{"id":62359,"date":"2011-03-04T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2011-03-03T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/gammon-india-limited-vs-nanda-kumar-on-4-march-2011"},"modified":"2018-09-24T12:12:27","modified_gmt":"2018-09-24T06:42:27","slug":"gammon-india-limited-vs-nanda-kumar-on-4-march-2011","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/gammon-india-limited-vs-nanda-kumar-on-4-march-2011","title":{"rendered":"Gammon India Limited vs Nanda Kumar on 4 March, 2011"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"docsource_main\">Madras High Court<\/div>\n<div class=\"doc_title\">Gammon India Limited vs Nanda Kumar on 4 March, 2011<\/div>\n<pre>       \n\n  \n\n  \n\n \n \n BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT\n\nDATED: 04\/03\/2011\n\nCORAM\nTHE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE M.VENUGOPAL\n\nWrit Petition (NPD) No.9192 of 2008\na n d\nM.P.(MD) No.2 of 2008\nand\nM.P.(MD) No.1 of 2011\n\nGammon India Limited\nthrough its Authorised Signatory\nP.A.Datar\nMumbai 400 025\t\t\t...\t\tPetitioner\n\nVs\n\n1.  Nanda Kumar\n\n2.  The Presiding Judge\n    Labour Court\n    Tirunelveli.\t\t...\t\tRespondents\n\n\tPetition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for\nthe issuance of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to call for the records of the\nsecond respondent in I.D.No.2 of 2006 dated 17\/12\/2007 by quashing the same as\nillegal, incompetent and without jurisdiction.\n\n!For petitioner \t...\tM\/s.P.S.Sundaram\n\t\t\t\tG.Anbu Saravanan\n^For respondents\t...\tM\/s.M.Ajmal Khan\n\t\t\t\tM.E.Elango\n\t\t\t\tC.Venkatesh Kumar\n\t\t\t\tfor R.1.\n- - - - - -\n\n:ORDER\n<\/pre>\n<p>\tThe petitioner has filed the present writ of certiorarified mandamus in<br \/>\ncalling for the records of the second respondent\/Labour Court, Tirunelveli in<br \/>\nregard to the award passed in I.D.No.2 of 2006 dated 7\/12\/2007 and to quash the<br \/>\nsame.\n<\/p>\n<p>\t2.  According to the Learned counsel for the petitioner\/respondent, the<br \/>\npetitioner Company has been awarded a contract to construct a Masonry dam at<br \/>\nAdvinainarkoil at Mekkarai, Shencottah Taluk, Tirunelveli District by the<br \/>\nGovernment of Tamil Nadu.  The period of contract is for four years (inclusive<br \/>\nof the extended period).  The contract is for a limited period from 1\/4\/1998 to<br \/>\n31\/3\/2002.\n<\/p>\n<p>\t3.  The Learned counsel for the petitioner\/respondent urges before this<br \/>\nCourt that the First Respondent\/petitioner has been appointed in the<br \/>\npetitioner&#8217;s Company on probation basis as per appointment order dated 1\/10\/1999<br \/>\non a consolidated salary of Rs.2,418\/-.  Further, it is mentioned in the<br \/>\nappointment order itself that his services will get discontinued after<br \/>\ncompletion of the contract.  The first respondent has submitted his nomination<br \/>\ndeclaration as regards the Employees Provident Fund which has been duly counter<br \/>\nsigned by the petitioner Company.  He also submitted Form No.5 pertaining to the<br \/>\nEmployees Provident Fund. His services have been terminated on 11\/5\/2000.  As a<br \/>\nmatter of fact, the project has been in operation only for a contractual period<br \/>\nof four years.\n<\/p>\n<p>\t4.  The Learned counsel for the petitioner, advancing his arguments<br \/>\ncontends that the first respondent filed I.D.No.2 of 2006 on the file of the<br \/>\nsecond respondent\/Labour Court  and notices have been addressed to the erstwhile<br \/>\nsite Office of the petitioner at Kuttralam, so as to obtain ex parte award<br \/>\nagainst the petitioner\/Company and the first respondent obtained an ex parte<br \/>\naward on 8\/5\/2008 before the second respondent\/Labour Court, Tirunelveli.\n<\/p>\n<p>\t5.  Also, the Learned counsel proceeds to submit that the award has been<br \/>\nposted to the petitioner Company to their Courtallam Office address on 29\/4\/2008<br \/>\nby the Labour Officer, Tirunelveli, etc., and the said award has been sent to<br \/>\nMumbai Office of the petitioner&#8217;s Company, after getting re-routed from<br \/>\nCourtallam address and the same has been received by the petitioner Company at<br \/>\nMumbai on 28\/5\/2008.\n<\/p>\n<p>\t6.  The Learned counsel for the petitioner Company submits that the second<br \/>\nRespondent Office, Tirunelveli has not posted the postal article from<br \/>\nTirunelveli, but the same has been done by the first respondent by posting it<br \/>\nfrom Tenkasi and thus, award has been obtained behind the back of the petitioner<br \/>\nCompany and therefore, the same is void and an illegal one.\n<\/p>\n<p>\t7.  The Learned counsel for the petitioner\/Company\/Management submits that<br \/>\nthe petitioner Company has been engaged only in contract work and therefore,<br \/>\nthere is no  permanency in the work and hence, the first respondent\/petitioner<br \/>\ncannot claim for his reinstatement with back wages since the contract period has<br \/>\nbeen less than two years.\n<\/p>\n<p>\t8.  The plea of the Learned counsel for the petitioner\/Management is that<br \/>\nthe failure report of the labour Officer, Tirunelveli is dated 12\/2\/2001 and the<br \/>\nreference to the Labour Court is of the year 2006, after a lapse of five years<br \/>\nand by that time, the contract has come to an end after two years and in fact,<br \/>\nKuttralam Office of the petitioner has been wound up.\n<\/p>\n<p>\t9.  The Learned counsel for the petitioner takes a stand that the first<br \/>\nrespondent\/Employee is aware of his temporary employment in a contractual<br \/>\nproject and as such, he is aware of the address of the petitioner Company all<br \/>\nthrough the period of employment and he is also aware that there is no Project<br \/>\nOfficer at Kuttralam after completion of the earth work involved in the project<br \/>\nin which the driving machineries have been used by the first respondent.\n<\/p>\n<p>\t10.  The Learned counsel for the petitioner\/Management, expatiating his<br \/>\nsubmissions submits that the First respondent\/Employee has attempted to assault<br \/>\nthe Superior Officer with chappals and using filthy language and there has been<br \/>\ncomplaints given in writing by the superiors of the first respondent\/Employee.\n<\/p>\n<p>\t11.  Also, the First Respondent&#8217;s Superior  has lodged a Police complaint<br \/>\nbefore Achanpudur Police Station against the First Respondent\/Employee.  The<br \/>\nFirst Respondent\/Employee has given a letter of apology to correct himself. But,<br \/>\nhe has not corrected himself during the second probationary period.\n<\/p>\n<p>\t12.  Lastly, it is the contention of the Learned counsel for the<br \/>\npetitioner\/Management that the petitioner Company has no other alternative<br \/>\nremedy to assail the award dated 17\/12\/2007 passed in I.D.No.2 of 2006 by the<br \/>\nsecond Respondent\/Labour Court, Tirunelveli and therefore, the writ petition is<br \/>\nmaintainable before this Court.\n<\/p>\n<p>\t13.  Per contra, it is the contention of the learned counsel for the First<br \/>\nRespondent\/Employee that the First Respondent has been terminated from service<br \/>\nby means of an order of the petitioner dated 11\/5\/2000 and that the petitioner<br \/>\nCompany has not conducted any enquiry in respect of the petitioner and also no<br \/>\nshow cause notice has been given to the petitioner either in regard to his<br \/>\npurported misbehaviour with Ravi, Assistant Plan Engineer on 10\/5\/2000 at night<br \/>\nor in regard to threatening to beat him with chappals, etc. Further, the Labour<br \/>\nOfficer, Tirunelveli has addressed a letter dated 17\/8\/2000 to the petitioner<br \/>\nCompany stating that there will be  a meeting in the Office on 24\/8\/2000 in the<br \/>\nafternoon session at 3.00 p.m., and before that, the first respondent has<br \/>\nsubmitted an application before the Labour Officer, Tirunelveli as per Section 2<br \/>\nA claiming reinstatement. On 6\/11\/2000, the Deputy General Manager of the<br \/>\npetitioner Company has addressed a letter to the Labour Officer, Tirunelveli and<br \/>\nauthorising one Mr.E.R.Nair to attend and deal with the hearing in Reference<br \/>\nNo.1127\/2000 on their behalf.  Later, the Labour Officer, Tirunelveli, has<br \/>\nsubmitted the failure report on 12\/2\/2001 to the Government in Ref.No.1127\/2000.\n<\/p>\n<p>\t14.  The Learned counsel for the First Respondent\/Employee submits that it<br \/>\nis upto the Government to refer the matter to the Labour Court\/competent forum<br \/>\nand when the First Respondent\/petitioner raised a dispute claiming<br \/>\nreinstatement\/re-employment at that point of time the Office of the petitioner<br \/>\nCompany has been very much in existence and it participated in hearing before<br \/>\nthe Labour Officer, Tirunelveli.  There is no averment in the counter filed by<br \/>\nthe petitioner Company before the Labour Officer that when the project has been<br \/>\nclosed and that the petitioner\/Management  received  the  copy of the Ex parte<br \/>\nAward at Mumbai address to which it has been redirected and the second<br \/>\nrespondent\/Labour Court has exercised its due diligence.   Moreover, the<br \/>\npetitioner Company has not pursued the case and the scope of judicial review is<br \/>\nvery limited in a jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.\n<\/p>\n<p>\t15.  The second respondent\/Labour Court, Tirunelveli on 17\/12\/2007 in<br \/>\nI.D.No.2 of 2006 has passed the following award, which runs as follows:-\n<\/p>\n<p>\t&#8220;Petitioner was examined as W.W.1 on 22\/11\/2007 besides proof affidavit<br \/>\nhaving been filed and Ex.W.1 and W.2 have been marked on the side of the<br \/>\npetitioner.  But respondent was called absent and set ex parte on 22\/11\/2007 and<br \/>\ntill this day respondent has not come forward with any application to set aside<br \/>\nex parte order dated 22\/11\/2007.  Hence petitioner is entitled to the relief as<br \/>\nprayed for and accordingly award is passed directing the respondent to reinstate<br \/>\npetitioner in service and also pay the backwages.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>\t16.  As seen from the award, it is mentioned that the<br \/>\npetitioner\/Management (Respondent in I.D.No.2 of 2006)  has been called absent<br \/>\nand set Ex parte on 22\/11\/2007.  Further, till the passing of the award on<br \/>\n17\/11\/2007, the petitioner\/Management has not filed any application to set aside<br \/>\nthe Ex parte order.  Therefore, the second Respondent\/Labour Court has examined<br \/>\nthe first respondent has W.W.1 on 22\/11\/2007 (besides the proof affidavit being<br \/>\nfiled) and also marked W.1 and W.2 on his side.  The second respondent has<br \/>\npassed an award holding that the First Respondent\/petitioner is entitled to the<br \/>\nrelief as prayed for in I.D.No.2 of 2006 and directed the petitioner\/Management<br \/>\nto reinstate the First Respondent\/Employee and to pay him the back wages.\n<\/p>\n<p>\t17.  The learned counsel for the petitioner\/Management submits that if the<br \/>\nGovernment has not made the reference to the competent forum within a reasonable<br \/>\ntime and if sufficient cause is not shown in that regard, the same is fatal.  To<br \/>\nlend support to his contention, he relies on the decision of Honourable Supreme<br \/>\nCourt in KULDEEP SINGH Vs. G.M.INSTRUMENT DESIGN D &amp; F CENTER &amp; ANOTHER reported<br \/>\nin 2011 (1) LLN 1 (SC), wherein it has among other things held that<\/p>\n<p>\t&#8220;Government cannot go into merits of dispute and once it is found that<br \/>\nthere is dispute, Government ought to make a reference and further and if<br \/>\nadequate reasons are found, the Government has to refer the dispute and must not<br \/>\ndecline on ground of laches and also that though there is no limitation<br \/>\nprescribed, but the reference has to be sought within a reasonable time and<br \/>\nsufficient cause is not shown, it would become fatal.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>\t18.  He cites a Division Bench decision of this Court in AMMANI AMMAL Vs.<br \/>\nDHANALAKSHMI BANK LTD., TIRUPPUR AND OTHERS reported in (2008) 2 MLJ &#8211; 395,<br \/>\nwherein, it  among other things held that<\/p>\n<p>\t&#8220;There is a duty cast on the bank to state the correct address of the<br \/>\nborrowers and the guarantor and the Court or Tribunal while making an order to<br \/>\nhear the suit ex parte, should be convinced that the summons was duly served on<br \/>\nthe defendant.  Further, unless and until it is shown that the defendant was<br \/>\nserved in the correct address, it cannot be said in spite of the notice, the<br \/>\ndefendant failed to appear before the Court, etc.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>\t19.  Continuing further, in the aforesaid decision, at page No.396, it is<br \/>\nheld that<\/p>\n<p>\t&#8220;The Court or Tribunal cannot mechanically declare a party ex parte<br \/>\nwithout making an attempt to see whether the summons was really served and in<br \/>\nthe present case,  no such attempt has been made by the Tribunal and it also<br \/>\nfailed to note that the correct address of the petitioner was not given in the<br \/>\noriginal application and that there is no exorbitant delay in filing the<br \/>\napplication to set aside the exparte order and accordingly, the delay has been<br \/>\ncondoned.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>\t20.  He invites the attention of this Court to the decision of the<br \/>\nHonourable Supreme Court in MD.U.P.LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND ANOTHER Vs.<br \/>\nAMAR SINGH AND OTHERS reported in (2003) 5 Supreme Court Cases &#8211; 388, wherein<br \/>\nthe Honourable Supreme Court has held as follows:-\n<\/p>\n<p>\t&#8220;The internal note and order of the Corporation was prepared by the<br \/>\nDirector of the Corporation for his own purpose, but strangely enough a copy of<br \/>\nthe same was produced by the respondents in the writ petition.  Apart from the<br \/>\nfact whether such an internal note itself could give any right to the<br \/>\nrespondents, the very reading of the same does not give an impression that it is<br \/>\nindicated to create twenty-five posts on a regular basis.  It only states that a<br \/>\npanel of twenty-five persons be prepared for training, taking note of the future<br \/>\npossible requirements of persons working in the project.  From the documents<br \/>\nviz., the internal note and order of the Corporation, letter addressed to the<br \/>\nVice Chancellor of Agricultural University seeking names of the candidates for<br \/>\nrecruitment to the post of Assistant Project Manager (Group 3), letters<br \/>\naddressed to the respondents individually asking them to attend the office for<br \/>\ntraining, during which they were to get a monthly training allowance for Rs.1200<br \/>\nonly and the letter of the Joint Secretary, U.P. Govt, stating the vacancy<br \/>\nposition, it is clear that the respondents were never recruited as against<br \/>\nregularly sanctioned posts on a regular basis.  Reading of these documents and<br \/>\nthe contentions raised on either side go to show that the appointments of the<br \/>\nrespondents were temporary under the &#8220;Million Wells Scheme&#8221;.  When the work of<br \/>\nthe Scheme come to an end, the respondents were not entitled to claim<br \/>\nregularisation of their services.  When the project comes to a close, the<br \/>\nemployees who are working in the project will not get any vested right.  In<br \/>\nother words, once the project comes to an end, services of the employees also<br \/>\ncome to an end.  Even though their services were continued by virtue of an<br \/>\ninterim order passed in the writ petition, they cannot claim benefits of<br \/>\nregularisation of their services as a matter of right.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>\t21.  He cites the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in MAHINDRA AND<br \/>\nMAHINDRA, LTD Vs. N.B.NARAWADE reported in 2005 (1) L.L.N. &#8211; 1074, wherein it is<br \/>\nobserved that<\/p>\n<p>\t&#8220;&#8230;. Discretion under Section 11 A of the Industrial Disputes Act can be<br \/>\nexercised only on existence of certain factors like punishment being<br \/>\ndisproportionate to the gravity of misconduct so as to disturb the conscience of<br \/>\nthe Court or the existence of any mitigating circumstances which require the<br \/>\nreduction of the sentence or the past conduct of the workman which may persuade<br \/>\nthe Labour Court to reduce the punishment and further, the use of abusive and<br \/>\nfilthy language against the supervisor not once but twice that too in the<br \/>\npresence of his subordinates cannot be termed to be an indiscipline calling for<br \/>\nlesser punishment.  In the absence of any extenuating factor and therefore, the<br \/>\nLabour Court as well as the High Court erred in interfering with the punishment<br \/>\nimposed by the disciplinary authority.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>\t22.  The learned counsel for the petitioner places reliance on the<br \/>\ndecision of this Court in THE CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR, TAMIL NADU<br \/>\nMINERALS LTD., CHENNAI 5 Vs. THE PRESIDING OFFICER, INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, CHENNAI<br \/>\n104 AND TWO OTHERS reported in 2000 (IV) CTC &#8211; 131, wherein it is held that<br \/>\n\t&#8220;The award passed without considering the merits and demerits of the claim<br \/>\nand the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal is a non-speaking order without<br \/>\nconsidering the merits and demerits of the claim and that there is absence of<br \/>\njudicial application of mind and the said order of the Industrial Tribunal is<br \/>\nnot a judicious one.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>\t23.  Apart from the above, the learned counsel for the<br \/>\npetitioner\/Management draws the attention of this Court to the following<br \/>\ndecisions.\n<\/p>\n<p>\t(a).  This Court in the order made in W.P.Nos.831 to 833 of 2008 in THE<br \/>\nMANAGEMENT OF M\/s. STALLION GARMENTS Vs. 1.  THE PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR<br \/>\nCOURT, SALEM AND THREE OTHERS, wherein reference was made to Section 24 which<br \/>\ndeals with the power of the Board, Courts, Labour Courts, Tribunals and National<br \/>\nTribunals, which runs as follows:-\n<\/p>\n<p>\t&#8220;11. Likewise, the Tamil Nadu Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958,<br \/>\nparticularly Rule 34 which speaks about the proceedings before the Labour Court<br \/>\nor Tribunal enables the Labour Court to decide a reference in the absence of a<br \/>\ndefaulting party as ex parte, however, with the right to revoke the said ex<br \/>\nparte proceedings on the application of the party within 15 days from the ex<br \/>\nparte proceedings, if satisfied with the reasons preventing the party from<br \/>\nappearing. It also confers the power on the Labour Court in the case of the<br \/>\napplicant satisfying that he has sufficient cause for not preferring the<br \/>\napplication even beyond 15 days. The said provisions are as follows: 34.<br \/>\nProceeding before the Labour Court or Tribunal:\n<\/p>\n<p>\t(1) to (9) xxxxx<\/p>\n<p>\t(10) In case, any party defaults or fails to appear at any stage, the<br \/>\nLabour Court or Tribunal as the case may be, may proceed ex-parte and decide the<br \/>\nreference application in the absence of the defaulting party. (11)<br \/>\nNotwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (10), the Labour Court or the<br \/>\nTribunal, as the case may be, may, before submitting the award to the State<br \/>\nGovernment, revoke the ex-parte proceedings on the application of the party made<br \/>\nwithin 15 days of the ex-parte proceedings if it is satisfied that the party has<br \/>\nbeen prevented from attending the proceedings for valid reasons: Provided that<br \/>\nan application may be admitted after the said period of 15 days, if the<br \/>\napplicant satisfies the Labour Court or Tribunal, as the case may be, that he<br \/>\nhad sufficient cause for not preferring the application within that period.<br \/>\nTherefore, under the Tamil Nadu Industrial Disputes Rules,1958 there is an<br \/>\nenabling provision to the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal to entertain the<br \/>\napplication filed to set aside the award even beyond 15 days without any further<br \/>\nrestriction to the party when sufficient cause has been shown to the<br \/>\nsatisfaction of the Court.\n<\/p>\n<p>\t12. It is true that while the ex parte award was passed by the Labour<br \/>\nCourt and the petitions to set aside the ex parte award with the petitions to<br \/>\ncondone the delay were dismissed in 2007, the judgment of the Supreme Court at<br \/>\nthat time dealing with the powers of the Labour Court in setting aside the ex<br \/>\nparte award after 30 days from the date of publication was as held in <a href=\"\/doc\/767290\/\">Sangham<br \/>\nTape Company vs. Hans Raj<\/a> [2004(5) CTC 104 (SC)]. That was also a case where<br \/>\nafter the expiry of 30 days from the date of publication of the ex parte award,<br \/>\nthe application filed to set aside the ex parte award came to be allowed and<br \/>\nwhen a similar contention was raised that after the lapse of 30 days from the<br \/>\ndate of publication, the Labour Court has no jurisdiction, the High Court set<br \/>\naside the award of the Labour Court which was challenged by the employer.\n<\/p>\n<p>\t13. In that case, the Supreme Court considered the judgment in <a href=\"\/doc\/1136885\/\">Grindlays<br \/>\nBank v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal and others<\/a> [1980 Supp.SCC 420]<br \/>\nwherein it was held that by virtue of the provisions of section 11 of the<br \/>\nIndustrial Disputes Act,1947 and Rules 22 to 24 of the Industrial Disputes<br \/>\n(Central) Rules,1957 if within 30 days from the date of publication of award any<br \/>\napplication is filed to set aside the award, the same can be entertained and<br \/>\ntherefore, it was only till 30 days from the date of publication of the award,<br \/>\nthe Tribunal retains its jurisdiction, and having held that the judgment of the<br \/>\nSupreme Court in <a href=\"\/doc\/43103\/\">Anil Sood vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court<\/a> [2001 (2) Scale<br \/>\n193] did not lay down any law contrary to the judgment in Grindlays Bank case<br \/>\n(cited supra), the Supreme Court held as follows: 12. This Court in Anil Sood<br \/>\n(supra) did not lay down any law to the contrary. The contention raised on the<br \/>\npart of Mr.Jain to the effect that in fact in that case an application for<br \/>\nsetting aside an award was made long after 30 days cannot be accepted for more<br \/>\nthan one reason. Firstly, a fact situation obtaining in one case cannot be said<br \/>\nto be a precedent for another. [<a href=\"\/doc\/1127964\/\">See Mehboob Dawood Shaikh v. State of<br \/>\nMaharashtra<\/a> (2004 (2) SCC 362]. Secondly, from a perusal of the said decision,<br \/>\nit does not appear that any date of publication of the award was mentioned<br \/>\ntherein so as to establish that even on fact, the application was made 30 days<br \/>\nafter the expiry of publication of the award. Furthermore, the said decision<br \/>\nappears to have been rendered on concession.\n<\/p>\n<p>\t14. It was based on the said dictum laid down by the Supreme Court which<br \/>\nwas holding the field at that time, the Labour Court rejected the application<br \/>\nfiled by the petitioner beyond 30 days from the date of publication of the award<br \/>\non the ground that the Labour Court became functus officio. But, as brought to<br \/>\nthe notice of this Court by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the Supreme<br \/>\nCourt had an occasion to consider the said issue recently in <a href=\"\/doc\/859837\/\">Radhakrishna Mani<br \/>\nTripathi vs. L.H.Patel and<\/a> another [2009(1) LLN 786] wherein the judgment in<br \/>\n<a href=\"\/doc\/767290\/\">Sangham Tape Company vs. Hans Raj<\/a> [2004(5) CTC 104] was not considered, but, at<br \/>\nthe same time considered in detail the judgments in Grindlays Bank and Anil Sood<br \/>\n(cited supra) in the light of the Industrial Disputes (Bombay) Rules, 1956. Rule<br \/>\n26 of the Industrial Disputes (Bombay) Rules is slightly different from the<br \/>\nrelevant provision in the Tamil Nadu Rules in the sense that it enables a party<br \/>\naffected by an ex parte award to file application within 30 days of the receipt<br \/>\nof copy of the said award. The said rule is as follows: 26. Board, Court, Labour<br \/>\nCourt, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed ex parte.-\n<\/p>\n<p>If without sufficient cause being shown, any party to a proceeding before a<br \/>\nBoard, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or an arbitrator fails to attend or to be<br \/>\nrepresented, the Board, Court, Labour court, Tribunal or arbitrator may proceed<br \/>\nex parte. (2) Where any award, order or decision is made ex parte under sub-rule<br \/>\n(1), the aggrieved party, may within thirty days of the receipt of a copy<br \/>\nthereof, make an application to the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or<br \/>\nArbitrator as the case may be, to set aside such award, order or decision. If<br \/>\nthe Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator is satisfied that there<br \/>\nwas sufficient cause for non-appearance of the aggrieved party, it or he may set<br \/>\naside the award, order or decision so made and shall appoint a date for<br \/>\nproceeding with the matter: Provided that, no award, order or decision shall be<br \/>\nset aside on any application as aforesaid unless notice thereof has been served<br \/>\non the opposite party.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>\tAlso, in the said decision, the learned counsel for the petitioner, refers<br \/>\nto the observations made in paragraph 17, 18 and 20, which runs as follows:-\n<\/p>\n<p>\t17. Applying the latest dictum of the Supreme Court wherein the Honble<br \/>\nSupreme Court has taken note of Rule 22 of the Central Rules which is similar to<br \/>\nRule 26(1) of the Bombay Rules, to the facts of the present case, as elicited<br \/>\nabove, Rule 34(10) and (11) of the Tamil Nadu Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958,<br \/>\nespecially the proviso to Rule 34(11) which enables an applicant to set aside<br \/>\nthe ex parte award even after 30 days of publication, since no maximum period of<br \/>\nlimitation is mentioned even after the period of 15 days, and the same is<br \/>\nrelatable to Rule 22 of the Central Rules and Rule 26(1) of the Bombay Rules as<br \/>\nstated above.\n<\/p>\n<p>18. In fact, by referring to the said Rule 22 of the Central Rules, this Court<br \/>\nin <a href=\"\/doc\/169614\/\">Chairman and Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Minerals Ltd., Chennai vs.<br \/>\nPresiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Chennai and others<\/a> [2000(3) LLN 1025]<br \/>\nwas dealing with an application to set aside ex parte award which was filed<br \/>\nafter a delay of 1245 days. In that case, P.Sathasivam,J.(as he then was) by<br \/>\nrelying upon the judgment of this Court in <a href=\"\/doc\/1848510\/\">T.N.H.B. v. Presiding Officer, Second<br \/>\nAdditional Labour Court, Madras<\/a> [1997(1) LLJ 923] held that when the ex parte<br \/>\naward was passed, the Labour Court did not choose to give any reason and even<br \/>\nthe facts of the case were not mentioned and the award was passed in a casual<br \/>\nmanner without application of mind. It was also held as under: 7. It is also<br \/>\nrelevant to refer a Division Bench decision of this Court in <a href=\"\/doc\/1848510\/\">T.N.H.B. v.<br \/>\nPresiding Officer, Second Additional Labour Court, Madras<\/a> (1997 I L.L.J. 923).<br \/>\nTheir Lordships of the Division Bench after considering similar rule 48 of the<br \/>\nTamil Nadu Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958, as well as an ex parte award passed<br \/>\nby the Labour Court, have observed thus: 6. Thus, from the aforesaid award, it<br \/>\nis clear that the Labour Court has not considered the evidence on record. Even<br \/>\nthough the appellant remained absent, nevertheless, there was evidence on<br \/>\nrecord. There were the statements of the case pleaded by the petitioner and the<br \/>\nrespondent. The Labour Court was required to consider and give reasons for<br \/>\npassing the award in favour of the second respondent-workmen. As no such reason<br \/>\nis given, not even the facts of the case are stated, the award cannot at all be<br \/>\nconsidered to be a speaking order, as such it cannot be sustained. The Presiding<br \/>\nOfficer is an officer of the district Judge grade. He should not have decided<br \/>\nthe dispute in such a manner. There is no judicial application of mind of the<br \/>\nPresiding Officer of the Labour Court. Such exercise of jurisdiction causes<br \/>\ngreat and incalculable damage to the parties and also to the administration of<br \/>\njustice. The Presiding Officer would do better, if he discontinues such a habit<br \/>\nof disposal of cases. In the case before the Division Bench, when the dispute<br \/>\nwas taken up for enquiry, the respondent-management was absent and set exparte.<br \/>\nOn the side of the workmen, W.W.1 was examined and Exhibits W.1 to W.4 were<br \/>\nmarked. The Labour Court after stating that W.W.1 was examined, that Exhibits<br \/>\nW.1 to W.4 were marked, and that claim is proved, passed an award directing the<br \/>\nrespondents-management to reinstate the workman in service with back-wages,<br \/>\ncontinuity of service and other attendant benefits with cost of Rs.100. The aid<br \/>\naward was set aside by the Division Bench stating that the Labour Court has not<br \/>\nassigned any reason and has not stated even the facts of the case. It is clear<br \/>\nthat in a matter like this, even if the respondent was absent, it is the duty of<br \/>\nthe Labour Court\/Industrial Tribunal to consider and give reason for passing the<br \/>\naward. Inasmuch as the Presiding Officer is an officer of the District Judge<br \/>\ngrade, as observed by their Lordships in the Division Bench, he should not have<br \/>\ndecided the dispute in such a manner. There must be a judicial application of<br \/>\nmind and his order must be based on acceptable materials. By applying the ratio<br \/>\nlaid down in the Division Bench decision, the impugned order cannot be<br \/>\nsustained. In W.P.No.6346 of 1998, dated 14 August, 2000, I had an occasion to<br \/>\nconsider similar ex parte award passed by First Additional Labour Court,<br \/>\nChennai, in I.D.No.120 of 1995. In the light of the Division Bench decision<br \/>\nreferred to above, I set aside the ex parte award with a direction to pay cost<br \/>\nto the workman concerned by the management and directed the Labour Court to<br \/>\ndecide the dispute on merits. The decision of mine also supports the contention<br \/>\nof the learned counsel for the petitioner.\n<\/p>\n<p>20. In such view of the matter, considering the view of the Supreme Court in its<br \/>\nlatest judgment in <a href=\"\/doc\/859837\/\">Radhakrishna Mani Tripathi vs. L.H.Patel and<\/a> another [2009(1)<br \/>\nLLJ 786] and for the reasons stated above, I am of the considered view that it<br \/>\ncannot be said that the Labour Court has become functus officio after the<br \/>\npublication of the award under section 17A of the Act. It is also relevant to<br \/>\nnote that the ex parte award passed by the Labour Court itself is, on the face<br \/>\nof it, without application of mind and even the facts of the case have not been<br \/>\nnarrated by the Labour Court while passing the ex parte award which can<br \/>\ncertainly be said to be an award passed in a casual manner, as observed by this<br \/>\nCourt as elicited above. While the powers of C.P.C. are conferred on the Labour<br \/>\nCourt in respect of procedure to be followed in passing the award, certainly in<br \/>\ncase where ex parte award is sought to be passed, there should be proper<br \/>\napplication of mind and the presiding officer should be fair at least in<br \/>\nnarrating the facts of the case, especially in the circumstance where he allowed<br \/>\nthe claim against the termination, as pleaded by the second respondent-workmen.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>\t(b).  In RADHAKRISHNA MANI TRIPATHI Vs. L.H.PATEL AND ANR reported in 2009<br \/>\n(2) SCC &#8211; 81, wherein the Honourable Supreme Court has held that<\/p>\n<p>\t&#8220;The Tribunal held that the appellant obtained an order for ex parte<br \/>\nhearing of the reference by knowingly suppressing the correct address of<br \/>\nRespondent No.1 and the labour Court recalled its earlier award and in the<br \/>\nappeal, it is held that the order of the labour Court recalling the ex parte<br \/>\naward was completely in accordance with Rule 26 (2) of the Bombay Rules and<br \/>\nalso, the respondent No.1 was also able to fully satisfy the Labour Court that<br \/>\nthere was sufficient cause for his non-appearance since no notice was ever<br \/>\nserved on him and there is no conflict between Rule 26 (2) of the  Maharashtara<br \/>\nRules and Section 17 A of the Act and resultantly, dismissed the appeal.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>\t(c).  In L.K.VERMA Vs. H.M.T LTD AND ANR reported in 2006 (2) SCC &#8211; 269,<br \/>\nwherein the Honourable Supreme Court has observed that<\/p>\n<p>\t&#8220;Despite the existence of an alternative remedy, a writ Court may exercise<br \/>\nits discretionary jurisdiction of judicial review in the following cases: where<br \/>\nthe Court or the tribunal lacks inherent jurisdiction; or for enforcement of a<br \/>\nfundamental right; or if there had been a violation of a principle of natural<br \/>\njustice; or where vires of the act were in question and in the present case, the<br \/>\nalternative remedy had been held not to operate as a bar.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>\t(d).  In KEDARISETTI ATMARAM Vs. N.SEETHARAMARAJU  reported in AIR 2011<br \/>\n(NOC) 65 (A.P.), wherein it is held as follows:-\n<\/p>\n<p>\t&#8220;Irrespective of the fact whether the petitioner had availed the<br \/>\nalternative remedy or not or whether the petitioner had exhausted the other<br \/>\nremedies or not, but where it appears that manifest injustice has been done,<br \/>\nHigh Court shall have superintendence over all the subordinate Courts and<br \/>\nTribunals through the territory in relation to which it exercises its<br \/>\njurisdiction and when prejudice is caused to the general provisions, the High<br \/>\nCourt may call for written explanation from such Courts and make and issue<br \/>\ngeneral rules and prescribe norms for regulating the practice and proceedings of<br \/>\nsuch Courts.  Thus the power of superintendence over subordinate Courts and<br \/>\ntribunals are exhaustive and cannot be curtailed even by any legislation.\n<\/p>\n<p>\tWhere it appears that manifest injustice has been done, the High Court can<br \/>\ninterfere under Article 227 of the Constitution. Therefore, where it appears to<br \/>\nthe Court that a decree has been obtained by misrepresentation or by playing<br \/>\nfraud, the Court can exercise its powers under Article 227 and entertain a<br \/>\nrevision and set aside such judgement and decree and see that illegal, unjust<br \/>\nand irregular orders do not prevail. It is the duty of the Court to see that<br \/>\nfraud played by the parties should not perpetuate and as and when it comes to<br \/>\nthe notice of any Court at any stage, the Court has to set aside the same in the<br \/>\ninterest of justice.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>\t24.  However, the learned counsel for the respondent\/Employee cites the<br \/>\ndecision of the Honourable Supreme Court in SANGHAM TAPE CO Vs. HANS RAJ<br \/>\nreported in (2005) 9 Supreme Court Cases 331, wherein it is held as follows:-\n<\/p>\n<p>\t&#8220;An industrial adjudication is governed by the provisions of the<br \/>\nIndustrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the Rules framed thereunder.  The Rules framed<br \/>\nunder the Act may provide for applicability of the provisions of the Code of<br \/>\nCivil Procedure.  Once the provisions of Order 9 Rule 13 thereof would be<br \/>\nattracted.   But unlike an ordinary civil court, the Industrial Tribunals and<br \/>\nthe Labour Courts have limited jurisdiction in that behalf.  While an Industrial<br \/>\nCourt will have jurisdiction to set aside an ex parte award, but having regard<br \/>\nto the provision contained in Section 17 A of the Act, an application therefor<br \/>\nmust be filed before the expiry of 30 days from the publication thereof.  Till<br \/>\nthen the Tribunal retains jurisdiction over the dispute referred to it for<br \/>\nadjudication, and only up to that date it has the power to entertain an<br \/>\napplication in connection with such dispute.  This is because an award made by<br \/>\nan Industrial Court becomes enforceable under Section 17A of the Act on the<br \/>\nexpiry of 30 days from the date of its publication.  Once the award becomes<br \/>\nenforceable, the Industrial Tribunal and\/or Labour Court becomes functus<br \/>\nofficio.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>\t25.  At this stage, this Court points out the decision of the Honourable<br \/>\nSupreme Court in (2001) 10 SUPREME COURT CASES &#8211; 534, wherein it is held as<br \/>\nfollows:-\n<\/p>\n<p>\t&#8220;The aspect that the party against whom award is to be made has to be<br \/>\ngiven due opportunity to defend is a matter of procedure and not that of power<br \/>\nin the sense in which the language is adopted in Section 11.  When matters are<br \/>\nreferred to the tribunal or court they have to be decided objectively and the<br \/>\ntribunals\/courts have to exercise their discretion in a judicial manner without<br \/>\narbitrariness by following the general principles of law and rules of natural<br \/>\njustice.\n<\/p>\n<p>\tThe power to proceed ex parte is available under Rule 22 of the Central<br \/>\nRules which also includes the power to inquire whether or not there was<br \/>\nsufficient cause for the absence of a party  at the hearing and if there is<br \/>\nsufficient cause shown which prevented a party from appearing, then if the party<br \/>\nis visited with an award without a notice, that is a nullity and therefore,  the<br \/>\nTribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must<br \/>\nnecessarily have power to set aside the ex parte award.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>\t26.  Also in NICE RUBBER Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER AND OTHERS reported in 2003\n<\/p>\n<p>&#8211; III &#8211; LLJ &#8211; 322, where at paragraph Nos.4 and 5, it is observed as follows:-\n<\/p>\n<p>\t&#8220;4. The question raised in this petition is no longer res-Integra in as<br \/>\nmuch as the Supreme Court in a case reported as <a href=\"\/doc\/43103\/\">Anil Sood v. Presiding Officer,<br \/>\nLabour Court, JT<\/a> 2001 &#8211; I &#8211; LLJ &#8211; 113  has held that Section 11 of the<br \/>\nIndustrial Disputes Act conferred ample powers upon the Tribunal to devise its<br \/>\nown procedure in the interest of justice which includes power which bring out<br \/>\nthe adjudication of an existing industrial dispute. Sub-section (1) and (3) of<br \/>\nSection 11 of the Act thereby indicate the difference between procedure and<br \/>\npowers of the Tribunal under the Act. While the procedure is left to be devised<br \/>\nby the Tribunal to suit carrying out its functions under the Act, the extent of<br \/>\npowers of Civil Court and clearly set out. It was held that the aspect that the<br \/>\nparty against whom award is to be made, due opportunity to defend has to be<br \/>\ngiven is a matter of procedure and not that of power in the sense in which the<br \/>\nlanguage is adopted in Section 11. When matters are referred to the Tribunal or<br \/>\nCourt, they have to be decided objectively and the Tribunals\/Courts have to<br \/>\nexercise their discretion in a judicial manner without arbitrariness by<br \/>\nfollowing the principles of law and rules of natural justice. The power to<br \/>\nproceed ex-parte is available under Rule 22 of the Central Rules which also<br \/>\nincludes the power to inquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the<br \/>\nabsence of a party at the hearing, and if there is sufficient cause shown which<br \/>\nprevented a party from appearing, then if the party is visited with an award<br \/>\nwithout a notice which is a nullity, therefore, the Tribunal will have no<br \/>\njurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set<br \/>\naside the ex-parte award. It was held that if that is the position in taw, the<br \/>\nobservations of the High Court and the Tribunal that the Labour Court had become<br \/>\nfunctus officio after making the award, though ex-pane, were erroneous.\n<\/p>\n<p>\t5.  In view of the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court, it is clear<br \/>\nthat even after passing an ex-parte award the Labour Court had the jurisdiction<br \/>\nto set aside the same in case sufficient cause was shown by the party against<br \/>\nwhom the award was passed for his absence before the Court. The order of the<br \/>\nLabour Court, therefore, holding that the Court had become functus officio after<br \/>\nthe award had become enforceable is clearly erroneous and cannot be sustained.<br \/>\nI, accordingly, make the rule absolute, quash the impugned order dated 23rd<br \/>\nFebruary, 2000 and allow the writ petition. The matter is remanded to the Labour<br \/>\nCourt with a direction to decide the application of the petitioner for setting<br \/>\naside the ex-parte award on its merits. In the facts of the case I leave the<br \/>\nparties to bear their own cost. The parties are directed to appear before the<br \/>\nLabour Court on 7.4.2003.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>\t27.  It is to be borne in mind that Rule 22 of the Industrial Disputes<br \/>\n(Central) Rules, 1958 enjoins that<\/p>\n<p>\t&#8220;If without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceedings before<br \/>\na Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to<br \/>\nattend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal, National<br \/>\nTribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been<br \/>\nrepresented.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>\t28.  Significantly, Rule 48 of Tamil Nadu Industrial  Dispute Rules, 1958<br \/>\nspeaks of ex parte proceedings and the same is as follows:-\n<\/p>\n<p>\t&#8220;(1)  If, without showing sufficient cause any party to proceedings before<br \/>\na Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be<br \/>\nrepresented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or the Arbitrator may<br \/>\nproceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented.\n<\/p>\n<p>\t(2).  The Board, Court, Labour Court, or Tribunal or an Arbitrator may,<br \/>\nfor sufficient cause, set aside, after notice to the opposite party, the ex<br \/>\nparte decision either wholly or in part, on an application made within 15 days<br \/>\nof the ex parte decision:\n<\/p>\n<p>\tProvided that an application may be admitted after the said period of 15<br \/>\ndays, if the applicant satisfies the Board, Court, Labour Court or Tribunal or<br \/>\nArbitrator, as the case may be, that he had sufficient cause for not preferring<br \/>\nthe application within that period.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>\t29.  The Ex parte award will be set aside even after thirty days of its<br \/>\npublication since, there is no bar for High Court in not entertaining an<br \/>\napplication for setting aside even after thirty days of its publication which is<br \/>\napplicable to the Labour Court\/Tribunal.\n<\/p>\n<p>\t30.  At this stage, a perusal of the notes paper in I.D.No.2\/2006 on the<br \/>\nfile of the second respondent\/Labour Court, Tirunelveli indicates that on<br \/>\n24\/1\/2007, fresh notice to the respondent (Writ petitioner\/Management) through<br \/>\n&#8220;Registered Post with Acknowledgment Due&#8221; has been ordered, returnable by<br \/>\n28\/2\/2007.  Again on 28\/2\/2007, fresh notice through Registered Post to the<br \/>\nrespondent has been ordered and the matter has been posted on 2\/4\/2007.  Again<br \/>\non 2\/4\/2007, notice to the respondent has been ordered and the matter has been<br \/>\nposted on 10\/5\/2007.  On 10\/5\/2007, the matter has been re-posted on 27\/6\/2007<br \/>\nbased on the reason that &#8216;P.O is in training&#8217;.  On 27\/6\/2007, fresh notice to<br \/>\nrespondent through &#8220;Registered Post with Acknowledgment Due&#8221; has been ordered<br \/>\nand the matter has been re-posted on 20\/7\/2007.  Again, on 20\/7\/2007, fresh<br \/>\nnotice to the respondent through &#8220;Registered Post with Acknowledgment Due&#8221; has<br \/>\nbeen ordered, returnable by 23\/8\/2007.  Subsequently, from 23\/8\/2007, the matter<br \/>\nhas been adjourned to 21\/9\/2007 and 18\/10\/2007 respectively.  On 18\/10\/2007, in<br \/>\nthe notice paper, it is endorsed that &#8220;the petitioner&#8217;s notice served&#8221; (first<br \/>\nrespondent) and the respondent&#8217;s notice (writ petitioner) returned as &#8220;left&#8221;.<br \/>\nAgain, on 18\/10\/2007, fresh notice to respondent through &#8220;Registered Post with<br \/>\nAcknowledgment Due&#8221; to the correct address has been ordered returnable by<br \/>\n22\/11\/2007.  On 22\/11\/2007, it is endorsed as &#8220;respondent served and<br \/>\nacknowledgment card received&#8221;.  The respondent called absent and the matter has<br \/>\nbeen posted for Ex parte evidence on 29\/11\/2007.  On 29\/11\/2007, when the matter<br \/>\nhas been posted for taking of ex parte evidence, W.W.1 has been examined in<br \/>\nchief ex parte.  Exs.W.1 and W.2 are  marked and the matter has been posted for<br \/>\norders on 30\/11\/2007.  On 30\/11\/2007, it is stated that the order is not ready<br \/>\nand the matter has been adjourned to 13\/12\/2007 for orders.  Again, from<br \/>\n13\/12\/2007, the matter has been adjourned to orders on 14\/12\/2007. On<br \/>\n14\/12\/2007, the matter has been posted on 17\/12\/2007 for orders and finally, on<br \/>\n17\/12\/2007, the award has been passed.\n<\/p>\n<p>\t31.  A perusal of the summons as per Section 36 of the Act, sent to the<br \/>\nwrit petitioner (respondent in I.D.No.2 of 2006) shows that the date of hearing<br \/>\nof I.D.No.2 of 2006 is slated on 6\/2\/2006 at 10.00 a.m., and the writ<br \/>\npetitioner\/Management address is mentioned as<\/p>\n<p>\t&#8220;8\/209 Balaji Illam,<br \/>\n\t Ramalayam, V.K.N. Near,<br \/>\n\t Courtallam &amp; Post<br \/>\n\t Tenkasi Taluk.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>\tThe said notice has been despatched in D.No.9,10\/06 dated 9\/1\/2006.  Even,<br \/>\nthe Registered Post with Acknowledgment Due sent in D.No.732\/07 dated 27\/9\/2007<br \/>\nby the second respondent\/Labour Court, addressed to the writ petitioner<br \/>\n(respondent<br \/>\nin I.D.No.2 of 2006) shows that the address of the writ petitioner is mentioned<br \/>\nas<\/p>\n<p>\t&#8220;No.8\/209 Balaji Illam<br \/>\n\t Ramalayam, V.K.N Nagar<br \/>\n\t Kuttralam &amp; Post<br \/>\n  \t Tenkasi Taluk&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>has been returned to the Sender viz., the second respondent as &#8220;addressee left&#8221;.<br \/>\nTherefore, it is quite evident that the second respondent\/Labour Court has sent<br \/>\nthe &#8220;Registered Post with Acknowledgment Due&#8221;  to the writ petitioner<br \/>\n(Respondent in I.D. No.2 of 2006) only to the address at Courtrallam &amp; Post,<br \/>\nTenkasi Taluk.\n<\/p>\n<p>\t32.  A perusal of an acknowledgment card sent by the second<br \/>\nrespondent\/Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Tirunelveli addressed to the writ<br \/>\npetitioner (respondent) shows that the writ petitioner&#8217;s address is mentioned as<br \/>\nBombay and the same has been received by someone on behalf of the writ<br \/>\npetitioner on 6\/11\/2007.\n<\/p>\n<p>\t33.  Indeed, the Registered Post with Acknowledgment Due to the writ<br \/>\npetitioner\/Management has been despatched by the second respondent Office in<br \/>\nD.No.868\/07 dated 1\/11\/2007 specifying the hearing date on 22\/11\/2007.  Exactly,<br \/>\n15 days before hearing of I.D.No.2 of  2006 on 22\/11\/2007, the writ petitioner<br \/>\nhas received the Registered Post with Acknowledgment Due i.e., on 6\/11\/2007.  At<br \/>\nleast, after the receipt of the notice of hearing, the writ<br \/>\npetitioner\/Management should have taken diligent steps to appear before the<br \/>\nsecond respondent\/Labour Court for the hearing on 22\/11\/2007.  But the perusal<br \/>\nof the notice paper in I.D.No.2 of 2006 of the second respondent\/Labour Court,<br \/>\nTirunelveli shows that the Acknowledgment Card has been received from the<br \/>\nrespondent (writ petitioner) and it has been called absent and set ex parte.<br \/>\nTherefore, it is quite clear that notice of hearing of I.D. No.2 of 2006 dated<br \/>\n22\/11\/2007 has been duly served on the writ petitioner (respondent\/Management)<br \/>\non 6\/11\/2007.  As such, it is not open to the writ petitioner\/Management to<br \/>\ncontend that no notice has been served upon it at  Mumbai address.  After having<br \/>\nreceived the notice and also the second respondent\/Labour Court has received the<br \/>\nacknowledgment from the writ petitioner\/Management to that effect, then, non-<br \/>\nappearance of the writ petitioner (respondent) before the second<br \/>\nrespondent\/Labour Court on 22\/11\/2007 is to be construed only as &#8220;without<br \/>\nsufficient cause&#8221;, in the considered opinion of this Court.  Therefore, the<br \/>\ncontra contention put forward on the side of the petitioner\/Management is not<br \/>\naccepted by this Court and the same is rejected.\n<\/p>\n<p>\t34.  In the present case, even though the petitioner\/Management<br \/>\n(respondent in I.D.No.2 of 2006) has been called absent and set ex parte, the ex<br \/>\nparte evidence of the First respondent\/petitioner has not been recorded\/taken on<br \/>\n22\/11\/2007 by the second respondent\/Labour Court.  However, the matter has been<br \/>\nposted to 29\/11\/2007 for taking ex parte evidence.  Only on 29\/11\/2007, the<br \/>\nfirst respondent (petitioner in I.D.No.2 of 2006) has been examined as W.W.1 in<br \/>\nchief and the matter has been posted for orders to 30\/11\/2007.  Surprisingly,<br \/>\nthe ex parte award has not been passed from 30\/11\/2007 till 14\/12\/2007.  Only,<br \/>\non 17\/12\/2007, the ex parte award has been passed.\n<\/p>\n<p>\t35.  On going through the Ex parte award dated 17\/12\/2007 passed by the<br \/>\nsecond respondent\/Labour Court, Tirunelveli, this Court is of the considered<br \/>\nview that the same is bereft of quantitative and qualitative details. In fact,<br \/>\nthere is no discussion about the merits and demerits of the claim and rival<br \/>\nclaim made by the parties.  Even in Ex parte award\/decree, the Tribunal\/Court of<br \/>\nlaw has to apply judicial mind.  But, in the instant case, the award passed by<br \/>\nthe second respondent\/Labour Court dated 17\/12\/2007 suffers from outline of<br \/>\nprocess of reasoning.  Merely, mentioning in the award for what relief, I.D.No.2<br \/>\nof 2006 has been filed before the second respondent and further stating that<\/p>\n<p>\t&#8220;It is contended by the petitioner that he was appointed as Tipper Driver<br \/>\nin the month of May 1998 and he was paid salary of Rs.3,000\/- per month and<br \/>\nother monetary benefits and respondent without any valid reason dismissing him<br \/>\nfrom service on 9\/5\/2000.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>will not suffice, so as to enable the second respondent to pass an ex parte<br \/>\naward.\n<\/p>\n<p>\t36.  Proceeding further, it is relevant to make a significant mention in<br \/>\nthe award that the petitioner was examined as W.W.1 on 22\/11\/2007 besides proof<br \/>\naffidavit have been filed and Exs.W.1 and W.2 have been marked and that the<br \/>\nrespondent (writ petitioner) was called absent and set ex parte on 22\/11\/2007<br \/>\netc., and therefore, the petitioner is entitled to the relief as prayed for and<br \/>\naccordingly, passing an award directing the Reinstatement of the First<br \/>\nRespondent is not a palatable and prudent one in the eye of law.  An unreasoned<br \/>\naward may be a just one from the point of view of the person, who has passed the<br \/>\nsame.  But, it may not be so to an aggrieved  person, who may have a genuine<br \/>\ncause for concern that by passing of an unreasoned and non-speaking order,<br \/>\nsomething legal wrong has been done to him\/it.\n<\/p>\n<p>\t37.  To put it succinctly, the ex parte Award dated 17\/12\/2007 passed by<br \/>\nthe second respondent\/Labour Court is an unreasoned and non-speaking one, which<br \/>\ncannot stand a scrutiny in the eye of law.  Also, the second respondent\/Labour<br \/>\nCourt has not framed a point for determination and also that it has not assigned<br \/>\nqualitative and quantitative reasons for the decision arrived at by it by<br \/>\ndiscussing the relative merits and demerits of the parties  based on the<br \/>\npleadings projected in the main Industrial Dispute.  Therefore, this Court,<br \/>\ninterferes with the said award passed by the second respondent\/Labour Court in<br \/>\nI.D.No.2 of 2006 dated 17\/12\/2007 and set aside the same, by exercising its writ<br \/>\njurisdiction to prevent aberration of justice.  Consequently, the writ petition<br \/>\nsucceeds.\n<\/p>\n<p>\t38.  In the result, the writ petition is allowed, leaving the parties to<br \/>\nbear their own costs.  The Ex parte Award passed by the second respondent\/Labour<br \/>\nCourt is set aside by this Court for the reasons assigned in this writ petition.\n<\/p>\n<p>\t39. M.P.(MD) No.1 of 2011:- The writ petitioner\/Management filed M.P.No.2<br \/>\nof 2008 praying for the relief of granting stay in regard to the operation of<br \/>\nthe ex parte award passed by the second respondent in I.D.No.2 of 2006 dated<br \/>\n17\/12\/2007.  However, in the said M.P., only notice and private notice<br \/>\nreturnable by two weeks has been ordered on 21\/10\/2008.\n<\/p>\n<p>\t40.  However, the first respondent\/petitioner (workmen) filed M.P.No.1 of<br \/>\n2011, praying for issuance of a direction of this Court to the writ<br \/>\npetitioner\/Management to pay back wages to him and to continue to pay the wages<br \/>\nas per Section 17 B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.  Admittedly, Section<br \/>\n17 B of the Industrial Disputes Act, will not come into operative play when this<br \/>\nCourt has not granted stay in M.P.No.2 of 2008 (stay petition) because, in that<br \/>\ncontingency, the Employer will be bound to reinstate the workmen forthwith.  In<br \/>\nthe absence of an order of stay of operation of the award in I.D.No.2 of 2006,<br \/>\nthis Court will expose the writ petitioner to the penel consequences of Section<br \/>\n29 of the Industrial Disputes Act, which deals with penalty for breach of<br \/>\nsettlement or award apart from the recovery proceedings as per Section 33 of the<br \/>\nIndustrial Disputes Act, 1947 which refers to &#8220;the conditions of service, etc.,<br \/>\nto remain unchanged under circumstances during pendency of proceedings.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>\t41.  The object of 17 B of the Act is that during the pendency of<br \/>\nproceedings in higher forum, a workmen should not have been gainfully employed<br \/>\nin any other Establishment from which he receives adequate remuneration, if an<br \/>\naffidavit has been filed by the workmen to the effect that he has not been<br \/>\nemployed in any establishment during the pendency of such proceedings, then, he<br \/>\nhas despatched his burden.\n<\/p>\n<p>\t42.  Ordinarily, the payment of 17 B wages under the Industrial Disputes<br \/>\nAct is akin to the subsistence allowance.  It is not a recoverable or refundable<br \/>\none.  The object of 17 B is to provide relief to a workman  aiming at relieving<br \/>\nthe hardship to him that will be caused on account of delay in implementation of<br \/>\nthe award, as a result of the pendency of the proceedings before the second<br \/>\nrespondent.  The ingredients of Section 17 B of the Industrial Disputes Act will<br \/>\ncome into operation only when proceedings are initiated before the High Court or<br \/>\nthe Honourable Supreme Court against the award directing reinstatement and it<br \/>\nwill not apply if the award of reinstatement is not challenged.  As per Section<br \/>\n17 B of the Act, there is no obligation on the part of the Employer to pay<br \/>\nwithout the orders of this Court, the workmen has to claim and satisfy the Court<br \/>\nbefore being entitled to an order for payment as per Section 17 B of the<br \/>\nIndustrial Disputes Act.  Section 17 B is mandatory in character and it gives a<br \/>\nmandate to the Court to award full wages, if the conditions enumerated in<br \/>\nSection 17 B are fully satisfied, in the considered opinion of this Court.<br \/>\nHowever, the delay in making application will not affect the powers of the Court<br \/>\nas per decision in RAJASTHAN STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION Vs. LABOUR COURT<br \/>\nreported in (1998) 1 LLJ &#8211; 831 (Raj) (DB).\n<\/p>\n<p>\t43.  The three ingredients mentioned in Section 17 B  of the Act are as<br \/>\nfollows:-\n<\/p>\n<p>\ta.  The Labour Court, directed reinstatement of workman.\n<\/p>\n<p>\tb.  The Employer  filed proceedings against the award before the<br \/>\nHonourable High Court or the Honourable Supreme Court.\n<\/p>\n<p>\tc.  The workman has not been employed in any Establishment during such<br \/>\nperiod.\n<\/p>\n<p>Then, the Employer  is liable to pay the last drawn wages to the workmen, in the<br \/>\nconsidered opinion of this Court.  The liability as per Section 17 B of the<br \/>\nIndustrial Disputes Act continues during the entire period of the pendency of<br \/>\nproceedings in higher course even if the workmen  as in the meanwhile crossed<br \/>\nhis age of super annuation  and would have retired, had he not been dismissed or<br \/>\ndischarged from service as opined by this Court.\n<\/p>\n<p>\t44.  Section 17 B of the Industrial Disputes Act is a statutory exception<br \/>\nand creates a liability in favour of the workmen and against the Employer.  The<br \/>\nright as per Section 17 B of the Industrial Disputes Act is an independent right<br \/>\nto a workman during the pendency of proceedings before the Honourable High Court<br \/>\nor the Honourable Supreme Court.\n<\/p>\n<p>\t45.  This Court worth recalls a Division Bench  decision in ELPRO<br \/>\nINTERNATIONAL LTD. Vs. K.B.JOSHI AND OTHERS reported in 1987 (II) LLJ &#8211; 210<br \/>\n(Bombay High Court), wherein it is laid down that<\/p>\n<p>\t&#8220;Section 17 B of the Act does not in any way impinge upon the<br \/>\nextraordinary powers conferred on the High Court under Arts.136 and 226 of the<br \/>\nConstitution, much less restricting the said powers.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>\t46.  In the aforesaid decision, at page 215, it has among other things<br \/>\nobserved that<\/p>\n<p>\t&#8220;Section nowhere lays down that in extreme cases where it is demonstrated<br \/>\nthat the award passed is either without jurisdiction or is otherwise a nullity,<br \/>\nor grossly erroneous or perverse, the High Court or the Supreme Court is<br \/>\ndebarred from exercising its power under Art.226 and 136 of the Constitution.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>\t47.   This Court also aptly points out that in GODREJ AND BOYCE<br \/>\nMANUFACTURING COMPANY LTD., Vs. PRINCIPAL LABOUR COURT, MADRAS AND ANOTHER<br \/>\nreported in 1992 &#8211; II &#8211; LLJ &#8211; 201, wherein at page 209, it is held that<\/p>\n<p>\t&#8220;&#8230; Courts cannot afford to be manipulated and allow the<br \/>\nmanagement\/employer to use the interim order as a weapon to avoid such a<br \/>\nstatutory liability.  Some error of fact or even some error of law alone will<br \/>\nnot thus be enough to issue any interim order.  If, however, the error is such<br \/>\nthat it goes to the root of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and the Court has<br \/>\ngot sufficient materials to ignore the effect of S.17 B of the Act the Court may<br \/>\ndecline to order payment of the wages pendente lite &#8230;&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>\t48.   Be that as it may,  in view of the fact that the first<br \/>\nrespondent\/petitioner has taken a stand that he has been removed from service<br \/>\nillegally from 9\/5\/2000, but the same has been repudiated by the<br \/>\npetitioner\/Management saying that the services have been terminated on 11\/5\/2000<br \/>\nthough the first respondent has joined on 1\/10\/1999 and earlier, he was on<br \/>\nprobation and that the project was in operation only for a contractual period of<br \/>\nfour years etc., and also because of the fact, this Court has set aside the ex<br \/>\nparte award dated 17\/12\/2007 passed in I.D.No.2 of 2006 by the second respondent<br \/>\nas referred to earlier paragraphs of this Court, this Court is of the considered<br \/>\nview that prima facie, there are sufficient materials to decline the relief of<br \/>\npayment of wages as per Section 17 B pendentelite by exercising its judicial<br \/>\ndiscretion and ignore the effect of Section 17 B of the Act based on the over<br \/>\nall facts and circumstances of the case which float on the surface.<br \/>\nConsequently, Miscellaneous Petition (MD) No.1 of 2011 is closed.\n<\/p>\n<p>\tM.P.(MD) No.2 of 2008:-  This Miscellaneous Petition is closed.\n<\/p>\n<p>mvs.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Madras High Court Gammon India Limited vs Nanda Kumar on 4 March, 2011 BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT DATED: 04\/03\/2011 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE M.VENUGOPAL Writ Petition (NPD) No.9192 of 2008 a n d M.P.(MD) No.2 of 2008 and M.P.(MD) No.1 of 2011 Gammon India Limited through its Authorised Signatory P.A.Datar Mumbai [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[8,13],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-62359","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-high-court","category-madras-high-court"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.0 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Gammon India Limited vs Nanda Kumar on 4 March, 2011 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court &amp; 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