Reference has also been made to what\thappened  to
\nthe  Limitation Act, 1623, apart from mentioning  about\t the
\nrefusal\t to act according to Sex Disqualification  (Removal)
\nAct, 1919, despite which enactment a peeress was denied\t the
\nright  to  sit\tin the House of\t Lords,\t Vide  Committee  of
\nPrivileges,  Viscountess  Rhonddas’ Claim, 1922-2 AC  3\t 39,
\n(HL).  The judicial emasculation of the first act had caused
\nLord\t Sumner\t   to\t lament\t   the\t   difficulty\t  of
\nextracting’…anything\t that  deserves\t to  be\t  called   a
\nprinciple from the decisions of three centuries, which\thave
\nbeen  directed to what is after all the task  of  decorously
\ndisregarding an Act of Parliament’.\n<\/p>\n
31.  In\t Craies’s  ‘Statute Law’ (7th Edition) it  has\tbeen
\nstated at page 7 that desuetude is a process by which an Act
\nof Parliament may lose its force without express repeal.  It
\ndoes not, however, consist merely of obsolescence or disuse:
\nthere  must  also be a contrary practice, which must  be  of
\nsome  duration and general application.\t Lord Mackay’s\tview
\nin  Brown  v. Magistrate of Edinburgh, 1931 SLT\t (Scots\t Law
\nTimes  Reports) 456 (458) has also been noted, which  is  as
\nbelow
\n\t      “I  hold\tit clear in law that  desuetude\t re-\n<\/p>\n
\t      quires  for its operation a very\tconsiderable
\n\t      period, not merely of neglect, but of contrary
\n\t      usage  of such a character as  practically  to
\n\t      infer such completely established habit of  de
\n\t      community\t as  to\t set a\tcounter\t of  law  or
\n\t      establish a quasi-repeal”\n<\/p>\n
A  perusal of this judgment shows that Lord Mackay  ventured
\nto  prefer the Scottish system to that of England  regarding
\nwhich Lord Eldon, as a member of House of Lords, had  stated
\nthus in Johnstone v. Scott, (1802) 4 Pat 274 at p. 285: –\n<\/p>\n
\t      “The  English lawyer feels himself much  at  a
\n\t      loss here; tie cannot conceive at what  period
\n\t      of time a statute can be held as commencing to
\n\t      grow  in desuetude, no when it can be held  to
\n\t      be  totally  worn out.  All he can  do  is  to
\n\t      submit to what great authorities have declared
\n\t      the Law of Scotland to be.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Lord  Mackay thereafter enunciated the afore-quoted test  of
\ndesuetude for it to permit quasi-repeal.\n<\/p>\n
32.It  would be useful to note what has been stated in\tthis
\nregard\tin  the\t chapter headed\t ‘Repeal  and  Desuetude  of
\nStatutes’  by  Aubrey L. Diamond, printed in  Current  Legal
\nProblems  (1975), Volume 28 pages 107 to 124.\tDiamond\t has
\nquoted\ton this subject what Lord Denning M.R.\tobserved  in
\nBuckoke v. Greater London Council, 1971 Ch.655 at page\t668,
\nwhich reads:-\n<\/p>\n
\t      “It  is  a fundamental principle of  our\tcon-
\n\t      stitution,  enshrined in the Bill\t of  Rights,
\n\t      that  no one, not even the Crown\titself,\t has
\n\t      ‘the  power  of dispensing with  laws  or\t the
\n\t      execution of laws’.  But this is sub-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      322<\/span><\/p>\n
\t      ject  to some qualification.  When a  law\t has
\n\t      become  a\t dead letters the  police  need\t not
\n\t      prosecute,  nor  need the\t Magistrate  punish.
\n\t      They can give an absolute discharge”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
33.  Diamond   has  thereafter\treferred  to  the   Scottish
\napproach  to  desuetude at pages 122 and 123 and  has  noted
\nsome decisions wherein an Act of Scottish Parliament was not
\nenforced  because of desuetude.\t It would be of interest  to
\nnote that when an argument was advanced that the  particular
\nAct  (which  was of 1606) had been left\t unrepealed  by\t the
\nStatute\t Law  (Repeals) Act, 1906, and must,  therefore,  be
\nregarded  as still in force, the reply given by one  of\t the
\nlaw  Lords  was that “it was for the Court and not  for\t the
\nStatute\t Law Revision (sic Repeal) Act to determine  whether
\nAct of 1606 was or was not in desuetude.  ”\n<\/p>\n
34.  Though  in\t India the doctrine of\tdesuetude  does\t not
\nappear to have been used so far to hold that any statute has
\nstood repealed because of this process, we find no objection
\nin principle to apply this doctrine to our statutes as well.
\nThis  is for the reason that a citizen should know  whether,
\ndespite\t a statute having been in disuse for  long  duration
\nand  instead a contrary practice being in use, he  is  still
\nrequired to act as per the ‘dead letter’.  We would think it
\nwould advance the cause of justice to accept the application
\nof  doctrine  of desuetude in our country also Our  soil  is
\nready  to accept this principle: indeed, there is  need\t for
\nits  implantation, because persons residing in\tfree  India,
\nwho have assured fundamental rights including what has\tbeen
\nstated\tin Article 21, must be protected from  their  being,
\nsay,  prosecuted and punished for violation of a  law  which
\nhas  become  ‘dead  letter’.   A  new  path  is,  therefore,
\nrequired to be laid and trodden.\n<\/p>\n
35.In written submissions filed on behalf of respondents, it
\nhas  been stated that the theory, of desuetude can  have  no
\napplication  to\t the facts of the present  case,  since\t the
\nchallenge by the respondents is to the levy and\t calculation
\nunder the 1963 schedule, and not to the rates enforced since
\n1918.\t  This\tsubmission has been characterised  as  “most
\nimportant”.    As  to  this  -we  would\t observe   that\t  if
\nNotification  of  1818\twere to\t prevail  despite  1918\t No-
\ntifications,  the  fact that some changes were made  in\t the
\nschedule in 1963 has no legal bearing on the question  under
\nexamination.  The theory or desuetude has been pressed\tinto
\nservice by the appellant only to take can: of relevant\t1918
\nNotifications.\tIf those Notifications can be said to  stand
\neclipsed, the fact that changes were made in the rates\tetc.
\nin 1963 cannot stand in the way of application of the theory
\nof desuetude.\n<\/p>\n
36.  Coming  to\t 1918 Notifications, we\t find  materials  on
\nrecord\tto show that it has not been implemented till  date;
\nand  in fact what has been done was contrary, and  that\t too
\nfor  long period.  So, we hold that Notification  Nos.\t4162
\nand  4163 dated 17th June 1918 had stood repealed  ‘quasily’
\nby  the\t time new Octroi Rules came to be  framed  in  1963,
\nwhich  were applied to realise octroi from the\trespondents.
\nThe  Statement\tmade  in the written  submissions  filed  on
\nbehalf\tof  the\t respondents  that  this  cowl\thad  treated
\nNotification  No.416O  as operative in the case\t of  western
\nIndia  Theatres v. Cantonment Board, Pune,<\/a> 1959\t Suppl.\t (2)
\nSCR  63,  does not affect the view taken by us\trelating  to
\nquasi-repeal of Notification Nos. 4162 and 4163 inas-\n<\/p>\n
323<\/span><\/p>\n
much  as the field of operation of Notification\t No.4160  is
\ndifferent  from\t that  of later\t Notifications,\t as  already
\nnoted.\n<\/p>\n
Legal objections\n<\/p>\n
37.  Being satisfied that 1881 Notifications held the  field
\neven   by  1963,  the  legal  objections  relating  to\t its
\napplications  may ,now be dealt with.  These objections,  as
\nalready noted, are (1) lack of agreement as required by law,
\n(2)  impermissible delegation; and (3)\tnon-compliance\twith
\nthe  procedure\tmentioned in section 62 of  the\t Cantonments
\nAct, 1924.\n<\/p>\n
38.  We shall deal with these objections as well  seriatim
\nLack of agreement as required by law\n<\/p>\n
39.  That such sawn agreement is required is not disputed by
\nthe  learned  Advocate General.\t His stand is that  such  an
\nagreement  had in fact been entered into between  the  Poona
\nCantonment Board and Poona City Municipality in 1881 and the
\nsame  was being renewed from time to time, as  would  appear
\nfrom  the  resolutions of the Cantonment  Board,  copies  of
\nwhich  have been printed in Appeal Paper Book (ii) at  pages
\n245-428.   As we have held that the 1881  Notification\theld
\nthe  field by 1963, the fact that no agreement\twas  entered
\ninto  after  the  Octroi Rules of 1963 were  framed  by\t the
\nappellants   as\t had  been  done  between  Poona   Municipal
\nCorporation and Kirkee Cantonment Board, is not relevant We.
\ntherefore, do not find any legal infirmity in enforcement of
\n1963  Octroi Rules on the ground of lack of  agreement\twith
\nthe Poona Cantonment Board after these ruts came into force.
\nImpermissible delegation\n<\/p>\n
40.  Shri Shanti Bhushan has taken pains to impress upon  us
\nthat if we were to read the expression “for the time being,,
\nfinding\t place\tin 1881 Notification to mean “from  time  to
\ntime”,\tthat notification has to be struck down\t because  of
\nthe delegation of an essential feature of the statute, which
\nis not permissible in law.\n<\/p>\n
41.  On the question of permissible extent of delegation the
\nleading judgment is one rendered by a 7-Judge Bench of\tthis
\nCourt  in In re Delhi Laws Act, 1951 SCR 747.  The ratio  of
\nthat  decision\tcame to be applied to a\t taxing\t statute  in
\nRajnarain   Singh  V.  Chairman,  of   Patna   Demonstration
\nCommittee,<\/a>  1955-1  SCR,  290.\tIt was\theld  there  by\t the
\nmajority that a delegatee has no power to change a policy of
\nthe  statute;  and imposition of tax without  observing\t the
\nformalities  prescribed\t by  the statute was held  to  be  a
\nchange\tin  the legislature policy.  The statute  which\t had
\ncame to be examined in that case had required an opportunity
\nto be given to raise objection; but the notification  issued
\nby the delegate which had the effect of levying tax had been
\ndone  without inviting objection.  The same  was,  therefore
\nstruck down as ultra vires.\n<\/p>\n
42.  Shri Shanti Bhushan contends that the octroi  collected
\nby  the\t appellant  being from\tpersons\t residing  in  Poona
\nCantonment, opportunity was   required\tto be given to\tthem
\nto have their  say if they have objection to the enhancement
\nof  rate  of  octroi  or for imposition\t of  octroi  on\t new
\narticles  as  the 1963 Rules purported to do.  It  is  urged
\nthat  because  of the special importance of  Cantonment\t the
\nCentral\t Government  has been conferred with  the  power  to
\ncontrol
\n324<\/span>
\nthese areas; and it is because of this that the\t Cantonments
\nAct  of\t 1924 required by its section 62 to  seek  objection
\nbefore\timposing any taxation which had admittedly not\tbeen
\ndone  in  the present case; and so, octroi  could  not\thave
\ncollected by the appellant at least after coming into  force
\nof  The 1924 Act. (As we would point out later,\t section  62
\nhas  not application to the facts of the present case.\t The
\nnon-inviting of objection has therefore introduced no  legal
\ninfirmity).\n<\/p>\n
43.In  support\tof his submission, Shri Shanti\tBhushan\t has
\nfurther referred to Bagalkot State Municipality v.  Bagalkot
\nCement Company,<\/a> (1963 (Supp.) (1) SCR 710 wherein the  stand
\nof   the   municipality\t  that\toctroi\t duty\thad   become
\nautomatically realisable from that area which had come to be
\nincluded   within   the\t municipal  limits   following\t the
\nenlargement  of\t Be limit, was held to be  not\tsustainable.
\nWhat  had been stated in that case has no  application,\t be-
\ncause  here  the appellant is not trying to  realise  octroi
\nfrom  the  residents  of the  Poona  Cantonment\t because  of
\nenlargement of the limit of Poona Municipality.\n<\/p>\n
44.Shri Shanti Bhushan than places reliance on B. Sharma Rao
\nv.  Union  Territory  of<\/a> pondicherry,  (1967  (2)  SCR\t650.
\nThere,\t the  particular  Act  of  Pondicherry\t Legislative
\nAssembly  was held to be an abdication or effacement by\t the
\nlaw  making  authority\tinasmuch as it had  by\tthe  Act  in
\nquestion  allowed the amendments to be made in the  parallel
\nMadras\tstatute\t to prevail in Pondicherry  without  knowing
\nthat  those  amendments\t would\tbe.   Shri  Shanti   Bhushan
\ncontends  that same would be the position here if  the\t1881
\nNotification were to permit changes in the rates of  octroi,
\nwithout\t knowing what the same would be, to prevail  in\t the
\nCantonment area also.\n<\/p>\n
45.Learned  Advocate General has contended that the case  of
\nSharma\tRao  was distinguished in Gwalior  Rayon  Silk\tMfg.
\n(Wvg.). Company Ltd. v. The Assistant Commissioner of  Sales
\nTax,<\/a> (1974 (2) SCR 879.\t In this connection what was  stated
\nby Khanna, J. at pages 885-6 and by Mathew J. at pages 908-9
\nhas  been brought to our notice.  In that case the  validity
\nof  section 8(2)(b) of the Central Sales Tax, Act, 1956\t was
\nassailed  on  the ground that it suffered from the  vice  of
\nexcessive delegation inasmuch as it stated that the rate  of
\ncentral sales tax in case of goods other than declared goods
\nshall  be  calculated  at the raw of 10%,  or  at  the\trate
\napplicable to the sale or purchase of such goods inside\t the
\nappropriate  State,, whichever is higher.  The\tConstitution
\nBench  rejected the contention because of clear\t legislative
\npolicy\tbeing discernible in what has been provided  in\t the
\nimpugned section.  This shows that merely because the matter
\nof rate at which tax is required to be imposed is left to be
\ndetermined  by\tsome  authority other  than  the  one  which
\nimposesit, the same would not be impermissible in law.\n<\/p>\n
46.  Still  another decision pressed into  service  by\tShri
\nShanti\tBhushan\t in  this context is  that  of\tAtlas  Cycle
\nIndustries v.State of Haryana, 1971 (2) SCC 564.  A  perusal
\nof  this decision shows dud A too was on a different  point.
\nThere, the effort of the Municipality of Sonipat to  realise
\noctroi\ton the force of Notification which had\tbeen  issued
\nearlier was not upheld, because the relevant section did not
\ntake  care, of Notification, but had mentioned about  rules,
\nbye-laws, orders, directions and powers.\n<\/p>\n
325<\/span><\/p>\n
47.To buttress his submission, the learned Advocate  General
\nbrings\tto our notice the decision in MK Papaiah  v.  Excise
\nCommissioner, 1975 (1) SCC 492, in which it was held that if
\nthe  legislature retained its control over its\tdelegate  by
\nexercising  its\t power of repeal, the same  would  meet\t the
\nobjection  relating  to\t excessive  delegation,\t for   which
\npurpose\t  the  test  to\t be  applied  is  not  whether\t the
\nlegislature  has delegated any matter relating\tto  essraial
\npolicy.\t It is contended what was stated in Papiah’s case by
\na  three-Judge\tBench through Mathew, J.  was  accepted,  as
\ncorrect\t by  a Constitution Bench in A.K. Roy  v.  Union  of
\nIndia, 1982 (1) SCC 27 1.\n<\/p>\n
48.  What was held in Brij Sunder Kapoor v.  First     Addl.
\nDistrict  Judge, 1989 (1) SCC 561 is more relevant  for\t our
\npurpose,  because  in that case a two-Judge  Bench  of\tthis
\nCourt had upheld the delegation as contained in section 3 of
\nCantonment  (Extention of Rent Control Laws) Act,  1957,  by
\nwhich  the Central Government by a notification in  official
\ngazette\t could\textend\tto  any\t cantonment  any   enactment
\nrelating to control of rent which was in force in the  State
\nin   which   the   cantonment  is   situated.\t The   Bench
\ndistinguished Shama Rao’s case and held that the  delegation
\nwas valid, including that part of it by which amendments  in
\nthe  concerned\tState  legislation were\t allowed  to  become
\neffective in the cantonment area as well.\n<\/p>\n
49.  What was stated in Brij Sunders’case about the  typical
\nsituation of cantonment in para 25 is more important for our
\npurpose.  The same is as below:-\n<\/p>\n
\t      “These  cantonments were located in the  heart
\n\t      of  various cites ha the different States\t and
\n\t      unlike  the position that prevailed  in  early
\n\t      years,  had  ceased  to  be  a  separate\t and
\n\t      exclusive colony for army personnel.  It\twas,
\n\t      therefore,  but  natural\tfor  Parliament\t  to
\n\t      decide,  as  a matter of\tpolicy,\t that  there
\n\t      should  be  no difference, in  the  matter  of
\n\t      housing\t accommodation,\t  between    persons
\n\t      residing\tin cantonment areas of a  State\t and
\n\t      those residing in other parts of the State and
\n\t      it  is  this  policy  that  was  given  effect
\n\t      to…..  Having decided upon this\t policy,  it
\n\t      was  open\t to  Parliament to  do\tone  of\t two
\n\t      things:  pass a separate enactment in  respect
\n\t      of  the cantonment areas in each State  or  to
\n\t      merely extend the statutes prevalent in  other
\n\t      parts  of\t the respective States by  a  single
\n\t      enactment.  The second course was opted upon\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
50.What was stated relating to cantonments in the  aforesaid
\nexcerpt qua housing accommodation should apply, according to
\nus,  to\t levy  of  taxes as  well  on  persons\tresiding  in
\ncantonment  areas.  It can well be said that as a matter  of
\npolicy there should be no difference in taxing the residents
\nof  cantonment areas and those residing in municipal  areas,
\nin  view  of the fact that the former have ceased  to  be  a
\nseparate  and  exclusive  colony. for  armed  personnel,  as
\npointed out in the aforesaid case.\n<\/p>\n
51.This\t being\tthe legal position, we hold  that  the\t1881
\nNotification   cannot\tbe  assailed  on   the\t ground\t  of
\nimpermissible  delegation. -Me second legal infirmity  also,
\nas  canvassed  by the learned counsel for  the\trespondents,
\ntherefore, does not exist.\n<\/p>\n
Non-compliance with the procedure mentioned in section 62 of
\nthe Cantonments Act, 1924\n<\/p>\n
52.That\t the  procedure contemplated by section 62  has\t not
\nbeen followed is not in disputes The stand of the  appellant
\nis that
\n326<\/span>
\nprocedure was not required to be followed.  The\t respondents
\nhave serious objection to this stand of the appellant\n<\/p>\n
53.The\tobjection is founded on the legal  proposition\tthat
\nenhancement of rates by the Octroi Rules of 1963 have to  be
\ntaken  as  imposition of octroi, which would  have  required
\ninvitation of objections, of which mention has been made  in
\nsection\t 62.  The question for determination is whether\t en-
\nhancement of rates of octroi can be said to be imposition of
\noctroi, in which case alone section 62 would get  attracted,
\nbecause of what has been stated in sections 60 and 6 1. That
\nthis is so is very strenuously contended by Shri Anil  Divan
\nby  placing reliance on two decisions of this Court, one  of
\nwhich is of Constitution Bench: The Amalgamated Coal  Fields
\nLtd. v. Janapada Sabha Chhindwara<\/a> 1963 Sup, (1)\t  SCR\t172;
\nand  another by a two-Judge Bench:in Dhrangadhara  Chemicals
\nWorks Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, 1973 (2) SCC 345.\n<\/p>\n
54.  In\t Amalgamated Coal Field’s case the legality of\tlevy
\nof the tax imposed on coal at 9 pies per ton by the Janapada
\nSabha of Chhindwara was assailed on the ground that die same
\nwas  in\t violation  of section 51(2) of\t the  concerned\t Act
\n(noted\tat page 191 of the Report) which had laid down\tthat
\nthe  ‘first imposition’ of any tax shall be the\t subject  to
\nthe previous sanction of the Provincial (Government The\t tax
\non coal had not, however, been imposed for the first time on
\nthe residents of the Janapada Sabha.  What the Janpadha\t had
\ndone  was that the tax which was earlier being levied  by  a
\nMining Board (whose successor the Sabha was) at the rate  of
\n3  pies per ton had been enhanced to 9\tpiece.The  appellant
\ntook a stand that though the Janpadha Sabha had on, enhanced
\nbe rate of tax, the same could have been done only with\t the
\nprevious sanction of the Provincial Government, as laid down
\nin section 5 1(2), despite the section having required\tthis
\nfor ‘first imposition’.\t The Constitution Bench upheld\tthis
\ncontention.  Mr. Divan, therefore, contends that enhancement
\nof rate of octroi duties by 1963 Rules could have been\tdone
\nonly in accordance with the provisions contained in sections
\n60 to 63 of the Cantonments Act 1924.\n<\/p>\n
55 Learned Advocate General, however, submits that what\t was
\nheld by the Constitution Bench in the aforesaid case may not
\nbe  taken  to mean that every case of  enhancement  of\trate
\nwould be first or fresh imposition of tax.  According to the
\nlearned\t counsel,  the Constitution Bench had  regarded\t the
\nimposition  of\tthe  levy at the  altered  rates  as  ‘first
\nimposition’ only in the context (this word has been used  at
\npage  193  of the Report) of what had happened;\t and  it  is
\nbecause\t of this that the altered rates were ‘deemed’  (page\n<\/p>\n
194)  to  have\tbeen  included\tin  the\t expression   ‘first
\nimposition’.   The context, as per the learned\tcounsel\t was
\nthat the Janpada Sabha had levied the tax for the first time
\nand  it\t is because of this that it was taken  to  be  first
\nimposition  qua\t the  Sabha  residents.\t  Learned   Advocate
\nGeneral submits\t that if what was held by the.\tConstitution
\nBench  were to be taken literally, even if the rate  of\t any
\ntax  were  to be enhanced, say, even by 1%  the\t same  would
\nrequire the procedural aspect relating to imposition of\t tax
\nto be gone through whole hog, which could not have been\t the
\nintention of the constitution Bench.\n<\/p>\n
56.  We have duly considered the rival submission.   Nothing
\nreally turns  on the
\n327<\/span>
\nrate  of change, according to us.  It cannot be that if\t the
\nchange be significant (say, 10051) then only the same  would
\nbe  a case of fresh imposition, but if it  be  insignificant
\n(say,  1%  as mentioned by the Advocate General),  die\tsame
\nwould not be a case of fresh imposition.  Even so, what\t has
\nbeen contended by the learned Advocate General seems to have
\nforce,\tas in Amalgamated Coal Field’s case this  Court\t did
\ndeal  with a levy which had been imposed for the first\ttime
\nby the Janpada Sabha.\n<\/p>\n
57.  Shri  Divan urges that what was held by  the  two-Judge
\nin.Dharangadhra Chemicals’ case (supra) would not leave any-
\nthing to doubt that increase in rate of tax has to be  taken
\nto  be a case of imposition of tax.  But in that  case\talso
\nthe  Municipality’s  increase of octroi was  in\t first\tact,
\nbecause of which what has been urged by the learned Advocate
\nGeneral\t qua  Amalgamated Coal Field’s case would  apply  to
\nthis case also.\n<\/p>\n
58.The\tcase  of  Visakhapatnam\t Municipality  v.  Nukaraju,<\/a>
\n1976(1)\t SCR 544, which was cited by shri Shanti  Bhusan  in
\nsome other context, is more relevant in the present context.
\nThere,\twhat happened Was that no opportunity to object\t was
\ngiven  to  the\tpersons of the area, which had\tcome  to  be
\nincluded  in the municipality subsequently,  before  calling
\nupon  the residents to pay tax in question.  Though the\t mu-
\nnicipality in that case lost on some other ground, what\t had
\nbeen  stated  about  the  need to  call\t for  objections  is
\nrelevant inasmuch as it was stated that even for  imposition
\nof  tax\t at new rate objection is required  to\tbe  invited.
\nThis stand was taken according to us, because the proviso to
\nSection\t 81(2) of the concerned Act (noted at page 548)\t had
\nstated\tthat before passing a resolution imposing a tax\t for
\nthe first time or increasing the rate of an existing tax the
\ncouncil\t shall\tpublish a notice in  the  prescribed  manner
\ndeclaring  the requisite intention.  It is because  of\tthis
\nrequirement  that  the\tneed  for  calling  objections\t for
\nincreased rate as well was held obligatory.\n<\/p>\n
59.  This  is  not  all\t that we  propose  to  say  on\tthis
\nimportant  facet of the appeals.  We think that if  sections
\n60  to 63 of the 1924 Act are read closely it  would  appear
\nthat  for  change in the rate of tax already  in  operation,
\nobjections  are not required to be invited.  To\t bring\thome
\nthis, let sections 60 to 63 of the Act, which together\tform
\na chain, be noted:-\n<\/p>\n
\t      “60.  General power of taxation-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (1)   The\t  Board\t may,  with  the   previous,
\n\t      sanction of the Central Government, impose  in
\n\t      any   Cantonment\tany  tax  which\t under\t any
\n\t      enactment for the time being in force, may  be
\n\t      imposed  in  any\tmunicipality  in  the  State
\n\t      wherein such cantonment is situated:
\n\t      (2) Any tax imposed  under this section  shall
\n\t      take effect from the date of its\tnotification
\n\t      in  the official Gazette, or where  any  later
\n\t      date  is\tspecified  in  this  behalf  in\t the
\n\t      notification from such later, date.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      61.   Framing of preliminary proposals-
\n\t      When a resolution has been passed by the Board
\n\t      proposing\t to impose a tax under\tsection\t 60,
\n\t      the  Board shall in the manner  prescribed  in
\n\t      section 255 publish a notice specifying –\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (a)   the tax which it is proposed to impose;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      328<\/span><\/p>\n
\t      (b)the  persons  or classes of persons  to  be
\n\t      made   liable  and  the  description  of\t the
\n\t      property\tor  other taxable thing\t or  circum-
\n\t      stance in respect of which they are to be mode
\n\t      liable; and\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (c)the rate at which the tax is to be levied.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      62.   Objections and disposal thereof-
\n\t      (1)   Any\t inhabitant of the  cantonment\tmay,
\n\t      within thirty days from the publication of the
\n\t      notice  under section 61, submit to the  Board
\n\t      an  objection in writing to all or any of\t the
\n\t      proposals\t contained  therein  and  the  Board
\n\t      shall  take such objection into  consideration
\n\t      and pass orders thereon by special resolution.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (2)   Unless the Board decides to abandon\t its
\n\t      proposals\t contained in the  notice  published
\n\t      under  section  61,  it shall  submit  to\t the
\n\t      Central\tGovernment   through   the   Officer
\n\t      Commanding  in-Chief,  the command,  all\tsuch
\n\t      proposals\t alongwith the objections,  if\tany,
\n\t      received in connection therewith together with
\n\t      its  opinion  thereon  and  any  modifications
\n\t\t\t    proposed  in accordance with such  opinion\tan
\nd
\n\t      the note published under the said section.\n<\/p>\n
\t      63.   Imposition of tax –\n<\/p>\n
\t      (1)   The Central Government may authorise the
\n\t      Board to impose the tax either in the original
\n\t      form  or, if any objection has been  submitted
\n\t      in  that form or any such modified form as  it
\n\t      thinks fit.  ”\n<\/p>\n
60.  The  aforesaid  shows that the notice  required  to  be
\npublished by Section 61 specifying, inter alia, “the rate at
\nwhich  the tax is to be levied”, of which mention  has\tbeen
\nmade in clause (c), refers to the tax to be levied, and\t not
\nwhich  has already been levied.\t Clause (a) makes  it  clear
\nthat the publication required by Section 61 is about the tax
\nwhich  is  proposed to be imposed.  These  provisions  would
\nshow  that the objection which is to be solicited,  pursuant
\nto  the mandate of section 62, has to be regarding  the\t tax
\nproposed  to  be imposed and the rate at which it is  to  be
\nlevied.\t  The opening sentence of section 61 mentions  about
\nthe  proposal of the Board “to impose a tax” ; and  so,\t the
\nimposition  of\twhich  section 60 speaks of,  is  of  a\t tax
\nproposed to be imposed by the Board, and not a tax which had
\nalready\t been  imposed\tby  the time  the  Act\tcame  to  be
\nenforced.\n<\/p>\n
61.  We,  therefore,  do  not  find  any  infirmity  in\t the
\ncollection of octroi by the appellant at the enhanced rates,
\nmentioned  in  the  schedule of 1963  Rules,  without  there
\nhaving been compliance of what was required by section 62 of
\nthe: aforesaid Act.\n<\/p>\n
Conclusion\n<\/p>\n
62.  For  the  reasons\taforesaid, we  hold  that  the\t1881
\nNotification  did  in fact permit the appellant\t to  collect
\noctroi\tduties at the rates specified in 1963  Octroi  Rules
\nframed by the appellant; and there was no obstacle in law in
\nallowing the appellant to do so.\n<\/p>\n
63.  The  appeals are allowed accordingly by  setting  aside
\nthe  impugned  judgment,  with\tthe  result  that  the\twrit
\npetitions  filed in the High Court by the respondents  stand
\ndismissed.   On the facts and circumstances of the case,  we
\ndo not make any order as to costs.\n<\/p>\n
330<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India The Municipal Corporation For … vs Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. & Ors on 10 March, 1995 Equivalent citations: 1995 SCC (3) 434, JT 1995 (3) 312 Author: H B.L. Bench: Hansaria B.L. (J) PETITIONER: THE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION FOR CITY OF PUNE AND ANR. Vs. RESPONDENT: BHARAT FORGE CO. LTD. & ORS. […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-60773","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nThe Municipal Corporation For ... vs Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. & Ors on 10 March, 1995 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-municipal-corporation-for-vs-bharat-forge-co-ltd-ors-on-10-march-1995\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"The Municipal Corporation For ... vs Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. & Ors on 10 March, 1995 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-municipal-corporation-for-vs-bharat-forge-co-ltd-ors-on-10-march-1995\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"1995-03-09T18:30:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2015-07-31T16:46:11+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@legaliadmin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@Legal_india\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"40 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-municipal-corporation-for-vs-bharat-forge-co-ltd-ors-on-10-march-1995#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-municipal-corporation-for-vs-bharat-forge-co-ltd-ors-on-10-march-1995\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\"},\"headline\":\"The Municipal Corporation For … vs Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. & Ors on 10 March, 1995\",\"datePublished\":\"1995-03-09T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2015-07-31T16:46:11+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-municipal-corporation-for-vs-bharat-forge-co-ltd-ors-on-10-march-1995\"},\"wordCount\":8017,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization\"},\"articleSection\":[\"Supreme Court of India\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-municipal-corporation-for-vs-bharat-forge-co-ltd-ors-on-10-march-1995#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-municipal-corporation-for-vs-bharat-forge-co-ltd-ors-on-10-march-1995\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-municipal-corporation-for-vs-bharat-forge-co-ltd-ors-on-10-march-1995\",\"name\":\"The Municipal Corporation For ... vs Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. & Ors on 10 March, 1995 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"1995-03-09T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2015-07-31T16:46:11+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-municipal-corporation-for-vs-bharat-forge-co-ltd-ors-on-10-march-1995#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-municipal-corporation-for-vs-bharat-forge-co-ltd-ors-on-10-march-1995\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-municipal-corporation-for-vs-bharat-forge-co-ltd-ors-on-10-march-1995#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"The Municipal Corporation For … vs Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. & Ors on 10 March, 1995\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/\",\"name\":\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"description\":\"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization\"},\"alternateName\":\"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"alternateName\":\"Legal India\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"width\":512,\"height\":512,\"caption\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/\",\"https:\/\/x.com\/Legal_india\"]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\",\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Legal India Admin\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\",\"https:\/\/x.com\/legaliadmin\"],\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/author\/legal-india-admin\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"The Municipal Corporation For ... vs Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. & Ors on 10 March, 1995 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-municipal-corporation-for-vs-bharat-forge-co-ltd-ors-on-10-march-1995","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"The Municipal Corporation For ... vs Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. & Ors on 10 March, 1995 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","og_url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-municipal-corporation-for-vs-bharat-forge-co-ltd-ors-on-10-march-1995","og_site_name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","article_published_time":"1995-03-09T18:30:00+00:00","article_modified_time":"2015-07-31T16:46:11+00:00","og_image":[{"width":512,"height":512,"url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Legal India Admin","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@legaliadmin","twitter_site":"@Legal_india","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Legal India Admin","Est. reading time":"40 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-municipal-corporation-for-vs-bharat-forge-co-ltd-ors-on-10-march-1995#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-municipal-corporation-for-vs-bharat-forge-co-ltd-ors-on-10-march-1995"},"author":{"name":"Legal India Admin","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea"},"headline":"The Municipal Corporation For … vs Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. & Ors on 10 March, 1995","datePublished":"1995-03-09T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2015-07-31T16:46:11+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-municipal-corporation-for-vs-bharat-forge-co-ltd-ors-on-10-march-1995"},"wordCount":8017,"commentCount":0,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"articleSection":["Supreme Court of India"],"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-municipal-corporation-for-vs-bharat-forge-co-ltd-ors-on-10-march-1995#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-municipal-corporation-for-vs-bharat-forge-co-ltd-ors-on-10-march-1995","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-municipal-corporation-for-vs-bharat-forge-co-ltd-ors-on-10-march-1995","name":"The Municipal Corporation For ... vs Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. & Ors on 10 March, 1995 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website"},"datePublished":"1995-03-09T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2015-07-31T16:46:11+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-municipal-corporation-for-vs-bharat-forge-co-ltd-ors-on-10-march-1995#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-municipal-corporation-for-vs-bharat-forge-co-ltd-ors-on-10-march-1995"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-municipal-corporation-for-vs-bharat-forge-co-ltd-ors-on-10-march-1995#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"The Municipal Corporation For … vs Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. & Ors on 10 March, 1995"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","description":"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"alternateName":"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization","name":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","alternateName":"Legal India","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","width":512,"height":512,"caption":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","https:\/\/x.com\/Legal_india"]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea","name":"Legal India Admin","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Legal India Admin"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com","https:\/\/x.com\/legaliadmin"],"url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/author\/legal-india-admin"}]}},"modified_by":null,"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/60773","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=60773"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/60773\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=60773"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=60773"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=60773"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}