{"id":6788,"date":"2010-09-17T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2010-09-16T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/laxmiben-vs-the-on-17-september-2010"},"modified":"2016-01-19T12:45:16","modified_gmt":"2016-01-19T07:15:16","slug":"laxmiben-vs-the-on-17-september-2010","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/laxmiben-vs-the-on-17-september-2010","title":{"rendered":"Laxmiben vs The on 17 September, 2010"},"content":{"rendered":"
Gujarat High Court<\/div>\n
Laxmiben vs The on 17 September, 2010<\/div>\n
Author: H.B.Antani,&Nbsp;<\/div>\n
   Gujarat High Court Case Information System \n\n  \n  \n    \n\n \n \n    \t      \n         \n\t    \n\t\t   Print\n\t\t\t\t          \n\n  \n\n\n\t \n\t \n\t \n\t \n\t \n\t \n\t \n\t \n\t \n\t\n\n\n \n\n\n\t \n\nCRA\/36\/2009\t 55\tJUDGMENT \n \n \n\n\t\n\n \n\nIN\nTHE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD\n \n\n \n\n\n \n\nCIVIL\nREVISION APPLICATION No. 36 of 2009\n \n\n \n \nFor\nApproval and Signature:  \n \nHONOURABLE\nMR.JUSTICE H.B.ANTANI\n \n \n=========================================================\n\n \n\t  \n\t \n\t  \n\t\t \n\t\t\t \n\n1\n\t\t\n\t\t \n\t\t\t \n\nWhether\n\t\t\tReporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment ?\n\t\t\n\t\n\n \n\t  \n\t \n\t  \n\t\t \n\t\t\t \n\n2\n\t\t\n\t\t \n\t\t\t \n\nTo be\n\t\t\treferred to the Reporter or not ?\n\t\t\n\t\n\n \n\t  \n\t \n\t  \n\t\t \n\t\t\t \n\n3\n\t\t\n\t\t \n\t\t\t \n\nWhether\n\t\t\ttheir Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the judgment ?\n\t\t\n\t\n\n \n\t  \n\t \n\t  \n\t\t \n\t\t\t \n\n4\n\t\t\n\t\t \n\t\t\t \n\nWhether\n\t\t\tthis case involves a substantial question of law as to the\n\t\t\tinterpretation of the constitution of India, 1950 or any order\n\t\t\tmade thereunder ?\n\t\t\n\t\n\n \n\t  \n\t \n\t  \n\t\t \n\t\t\t \n\n5\n\t\t\n\t\t \n\t\t\t \n\nWhether\n\t\t\tit is to be circulated to the civil judge ?\n\t\t\n\t\n\n \n\n \n=========================================================\n\n \n\nLAXMIBEN\nWD\/O RAMUBHAI MAGANBHAI & 4 - Applicant(s)\n \n\nVersus\n \n\nVASUDEVBHAI\nGANDABHAI PATEL & 3 - Opponent(s)\n \n\n=========================================================\n \nAppearance\n: \nMR\nMIHIR THAKORE and MR PC KAVINA, SR. ADVOCATES with MR AB MUNSHI\nfor\nApplicant(s) : 1 - 5. \nMR AMIT V THAKKAR for Opponent(s) : 1 -\n4. \n=========================================================\n\n\n \n\t  \n\t \n\t  \n\t\t \n\t\t\t \n\nCORAM\n\t\t\t: \n\t\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t \n\t\t\t \n\nHONOURABLE\n\t\t\tMR.JUSTICE H.B.ANTANI\n\t\t\n\t\n\n \n\n \n \n\n\n \n\nDate\n: 17\/09\/2010 \n\n \n\n \n \nORAL\nJUDGMENT<\/pre>\n
1.\t\tThe
\napplicants who are the original defendants have preferred the present
\nRevision Application under Section 115 of the Code of Civil
\nProcedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as  the Code ) against
\nthe opponents   original plaintiffs challenging the order dated
\n2.2.2009 passed by the learned 7th Additional Senior Civil
\nJudge, Surat by which the learned Judge partly allowed the
\napplication at Exh.47 filed by the applicants in Regular Civil Suit
\nNo. 397 of 2007 so far as the relief prayed for by the applicants
\nunder Order 7 Rule 11(b) and (c) of the Code is concerned, but
\nrejected the said application so far as the remaining reliefs prayed
\nfor in the said application is concerned.\n<\/p>\n
2.\t\tThe
\nfacts of the case are as under:-\n<\/p>\n
\t\tThe
\nopponents have filed Regular Civil Suit No. 397 of 2007 in the Court
\nof learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Surat for a declaration that
\nthe opponents herein have 1\/2 share in the property being
\nagricultural land bearing block Nos. 4, 74, 76 and 226 of Village
\nPal, Taluka District Surat and that the applicants herein have no
\nright to transfer the said land in any manner whatsoever or to hand
\nover possession thereof to a third party and for separate possession
\nof 1\/2 share in the suit property by partitioning the suit property
\nby metes and bounds and for accounts of the income derived by the
\napplicants from the suit land during last three years and for
\npermanent injunction restraining the applicants from in any manner
\ndealing with the suit property and from transferring the possession
\nof the suit land in favour of a third party or from in any manner
\nchanging the nature and identity of the suit land and from putting up
\nany construction etc. The suit was filed on 22.8.2007. The opponents
\nalso filed an application vide Exh.5 for interim injunction. The
\napplicants resisted the claim of the opponents made in the suit as
\nwell as the application Exh.5 for interim relief by filing the
\nwritten submissions vide Exh.18 on 17.10.2007. In their written
\nstatement, the applicant raised a preliminary objection against
\nmaintainability of the suit itself and contended that a preliminary
\nissue is required to be raised and the suit be decided on the
\npreliminary issue. The applicants also filed the application at
\nExh.35 under Order 14 Rule 2 read with Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code
\nand requested the learned Trial Judge to frame and decide two issues
\nas set out in the said application before application Exh.5 was
\ndecided. The opponents filed their reply at Exh.37 resisting the
\napplication at Exh.35. Thereafter, the applicants filed the
\napplication at Exh.47 under Order 7 Rule 11(a), (b) and (d) of the
\nCode requesting the learned Trial Judge to reject the plaint as the
\nsame did not disclose any cause of action as per Hindu law as
\noperative before 1956 and law of limitation even as per the averments
\nmade in the plaint itself. The said application was filed on
\n15.3.2008. The opponents filed their reply vide Exh.49 on 28.3.2008
\nand contested the application at Exh.47 on various grounds. It is
\nsubmitted that the learned 11th Additional Senior Civil
\nJudge, Surat proceeded to decide the application Exh.35 without
\ndisposing of the application Exh.38 filed by the opponents and Exh.47
\nfiled by the applicants. The learned Judge by his order dated
\n15.3.2008 rejected the application Exh.35 filed by the applicants.
\nThe applicants thereafter filed Review Application No.33 of 2008
\nunder Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code for review of
\nthe order dated 15.3.2008 passed by the learned Trial Judge below
\napplication Exh.35. The opponents filed the reply vide Exh.18
\ncontesting the Review Application and ultimately, the learned Judge
\nby his judgment and order dated 22.7.2008 rejected the said Review
\nApplication. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the order
\npassed by the learned Trial Judge in the Review Application, the
\napplicants approached this Court by filing Special Civil Application
\nNo. 10284 of 2008, wherein they have produced all the applications
\nand the orders passed below the applications along with memo of the
\npetition. After hearing both the parties at length in the said
\npetition, the Court was pleased to dispose of the said petition
\nsubject to the following observations made in Para 3 of the order
\ndated 12.8.2008 which is as under :-\n<\/p>\n
 3.\t\tConsidering the
\nabove, present Special Civil Application is disposed of without
\nfurther considering the impugned order on merits by observing that,
\nas and when application Exh.47 submitted by the petitioners-original
\ndefendants under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC is taken up for hearing, the
\nsame shall be decided and disposed of by the learned trial court
\nindependently in accordance with law and on merits and in any way
\nwithout being influenced by any of the observations made by the trial
\ncourt while passing the impugned order under Exh.35.\n<\/p>\n
\t\tIt is submitted that the
\napplicants thereafter submitted written submissions at Exh.76 in
\nsupport of the application at Exh.47 on 9.9.2008. Thereafter, the
\nopponents also filed the written arguments vide Exh.80 in support of
\ntheir claim in their written reply at Exh.49 on 15.12.2008.
\nThereafter, the learned Trial Judge by his order dated 2.2.2009
\npartly allowed the application Exh.47 and directed the opponents
\nherein to amend the valuation of suit and pay the deficit amount of
\nCourt fees within 15 days. However, the learned Judge rejected the
\napplication Exh.47 so far as the relief of rejecting the plaint is
\nconcerned. The applicants being aggrieved by the aforesaid order has
\npreferred the present Revision Application.\n<\/p>\n
3.\t\tMr Mihir Thakore and Mr
\nPC Kavina, learned Senior Advocates for the applicants submit that
\nthe learned Trial Judge has committed gross error in exercising the
\njurisdiction not vested in him while not considering the relief to
\nreject the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(a) and (d) of the Code. It is
\nsubmitted that the learned Judge committed an error in not
\nappreciating the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11(a) and (d) of the Code
\nin proper perspective. Order 7 Rule 11(a) and (d) is with regard to
\nrejection of plaint. It is stated therein that the plaint shall be
\nrejected in the cases where it does not disclose a cause of action
\nand where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be
\nbarred by any law. The learned Trial Judge committed an error in not
\nappreciating that as per the averments made in the plaint, the common
\nancestor of the parties to the suit had expired on 12.3.1955 and on
\nhis death, the properties of the deceased Maganbhai were inherited by
\nhis son Ramubhai to the exclusion of his sister Shantiben. The
\nplaintiffs are the descendants of Shantiben who inherited no property
\nsince the succession which opened on the death of Maganbhai resulted
\nin his son Ramubhai taking the entire property by way of intestate
\nsuccession as per the customary Hindu law. The learned Judge also did
\nnot appreciate that the wife of Maganbhai Bhagubhai had predeceased
\nhim and his daughter Shantiben had no right of inheritance in Hindu
\nlaw as it stood at the relevant time i.e. prior to the enactment of
\nHindu Succession Act, 1956. It is submitted that the claim of the
\nopponents is based on the averments made in the plaint that
\nShantiben, daughter of Maganbhai was entitled to a share in the
\nproperties left by the deceased Maganbhai on his death on 12.3.1955,
\nthough under the Hindu law then in force, she was not entitled to a
\nshare in the said properties. The learned Trial Judge, therefore,
\ncommitted an error in not appreciating that from the averments made
\nin the plaint itself, the plaint does not disclose the cause of
\naction. The learned Judge has also not appreciated that admittedly
\nthe opponents   plaintiffs claim share in the suit properties
\nthrough Shantiben, daughter of the deceased Maganbhai on the ground
\nthat they are the heirs of the deceased Shantiben. It is submitted
\nthat as demonstrated, Shantiben herself has no right under the Hindu
\nlaw at the relevant time to inherit the properties of deceased
\nMaganbhai and therefore, the question of claiming any right to
\ninherit the properties left by the deceased Maganbhai by the heirs of
\nthe deceased Shantiben did not arise at all. It is also submitted
\nthat the learned Trial Court has committed an error in not
\nappreciating that as per the averments made in the plaint, the common
\nancestor of the parties to the suit had expired on 12.3.1955 when
\naccording to the plaintiffs succession opened. The plaintiffs have
\nclaimed 1\/2 share in the suit properties left by the deceased
\nMaganbhai on his death on 12.3.1955, whereas the suit is filed only
\non 22.8.2007 i.e. after a lapse of more than 52 years from the date
\nof succession is alleged to have opened to the plaintiffs. Thus, the
\nsuit is also barred by law of limitation and therefore, the plaint is
\nliable to be rejected. In view of the aforesaid facts and
\ncircumstances of the case, the order passed by the learned Judge
\ndeserves to be quash and set aside.\n<\/p>\n
4.\t\tLearned Senior Advocates
\nfor the applicants have placed reliance on the following judgments.
\nThey are as under :-\n<\/p>\n
(i)\tT. Arivandandam Vs. T.V.\n<\/p>\n
Satyapal & Anr., reported in AIR 1977 SC 2421.\n<\/p>\n
(ii)\tI.T.C. Limited Vs.
\nDebts Recovery Appellate Tribunal & Ors., reported in (1998) 2
\nSCC 70.\n<\/p>\n
(iii)\tRaj Narain Sarin &
\nOrs. Vs. Laxmi Devi & Ors., reported in (2002) 10 SCC 501.\n<\/p>\n
(iv)\tSopan Sukhdeo Sable &
\nOrs. Vs. Assistant Charity Commissioner & Ors., reported in
\n(2004) 3 SCC 137.\n<\/p>\n
(v)\tLalitaben wd\/o
\nBaldevbhai Manibhai Suthar Vs. Niruben Ramanbhai Suthar & Anr.,
\nreported in 2007(1) GLH 403.\n<\/p>\n
(vi)\tSmt. Bagirathi &
\nOrs. Vs. S. Manivanan & Anr., reported in AIR 2008 Madras 250.\n<\/p>\n
(vii)\tJageshwari Devi &
\nOrs. Vs. Shatrughan Ram, reported in (2007) 15 SCC 52.\n<\/p>\n
(viii)\tRanjeet Mal Vs.
\nPoonam Chand & Anr., reported in AIR 1983 Rajasthan 1.\n<\/p>\n
(ix)\tSukhpal Singh Vs. State
\nof Rajasthan & Ors., reported in AIR 1998 Rajasthan 103.\n<\/p>\n
(x)\tPurnmasi Yadav Vs.
\nNarbedeshwar Tripathi & Ors., reported in AIR 1998 Allahabad 260.\n<\/p>\n
(xi)\tMaharaj Shri
\nManvendrasinhji R. Jadeja Vs. Rajmata Vijaykunverba wd\/o Maharaja
\nMahendrasinhji, reported in 1999(1) GLR 261.\n<\/p>\n
(i)\t\tIn
\nT. Arivandandam Vs. T.V. Satyapal & Anr., reported in AIR 1977 SC
\n2421, the learned Senior Advocates have placed reliance on Para 5,
\nwhich is as under:-\n<\/p>\n
 5.\t\tWe have not the
\nslightest hesitation in condemning the petitioner for the gross abuse
\nof the process of the court repeatedly and unrepentently resorted to.
\nFrom the statement of the facts found in the judgment of the High
\nCourt, it is perfectly plain that the suit now pending before the
\nFirst Munsif’s Court Bangalore, is a flagrant misuse of the mercies
\nof the law in receiving plaints. The learned Munsif must remember
\nthat if on a meaningful – not formal – reading of the plaint it is
\nmanifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a
\nclear right to sue, he should exercise his power under O. VII R. 11,
\nC. P. C. taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is
\nfulfilled. And, if clear drafting has created the illusion of a cause
\nof action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the
\nparty searchingly under O. X. C.P.C. An activist Judge is the answer
\nto irresponsible law suits. The trial Courts would insist
\nimperatively on examining the party at the first hearing so that
\nbogus litigation can be shot down at the earliest stage. The Penal
\nCode is also resourceful enough to meet such men, (Ch. XI) and must
\nbe triggered against them. In this case, the learned Judge to his
\ncost realised what George Bernard Shaw remarked on the assassination
\nof Mahatma Gandhi <\/p>\n
“It is dangerous to
\nbe too good.”\n<\/p>\n
(ii)\t\tIn I.T.C. Limited Vs.
\nDebts Recovery Appellate Tribunal & Ors., reported in (1998) 2
\nSCC 70, learned Senior Advocates have placed reliance on Para 12 and
\n13, which are as under:-\n<\/p>\n
12.\t\tThe first point here is
\nwhether the power to reject the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC can
\nbe exercised even after the framing of issues, and when the matter is
\nposted for evidence. This point has arisen because the Division Bench
\nof the High Court has referred to this aspect while dismissing the
\nappeal.\n<\/p>\n
13.\t\tWe may state that in
\nthe context of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, a contention that once issues
\nhave been framed, the matter has necessarily to go to trial has been
\nclearly rejected by this Court in Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi,<\/a> 1986
\nSupp. SCC 315 (SCC p.324) as follows : (SCC para 12)<\/p>\n
 In substance, the
\nargument is that the court must proceed with the trial, record and
\nevidence, and only after the trial … is concluded that the powers
\nunder the Code of Civil Procedure for dealing appropriately with the
\ndefective petition which does not disclose cause of action should be
\nexercised. With respect to the learned counsel, it is an argument
\nwhich is difficult to comprehend. The whole purpose of conferment of
\nsuch powers is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless and
\nbound to prove abortive should not be permitted to occupy the time of
\nthe court….\n<\/p>\n
\tThe abovesaid judgment
\nwhich related to an election petition is clearly applicable to suits
\nalso and was followed in Samar Singh v. Kedar Nath,<\/a> 1987 Supp. SCC\n<\/p>\n
663. We therefore hold that the fact that issues have been framed in
\nthe suit cannot come in the way of consideration of this application
\nfiled by the appellant under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC.\n<\/p>\n
(iii)\tRaj Narain Sarin &
\nOrs. Vs. Laxmi Devi & Ors., reported in (2002) 10 SCC 501 is
\ncited by the learned Senior Advocates in support of the submissions
\nthat if the plaint on perusal of it manifestly appears to be
\nvexatious or meritless in the sense of not disclosing a clear right
\nto sue, the Trial Court can exercise its power under Order 7 Rule 11
\nof the CPC.\n<\/p>\n
(iv)\t\tIn Sopan Sukhdeo Sable
\n& Ors. Vs. Assistant Charity Commissioner & Ors., reported in
\n(2004) 3 SCC 137, the Apex Court considered the nature and scope of
\nOrder 7 Rule 11 and held that Order 7 Rule 11 lays down an
\nindependent remedy made available to the defendant to challenge the
\nmaintainability of the suit itself, irrespective of his right to
\ncontest the same on merits. The law ostensibly does not contemplate
\nat any stage when the objections can be raised. The Trial Court can
\nexercise the power at any stage of the suit i.e. before registering
\nthe plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant at any time
\nbefore conclusion of the trial and also does not say in express terms
\nabout filing of a written statement for the purposes of deciding an
\napplication under clauses (a) and (d) of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code.
\nThe averments in the plaint are germane. The pleas taken by the
\ndefendants would be wholly irrelevant at that stage. Instead the word
\n shall  is used clearly implying thereby that Order 7 Rule 11
\ncasts a duty on the court to perform its obligations in rejecting the
\nplaint when the same is hit by any of the infirmities provided in
\nOrder 7 Rule 11 even without intervention of the defendant. The Apex
\nCourt further held that the basic question to be decided while
\ndealing with the application filed under Order 7 Rule 11(a) of the
\nCPC is whether a real cause of action has been set out in the plaint
\nor something purely illusory has been stated with a view to get
\naround Order 7 Rule 11. The Trial Court must remember that if on a
\nmeaningful and not formal reading of the plaint, it is manifestly
\nvexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing a clear right
\nto sue, it should exercise the power under Order 7 Rule 11(a) taking
\ncare to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled.\n<\/p>\n
(v)\t\tIn Lalitaben wd\/o
\nBaldevbhai Manibhai Suthar Vs. Niruben Ramanbhai Suthar & Anr.,
\nreported in 2007(1) GLH 403, the learned Single Judge of the High
\nCourt while considering Sections 6, 8 and 14 of Hindu Succession Act
\nheld as under:-\n<\/p>\n
 Before coming into force
\nof Hindu Succession Act, 1956, succession amongst Hindu was governed
\nby Sruti, Smruti and orthodox Hindu Law. Mansmruti was the source to
\nprovide that what would be the mode of succession. Mitakshara or
\nBanaras law, Daybhag or Bengal Hindu Law were also to govern the
\nsuccession. In Gujarat, succession could be governed by Mayukha
\nSchool of Hindu Law. In each of the laws, daughter or widow of the
\ndeceased was not entitled to succession to the property left by the
\nlast male holder, be he a Karta of Joint Hindu Family or owner in his
\npersonal capacity. Mayukh Hindu Law which governs a part of Gujarat,
\ntalks of the Matiarchiel family and right of the woman in property,
\nbut to appreciate that the parties are governed by Mayukh law and the
\ndaughter or female would be entitled to succeed to the property. Such
\nevidence is required to be brought on record by the person who claims
\nsuccession through her father.\n<\/p>\n
….It is trite to say that
\nsuccession never remains in abeyance and on the death of last holder
\nor the owner, it immediately opens and the property flows in favour
\nof those who are entitled to succeed to the property under the law
\ngoverning the field at the material time….\n<\/p>\n
\tA person who was offered
\nthe property towards the maintenance, if was in possession and
\ncontinued to be in possession till coming into force of the Hindu
\nSuccession Act, would become absolute owner of the property under S.
\n14 of the Hindu Succession Act. A person who simply had a right of
\nmaintenance, but was not given any property, would not be entitled to
\na partition of property after coming into force of the Hindu
\nSuccession Act, because, succession had already opened much before
\ncoming into force of the Hindu Succession Act. Hindu Succession Act,
\nin fact, conferred rights in favour of those who had no right in the
\nproperty, the Act did not revive the lost rights nor is retrospective
\nin operation. Hindu Succession Act was simple to crystallize and
\ncodify the Hindu Law relating to succession. For the first time under
\nthe codified law, right was conferred upon widow, daughter, widow of
\nthe predeceased son and other females, who, otherwise, had no right
\nin the property before coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act.\n<\/p>\n
….S.6 would govern the
\nfield of succession after coming into force of Hindu Succession Act
\nand would not reopen the subject which already came to an end.\n<\/p>\n
(vi)\t\tIn Smt. Bagirathi &
\nOrs. Vs. S. Manivanan & Anr., reported in AIR 2008 Madras 250, a
\nDivision Bench of Madras High Court considered the provisions of
\nSection 6 of Hindu Succession Act and held in Para 13, 14 and 15 as
\nunder:-\n<\/p>\n
 13.\t\tA careful reading of
\nSection 6(1) read with 6(3) of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act
\nclearly indicates that a daughter can be considered as a coparcener
\nonly if her father was a coparcener at the time of coming into force
\nof the amended provision. It is of course true that for the purpose
\nof considering whether the father is a coparcener or not, the
\nrestricted meaning of the expression  partition  as given in the
\nexplanation is to be attributed.\n<\/p>\n
14.\t\tIn the present case,
\nadmittedly the father of the present petitioners had expired in 1975.
\nSection 6(1) of the Act is prospective in the sense that a daughter
\nis being treated as coparcener on and from the commencement of the
\nHindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005. If such provision is read
\nalong with Section 6(3), it becomes clear that if a Hindu dies after
\ncommencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, his
\ninterest in the property shall devolve not by survivorship but by
\nintestate succession as contemplated in the Act.\n<\/p>\n
15.\t\tIn the present case,
\nthe death of the father having taken place in 1975, succession itself
\nopened in the year 1975 in accordance with the existing provisions
\ncontained in Section 6. If the contention of the petitioners is
\naccepted, it would amount to giving retrospective effect to the
\nprovisions of Section 6 as amended in 2005. On the death of the
\nfather in 1975, the property had already vested with Class-I heirs
\nincluding the daughters as contemplated in the unamended Section 6 of
\nthe Act. Even though the intention of the amended provision is to
\nconfer better rights on the daughters, it cannot be stretched to the
\nextent of holding that the succession which had opened prior to
\ncoming into force of the amended Act are also required to be
\nreopened. In this connection, we are also inclined to refer to the
\ndecision of M. Srinivasan, J., as His Lordship then was, reported in
\n1991(2) MLJ 199 (Sundarambal and others v. Deivanaayagam and others).
\nWhile interpreting almost a similar provision, as contained in
\nSection 29-A of the Hindu Succession Act, as introduced by the Tamil
\nNadu Amendment Act 1 of 1990, the learned Single Judge had made the
\nfollowing observations :-\n<\/p>\n
 14.\t\t… Under sub-clause
\n(1), the daughter of a coparcener shall become a coparcener in her
\nown right by birth, thus enabling all daughters of a coparcener who
\nwere born even prior to 25th March, 1989 to become
\ncoparceners. In other words, if a male Hindu has a daughter born on
\nany date prior to 25th March, 1989, she would also be a
\ncoparcener with him in the joint family when the Amendment came into
\nforce. But the necessary requisite is, the male Hindu should have
\nbeen alive on the date of the coming into force of the Amended Act.
\nThe section only makes a daughter a coparcener and not a sister. If a
\nmale Hindu had died before 25th March, 1989 leaving
\ncoparcenary property, then his daughter cannot claim to be a
\ncoparcener in the same manner as a son, as, on the date on which the
\nAct came into force, her father was not alive. She had the status
\nonly as a sister-a-vis her brother and not a daughter on the date of
\nthe coming into force of the Amendment Act. …\n<\/p>\n
(vii)\tIn Jageshwari Devi &
\nOrs. Vs. Shatrughan Ram, reported in (2007) 15 SCC 52, the Apex Court
\nconsidered the scope of Order 7 Rule 11(a) and held that
\nnon-disclosure of the cause of action is distinct from a defective
\ncause of action. The former falls but the latter does not fall within
\nthe scope of Order 7 Rule 11(a). The latter is to be decided during
\nthe trial of the suit and therefore, the contention which was raised
\nby the defendant that the disclosed cause of action was vague and
\nincomplete and therefore, it could not be a ground for rejection of
\nthe plaint.\n<\/p>\n
(viii)\tIn Ranjeet Mal Vs.
\nPoonam Chand & Anr., reported in AIR 1983 Rajasthan 1, the Hight
\nCourt has considered the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11(a) of the CPC
\nand held that while deciding the application under Order 7 Rule
\n11(a), the Court has to consider as to whether the plaint discloses
\nany cause of action or not and to find out from the allegations of
\nthe plaint itself as to whether it is bogus, wholly vexatious or
\nfrivolous litigation initiated under the garb of ingenious drafting
\nof the plaint and to guard against the mischief of a litigant
\nmisusing the process of the Court by entering into a false litigation
\nmerely for the purpose of harassing the other party and obtaining
\nundue advantage of the process of the Court by adopting tactics and
\nin starting sham and shady actions.\n<\/p>\n
(ix)\t\tIn Sukhpal Singh Vs.
\nState of Rajasthan and others, reported in AIR 1998 Rajasthan 103,
\nthe Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court while considering the provisions of
\nOrder 7 Rule 11 held in Para 25 as under:-\n<\/p>\n
25.\t\tIf in the light of the
\nabove, the instant case is examined, it is abundantly clear that if
\nthe facts stated, the grounds and allegations and the averments made
\ntherein are taken into consideration in totality, it is abundantly
\nclear in sum and substance that the respondent No.3   plaintiff has
\nmade a grievance that the Will, on the basis of which the present
\npetitioner   defendant has got the mutation, is void being a forged
\nand fabricated document as it had never been executed by their father
\nIshar Singh. If the Revenue Court comes to the conclusion that it was
\nnever executed by late (Shri) Ishwar Singh, it is not necessary for
\nthe Revenue Court to declare it a nullity as it can be simply ignored
\nand in that situation, by ignoring the said Will, the other reliefs
\nclaimed by the respondent No.3 plaintiff can be granted by the
\nRevenue Court as according to the averments in the plaint, neither
\nthe body nor mind of Shri Ishar Singh accompanied the alleged Will
\nand the said instrument, being non est, is just to be ignored.
\nMoreover, this petition has arisen only against an order passed on
\nthe application filed by the petitioner   defendant under Order 7,
\nRule 11, CPC and it is settled law that such an application cannot be
\nentertained and allowed where the validity of a particular document
\nis under challenge.\n<\/p>\n
(x)\t\tIn Purnmasi Yadav Vs.
\nNarbedeshwar Tripathi and others, reported in AIR 1998 Allahabad 260,
\nthe Hon’ble Allahabad High Court has observed in Para 5 as under :-\n<\/p>\n
 5.\t\tThe power under Order
\n7, Rule 11 speaks of rejection of plaint under four circumstances,
\nthe first one being non-disclosure of cause of action, and the last
\none is on a bar of suit under any provision of law. the other two
\ngrounds on which a plaint could be rejected relate to valuation and
\nnon-payment of Court fees, which are not matters concerned with the
\npresent case. For an order under Order 7, Rule 11, CPC it is the
\nplaint and the plaint alone which is to be considered and if the
\nplaint made out a case indicating a cause of action then the falsity
\nof the claim would be a matter to be determined at the trial and if
\nat all the suit was found to be vexatious or based on false
\nassertion, the plaintiff would be liable for compensatory costs under
\nS. 35-A, CPC. The judgment of the Supreme Court that was quoted by
\nthe Trial Judge also spoke that a meaningful reading of the plaint
\nwas necessary before rejecting a plaint under Order 7, Rule 11, CPC.\n<\/p>\n
(xi)\t\tIn Maharaj Shri
\nManvendrasinhji R. Jadeja Vs. Rajmata Vijaykunverba wd\/o Maharaja
\nMahendrasinhji, reported in 1999(1) GLR 261, the Hon’ble Division
\nBench of this Court considered the provisions and scope of Order 7
\nRule 11(a) of CPC and held in Para 14, 15 and 16 as under:-\n<\/p>\n
  14.\t\tHaving  noticed  brief  summary of the plaint and prayers earlier, it would be relevant  to  refer  to  the provisions  of  Order 7, R.11(a) of the CPC and the scope thereof. Order 7, R.11(a) of the CPC provides that the plaint  shall  be  rejected in case  where  it does not disclose a cause of action.  Order 7, R.11(a) of the  CPC is  mandatory and if it is found that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, the Court has no option  but to reject  the  plaint. To  find out whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not, the Court has to look only to the averments made in the plaint.  When a  plaint is  based  on  a document filed along with the plaint, it can, however, be considered to  ascertain if plaint discloses any cause of action. Cause of action means every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to  prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to judgment. The words “cause of  action” mean the whole bundle of  material  facts which are necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to entitle him to the reliefs claimed in the suit. What is to be done by the Court  at the stage of deciding as to whether the plaint discloses any cause of action or not is to find out from the allegation of the plaint itself as to whether a bogus, wholly vexatious or frivolous litigation is sought to be initiated under the garb of ingenuous drafting of the plaint or not because it is the  duty  of  the  Court  to guard against the mischief of a litigant misusing the process of court by entering into a false litigation merely  for  the purpose of harassing the other party and to nip in the bud the litigation which is sham and shabby in character. In order to find out  whether  the  plaint discloses a cause of action or not, the averments made in the plaint and documents annexed thereto should be scrutinised meaningfully and if on such scrutiny it is found that the plaint does not disclose cause of action, it has got to be rejected in view of the provisions of Order 7, R.11(a) of the CPC.  When it is said that the Court should take into consideration the  averments  made in the plaint for the purpose of deciding the question whether the averments made in the plaint disclose cause of action or not, it  does not mean that the Court is precluded from applying the statutory provisions or case-law to the averments made in the plaint. If an assertion made in the plaint is contrary to statutory law or case-law, it cannot be considered as disclosing cause of action. In ITC  Ltd. (supra), bank had filed suit against the appellant and others and claimed relief for a sum of Rs.52,59,639-66 ps. After the suit was filed, it was transferred to the Debt Recovery Tribunal. Before the Tribunal, an application was filed by the appellant under Order 7, R.11 of the CPC for rejecting the plaint, so far as appellant was concerned, on the ground that no valid cause of action had been  shown against the appellant. That application was rejected by the Tribunal. Against the said order, an appeal was filed before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal. The appeal was dismissed in limine. Thereupon a writ  petition  was filed  by the appellant, which was dismissed holding that the question should be decided at  the  trial. Against that  judgment, the appellant had filed an appeal before the Division Bench of the High  Court,  which  was  also dismissed. The matter was thereafter carried before the Supreme Court. After  taking into consideration the decided  cases  on the point whether there was fraudulent movement of  goods  under  which  letter  of  credit  was obtained  which  in  turn  entitled  the bank to file the suit, the Supreme Court held that that point was  already decided by decision of  the  Supreme  Court  in  U.P. Co-operative Federation’s case and therefore, the allegation  of  non-supply of goods by the sellers to the buyers did not by itself amount, in law,  to  a  plea  of “fraud” as understood in this branch of the law and hence by merely characterising alleged non-movement of goods as “fraud”,  the  bank  was not entitled to claim that there was a cause of action based on fraud    or misrepresentation. While allowing the appeal, what is emphasised by the Supreme  Court  is  that  the  question whether  a  real  cause of action has been set out in the plaint or something purely illusory has been stated  with a  view  to get out of Order 7, R.11 of the CPC has to be decided with reference to averments made in the plaint and clever drafting creating illusions of cause of action are  not permitted in law and a clear right to sue should be shown in the plaint. In view of this decision of the Supreme Court, it is evident that if something purely illusory has been stated with a view to get out of  Order 7, R.11  of  the CPC by resorting to clever drafting, it cannot be said that  the  plaint  discloses  a  cause  of action  and  if  a clear right to sue is not shown in the plaint, it is liable to be rejected.\n<\/p>\n
15.\t\tIn the light of scope of Order 7, R.11(a) of the CPC, we would   now proceed to examine different submissions made on behalf of the appellant. The submission that the plaint was presented on December 26,1978, whereas issues for determination were framed by the learned Judge on July  21, 1981 and therefore the application  filed by the respondent under Order 7, R.11(a) of the CPC on June 26, 1996 should not have been entertained at such a long  distance  of time, has no substance. As noted earlier, the provisions of Order  7, R.11(a)  of  the Code of Civil Procedure are mandatory in nature.  It is the duty of the Court to reject the plaint which does not disclose cause of action.  If a plaint can be rejected at threshold of the proceedings, we do not see any reason as to why it cannot be  rejected at any subsequent stage of the proceedings. Even if after framing  of  issues,  the  basic  defect  in  the  plaint persists,  namely,  absence  of  cause  of  action, it is always open to the contesting defendants to insist that the plaint be rejected under Order 7, R.11 of the CPC and the  Court  would  be  acting  within its jurisdiction in considering such a plea. Order 7, R.11 of the  CPC  does not place  any restriction or limitation on the exercise of the court’s power.  It does not either expressly or by necessary implication provide that power under Order 7, R.11 of the CPC should be exercised at a particular stage only. In the view we are taking, we are fortified by the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of ITC Ltd. (supra). Therein, the suit was filed by the Bank in the year 1985. In 1995, it was  transferred  to  Debt Recovery Tribunal and thereafter an application was filed by the appellant under the provisions of Order 7, R.11 of the CPC for rejection of the plaint as not disclosing any cause of action against the appellant.  The application filed by the appellant was rejected not only by the Tribunal and Appellate Tribunal, but also by the High Court. When the matter reached before the Supreme Court in the year 1997, it was contended that the power under Order 7, R.11 of the CPC should not  be exercised after such  a long lapse of time, more particularly when issues were framed.  That plea has been negatived by the Supreme Court in following terms:-\n<\/p>\n
“13.\t\tWe may state that in the context of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, a contention that once issues have been framed, the matter has necessarily to go to trial has been clearly rejected by this Court in Azhar  Hussain  v.  Rajiv Gandhi (SCC<\/a> p.324) as follows: (SCC para 12)<\/p>\n
       “In substance, the argument is that the Court must proceed with the trial, record the evidence, and only after the trial…is concluded that the powers under the Code of Civil Procedure for dealing appropriately with the defective petition which does not disclose cause of action should be exercised. With respect to the learned  counsel, it is  an argument which is difficult to comprehend. The whole purpose of conferment of such powers is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless and bound to prove abortive should not be  permitted to  occupy the time of the Court…”\n<\/p>\n
\tThe abovesaid judgment which  related to an election petition is clearly applicable to suits also and  was followed in Samar Singh v. Kedar Nath. We the<\/a>refore hold that the  fact that issues have been framed in the suit cannot come in the way of consideration of this application filed by the appellant under  Order 7 Rule 11 CPC.”\n<\/p>\n
16.\t\tIn view of settled legal position, plea that powers under Order 7, R.11(a) of the CPC should not have been exercised after framing of issue cannot be upheld and is hereby rejected.\n<\/p>\n
\t\tThus,
\nit is submitted by the learned Senior Advocates that considering the
\nratio laid down in the above-mentioned judgments, the Revision
\nApplication deserves to be allowed and the order passed by the Trial
\nCourt be set aside.\n<\/p>\n
5.\t\tMr
\nAmit V Thakkar, learned advocate for the opponents has placed
\nreliance on the following judgments. They are as under :-\n<\/p>\n
(i)\tLiverpool & London
\nS.P. & I Asson. Ltd. Vs. M.V. Sea Success I & Anr., reported
\nin JT 2003(9) SC 218.\n<\/p>\n
(ii)\tBritish Airways Vs. Art
\nWorks Export Ltd. & Ors., reported in AIR 1986 Calcutta 120.\n<\/p>\n
(iii)\tState of Orissa Vs.
\nKlockner and Company & Ors., reported in AIR 1996 SC 2140.\n<\/p>\n
(iv)\tPrem Lala Nahata &
\nAnr. Vs. Chandi Prasad Sikaria, reported in AIR 2007 SC 1247.\n<\/p>\n
(v)\tKamala & Ors. Vs.
\nK.T. Eshwara Sa & Ors., reported in AIR 2008 SC 3174.\n<\/p>\n
(vi)\tSalem Advocate Bar
\nAssociation, Tamil Nadu Vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 2003 SC\n<\/p>\n
189. <\/p>\n
(vii)\tVidya Devi alias Vidya
\nVati Vs. Prem Prakash & Ors., reported in AIR 1995 SC 1789.\n<\/p>\n
(viii)\tVirender Nath Gautam
\nVs. Satpal Singh & Ors., reported in (2007) 3 SCC 617.\n<\/p>\n
(i)\t\tIn
\nLiverpool & London S.P. & I Asson. Ltd. Vs. M.V. Sea Success
\nI & Anr., reported in JT 2003(9) SC 218, the Apex Court
\nconsidered the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11(a) of the CPC and held
\nas under :-\n<\/p>\n
 It may be true that Order
\n7 Rule 11(a) although authorises the court to reject a plaint on
\nfailure on the part of the plaintiff to disclose a cause of action
\nbut the same would not mean that the averments made therein or a
\ndocument upon which reliance has been placed although discloses a
\ncause of action, the plaint would be rejected on the ground that such
\naverments are not sufficient to prove the facts stated therein for
\nthe purpose of obtaining reliefs claimed in the suit. The approach
\nadopted by the High Court, in this behalf, in our opinion, is not
\ncorrect. (Para 145)<\/p>\n
\tIn ascertaining whether the
\nplaint shows a cause of action, the court is not required to make an
\nelaborate enquiry into doubtful or complicated questions of law or
\nfact. By the statute the jurisdiction of the court is restricted to
\nascertaining whether on the allegations a cause of action is shown.
\n(Para 150) <\/p>\n
\tThe approach of the High
\nCourt, in our considered opinion, is not correct. For the purpose of
\nrejecting a plaint, it is not necessary to consider whether the
\naverments made in the plaint prove the factum that the defendant no.1
\n Sea Success-I  is a sister ship of  Sea Glory  and  Sea
\nRanger  or the said two ships are beneficially owned by the
\ndefendant no.2. The reasons which have been assigned in support of
\nthe said aforementioned finding that the ship is a valuable
\ncommercial chattel and her arrest undeservingly prejudices third
\nparties as well as affect the interest of owner and others is a
\nquestion which must be gone into when passing a final order as regard
\ninterim arrest of ship or otherwise. For the aforementioned purpose
\nthe vessel herein could file an application for vacation of stay.
\nWhile considering such an application, the court was entitled to
\nconsider not only a prima facie case but also the elements of balance
\nof convenience and irreparable injury involved in the matter. In such
\na situation and particularly when both the parties disclose their
\ndocuments which are in their possession, the court would be in a
\nposition to ascertain even prima facie as to whether the club has
\nbeen able to make out that  Sea Glory  and  Sea Ranger  are
\nsister vessels of the  vessel . (Para 153) <\/p>\n
\tThe reason for the
\naforementioned conclusion is that if a legal question is raised by
\nthe defendant in the written statement, it does not mean that the
\nsame has to be decided only by way of an application under Order 7
\nRule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure which may amount to
\npre-judging the matter. (Para 154) <\/p>\n
\tFurthermore, the question
\nas to whether the asset of a 100% subsidy can be treated as an asset
\nof the parent company would again depend upon the fact situation of
\neach case. (Para 155)  <\/p>\n
(ii)\t\tIn British Airways Vs.
\nArt Works Export Ltd. & Ors., reported in AIR 1986 Calcutta 120,
\nThe Hon’ble Calcutta High Court considered the provisions of Order 7
\nRule 11(a) of the CPC and held in Para 12 and 13 as under :-\n<\/p>\n
 12.\t\tWe are unable to
\naccept the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner.
\nUnder Cl. (a) of O.7, R.11, the plaint shall be rejected where it
\ndoes not disclose a cause of action. The plea of the petitioner that
\nthere is no cause of action for the suit is not same as to say the
\nplaint does not disclose any cause of action, which is a ground for
\nthe rejection of the plaint. Indeed, the plaint discloses a cause of
\naction. The correctness or otherwise of the allegations constituting
\nthe cause of action is beyond the purview of Cl.(a) of O.7, R.11. It
\nis not the case of the defendant petitioner that the plaint does not
\ndisclose a cause of action but, as stated already, its case is that
\nthere is no cause of action for the suit which is not a ground for
\nrejection of plaint under O.7, R.11 of the Civil P.C. This view finds
\nsupport from a Bench decision of the Assam High Court in Santi Ranjan
\nDas Gupta v. Dasuram Mirzamal, AIR<\/a> 1957 Assam 49, where it has been
\nlaid down that a plea that there was no cause of action for the suit
\nis something different from saying that the plaint itself did not
\ndisclose any cause of action. There is, therefore, no substance in
\nthe contention made in the instant case on behalf of the petitioner
\nthat the learned Judge should have rejected the plaint on the ground
\nthat there is no subsisting cause of action for the suit.\n<\/p>\n
13.\t\tThe second ground that
\nhas been urged on behalf of the petitioner is that the suit is barred
\nby the provision of Art. 30(1) of the Second Schedule to the Act. It
\nis submitted that in view of Art. 30(1), the right of the plaintiff
\nopposite party No.1 to sue for damages stood extinguished on the date
\nthe suit was filed. On the other hand, it is submitted by Mr.
\nChatterjee, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff
\nopposite party No.1 that in view of Art.30(2) of the Second Schedule
\nto the Act, the right of the plaintiff to sue the defendant
\npetitioner for damages was, prima facie, subsisting on the date the
\nsuit was filed. In other words, it is submitted that as under Art.
\n30(2), the method of calculating the period of limitation shall be
\ndetermined by the law of the Court seized of the case, the provision
\nof the Limitation Act, 1963 will apply for the purpose of computing
\nthe period of two years mentioned in Art.30(1). In our opinion, in
\nview of the provision of Art.30(2), it requires some consideration
\nwhether the suit is barred by Art. 30(1) or not. It may be stated
\nhere that in the plaint the plaintiff opposite party No.1 has pleaded
\nacknowledgment by the defendant petitioner of its liability, and that
\nthe period of two years referred to in Art.30(1) should be computed
\nafter taking into consideration such acknowledgment. It is,
\ntherefore, difficult to say at this stage whether the suit is barred
\nby the provision of Art. 30(1) or not. Where on the face of the
\nplaint a suit appears to be barred by any law, the Court shall
\ndismiss the suit. But where it does not so appear, but requires
\nfurther consideration or, in other words, if there be any doubt or if
\nthe Court is not sure and certain that the suit is barred by some
\nlaw, the Court cannot reject the plaint under Cl.(d) of O.7, R.11 of
\nthe Civil P.C. Both the grounds as embodied in Cls.(a) and (d) of
\nO.7, R.11 must appear on the face of the plaint. In the instant case,
\nhowever, it cannot be said that the plea of the defendant petitioner
\nthat the suit is barred by the provision of Art.30(1) of the Second
\nSchedule to the Act appears on the face of the plaint in view of Art.
\n30(1) read with Art. 30(2) of the Second Schedule to the Act.\n<\/p>\n
(iii)\tIn State of Orissa Vs.
\nKlockner and Company & Ors., reported in AIR 1996 SC 2140, the
\nApex Court considered the scope of Order 7 Rule 11(a) and (d) and
\nheld in Para 24 as under :-\n<\/p>\n
 24.\t\tNow coming to
\nSpecial Leave Petition (C) No. 19846\/95, this petition is filed
\nagainst the judgment and order of the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack
\nin First Appeal No. 14\/95 dated 12-5-1995. By the Order under appeal,
\nthe High Court has reversed the Order of the learned Subordinate
\nJudge. Bhubaneswar dated 26-3-94, by which the learned Subordinate
\nJudge accepting an application filed under Order 7, Rule 11, C.P.C.
\nrejected the plaint in title suit No. 231\/92 filed by the first
\nrespondent in Special Leave Petition. The learned single Judge of the
\nHigh Court while reversing the Order of the learned Subordinate Judge
\nobserved as follows :-\n<\/p>\n
“In the present case on
\na fair reading of the petition filed by the defendant No.1 under
\nOrder 7, Rule 11 of C.P.C. it is clear that the case of the applicant
\nis that the plaintiff has no cause of action to file the suit. It is
\nnot specifically pleaded by the applicant that the plaint does not
\ndisclose any cause of action. The learned trial Judge has also not
\nrecorded any specified finding to this effect. From the discussions
\nin the order it appears that the learned trial Judge has not
\nmaintained the distinction between the plea that there was no cause
\nof action for the suit and the plea that the plaint does not disclose
\na cause of action. No specific reason for ground is stated in the
\norder in support of the finding that the plaint is to be rejected
\nunder 0.7, R.11(a). From the averments in the plaint, it is clear
\nthat the plaintiff has pleaded a cause of action for filing the suit
\nseeking the reliefs stated in it. That is not to say that the
\nplaintiff has cause of action to file the suit for the reliefs sought
\nthat question is to be determined on the basis of materials (other
\nthan the plaint) which may be produced by the parties at appropriate
\nstage in the suit. For the limited purpose of determining the
\nquestion whether the suit is to be wiped out under Order 7, Rule
\n11(1) or not the averments in the plaint are only to be looked into.
\nThe position noted above is also clear from the petition filed by
\ndefendant No. 1 under Order 7, Rule 11 in which the thrust of the
\ncase pleaded is that on the stipulation in the agreement of 20-4-82
\nthe plaintiff is not entitled to file a suit seeking any of the
\nreliefs stated in the plaint.\n<\/p>\n
10.\t\tComing to the question
\nwhether the plaint is to be rejected under Clause (d) of Rule 11 of
\nOrder 7, the Supreme Court in the case of Orient Transport Co. (AIR
\n1987 SC 2289) (supra) has clearly laid down that there is a
\ndistinction between a case in which the validity, effect and
\nexistence of the arbitration agreement is challenged and suit in
\nwhich the validity of the contract which contains an arbitration
\nclause is challenged. The bar to suit under Section 32 of the
\nArbitration Act extends to a case where the existence, effect or
\nvalidity of an arbitration agreement is challenged and not to the
\nlatter type of the suit. On this question too the learned trial Judge
\nhas failed to maintain the distinction between the two types of
\ncases. He has failed to notice that the case pleaded by the plaintiff
\nis that the entire agreement including the arbitration clause is null
\nand void and unenforceable and not that the arbitration agreement is
\nnull and void.\n<\/p>\n
11.\t\tFrom the lower Court
\nrecord in the case and also the records in a similar suit filed by
\nthe State of Orissa. Title Suit No. 152 of 1993 in which O.M.C. Ltd.
\nis a defendant, it appears that in both the cases the defendant No.1\n<\/p>\n
– Klockner and Co. filed applications under Section 3 of the Foreign
\nAwards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961. Such application
\npresupposes that the applicant accepts the position that the said
\napplies to the case and the Arbitration Act, 1940 has no application
\nto the case. Under the Foreign Awards Act, there is no specific
\nprovision for bar of suit. Further, from the averments in the
\napplication filed under Order 7, Rule 11 of C.P.C. it is clear that
\nthe main case pleaded by the applicant was that the parties had
\nagreed that the Swiss Law will be applicable to the contract as well
\nas the arbitration agreement and the venue of arbitration will be at
\nLondon and, therefore, the Indian Law in general and the arbitration
\nAct in particular, have no application to the case. Alternatively the
\napplicant has pleaded that even assuming that the Indian Law of
\nArbitration applies to the case then the suit is barred under Section
\n32 of the Act. The learned trial Judge does not appear to have
\nconsidered the main case pleaded by the applicant but disposed the
\npetition on consideration of the alternative case pleaded by it.
\nTherefore this finding against bar of the suit under Order 7, Rule 11\n<\/p>\n
(d) is also vitiated.\n<\/p>\n
12.\t\tOn the analysis and
\ndiscussions in the foregoing paragraphs, it is my considered view
\nthat the order passed by the learned trial Judge rejecting the plaint
\nunder Order 7, Rule 11 (a) and (d) of C.P.C. is unsustainable and has
\nto be set aside. Accordingly the appeal is allowed and the order
\ndated 26-3-1994 of the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bhubaneswar in
\nMisc. Case No. 75 of 1993 is set aside. There will be no order for
\ncosts of this Court.\n<\/p>\n
\tAfter hearing the learned
\ncounsel on both sides and after carefully perusing the relevant
\npleadings, we do think that the High Court has committed any error in
\nrejecting the application of the appellant under Order 7, Rule 11. We
\naccept the view taken by the High Court and consequently find no case
\nfor interference.\n<\/p>\n
\tIn the result all the Civil
\nAppeals are dismissed with costs and Special Leave petition is
\ndismissed without costs.\n<\/p>\n
(iv)\t\tIn Prem Lala Nahata &
\nAnr. Vs. Chandi Prasad Sikaria, reported in AIR 2007 SC 1247, the
\nApex Court while considering the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11(d)
\nheld in Para 14 and 15 as under:-\n<\/p>\n
 14.\t\tOrder VII, Rule 11\n<\/p>\n
(d) speaks of the suit being “barred by any law”. According
\nto the Black’s Law Dictionary, bar means, a plea arresting a law suit
\nor legal claim. It means as a verb, to prevent by legal objection.
\nAccording to Ramanatha Aiyar’s Law Lexicon, ‘bar’ is that which
\nobstructs entry or egress; to exclude from consideration. It is
\ntherefore necessary to see whether a suit bad for misjoinder of
\nparties or of causes of action is excluded from consideration or is
\nbarred entry for adjudication. As pointed out already, on the scheme
\nof the Code, there is no such prohibition or a prevention at the
\nentry of a suit defective for misjoinder of parties or of causes of
\naction. The court is still competent to try and decide the suit,
\nthough the court may also be competent to tell the plaintiffs either
\nto elect to proceed at the instance of one of the plaintiffs or to
\nproceed with one of the causes of action. On the scheme of the Code
\nof Civil Procedure, it cannot therefore be held that a suit barred
\nfor misjoinder of parties or of causes of action is barred by a law,
\nhere the Code. This may be contrasted with the failure to comply with
\nSection 80 of the Code. In a case not covered by sub-section (2) of
\nSection 80, it is provided in sub-section (1) of Section 80 that “no
\nsuit shall be instituted”. This is therefore a bar to the
\ninstitution of the suit and that is why courts have taken the view
\nthat in a case where notice under Section 80 of the Code is
\nmandatory, if the averments in the plaint indicate the absence of a
\nnotice, the plaint is liable to be rejected. For, in that case, the
\nentertaining of the suit would be barred by Section 80 of the Code.
\nThe same would be the position when a suit hit by Section 86 of the
\nCode is filed without pleading the obtaining of consent of the
\nCentral Government if the suit is not for rent from a tenant. Not
\nonly are there no words of such import in Order I or Order II but on
\nthe other hand, Rule 9 of Order I, Rules 1 and 3 of Order I, and
\nRules 3 and 6 of Order II clearly suggest that it is open to the
\ncourt to proceed with the suit notwithstanding the defect of
\nmisjoinder of parties or misjoinder of causes of action and if the
\nsuit results in a decision, the same could not be set aside in
\nappeal, merely on that ground, in view of Section 99 of the Code,
\nunless the conditions of Section 99 are satisfied. Therefore, by no
\nstretch of imagination, can a suit bad for misjoinder of parties or
\nmisjoinder of causes of action be held to be barred by any law within
\nthe meaning of Order VII, Rule 11(d) of the Code.\n<\/p>\n
15.\t\tThus, when one
\nconsiders Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code with particular reference to
\nClause (d), it is difficult to say that a suit which is bad for
\nmisjoinder of parties or misjoinder of causes of action, is a suit
\nbarred by any law. A procedural objection to the impleading of
\nparties or to the joinder of causes of action or the frame of the
\nsuit, could be successfully urged only as a procedural objection
\nwhich may enable the Court either to permit the continuance of the
\nsuit as it is or to direct the plaintiff or plaintiffs to elect to
\nproceed with a part of the suit or even to try the causes of action
\njoined in the suit as separate suits.\n<\/p>\n
(v)\t\tIn
\nKamala & Ors. Vs. K.T. Eshwara Sa & Ors., reported in AIR
\n2008 SC 3174, the Apex Court while considering the provisions of
\nOrder 7 Rule 11(d) as well as (a) and held in Para 15, 16 and 23 as
\nunder :-\n<\/p>\n
15.\t\tOrder VII, Rule 11(d)
\nof the Code has limited application. It must be shown that the suit
\nis barred under any law. Such a conclusion must be drawn from the
\naverments made in the plaint. Different clauses in Order VII, Rule
\n11, in our opinion, should not be mixed up. Whereas in a given case,
\nan application for rejection of the plaint may be filed on more than
\none ground specified in various sub-clauses thereof, a clear finding
\nto that effect must be arrived at. What would be relevant for
\ninvoking clause (d) of Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code is the
\naverments made in the plaint. For that purpose, there cannot be any
\naddition or sub traction. Absence of jurisdiction on the part of a
\ncourt can be invoked at different stages and under different
\nprovisions of the Code. Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code is one, Order
\nXIV, Rule 2 is another.\n<\/p>\n
16.\t\tFor the purpose of
\ninvoking Order VII, Rule 11(d) of the Code, no amount of evidence can
\nbe looked into. The issues on merit of the matter which may arise
\nbetween the parties would not be within the realm of the court at
\nthat stage. All issues shall not be the subject-matter of an order
\nunder the said provision.\n<\/p>\n
\t\tThe principles of res
\njudicata, when attracted, would bar another suit in view of Section
\n12 of the Code. The question involving a mixed question of law and
\nfact which may require not only examination of the plaint but also
\nother evidence and the order passed in the earlier suit may be taken
\nup either as a preliminary issue or at the final hearing, but, the
\nsaid question cannot be determined at that stage.\n<\/p>\n
\t\tIt is one thing to say
\nthat the averments made in the plaint on their face discloses no
\ncause of action, but it is another thing to say that although the
\nsame discloses a cause of action, the same is barred by a law.\n<\/p>\n
\t\tThe decisions rendered by
\nthis Court as also by various High Courts are not uniform in this
\nbehalf. But, then the broad principle which can be culled out
\ntherefrom is that the court at that stage would not consider any
\nevidence or enter into a disputed question of fact of law. In the
\nevent, the jurisdiction of the court is found to be barred by any
\nlaw, meaning thereby, the subject-matter thereof, the application for
\nregistration of plaint should be entertained.\n<\/p>\n
23.\t\tOne of the grounds
\ntaken in the counter-affidavit of the respondent Nos. 10, 11, 13 and
\n17 under Order VII, Rule 11(d) of the Code is as under :\n<\/p>\n
“16. So far as item No.
\n8 of the Schedule-A, the subsequent purchases have made flats and 80%
\nhave been sold to third party and the third-party interest have been
\ncreated and third parties are not made parties before the Court.
\nHence, the suit is bad in law for misjoinder and non-joinder of
\nnecessary parties. Moreover, third party’s interest has been created
\nand separate khatas have been issued.”\n<\/p>\n
(vi)\t\tIn Salem Advocate Bar
\nAssociation, Tamil Nadu Vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 2003 SC
\n189, the Apex Court while considering the provisions of Order 7 Rule
\n11(e) and (f) held in Para 16 as under :-\n<\/p>\n
 16.\t\tOur attention has
\nbeen drawn to Order 7, Rule 11 to which clauses (e) and (f) have been
\nadded which enable the Court to reject the plaint where it is not
\nfiled in duplicate or where the plaintiff fails to comply with the
\nprovisions of Rule 9 of Order 7. It appears to us that the said
\nclauses being procedural would not require the automatic rejection of
\nthe plaint at the first instance. If there is any defect as
\ncontemplated by Rule 11(e) or non-compliance as referred to in Rule
\n11(f), the Court should ordinarily give an opportunity for rectifying
\nthe defects, and in the event of the same not being done the Court
\nwill have the liberty or the right to reject the plaint.\n<\/p>\n
(vii)\tIn
\nVidya Devi alias Vidya Vati Vs. Prem Prakash & Ors., reported in
\nAIR 1995 SC 1789, the Apex Court considered Section 186 of the Delhi
\nLand Reforms Act and Sections 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act and
\nheld in Para 21 and 22 as under:-\n<\/p>\n
 21.\t\tThe legislature has
\nnot prescribed any period of limitation for filing a suit for
\npartition because  partition is an incident attached to the property
\nand there is always a running cause of action for seeking partition
\nby one of the co-sharers if and when he decides not to keep his share
\njoint with other co-sharers. Since the filing of the suit is wholly
\ndependent upon the will of the co-sharer, the period of limitation,
\nspecially the date or time from which such period would commence,
\ncould not have been possibly provided for by the legislature and,
\ntherefore, in this Act also a period of limitation, so far as suits
\nfor partition are concerned, has not been prescribed. This, however,
\ndoes not mean that a co-sharer who is arrayed as a defendant in the
\nsuit cannot raise the plea of adverse possession against the
\nco-sharer who has come before the Court as a plaintiff seeking
\npartition of his share in the joint  property.\n<\/p>\n
22.\t\tNormally, where the
\nproperty is joint, co-sharers are the representatives of each
\nanother. The co-sharer who might be in possession  of  the joint
\nproperty shall be deemed to  be in possession on behalf of all the
\nco-sharers. As such, it would be difficult to raise the plea of
\nadverse possession by one co-sharer against the other. But if the
\nco-sharer or the joint owner had been professing hostile title as
\nagainst other co-sharers openly and to the knowledge of other joint
\nowners, he can, provided the hostile title or possession has
\ncontinued uninterruptedly for the whole period prescribed for
\nrecovery of possession, legitimately acquire title by adverse
\npossession and can plead such title in defence to claim for
\npartition.\n<\/p>\n
“Adverse possession”\n<\/p>\n
means hostile possession, that is, a possession which is expressly in
\ndenial of the title of the true owner. (See Gaya Parshad Dikshit v.
\nNirmal Chander, AIR<\/a> 1984 SC 930). The denial of title of the true
\nowner is a sign of adverse possession. In Ezaz Ali v. Special
\nManager, Court of Wards, AIR 1935 PC (at p.56), it was observed:\n<\/p>\n
“The principle of law
\nis firmly established that a person, who bases his title on adverse
\npossession, must show by clear and unequivocal evidence that his
\npossession was hostile to the real owner and amounted to a denial of
\nhis title to the property claimed.”\n<\/p>\n
(viii)\tIn
\nVirender Nath Gautam Vs. Satpal Singh & Ors., reported in (2007)
\n3 SCC 617, the Apex Court observed in Para 51 and 52 as under :-\n<\/p>\n
 51.\t\tIn our considered
\nopinion, material facts which are required to be pleaded in the
\nelection petition as required by Section 83(1) of the Act read with
\nOrder 7 Rule 11(a) of the Code have been pleaded by the election
\npetitioner, cause of action has been disclosed in the election
\npetition and, hence, the petition could not have been dismissed by
\nthe High Court. The impugned order of the High Court suffers from
\ninfirmity and cannot be sustained.\n<\/p>\n
52.\t\tThe High Court, in our
\nconsidered opinion, stepped into prohibited area of considering
\ncorrectness of allegations and evidence in support of averments by
\nentering into the merits of the case which would be permissible only
\nat the stage of trial of the election petition and not at the stage
\nof consideration whether the election petition was maintainable and
\ndismissed the petition.\n<\/p>\n
The said action, therefore,
\ncannot be upheld and the order deserves to be set aside.\n<\/p>\n
6.\t\tMr
\nAmit V Thakkar, learned advocate for the opponents submitted that the
\nlearned Trial Judge has not committed any error which would call for
\ninterference in the Revision Application preferred under Section 115
\nof the Code. The learned Trial Judge has rightly passed the order
\nbelow application Exh.47 and directed that proper Court fee in view
\nof the prayer under Order 7 Rule 11(b) and (c) is required to be
\ncarried out within a period of 15 days and the same was considered at
\nlength by the learned Judge. While passing the aforesaid order, the
\nlearned Trial Judge has considered in an exhaustive manner all the
\ncontentions taken up by both the parties and there is no infirmity or
\nillegality in the order passed by the learned Trial Judge which would
\ncall for interference while exercising the powers under Section 115
\nof the Code. Even the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11(a) and (d) as
\ncontended by the applicants cannot be attracted in the facts and
\ncircumstances of the present case and therefore, the learned Judge
\nhas rightly rejected the application for rejection of plaint as
\nprovided under Order 7 Rule 11(a) and (d) of the Code and as no
\ninfirmity or illegality is caused by the learned Judge while passing
\nthe order below application Exh.47, the Revision Application deserves
\nto be rejected as it is devoid of merits.\n<\/p>\n
7.\t\tI
\nhave heard Mr Mihir
\nThakore and Mr PC Kavina, learned Senior Advocates with Mr AB Munshi
\nfor the applicants   original defendants and Mr Amit V Thakkar,
\nlearned advocate for the opponents   original plaintiffs. I have
\nalso considered the judgments cited by the learned counsel of both
\nthe sides and there is no dispute about the ratio or proposition laid
\ndown in those judgments. The order passed below Exh.47 in Regular
\nCivil Suit No.397 of 2007 by the learned 7th
\nAdditional Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Surat dated 2.2.2009 is also
\ntaken into consideration by me.\n<\/p>\n
8.\t\tThe
\noriginal plaintiffs filed the suit for declaration and injunction
\nagainst the defendants, wherein the application was given by the
\npresent applicants   original defendants under Order 7 Rule 11(a),\n<\/p>\n
(b) and (d) of the Code. Order 7 Rule 11(a), (b) and (d) of the Code
\nis reproduced hereinbelow :-\n<\/p>\n
 (a)\t\twhere
\nit does not disclose a cause of action;\n<\/p>\n
(b)\t\twhere
\nthe relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being
\nrequired by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be
\nfixed by the Court, fails to do so;\n<\/p>\n
(d)\t\twhere
\nthe suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any
\nlaw:\n<\/p>\n
\t\tProvided
\nthat the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation
\nor supplying of the requisite stamp-papers shall not be extended
\nunless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the
\nplaintiff was prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature from
\ncorrecting the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp-papers, as
\nthe case may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal
\nto extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.\n<\/p>\n
9.\t\tThe
\nlearned Judge has considered the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11(a),\n<\/p>\n
(c) and (d) and held that on perusal of Order 7 Rule 11(a) if the
\nsuit does not disclose a cause of action then it is liable to be
\nrejected. On perusal of Para 8 of the suit, the plaintiffs have
\ndisclosed the fact as to when the cause of action had arisen and as
\nper the say of the plaintiffs, the cause of action took place in
\nAugust 2007 when the defendants made an attempt to frustrate the
\nright of the plaintiffs in the suit lands. The plaintiffs came to
\nknow about the aforesaid fact in August 2007. The defendants also
\nmade an attempt to dispose of the land or alienate the land by sale.
\nThe Court took into consideration the averments made in Para 8 of the
\nplaint and held that the cause of action had arisen in August 2007
\nand on perusal of the sale deed, it becomes clear and therefore, the
\nCourt came to the conclusion that there is no breach of Order 7 Rule
\n11(a) of the Code. It is also contended by the defendants that
\nMaganbhai Bhagubhai Patel expired
\non 12.3.1955 and at that time, Hindu Succession Act was not in force.
\nIt came into force on 17.6.1956 and prior to 17.6.1956, Hindu law was
\nin force by which the daughters were not given any share in the
\nproperty of their father. In view of the above-mentioned facts,
\nShantiben had no right in the property of her father. The Court took
\ninto consideration Articles 218, 220, 213, 223(a)(4) and 230(6). The
\nsuit filed by the plaintiffs cannot be rejected under the provisions
\nof Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code as contended in the application.
\nConsidering the submissions canvassed by both the sides, the learned
\nJudge held how the property in question of the deceased Maganbhai
\nBhagubhai Patel came into inheritance and how the entries were made
\nin the revenue record is a matter of evidence and therefore, an
\nopportunity is required to be given to the plaintiffs and therefore,
\nat the outset, the application cannot be rejected under Order 7 Rule
\n11(d) of the Code and the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11(d) cannot be
\nmade applicable. With
\nregard to the contention raised by the present petitioner   the
\noriginal defendants about the limitation, it is observed by the
\nlearned Judge that the defendants gave the application vide Exh.35
\ncontending inter-alia that the suit filed by the plaintiffs is barred
\nby the provisions of Limitation Act. The application was heard by the
\nCourt and it was rejected over which Review Application was preferred
\nand the same was also rejected. Thereafter, the defendants filed
\nSpecial Civil Application No.10284 of 2008 in the Hon’ble Gujarat
\nHigh Court. The Hon’ble Gujarat High Court held that the application
\nbelow Exh.47 is required to be decided on merits. The learned Judge
\nheld that in the present case, Maganbhai Bhagubhai Patel expired in
\nthe year 1955 and the mother of the plaintiffs Shantiben expired on
\n19.1.2000. It has been contended in the application that when the
\nattempt was made to frustrate the right of the defendants and an
\nattempt was made to alienate the suit land, the cause
\nof action had arisen. However, the learned Judge held that it is a
\nmatter of record and evidence is required to be adduced and
\nopportunity is required to be given to both the sides and whether the
\nsuit of the plaintiff is barred by law of limitation is a mixed
\nquestion of law and fact and whether the plaintiffs have got any
\nright in the suit land is a matter of evidence and therefore, that
\nprayer was also rejected by the learned Judge while passing the order
\nbelow Exh.47.\n<\/p>\n
10.\t\tIt
\nis not in dispute that in the present case, Maganbhai Bhagubhai Patel
\nexpired in the year 1955 and the mother of the plaintiffs expired on
\n19.1.2000. When Maganbhai Bhagubhai Patel expired on 12.3.1955, Hindu
\nSuccession Act was not in force and it came into force on 17.6.1956
\nTherefore, the provisions of Hindu law were applicable when Maganbhai
\nBhagubhai Patel expired on 12.3.1955 and naturally, the provisions of
\nHindu law and the inheritance or succession would be governed by the
\nprovisions of Hindu
\nlaw. When the common ancestor of the parties to the suit expired on
\n12.3.1955, on his death, the properties of the deceased Maganbhai
\nBhagubhai Patel were inherited by his son Ramubhai to the exclusion
\nof his sister Shantiben. Prior to the enactment of Hindu Succession
\nAct, Shantiben who is the daughter of Maganbhai Bhagubhai Patel had
\nno right of inheritance under the Hindu law. Even as per the averment
\nmade by the opponents i.e. the original plaintiffs that Shantiben
\ndaughter of Maganbhai Bhagubhai Patel was entitled to the share in
\nthe property left by the deceased Maganbhai Bhagubhai Patel on his
\ndeath on 12.3.1955 but as per the provisions of Hindu law which was
\nin force on the death of Maganbhai Bhagubhai Patel, she was not
\nentitled to a share in the said properties and therefore, the
\nquestion of claiming any right to inherit the properties left by the
\ndeceased Maganbhai Bhagubhai Patel by the heirs of the deceased
\nShantiben did not arise at all and therefore, as such the plaintiffs
\nhad no cause of action
\nto file the present suit. As soon as the death of common ancestor of
\nthe parties took place on 12.3.1955, the succession opened and the
\nplaintiffs have claimed 1\/2 share in the suit properties left by the
\ndeceased Maganbhai Bhagubhai Patel on his death on 12.3.1955. The
\nsuit was filed on 22.8.2007 after lapse of 52 years from the date on
\nwhich the succession is opened to the plaintiffs. In view of the
\naforesaid facts and circumstances, the suit is also barred by law of
\nlimitation. On perusal of the reasoning given by the learned Judge,
\nit has been observed by the learned Judge in Para 7 and 8 that both
\nthe parties are required to adduce the evidence in order to prove
\ntheir case and therefore, the question which was raised in the
\napplication below Exh.47 for rejecting the plaint under the
\nprovisions of Order 7 Rule 11(a), (c) and (d) cannot be considered
\nmerely on the basis of the averments made in the application and the
\nreply filed by the other side. Even the plaint was not sufficiently
\nstamped and therefore, it was
\nliable to be rejected as provided under Order 7 Rule 11(c). The
\nlearned Judge on perusal of the reasonings assigned by him has not
\ntaken into consideration the aforesaid aspect in its true perspective
\nas well as the applicability of Hindu Succession Act and the
\nprovisions of Hindu law at the relevant time when the succession
\nopened in favour of the plaintiffs i.e. after the death of Maganbhai
\nBhagubhai Patel way back on 12.3.1955 while the suit is filed in
\n2007. It has been held by the learned Judge that certain documents
\nand the revenue entries are required to be considered in deciding
\ninheritance of the deceased   Maganbhai Bhagubhai Patel and since
\nit is a matter of evidence, it cannot be decided only on the basis of
\nthe application and the reply given by the other side. However, in
\nconsidering the clear position of law, the learned Trial Judge has
\ncommitted error in not rejecting the application under the provisions
\nof Order 7 Rule 11(a), (b) and (d) as prayed for in the application.\n<\/p>\n
11.\t\tFor
\nthe foregoing reasons and in view of the clear position as narrated
\nhereinabove, there is substantial force in the submissions canvassed
\nby the learned counsel for the applicants that the application
\npreferred under Order 7 Rule 11(a), (c) and (d) requires to be
\nallowed.\n<\/p>\n
12.\t\tFor
\nthe foregoing reasons, the Civil Revision Application succeeds and
\nthe order passed by the learned 7th
\nAdditional Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Surat below application
\nExh.47 is quashed and set aside and the application Exh.47 is allowed
\nin toto and the plaint for the reasons stated hereinabove being
\nRegular Civil Suit No.397 of 2007 is rejected in view of the clear
\nprovisions of Order 7 Rule 11(a), (c) and (d).\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t\t\t[H.B.ANTANI,
\nJ.]<\/p>\n
\t\tAfter
\npronouncement of the judgment, learned advocate Mr Amit Thakkar
\nsubmits that as he wants to approach the higher forum to ventilate
\nhis grievances against the order passed by this Court, he prays for
\nstay of operation of this order for a period of six weeks. Learned
\nadvocate for the other side strongly objects to this prayer. However,
\nconsidering the facts and circumstances, the order passed by this
\nCourt is stayed for a period of six weeks from today.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t\t\t[H.B.ANTANI,
\nJ.]<\/p>\n
mrpandya<\/p>\n
\t\t   \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n
\t\t   Top<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Gujarat High Court Laxmiben vs The on 17 September, 2010 Author: H.B.Antani,&Nbsp; Gujarat High Court Case Information System Print CRA\/36\/2009 55 JUDGMENT IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION No. 36 of 2009 For Approval and Signature: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE H.B.ANTANI ========================================================= 1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[16,8],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-6788","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-gujarat-high-court","category-high-court"],"yoast_head":"\nLaxmiben vs The on 17 September, 2010 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/laxmiben-vs-the-on-17-september-2010\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Laxmiben vs The on 17 September, 2010 - 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