{"id":61042,"date":"2009-08-25T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2009-08-24T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/shanti-sports-club-anr-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-25-august-2009"},"modified":"2018-07-11T02:31:10","modified_gmt":"2018-07-10T21:01:10","slug":"shanti-sports-club-anr-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-25-august-2009","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/shanti-sports-club-anr-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-25-august-2009","title":{"rendered":"Shanti Sports Club & Anr vs Union Of India & Ors on 25 August, 2009"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Shanti Sports Club & Anr vs Union Of India & Ors on 25 August, 2009<\/div>\n
Author: ………………….J.<\/div>\n
Bench: B.N. Agrawal, G.S. Singhvi<\/div>\n
                                  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA\n\n                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION\n\n                     CIVIL APPEAL NOS.8500-8501 OF 2001\n\n\nShanti Sports Club & another                         ... Appellants\n\n         Versus\n\nUnion of India & others                             ... Respondents\n\n                                       With\n\n                   Contempt Petition Nos. 252-253 of 2001\n\n\n\n\n                               J U D G M E N T\n<\/pre>\n
G.S. Singhvi, J.\n<\/p>\n
1.       These appeals filed against order dated 21.8.2001 of the<\/p>\n
Division Bench of Delhi High Court whereby it refused to interfere<\/p>\n
with the Central Government’s decision not to exercise discretion<\/p>\n
under Section 48(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short<\/p>\n
`the Act’) to withdraw from the acquisition of land comprised in<\/p>\n
khasra   Nos.35,     369\/36,   37,    38,     367\/21     and   365\/33    of    Village<\/p>\n
Masudpur,   Tehsil     Mehrauli,     Delhi    are      illustrative     of    how   the<\/p>\n
litigants use the courts process for frustrating the acquisition of<\/p>\n
land for a public purpose for years together and seek equity after<\/p>\n
raising illegal construction over the acquired land under the cloak<\/p>\n
of interim order(s) passed by one or the other court.<\/p>\n
Background Facts:\n<\/p>\n
2.        In   the    aftermath      of    partition    of     the   country,       lakhs   of<\/p>\n
people    were    forced      to   leave     their     habitat,      properties,      trade,<\/p>\n
business, etc. in the territory which became Pakistan.                       Most of them<\/p>\n
came and settled in northern parts of the country, particularly<\/p>\n
Punjab and Delhi. Out of sheer compulsion, they constructed houses,<\/p>\n
etc. without proper layouts and planning.                   Initially, the Government<\/p>\n
did not pay much attention to the haphazard construction of houses<\/p>\n
and the growth of unplanned colonies, but with rapid increase in<\/p>\n
population of the city on account of influx of thousands of people<\/p>\n
from   other     parts   of    the   country,     it    was    realized      that    planned<\/p>\n
development of the capital city is sine qua non for its healthy<\/p>\n
growth.    Keeping this in mind, the Central Government created Delhi<\/p>\n
Development      Authority         (DDA)    and      also    set     up   Town      Planning<\/p>\n
Organization, which was entrusted with the task of giving advice on<\/p>\n
all matters pertaining to planning in the territory of Delhi.<\/p>\n
3.        The master plan of Delhi was notified in 1962.                     It envisaged<\/p>\n
development      of   Delhi    in    different       segments,       i.e.,   residential,<\/p>\n
commercial,      institutional,       industrial        etc.    in    a   scientific        and<\/p>\n
modern way.       For implementing the concept of planned development in<\/p>\n
accordance with the notified master plan, large tracts of land were<\/p>\n
acquired vide notifications dated 13.11.1959, 24.10.1961, 4.4.1964,<\/p>\n
16.4.1964 and 23.1.1965 issued under Section 4(1) of the Act.                           Writ<\/p>\n
petitions filed by those affected by the first notification were<\/p>\n
dismissed by the High Court and their appeals were dismissed by this<\/p>\n
Court in the case titled Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi<\/a> (1975) 4<\/p>\n
SCC 285, with a categorical finding that the planned development of
\nDelhi is a public purpose for which large tracts of land could be<\/p>\n
acquired.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
4.       The acquisitions made in furtherance of other notifications<\/p>\n
were also challenged by the land holders and other affected persons.<\/p>\n
C.W.P. No.963\/1980 filed by one Ved Prakash was dismissed by the<\/p>\n
High Court.    However, the special leave petition was entertained by<\/p>\n
this Court and leave was granted.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
5.       During the pendency of the civil appeal arising out of the<\/p>\n
special leave petition filed by Ved Prakash and some writ petitions<\/p>\n
which were directly entertained by this Court, a Division Bench of<\/p>\n
the High Court made a reference to the Full Bench for considering<\/p>\n
the questions whether the acquisition proceeding should be treated<\/p>\n
as having been abandoned on account of delay in making the awards<\/p>\n
and whether more than one award can be passed in respect of the land<\/p>\n
covered by the same notification.          The Full Bench dismissed all the<\/p>\n
writ petitions and related miscellaneous applications vide judgment<\/p>\n
titled   Roshanara    Begum   v.   Union   of    India,    AIR    1996    Delhi    206.<\/p>\n
Appeals filed against the judgment of Full Bench were dismissed by<\/p>\n
this Court – Murari v. Union of India<\/a> (1997) 1 SCC 15.<\/p>\n
6.       The   land   which   is   subject      matter    of   these     appeals    was<\/p>\n
acquired    vide   notification    dated     23.1.1965.          Declaration      under<\/p>\n
Section 6 was published on 23.12.1968, notices under Sections 9 and<\/p>\n
10 were issued in 1976 and the award was made on 22.12.1980.\n<\/p>\n
7.        Shri Amrit Lal Khanna, who is said to have purchased 26<\/p>\n
bighas of land comprised in khasra Nos.35, 369\/36 and 37 in Village<\/p>\n
Masudpur, Tehsil Mehrauli, Delhi along with three others, namely,<\/p>\n
S\/Shri    Srivastava,         Naresh       Kumar     and     Gopal      Kishan      from      Shri<\/p>\n
Parmeshwar       Lal     vide       sale     deed        dated     31.1.1969        challenged<\/p>\n
notification dated 23.1.1965 in W.P. No.1753\/1980.                           He also filed an<\/p>\n
application for interim relief.                    By an order dated 9.12.1980, the<\/p>\n
High Court restrained the respondents in the writ petition from<\/p>\n
dispossessing      the    petitioner.              The     writ    petition      was     finally<\/p>\n
dismissed by the Full Bench along with other cases.<\/p>\n
8.        While the writ petition filed by Shri Amrit Lal Khanna was<\/p>\n
pending, Shri Satish Khosla (appellant No.2 in one of the appeals)<\/p>\n
got registered a company in the name and style of Shanti India<\/p>\n
Private Limited under the Companies Act, 1956 and a society in the<\/p>\n
name of Shanti Sports Club under the Societies Registration Act,<\/p>\n
1860.        Between     1990-1993,         Shri    Satish       Khosla      appears    to    have<\/p>\n
entered into some arrangement\/agreement with Shri Amrit Lal Khanna<\/p>\n
and other land owners and got possession of land bearing khasra<\/p>\n
Nos.35,   369\/36,      37,    38,    367\/21      and     365\/33    of     Village      Masudpur,<\/p>\n
Tehsil    Mehrauli,      Delhi      which    had     already      been       acquired    by   the<\/p>\n
Central Government.           Thereafter, he got constructed complex over the<\/p>\n
acquired land in the name of appellant No.1 without even making an<\/p>\n
application to the competent authority for sanction of the building<\/p>\n
plan.       He   did     so   because       he   knew    that     if    an    application      for<\/p>\n
sanction of the building plan was to be made, the same would be<\/p>\n
rejected in view of the prohibition contained in Section 3 of the
\nDelhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972 (for short `the<\/p>\n
1972 Act’) against transfer of the acquired land and the concerned<\/p>\n
authorities may stall the clandestine construction activities.<\/p>\n
9.        With a view to protect his possession of the acquired land<\/p>\n
and illegal construction raised over it, Shri Satish Khosla filed<\/p>\n
W.P. No.4777\/1993 in the name of Shanti Sports Club of which he<\/p>\n
himself was described as President and Shri Sunil Nagar, Member<\/p>\n
Secretary    of    the    Club    for     issue     of   a    mandamus      to    the    Central<\/p>\n
Government to release the land under Section 48(1) of the Act.                                In<\/p>\n
that petition, it was claimed that with the construction of a sports<\/p>\n
complex, the purpose of acquisition, i.e., planned development of<\/p>\n
the area has already been served.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
10.       At this stage, it is appropriate to note that before filing<\/p>\n
W.P.   No.4777\/1993,       Shri     Satish      Khosla       got    filed   two    suits    for<\/p>\n
injunction.       The    first     suit    bearing       No.3318\/1991        was    filed     on<\/p>\n
29.10.1991 in the name of Shanti India Private Limited with the<\/p>\n
prayer that DDA be restrained from digging the land or constructing<\/p>\n
gates on the road leading to Shanti Garden.                          In that suit, it was<\/p>\n
pleaded    that    the    plaintiff        is   a    company        registered     under    the<\/p>\n
Companies Act, 1956; that it purchased 38 bighas 13 biswas of land<\/p>\n
comprising    in    khasra       Nos.35,    369\/36,      37,       38,   367\/21    and   365\/33<\/p>\n
situated in Village Masudpur, Tehsil Mehrauli, Delhi and floated<\/p>\n
Shanti Sports Club of India which formed a cricket academy with a<\/p>\n
view to provide cricketing facility for its members.                              It was then<\/p>\n
averred that on 28.10.1991, DDA started digging a road, which runs
\nfrom Andheria Modh to Airport with a view to raise a wall for<\/p>\n
blocking     the     entire        road       and     rendering        the       suit     property<\/p>\n
inaccessible.         Along        with       the    suit,      the    plaintiff        filed     an<\/p>\n
application for temporary injunction.                       By order dated 4.1.1992, the<\/p>\n
Court    permitted    DDA     to    raise       the     wall    without      obstructing        the<\/p>\n
plaintiff’s access to the suit property.                       In the second suit bearing<\/p>\n
No.1544\/1993 which was filed on 13.7.1993, appellant No.2 herein<\/p>\n
joined S\/Shri Atma Ram and Amrit Lal Khanna as plaintiffs and prayed<\/p>\n
that DDA be restrained from dispossessing them or interfering with<\/p>\n
their possession or demolishing or sealing any part of existing<\/p>\n
structure.    The subject matter of second suit was identical to the<\/p>\n
one for which earlier suit had been instituted.                           In the plaint, all<\/p>\n
the plaintiffs were described as owners of the property measuring 38<\/p>\n
bighas 13 biswas and it was pleaded that a sports club in the name<\/p>\n
of Shanti Sports Club of India was built by plaintiff No.3, Shri<\/p>\n
Satish   Khosla.       It    was     alleged         that     officers     of    the    DDA     have<\/p>\n
demolished certain structures in Village Kishangarh on 29.6.1993 and<\/p>\n
threatened to demolish the suit property.                           In the second suit also<\/p>\n
an order of injunction was passed on 15.7.1993.<\/p>\n
11.      After filing Writ Petition No.4777\/1993, Shri Satish Khosla<\/p>\n
instituted third suit bearing No.2865\/1995 in his own name and that<\/p>\n
of Shri Amrit Lal Khanna claiming that they were Bhumidars of khasra<\/p>\n
Nos.35, 369\/36 and 37 of Village Masudpur, Tehsil Mehrauli, Delhi,<\/p>\n
total measuring       26    bighas        6   biswas;        that   the   suit    property       was<\/p>\n
surrounded by a boundary wall with an iron gate; that plaintiff<\/p>\n
No.1-Satish    Khosla       floated       the       Shanti    Sports      Club    which    runs    a
\ncricket academy for its members and that the officers of the DDA<\/p>\n
have threatened to demolish the boundary wall and take forcible<\/p>\n
possession of an area of about 250 sq. yds. on the pretext that it<\/p>\n
formed part of khasra Nos.460, 368 and 36, which was earmarked for<\/p>\n
construction of a dispensary.      In the third suit, the court passed<\/p>\n
an order of temporary injunction on 12.12.1995 restraining DDA from<\/p>\n
dispossessing the plaintiffs or demolishing the boundary wall.<\/p>\n
12.      By filing Writ Petition No.4777\/1993, Shri Satish Khosla had<\/p>\n
hoped that he will be able to convince the High Court to ignore the<\/p>\n
gross irregularities and illegalities committed by him in securing<\/p>\n
possession of the acquired land and raising construction over it and<\/p>\n
pass an order for protection of the existing structure and also<\/p>\n
direct the Central Government to release the land from acquisition<\/p>\n
on which sports complex had already been constructed, but his hopes<\/p>\n
were belied because the High Court did not entertain the prayer for<\/p>\n
interim relief.     Undeterred by this unexpected adverse result, Shri<\/p>\n
Satish   Khosla    got   filed   C.M.   No.8269\/1993   in   Writ   Petition<\/p>\n
No.1753\/1980 with the prayer that the government be directed to<\/p>\n
release the land from acquisition because the same has already been<\/p>\n
developed.        The Full Bench of the High Court considered similar<\/p>\n
prayer made on behalf of other land owners, referred to the judgment<\/p>\n
of this Court in Gandhi Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. V. State of<\/p>\n
Rajasthan<\/a> (1993) 2 SCC 662 and held:\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
      “…… So, even if some land has been developed by the land
\n      owner according to his own notions and may be the
\n      construction raised by him on the said land is also
\n      serving some public purpose, still that cannot be a
\n      substitute for planned development of Delhi which object
\n      is visualized by the authorities.    If the public object
\n      for which the land is sought to be acquired by the
\n      authorities is justified, it cannot be frustrated because
\n      the land owner has developed the land and is utilising the
\n      land for some other public purpose.    So, this contention
\n      also does not survive in view of the law held down by the
\n      Supreme Court.”<\/p>\n
13.     The    Full   Bench     separately   dealt    with     Writ   Petition<\/p>\n
No.1753\/1980   and    C.M.    No.8269\/1993   and   dismissed    the   same   by<\/p>\n
recording the following observations:\n<\/p>\n
      “181.   Most of the points raised in this writ petition
\n      are common with the main points already discussed by us.
\n      However, Mr. G. L. Sanghi, Senior Advocate, who appeared
\n      for the applicant in C.M. 8269\/93 has urged that the land
\n      in question has been developed into a sports complex and
\n      modern amenities have been provided and it would be
\n      national waste in allowing such constructions to be
\n      demolished.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      182.    It is urged that the applicant has acquired this
\n      land in 1969 before coming into force of the Delhi Land
\n      (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972 and thus, there was
\n      no bar in the transferee raising constructions. However,
\n      it is the admitted fact that all these constructions have
\n      been raised after issuance of the notification under
\n      Section 4 of the Act. These constructions have been raised
\n      obviously with complete knowledge of the fact that this
\n      land is liable to be acquired for public purpose. It is
\n      true that transferee of the land such as the applicant is
\n      entitled to same benefits and rights as the transferor
\n      (See Smt. Gunwant Kaur v. Municipal Committee, Bhatinda,
\n      AIR<\/a> 1970 SC 802). However, unless and until it is shown
\n      that public purpose for which the land was sought to be
\n      acquired by issuing a notification under Section 4 and
\n      declaration under Section 6 has elapsed, it would not be
\n      possible for this Court to hold that mere fact that land
\n      has been developed by the petitioner\/applicant should lead
\n      to the conclusion that public purpose for which the land
\n      was sought to be acquired has been achieved. It is pointed
\n      out to us that this particular land is required for the
\n      residential scheme of Vasant Kunj. So, it cannot be said
\n      that the sports complex built up by the applicant in the
\n      land in question is in consonance with the public purpose
\n      for which the land has been earmarked in the scheme of the
\n      Government.   Thus,    we   do   not   think    that   the
\n      petitioner\/applicant can legally get the notification
\n      quashed on any valid grounds in the present matter.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      However, the petitioner\/ applicant is at liberty to make
\n      any representation to the authorities for getting the land
\n      released and it is for the authorities to examine whether
\n      in view of the modern sports complex having been brought
\n      into existence in the land in question could it serve the
\n      public purpose of acquiring this land for that particular
\n      scheme or the scheme is liable to be modified or amended
\n      in respect of the land in question. However, the
\n      acquisition proceedings are not liable to be quashed on
\n      any such plea.”\n<\/p>\n
                                                [Emphasis added]<\/p>\n
14.     In the appeals preferred against the judgment of the Full<\/p>\n
Bench, the land owners reiterated the prayer for issue of direction<\/p>\n
to the Government to release their land by asserting that the same<\/p>\n
has already     been   developed   by   constructing   factories,     workshops,<\/p>\n
godowns,   schools,    residential      houses\/quarters,     farm   houses     with<\/p>\n
modern facilities and sports complex.           This Court opined that the<\/p>\n
constructions    raised    by   the     appellants   would    be    regarded     as<\/p>\n
unauthorized because no sanction or permission is shown to have been<\/p>\n
obtained from the competent authority.          The Court then referred to<\/p>\n
an earlier judgment in State of U.P. v. Pista Devi<\/a> (1986) 4 SCC 251<\/p>\n
and rejected the prayer for release of land by making the following<\/p>\n
observations:-\n<\/p>\n
      “Some of the learned counsel for the appellants also
\n      submitted that even the land shown in green colour in the
\n      master plan which has been sought to be acquired but it is
\n      not understood as to for what purpose the said land is
\n      being acquired. It was also submitted that there are a
\n      large number of structures and complexes raised on the
\n      land sought to be acquired in which schools, sports and
\n      other recreational activities are going on. Shri G.L.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      Sanghi, learned counsel appearing for the appellants in
\n      Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 5771 of 1996 and
\n      Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 740 of 1996 as
\n      well as other advocates appearing for some other
\n      appellants   submitted   that   there   exist   factories,
\n      workshops, godowns and MCD school besides residential
\n      houses and quarters over the land belonging to the
\n      appellant Partap Singh situated at Roshanara Road, Sabzi
\n      Mandi, Delhi which has been acquired and that there exists
\nmodern and well-developed farmhouse with modern facilities
\nin the land belonging to the appellant Roshanara Begum,
\nwhere there are a good number of other structures and
\nfruit-bearing trees. Consequently these areas do not
\nrequire further development as they are already developed
\nand, therefore, the said land should be released from
\nacquisition. Mr Sanghi, learned counsel appearing for some
\nof the appellants urged that the appellant concerned had
\ndeveloped a sports complex providing modern amenities
\ntherein and if the same is demolished it would be a great
\nnational waste. It was, therefore, urged that such
\ncomplexes and built-up areas should be deleted from the
\nacquisition. It may be pointed out that in the master plan
\nthe land indicated in green colour is reserved for
\nrecreational facilities. The recreational facilities are
\nalso part of the planned development of Delhi and it
\ncannot be disputed that recreational amenities are also
\npart of the life of the people and an important feature of
\na developed society. Therefore, no legitimate objection
\ncan be made in the acquisition of such land which is shown
\nin   green  colour.   So   far  as   the  structures   and
\nconstructions made on the land are concerned there is no
\nmaterial to show that they were made before the issuance
\nof notification under Section 4 of the Act. It is also not
\nclear whether such constructions were raised with or
\nwithout necessary sanction\/approval of the competent
\nauthority. No grievance therefore can legitimately be
\nraised in that behalf as the same would be regarded as
\nunauthorised and made at the risk of the landowners. Here
\na reference of a decision of this Court in the case of
\nState of U.P. v. Pista Devi<\/a> may be made with advantage,
\npara 7 of which reads as under: (SCC p. 258, para 7)<\/p>\n
“It was next contended that in the large extent of land
\nacquired which was about 412 acres there were some
\nbuildings here and there and so the acquisition of these
\nparts of the land on which buildings were situated was
\nunjustified since those portions were not either waste or
\narable lands which could be dealt with under Section 17(1)
\nof the Act. This contention has not been considered by the
\nHigh Court. We do not, however, find any substance in it.
\nThe Government was not acquiring any property which was
\nsubstantially covered by buildings. It acquired about 412
\nacres of land on the outskirts of Meerut city which was
\ndescribed as arable land by the Collector. It may be true
\nthat here and there there were a few super-structures. In
\na case of this nature where a large extent of land is
\nbeing acquired for planned development of the urban area
\nit would not be proper to leave the small portions over
\nwhich some superstructures have been constructed out of
\nthe development scheme. In such a situation where there is
\nreal urgency it would be difficult to apply Section 5-A of
\nthe Act in the case of few bits of land on which some
\n        structures are standing and to exempt the rest of the
\n        property from its application.”\n<\/p>\n
      In the present case also a large extent of land measuring
\n      thousands of acres has been acquired and, therefore, it
\n      would not be proper to leave out some small portions here
\n      and there over which some structures are said to be
\n      constructed out of the planned development of Delhi. We
\n      may, however, add here that during the course of the
\n      arguments Shri Goswami, learned counsel appearing for the
\n      respondents-State made a statement that the Government
\n      will consider each of the structures and take a decision
\n      in that respect. We, therefore, leave this issue to the
\n      discretion of the respondent.”\n<\/p>\n
                                               [Emphasis added]<\/p>\n
15.       By taking cue from the observations made by the High Court<\/p>\n
in last portion of paragraph 182 of its judgment and the statement<\/p>\n
made by the State’s counsel before this Court, which finds mention<\/p>\n
in the last part of para 21 of the judgment reported in (1999) 1 SCC<\/p>\n
15,   a   representation      was   made   on   behalf   of    appellant   no.1   on<\/p>\n
3.10.1997 to various functionaries of the Government and DDA for<\/p>\n
release of the land under Section 48(1) of the Act on the ground<\/p>\n
that several parcels of the acquired land have already been released<\/p>\n
in favour of Hamdard Public School, St. Xavier School, Sahabad State<\/p>\n
Extension Welfare Association, Village Pul Pehlad Ten Mehrauli and<\/p>\n
Sahabad Daulatpur.       Another representation was made on 3.6.1999 for<\/p>\n
release     of   the   land    covered     by   the   sports    complex.     These<\/p>\n
representations were considered in the meeting held in the office of<\/p>\n
the then Minister for Urban Development which was attended among<\/p>\n
others by the President of Shanti Sports Club and Vice Chairman of<\/p>\n
DDA and a decision is said to have been taken to de-notify the land<\/p>\n
in question and for regularization thereof in favour of appellant<\/p>\n
No.1.     The President of appellant No.1 is said to have been asked to
\ndiscuss the matter with the official of the DDA for working out the<\/p>\n
terms of regularization.          On 8.6.1999, the Private Secretary to the<\/p>\n
then     Urban      Development     Minister     sought   a    report        from    the<\/p>\n
Commissioner of Planning, Delhi Development Authority in order to<\/p>\n
enable the Hon’ble Minister to take appropriate decision.                       On the<\/p>\n
same day, the concerned Minister recorded the following note in the<\/p>\n
file:-\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
       “Extensive construction has taken place.      This must be
\n       with full cooperation of the public servants concerned.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
       In accordance with the settled policy, no demolition can
\n       or will be ordered. At the last meeting, I indicated that
\n       suitable   terms   of  regularization   be    settled  by
\n       negotiations. I would leave this now to my successor.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
16.         The issue was then considered by the successor Minister in<\/p>\n
the Urban Development Department, who finally decided on 14.7.1999<\/p>\n
that the land        covered   by   the   sports   complex    cannot    be    released<\/p>\n
because the development on the land was made after completion of the<\/p>\n
acquisition proceedings and making of the award and also because the<\/p>\n
land   was     needed   for    `Vasant    Kunj   Residential    Project’.           This<\/p>\n
decision      was   communicated     to   the    appellants    vide    letter       dated<\/p>\n
9.6.2000, which reads as under:-\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
                       “No.J-13039\/1\/95\/DDIB, Vol-II
\n                              Government of India,
\n              Ministry of Urban Development & Poverty Alleviation,
\n                                 (Delhi Division)
\n                            Nirman Bhawan, New Delhi.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                                                              Dated 9th June, 2000
\n       To
\n       Shri Satish Khosla,
\n       President,
\n       Shanti Sports Club,
\n       Shanti Sports Complex,
\n       Vasant Kung,
\n       New Delhi-110 070.\n<\/p>\n
       Sub:    De-notification of Shanti Sports Club land comprising 50
\n              bighas 12 biswas in respect of land bearing Khasra No.
\n              367\/21(1-10), 32 (8-05), 355\/33 (3-07), 35 (5-19), 369\/36
\n              (11-14), 37 (8-13), 38 min (7-0) and 354\/33 (4-04).<\/p>\n
       Sir,<\/p>\n
               I am directed to refer to your representation dated
\n       3.6.99 submitted to this Ministry & representation dated 8.6.99
\n       enclosed as Annexure to the Writ Petition on the above
\n       mentioned subject and to say that the matter has been examined
\n       in consultation with DDA.     The Development on the land has
\n       taken place after the acquisition of land was completed and
\n       award was declared. The land has been acquired for the Vasant
\n       Kunj Residential Project which has been held up due to
\n       prolonged litigation. Apart from these the Hon’ble High Court
\n       in CWP No. 1753\/80 filed by Shri Amrit Lal Khanna and
\n       subsequently the Hon’ble Supreme Court have upheld the
\n       acquisition proceedings in favour of the Government.<\/p>\n
       2.      Therefore, it has been decided that your request to
\n       denotify the above land cannot be acceded as the land is
\n       required for public purpose. This is for your information.<\/p>\n
       3.          This issues with approval of the competent authority.<\/p>\n
                                                                   Yours faithfully,
\n                                                                                Sd\/-\n<\/p>\n
                                                                        (R.C. Nayak)
\n                                                             Under Secretary (DDVA)”\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
17.         The appellants challenged the aforementioned decision of the<\/p>\n
Government in Writ Petition No.3277\/2000 mainly on the following<\/p>\n
grounds:\n<\/p>\n
  1.        That    on   8th   June,   1999,     the   then    Minister   for     Urban
\n            Development had taken final decision for de-notification of
\n            the land and regularization thereof in favour of appellant
\n            No.1   and   his    successor      could   not    have   overturned   that
\n        decision.\n<\/p>\n
  2.    The    decision   contained     in   letter      dated    June   9,   2000   is
\n        totally     devoid    of   reasons   inasmuch     as     while   refusing    to
\n        release the land in question in favour of appellant No.1, the
\n        Government did not take into account the fact that a huge
\n        sports complex had been built by spending substantial amount
\n        and demolition thereof would be injurious to vast section of
\n        the people which was benefited by the facilities available in
\n        the sports complex.\n<\/p>\n
  3.    That similar representations made for release of land were
\n        entertained and accepted by the Government, but without any
\n        rhyme and reason, the appellants were discriminated and in
\n        this manner, their right to equality guaranteed under Article
\n        14 of the Constitution has been violated.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
18.     In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Union of<\/p>\n
India, it was averred that the alleged transfer of land in favour of<\/p>\n
the petitioners is contrary to the provisions of the 1972 Act and<\/p>\n
is, therefore, void; that no decision was taken by the then Minister<\/p>\n
on 8.6.1999 for release of land covered by the sports complex and<\/p>\n
that the representation was finally rejected on 14.7.1999 because<\/p>\n
the land was required for public purpose, namely, the `Vasant Kunj<\/p>\n
Residential Project’.         On the issue of release of other parcels of<\/p>\n
land,   it    was   pleaded   that   each    case   is   decided    on   its   merits<\/p>\n
depending on the use to which the land is to be put and various<\/p>\n
other factors and release of some land under Section 48(1) of Act<\/p>\n
does not create a right in favour of other land owners to seek a<\/p>\n
direction for release of their land.\n<\/p>\n
19.         In a    separate counter           affidavit filed       on behalf      of DDA,<\/p>\n
details      of    various      litigious      ventures   undertaken         by   the     writ<\/p>\n
petitioners, Amrit Lal Khanna and Atma Ram were given and it was<\/p>\n
pleaded that the petitioners are not entitled for relief because<\/p>\n
they appear to have entered into some transaction with the land<\/p>\n
owners in violation of the negative mandate contained in Section 3<\/p>\n
of the 1972 Act against transfer of the acquired land and also<\/p>\n
because by taking advantage of interim order passed in Writ Petition<\/p>\n
No.1753\/1980, they raised illegal construction.                        In para 5 of the<\/p>\n
counter affidavit it was averred that the construction was made in<\/p>\n
clear violation of the existing master plan.                    It was further averred<\/p>\n
that even in the master plan of 2001, the permitted use of                         the land<\/p>\n
in question is partly residential and partly rural; that residential<\/p>\n
portion of the land is to be used for Vasant Kunj Residential Scheme<\/p>\n
of DDA, which was held up due to protective orders of injunction<\/p>\n
passed by different courts and that in the rural zone, only rural<\/p>\n
centre,      public       and   semi   public      facilities,       orchards,      plants,<\/p>\n
nurseries,         wireless     and    transmission,          forest    and       extractive<\/p>\n
industries and LNP are permitted.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
20.         The Division Bench of the High Court heard Writ Petition<\/p>\n
No.4777      of    1993    along   with     Writ   Petition     No.3277      of    2000    and<\/p>\n
dismissed both the writ petitions after threadbare consideration of<\/p>\n
various issues raised by the parties.                  The Division Bench referred<\/p>\n
to    the     notings       recorded      in     the   file     in     the    context      of<\/p>\n
representations made by the appellants including note dated 8.6.1999<\/p>\n
recorded by the then Minister for Urban Development leaving the
\nmatter to his successor and observed:\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
      “………..We fail to appreciate the argument advanced on
\n      behalf of the petitioners that the then Minister had taken
\n      a final decision to regularise and denotify the land in
\n      favour of the petitioners.          Assuming for the sake of
\n      argument that on June 3, 1999 and June 8, 1999 a decision
\n      to denotify and regularize the land was taken by the then
\n      Minister for Urban Development, it seems to us that such a
\n      decision will be of no consequence and will have no
\n      existence in the eye of law. This is so because the terms
\n      for denotification and regularization were not settled.
\n      Settlement, if any, was left for the future. In the event
\n      of the parties failing to reach a settlement there would
\n      be no occasion to withdraw from acquisition of the land
\n      and to regularize the same in favour of the petitioners.
\n      We also fail to appreciate as to how it can be argued that
\n      though the terms for regularization were still to be
\n      settled, the decision to regularise the land in favour of
\n      the first petitioner was taken by Sh. Ram Jethmalani. The
\n      argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners, therefore,
\n      is fallacious and is hereby rejected.            Besides, the
\n      withdrawal        from  acquisition  of  any  land   of  which
\n      possession has not been taken is governed by section 48 of
\n      the Act.         Undoubtedly, section 48 vests power in the
\n      Government to withdraw from acquisition except in the case
\n      provided for in section 36 thereof.        But withdrawal from
\n      acquisition must necessarily be by a notification under
\n      sub-section (1) of section 48 of the Act published in the
\n      official gazette.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
21.     The Division Bench held that the construction made over the<\/p>\n
acquired land has to be treated as unauthorised because the same was<\/p>\n
raised in violation of various statutory provisions.                  The Division<\/p>\n
Bench then referred to master plan, 2001 in which land use of the<\/p>\n
area in question was shown partly residential and partly rural and<\/p>\n
observed   that   use      of   the     land    by    the    petitioner-club   for<\/p>\n
recreational purposes is unauthorized.               The Division Bench observed<\/p>\n
that if the land is regularised in favour of the petitioner-club,<\/p>\n
then the land use will have to be first changed from rural to<\/p>\n
recreational   and   for    that      purpose   master      plan   would   require
\namendment in accordance with Section 11(A) of the Delhi Development<\/p>\n
Act,    1957,       which   provides   for   issuance     of   a   notice   inviting<\/p>\n
objections and suggestions with respect to the proposed modification<\/p>\n
and consideration thereof by DDA and Central Government.<\/p>\n
22.      The Division Bench also considered the argument that as per<\/p>\n
the lay out plan of the Vasant Kunj, only 11 bighas 14 biswas was<\/p>\n
required for the housing scheme and the petitioners are prepared to<\/p>\n
part   with     that    portion   of   the   land   and   rejected    the   same   by<\/p>\n
recording the following observations:-\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
       “……….Respondent no.5 in his counter affidavit dated August
\n       5, 2000 has clearly stated that the land is required for
\n       development schemes of the DDA. It is pointed out that
\n       because of the illegal construction made by the petitions
\n       during the operation of the restraint orders the housing
\n       scheme of the DDA has been held up resulting in loss to
\n       the public. The affidavit also alludes to the fact that
\n       the land for peripheral road in Sector D-7 and land meant
\n       for primary school and dispensary has been encroached upon
\n       by the petitions. According to the affidavit, the
\n       permitted land use in the area is as follows:-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
              (1)           Partly residential.\n\n\n              (2)           Partly for rural use.\n\n\n<\/pre>\n
       The affidavit goes on to state that the Technical
\n       Committee of the DDA has mooted a proposal for change of
\n       land use from rural use to ‘residential use’, keeping in
\n       view the need of lakhs of applicants who are on the
\n       waiting list for allotment of flats. The recommendation of
\n       the Technical Committee is stated to have been accepted by
\n       the DDA and a resolution has been passed recommending
\n       change of user of 23.08 hectares of land behind D-6,
\n       Vasant Kunj from rural to residential use. In view of the
\n       categorical stand of the DDA that the land is needed for
\n       housing project, the argument of the petitioners that only
\n       11 bighas and 14 biswas was required for residential use
\n       fails. It has been noticed by the Supreme Court in Murari
\n       vs. Union of India<\/a> (supra) that there is inflow of more
\n       than one lakh people every year to the city. It is also
\n       noted that Delhi is an ever expanding cosmopolitan,
\n       commercial   and   industrial  city   where  millions   of
\n       multifarious, national and international activities take
\n       place. The Supreme Court also noticed that the city is
\n       confronted with serious housing problems. As a sequitur,
\n       it was found that planned development of Delhi is a
\n       continuous and unending process. Therefore, we cannot find
\n       fault with the decision of the Government declining to
\n       release the land from acquisition.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
23.       In the concluding part of its order, the Division Bench took<\/p>\n
cognizance of written statement filed by Satish Khosla, President of<\/p>\n
Club in Suit No.3064\/1996 titled as M\/s Eli Lilly Ranbaxy Limited<\/p>\n
and others v. Satish Khosla wherein, the plaintiff had sought a<\/p>\n
decree    of    permanent    injunction,   restraining    the    defendant   from<\/p>\n
letting out garden for functions and parties during the currency of<\/p>\n
lease agreement entered by and between M\/s Eli Lilly Ranbaxy Limited<\/p>\n
and Shri Satish Khosla in respect of cottage No.6.                 The Division<\/p>\n
Bench noted that in paragraphs 4, 6 and 11 of the written statement,<\/p>\n
the defendant had unequivocally given out that the premises are<\/p>\n
being used not only for sporting activities but for wedding parties,<\/p>\n
birthday       parties   and    other    festive     occasions    and   cottages<\/p>\n
constructed in the premises were being given to the affluent parties<\/p>\n
like     the    plaintiff,     several   diplomats    including    Deputy    High<\/p>\n
Commissioner of Pakistan, Ambassador of Kazakastan, that huge rent<\/p>\n
and other charges were being collected by the defendant from the<\/p>\n
plaintiff which ran into lacs of rupees and opined that the claim of<\/p>\n
the petitioner that the complex was being used for recreation of the<\/p>\n
members only was fallacious.\n<\/p>\n
24.         On the issue of discrimination, the Division Bench held that<\/p>\n
even if some other lands have been de-notified under Section 48(1),<\/p>\n
the same would be contrary to the purpose of acquisition and one<\/p>\n
wrong cannot justify another wrong.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
25.         Shri Mukul Rohtagi, learned senior counsel appearing for the<\/p>\n
appellants argued with his usual vehemence that the decision taken<\/p>\n
by    the    then   Minister    for   Urban    Development       on    8.6.1999   for<\/p>\n
regularization of the construction made on the land in question was<\/p>\n
final and his successor was not justified in reviewing\/reversing the<\/p>\n
same.       He submitted that the Government is bound to respect the<\/p>\n
decision taken by the then Minister in favour of the appellant and<\/p>\n
mere change of portfolio or absence of formal notification under<\/p>\n
Section 48(1) of the Act cannot denude the earlier decision of its<\/p>\n
sanctity.      Shri Rohtagi emphasized that if the decision taken by one<\/p>\n
Minister      is    overruled   or    overturned     by   his     successor,      the<\/p>\n
credibility of the Government will become questionable.                       Learned<\/p>\n
senior counsel further argued that even if the note recorded in the<\/p>\n
file by the then Minister for Urban Development on 8.6.1999 is not<\/p>\n
treated as a decision taken by the Government under Section 48(1) of<\/p>\n
the Act, rejection of the appellants representations is liable to be<\/p>\n
quashed on the ground of arbitrariness and non-application of mind.<\/p>\n
Shri Rohtagi made a pointed reference to the observations contained<\/p>\n
in para 182 of the judgment of the Full Bench in Roshanara Begum v.<\/p>\n
Union   of    India   (supra)   and   the     statement   made    by    the   counsel<\/p>\n
appearing on behalf of the State before this Court in Murari v.<\/p>\n
Union of India<\/a> (supra) that the Government will consider each of the
\nstructure and take a decision in that respect and argued that the<\/p>\n
appellants prayer for withdrawal from acquisition could not have<\/p>\n
been rejected on the specious grounds that development has been<\/p>\n
carried      out   after   acquisition        of    the       land    or    that    the   same    is<\/p>\n
required for Vasant Kunj Residential Project, more so, when power<\/p>\n
under that section had already been exercised in favour of Hamdard<\/p>\n
Public School, St. Xavier School, Shahbad Estate Extension Welfare<\/p>\n
Association, Scindia Potteries                and others.            Learned counsel pointed<\/p>\n
out that the sports complex constructed at the site has a cricket<\/p>\n
ground,      tennis     stadium,      badminton         courts,       swimming      pool,    table<\/p>\n
tennis room, squash court where the people can play different games<\/p>\n
and sports under the watchful eyes of expert coaches.                               He submitted<\/p>\n
that     the   facilities       available         at     the     sports      complex      are    of<\/p>\n
international         standard,      which    can       be    used    for    various      purposes<\/p>\n
including the impending Commonwealth Games and nobody is going to be<\/p>\n
benefited by demolition of the complex.                        Shri Rohtagi also referred<\/p>\n
to the guidelines issued by the Government of India, Ministry of<\/p>\n
Urban Affairs & Employment, Department of Urban Development vide<\/p>\n
letter No.K-13011\/17\/96-DDIB dated 5.3.1989 and submitted that on<\/p>\n
the    one     hand     the     Government         is        encouraging      public      private<\/p>\n
cooperation        in    development         of    the       land     for    activities         like<\/p>\n
construction       of    schools,      shopping         complexes,         community      centers,<\/p>\n
ration     shops,       hospitals      and    dispensaries,            the    sports      complex<\/p>\n
constructed by the appellants by spending crores of rupees is sought<\/p>\n
to be demolished after a gap of more than 25 years.                             Learned counsel<\/p>\n
submitted      that     there   is    no   sports       club     in    Vasant      Kunj   and    the<\/p>\n
appellants are willing to pay market price or offer half of the land
\nfor accomplishment of the residential project for which the land is<\/p>\n
sought to be acquired.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
26.     Ms. Indira Jaising, learned Additional Solicitor General and<\/p>\n
Shri   A.   Sharan,    learned     senior   advocate,    appearing     for   the   DDA<\/p>\n
emphatically    submitted        that   this    Court    should     not   grant    any<\/p>\n
indulgence to the appellants because they constructed the so called<\/p>\n
sports complex knowing fully well that the land in question had<\/p>\n
already been acquired.           Ms. Jaising submitted that the appellants<\/p>\n
had no business to raise construction on the acquired land because<\/p>\n
they do not have any title over it.              She referred to Section 3 of<\/p>\n
the 1972 Act and argued that in the face of unequivocal prohibition<\/p>\n
against transfer of the acquired land, the appellants could not have<\/p>\n
constructed the building and that too without obtaining sanction or<\/p>\n
permission from any competent authority.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
27.     In the light of the submissions made by the learned counsel<\/p>\n
for the parties, we shall now consider whether note dated 8.6.1999<\/p>\n
recorded by the then Minister for Urban Development can be treated<\/p>\n
as a decision of the Government to withdraw from the acquisition of<\/p>\n
land in question in terms of Section 48(1) of the Act, which lays<\/p>\n
down   that   except    in   the   case     provided    for   in   Section   36,   the<\/p>\n
Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of<\/p>\n
any land of which possession has not been taken.                      Although, the<\/p>\n
plain language of Section 48(1) does not give any indication of the<\/p>\n
manner or mode in which the power\/discretion to withdraw from the<\/p>\n
acquisition of any land is required to be exercised, having regard
\nto the scheme of Parts II and VII of the 1894 Act, which postulates<\/p>\n
publication of notification under Section 4(1), declaration under<\/p>\n
Section 6 and agreement under Section 42 in the official gazette as<\/p>\n
a condition for valid acquisition of the land for any public purpose<\/p>\n
or for a company, it is reasonable to take the view that withdrawal<\/p>\n
from the acquisition, which may adversely affect the public purpose<\/p>\n
for    which,    or    the    company       on   whose   behalf    the    acquisition      is<\/p>\n
proposed, can be done only by issuing a notification in the official<\/p>\n
gazette.      The decision to acquire the land for a public purpose is<\/p>\n
preceded by consideration of the matter at various levels of the<\/p>\n
Government.         The revenue authorities conduct survey for determining<\/p>\n
the    location       and    status    of    the    land   and     feasibility     of     its<\/p>\n
acquisition for a public purpose. The final decision taken by the<\/p>\n
competent authority is then published in the official gazette in the<\/p>\n
form    of   a   notification         issued     under   Section    4(1)    of   the    Act.<\/p>\n
Likewise, declaration made under Section 6 of the Act is published<\/p>\n
in the official gazette.                The publication of notifications under<\/p>\n
Section      4(1)    has    two-fold    objectives.        In     the    first   place,    it<\/p>\n
enables the land owner(s) to lodge objections against the proposed<\/p>\n
acquisition.        Secondly, it forewarns the owners and other interested<\/p>\n
persons not to change the character of the land and, at the same<\/p>\n
time, make them aware that if they enter into any transaction with<\/p>\n
respect to the land proposed to be acquired, they will do so at<\/p>\n
their own peril.            When the land is acquired on behalf of a company,<\/p>\n
consent of the appropriate government is a must.                          The company is<\/p>\n
also required to execute an agreement in terms of Section 41 of the<\/p>\n
Act which is then published in the official gazette in terms of
\nSection 42 thereof.              As a necessary concomitant, it must be held<\/p>\n
that the exercise of power by the government under Section 48(1) of<\/p>\n
the Act must be made known to the public at large so that those<\/p>\n
interested in accomplishment of the public purpose for which the<\/p>\n
land    is    acquired      or    the    concerned    company     may   question      such<\/p>\n
withdrawal by making representation to the higher authorities or by<\/p>\n
seeking courts intervention.              If the decision of the Government to<\/p>\n
withdraw from the acquisition of land is kept secret and is not<\/p>\n
published in the official gazette, there is every likelihood that<\/p>\n
unscrupulous land owners, their agents and wheeler-dealers may pull<\/p>\n
strings      in   the    power    corridors    and    clandestinely     get    the    land<\/p>\n
released from acquisition and thereby defeat the public purpose for<\/p>\n
which the land is acquired.               Similarly, the company on whose behalf<\/p>\n
the land is acquired may suffer incalculable harm by unpublished<\/p>\n
decision of the Government to withdraw from the acquisition.<\/p>\n
28.       The requirement of issuing a notification for exercise of<\/p>\n
power     under    Section       48(1)    of   the    Act   to    withdraw     from    the<\/p>\n
acquisition of the land can also be inferred from the judgments of<\/p>\n
this    Court     in    Municipal   Committee,       Bhatinda    v.   Land   Acquisition<\/p>\n
Collector and others<\/a> (1993) 3 SCC 24 (para 8), U.P. State Sugar<\/p>\n
Corporation Ltd. v. State of U.P. and others (1995) Supp 3 SCC 538<\/p>\n
(para 3), State of Maharashtra and another v. Umashankar Rajabhau<\/p>\n
and others (1996) 1 SCC 299 (para 3) and State of T.N. and others v.<\/p>\n
L. Krishnan and others<\/a> (1996) 7 SCC 450 (para 7).                            In Larsen &<\/p>\n
Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat and others<\/a> (1998) 4 SCC 387, the<\/p>\n
Court considered the question whether the power under Section 48(1)
\nof the Act can be exercised by the Government without notifying the<\/p>\n
factum of withdrawal to the beneficiary of the acquisition.                It was<\/p>\n
argued that in contrast to Sections 4 and 6, Section 48(1) of the<\/p>\n
Act does not contemplate issue of any notification and withdrawal<\/p>\n
from the acquisition can be done by an order simpliciter.                  It was<\/p>\n
further argued that power under Section 21 of the General Clauses<\/p>\n
Act   can   be   exercised   for   withdrawing    notifications   issued    under<\/p>\n
Sections    4    and   6.     While   rejecting    the   argument,   the    Court<\/p>\n
observed:\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
      “….. When Sections 4 and 6 notifications are issued, much
\n      has been done towards the acquisition process and that
\n      process cannot be reversed merely by rescinding those
\n      notifications. Rather it is Section 48 under which, after
\n      withdrawal from acquisition is made, compensation due for
\n      any damage suffered by the owner during the course of
\n      acquisition proceedings is determined and given to him. It
\n      is, therefore, implicit that withdrawal from acquisition
\n      has to be notified.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      31. Principles of law are, therefore, well settled. A
\n      notification in the Official Gazette is required to be
\n      issued if the State Government decides to withdraw from
\n      the acquisition under Section 48 of the Act of any land of
\n      which possession has not been taken. An owner need not be
\n      given any notice of the intention of the State Government
\n      to withdraw from the acquisition and the State Government
\n      is at liberty to do so. Rights of the owner are well
\n      protected by sub-section (2) of Section 48 of the Act and
\n      if he suffered any damage in consequence of the
\n      acquisition proceedings, he is to be compensated and sub-<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      section (3) of Section 48 provides as to how such
\n      compensation is to be determined. There is, therefore, no
\n      difficulty when it is the owner whose land is withdrawn
\n      from acquisition is concerned. However, in the case of a
\n      company, opportunity has to be given to it to show cause
\n      against any order which the State Government proposes to
\n      make withdrawing from the acquisition. Reasons for this
\n      are not far to seek. After notification under Section 4 is
\n      issued, when it appears to the State Government that the
\n      land in any locality is needed for a company, any person
\n      interested in such land which has been notified can file
\n      objections  under   Section  5-A(1)   of  the   Act.  Such
\n      objections are to be made to the Collector in writing and
\n      who after giving the objector an opportunity of being
\n      heard and after hearing of such objections and after
\n      making such further enquiry, if any, as the Collector
\n      thinks necessary, is to make a report to the State
\n      Government for its decision. Then the decision of the
\n      State Government on the objections is final. Before the
\n      applicability of other provisions in the process of
\n      acquisition, in the case of a company, previous consent of
\n      the State Government is required under Section 39 of the
\n      Act nor (sic) unless the company shall have executed the
\n      agreement as provided in Section 41 of the Act. Before
\n      giving such consent, Section 40 contemplates a previous
\n      enquiry. Then compliance with Rules 3 and 4 of the Land
\n      Acquisition (Company) Rules, 1963 is mandatorily required.
\n      After the stage of Sections 40 and 41 is reached, the
\n      agreement so entered into by the company with the State
\n      Government is to be published in the Official Gazette.
\n      This is Section 42 of the Act which provides that the
\n      agreement on its publication would have the same effect as
\n      if it had formed part of the Act. After having done all
\n      this, the State Government cannot unilaterally and without
\n      notice   to   the  company   withdraw   from   acquisition.
\n      Opportunity has to be given to the company to show cause
\n      against the proposed action of the State Government to
\n      withdraw from acquisition. A declaration under Section 6
\n      of the Act is made by notification only after formalities
\n      under Part VII of the Act which contains Sections 39 to 42
\n      have been complied and the report of the Collector under
\n      Section 5-A(2) of the Act is before the State Government
\n      who consents to acquire the land on its satisfaction that
\n      it is needed for the company. A valuable right, thus,
\n      accrues to the company to oppose the proposed decision of
\n      the State Government withdrawing from acquisition. The
\n      State Government may have sound reasons to withdraw from
\n      acquisition but those must be made known to the company
\n      which may have equally sound reasons or perhaps more,
\n      which might persuade the State Government to reverse its
\n      decision withdrawing from acquisition. In this view of the
\n      matter it has to be held that Yadi (memo) dated 11-4-1991
\n      and Yadi (memo) dated 3-5-1991 were issued without notice
\n      to the appellant (L&T Ltd.) and are, thus, not legal.”\n<\/p>\n
                                                (emphasis added)<\/p>\n
29.     The issue deserves to be considered from another angle.     All<\/p>\n
executive actions of the Government of India and the Government of a<\/p>\n
State are required to be taken in the name of the President or the<\/p>\n
Governor of the concerned State, as the case may be [Articles 77(1)<\/p>\n
and 166(1)].   Orders and other instruments made and executed in the
\nname of the President or the Governor of a State, as the case may<\/p>\n
be,    are    required      to    be   authenticated       in    such   manner    as    may   be<\/p>\n
specified in rules to be made by the President or the Governor, as<\/p>\n
the case may be [Articles 77(2) and 166(2)].                            Article 77(3) lays<\/p>\n
down    that    the    President         shall    make    rules     for    more   convenient<\/p>\n
transaction of the business of the Government of India, and for the<\/p>\n
allocation among Ministers of the said business.                          Likewise, Article<\/p>\n
166(3) lays down that the Governor shall make rules for the more<\/p>\n
convenient transaction of the business of the Government of the<\/p>\n
State, and for the allocation among Ministers of the said business<\/p>\n
insofar as it is not business with respect to which the Governor is<\/p>\n
by or under this Constitution required to act in his discretion.<\/p>\n
This means that unless an order is expressed in the name of the<\/p>\n
President      or     the   Governor       and    is   authenticated         in   the   manner<\/p>\n
prescribed by the rules, the same cannot be treated as an order on<\/p>\n
behalf of the Government.               A noting recorded in the file is merely a<\/p>\n
noting       simpliciter         and    nothing    more.          It    merely     represents<\/p>\n
expression of opinion by the particular individual.                           By no stretch<\/p>\n
of imagination, such noting can be treated as a decision of the<\/p>\n
Government.         Even if the competent authority records its opinion in<\/p>\n
the file on the merits of the matter under consideration, the same<\/p>\n
cannot    be    termed      as    a    decision   of     the    Government    unless     it   is<\/p>\n
sanctified and acted upon by issuing an order in accordance with<\/p>\n
Article 77(1) and (2) or Article 166(1) and (2).                          The noting in the<\/p>\n
file or even a decision gets culminated into an order affecting<\/p>\n
right of the parties only when it is expressed in the name of the<\/p>\n
President or the Governor, as the case may be, and authenticated in
\nthe manner provided in Article 77(2) or Article 166(2).                  A noting or<\/p>\n
even     a     decision   recorded     in     the     file        can    always     be<\/p>\n
reviewed\/reversed\/overruled or overturned and the court cannot take<\/p>\n
cognizance of the earlier noting or decision for exercise of the<\/p>\n
power of judicial review.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
30.      In State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh AIR<\/a> 1961 SC 493,<\/p>\n
this Court considered the question whether a provisional decision<\/p>\n
taken by the Council of Ministers to reinstate an employee could be<\/p>\n
made   basis    for   filing   an   action   for    issue    of    a    mandamus   for<\/p>\n
reinstatement and held:\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
       “………. We are unable to understand this argument. Even if
\n       the Council of Ministers had provisionally decided to
\n       reinstate the respondent that would not prevent the
\n       Council from reconsidering the matter and coming to a
\n       contrary conclusion later on, until a final decision is
\n       reached by them and is communicated to the Rajpramukh in
\n       the form of advice and acted upon by him by issuing an
\n       order in that behalf to the respondent.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
31.      A     somewhat   similar     question      was     considered       by    the<\/p>\n
Constitution Bench in Bachhittar Singh v. The State of Punjab<\/a> (1962)<\/p>\n
Supp. 3 SCR 713, in the backdrop of the argument that once the<\/p>\n
Revenue Minister of PEPSU had recorded a note in the file that the<\/p>\n
punishment imposed on the respondent be reduced from dismissal to<\/p>\n
that of reversion, the same could not be changed\/reviewed\/overruled<\/p>\n
by the Chief Minister.         This Court proceeded on the assumption that<\/p>\n
the note recorded by the Revenue Minister of PEPSU in the file was
\nan   order,   referred   to   the   provisions   of   Article   166   of    the<\/p>\n
Constitution and held:\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
     “Merely writing something on the file does not amount to
\n     an order. Before something amounts to an order of the
\n     State Government two things are necessary. The order has
\n     to be expressed in the name of the Governor as required by
\n     clause (1) of Art.166 and then it has to be communicated.
\n     As already indicated, no formal order modifying the
\n     decision of the Revenue Secretary was ever made. Until
\n     such an order is drawn up the State Government cannot, in
\n     our opinion, be regarded as bound by what was stated in
\n     the file. As along as the matter rested with him the
\n     Revenue Minister could well score out his remarks or
\n     minutes on the file and write fresh ones.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     The business of State is a complicated one and has
\n     necessarily to be conducted through the agency of a large
\n     number of officials and authorities. The constitution,
\n     therefore, requires and so did the Rules of Business
\n     framed by the Rajpramukh of PEPSU provide, that the action
\n     must be taken by the authority concerned in the name of
\n     the Rajpramukh. It is not till this formality is observed
\n     that the action can be regarded as that of the State or
\n     here, by the Rajpramukh. We may further observe that,
\n     constitutionally speaking, the Minister is no more than an
\n     adviser and that the head of the State, the Governor or
\n     Rajpramukh (Till the abolition of that office by the
\n     Amendment of the Constitution in 1956), is to act with the
\n     aid and advice of his Council of Ministers. Therefore,
\n     until such advice is accepted by the Governor whatever the
\n     Minister or the Council of Ministers may say in regard to
\n     a particular matter does not become the action of the
\n     State until the advice of the Council of Ministers is
\n     accepted or deemed to be accepted by the Head of the
\n     State. Indeed, it is possible that after expressing one
\n     opinion about a particular matter at a particular stage a
\n     Minister or the Council of Ministers may express quite a
\n     different opinion, one which may be completely opposed to
\n     the earlier opinion. Which of them can be regarded as the
\n     ‘order’ of the State Government ? Therefore to make the
\n     opinion amount to a decision of the Government it must be
\n     communicated to the person concerned. In this connection
\n     we may quote the following from the judgment of this Court
\n     in the State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh.<\/a>\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          “Mr. Gopal Singh attempted to argue that before             the
\n          final order was passed the Council of Ministers             had
\n          decided to accept the respondent’s representation           and
\n          to reinstate him, and that, according to him,               the
\n            respondent seeks to prove by calling the two original
\n            orders. We are unable to understand this argument.
\n            Even if the Council of Ministers had provisionally
\n            decided to reinstate the respondent that would not
\n            prevent the Council from reconsidering the matter and
\n            coming to a contrary conclusion later on, until a
\n            final decision is reached by them and is communicated
\n            to the Rajpramukh in the form of advice and acted
\n            upon by him by issuing an order in that behalf to the
\n            respondent.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      Thus it is of the essence that the order has to be
\n      communicated to the person who would be affected by that
\n      order before the State and that person can be bound by
\n      that order. For, until the order is communicated to the
\n      person affected by it, it would be open to the Council of
\n      Ministers to consider the matter over and over again and,
\n      therefore, till its communication the order cannot be
\n      regarded as anything more than provisional in character.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      We are, therefore, of the opinion that the remarks or the
\n      order of the Revenue Minister, PEPSU are of no avail to
\n      the appellant.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                                                         [emphasis added]<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
32.       In State of Bihar and others v. Kripalu Shankar and others<\/a><\/p>\n
(1987) 3 SCC 34, a two-Judge Bench while considering the question<\/p>\n
whether   notings   recorded   in   the   file   would   constitute   civil   or<\/p>\n
criminal contempt within the meaning of Section 2(b) and (c) of the<\/p>\n
Contempt of Courts Act observed as under:-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      “14. Now, the functioning of Government in a State is
\n      governed by Article 166 of the Constitution, which lays
\n      down that there shall be a council of ministers with the
\n      Chief Minister at the head, to aid and advise the Governor
\n      in the exercise of his functions except where he is
\n      required to exercise his functions under the Constitution,
\n      in his discretion. Article 166 provides for the conduct of
\n      Government business. It is useful to quote this article:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
            166 (1) All executive action of the government of a
\n            State shall be expressed to be taken in the name of
\n            the Governor.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<\/blockquote>\n
            (2) Orders and other instruments made and executed in
\n            the name of the Governor shall be authenticated in
\n          such manner as may be specified in rules to be made
\n          by the Governor, and the validity of an order or
\n          instrument which is so authenticated shall not be
\n          called in question on the ground that it is not an
\n          order or instrument made or executed by the Governor.
\n          (3) The Governor shall make rules for the more
\n          convenient transaction of the business of the
\n          government of the State, and for the allocation among
\n          Ministers of the said business insofar as it is not
\n          business with respect to which the Governor is by or
\n          under this Constitution required to act in his
\n          discretion.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      15. Article 166(1) requires that all executive action of
\n      the State Government shall be expressed to be taken in the
\n      name of the Governor. This clause relates to cases where
\n      the executive action has to be expressed in the shape of a
\n      formal order or notification. It prescribes the mode in
\n      which an executive action has to be expressed. Noting by
\n      an official in the departmental file will not, therefore,
\n      come within this article nor even noting by a Minister.
\n      Every executive decision need not be as laid down under
\n      Article 166(1) but when it takes the form of an order it
\n      has to comply with Article 166(1). Article 166(2) states
\n      that orders and other instruments made and executed under
\n      Article 166(1), shall be authenticated in the manner
\n      prescribed. While clause (1) relates to the mode of
\n      expression, clause (2) lays down the manner in which the
\n      order is to be authenticated and clause (3) relates to the
\n      making of the rules by the Governor for the more
\n      convenient transaction of the business of the Government.
\n      A study of this article, therefore, makes it clear that
\n      the notings in a file get culminated into an order
\n      affecting right of parties only when it reaches the head
\n      of the department and is expressed in the name of the
\n      Governor, authenticated in the manner provided in Article
\n      166(2).”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
33.     In Rajasthan Housing Board v. Shri Kishan (1993) 2 SCC 84,<\/p>\n
this Court made a detailed reference to the records and affidavit<\/p>\n
filed on behalf of the Rajasthan Housing Board and held:<\/p>\n
      “From the above material, it is clear that there was no
\n      final decision at any time to de-notify the said lands. A
\n      tentative decision was no doubt taken in February 1990 but
\n      before it could be implemented the Government thought it
\n      necessary to ascertain in views of the Housing Board and
\n      to find out as to what the Board had done upon the land,
\n      what structures it had raised and what amount it had spent
\n      so that the Board could be compensated while delivering
\n       the possession back to the Housing Society. Before this
\n       could be done there was a change in the Government and the
\n       said tentative decision was reversed. In this view of the
\n       matter, it is not necessary for us to go into the question
\n       whether there was a communication of the `decision’ of the
\n       Government to the petitioner. The communication must be of
\n       a final decision and not of a provisional or tentative
\n       decision.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
34.         The    issue   was   recently     considered        in   Sethi     Auto   Service<\/p>\n
Station and another v. Delhi Development Authority and others (2009)<\/p>\n
1 SCC 180.         In that case, the appellant had claimed relocation of<\/p>\n
two   petrol       pumps   which    had   become       non-profitable        on   account   of<\/p>\n
construction of 8 lane express highway between Delhi and Gurgaon.<\/p>\n
The   appellants       relied      on   the   notings     recorded      by   the   technical<\/p>\n
committee headed by the Vice Chairman, DDA.                      It was urged that the<\/p>\n
technical committee had recommended relocation of the petrol pumps,<\/p>\n
it    was    not    open   to    DDA    to    do   a    volte    face    and      reject    the<\/p>\n
representation of the appellants.                  On behalf of the respondents, it<\/p>\n
was urged that mere notings and proposal recorded in the files of<\/p>\n
DDA did not create any right in favour of the appellants and the<\/p>\n
final decision taken by DDA against relocation of petrol pumps was<\/p>\n
consistent with the policy in vogue.                    This Court approved the High<\/p>\n
Court’s refusal to interfere with DDA’s decision and observed:<\/p>\n
       “It is trite to state that notings in a departmental file
\n       do not have the sanction of law to be an effective order.
\n       A noting by an officer is an expression of his viewpoint
\n       on the subject. It is no more than an opinion by an
\n       officer for internal use and consideration of the other
\n       officials of the department and for the benefit of the
\n       final decision-making authority. Needless to add that
\n       internal notings are not meant for outside exposure.
\n       Notings in the file culminate into an executable order,
\n       affecting the rights of the parties, only when it reaches
\n       the final decision-making authority in the department,
\n       gets his approval and the final order is communicated to
\n       the person concerned.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
35.         In C.W.P. No.325\/1982 – Ram Phal v. Union of India, which<\/p>\n
was decided by the Full Bench of the High Court along with other<\/p>\n
cases, vide Roshanara Begum v. Union of India, an application was<\/p>\n
moved    by    the     petitioners    with    the    prayer       that     the   acquisition<\/p>\n
proceedings may be quashed because the Central Government has issued<\/p>\n
an    order    under    Section     48(1)    of    the   Act    for   withdrawal      of   the<\/p>\n
acquisition proceedings in respect of the land which was subject<\/p>\n
matter of the writ petition. On behalf of the Central Government, it<\/p>\n
was urged that no order has been made by the Central Government for<\/p>\n
withdrawing          from   acquisition       of     the       land   in     question      and<\/p>\n
communication regarding withdrawal was sent due to misreading of<\/p>\n
orders made in the file.              Counsel representing the Union of India<\/p>\n
went to the extent of arguing that if the court was to infer that<\/p>\n
any such order has been made by the Central Government, then the<\/p>\n
same be treated as non est and declared as illegal and void because<\/p>\n
the land was being acquired for planned development of Delhi.                               It<\/p>\n
was argued that before an order under Section 48 could come into<\/p>\n
play, the same is required to be published in the official gazette<\/p>\n
in    the     same    manner   in   which    notification         under     Section   4    and<\/p>\n
declaration under Section 6, are published.                     The Full Bench adverted<\/p>\n
to Section 48(1) of the Act and observed:\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
       “Section 48 of the Act lays down that Government shall be
\n       at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of
\n       which possession has not been taken. The original record
\n       in which the Minister concerned had made the order was
\n       produced before us which we have perused and as a matter
\n       of fact, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed
\n       on record the photocopies of the notings on which the
\n      order of the Minister has been accorded. It is evident
\n      that if this Court is to come to the conclusion on reading
\n      the said record that in fact no order has been made by the
\n      Minister concerned which amounts to withdrawing from
\n      acquisition, mere communication of the misconstrued order
\n      by the officials would not have the effect of an order of
\n      the Government withdrawing from the acquisition.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
36.     The     Full   Bench     then   examined      the    notings    in    the   file,<\/p>\n
referred   to    Section    21    of    the    General      Clauses    Act,    1897    and<\/p>\n
concluded:\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
      “157. Section 48 by itself does not require publication of
\n      such an order in the Official Gazette. As a matter of
\n      fact, there is no repugnancy between the provisions of
\n      Section 48 of the Act as read with Section 21 of the
\n      General   Clauses  Act.   The   purpose   of   issuance   of
\n      publication   of  notifications   and   declarations   under
\n      Sections 4 and 6 of the Act in Official Gazette are that
\n      public at large should become aware of the factum that the
\n      land so notified is to be acquired for public purpose so
\n      that people at large should not suffer any monetary loss
\n      or any other inconveniences in entering into any deals in
\n      respect of such land, subject-matter of compulsory
\n      acquisition. As an analogy of the purpose enshrined in
\n      notification issued under Section 4 and declaration issued
\n      under Section 6 for their publication in Official Gazette
\n      is also, in our view, linked to the order which is made
\n      under Section 48 of the Act for withdrawing from such
\n      acquisition and unless the same is also published in the
\n      manner as the original notifications, the said object
\n      could not be achieved i.e. of giving public notice to the
\n      public at large.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
37.     As a result of the above discussion, we hold that the noting<\/p>\n
recorded in the official files by the officers of the Government at<\/p>\n
different levels and even the Ministers do not become decision of<\/p>\n
the Government     unless      the   same     is   sanctified   and    acted    upon    by<\/p>\n
issuing an order in the name of the President or Governor, as the<\/p>\n
case may, authenticated in the manner provided in Articles 77(2) and<\/p>\n
166(2) and is communicated to the affected persons.                          The notings
\nand\/or decisions recorded in the file do not confer any right or<\/p>\n
adversely affect the right of any person and the same can neither be<\/p>\n
challenged in a court nor made basis for seeking relief.                                      Even if<\/p>\n
the competent authority records noting in the file, which indicates<\/p>\n
that some decision has been taken by the concerned authority, the<\/p>\n
same can always be reviewed by the same authority or reversed or<\/p>\n
over-turned    or     overruled        by     higher    functionary\/authority                 in    the<\/p>\n
Government.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
38.       Reverting to the case in hand, we find that representation<\/p>\n
made   on    behalf       of     appellant       No.1    was       examined       by     different<\/p>\n
functionaries of the Government and DDA.                            On 8.6.1999, the then<\/p>\n
Minister for Urban Development recorded a note in the file that<\/p>\n
extensive    construction            has    taken   place     and       this    must    have       been<\/p>\n
possible with the cooperation of the concerned officers and opined<\/p>\n
that no demolition can or will be ordered as per the policy.                                         He<\/p>\n
then recorded that suitable terms for regularization be settled by<\/p>\n
negotiations and left the matter there for consideration by his<\/p>\n
successor.     That noting was never translated into an order nor the<\/p>\n
same   was   published          in    the    official    gazette          in    the    form     of    a<\/p>\n
notification.        It was not even communicated to the appellants or<\/p>\n
DDA.   The reason for this is not far to seek.                                 The Minister had<\/p>\n
himself     left   the     matter      for     consideration            and    decision       by   his<\/p>\n
successor.         The    latter       finally      decided        on    14.7.1999       that       the<\/p>\n
appellants     request         for    de-notification          of       the    land     cannot       be<\/p>\n
accepted     because       the       development        was    carried          out    after        its<\/p>\n
acquisition    and       also    because      the   land      is    required      for     a    public
\npurpose, i.e, Vasant Kunj Residential Project, which was held up due<\/p>\n
to prolonged litigation.             This being the position, the appellants<\/p>\n
cannot rely upon the note recorded by the then Minister on 8.6.1999<\/p>\n
for pleading before the Court that the Government had taken decision<\/p>\n
to withdraw from the acquisition of land in question in terms of<\/p>\n
Section 48(1) of the Act.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
39.         Before leaving this part of the discussion, we consider it<\/p>\n
necessary to observe that there have been several cases of exercise<\/p>\n
of     power    under      Section    48(1)     of    the    Act    for     extraneous<\/p>\n
considerations defeating the very purpose of acquisition.                    Two such<\/p>\n
instances have been considered by this Court in Chandra Bansi Singh<\/p>\n
v. State of Bihar (1984) 4 SCC 316 and Rajasthan Housing Board v.<\/p>\n
Sri Kishan (supra).          The facts of Chandra Bansi Singh’s case were<\/p>\n
that on 19.8.1974, the Government of Bihar issued notification under<\/p>\n
Section 4 for acquisition of 1034.94 acres of land in village Digha<\/p>\n
for the purpose of construction of houses by the Bihar State Housing<\/p>\n
Board.      After consideration of objections, declaration under Section<\/p>\n
6     was   issued   and    published    on     20.2.1976.         On   8.11.1976,    a<\/p>\n
representation was made by one Mr. Ram Avtar Shastri, Member of<\/p>\n
Parliament for withdrawing the acquisition proceedings.                      The same<\/p>\n
was rejected in December, 1976.            However, before compensation could<\/p>\n
be disbursed to the land owners, general elections were announced<\/p>\n
and, therefore, the matter was deferred and put in cold storage.                     On<\/p>\n
24.5.1980, 4.03 acres land belonging to Pandey families was released<\/p>\n
from acquisition.          In the same year, a writ petition was filed in<\/p>\n
the High Court       challenging      release    of   land   in    favour   of   Pandey
\nfamilies but the same was withdrawn.                         In May 1981, another writ<\/p>\n
petition was filed on the same subject and it was pleaded that<\/p>\n
release of land in favour of Pandey families is violative of Article<\/p>\n
14 of the Constitution.               The State Government supported the release<\/p>\n
of land in favour of Pandey families by asserting that they had put<\/p>\n
up buildings with boundary walls in the entire area covered by 4.03<\/p>\n
acres    and     that    it   would    have    been    difficult       for     government         to<\/p>\n
demolish the construction.             This was controverted by the petitioner,<\/p>\n
who produced several photographs to show that no huge buildings or<\/p>\n
houses were constructed and only small hutment had been put up on<\/p>\n
the land.        After considering the entire record, this Court ruled<\/p>\n
that release of land in favour of Pandey families was pure and<\/p>\n
simple     act     of    favouritism         without    there       being     any        legal   or<\/p>\n
constitutional justification for the same and declared the action of<\/p>\n
the     State    Government      to     be     violative       of    Article        14     of    the<\/p>\n
Constitution.           The Court also declared that the entire acquisition<\/p>\n
will be deemed to be valid and the land released to Pandey families<\/p>\n
would form part of the acquisition initiated vide notification dated<\/p>\n
19.8.1974.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
40.       The facts of Sri Kishan’s case were that 2570 bighas of land<\/p>\n
(approximately equal to 1580 crores) was acquired for the benefit of<\/p>\n
the Rajasthan Housing Board by publication of notification under<\/p>\n
Section 4(1) read with Section 17(4) of the Act.                           The learned Single<\/p>\n
Judge    of     the   High    Court    dismissed       the    writ    petitions          involving<\/p>\n
challenge to the acquisition proceedings.                      On appeals filed by the<\/p>\n
land     owners,      Judges    constituting       the       Division        Bench       expressed<\/p>\n
divergent       opinions.       Thereupon,       the    matter       was    referred       to    the
\nlarger Bench.          By a majority judgment, the larger Bench quashed the<\/p>\n
notification issued under Section 17(4) and declaration issued under<\/p>\n
Section 6.       During the pendency of appeals before this Court, a writ<\/p>\n
petition was       filed     by    New    Pink     City    Grah       Nirman   Sahkari       Sangh.<\/p>\n
Therein    it    was    pleaded      that    by    virtue        of   the   decision        of   the<\/p>\n
Minister-in-charge,          Urban       Development        Department         and    the    Chief<\/p>\n
Minister, the State Government must be deemed to have withdrawn from<\/p>\n
the acquisition within the meaning of Section 48(1) of the Act.<\/p>\n
This Court noted that the society, which claims to have purchased<\/p>\n
525 bighas of land from khatedars, represented the Government to de-<\/p>\n
notify the land.            The then Minister-in-charge, Urban Development<\/p>\n
Department recorded a decision in the file on July 20, 1984 that the<\/p>\n
lands be     released,       but    his     decision       was    overruled     by    the     Chief<\/p>\n
Minister.       After about five years, the society again represented for<\/p>\n
de-notification of the land.                     The Minister for Urban Development<\/p>\n
made recommendation in favour of the society.                          This time, the Chief<\/p>\n
Minister agreed with the Minister by observing that the land of the<\/p>\n
society was regularised according to the decision of the Cabinet.<\/p>\n
Thereafter,       Deputy         Secretary,        Urban     Development            and     Housing<\/p>\n
Department wrote a letter to the Secretary of the Housing Board that<\/p>\n
the Government has decided to release the land of the society.                                     A<\/p>\n
copy of the letter was marked to the society.                           During the pendency<\/p>\n
of writ petition before this Court, an additional affidavit of the<\/p>\n
Secretary,      Rajasthan        Housing    Board     was    filed      with    a    categorical<\/p>\n
assertion    that      at   no    point     of    time    any    notification        was     issued<\/p>\n
withdrawing from the acquisition and the Beri Commission, which was<\/p>\n
constituted       to    look      into     the     illegalities          and    irregularities
\ncommitted by functionaries and officials of the previous Government,<\/p>\n
recorded a categorical finding that the decision to de-acquire the<\/p>\n
land of the petitioner – society was in contravention of the earlier<\/p>\n
decision of the Cabinet and was also contrary to law and against<\/p>\n
public interest.      This Court held that the notings recorded by the<\/p>\n
Minister and Chief Minister for release of land in favour of the<\/p>\n
society, were totally unjustified.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
41.       The next question which needs consideration is whether the<\/p>\n
decision    contained    in    letter   dated     9.6.2000    is   liable    to   be<\/p>\n
nullified on the ground of arbitrariness and violation of Article 14<\/p>\n
of the Constitution.      The plea of the appellants is that even though<\/p>\n
the construction of the sports complex and other buildings may not<\/p>\n
be in conformity with law, the Government is duty-bound to treat<\/p>\n
them at par    with     others   like   Hamdard    Public    School,   St.    Xavier<\/p>\n
School,    Shahbad    Estate     Extension   Welfare     Association,        Scindia<\/p>\n
Potteries etc., whose land was released from acquisition despite the<\/p>\n
fact that constructions were made after issue of notification under<\/p>\n
Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6 of the Act and, in some<\/p>\n
cases, even after the award was made.           Their further plea is that in<\/p>\n
view of the observations contained in the last part of para 182 of<\/p>\n
the judgment of the Full Bench in Roshanara Bgum v. Union of India<\/p>\n
(supra) and statement made by the counsel appearing on behalf of the<\/p>\n
State, which finds mention in para 21 of the judgment of this Court<\/p>\n
in Murari v. Union of India<\/a> (supra), the representations made by<\/p>\n
them for release of the land could not have been rejected on the<\/p>\n
grounds that the construction has been raised after the acquisition
\nof land and the acquired land is needed for Vasant Kunj Housing<\/p>\n
Project.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
42.       In our opinion, the Government’s decision not to withdraw<\/p>\n
from the acquisition of land in question or de-notify the acquired<\/p>\n
land, does not suffer from the vice of discrimination or arbitrary<\/p>\n
exercise of power or non application of mind.                     With due deference to<\/p>\n
the Full Bench of the High Court which disposed of the batch of writ<\/p>\n
petitions and miscellaneous applications, the observations contained<\/p>\n
in the last part of paragraph 182 of the judgment suggesting that<\/p>\n
the petitioner\/applicant can make representation for release of the<\/p>\n
land and the concerned authorities can examine whether the sports<\/p>\n
complex    could      serve    the    purpose   of    acquiring         the    land    for    the<\/p>\n
particular      scheme    or    the    scheme   can    be    modified         or   amended     in<\/p>\n
respect of the land in question were nothing more than pious hope<\/p>\n
and the Government rightly did not take them seriously because in<\/p>\n
the same paragraph the Full Bench unequivocally ruled that the land<\/p>\n
is required for residential scheme of Vasant Kunj and the sports<\/p>\n
complex built by the applicant was not in consonance with the public<\/p>\n
purpose    for    which    the   land    was    earmarked      in       the   scheme.         The<\/p>\n
statement made by the counsel representing the State before this<\/p>\n
Court which finds mention in paragraph 21 of the judgment in Murari<\/p>\n
v. Union of India<\/a> (supra) was neither here nor there.                              It did not<\/p>\n
amount     to     a    commitment       on   behalf     of     the       Government          that<\/p>\n
representations made for release of land will receive favourable<\/p>\n
consideration.         In any case, once this Court had made it clear in<\/p>\n
Murari    v.     Union    of   India<\/a>    (supra)      that    in     a    matter       involving
\nacquisition of thousands of acres of land, it would not be proper to<\/p>\n
leave    out   some     small   portions     here   and    there    over   which     some<\/p>\n
construction may have been made, the decision of the Government not<\/p>\n
to withdraw from the acquisition of the land in question cannot be<\/p>\n
faulted.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
43.       The appellants’ plea that the Government ought to have de-<\/p>\n
notified the land covered by the sports complex because the same has<\/p>\n
been built by spending crores of rupees and is being used by a large<\/p>\n
section of people sounds attractive, but, after having given serious<\/p>\n
thought to the entire matter,          we are convinced that the Government<\/p>\n
rightly refused to exercise discretion under Section 48(1) of the<\/p>\n
Act for de-notifying the acquired land and the High Court did not<\/p>\n
commit any error whatsoever by refusing to fall in the trap of<\/p>\n
alluring argument that demolition of the sports complex built by<\/p>\n
spending substantial amount will be a waste of national wealth and<\/p>\n
nobody will be benefited by it.            The appellants have not denied the<\/p>\n
fact that the land on which the sports complex has been constructed<\/p>\n
was     acquired   by    the    Government     by   issuing       notification     dated<\/p>\n
23.1.1965 under Section 4(1) of the Act, which culminated in the<\/p>\n
making of award dated 22.12.1980.              It is also not their case that<\/p>\n
the     construction     activity   was      started      prior    to   initiation    of<\/p>\n
acquisition proceedings. Rather, their admitted stance is that they<\/p>\n
came in possession of the land between 1990-1993, i.e., more than 10<\/p>\n
years after finalization of the acquisition proceedings.                   This being<\/p>\n
the position, the appellants cannot plead equity and seek court’s<\/p>\n
intervention for protection of the unauthorised constructions raised
\nby them.        It is trite to say that once the land is acquired by<\/p>\n
following due process of law, the same cannot be transferred by the<\/p>\n
land owner to another person and that any such transfer is void and<\/p>\n
is not binding on the State.            A transferee of the acquired land can,<\/p>\n
at best, step into the shoes of the land-owner and lodge claim for<\/p>\n
compensation – Gian Chand v. Gopala and others<\/a> (1995) 2 SCC 528,<\/p>\n
Secretary, Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur v. Daulat Mal Jain<\/p>\n
and others<\/a> (1997) 1 SCC 37, Yadu Nandan Garg v. State of Rajasthan<\/p>\n
and others JT<\/a> (1995) 8 S.C. 179 and Jaipur Development Authority v.<\/p>\n
Mahavir Housing Coop. Society, Jaipur and others<\/a> (1996) 11 SCC 229.<\/p>\n
44.       The   appellants       have   another   unsurmountable    hurdle   in    the<\/p>\n
form   of   Section    3    of   the    1972   Act,   which   contains   prohibition<\/p>\n
against     transfer   of    the   acquired     land.     That   section   reads   as<\/p>\n
under:-\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
       “Prohibition on transfer of lands acquired by Central
\n       Government.– No person shall purport to transfer by sale,
\n       mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise any land or part
\n       thereof situated in the Union territory of Delhi, which
\n       has been acquired by the Central Government under the Land
\n       Acquisition Act, 1984 or under any other law providing for
\n       acquisition of land for a public purpose.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Section 4 which contains provision for regulation of transfer of<\/p>\n
lands which are under acquisition also reads as under:-<\/p>\n
       “Regulation on transfer of lands in relation to which
\n       acquisition proceedings have been initiated. – No person
\n       shall, except with the previous permission in writing of
\n       the competent authority, transfer or purport to transfer
\n       by sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise any land or
\n       part thereof situated in the Union territory of Delhi,
\n       which is proposed to be acquired in connection with the
\n       Scheme and in relation to which a declaration to the
\n       effect that such land or part thereof      is needed for a
\n       public purpose having been made by the Central Government
\n       under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, (1 of
\n       1894) the Central Government has not withdrawn form the
\n       acquisition under section 48 of that Act.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
45.         The distinction between the above reproduced two provisions<\/p>\n
is that while Section 3 contains an absolute prohibition on transfer<\/p>\n
of the acquired land by sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise,<\/p>\n
Section 4 declares that no person shall, except with the previous<\/p>\n
permission      in   writing    of   the   competent    authority,       transfer    or<\/p>\n
purport to transfer by sale etc. of any land or part thereof, which<\/p>\n
is proposed to be acquired in connection with the scheme and in<\/p>\n
relation to which a declaration to the effect that such land or part<\/p>\n
thereof is needed for a public purpose has been made by the Central<\/p>\n
Government and the Central Government has not withdrawn                     from the<\/p>\n
acquisition under Section 48(1).\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
46.         The present case falls within the ambit of Section 3 of the<\/p>\n
1972 Act.       The land owners and Shri Satish Khosla must have been<\/p>\n
aware of the prohibition on transfer of the acquired land, but by<\/p>\n
taking advantage of the stay order passed by the High Court in Writ<\/p>\n
Petition      No.1753\/1980,     they   appear     to   have    entered    into     some<\/p>\n
clandestine      transaction     pursuant    to      which    Shri   Satish      Khosla<\/p>\n
acquired possession of the land and proceeded to build the sports<\/p>\n
complex and commercial facilities to which reference has been made<\/p>\n
in    the    order   of   the   Division    Bench.      We    have   described      the<\/p>\n
transaction as clandestine because the appellants are conspicuously<\/p>\n
silent as to how Shri Satish Khosla came in possession of land in
\nquestion after 35 years of initiation of the acquisition proceedings<\/p>\n
and 10 years of finalization thereof. During the course of hearing,<\/p>\n
Shri   Mukul     Rohtagi,       learned    senior     counsel      appearing     for    the<\/p>\n
appellants      did    make     a   statement      that    his   client   were    put   in<\/p>\n
possession in furtherance of an agreement of sale, but no document<\/p>\n
has been produced in support of this statement.                       Therefore, it is<\/p>\n
not possible to take cognizance of the so-called agreement of sale.<\/p>\n
In any case, even if such a transaction did take place, the same<\/p>\n
will have to be treated as void in view of the express prohibition<\/p>\n
contained in Section 3 of the 1972 Act.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
47.      Although,       the    then     Minister    for    Urban    Development,       who<\/p>\n
recorded      note    dated    8.6.1999,     was    extremely      magnanimous    to    the<\/p>\n
appellants when he wrote that the extensive construction must have<\/p>\n
been made with full cooperation of public servants concerned, but<\/p>\n
having carefully examined the entire record, we have no hesitation<\/p>\n
to observe that the construction of this magnitude could not have<\/p>\n
been possible, but for the active connivance of the concerned public<\/p>\n
servants who turned blind eye to the huge structure being built on<\/p>\n
the acquired land without any sanctioned plan.                       We are amazed to<\/p>\n
note that after having secured some sort of transfer of the acquired<\/p>\n
land in stark violation of the prohibition contained in Section 3 of<\/p>\n
the    1972    Act,     the     appellants      could      raise    massive     structure<\/p>\n
comprising      cricket        ground,    tennis     stadium,       badminton     courts,<\/p>\n
swimming pool, table tennis room, squash court, etc. and cottages<\/p>\n
with modern facilities without even submitting building plans for<\/p>\n
sanction by any competent authority and                    without being noticed by
\nany     of    the    authorities       entrusted         with    the     duty     of    checking<\/p>\n
illegal\/unauthorised construction.                  This mystery may perhaps never<\/p>\n
be solved because the officers responsible for ignoring the blatant<\/p>\n
violation of Section 3 of the 1972 Act, Delhi Development Authority<\/p>\n
Act and Building Rules, Regulations and By-laws must have either<\/p>\n
retired or moved to higher positions in the administration where<\/p>\n
they will be able to block any inquiry in the matter.                            Be that as it<\/p>\n
may, such illegal constructions cannot be protected by the court by<\/p>\n
nullifying the decision taken by the Government not to withdraw from<\/p>\n
the acquisition of the land in question.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
48.          At this stage, we may also take cognizance of the commercial<\/p>\n
activities         being   undertaken       in    what    has    been    described        by   the<\/p>\n
appellants as sports complex simpliciter.                       The nature and magnitude<\/p>\n
of the commercial activities may never have been revealed but for<\/p>\n
the fact that the officer representing the respondents could bring<\/p>\n
to the High          Court’s    notice      the   written       statement       filed    by    Shri<\/p>\n
Satish Khosla in Suit No. 3064\/1996 – M\/s. Eli Lilly Ranbaxy Ltd.<\/p>\n
and others v. Satish Khosla.                In that suit, the plaintiff had sought<\/p>\n
a   decree     of    permanent       injunction     restraining         the    defendant       from<\/p>\n
letting out the garden for parties and functions during the currency<\/p>\n
of lease agreement in respect of cottage no. 6.                               The contents of<\/p>\n
paras    4,    6    and    11   of    the   written       statement,      which        have    been<\/p>\n
extracted in the impugned order of the Division Bench of the High<\/p>\n
Court, read as under:-\n<\/p>\n
“4.     Para no. 4 is denied.     It is pertinent to note
\nthat the Cottage in question is situated in the Shanti
\nSports Club and is one of the 7 cottages in the said
\nSports Club.   Shanti Sports Club, of which the defendant
\nis the Chairman, came into existence in 1989 and the
\nsports facilities of the said Club are being utilized by
\nits members as well as others. The said Club has amongst
\nothers a cricket ground, six tennis courts, swimming pool,
\nsquash courts, billiards rooms and a host of other
\nfacilities for use for its members.     The Club has large
\nbeautifully manicured lawn appealing to the eye. Since the
\nvery inception of the Club, its beautiful lawns are hired
\nfor wedding parties, birth-day parties and for other
\nfestive occasions. These wedding parties have been held on
\nthe lawns of the Club since 1991, and are the very life
\nand soul of the Club apart from its sports activities. In
\nfact, the aforementioned wedding parties and other
\nfunctions which are held on the lawns are the major source
\nof revenue for the Club. The club has more than 1500
\nmembers and about 200-300 frequent the club every day.<\/p>\n
6.      Para 6 is denied. The contents of this para are
\nabsolutely false to the knowledge of the plaintiffs
\ninasmuch as the plaintiffs all along knew that the garden
\nin between the two Cottages was let out on hire for
\nmarriage and other private parties. The defendant denies
\nany verbal assurance was given to the plaintiffs that the
\ngarden was to be used for the families residing in two
\ncottages and not for any other purpose. The lawn\/garden in
\nquestion in between the two cottages is of more than 3000
\nsq. yards in size and it was not hired out to the
\nplaintiff.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
11. The averments made in para 11 are denied. It is
\nsubmitted that the plaintiffs have filed the present suit
\nonly to harass the defendant. It is pertinent to note that
\nin the other Cottages in the Club several Diplomats
\nincluding Deputy High Commissioner of Pakistan, Ambassador
\nof Kazakastan and other dignitaries are staying for
\nseveral years without any complaint. It is denied that the
\nplaintiffs   are  entitled   to  a  decree   of  permanent
\ninjunction restraining the defendant from hiring out the
\ngarden for functions and parties during the tenure of the
\nalleged lease agreement. The revenue generated from hiring
\nout the garden for functions and parties is significant
\nrevenue and is necessary for the proper and efficient
\nrunning of the Club and these functions and parties are
\nthe very life and soul of the Club.\n<\/p>\n
\nThe aforesaid averments made   in   the   written statement
\nfiled by Shri Satish Khosla    in   the   above noted suit
\nclearly reveal that the cottages at the club and its lawns
\nare being used for commercial and rental purposes. In
\nrespect of cottage No. 6 alone the club was charging large
\namounts as per below under various agreements. These
\ndetails are as follows:-\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
1. According to the lease agreement by and between the
\nclub and M\/s.Eli Lilly Ranbaxy Ltd. the latter was
\nrequired to pay a rental of Rs.60,000\/- p.m. to the former
\nduring the first year of the lease.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
2. The rent was liable to be increased by 5% after the
\nfirst years, 10% over the last rent paid after second year
\nand every year thereafter.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
3. Agreement stipulated payment of advance rent in the sum
\nof Rs.4,50,000\/- by M\/s. Eli Lilly Ranbaxy Ltd. to the
\nClub.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
4. Under maintenance and service agreement in respect of
\nthe said premises M\/s. Eli Lilly Ranbaxy Ltd. were
\nrequired to pay Rs.40,000\/- p.m. to the Club.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
5. The maintenance charges of the premises were liable to
\nbe increased by 5% over the last charge paid after the
\nfirst year, and increase of 10% over the last charge paid
\nafter the second year and every year thereafter.<\/p>\n
6. Under an agreement for security services, for the same
\ncottage, the aforesaid lessee was required to pay
\nRs.30,000\/- to the club and these charges were liable to
\nbe increased by 5% after first year and 10% after the
\nsecond year and every year thereafter.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
7. Under an agreement styled as ‘hire agreement’, the
\nlessee was required to pay to the club a sum of
\nRs.70,000\/- p.m. for the use of the fittings and fixtures
\ninstalled in the cottage.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
8. The lessee was also liable to pay to the club hire
\ncharges of Rs.7,50,000\/- as advance for the fittings and
\nfixtures installed in the cottage.”\n<\/p>\n
49.      From what we have noted above, it is crystal clear that the<\/p>\n
appellants have been undertaking large scale commercial activities<\/p>\n
in the complex and their so-called love for sports has substantial<\/p>\n
flavor of commerce.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
50.      The plea of discrimination and violation of Article 14 of<\/p>\n
the Constitution put forward by the appellants is totally devoid of<\/p>\n
substance because they did not produce any evidence before the High<\/p>\n
Court and none has been produced before this Court to show that<\/p>\n
their land is identically placed qua the lands on which Hamdard<\/p>\n
Public School, St. Xavier School, Scindia Potteries, etc. exist.                   In<\/p>\n
the    representations      made     to    different     functionaries      of     the<\/p>\n
Government and DDA, the appellants did claim that other parcels of<\/p>\n
the land have been de-notified and before the High Court a copy of<\/p>\n
notification dated 6.9.1996 issued under Section 48(1) was produced,<\/p>\n
but the said assertion and notification were not sufficient for<\/p>\n
recording a finding that their case is identical to those whose land<\/p>\n
had    been   denotified.          The    burden   to    prove     the   charge     of<\/p>\n
discrimination and violation of Article 14 was on the appellants.<\/p>\n
It was for them to produce concrete evidence before the court to<\/p>\n
show that their case was identical to other persons whose land had<\/p>\n
been   released   from   acquisition        and    the   reasons    given   by    the<\/p>\n
Government for refusing to release their land are irrelevant or<\/p>\n
extraneous.     Vague and bald assertions made in the writ petition<\/p>\n
cannot be made basis for recording a finding that the appellants<\/p>\n
have been subjected to invidious or hostile discrimination.                       That<\/p>\n
apart, we are prima facie of the view that the Government’s decision
\nto withdraw from the acquisition of some parcels of land in favour<\/p>\n
of some individuals was not in public interest.                     Such decisions had,<\/p>\n
to     some    extent,    resulted       in    defeating      the   object     of    planned<\/p>\n
development of Delhi on which considerable emphasis has been laid by<\/p>\n
the Full Bench of the High Court and this Court.                            This being the<\/p>\n
position, Article 14 cannot be invoked by the appellants for seeking<\/p>\n
a direction to the respondents to withdraw from the acquisition of<\/p>\n
the land in question.             Article 14 of the Constitution declares that<\/p>\n
the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or<\/p>\n
the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.                            The<\/p>\n
concept of equality enshrined in that Article is a positive concept.<\/p>\n
The Court can command the State to give equal treatment to similarly<\/p>\n
situated persons, but cannot issue a mandate that the State should<\/p>\n
commit illegality or pass wrong order because in another case such<\/p>\n
an illegality has been committed or wrong order has been passed.                            If<\/p>\n
any illegality or irregularity has been committed in favour of an<\/p>\n
individual      or    a   group    of    individuals,      others     cannot   invoke     the<\/p>\n
jurisdiction of the High Court or of this Court and seek a direction<\/p>\n
that    the    same   irregularity        or    illegality     be   committed       in   their<\/p>\n
favour by the State or its agencies\/instrumentalities.                              In other<\/p>\n
words, Article 14 cannot be invoked for perpetuating irregularities<\/p>\n
or   illegalities.          In    Chandigarh      Administration       v.    Jagjit      Singh<\/a><\/p>\n
(1995) 1 SCC 745, this Court made a lucid exposition of law on this<\/p>\n
subject.       The facts of that case were that the respondents, who had<\/p>\n
given    the    highest     bid    for    338    sq.   yds.    Plot    in    Section      31A,<\/p>\n
Chandigarh defaulted in paying the price in accordance with the<\/p>\n
terms and conditions of allotment.                 After giving him opportunity of
\nshowing cause, the Estate Officer cancelled the lease of the plot.<\/p>\n
The appeal and the revision filed by him were dismissed by the Chief<\/p>\n
Administrator      and      Chief        Commissioner,       Chandigarh      respectively.<\/p>\n
Thereafter,      the     respondent        applied     for    refund    of    the     amount<\/p>\n
deposited by him.           His request was accepted and the entire amount<\/p>\n
paid by him was refunded.                He then filed a petition for review of<\/p>\n
the order passed by the Chief Commissioner, which was dismissed.<\/p>\n
However, the officer concerned entertained the second review and<\/p>\n
directed that the plot be restored to the respondent.                          The latter<\/p>\n
did not avail benefit of this unusual order and started litigation<\/p>\n
by filing writ petition in the High Court, which was dismissed on<\/p>\n
March 18, 1991.          Thereafter, the respondent again approached the<\/p>\n
Estate Officer with the request to settle his case in accordance<\/p>\n
with   the   policy    of    the    Government       to   restore    the   plots    to   the<\/p>\n
defaulters by charging forfeiture amount of 5%.                        His request was<\/p>\n
rejected by the Estate Officer.               He then filed another writ petition<\/p>\n
before the High Court, which was allowed only on the ground that in<\/p>\n
another case pertaining to Smt. Prakash Rani, the Administrator had<\/p>\n
restored the plot despite dismissal of the writ petition filed by<\/p>\n
her.     While   reversing         the    order   of   the    High   Court,    this   Court<\/p>\n
observed as under:-\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
       “We are of the opinion that the basis or the principle, if
\n       it can be called one, on which the writ petition has been
\n       allowed by the High Court is unsustainable in law and
\n       indefensible in principle. Since we have come across many
\n       such instances, we think it necessary to deal with such
\n       pleas at a little length. Generally speaking, the mere
\n       fact that the respondent-authority has passed a particular
\n       order in the case of another person similarly situated can
\n       never be the ground for issuing a writ in favour of the
\n       petitioner on the plea of discrimination. The order in
\nfavour of the other person might be legal and valid or it
\nmight not be. That has to be investigated first before it
\ncan be directed to be followed in the case of the
\npetitioner. If the order in favour of the other person is
\nfound to be contrary to law or not warranted in the facts
\nand circumstances of his case, it is obvious that such
\nillegal or unwarranted order cannot be made the basis of
\nissuing a writ compelling the respondent-authority to
\nrepeat the illegality or to pass another unwarranted
\norder. The extraordinary and discretionary power of the
\nHigh Court cannot be exercised for such a purpose. Merely
\nbecause   the    respondent-authority   has   passed    one
\nillegal\/unwarranted order, it does not entitle the High
\nCourt to compel the authority to repeat that illegality
\nover again and again. The illegal\/unwarranted action must
\nbe corrected, if it can be done according to law — indeed,
\nwherever it is possible, the Court should direct the
\nappropriate authority to correct such wrong orders in
\naccordance with law — but even if it cannot be corrected,
\nit is difficult to see how it can be made a basis for its
\nrepetition. By refusing to direct the respondent-authority
\nto repeat the illegality, the Court is not condoning the
\nearlier illegal act\/order nor can such illegal order
\nconstitute the basis for a legitimate complaint of
\ndiscrimination. Giving effect to such pleas would be
\nprejudicial to the interests of law and will do
\nincalculable mischief to public interest. It will be a
\nnegation of law and the rule of law. Of course, if in case
\nthe order in favour of the other person is found to be a
\nlawful and justified one it can be followed and a similar
\nrelief can be given to the petitioner if it is found that
\nthe petitioners’ case is similar to the other persons’
\ncase. But then why examine another person’s case in his
\nabsence rather than examining the case of the petitioner
\nwho is present before the Court and seeking the relief. Is
\nit not more appropriate and convenient to examine the
\nentitlement of the petitioner before the Court to the
\nrelief asked for in the facts and circumstances of his
\ncase than to enquire into the correctness of the order
\nmade or action taken in another person’s case, which other
\nperson is not before the case nor is his case. In our
\nconsidered opinion, such a course — barring exceptional
\nsituations — would neither be advisable nor desirable. In
\nother words, the High Court cannot ignore the law and the
\nwell-accepted norms governing the writ jurisdiction and
\nsay that because in one case a particular order has been
\npassed or a particular action has been taken, the same
\nmust be repeated irrespective of the fact whether such an
\norder or action is contrary to law or otherwise. Each case
\nmust be decided on its own merits, factual and legal, in
\naccordance with relevant legal principles. The orders and
\nactions of the authorities cannot be equated to the
\njudgments of the Supreme Court and High Courts nor can
\nthey be elevated to the level of the precedents, as
\n      understood in the judicial world.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                                                                   [emphasis added]<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
51.       Similar    is    the   ratio      of      the   judgments      in       Narain    Das    v.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Improvement Trust, Amritsar (1973) 2 SCC 265, Gursharan Singh v. New<\/p>\n
Delhi    Municipal    Committee<\/a>        (1996)         2   SCC    459,    Secretary,          Jaipur<\/p>\n
Development Authority v. Daulat Mal Jain<\/a> (supra), Yadu Nandan Garg<\/p>\n
v. State of Rajasthan and others<\/a> (supra), State of Haryana v. Ram<\/p>\n
Kumar Mann<\/a> [(1997) 3 SCC 321, Faridabad CT. Scan Centre v. D.G.<\/p>\n
Health Services<\/a> [(1997) 7 SCC 752], Style (Dress land) v. Union<\/p>\n
Territory, Chandigarh [(1999) 7 SCC 89], State of Bihar v. Kameshwar<\/p>\n
Prasad    Singh<\/a>    (2000)    9   SCC     94,     Union     of    India       v.    International<\/p>\n
Trading Co.<\/a> (2003) 5 SCC 437, Ekta Sakthi Foundation v. Govt. of NCT<\/p>\n
of Delhi<\/a> (2006) 10 SCC 337, Sanjay Kumar Munjal v. Chairman, UPSC<\/a><\/p>\n
(2006) 8 SCC 42,          K.K. Bhalla v. State of M.P. and others<\/a> (2006) 3<\/p>\n
SCC     581,   National     Institute          of     Technology        v.    Chandra        Sekhar<\/p>\n
Chaudhary<\/a> (2007) 1 SCC 93, Vice Chancellor, M.D. University, Rohtak<\/p>\n
v. Jahan Singh<\/a> (2007) 5 SCC 77, State of Kerala and others v. K.<\/p>\n
Prasad and<\/a> another (2007) 7 SCC 140, Punjab State Electricity Board<\/p>\n
and others v. Gurmail Singh<\/a> (2008) 7 SCC 245 and Panchi Devi v.<\/p>\n
State of Rajasthan and others<\/a> (2009) 2 SCC 589.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
52.       Before    concluding,        we   consider        it    necessary         to     enter   a<\/p>\n
caveat.             In all developed countries, great emphasis has been<\/p>\n
laid on the planned development of cities and urban areas.                                        The<\/p>\n
object    of    planned     development             has   been    achieved          by     rigorous<\/p>\n
enforcement of master plans prepared after careful study of complex<\/p>\n
issues, scientific research and rationalisation of laws.                                 The people
\nof   those    countries     have     greatly      contributed        to    the    concept    of<\/p>\n
planned development of cities by strictly adhering to the planning<\/p>\n
laws, the master plan etc.                 They respect the laws enacted by the<\/p>\n
legislature for regulating planned development of the cities and<\/p>\n
seldom there is a complaint of violation of master plan etc. in the<\/p>\n
construction of buildings, residential, institutional or commercial.<\/p>\n
In   contrast,    scenario      in    the    developing       countries      like    ours    is<\/p>\n
substantially different.             Though, the competent legislatures have,<\/p>\n
from time to time, enacted laws for ensuring planned development of<\/p>\n
the cities and urban areas, enforcement thereof has been extremely<\/p>\n
poor and the people have violated the master plans, zoning plans and<\/p>\n
building     regulations     and     bye-laws       with   impunity.         In    last   four<\/p>\n
decades,     almost   all    cities,        big   or   small,    have      seen     unplanned<\/p>\n
growth.      In the 21st century, the menace of illegal and unauthorized<\/p>\n
constructions and encroachments has acquired monstrous proportions<\/p>\n
and everyone has been paying heavy price for the same.                           Economically<\/p>\n
affluent     people   and    those       having     support     of   the    political       and<\/p>\n
executive      apparatus     of      the    State      have    constructed         buildings,<\/p>\n
commercial complexes, multiplexes, malls etc. in blatant violation<\/p>\n
of   the     municipal    and     town     planning     laws,    master      plans,       zonal<\/p>\n
development plans and even the sanctioned building plans.                            In most<\/p>\n
of the cases of illegal or unauthorized constructions, the officers<\/p>\n
of the municipal and other regulatory bodies turn blind eye either<\/p>\n
due to the influence of higher functionaries of the State or other<\/p>\n
extraneous reasons.         Those who construct buildings in violation of<\/p>\n
the relevant statutory provisions, master plan etc. and those who<\/p>\n
directly or indirectly abet such violations are totally unmindful of
\nthe grave consequences of their actions and\/or omissions on the<\/p>\n
present as well as future generations of the country which will be<\/p>\n
forced to live in unplanned cities and urban areas.                           The people<\/p>\n
belonging to this class do not realize that the constructions made<\/p>\n
in violation of the relevant laws, master plan or zonal development<\/p>\n
plan or      sanctioned building plan or the building is used for a<\/p>\n
purpose other than the one specified in the relevant statute or the<\/p>\n
master plan etc., such constructions put unbearable burden on the<\/p>\n
public facilities\/amenities like water, electricity, sewerage etc.<\/p>\n
apart from creating chaos on the roads.                   The pollution caused due to<\/p>\n
traffic   congestion       affects    the       health    of   the   road   users.      The<\/p>\n
pedestrians and people belonging to weaker sections of the society,<\/p>\n
who cannot afford the luxury of air-conditioned cars, are the worst<\/p>\n
victims of pollution.          They suffer from skin diseases of different<\/p>\n
types, asthma, allergies and even more dreaded diseases like cancer.<\/p>\n
It can only be a matter of imagination how much the government has<\/p>\n
to spend on the treatment of such persons and also for controlling<\/p>\n
pollution    and     adverse   impact      on    the     environment   due   to   traffic<\/p>\n
congestion      on   the   roads     and   chaotic       conditions    created    due   to<\/p>\n
illegal and unauthorized constructions. This Court has, from time to<\/p>\n
time,   taken    cognizance     of    buildings        constructed     in   violation    of<\/p>\n
municipal and other laws and emphasized that no compromise should be<\/p>\n
made with the town planning scheme and no relief should be given to<\/p>\n
the violator of the town planning scheme etc. on the ground that he<\/p>\n
has spent substantial amount on construction of the buildings etc. –<\/p>\n
K. Ramdas Shenoy v. Chief Officers, Town Municipal Council, Udipi<\/a><\/p>\n
1974 (2) SCC 506, Dr. G.N. Khajuria v. Delhi Development Authority<\/a>
\n1995 (5) SCC 762, M.I. Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Radhey Shyam Sahu<\/a> 1999<\/p>\n
(6) SCC 464, Friends Colony Development Committee v. State of Orissa<\/a><\/p>\n
2004 (8) SCC 733, M.C. Mehta v. Union of India<\/a> 2006 (3) SCC 399 and<\/p>\n
S.N. Chandrasekhar v. State of Karnataka 2006 (3) SCC 208.<\/p>\n
53.       Unfortunately, despite repeated judgments by the this Court<\/p>\n
and High Courts, the builders and other affluent people engaged in<\/p>\n
the construction activities, who have, over the years shown scant<\/p>\n
respect   for   regulatory    mechanism       envisaged   in   the    municipal   and<\/p>\n
other similar laws, as also the master plans, zonal development<\/p>\n
plans,    sanctioned    plans   etc.,     have    received      encouragement     and<\/p>\n
support from the State apparatus.                As and when the courts have<\/p>\n
passed orders or the officers of local and other bodies have taken<\/p>\n
action for ensuring rigorous compliance of laws relating to planned<\/p>\n
development of the cities and urban areas and issued directions for<\/p>\n
demolition of the illegal\/unauthorized constructions, those in power<\/p>\n
have come    forward   to    protect    the    wrong   doers   either    by   issuing<\/p>\n
administrative orders or enacting laws for regularization of illegal<\/p>\n
and   unauthorized     constructions      in    the    name    of    compassion   and<\/p>\n
hardship.    Such actions have done irreparable harm to the concept of<\/p>\n
planned development of the cities and urban areas.                   It is high time<\/p>\n
that the executive and political apparatus of the State take serious<\/p>\n
view of the menace of illegal and unauthorized constructions and<\/p>\n
stop their support to the lobbies of affluent class of builders and<\/p>\n
others, else even the rural areas of the country will soon witness<\/p>\n
similar chaotic conditions.\n<\/p>\n
54.         In   the   result,        the   appeals   are    dismissed.       However,      by<\/p>\n
taking      note of the submission made by Shri Mukul Rohtagi that some<\/p>\n
time may be given to his clients to vacate the land, we deem it<\/p>\n
proper to grant thee months’ time to the appellants to handover<\/p>\n
possession of the land to the concerned authority of DDA.                           This will<\/p>\n
be subject to the condition that within two weeks from today an<\/p>\n
affidavit is filed on behalf of the appellants by an authorised<\/p>\n
person that possession of the land will be handed over to DDA by 30 th<\/p>\n
November, 2009 and during this period no encumbrances whatsoever<\/p>\n
will   be    created      by    the    appellants     or    their   agents    and    that   no<\/p>\n
compensation       will    be    claimed      for   the    construction      already    made.<\/p>\n
Needless to say that if the required undertaking is not filed, the<\/p>\n
concerned authorities of DDA shall be entitled to take possession of<\/p>\n
the land and, if necessary, take police help for that purpose.<\/p>\n
Contempt Petition Nos. 252-253 of 2001<\/p>\n
55.         We have    dismissed the          civil appeals         by the    above order.<\/p>\n
Hence, the contempt petitions are dismissed.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
                                                     ………………….J.\n<\/p>\n
                                             [B.N. AGRAWAL]<\/p>\n
                                                     ………………….J.\n<\/p>\n
                                             [G.S. SINGHVI]
\nNew Delhi
\nAugust 25, 2009.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Shanti Sports Club & Anr vs Union Of India & Ors on 25 August, 2009 Author: ………………….J. Bench: B.N. Agrawal, G.S. Singhvi IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS.8500-8501 OF 2001 Shanti Sports Club & another … Appellants Versus Union of India & others … Respondents […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-61042","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nShanti Sports Club & Anr vs Union Of India & Ors on 25 August, 2009 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/shanti-sports-club-anr-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-25-august-2009\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Shanti Sports Club & Anr vs Union Of India & Ors on 25 August, 2009 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/shanti-sports-club-anr-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-25-august-2009\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2009-08-24T18:30:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2018-07-10T21:01:10+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@legaliadmin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@Legal_india\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"83 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/shanti-sports-club-anr-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-25-august-2009#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/shanti-sports-club-anr-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-25-august-2009\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\"},\"headline\":\"Shanti Sports Club & Anr vs Union Of India & Ors on 25 August, 2009\",\"datePublished\":\"2009-08-24T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2018-07-10T21:01:10+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/shanti-sports-club-anr-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-25-august-2009\"},\"wordCount\":16568,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"articleSection\":[\"Supreme Court of India\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/shanti-sports-club-anr-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-25-august-2009#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/shanti-sports-club-anr-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-25-august-2009\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/shanti-sports-club-anr-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-25-august-2009\",\"name\":\"Shanti Sports Club & Anr vs Union Of India & Ors on 25 August, 2009 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"2009-08-24T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2018-07-10T21:01:10+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/shanti-sports-club-anr-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-25-august-2009#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/shanti-sports-club-anr-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-25-august-2009\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/shanti-sports-club-anr-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-25-august-2009#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Shanti Sports Club & Anr vs Union Of India & Ors on 25 August, 2009\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"name\":\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"description\":\"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"alternateName\":\"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"alternateName\":\"Legal India\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"width\":512,\"height\":512,\"caption\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.facebook.com\\\/LegalindiaCom\\\/\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/Legal_india\"]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\",\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Legal India Admin\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/legaliadmin\"],\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/author\\\/legal-india-admin\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Shanti Sports Club & Anr vs Union Of India & Ors on 25 August, 2009 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/shanti-sports-club-anr-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-25-august-2009","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Shanti Sports Club & Anr vs Union Of India & Ors on 25 August, 2009 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","og_url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/shanti-sports-club-anr-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-25-august-2009","og_site_name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","article_published_time":"2009-08-24T18:30:00+00:00","article_modified_time":"2018-07-10T21:01:10+00:00","og_image":[{"width":512,"height":512,"url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Legal India Admin","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@legaliadmin","twitter_site":"@Legal_india","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Legal India Admin","Est. reading time":"83 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/shanti-sports-club-anr-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-25-august-2009#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/shanti-sports-club-anr-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-25-august-2009"},"author":{"name":"Legal India Admin","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea"},"headline":"Shanti Sports Club & Anr vs Union Of India & Ors on 25 August, 2009","datePublished":"2009-08-24T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2018-07-10T21:01:10+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/shanti-sports-club-anr-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-25-august-2009"},"wordCount":16568,"commentCount":0,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"articleSection":["Supreme Court of India"],"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/shanti-sports-club-anr-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-25-august-2009#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/shanti-sports-club-anr-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-25-august-2009","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/shanti-sports-club-anr-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-25-august-2009","name":"Shanti Sports Club & Anr vs Union Of India & Ors on 25 August, 2009 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website"},"datePublished":"2009-08-24T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2018-07-10T21:01:10+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/shanti-sports-club-anr-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-25-august-2009#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/shanti-sports-club-anr-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-25-august-2009"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/shanti-sports-club-anr-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-25-august-2009#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Shanti Sports Club & Anr vs Union Of India & Ors on 25 August, 2009"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","description":"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"alternateName":"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization","name":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","alternateName":"Legal India","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","width":512,"height":512,"caption":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","https:\/\/x.com\/Legal_india"]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea","name":"Legal India Admin","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Legal India Admin"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com","https:\/\/x.com\/legaliadmin"],"url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/author\/legal-india-admin"}]}},"modified_by":null,"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/61042","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=61042"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/61042\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=61042"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=61042"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=61042"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}