{"id":65637,"date":"1959-03-26T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1959-03-25T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/balkrishna-savalram-pujari-and-vs-shree-dnyaneshwar-on-26-march-1959"},"modified":"2016-10-03T06:55:07","modified_gmt":"2016-10-03T01:25:07","slug":"balkrishna-savalram-pujari-and-vs-shree-dnyaneshwar-on-26-march-1959","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/balkrishna-savalram-pujari-and-vs-shree-dnyaneshwar-on-26-march-1959","title":{"rendered":"Balkrishna Savalram Pujari And … vs Shree Dnyaneshwar … on 26 March, 1959"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Balkrishna Savalram Pujari And … vs Shree Dnyaneshwar … on 26 March, 1959<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1959 AIR 798, \t\t 1959 SCR Supl. (2) 476<\/div>\n
Author: P Gajendragadkar<\/div>\n
Bench: Gajendragadkar, P.B.<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nBALKRISHNA SAVALRAM PUJARI AND OTHERS\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nSHREE DNYANESHWAR MAHARAJSANSTHAN & OTHERS.\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT:\n26\/03\/1959\n\nBENCH:\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.\nBENCH:\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.\nSARKAR, A.K.\nSUBBARAO, K.\n\nCITATION:\n 1959 AIR  798\t\t  1959 SCR  Supl. (2) 476\n CITATOR INFO :\n RF\t    1981 SC1106\t (18)\n\n\nACT:\nLimitation-Suit\t for  Possession of Sansthan  by  hereditary\nworshippers  on\t ouster by  trustees-Period  of\t limitation-\nTrustees,  if in possession adversely to  Plaintiffs-Ouster,\nif  a  continuing wrong-Indian Limitation Act,\t1908  (9  of\n1908), Arts. 120, 124, S. 23.\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\nThe  appellants who were the hereditary worshippers,  called\nGuravs, of the Shree Dnyaneshwar Sansthan of Alandi, claimed\nto  be its owners.  The respondents as trustees of the\tsaid\nSansthan  dismissed eleven of the Guravs in 1911,  served  a\nnotice\ton  the\t rest  calling upon them  to  agree  to\t act\naccording  to  the  orders  of\tthe  Temple  committee\t and\nappointed  six\tBrahmins  to carry on the  services  of\t the\nSansthan.  The Guravs did not agree and sued the respondents\nfor   a\t declaration  of  their\t rights\t of  ownership\t and\nconsequential  reliefs.\t That litigation ended in  the\tHigh\nCourt in 1921 with the result that their claim of  ownership\nstood  rejected but their rights as  hereditary\t worshippers\nwere  left  open.   Thereafter\tthe  Guravs  took   forcible\npossession  of\tthe temple on July  25,1922.   The  trustees\nbrought\t a  suit under s. 9 of the Specific  Relief  Act  on\nSeptember  12,\t1922, and obtained a decree on\tNovember  4,\n1932.\t In  execution\tof  that  decree  the  Guravs\twere\ndispossessed.\tThe suits, out of which the present  appeals\narise, were filed by the appellants against the trustees for\ndeclaration  of their rights as hereditary servants  of\t the\nSansthan,  a permanent injunction restraining  the  trustees\nfrom obstructing them in the exercise of the said rights and\naccounts.  The respondents claimed that the appellants\twere\nservants  of  the  Temple committee and\t had  no  hereditary\nrights as claimed by them; even if they had, their claim  to\nsuch  rights  was  barred by limitation.   The\ttrial  Court\ndecreed the suits. In appeal the High Court, while  agreeing\nwith  the  trial  court\t on the\t merits,  disagreed  on\t the\nquestion  of  limitation,  held the suits to  be  barred  by\nlimitation  under art. 120 Of the Limitation Act, the  cause\nof  action arising either on the filing of the s. 9 suit  by\nthe respondents or, in any event, on the date when the\tsaid\nsuit  was decreed, S. 23 of the Act having  no\tapplication,\nand allowed the appeals.  It was contended on behalf of\t the\nappellants  in\tthis Court that the suits were\tgoverned  by\nart.   I24  Of\tthe Limitation Act, and\t even  if  art.\t 120\napplied, S. 23 saved limitation.\nHeld, that the High Court was right in holding that art. 120\nand not art. 124, of the Limitation Act applied and that  S.\n23 had no application to the suits in question.\n477\nArticle\t 124  Of the Limitation Act applies only  where\t the\ncause  of action for the suit is wrongful  dispossession  of\nthe  plaintiff\tand adverse possession by the  defendant  in\nrespect\t of  the  hereditary office in\tquestion.   In\tsuch\nsuits, the contest usually is between rival claimants to the\nhereditary  office  and\t not  between  such  claimants\t and\ntrustees.  It is impossible to ignore the provision Of\tCol.\n3 to that article in deciding its applicability.\nKunj Bihari Prasadji v. Keshavlal Hiralal, [1904] I.L.R.  28\nBom.  567  and jalim Singh Srimal v. Choonee  Lall  Johurry,\n[1911] 15 C.W.N. 882, held inapplicable.\nThathachariar  v. Singarachariar, A.I.R. 1928 Mad. 377,\t ap-\nproved.\nAnnasami  v.  Advarachari,  I.L.R. 1941\t Mad.  275,  distin-\nguished.\nJhalandar Thakur v. jharula Das, [1914] I.L.R. 42 Cal. 2444,\nreferred to.\nSection 23 Of the Limitation Act refers not to a  continuing\nright  but  to a continuing wrong.  A  continuing  wrong  is\nessentially  one that creates a source of continuing  injury\nas  opposed  to\t one that was complete and  makes  the\tdoer\nliable\tfor such continuance.  A completed inJury would\t not\nbe  a  continuing wrong even though it might  give  rise  to\ncontinuing damage.\nThus tested, the injury to the appellants resulting from the\ndecree\tobtained  by the trustees in the s.  9\tsuit,  which\namounted to a ouster, was complete at the date of the ouster\nand  S.\t 23 Of the Limitation Act could not apply so  as  to\nsave limitation.\nChoudhury Bibhuti Narayan Singh v. Maharaja Sir Guru Mahadeu\nAsram  Prasad  Saki Bahadur, [1930] I.L.R. 19 Pat.  208\t and\nKhair  Mohammad Khan v. Mst. jannat, [1940] I.L.R.  22\tLah.\n22, referred to.\nMaharani Rajroop Koer v. Syaed Abdul Hossein, [1880] L.R.  7\nI.A.  240 and Hukum Chand v. Maharaj Bahadur  Singh,  [1933]\nL.R. 60 I.A. 313, distinguished and held inapplicable.\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 220 to\t 223
\nof 1953.\n<\/p>\n
Appeals\t from the Judgment and decrees dated April  14,1943,
\nof  the Bombay High Court in Appeals Nos. 183, 184, 185\t and
\n186 of 1942, arising out of the judgments and decrees  dated
\nFebruary 16, 1942, of the Court of the 1st Class  Sub-Judge,
\nPoona, in Suits Nos. 900\/37, 392\/35, 875\/36 and 1202\/33.
\nV.   P. Rege and Naunit Lal, for the appellants.
\nN.   C.\t Chatterjee,  K.  V.  Joshi  and  Ganpat  Rai,\t for
\nrespondents Nos. 1 to 6 (In all the Appeals).\n<\/p>\n
478<\/span><\/p>\n
1959.  March 26.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
\nGAJENDRAGADKAR,\t J.-These  four appeals represent  the\tlast
\nstage  of  a  long  and\t tortuous  litigation  between\t the
\nappellants  Waghmares  (also called Guravs)  who  claim\t the
\nrights\tof hereditary worshippers in the  Shree\t Dnyaneshwar
\nMaharaj Sansthan, Alandi, and respondents 1 to 6 who are the
\ntrustees  of the said Sansthan.\t Alandi , which is  a  small
\ntown situated on the banks of the river Indrayani at a\tdis-
\ntance  of about 14 miles from Poona, is regarded as  a\tholy
\nplace of pilgrimage by thousands of Hindu devotees.  In\t the
\nlast quarter’ of the 13th century Shree Dnyaneshwar Maharaj,
\nthe  great  Maharashtra\t Saint\tand  Philosopher,  lived  at
\nAlandi.\t  He  was a spiritual teacher and reformer;  by\t his
\nsaintly\t life and his inspiring and illuminating  commentary
\non  the\t Bhagvad Gita, known as Dnyaneshwari, he  helped  to
\ncreate\ta popular urge and fervour for religious and  social
\nrevolution which led to the foundation of a devotional cult;
\nthe  followers\tof  this  cult\tare  known  as\tWarkaris  in
\nMaharashtra.  They refuse to recognise any barriers of caste
\nor  class; and amongst them prevails a feeling of  real\t and
\ngenuine spiritual brotherhood.\tEvery year, in the months of
\nJuly  and November, thousands of them proceed on  pilgrimage
\non  foot and accompany the annual palanquin procession\tfrom
\nAlandi\tto  Pandharpur.\t Pandharpur is the chief  centre  of
\npilgrimage in Maharashtra and it is regarded by devotees  as
\nthe  Banares  of  Southern India.  About 1300  A.  D.  Shree
\nDnyaneshwar  Maharaj took Samadhi at Alandi and\t since\tthen
\nAlandi also has become a place of pilgrimage.
\nIn or about 1500 A. D. a big temple was erected in front  of
\nthe  idol  of Shiva called Siddeshwar where the\t said  Shree
\nDayaneshwar  Maharaj  took his Samadhi.\t In due\t course\t the
\nMahratta Kings and the Peshwas of Poona granted the  village
\nof  Alandi  in\tinam for the upkeep of the  temple  and\t the
\nSamadhi.   About 1760 A. D. Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao framed  a
\nbudget\tcalled Beheda or Taleband in order to  regulate\t the
\nmanagement and worship of the shrine and provided for proper
\n479<\/span>
\nadministration of its annual revenue amounting to Rs. 1,725.
\nThe  appellants\t claim\tthat their ancestors  were  then  in
\npossession  of\tthe  temple and management  of\tits  affairs
\nespecially the worship of the shrine.  The budget framed  by
\nthe Peshwa shows that out of the sum of Rs. 1,725 an  amount
\nof Rs. 361 was assigned to the worshippers for some of their
\nservices.\n<\/p>\n
After  the  fall  of the Mahratta power\t the  management  of
\nAlandi passed into the hands of the East India Company which
\ncontinued the old arrangement without any interference.\t  In
\n1852,  under  orders  from  the-Government  of\tBombay\t the
\nCollector  of Poona drew up a yadi or memorandum  appointing
\nsix  persons as Punchas (trustees) with directions  to\tthem
\nfor the management of the temple in accordance with the\t old
\ntradition and practice as well as for the administration  of
\nthe  revenue  of  the village subject  to  the\tcontrol\t and
\nsanction  of  the Collector.  This arrangement\tcame  to  be
\ndescribed as ” the scheme of 1852″.\n<\/p>\n
In  1863  the  Religious  Endowment  Act  was  passed,\t and
\ninconsequence,\tin  1864 the Government of  Bombay  withdrew
\ntheir  superintendence\tover  the  affairs  of\tthe   Alandi
\nSansthan;  and the trustees continued to manage the  affairs
\nof  the\t temple without any supervision on the part  of\t the
\nGovernment.  It was during this period that the\t appellants’
\nancestors  began to assert that they were the owners of\t the
\nshrine\twhile the trustees insisted on treating them as\t the
\nservants  of  the shrine.  This conflict inevitably  led  to
\nseveral disputes between the worshippers and the trustees.
\nMatters\t appear\t to have come to a crisis in 1911  when\t the
\ntrustees dismissed eleven Guravs from the temple service  on
\nthe ground that they were found guilty of gross\t misconduct.
\nThe  Guravs nevertheless asserted that they were the  owners
\nof  the\t shrine and that the trustees had  no  authority  or
\npower  to  dismiss  them.   Taking  their  stand  on   their
\nownership  of the shrine some of the dismissed Guravs  filed
\nCivil  Suit No. 485 of 1911 in the Court of the\t Subordinate
\nJudge,\tPoona,\tagainst\t the  trustees\tand  this  was\t the
\nbeginning  of the long drawn out litigation  which  followed
\nbetween the parties.  In that suit the Guravs
\n480<\/span>
\nclaimed\t a  declaration\t that they were the  owners  of\t the
\ntemple and not the servants of the temple committee; and  as
\nowners\tthey  were entitled to perform the  worship  at\t the
\nshrine and to appropriate the offerings made to the idol  of
\nthe  Saint.   This claim was resisted by  the  trustees\t who
\npleaded\t that  the Guravs were merely the  servants  of\t the
\ntemple\tcommittee and not the owners at all.  On  April\t 20,
\n1917, the learned trial judge dismissed the suit because  he
\nheld  that the Guravs were not the owners of the shrine\t and
\nwere  not  entitled  to the declarations  claimed  by  them.
\nAgainst\t this decision the Guravs preferred several  appeals
\nbut  these appeals were dismissed on August 3, 1921.   While
\ndismissing   their  appeals  the  High\tCourt\tincidentally
\nexpressed the view that it was open to the Guravs to come to
\nterms with the temple committee and that the terms on  which
\nthe Guravs could be reinstated can be decided  appropriately
\nin a suit filed under s. 92 of the Code of Civil  Procedure.
\nIt was also observed by the High Court in its judgment\tthat
\nthe  temple  committee\tdid not dispute the  fact  that\t the
\nGuravs\twere the hereditary pujaris and that they  had\tsome
\nrights\tin  that capacity.  No doubt the  committee  claimed
\nthat  under  the scheme framed in 1852 it was  competent  to
\ndismiss hereditary servants for a substantial cause such  as
\ngross misconduct.\n<\/p>\n
It appears that instead of adopting the course indicated  in
\nthe judgment of the High Court and filing a suit under s. 92
\nof the Code, the Guravs chose to take the law into their own
\nhands,\tand  obtained  forcible\t possession  of\t the  temple
\npremises on July 25, 1922, and began to perform the puja and
\nto  take the offerings placed before the deity as  they\t had
\nbeen doing prior to their dismissal.  This was followed by a
\nsuit  filed by the trustees on September 12, 1922 (Suit\t No.
\n1075  of 1922) under s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act.\tThis
\nsuit  terminated in a decree in favour of the  committee  on
\nNovember 4, 1922.  In pursuance of this decree the committee
\nrecovered  possession  of the temple on November  16,  1922.
\nThus the Guravs had occupied the temple precincts for  about
\nthree and a half months.\n<\/p>\n
481<\/span><\/p>\n
When  the Guravs were thus dispossessed by the committee  in
\nexecution  of  the  decree  obtained by\t it,  some  of\tthem
\nproceeded to file Suit No. 19 of 1922 in the District  Court
\nof  Poona; this suit purported to be one under s. 92 of\t the
\nCode but it claimed the same reliefs as had been claimed  by
\nthe  Guravs  in theirs earlier suit of 1911.  On  April\t 25,
\n1927, the District A Court dismissed this suit on the ground
\nthat the Guravs could not reagitate the same questions\tover
\nagain. it was held that their claim was barred by the  deci-
\nsion  of  the earlier Suit No. 485 of  1911.   Against\tthis
\ndecision the Guravs appealed to the High Court (First Appeal
\nNo.  507  of  1927);  but the High  Court  agreed  with\t the
\nconclusion  of the District Court and dismissed the  Guravs”
\nappeal on June 20, 1933.  It was held by the High Court that
\nthe suit as framed was not properly constituted under s.  92
\nof the Code.\n<\/p>\n
It was at this stage that a properly constituted suit, No. 7
\nof  1934, was filed under s. 92 of the Code by\tthe  general
\npublic of Alandi along with two Guravs in the District Court
\nat Poona.  This suit claimed that a proper scheme should  be
\nframed\tfor the management of the temple.  Even so,  one  of
\nthe  allegations made in the plaint referred to the  Guravs’
\nrights\t as  hereditary\t worshippers.\tIt  was\t  apparently
\napprehended that this allegation would be treated as outside
\nthe  scope  of a scheme suit under s. 92 and so\t the  Guravs
\ntook the precaution of filing four separate suits on  behalf
\nof four branches in the Waghmare family one after the other.
\nThese suits were numbered as 1202 of 1933, 392 of 1935,\t 875
\nof 1936 and 900 of 1937; the plaintiffs in these suits\twere
\nrespectively the members of the third, the fourth, the first
\nand  the second branch of the Waghmare family’.\t It  appears
\nthat  the hearing of these suits were stayed by an order  of
\nthe District Judge pending the final decision of the  scheme
\nsuit which was being tried by him.\n<\/p>\n
The scheme suit was taken, up for hearing in 1937.  As\tmany
\nas  22\tissues\twere  framed in\t this  suit  and  voluminous
\nevidence  Was  recorded.  In the result\t the  learned  judge
\nsubstantially confirmed the original
\n61<\/span>
\n482<\/span>
\nscheme\t of  1852,  though  he\tissued\tcertain\t  directions
\nmodifying it.  This decree was passed on December 11,  1937.
\nThe  trustees felt aggrieved by this decree  and  challenged
\nits  propriety by preferring an appeal, No. 92 of  1938,  in
\nthe  Bombay  High Court.  On  November 16,  1939,  the\tHigh
\nCourt dismissed the appeal though it made some amendments in
\nthe  scheme framed by the- District Judge by consent of\t the
\nparties.\n<\/p>\n
After  the  scheme  suit was thus disposed of  by  the\tHigh
\nCourt, the four suits filed by the pujaris were taken up for
\ntrial by the learned Subordinate Judge, First Class,  Poona.
\nIn  all these suits the appellants claimed their  rights  as
\nhereditary  vatandar Pujari Gurav Servants of the  Sansthan.
\nThey alleged that they were under a duty to perform  worship
\naccording to certain rites in Shree Dayaneshwar Sansthan and
\nthat  they  were also under an obligation to  perform  other
\nincidental  duties  enumerated\tby them\t in  their  plaints.
\nLikewise  they\tclaimed\t that  for  remuneration  they\twere
\nentitled to receive coins and perishable articles offered by
\nthe devotees and the committee as well as yearly  emoluments
\nfrom  the  committee.  On these allegations  the  appellants
\nclaimed\t a declaration about their respective rights and  an
\ninjunction   permanently  restraining  the   trustees\tfrom
\nobstructing  the  appellants  in the exercise  of  the\tsaid
\nrights.\t  They\talso claimed accounts from the\ttrustees  in
\nregard to the offerings prior to the institution of the suit
\nas well as those made after the institution of the suit\t and
\nbefore the passing of the decree.\n<\/p>\n
These  allegations were denied by respondents 1 to 6.  Their
\ncase was that the appellants were the servants of the temple
\ncommittee  and as such had no hereditary rights set  up,  by
\nthem.  In the alternative, it was pleaded by them that\teven
\nif  the\t appellants had any hereditary rights the  same\t had
\nbeen  lost  by\ttheir  misconduct  and\thad  been  otherwise
\nextinguished  by limitation.  Against the appellants’  claim
\npleas of res judicata and estoppel were also raised.
\nOn  these pleadings as many as 21 issues were framed in\t the
\ntrial court.  The trial court found in favour
\n483<\/span>
\nof the appellants on all the issues.  The learned judge held
\nthat  the Guravs had established the hereditary\t rights\t set
\nout  by them and he was inclined to take the view  that\t the
\nrespondents  could  not\t deprive  the  appellants  of  their
\nhereditary  rights of service because of the  misconduct  of
\nsome  of their ancestors.  He also found that there  was  no
\nsubstance  in the plea of estoppel or res judicata and\tthat
\nthe suits were not barred by limitation.  In the result\t the
\nappellants’ suits were decreed on February 16, 1942.
\nThereupon  the\trespondents  challenged\t these\tdecrees\t  by
\npreferring  appeals against them in the Bombay\tHigh  Court.
\nThe  four suits accordingly gave rise to First Appeals\tNos.
\n183,  184,  185\t and 186 of  1942  respectively.   In  these
\nappeals\t the  High  Court agreed with  the  trial  court  in
\nholding\t that on the merits the appellants  had\t established
\ntheir case and that their claim was not barred either by res
\njudicata  or  by  estoppel.  However,  on  the\tquestion  of
\nlimitation the High Court took the view that the appellants’
\nsuits  were governed by art. 120 of the Limitation  Act\t and
\nthat  they  had been filed beyond the period  of  six  years
\nprescribed by the said article.\t That is why the High  Court
\nset aside the decrees passed by the trial court, allowed the
\nrespondents’  appeals and dismissed the\t appellants’  suits.
\nHowever,  in view of the special facts of the case the\tHigh
\nCourt  directed\t that each party should bear its  own  costs
\nthroughout.  This judgment was pronounced on April 14, 1943.
\nLike the trial court the High Court also dealt with all\t the
\nfour cases by one common judgment.\n<\/p>\n
It  appears that after this judgment was pronounced  by\t the
\nHigh  Court but before it Was signed, the  appellants  moved
\nthe  High Court on July 2, 1943, for a rehearing of  one  of
\nthe appeals (No. 186 of 1942).\tIt was urged before the High
\nCourt  that even if art. 120 applied the claim made  by\t the
\nappellant in the said appeal (which arose from Suit No. 1202
\nof 1933) could not be held to be barred by limitation.\t The
\nHigh Court was not impressed by this plea and so the  motion
\nfor rehearing was discharged.\n<\/p>\n
Subsequently a Civil Application, No. 1039 of 1944,
\n484<\/span>
\nwas  made  by the appellant in the said\t appeal\t seeking  to
\nraise  the  same point over again but this  application\t was
\nrejected by the High Court on September 12, 1944.
\nThe appellants then applied for leave to appeal to the Privy
\nCouncil\t on August 15, 1944.  Their applications were  heard
\ntogether  and were disposed of by an order passed  on  March
\n26, 1946, whereby leave was granted to them to appeal to the
\nPrivy  Council\tand their prayer for consolidating  all\t the
\nappeals was also allowed.  These appeals could not, however,
\nbe disposed of by the Privy Council before the\tjurisdiction
\nof the Privy Council to deal with Indian appeals came to  an
\nend  and  so  they ultimately came to this  Court  and\twere
\nnumbered  as  Appeals Nos. 220 to 223 of 1953.\t It  may  be
\nconvenient  to state that these appeals\t arise\trespectively
\nfrom  Suits Nos. 907 of 1937, 392 of 1935, 875 of  1936\t and
\n1202  of  1933.\t It would thus be seen that  the  litigation
\nwhich began between the parties in 1911 has now reached\t its
\nfinal stage before us in the present appeals.
\nAs  we\thave already indicated, both the courts\t below\thave
\nfound in favour of the appellants on most of the issues that
\narose  in  the present litigation; but the  appellants\thave
\nfailed\tin the High Court on the ground of  limitation.\t  In
\nthe  trial court the respondents had urged that the  present
\nsuits  were governed by art. 124 of the Limitation  Act\t and
\nthat  since  the Guravs had been dismissed from\t service  in
\n1911  and  other Guravs refused to serve in  1913  and\t1914
\nlimitatation  began to run against them at least  from\t1914
\nand so the suits were beyond time.  The learned trial  judge
\nheld  that  art.  124  was  inapplicable.   He\talso   found
\nalternatively  that, even if the said article  applied,\t the
\ntrustees  did  not have continuous possession  of  the\tsuit
\nproperties  from  1911 or 1914 for twelve years and  so\t the
\nsuits  were not barred by time.\t According to him  the\tcase
\nwas  really covered by s. 23 of the Limitation Act,  and  so
\nthe plea of limitation could not succeed.\n<\/p>\n
The  High Court has agreed with the trial court\t in  holding
\nthat art. 124 is inapplicable.\tIt has, however,
\n485<\/span>
\ncome  to the conclusion that the suits are governed by\tart.
\n120  of the Limitation Act, and, according to its  findings,
\nlimitation  began to run against the appellants either\tfrom
\nSeptember 12, 1922, when the trustees filed their suit under
\ns.  9  of  the Specific Relief Act, or,\t in  any  case\tfrom
\nNovember,  1922 when, in execution of the decree  passed  in
\nthe said’ suit, the appellants were driven out of the temple
\nprecincts  by  the trustees.  The High Court has  also\theld
\nthat  s.  23 can have no application to\t the  present  case.
\nThat  is how the High Court has reached the conclusion\tthat
\nthe  appellants’  suits are barred by time under  art.\t120.
\nThe  question which arises for our decision in\tthe  present
\nappeals,  therefore,  is  one of limitation; it\t has  to  be
\nconsidered  in\ttwo  aspects: Was the High  Court  right  in
\nholding\t that art. 120 applies and that the cause of  action
\naccrued\t more  than  six  years\t before\t the  dates  of\t the
\ninstitution of the present suits ?; Was the High Court\talso
\nright in holding that s. 23 does not apply to the suits ?
\nOn  behalf of the appellants Mr. Rege has contended that  in
\nsubstance, in their present suits the appellants have made a
\nclaim  for  possession of an hereditary office and  as\tsuch
\nthey  would be governed by art. 124 of the  Limitation\tAct.
\nIn  this  connection  he has referred  us  to  the  relevant
\nallegations  in\t the  plaint to show  that  the\t appellants’
\nprayer\tfor a declaration about their hereditary rights\t and
\nfor  a consequential permanent injunction amount to no\tmore
\nand  no\t less  than  a claim  for  possession  of  the\tsaid
\nhereditary office.  In support of this argument reliance has
\nbeen placed on the decision of the Bombay High Court in Kunj
\nBihari Prasadji v. Keshavlal Hiralal (1).  In that case\t the
\nplaintiff  had made a claim to the gadi of the\tSwaminarayan
\ntemple at Ahmedabad and had asked for a declaration that the
\nwill  of  the  last  Acharya  which  purported\tto   appoint
\ndefendant  14 as his adopted son and successor was null\t and
\nvoid.\tAs  a consequence a perpetual injunction  -was\talso
\nclaimed\t  restraining  the  defendants\tfrom  offering\t any
\nobstruction  to\t the plaintiff in occupying the\t said  gadi.
\nThe
\n(1)  (1904) I.L.R. 28 Bom. 567.\n<\/p>\n
486<\/span><\/p>\n
principal point which was decided in the case had  reference
\nto  the\t effect of the provisions of s. 42 of  the  Specific
\nRelief Act., The plaintiff’s suit had been dismissed in\t the
\ncourts\tbelow on the ground that he had omitted to  ask\t for
\nfurther relief as he was bound to do under s. 42 of the said
\nAct and the High Court held that the section did not empower
\nthe  court to dismiss the suit under the said  section.\t  In
\nconsidering  the nature of the claim made by  the  plaintiff
\nJenkins, C. J., observed that ” in the plaintiff’s view\t the
\nsuit  was not one of possession of land appertaining to\t the
\ngadi but to determine who was to occupy the gadi and thus as
\ngadinishin become the human agent of the deity.\t If that was
\nso,  then the injunction restraining all  interference\twith
\nthe  occupancy by the plaintiff of the gadi secures  in\t the
\nmost  complete\tmanner to him the rights he  claims  “.\t The
\nlearned\t Chief\tJustice also observed that ”  the  plaintiff
\nmight  in terms have asked for possession of the  office  he
\nsaid was his “, but be asked ” how would practical effect be
\ngiven to an award of possession of office otherwise than  by
\npreventing interference with the rights of which it was made
\nup  “.\tEven so, having reversed the decree  passed  by\t the
\ncourts\tbelow,\twhen the High Court remanded  the  case\t for
\nretrial,  the plaintiff was advised to amend his plaint\t and
\nto  define  more precisely the terms of\t the  injunction  he
\nsought.\t  It is urged that, in the present appeals also,  by
\nasking\tfor  a\tdeclaration  of\t their\trights\tand  for  an
\nappropriate   injunction   against  the\t  respondents,\t the
\nappellants  were  in  effect asking for\t possession  of\t the
\nhereditary office.  It is doubtful if the claims made by the
\nappellants  in their respective suits are exactly  analogous
\nto  the claim made by the plaintiff in Kunj Bihari  Prasad’s
\ncase  (1).   The  appellants  have not\tonly  asked  for  an
\ninjunction but also for an account of the income received by
\nthe trustees from July 23, 1933, up to the date of the\tsuit
\nas  well  as for similar account from the date of  the\tsuit
\nuntil  the date of the decree.\tA claim for accounts in\t the
\nform  in which it is made may not be quite  consistent\twith
\nthe appellants’ contention that their suits are for  nothing
\nmore than possession
\n(1)  (1904) I.L.R. 28 Bom. 567.\n<\/p>\n
487<\/span><\/p>\n
of  the hereditary office ; but in dealing with the  present
\nappeals\t we  are  prepared  to\tassume\tthat  they  have  in
\nsubstance  claimed possession of the office.   The  question
\nwhich then arises is: Does this claim for possession attract
\nthe  application  of  art.  124\t of  the  Limitation  Act  ?
\nArticle\t 124 governs suits for possession of  an  hereditary
\noffice.\t The period of limitation prescribed by the  article
\nis  twelve years and the said period begins to run when\t the
\ndefendant  takes possession of the office adversely  to\t the
\nplaintiff.   This is explained to mean that  the  hereditary
\noffice\tis  possessed when the profits thereof\tare  usually
\nreceived  or  (if  there are no\t profits)  when\t the  duties
\nthereof are usually performed.\tIt is clear that before this
\narticle can apply it must be shown that the suit makes claim
\nfor  possession\t of an office which is hereditary;  and\t the
\nclaim  must  be\t made against the defendant  who  has  taken
\npossession  of the said hereditary office adversely  to\t the
\nplaintiff.  Unlike art. 142 the fact that the plaintiff,  is
\nout  of\t possession of the hereditary office for  more\tthan
\ntwelve\tyears before the date of his suit would\t not  defeat
\nhis  claim  for possession of the said office.\t What  would
\ndefeat\this  claim  is the adverse possession  of  the\tsaid
\noffice\tby the defendant for the prescribed period.  As\t the
\nexplanation  makes  it\tclear usually  the  receipt  of\t the
\nprofits\t may amount to the possession of the office; but  if
\nthe  defendant\tmerely\treceives the profits  but  does\t not
\nperform the duties which are usually performed by the holder
\nof the office, the receipt of the profits by itself may\t not
\namount to the possession of office.  The cause of action for
\npossession  in suits falling under art. 124 is the  wrongful
\ndispossession of the plaintiff and the adverse possession by
\nthe  defendant\tof  the\t office\t in  question.\t Claims\t for
\npossession   of\t  hereditary  offices  which   attract\t the
\napplication  of this article are usually made by holders  of
\nthe   said  offices  against  persons  who   claim   adverse
\npossession of the said offices; in other words, in suits  of
\nthis kind, the contest is usually between rival claimants to
\nthe hereditary office in question.\n<\/p>\n
In the present appeals the claim for possession is
\n488<\/span>
\nmade by the appellants against the trustees of the Sansthan.
\nIt  is\tsignificant  that the –\t persons  who  are  actually
\nperforming the duties of the worshippers are not impleaded ;
\nand they do not claim to hold office as hereditary  officers
\neither.\t  They\thave  been  appointed  by  the\ttrustees  as
\nservants of the institution  and they perform the duties  of
\nworship as such servants.  The trustees, on the other  hand,
\ncannot\tbe   said  to have taken possession  of\t the  office
\nthemselves  adversely to the appellants.  They do  not\ttake
\nthe  profits  themselves  nor do  they\tperform\t the  duties
\nassociated with the said office.  They have, in exercise  of
\ntheir  authority  and  power  as  trustees,  dismissed\t the
\nappellants’  predecessors  from office and have\t made  fresh
\nappointments  of  servants  to perform the  worship  at\t the
\nSansthan; and in making the said appointments, have in\tfact
\ndestroyed  the\thereditary  character of  the  office.\t The
\ndispute\t in the present appeals is between  the\t worshippers
\nwho  claim  hereditary\trights\tand  the  trustees  of\t the
\ninstitution  who  claim\t to  have  validly  terminated\t the
\nservices  of some of the predecessors of the appellants\t and
\nto have made valid appointments to the said office.  It\t is,
\ntherefore, impossible to accept the argument that the  claim
\nmade  by the appellants in their respective  suits  attracts
\nthe provision& of art. 124.  It is conceded by Mr. Rege that
\nif art. 124 does, not apply, the suits would be governed  by
\nart.  120 which is a residuary article.\t It may prima  facie
\nappear somewhat strange that whereas a suit against a person
\nclaiming  to  hold the hereditary office  adversely  to\t the
\nplaintiff is governed by a period’ of twelve years, a  claim
\nagainst\t the  trustees like the respondents in\tthe  present
\nappeals who have dismissed the hereditary worshippers should
\nbe governed by a period of six years.  It may be possible to
\nsuggest that there is a substantial difference in the nature
\nof  the two disputes ; but apart from it, it  is  well-known
\nthat  the artificial provisions of limitation do not  always
\nsatisfy the test of logic or equity.\n<\/p>\n
Mr.  Rege, however, argued that in determining the scope  of
\nart.  124 we need not consider the provisions of col.  3  to
\nthe said article.  His contention appears
\n489<\/span>
\nto be that once it is shown that the suit is for  possession
\nof  an\thereditary office, art. 124 must  apply\t though\t the
\nclaim  for  possession\tmay not have been  made\t ,against  a
\nperson\twho has taken possession of the office adversely  to
\nthe  plaintiff.\t  He  also  urged  alternatively  that\t the
\ntrustees  should be deemed to have, taken possession of\t the
\noffice\tadversely to the appellants.  We have  already\theld
\nthat  the conduct of the trustees shows that they  have\t not
\ntaken possession of the office adversely within the  meaning
\nof  col. 3 of art. 124; and we do not think it is  possible,
\nto ignore the provision of col. 3 in deciding whether or not
\nart. 124 applies.  It is true that in Jalim Singh Srimal  v.
\nChoonee Lall Johurry (1), while holding that the  adjustment
\non which the plaintiff’s claim was based in that case was in
\ntime  both  under  arts. 115 and 120,  Jenkins,\t C.  J,\t has
\nobserved that the function of the third column of the second
\nschedule  is not to define causes of action but to  fix\t the
\nstarting point from which the period of limitation is to  be
\ncounted\t ;  but\t this  observation  does  not  support\t the
\nappellants’  case that art. 124 would govern the  suit\teven
\nthough the third column is wholly inapplicable to it.\tThat
\nobviously  is  not the effect of the  observations  made  in
\nJalim Singh’s case (1).\n<\/p>\n
The question about the nature and scope of the provisions of
\nart.  124  has been considered by the Madras High  Court  in
\nThathachariar  v.  Singarachariar (2).\t” If  we  take\tinto
\nconsideration  the terminology used in the three columns  of
\nart. 124 “, observed Srinivasa Aiyangar, J., in that case, ”
\nit  is\tclear  that the nature of the suit  intended  to  be
\ncovered by that article must be a suit filed by a  plaintiff
\nwho  claims the office from a person who at that time  holds
\nthe office himself “. In our opinion this view is correct.
\nWe  may\t also refer to another decision of the\tMadras\tHigh
\nCourt  in  which  this question\t has  been  considered.\t  In
\nAnnasami v. Adivarachari (3) a Full Bench of the Madras High
\nCourt was dealing with a suit in
\n(1) (1911) 15 C.W.N. 882.      (2) A.I.R. 1928 Mad, 377.
\n(3)  I.L.R. 1941 Mad. 275.\n<\/p>\n
62<\/span>
\n490<\/span><\/p>\n
which  the plaintiff had claimed an  injunction\t restraining
\nthe  trustee  and  the archakas of  the\t Sri  Bhuvarabaswami
\ntemple\tat Srimushnam from interfering with the\t performance
\nof the duties of his office of mantrapushpam of the  temple.
\nThis   suit  had  been\tfiled  in  1929.   The\t office\t  of
\nmantrapushpam was a hereditary office and the plaintiff\t had
\nsucceeded  to  it on the death of his father in\t 1906.\t The
\nemoluments of the office consisted of a ball of cooked\trice
\nper  them and twelve annas per month.  It appears  that\t the
\nplaintiff  was a Vadagalai while the archakas of the  temple
\nwere Thengalais and there was animosity between them; and as
\na result of this animosity the plaintiff bad never been able
\nto  perform the duties of his office.  It was common  ground
\nthat  the plaintiff was the lawful holder of the office\t and
\nthat  he  had been receiving its emoluments month  by  month
\nuntil 1927.  The archakas who resisted the plaintiff’s claim
\ndid not claim that they were in possession of the office  or
\nthat they had performed the duties of the said office.\t The
\nFull  Bench  held  that, where a person\t is  admittedly\t the
\nlawful\tholder\tof  the\t office\t and  he  is  enjoying\t its
\nemoluments,  he\t must  in  law\tbe  regarded  as  being\t  in
\npossession  of\tthe office itself, especially where  no\t one
\nelse  is  performing the duties of the said office;  and  so
\nunder art. 124 it was enough for the plaintiff to show\tthat
\nhe  had been in receipt of the emoluments of the  office  to
\nsave  his claim from the bar of limitation.  The Full  Bench
\nalso  rejected the contention that under art. 120  the\tsuit
\nwas  barred because it was held that every time the  trustee
\nand the archakas prevented the plaintiff from performing his
\nduties\tas  a hereditary officer a. fresh  cause  of  action
\narose  and so there can be no bar of limitation\t under\tart.\n<\/p>\n
120.   It would be noticed that the basis of  this  decision
\nwas  that,  in\tthe  eyes  of  law,  the  plaintiff  was  in
\npossession  of the hereditary office since he was  receiving
\nthe  emoluments\t of the said office month by month,  and  so
\nevery act of obstruction on the part of the archakas and the
\ntrustee\t was in the nature of a continuing wrong which\tgave
\nrise  to a fresh cause of action to the plaintiff from\ttime
\nto  time.  In other words, on the facts the Full Bench\theld
\nthat
\n491<\/span>
\ns.23 helped the plaintiff and saved his suit from the bar of
\nlimitation.   As  we will presently point out  there  is  no
\nscope for applying s. 23 to the facts of the present  cases,
\nand  so the decision in Annasami Iyengar’s case\t (1)  cannot
\nassist the appellants.\n<\/p>\n
In  this connection it is relevant to consider the  decision
\nof the Privy Council in Jhalandar Thakur v., Jharula Das (2)
\nin  which it was held that art. 124 was\t inapplicable.\t The
\ndefendant  Jharula Das had obtained a decree for money on  a
\nmortgage  which\t bad  been executed in his  favour  by\tMst.
\nGrihimoni,  the\t widow\tof the shebait of  the\ttemple.\t  In
\nexecution of the said decree the defendant had caused 3\t 1\/2
\nas. share of the judgment-debtor including her right in\t the
\nnett  income of the daily offerings made before the idol  to
\nbe  put\t up  for sale and had himself purchased\t it  at\t the
\nauction sale.  As such purchaser he was in possession of the
\nincome of the said share.  The judgment-debtor attempted  to
\nchallenge the said sale by two suits but her attempts failed
\nand the’ auction purchaser continued to be in possession  of
\nthe  income.   On  the death  of  Mst.\t Grihimoni,  Bhaiaji
\nThakur, who succeeded to the office of the shebait, sued the
\ndefendant  for\tpossession of certain lands  and  claimed  a
\ndeclaration  that he was entitled to receive the 3  1\/2\t as.
\nshare  of the nett income from the offerings to\t the  temple
\nwith  other  reliefs.\tThis  claim  was  resisted  by\t the
\ndefendant  Jharula Das.\t In regard to the plaintiff’s  claim
\nin  respect of the said 3 1\/2 as share, the High  Court\t had
\nheld  that  art. 124 applied and that the claim\t was  barred
\nunder  the said article.  That is why the decree  passed  by
\nthe trial court in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the
\nsaid  income was reversed by the High Court.  This  decision
\nwas challenged by the plaintiff before the Privy Council and
\nit was urged on his behalf that art. 124 did not apply.\t The
\nPrivy Council upheld this contention.  It was clear that the
\noffice of the shebait of the temple was a hereditary  office
\nwhich  could  not be held by anyone who was  not  a  Brahmin
\nPanda.\t Jharula Das was not a Brahmin Panda.  He was of  an
\ninferior caste and was not
\n(1) I.L.R. 1941 Mad. 275.\n<\/p>\n
(2) (1914) I.L.R. 42 Cal. 244.\n<\/p>\n
492<\/span><\/p>\n
competent  to hold the office of the shebait of the  temple,
\nor  to\tprovide for the performance of the  duties  of\tthat
\noffice.\t  On  these facts the Privy Council  held  that\t the
\nappropriation from time to time by Jharula Das of the income
\nderivable from the said 3 1\/2 as share -did not deprive Mst.
\nGrihimoni,  and\t after\ther death, Bhaiaji  Thakur,  of\t the
\npossession of the office of the shebait although that income
\nwas  receivable by them .in right of the  shebaitship.\t The
\nbasis  of this decision is that, on each occasion  on  which
\nJharula Das received and wrongfully appropriated to his\t own
\nuse a share of the income to which the shebait was entitled,
\nhe committed a fresh actionable wrong in respect of which  a
\nsuit could be brought against him by the shebait; but it did
\nnot constitute him a shebait for the time being or affect in
\nany  way  the  title  of the  office.\tThus  this  decision
\nemphasises  that  for  the application of  art.\t 124  it  is
\nessential that the defendant to the suit must be in  adverse
\npossession  of the hereditary office in question.  We  must,
\ntherefore,  hold that art. 124 does not apply to  the  suits
\nfiled  by the appellants; and as we have  already  observed,
\nif. art. 124 does not apply, art. 120 does.\n<\/p>\n
The  next  point which arises for our  decision\t is  whether
\nunder  art. 120 the suits are barred by\t limitation.   Under
\nart. 120 time begins to run against the plaintiffs when\t the
\nright  to sue accrued to them, and that naturally poses\t the
\nquestion  as  to  when\tthe right  to  sue  accrued  to\t the
\nappellants.  In deciding this question it would be necessary
\nto  recall briefly the material facts in regard to the\tpast
\ndisputes  between  the appellants and the  trustees.   These
\ndisputes  began in 1911.  On January 31, 1911, the  trustees
\nwrote  a yadi (memorandum) to the Collector of Poona  asking
\nhis permission to dismiss eleven Guravs from service.\tThey
\nset  out in detail several items of misconduct of which\t the
\nsaid  Guravs were guilty; and they expressed  their  opinion
\nthat  for  the\tproper\tmanagement of  the  affairs  of\t the
\ninstitution  it was necessary to terminate the\tservices  of
\nthe  off-ending\t Guravs (Ex. 407).  On April  1,  1911,\t the
\nCollector  sent a reply to the trustees and told them  that,
\nas a result of the Government
\n493<\/span>
\nResolution  No.\t 4712  passed on November  29,1864,  it\t was
\nunnecessary  for  the  trustees to  obtain  the\t Collector’s
\nsanction because it was competent to the trustees to  settle
\ntheir  own affairs without any such sanction.  The  trustees
\nthen  met in a committee on September 18, 1911, and  decided
\nto  dismiss  from service the said eleven  Guravs.   In\t its
\nresolution the committee stated that the Guravs were violent
\nand arrogant and it was likely that they may commit riot  at
\nthe  time when the committee would seek to take charge\tfrom
\nthem.\tThe committee also apprehended that the rest of\t the
\nGuravs\twould  make a common cause with those who  had\tbeen
\ndismissed  from\t service  and  would  refuse  to  serve\t the
\nSansthan.   Even  so the committee decided  to\tappoint\t six
\nBrahmins  temporarily  to perform the service,\tbecause\t the
\ncommittee  was prepared to allow the rest of the  Guravs  to
\nrender\tservice\t to the Sansthan if they were ready  to\t act
\naccording to the orders of the committee and were willing to
\nenter into a formal agreement in that behalf.  In accordance
\nwith  this  resolution the committee served  notice  on\t the
\neleven\tGuravs\ton  October  13,  1911,\t terminating   their
\nservices and calling upon them to hand over to the committee
\nall  articles  in  their charge\t and  forbidding  them\tfrom
\nentering  the temple in their capacity as servants.   Notice
\nwas  likewise served on the rest of the Guravs calling\tupon
\nthem to agree to serve the Sansthan on conditions  specified
\nin  the\t notice.   These terms were not\t acceptable  to\t the
\nGuravs\tand  so,  on behalf of two  Guravs  Eknath  and\t his
\nbrother\t Ramachandra, notice was served on the\ttrustees  on
\nOctober 26, 1911, complaining against the trustees’  conduct
\nin forcibly removing the Guravs from the temple and  thereby
\nwrongfully  denying  their rights.  The\t notice\t warned\t the
\ntrustees  that\tunless they retraced their  steps  and\tgave
\npossession  to\tthe Guravs as claimed in  the  notice  legal
\nsteps would be taken against them.\n<\/p>\n
This  notice  was followed by the Guravs’ Suit\tNo.  485  of
\n1911.  In the suit the plaintiffs claimed declaration  about
\ntheir  rights  of  ownership  and  asked  for  consequential
\nreliefs.  This claim was denied by the
\n494<\/span>
\ntrustees  who claimed the right to dismiss the\tGuravs.\t  It
\nwas alleged on their behalf that some of the plaintiffs\t had
\nbeen dismissed and others had resigned their employments and
\nso  all\t of  them  had lost their  rights.   This  suit\t was
\nseriously  contested  but  in the end the  Guravs  lost\t and\n<\/p>\n
-their suit was dismissed on  January 31, 1918.
\nThe  Guravs  then preferred appeals in the  High  Court\t but
\nthese  appeals\twere also dismissed on August 3,  1921.\t  We
\nhave  already  pointed out that, while dismissing  the\tsaid
\nappeals, the High Court made certain observations about\t the
\nGuravs’\t hereditary  rights of worship\tand  suggested\tthat
\nthese rights could be adjudicated upon in a suit filed under
\ns.  92\tof  the Code.  Thus at the  time  when\tthe  Guravs’
\nappeals\t were dismissed the position was that the  claim  of
\nownership set up by them had been rejected; but the question
\nas  to\twhether they were entitled to the lesser  rights  of
\nhereditary worshippers was left open.\n<\/p>\n
The  Guravs then obtained forcible possession of the  temple
\nand  that  led\tto  the trustees’ suit under  s.  9  of\t the
\nSpecific  Relief  Act, No. 1075 of 1922,  on  September\t 12,
\n1922.\tIn this suit the trustees specifically alleged\tthat
\nthe  relationship  of  the defendants  as  servants  of\t the
\nSansthan  had  ceased  as from\tSeptember,  1911,  and\tthey
\naverred that the defendants had therefore no right to obtain
\npossession of the temple.  The defendants no doubt  disputed
\nthis  claim  and  pleaded  that\t they  were  the  hereditary
\nvatandar pujari servants but their claim was negatived and a
\ndecree\tfor possession was passed on November 4,  1922.\t  In
\nexecution of this decree the defendants were dispossessed.
\nOn  these  facts the High Court has held in  favour  of\t the
\nappellants,  and rightly we think, that it was difficult  to
\naccept the respondents’ contention that the cause of  action
\nfor  the present suits which were expressly based  upon\t the
\nstatus\tof the Guravs as hereditary servants arose in  1911.
\nBut,  the High Court felt no doubt that the cause of  action
\nto  file the present suits had accrued either  on  September
\n12,  1922, when the trustees filed their suit under s. 9  of
\nthe Specific Relief Act or in any event on November 4,
\n495<\/span>
\n1922,  when  the said suit was decreed and the\tGuravs\twere
\nconsequently  dispossessed.  In our opinion this  conclusion
\nis  also right.\t One of the Guravs who was examined  in\t the
\npresent litigation has stated that, ” if in any year when it
\nis the turn of any takshim to serve, if a person outside the
\nGurav family is appointed by the trustees, all the  takshims
\nhave  a right to-, object “. There is also no  dispute\tthat
\nsince  the  dismissal  of eleven Guravs\t in  1911  till\t the
\ninstitution of, the present suits none from the Gurav family
\nhas  served the temple except for 3 1\/2 months in 1922\twhen
\nthe Guravs had wrongfully obtained possession of the temple.
\nIn  1922 the Guravs knew that their claim of  ownership\t had
\nbeen  rejected and that the only right which they could\t set
\nup  was as hereditary worshippers of the temple and not\t its
\nowners.\t This right was specifically denied by the  trustees
\nin their plaint while it was specifically set up in  defence
\nby  the\t Guravs in their written statement; and\t the  decree
\nthat  followed\tupheld the trustees’ case and  rejected\t the
\ndefendant’s  claim.   On  these\t facts\tthe  conclusion\t  is
\nirresistible that the right to sue accrued to the Guravs  at
\nthe  latest  on November 4, 1922, when a decree\t was  passed
\nunder s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act.\tIf not the plaint in
\nthe  suit,  at least the decree that  followed\tclearly\t and
\neffectively  threatened\t the Guravs’  rights  as  hereditary
\nworshippers  and  so  the  cause of action  to\tsue  on\t the
\nstrength of the said rights clearly and unambiguously  arose
\nat that time.  If that be the true position it follows\tthat
\nthe  present  suits  which have been filed  long  after\t the
\nexpiration  of six years from 1922 are barred by time  under
\nart. 120.\n<\/p>\n
It  is then contended by Mr. Rege that the suits  cannot  be
\nheld  to  be  barred under art. 120 because  s.\t 23  of\t the
\nLimitation Act applies; and since, in the words of the\tsaid
\nsection,   the\tconduct\t of  the  trustees  amounted  to   a
\ncontinuing wrong, a fresh period of limitation began to\t run
\nat  every  moment  of  time  during  which  the\t said  wrong
\ncontinued.   Does  the conduct of the trustees amount  to  a
\ncontinuing  wrong under s. 23 ? That is the  question  which
\nthis  contention raises for our decision.  In  other  words,
\ndid the
\n496<\/span>
\ncause  of  action  arise de die in them as  claimed  by\t the
\nappellants  ? In dealing with this argument it is  necessary
\nto bear in mind that s. 23 refers not to a continuing  right
\nbut  to\t a continuing wrong.  It is the very  essence  of  a
\ncontinuing  wrong  that\t it  is\t an  act  which\t  creates  a
\ncontinuing source of injury and renders the ‘doer of the act
\nresponsible  and  liable  for the continuance  of  the\tsaid
\ninjury.\t  If  the  wrongful act causes an  injury  which  is
\ncomplete,  there  is  no continuing wrong  even\t though\t the
\ndamage resulting from the act may continue.  If, however,  a
\nwrongful  act is of such a character that the injury  caused
\nby   it\t itself\t continues,  then  the\tact  constitutes   a
\ncontinuing  wrong.   In this connection it is  necessary  to
\ndraw a distinction between the injury caused by the wrongful
\nact  and  what may be described as the effect  of  the\tsaid
\ninjury.\t It is only in regard to acts which can be  properly
\ncharacterised  as  continuing  wrongs  that  s.\t 23  can  be
\ninvoked.  Thus considered it is difficult to hold  that\t the
\ntrustees’  act in denying altogether the alleged  rights  of
\nthe  Guravs as hereditary , worshippers and in claiming\t and
\nobtaining  possession from them by their suit in 1922 was  a
\ncontinuing  wrong.  The decree obtained by the\ttrustees  in
\nthe  said litigation had injured effectively and  completely
\nthe appellants’ rights though the damage caused by the\tsaid
\ndecree\tsubsequently continued.\t Can it be said that,  after
\nthe appellants were evicted from the temple in execution  of
\nthe said decree, the continuance of their dispossession\t was
\ndue  to\t a recurring act of tort committed by  the  trustees
\nfrom moment to moment ? As soon as the decree was passed and
\nthe  appellants were dispossessed in execution\tproceedings,
\ntheir  rights had been completely injured, and though  their
\ndispossession continued, it cannot be said that the trustees
\nwere committing wrongful acts or acts of tort from moment to
\nmoment so as to give the appellants a cause of action de die
\nin  diem.   We think there can be no doubt  that  where\t the
\nwrongful act complained of amounts to ouster, the  resulting
\ninjury\tto the right is complete at the date of\t the  ouster
\nand so there would be no scope for the application of s.  23
\nin such a case.\t That is
\n497<\/span>
\nthe view which the High Court has taken and we see no reason
\nto differ from it.\n<\/p>\n
We  would now like to refer to some of the  decisions  which
\nwere cited before us on this point.  The first case which is
\nusually considered in dealing with the application of s.  23
\nis  the\t decision of the Privy Council in  Maharani  Rajroop
\nKoer  v. Syed Abdul Hossein (1) In order to appreciate\tthis
\ndecision  it is necessary to refer, though briefly,  to\t the
\nmaterial facts.\t The plaintiff had succeeded in establishing
\nhis  right to the pyne or an artificial watercourse  and  to
\nthe  use of the water flowing through it except\t that  which
\nflowed\tthrough the branch channel; he had, however,  failed
\nto  prove  his right to the water in the tal except  to\t the
\noverflow  after the defendants as owners of  mouzah  Morahad
\nused the water for the purpose of irrigating their own land.
\nIt  was\t found that all the obstructions by  the  defendants
\nwere unauthorised and in fact the plaintiff had succeeded in
\nthe  courts below in respect of all the obstructions  except
\ntwo which were numbered No. 3 and No. 10.  No. 3 was a khund
\nor channel cut in the side of the pyne at a point below\t the
\nbridge whereas No. 10 was a dhonga also below the bridge and
\nit  consisted of hollow palm trees so placed as to draw\t off
\nwater  in  the\tpyne  for  the\tpurpose\t of  irrigating\t the
\ndefendants’   lands.   It  was\tin  regard  to\t these\t two
\nobstructions  that the question about the  continuing  wrong
\nfell  to be considered; and the Privy Council held that\t the
\nsaid obstructions which interfered with the flow of water to
\nthe  plaintiff’s  mehal\t were in the  nature  of  continuing
\nnuisance as to which the cause of action was renewed de\t die
\nin   them   so\tlong  as  the  obstructions   causing\tsuch
\ninterference  were  allowed to continue.  That\tis  why\t the
\nPrivy  Council allowed the plaintiff’s claim in\t respect  of
\nthese two obstructions and reversed the decree passed by the
\nHigh  Court  in\t that behalf.  In fact the  conduct  of\t the
\ndefendant showed that whenever he drew off water through the
\nsaid  diversions he was in fact stealing  plaintiff’s  water
\nand thereby committing fresh wrong every time.\tThus this is
\nclearly not a case of exclusion or ouster.\n<\/p>\n
(1)  (1880) L.R. 7 I.A. 240.\n<\/p>\n
63<\/span>
\n498<\/span><\/p>\n
Similarly,  in Hukum Chand v. Maharaj Bahadur Singh (1)\t the
\nPrivy Council was dealing with a case where the\t defendants’
\nact  clearly amounted to a continuing wrong and\t helped\t the
\nplaintiff  in  getting the benefit of s. 23.   The  relevant
\ndispute\t in  that case\tarose because  alterations  had been
\nmade  by the\tSwetambaris in the  character of the charans
\nin  certain shrines and the Digambaris complained that\t the
\nsaid  alterations  amounted to an  interference\t with  their
\nrights.\t  It had been found by the courts in India that\t the
\ncharans\t in  the  old shrines were the\timpressions  of\t the
\nfootprints  of the saints each bearing a lotus\tmark.\t“The
\nSwetambaris  who  preferred to worship the  feet  themselves
\nhave  evolved  another\tform  of charan\t not  very  easy  to
\ndescribe accurately in the absence of models or\t photographs
\nwhich\tshows  toe  nails  and\tmust  be  taken\t to   be   a
\nrepresentation\tof  part of the foot.  This  the  Digambaris
\nrefused\t to worship as being a representation of a  detached
\npart of the human body “. The courts had also held that\t the
\naction of the Swetambaris in placing the charans of the said
\ndescription in three of the shrines was a wrong of which the
\nDigambaris  were entitled to complain.\tThe  question  which
\nthe Privy Council had to consider was whether the action  of
\nthe Swetambaris in placing the said charans in three of\t the
\nshrines was a continuing wrong or not; and in answering this
\nquestion  in  favour  of the plaintiffs\t the  Privy  Council
\nreferred  to  its earlier decision in the case\tof  Maharani
\nRajroop Koer (2 ) and held that the action in question was a
\ncontinuing  wrong.   There  is no doubt\t that  the  impugned
\naction did not amount to ouster or complete dispossession of
\nthe plaintiffs.\t It was action which was of the character of
\na  continuing wrong and as such it gave rise to a  cause  of
\naction de die in diem.\tIn our opinion, neither of these two
\ndecisions can be of any assistance to the appellants.
\nOn  the other hand the decision of the Patna High  Court  in
\nChoudhury Bibhuti Narayan Singh v. Maharaja Sir Guru Mahadev
\nAsram Prasad Sahi Bahadur(3)
\n(1) (1933) L.R. 60 I.A. 313.   (2) (1880) L.R. 7 I.A. 240.
\n(3) [1939] I.L.R. 19 Pat. 208.\n<\/p>\n
499<\/span><\/p>\n
as  well as that of the Full Bench of the Punjab High  Court
\nin   Khair  Mohammad  Khan  v.\tMst.   Jannat  support\t the
\nrespondents’  contention  that\twhere the  s,  impugned\t act
\namounts\t to ouster there is no scope for the application  of
\ns.  23 of the Limitation Act.  We are, therefore,  satisfied
\nthat  there  is no substance in the  appellants’  contention
\nthat s. 23 helps to save limitation for their suits.
\nThe  result  no doubt is unfortunate.  The  appellants\thave
\nsucceeded  in both the courts below in proving their  rights
\nas hereditary worshippers; but their claim must be  rejected
\non the ground that they have filed their suits beyond  time.
\nIn  this court an attempt was made by the parties to see  if
\nthis long drawn out litigation could be brought to an end on
\nreasonable terms agreed to by them, but it did not  succeed.
\nIn the result the appeals fail and are dismissed.  We would,
\nhowever, direct that the parties should bear their own costs
\nthroughout.\n<\/p>\n
Appeals dismissed.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Balkrishna Savalram Pujari And … vs Shree Dnyaneshwar … on 26 March, 1959 Equivalent citations: 1959 AIR 798, 1959 SCR Supl. (2) 476 Author: P Gajendragadkar Bench: Gajendragadkar, P.B. PETITIONER: BALKRISHNA SAVALRAM PUJARI AND OTHERS Vs. RESPONDENT: SHREE DNYANESHWAR MAHARAJSANSTHAN & OTHERS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 26\/03\/1959 BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-65637","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nBalkrishna Savalram Pujari And ... vs Shree Dnyaneshwar ... on 26 March, 1959 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/balkrishna-savalram-pujari-and-vs-shree-dnyaneshwar-on-26-march-1959\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Balkrishna Savalram Pujari And ... vs Shree Dnyaneshwar ... on 26 March, 1959 - 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